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DOCUMENTS RELATIFS AUX RELATIONS  
ENTRE LE CANADA ET TERRE-NEUVE

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DOCUMENTS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN  
CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

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CANADA

DOCUMENTS RELATIFS AUX RELATIONS  
ENTRE LE CANADA ET TERRE-NEUVE

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DOCUMENTS ON RELATIONS BETWEEN  
CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

VOLUME 1  
1935-1949

DÉFENSE, AVIATION CIVILE ET AFFAIRES ÉCONOMIQUES  
DEFENCE, CIVIL AVIATION AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Compilé par/Edited by

Paul Bridle

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



TERRE-NEUVE/NEWFOUNDLAND

MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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
## AVANT-PROPOS

Pour souligner le vingt-cinquième anniversaire de l'entrée de Terre-Neuve dans la Confédération du Canada, le ministère des Affaires extérieures a entrepris de publier deux volumes de documents portant sur les relations que le Canada a entretenues avec Terre-Neuve avant que celle-ci ne devienne une province canadienne. Le présent volume montre le déroulement de ces relations au cours des années 1935-1949; le second, qui sera publié incessamment, fait voir comment, au cours de la période de 1945 à 1949, l'entrée dans la Confédération en est venue à se réaliser.

Cette initiative vise à rendre hommage à Terre-Neuve et à sa population en cette année qui marque les 25 ans de vie canadienne de l'île. Le premier avril dernier, le Premier ministre, M. Pierre Elliot Trudeau déclarait à la Chambre des communes:

*Avec leurs riches traditions, leur culture séculaire distinctive, leur vigoureux esprit d'indépendance et leurs nombreux talents, les Terres-Neuviens ont fait un apport très important dans presque toutes les sphères de la vie canadienne. Je suis persuadé qu'il continuera à en être ainsi, car pendant les 25 dernières années, les Terres-Neuviens ont été des Canadiens loyaux et dévoués. Ils se sont profondément engagés à maintenir l'unité nationale, pourtant aucun groupe ne démontre plus clairement que des Canadiens aux antécédents différents mais aux objectifs communs peuvent travailler à la réalisation de desseins nationaux, tout en conservant leur identité et leur affection pour leur propre patrimoine. Nous espérons tous que les Terre-Neuviens ne perdront jamais ces qualités, mais les connaissant bien, nous savons que c'est peu probable.*

Le jour où Terre-Neuve s'est jointe au Canada constitue un événement d'une grande importance dans l'histoire du Canada. Je recommande ce volume, ainsi que celui qui s'y ajoutera bientôt, aux étudiants, aux universitaires et à tous ceux qui veulent mieux comprendre la portée de cet événement et mieux connaître les circonstances dans lesquelles il s'est produit.



Secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures

Ottawa,  
septembre 1974


## FOREWORD

To mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the confederation of Newfoundland with Canada the Department of External Affairs has undertaken the production of two volumes of documents on Canada's relations with Newfoundland in the pre-confederation period. This volume, the first of the two, documents actual relations in the years 1935-1949; the second, which will show how confederation was brought about in the 1945-49 period, will be published shortly.

These steps are being taken as one means of honouring Newfoundland and its people in this year which marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the union of Newfoundland and Canada. As the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliot Trudeau, said in the House of Commons on April 1st last:

*With their rich traditions, their centuries-old distinctive culture, their strong, independent spirit and their many talents, Newfoundlanders have made a very significant contribution in virtually every sphere of Canadian endeavour. I am sure this will continue to be the case, for during the past twenty-five years Newfoundlanders have been loyal and dedicated Canadians. They have a deep commitment to national unity. Yet no group offers clearer proof that it is possible in Canada for people of varied and different backgrounds who have common objectives to work for the advancement of national purposes, while at the same time maintaining their individuality and their affection for their special and unique heritage. We all hope the Newfoundlanders will never lose these qualities and, knowing them as we do, there is scant likelihood that they will.*

The union of Newfoundland with Canada was a major event in Canadian history. I commend this volume, and its companion volume when it appears, to students, scholars and others who wish to acquire a fuller understanding of that event and of the circumstances in which it occurred.



Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Ottawa,  
September 1974



## PRÉFACE DE L'ÉDITEUR

Au moment où la série intitulée *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*<sup>1</sup> allait aborder la période 1939-1945 Terre-Neuve se préparait à célébrer en 1974 le 25<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de son adhésion à la Confédération canadienne; nous avons donc jugé qu'il convenait de souligner cette occasion par la publication d'un volume spécial sur cette province.

Nous nous sommes rapidement aperçus qu'il faudrait deux volumes, car il était impossible de raconter l'histoire de cette adhésion sans fournir force détails sur les rapports que le Canada et Terre-Neuve avaient entretenus pendant la guerre et, dans une certaine mesure, aussi bien avant qu'après. En raison de la guerre, ces rapports, qui avaient été jusque-là aussi amicaux que sporadiques devinrent de plus en plus étroits et suivis. Dès juillet 1941, le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures signalait au Premier ministre que «le Canada traite avec Terre-Neuve d'affaires plus variées, plus importantes et plus urgentes qu'avec l'ensemble de tous les dominions autonomes où nous possédons des hauts-commissariats». Le présent volume met en relief cette intensification des rapports.<sup>2</sup>

En comparaison des volumes de la série régulière, ceux qui sont consacrés à Terre-Neuve semblent offrir un champ étroit. Bien que les documents réunis s'échelonnent sur une période relativement longue, ils portent tous sur un aspect limité et bien défini. Aussi le lecteur est-il en mesure d'étudier cette question historique en profondeur, d'autant plus qu'un grand nombre des documents ont été préparés à des paliers inférieurs de l'élaboration des politiques.

L'attention a porté autant que possible sur les événements qui intéressent aussi bien Terre-Neuve que le reste du Canada. Chaque fois qu'il en est autrement, ils n'ont trait qu'à Terre-Neuve; le présent volume fait état notamment du rôle de Terre-Neuve dans la conduite de la guerre et les débuts de l'aviation civile. Dès lors, certaines activités ne sont qu'évoquées sans être l'objet d'une documentation complète. C'est ainsi que le présent volume ne traite pas vraiment de la Bataille de l'Atlantique,<sup>3</sup> pas plus qu'il

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<sup>1</sup> *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*. Ottawa, Information Canada, 1967—. Dans le présent volume, les renvois seront normalement abrégés. Ex.: «Voir volume 8, document 26.»

<sup>2</sup> Les documents relatifs à l'adhésion de Terre-Neuve à la Confédération canadienne paraîtront dès que pourront être rendus publics les documents pertinents du Cabinet, présentement sous séquestre en raison du «règlement des 30 ans».

<sup>3</sup> Voir Schull, Joseph. *Lointains navires (Compte rendu officiel des opérations navales canadiennes lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale)*. Imprimeur de la Reine, Ottawa, 1961. 570 p.

## EDITOR'S PREFACE

When the series entitled *Documents on Canadian External Relations*<sup>1</sup> was approaching the 1939-49 decade it was recalled that the 25th anniversary of Newfoundland's confederation with Canada would fall in 1974; it therefore seemed fitting to plan a special Newfoundland volume for publication that year.

It soon became apparent that two volumes would be needed. The confederation story could be properly documented only against the background of relations as they existed during the war and, to a certain extent, before and after it. Before the war relations had been friendly but desultory; with the war they became increasingly close and active. As early as July, 1941, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs was advising the Prime Minister that "Canada has more varied, more important and more urgent business with Newfoundland than with all the self-governing Dominions in which we maintain High Commissioners put together." The present volume reflects this expansion.<sup>2</sup>

In comparison with volumes in the regular documents series, the Newfoundland volumes are microcosmic. Although their time-span is relatively long, they are concentrated on a narrow, well-defined subject. Consequently, the documents—many of them at the secondary level of policy formation—expose the history in some depth.

Focus has been sustained on the Canada-Newfoundland aspects as closely as possible; to the extent that there is deviation from this norm, it is toward depiction of the Newfoundland rôle *per se*—in the present volume, in prosecution of the war and in the development of civil aviation. This means that some activities, though included or touched upon, are not completely documented. For example, the story of the Battle of the Atlantic is not really in this volume<sup>3</sup> nor is the entire operational story of the Atlantic ferry service.<sup>4</sup> The United States rôle in the defence of Newfoundland and in the ferry service, though woven into the fabric of the defence chapter, is not fully depicted. Also, the multilateral negotiations which established the postwar

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<sup>1</sup> *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. Ottawa, Information Canada, 1967—Citations in the present volume will normally take an abbreviated form, e.g., "See Volume 8, Document 26."

<sup>2</sup> The documents on confederation will be published when the relevant Cabinet documents, now sequestered because of the "thirty-year rule", can be made public.

<sup>3</sup> See Schull, Joseph. *The Far Distant Ships (an official account of Canadian naval operations in the Second World War)*, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1961. 527 p.

<sup>4</sup> The ferry service, in addition to delivering aeroplanes as shown here, was important as a life-line for mail, freight and VIP's travelling on war business.

ne fournit de détails sur l'activité du service transocéanique.<sup>4</sup> Il ne relate pas non plus tous les aspects du rôle joué par les États-Unis dans la défense de Terre-Neuve et dans l'établissement du service transocéanique, bien qu'il soit question de ce rôle dans le chapitre consacré à la défense. De même, si le présent volume renferme de la documentation sur les négociations multilatérales qui ont précédé la création des compagnies d'aviation assurant le service transatlantique après la guerre, c'est uniquement pour éclairer les attitudes respectives du Canada et de Terre-Neuve à cet égard.

Les six premiers volumes de *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* renferment quelques documents sur les rapports que le Canada et Terre-Neuve ont entretenus de 1909 à 1939. Les volumes 7 et 8, consacrés à la période 1939-1941, renfermeront des pièces qui complètent de façon utile les parties du présent volume portant sur la position de Terre-Neuve dans le cadre des plans de défense canado-américains, des rapports de commandement à Terre-Neuve, et des bases des États-Unis. Ils comporteront également des documents sur les deux questions qui firent l'objet de presque toutes les relations canado-terre-neuviennes de 1939-1945, soit celle des îles Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, et celle de la préoccupation du Canada à l'égard du Groenland; ces questions sont à peine abordées dans le présent volume.

Dans les années trente, Terre-Neuve figurait parmi les territoires aussi intéressants qu'obscurs de l'hémisphère occidental. C'est à la guerre et aux premières envolées transatlantiques comme mode de transport commercial que Terre-Neuve doit la place prééminente qu'elle a acquise sur la scène internationale au cours des années quarante. Tant pendant la guerre que dans les années qui suivirent, c'est vers elle que convergeait toute l'activité de l'Atlantique-Nord, en raison de sa situation stratégique et du tremplin qu'elle constituait pour l'aviation civile. Son importance à cet égard ne cesse cependant de décroître depuis quelques années. Bien que les États-Unis y possèdent toujours une base navale à Argentia, la base aérienne de Goose Bay—seule base de Terre-Neuve à ne pas avoir perdu son importance stratégique dans l'après-guerre—ces installations perdent constamment de leur importance militaire à l'ère des missiles; et bien que Gander et Goose Bay soient encore des aéroports civils importants, les gros avions à réaction en provenance des pays d'Europe ne s'y arrêtent presque plus; on préfère se rendre sans escale d'Europe en Amérique du Nord.

Les documents rassemblés dans le présent volume font ressortir le rôle joué par le Canada dans cette évolution entre 1935 et 1949; c'est le temps qu'il a fallu à Terre-Neuve pour atteindre sa prééminence géopolitique. Ils mettent également en lumière les relations économiques qui existaient déjà entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve. Pour l'historien qui s'intéresse aux relations socio-culturelles de cette période, le présent volume n'a que peu d'in-

<sup>4</sup> En plus de permettre la livraison d'avions, comme les documents en font état, le service transocéanique servit de mode essentiel de transport pour le courrier, les marchandises et les personnages importants en service commandé pendant la guerre.

pattern of transatlantic aviation are documented only to the extent that they shed light on Canadian and Newfoundland attitudes.

The first six volumes of *Documents on Canadian External Relations* contain some documents on Canada-Newfoundland relations in the 1909-1939 period. Volumes 7 and 8 of the same series will cover the 1939-1941 period and will contain material which usefully supplements the parts of the present volume dealing with Newfoundland in Canada-United States defence planning, command relationships in Newfoundland, and United States bases. They also contain documentation of two subjects which were at the edge of the main stream of Canada-Newfoundland relations during the 1939-45 war—the St. Pierre-Miquelon issue and Canada's concern with Greenland; these subjects receive only cursory treatment in this volume.

In the thirties Newfoundland was one of the interesting but obscure countries of the western hemisphere. Its rise to a position of international prominence in the forties was a result of the war and of the emergence of transatlantic flying as a commercially viable form of transportation. During the war and for some time afterward Newfoundland occupied a central position in the North Atlantic region both with regard to military strategy and with regard to civil aviation. In recent years it has again begun to assume a more secondary rôle in these affairs. While the United States still maintains a presence in its naval base at Argentia, and in the Canadian air base at Goose Bay—the only Newfoundland air base to retain postwar strategic significance—these installations have come to have less and less military meaning in the missile age; and, while Gander and Goose Bay are still important civil airfields, they are regularly by-passed by large jet planes flying non-stop from places in Europe to airports on the North American mainland.

The documents in this volume show the part played by Canada in this evolution between 1935 and 1949, the period when Newfoundland was rising into a position of geopolitical prominence. They also throw light on economic relations between Canada and Newfoundland during the same period. The historian of this time should of course pay attention to social and cultural relations but the present volume will not help him much since these activities are difficult to document from official sources.

Treatment of documents about the Permanent Joint Board on Defence deserves a brief note. Documents which shed light on the origin of the Board and on its general concern with Newfoundland are in the Joint Board section while documents germane to particular defence activities have been placed elsewhere with other documents covering these activities. A complete list of the Board's recommendations affecting Newfoundland is in Appendix A.

At the more technical level, because the subject-matter of this volume is relatively homogeneous the customary list of documents containing a summary of each has been omitted; it is hoped that the table of contents and the index (occasionally supplemented by footnotes) will prove sufficient. The documents have been reproduced as found and no attempt has been made



térêt à cet égard car les documents officiels ne sont pas de nature à renseigner sur cette sorte d'activité.

Il y a lieu d'expliquer brièvement le mode de traitement des documents relatifs à la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense. Ceux qui traitent de la création de cet organisme et de l'intérêt général qu'il porte à Terre-Neuve sont réunis dans la section réservée à la commission; par contre, ceux qui ont trait à des activités précises de défense ont été insérés ailleurs, parmi d'autres documents relatifs à ces diverses activités. La liste complète des recommandations de la commission concernant Terre-Neuve figure à l'appendice A.

A un niveau plus technique, vu l'homogénéité relative du sujet, nous nous sommes abstenus, cette fois, d'établir la liste et le résumé des documents. Nous espérons que la table des matières et l'index (accompagnés parfois de renvois) suffiront. Il s'agit de documents originaux, et nous n'avons pas tenté d'en uniformiser l'orthographe, la ponctuation ou l'emploi des majuscules. Nous avons néanmoins corrigé les erreurs typographiques flagrantes et donné autant que possible aux noms et aux titres officiels leur appellation conventionnelle. Parfois, nous ne reproduisons qu'en partie les longs documents. Nous avons agi ainsi par économie d'espace, et uniquement dans les cas où les parties omises traitent de questions non pertinentes ou banales; nous indiquons d'ailleurs toutes les coupures.

Chaque document est précédé d'une indication de l'endroit où se trouve l'original; ces notes sont expliquées dans la section du livre intitulée «provenance des documents». Le lecteur qui tombera sur des noms propres qui ne lui sont pas familiers pourra identifier les plus importants en consultant la «liste des personnalités». Le présent volume renferme également une «liste des abréviations».

La plupart des localités de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador dont il est question dans les documents figurent sur les cartes à grande échelle qui se trouvent au début et à la fin du volume, sur la face interne de la couverture. Une carte à petite échelle situe Terre-Neuve dans l'Atlantique-Nord.

L'un des aspects inhabituels du présent ouvrage provient du fait que le rédacteur et son adjoint ont participé eux-mêmes activement à maints événements qui y sont décrits. Le rédacteur, fonctionnaire au ministère des Affaires extérieures, se rendit pour la première fois à Terre-Neuve au début de la guerre, lorsqu'il servait dans la Marine royale canadienne. Devenu employé du ministère une fois la guerre terminée, il eut à traiter avec ce territoire tout d'abord en qualité de responsable de secteur, puis de représentant du Canada à Terre-Neuve. L'adjoint du rédacteur, M. R. A. MacKay, est professeur émérite de l'Université Carleton. Lorsqu'il était professeur de sciences politiques à l'Université Dalhousie il y a plus de trente ans, M. MacKay fit œuvre de pionnier dans le domaine des études sur Terre-Neuve et fut considéré par la suite comme la principale autorité canadienne pour tout ce qui touche Terre-Neuve avant son adhésion à la Confédération canadienne. C'est lui qui, au ministère des Affaires extérieures, fut chargé des



to impart consistency in spelling, punctuation, capitalization, etc. However, obvious typing errors have been corrected and place names and official titles have been given the standard form when such exists. In some cases parts of long documents have been omitted. This has been done mainly to save space but only when the deleted portion is irrelevant or trivial; where there have been deletions, this is indicated.

At the head of each document there is an indication of where it may be found; these indications are explained in the section of the book entitled "Location of Documents". Readers encountering personal names with which they are not familiar may identify some of the more important by consulting the "List of Persons". There is also a "List of Abbreviations".

The large-scale maps inside the front and back covers show the location of most of the places in Newfoundland and Labrador which are mentioned in the documents. The small-scale map shows Newfoundland's geographical position in the North Atlantic area.

An unusual feature of the Newfoundland volumes is that the editor and his consultant played an active part in many of the events documented. The editor, an officer of the Department of External Affairs, first visited Newfoundland early in the war when in the Canadian navy. After the war, having joined External Affairs, he was associated with Newfoundland as "desk officer" dealing with that country and as a diplomatic representative of Canada in Newfoundland. His consultant is Professor R. A. MacKay, professor emeritus at Carleton University. More than thirty years ago, when professor of political science at Dalhousie University, he did pioneer work in the field of Newfoundland studies and was the leading Canadian authority on Newfoundland in the pre-confederation period. He was in charge of Newfoundland relations in the Department of External Affairs during most of the years between 1943 and 1949.

Professor MacKay has contributed an introduction to the present volume which should be especially helpful to uninitiated readers of the defence chapter.

The editor wishes particularly to acknowledge the work of his principal research assistant, Michel Normandin. He prepared lists of source material on Canada-Newfoundland relations, assisted with selection of documents and photographs, and generally took charge at the operational level. The editor also gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Dorothy Burwash, who—out of a rich background of scholarship and public service—prepared the documents for printing and acted as principal proof-reader.

The Newfoundland Government has kindly facilitated research in the Provincial Archives where the Archivist, R. Burnham Gill, his principal assistant, John Greene, and other members of his staff have been most helpful. In London, England, Norman Evans of the Public Record Office was invariably co-operative.

The Newfoundland volumes were launched when the Honourable Mitchell Sharp was Secretary of State for External Affairs. As an official of the Depart-

relations avec Terre-Neuve durant la plus grande partie de la période allant de 1943 à 1949.

Le professeur MacKay est l'auteur de l'introduction du présent volume, introduction dont le profane appréciera sûrement l'utilité au moment de lire le chapitre sur la défense.

L'éditeur tient à signaler tout particulièrement le travail de Michel Normandin, son principal documentaliste. C'est M. Normandin qui a établi les listes des sources documentaires sur les relations canado-terre-neuviennes; il a en outre collaboré à la sélection des documents, des photographies, et assumé l'ensemble des tâches techniques. L'éditeur tient également à témoigner sa reconnaissance à M<sup>lle</sup> Dorothy Burwash qui, grâce à son érudition et à une longue expérience de la fonction publique, a préparé les documents en vue de l'impression et agi en qualité de principal correcteur d'épreuves.

Le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve a grandement facilité les recherches que nous avons dû faire dans les Archives provinciales, où nous avons bénéficié de l'aide précieuse et avisée de l'archiviste, M. Burnham Gill, de son principal adjoint, M. John Greene, et d'autres membres de son personnel. A Londres, nous savions que nous pouvions toujours compter sur M. Norman Evans, du *Public Record Office*.

La préparation des volumes sur Terre-Neuve fut entreprise alors que l'Honorable Monsieur Mitchell Sharp détenait le portefeuille des Affaires extérieures. En sa qualité d'agent au Ministère des Finances, il avait participé, en 1947 et 1948, aux réunions qui aboutirent à l'entrée de Terre-Neuve dans la Confédération; par la suite, il ne cessa de manifester un intérêt particulier pour le projet de publication dont ce volume fait partie. Nous sommes infiniment reconnaissants au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Monsieur A. E. Ritchie pour son appui et ses encouragements. Nous désirons aussi remercier le directeur, Monsieur A. E. Blanchette, son adjoint Monsieur G. W. Hilborn, et le personnel de la Direction historique du ministère des Affaires extérieures pour toute l'aide qu'ils nous ont si aimablement apportée.

Nous osons espérer que les documents du premier volume seront utiles en eux-mêmes, tout en aidant le lecteur à envisager l'adhésion de Terre-Neuve à la Confédération canadienne dans sa véritable perspective. Considérés globalement, les documents des deux volumes devraient favoriser chez les Canadiens de Terre-Neuve et du reste du pays une meilleure appréciation réciproque.

Ottawa, septembre 1974

PAUL BRIDLE

ment of Finance, he had participated in the 1947 and 1948 meetings leading up to confederation, and he has always been most considerate of the present Newfoundland project. The support and encouragement of the Under-Secretary, A. E. Ritchie, and the assistance of the Director of the Historical Division, A. E. Blanchette, his deputy G. W. Hilborn, and other members of his staff are also gratefully acknowledged.

It is hoped that the documents in this first volume will not only be useful in themselves but will also assist readers of the second volume to consider Newfoundland's confederation with Canada in its actual context. Taken together, the volumes should help to foster a sense of mutual appreciation between Newfoundland and the rest of our country.

Ottawa, September 1974

PAUL BRIDLE

## INTRODUCTION

### TERRE-NEUVE DANS LA STRATÉGIE NORD-ATLANTIQUE AU COURS DE LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE

Au moment où la guerre éclata en 1914 et de nouveau en 1939, Terre-Neuve était dépourvue de forces militaires. Car, depuis la prise de possession de l'île par la Grande-Bretagne, sa sécurité était liée à la maîtrise qu'exerçait la marine britannique sur l'Atlantique Nord. Toutefois, les stratèges britanniques croyaient généralement qu'en cas de crise, le litige serait réglé en Europe et non dans les eaux de l'Atlantique Nord; de plus, ils estimaient que tant que l'ennemi serait confiné dans les ports d'Europe et qu'il ne pourrait pas avancer davantage vers l'Ouest, Terre-Neuve serait à l'abri de toute attaque importante ou de l'occupation. En temps de guerre on ne pouvait exclure la possibilité de raids aériens. Cette conjoncture pouvait justifier le maintien d'une petite garnison à St. John's pour empêcher les raids aériens, mais les autorités militaires britanniques estimaient qu'il serait inutile d'y établir d'importantes forces de défense ou des bases fortifiées.<sup>1</sup>

En 1870, les dernières forces impériales furent retirées des colonies autonomes, y compris la garnison de quelque trois cents hommes à Terre-Neuve.<sup>2</sup> Dorénavant elle serait responsable de sa propre défense. De temps à autre on tenta de former une milice mais sans grand succès. En conséquence, durant le régime du gouvernement responsable, Terre-Neuve adopta, par défaut, la politique impériale traditionnelle voulant que la sécurité du territoire soit confiée à la Marine royale plutôt qu'à des troupes locales sous son propre contrôle. Même en temps de paix, une force de défense locale, soit une petite milice, était un luxe qu'elle ne pouvait se permettre.

Les Terre-Neuviens toutefois demeuraient profondément conscients des liens les rattachant à la mère patrie et ils étaient fiers de former la plus vieille colonie britannique. Dans chaque conflit mondial, Terre-Neuve offrit promptement un contingent et participa davantage à la défense des pays d'outre-mer qu'à sa propre défense. Dans les deux guerres, les unités militaires de Terre-Neuve furent intégrées à l'Armée britannique et s'illustrèrent sur plusieurs champs de bataille, surtout à la bataille de la Somme lors de la Première Guerre mondiale où le Régiment de Terre-Neuve subit d'énormes

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<sup>1</sup> Graham, G. S. *Newfoundland in British Strategy from Cabot to Napoleon* dans *Newfoundland, Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*. Édité par R. A. MacKay, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1946. p. 245-264.

<sup>2</sup> Stacey, C. P. *The Withdrawal of the Imperial Garrison from Newfoundland* dans *Canadian Historical Review*. 1936. 17(2): 147-158.

## INTRODUCTION

### NEWFOUNDLAND IN NORTH ATLANTIC STRATEGY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

When war came in 1914, and again in 1939, Newfoundland was without military forces of any kind. Since Britain first laid claim to the Island its security had depended on British naval control of the North Atlantic. But British strategy had generally assumed that in a crisis the issue of control would be decided in European rather than in North American waters and that, as long as an enemy could be bottled up in European ports and prevented from breaking out in force to the West, Newfoundland was safe from any major attack or occupation, although in wartime it might be subject to raids. This situation might justify maintaining a token garrison in St. John's to take care of raids, but substantial garrison forces or fortified bases in Newfoundland were deemed by British military authorities to be largely superfluous.<sup>1</sup>

In 1870 the last Imperial forces were withdrawn entirely from the self-governing colonies, including the garrison of some 300 men in Newfoundland.<sup>2</sup> Henceforth Newfoundland would be responsible for its own local defence. Sporadic attempts were made from time to time to establish a militia force, but without success. Under responsible government Newfoundland thus adopted by default the traditional Imperial policy of reliance on the Royal Navy for security rather than on local defence forces under its own control. Local defence forces, even a militia, in peacetime seemed a luxury that Newfoundland could not afford.

The Newfoundland people, however, remained deeply conscious of their ties with the mother country and proud of being Britain's oldest colony. In each world war Newfoundland promptly offered a contingent and made its major efforts overseas rather than in home defence. In both wars Newfoundland military units were integrated with the British Army and had distinguished battle records, especially in the Somme Battle of the First War when the Newfoundland Regiment suffered dreadful casualties.<sup>3</sup> In both

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<sup>1</sup> Graham, G. S. *Newfoundland in British Strategy from Cabot to Napoleon in Newfoundland, Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies*. Edited by R. A. MacKay, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1946. p. 245-264.

<sup>2</sup> Stacey, C. P. *The Withdrawal of the Imperial Garrison from Newfoundland in Canadian Historical Review*. 1936. 1(2): p. 147-158.

<sup>3</sup> Nicholson, G. W. L. *The Fighting Newfoundlanders (A History of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment)*. St. John's, Government of Newfoundland, 1964. 614 p. and *idem*. *More Fighting Newfoundlanders (A History of Newfoundland's Fighting Forces in the Second World War)*. St. John's, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1969. 621 p.



pertes en vies humaines.<sup>3</sup> Grâce à la maîtrise qu'exerçait la Marine royale sur l'Atlantique Nord, Terre-Neuve eut, chaque fois, le temps d'organiser un contingent destiné à combattre outre-mer et une milice pour sa propre défense.

Mais bien avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale il devint évident, ou il aurait dû l'être, que la séculaire stratégie britannique était dépassée et qu'à l'ère de l'aviation Terre-Neuve acquerrait une importance stratégique nouvelle. Les premiers vols transatlantiques commençaient ou se terminaient habituellement là et dès 1935 la Grande-Bretagne, le Canada, Terre-Neuve et l'Irlande s'étaient entendus afin d'établir un service aérien transatlantique régulier dès que les installations le permettraient. La Grande-Bretagne s'était engagée à construire un aéroport près du lac Gander et une base d'hydravions à Botwood.<sup>4</sup> Le premier hydravion amerrit à Botwood en 1937 et le premier avion atterrit à Gander juste avant le début des hostilités en 1939.<sup>5</sup> Bien que ces nouvelles installations fussent principalement destinées à l'aviation civile, leur importance militaire était évidente.

### *L'avant-guerre*

Entre temps la situation internationale se détériorait rapidement. Pour leur part les autorités militaires canadiennes s'inquiétaient de ce qu'elles ne connaissaient pas les plans britanniques devant assurer la défense de l'île et de ses eaux adjacentes advenant une guerre. En 1937, dans un memorandum envoyé à leur ministre, les chefs d'état-major signalèrent que la défense de la côte est du Canada et celle de Terre-Neuve étaient si intimement liées, qu'on ne pouvait la concevoir séparément, et ils soulignèrent que l'industrie sidérurgique de Sydney en Nouvelle-Écosse, qui représentait environ 30% de la production canadienne d'acier, dépendait des mines de l'île Bell dans la baie de la Conception pour son approvisionnement en minerai. Le memorandum suggérait que le problème de la défense de Terre-Neuve soit discuté lors de la prochaine Conférence impériale devant avoir lieu plus tard dans l'année. Cependant, ce sujet ne fut pas abordé probablement à cause de la réticence bien connue du Premier ministre King à se compromettre sur la question de la défense de l'Empire.<sup>6</sup>

Avant d'en arriver à une véritable collaboration, il y avait un problème majeur à régler. Ayant abandonné la formule du gouvernement responsable,

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<sup>3</sup> Nicholson, G. W. L. *The Fighting Newfoundlander (A History of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment)*. St. John's, Government of Newfoundland, 1964. 614 p. et *idem. More Fighting Newfoundlanders (A History of Newfoundland's Fighting Forces in the Second World War)*. St. John's, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1969. 621 p.

<sup>4</sup> Document 1038.

<sup>5</sup> Fraser, A. M. *A History of the Participation of Newfoundland in World War II*. Ottawa, Department of National Defence (Manuscrit déposé à la direction historique HQ 1453-1 (D3), n.d. 98 p.

<sup>6</sup> Document 3 et Stacey, C. P. *Armes, hommes et gouvernements (Les politiques de guerre du Canada 1939-1945)*. Ottawa, Information Canada, 1970, p. 102-104.

wars, because of the Royal Navy's control of the North Atlantic, Newfoundland, although possessing no defence forces at the outset, had time both to organize for despatch of forces abroad and to organize a militia for home defence.

But it was becoming increasingly evident well before the war, or should have been, that Britain's historic Atlantic strategy no longer sufficed and that in the rapidly developing air age Newfoundland was acquiring a new strategic importance. Experimental transatlantic flights usually began or ended there and as early as 1935 it was agreed between Britain, Canada, Newfoundland and Ireland that a regular transatlantic air service should be established as soon as facilities were available. Britain agreed to construct an airfield for land planes at Gander Lake and a flying boat base at Botwood.<sup>4</sup> Newfoundland subsequently agreed to meet part of the British costs. The first flying boat arrived at Botwood in 1937 and the first wheeled plane touched down at Gander just before the outbreak of war in 1939.<sup>5</sup> Although the primary purpose of the new airports was the promotion of civil aviation, none could long deny that they had military significance.

### *The Approach of War*

Meantime, the international situation was deteriorating rapidly and Canadian defence authorities were becoming concerned over their lack of information about British plans for the defence of Newfoundland and adjacent waters in the event of war. In 1937 the Chiefs of Staff sent forward to their Minister a memorandum pointing out that the defence of Canada's east coast area and that of Newfoundland were inseparably linked, that no good purpose was served by treating the defence of Newfoundland and the defence of Eastern Canada separately, and that the steel industry at Sydney, Nova Scotia, which produced some thirty percent of Canada's steel, was dependent for its ore on the mines at Bell Island in Conception Bay. The memorandum suggested that the problem of Newfoundland's defence should be discussed at the forthcoming Imperial Conference scheduled for later in the year, but such a discussion was not held, probably because of Prime Minister King's well known reluctance to be drawn into commitments on Imperial defence.<sup>6</sup>

One difficulty that had to be overcome before effective co-operation for the defence of Newfoundland could be achieved was that Newfoundland, having given up responsible government at least temporarily, had in effect reverted to the status of a crown colony whose defence and external relations were the responsibility of the United Kingdom government. Hence official communications between St. John's and Ottawa normally went through London. Moreover, in London the security of Newfoundland seemed much less

<sup>4</sup> Document 1038.

<sup>5</sup> Fraser, A. M. *A History of the Participation of Newfoundland in World War II*. Ottawa, Department of National Defence (Manuscript held in the Directorate of History HQ 1453-1 (D3)), n.d. p. 98.

<sup>6</sup> Document 3 and Stacey, C. P. *Arms, Men and Governments (The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945)*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1970. p. 92-93.

du moins temporairement, Terre-Neuve était redevenue une colonie impériale dont la défense et les relations étrangères relevaient du Royaume-Uni. En conséquence les communications officielles entre St. John's et Ottawa devaient normalement passer par Londres. De plus à Londres la sécurité de Terre-Neuve semblait beaucoup moins compliquée que celle du Royaume-Uni. Lorsque le Canada demanda quels étaient les plans de la Grande-Bretagne pour la protection de l'île en cas de guerre, on répondit qu'aucune mesure particulière n'était envisagée si ce n'était l'envoi de six dragueurs de mines au début des hostilités, et par la suite de vaisseaux anti-sous-marins. Quant à sa «défense générale» on jugeait qu'elle «serait assurée par la couverture fournie par la Marine royale». Bien que pressé par ses conseillers militaires, le gouvernement canadien demeura muet sur la question; à ce sujet, l'historien attitré de l'Armée canadienne dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le colonel Stacey, fait ce commentaire: «L'absurdité militaire ne saurait être poussée plus loin.»<sup>7</sup>

Quoi qu'il en soit, le déclenchement de la guerre en 1939 souleva immédiatement la question de la participation du Canada à la défense de Terre-Neuve. Dans une allocution prononcée aux Communes le 8 septembre, le Premier ministre King déclarait: «l'intégrité de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador est essentielle à la sécurité du Canada»<sup>8</sup> et en participant à la défense de Terre-Neuve, le Canada défend non seulement son propre territoire, mais encore vient en aide à la Grande-Bretagne. À la demande de l'amiral de la Marine royale, responsable de l'Amérique et des Indes Occidentales, le Canada entreprit de faire la reconnaissance de la côte de Terre-Neuve une semaine avant de déclarer la guerre. Avant d'exécuter cette tâche, le Canada demanda à Terre-Neuve de permettre au CARC de survoler n'importe quelle partie du territoire de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador et d'utiliser les installations de l'aéroport. Le gouverneur répondit immédiatement que Terre-Neuve était heureuse d'agréer cette demande.<sup>9</sup>

Le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve était mû par un esprit plus fertile et plus réaliste que celui de Londres ou d'Ottawa. Dès le 15 septembre 1939, il télégraphiait au Royaume-Uni pour faire remarquer que le nouvel aéroport de Gander serait sûrement un atout dans la guerre mais qu'il n'avait pas les ressources nécessaires pour l'exploiter à fond dans ce contexte. Il proposa donc que l'aéroport et la base d'hydravions à Botwood soient confiés au Canada et sous sa responsabilité pour la durée de la guerre. Cependant, les autorités britanniques rejetèrent catégoriquement ce projet, alléguant qu'il contrecarrait les plans de l'aviation civile.<sup>10</sup> D'autres démarches visant à renforcer les liens de collaboration militaire entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve furent tentées durant les sept mois de la «drôle de guerre», mais les résultats tangibles furent à peu près négligeables.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* p. 104.

<sup>8</sup> Document 41.

<sup>9</sup> Documents 36 et 38-40.

<sup>10</sup> Documents 45 et 51.

problematical than that of the United Kingdom. In answer to an inquiry from Canada as to what plans the United Kingdom might have for the defence of Newfoundland in the event of war, Canada was informed that no specific measures were planned for its local defence except the despatch of six mine-sweepers at the outbreak, to be followed by anti-submarine units. As for Newfoundland's "general defence", it was contemplated that this "would rest on the cover provided by the Royal Navy". Although pressed by their military advisers the Canadian government made no reply; Coloney Stacey, the official historian of the Canadian Army in World War II, thus comments: "Military absurdity could not have gone much further".<sup>7</sup>

The outbreak of war in 1939, however, at once raised the contingency of Canada's participation in Newfoundland's defence. Speaking in Parliament on September 8 Prime Minister King declared that "the integrity of Newfoundland and Labrador is essential to the security of Canada"<sup>8</sup> and that in contributing to the defence of Newfoundland Canada would not only be defending Canada but also assisting Britain. At the request of the Admiral of the American and West Indies station of the Royal Navy Canada undertook a reconnaissance of the Newfoundland coast in the week before Canada declared war. But before undertaking the task Canada requested permission from Newfoundland for the RCAF to fly over any part of Newfoundland or Labrador and to make use of airport facilities. To this the Governor replied promptly that Newfoundland was entirely agreeable.<sup>9</sup>

The Newfoundland Government was more imaginative and realistic than either London or Ottawa. As early as September 15, 1939, it cabled the United Kingdom pointing out that the new Newfoundland airport at Gander was certain to be a useful asset in the war effort, but that Newfoundland did not have the resources to make optimum use of it for war purposes. It suggested, therefore, that the airport and the seaplane base at Botwood be transferred to Canadian use and control for the duration of the war. But the proposal was shot down by the United Kingdom authorities on the ground that it would interfere with plans for civil aviation.<sup>10</sup> Further steps looking toward closer military co-operation between Canada and Newfoundland were taken tentatively during the seven months of the "phoney war" but with no very important concrete results.

### *The Collapse on the Western Front in 1940*

The catastrophic events on the Western front in the spring and early summer of 1940 shocked North American governments into action. In April, Norway and Denmark were occupied; in May, the Low Countries were over-run, and France was attacked and in three weeks capitulated. The French fleet had avoided capture but who could say for how long? The British expeditionary force had escaped from France but virtually

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* p. 93.

<sup>8</sup> Document 41.

<sup>9</sup> Documents 36 and 38-40.

<sup>10</sup> Documents 45 and 51.



*L'effondrement du front de l'ouest en 1940*

Les événements catastrophiques survenus sur le front de l'ouest au printemps et au début de l'été 1940, incitèrent fortement les gouvernements nord-américains à passer à l'action. En avril, la Norvège et le Danemark étaient occupés; en mai, les Pays-Bas étaient envahis; en juin, la France était attaquée et capitulait au bout de trois semaines. La flotte française avait échappé à l'ennemi, mais pour combien de temps? Le corps expéditionnaire anglais avait fui la France, mais presque sans armes. Hitler était maintenant maître de tous les ports et de tous les chantiers de construction navale de l'Europe continentale, de l'extrémité nord à la frontière franco-espagnole. Inquiets, les gouvernements et la population en Amérique du Nord, de même qu'en Grande-Bretagne se demandaient: «La Grande-Bretagne peut-elle tenir le coup?» Sinon, quel sera le sort de la Marine royale? Pouvait-elle éviter d'être capturée ou détruite? Si la Grande-Bretagne tombait, l'Amérique du Nord pourrait bien être la prochaine cible.

Heureusement, la Grande-Bretagne ne fut pas envahie. La Marine royale ne perdit jamais la maîtrise de l'Atlantique Nord bien que sa situation fut assez précaire de temps à autre, et aucune attaque importante ne fut tentée contre l'Amérique du Nord. Mais il fallait parer à toutes les éventualités. En quinze jours, en août et septembre, trois ententes ou accords majeurs destinés à protéger l'Amérique du Nord furent conclus, du moins en principe, entre les gouvernements intéressés. Ces accords eurent pour conséquence directe de transformer Terre-Neuve, de protégée de la Marine royale qu'elle était, en un bastion pour la défense de l'Amérique du Nord.

Les trois accords conclus étaient les suivants:

- (1) une entente sur la défense entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve;
- (2) la déclaration d'Ogdensburg entre le Canada et les États-Unis;
- (3) l'accord sur les bases cédées à bail entre les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne.

*L'accord sur la défense entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve*

Le Canada fit le premier pas pour aider Terre-Neuve. Le 14 juin, un télégramme fut adressé directement au gouverneur lui offrant d'affecter des forces aériennes et terrestres à l'aéroport de Terre-Neuve (Gander). L'offre fut immédiatement acceptée et quelques jours plus tard une escadrille d'avions de reconnaissance y atterrissait et un bataillon d'infanterie débarquait à Botwood pour se rendre à Gander.<sup>11</sup>

Ces mesures furent prises avant la signature d'un accord officiel. En août, avant que le président Roosevelt n'invite le Premier ministre King à le rencontrer à Ogdensburg, l'honorable C. G. Power, ministre canadien de la Défense nationale pour l'Air, avait réussi à rencontrer le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve à St. John's pour étudier la question des ententes conjointes sur la défense. Il s'y trouvait encore au moment où King était à Ogdensburg

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<sup>11</sup> Documents 106-115.



without weapons. Hitler now controlled all ports and shipyards of continental Europe from the North Cape to the Franco-Spanish border. Anxious governments and people in North America, as well as in Britain were asking, "Can Britain hold out?". If it could not, what would be the fate of the Royal Navy? Could it avoid capture or destruction? North America might well be the next target if Britain fell.

Fortunately, Britain was not over-run. The Royal Navy never lost control of the North Atlantic although control was gravely threatened from time to time, and no major attack was ever mounted against North American territory. But contingencies had to be guarded against. In a single fortnight in August and September three major agreements or understandings designed to counter the threat to North America were reached, at least in principle, between the governments concerned. The net strategic effect on Newfoundland was to transform it from a ward of the Royal Navy into a bastion for the defence of North America. The three agreements were:

- (1) a defence understanding between Canada and Newfoundland;
- (2) the Ogdensburg Declaration between Canada and the United States; and
- (3) the Leased Bases Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.

### *The Canada-Newfoundland Defence Accord*

Canada moved first to assist Newfoundland. On June 14 a telegram was sent direct to the Governor of Newfoundland offering to station air and ground forces at the Newfoundland Airport (Gander). The offer was promptly accepted and in a matter of days a flight of RCAF reconnaissance planes had landed at Gander and a battalion of infantry had disembarked at Botwood and entrained for Gander.<sup>11</sup>

These steps were taken without waiting for a formal agreement. In August, before President Roosevelt invited Prime Minister King to meet at Ogdensburg, Hon. C. G. Power, Canadian Minister of National Defence for Air, had arranged to meet with the Newfoundland Government in St. John's to consider joint defence arrangements. He was in Newfoundland when King was at Ogdensburg and his meeting with the Newfoundland Government took place on August 20.<sup>12</sup> At first the Canadian government seems to have been thinking in terms of a general defence agreement that would give Canada in principle complete control of defence matters, but the Commission of Government demurred at such a broad grant of power, although they were quite prepared to consider specific items. In fact no general defence agreement was worked out during the war, the two governments contenting themselves with arrangements to cover specific defence requirements as they arose. In the early stage most of the arrangements were worked out in bilateral conferences, the first of which was the meeting

<sup>11</sup> Documents 106-115.

<sup>12</sup> Pickersgill, J. W. *The Mackenzie King Record*. Vol. I, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960. p. 134-135.

et une rencontre avec le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve eut lieu le 20 août.<sup>12</sup> Il semble qu'au début, le Canada pensait conclure un accord général sur la défense qui lui aurait accordé les pleins pouvoirs en matière de défense, mais la commission pour Terre-Neuve hésitait à accorder une si grande autorité à un gouvernement étranger bien qu'elle fût prête à étudier des questions bien précises. De fait, aucun accord général sur la défense ne fut conclu durant la guerre, les deux gouvernements se contentant d'élaborer des ententes suivant les besoins. Au tout début, la plupart des ententes furent conclues lors de conférences bilatérales, la première ayant eut lieu en août 1940, la seconde au cours des mois de novembre et décembre suivants et la troisième en avril 1941. Après la nomination d'un haut commissaire canadien à Terre-Neuve au cours de l'été 1941, les négociations au moyen de conférences bilatérales firent place aux négociations «diplomatiques». Ces deux méthodes permirent une collaboration fondée sur l'égalité entre Terre-Neuve et le Canada malgré la différence considérable de grandeur, de puissance, de richesse et d'autonomie dont jouissaient les deux interlocuteurs. Cette façon d'agir rendit l'arrivée des soldats canadiens plus acceptable que ne l'aurait fait la vaste délégation de pouvoir originellement proposée par le Canada.

À la première conférence bilatérale, les deux parties prirent promptement les mesures nécessaires pour renforcer les défenses de l'île. Il fut rapidement convenu que les forces terre-neuviennes tomberaient sous le commandement canadien et que Terre-Neuve prendrait immédiatement les mesures législatives nécessaires, y compris l'adoption de la *Loi sur les forces étrangères* (*Commonwealth britannique*) qui ressemblait à la loi du même genre en vigueur dans les pays autonomes du Commonwealth. La loi prévoyait deux modes de collaboration militaire entre deux ou plusieurs pays du Commonwealth en cas de guerre. Les forces pouvaient choisir entre «servir conjointement» avec les forces d'un autre pays du Commonwealth ou encore «agir de concert». Si elles «servaient conjointement», elles conserveraient leur identité nationale et leur structure hiérarchique particulière. Si elles «agissaient de concert», elles pourraient être réunies sous un commandement unique et dirigées par un officier commandant choisi parmi n'importe laquelle des forces et nommé par la Couronne.

Après l'adoption de la *Loi sur les forces étrangères* par Terre-Neuve, les deux gouvernements déclarèrent que leurs forces «agiraient de concert» à Terre-Neuve.<sup>13</sup> Ceci facilitait la création d'un commandement de l'Atlantique englobant les Maritimes et dirigé par un commandant en chef ayant son quartier général à Halifax, en plus d'un sous-commandement à Terre-Neuve. De plus, Terre-Neuve reconnaissait officiellement le commandant canadien du sous-commandement de Terre-Neuve comme le commandant des forces sur son territoire.

<sup>12</sup> Pickersoll, J. W. *The Mackenzie King Record*. Vol. 1, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960. p. 134 et Stacey, C.P. *op. cit.* p. 135.

<sup>13</sup> Documents 884-885, *Décret du Conseil canadien* P.C. 3822 du 12 août 1940 et Terre-Neuve, *Visiting Forces Order*, No. 1, 4 mars 1941.

in August 1940, the second a conference the following November-December, the third a meeting in the April following. After the appointment of a Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland in the summer of 1941, negotiations in bilateral conferences gave way to negotiations by "diplomacy". Both methods assumed a partnership based on equality of status between Newfoundland and Canada, despite profound differences in size, power and wealth and in the degree of self-government enjoyed. This practice made the introduction of Canadian forces more acceptable than a broad grant of power, as originally proposed by Canada, might have done.

The first bilateral conference promptly took action to strengthen Newfoundland's defences. It was quickly agreed that Newfoundland forces would come under Canadian operational command and that the necessary legislative steps would be taken immediately by Newfoundland, including enactment of a *Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act* similar to that in force in autonomous countries of the Commonwealth. The Act provided for two ways in which two or more Commonwealth countries could co-operate for military operations in event of war. The forces might be declared formally to be "serving together" with the forces of another Commonwealth country, or to be "acting in combination". If "serving together", they would retain their national identity and separate command structure. If "acting in combination", they might be brought within a unified command under a commanding officer chosen from either force and appointed by the Crown.

After the passage of the *Visiting Forces Act* by Newfoundland both governments formally declared that their forces in Newfoundland were "acting in combination".<sup>13</sup> This facilitated the establishment of an Atlantic Command, which embraced the Maritime Provinces, with a Commander-in-Chief based on Halifax and a Newfoundland sub-command. Newfoundland also formally recognized the Canadian commander of the Newfoundland sub-command as commander of Newfoundland forces.

Canada also agreed to station a battalion of infantry at St. John's, to provide coastal artillery and to erect harbour defences at St. John's. Canadian plans also included construction of an air base adjacent to St. John's, if the terrain proved suitable, to provide fighter cover for the city and nearby shipping (a proposal first mooted by the Newfoundland Commissioner for Justice in early defence talks in Ottawa)<sup>14</sup> and an advanced naval base at St. John's and possibly a summer base at Botwood. Two further conferences were held during the following months, the second of which completed an agreement for the transfer of Gander air base and Botwood sea-plane base to Canada for the duration of the war.<sup>15</sup> At the same conference Newfoundland also gave written approval for the construction by Canada of an airport at Torbay.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Documents 884 and 885, Canadian Order in Council No. 3822 of August 13, 1940 and Newfoundland *Visiting Forces Order*, No. 1, March 4, 1941.

<sup>14</sup> Document 67.

<sup>15</sup> Appendix E.

<sup>16</sup> Document 460.

Le Canada convint également d'affecter un bataillon d'infanterie à St. John's, qui serait chargé de l'artillerie côtière et de la construction des défenses du port de St. John's. Les plans du Canada comprenaient également la construction d'une base aérienne près de St. John's si le terrain s'y prêtait, pour protéger la ville et les installations d'expédition maritimes adjacentes (cette question fut soulevée par le commissaire à la Justice de Terre-Neuve lors des premières discussions sur la défense à Ottawa),<sup>14</sup> en plus d'une base navale à St. John's et possiblement une base d'été à Botwood. Deux autres conférences eurent lieu au cours des mois suivants; lors de la deuxième rencontre, un accord fut conclu prévoyant la remise de l'aéroport de Gander et de la base d'hydravions à Botwood pour la durée de la guerre.<sup>15</sup> Lors de la même Conférence, Terre-Neuve autorisa également le Canada par écrit à construire un aéroport à Torbay.<sup>16</sup>

### *Torbay*

Du point de vue de la défense, du confort des troupes de défense et de la population civile, il semblait logique de construire un aéroport près de St. John's. Terre-Neuve n'était financièrement pas en mesure de participer à ce projet, sauf en ce qui concerne l'octroi des terres de la Couronne nécessaires, mais elle n'avait aucune objection à ce que le gouvernement canadien achète les terrains privés selon le besoin. La nouvelle base entra en opération avant la fin de 1941. Le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve imposa une restriction: durant et après la guerre, Torbay ne devait pas servir à l'aviation civile sauf sur son autorisation. Une autre restriction sous-entendue, sinon stipulée expressément, voulait que les titres de propriété ne puissent être transférés à un autre gouvernement sans le consentement de Terre-Neuve. Les Américains dont le quartier général était situé à côté de l'aéroport en auraient sans doute pris possession s'il avait été disponible. Toutefois, ils pouvaient utiliser librement la base et les installations à des fins militaires. À ce moment, la question de l'utilisation de la base après la guerre, soit pour la défense soit pour l'aviation civile, ne se posait pas.

Dès le début, Torbay s'avéra un atout important dans la bataille de l'Atlantique car elle permettait d'augmenter considérablement la distance sur laquelle les convois pouvaient être protégés par avion en plus de devenir, à la fois pour les avions militaires canadiens et américains, une autre escale possible en cas de mauvais temps.

### *La déclaration d'Ogdensburg: la CPCAD*

Jusqu'à ce que la Seconde Guerre mondiale devienne imminente, le Canada et les États-Unis avaient formulé leurs politiques de défense respectives sans se consulter. Juste avant la Seconde Guerre, lors d'une visite à la Maison blanche, le Premier ministre eut un bref entretien officiel avec Roosevelt où il fut question de défense entre autres choses et où, avec

<sup>14</sup> Document 67.

<sup>15</sup> Appendice E.

<sup>16</sup> Document 460.



*Torbay*

An airfield adjacent to St. John's made sense from the standpoint of defence and convenience of defence forces and the civilian population. Newfoundland was unable to participate financially, except to provide any crown lands needed, but it had no objection to the Canadian Government purchasing privately-owned lands as required. The new base became operable before the end of 1941. One restriction imposed by the Newfoundland Government was that Torbay should not be used during or after the war for civil aviation except as approved by the Newfoundland Government. Another restriction understood, if not spelled out, was that title would not be passed to any other Government without the consent of Newfoundland. The Americans with their headquarters base adjacent to the airfield would no doubt have readily taken it over if it had been available. They were, however, permitted free use of the base and facilities for military purposes. The question of post-war use—whether for defence or for civil aviation—was for the time being left open.

From the first Torbay proved to be an important asset in the Battle of the Atlantic since it substantially increased the distance over which air cover could be provided to passing convoys; it also afforded an additional bad weather alternate for both Canadian and American military aircraft.

*The Ogdensburg Declaration: the PJBD*

Until World War II was imminent Canada and the United States had formulated their respective defence policies in complete isolation from one another. Just before the second war the Prime Minister, when on a visit to the White House, had a brief informal talk on defence among other topics with Roosevelt, and with the consent of both governments there were some exchanges of views between defence officials. But there was no established procedure for consultation between the two governments at the political level or for the exchange of views or information between their defence advisers. When war came even the informal personal contacts between Roosevelt and King ceased for the time being, one difficulty being that the United States was still neutral, and as yet hoped to remain so, whereas Canada had joined in the war almost at the outset. Each government was therefore careful to avoid any appearance of alliance or military understanding with the other.

The military collapse in the summer of 1940, however, rudely awakened both governments to their common danger. Canada, as we have seen, quickly moved to the defence of Newfoundland, but American policy was far from clear for several weeks. In the uncertainty the Prime Minister agreed to staff talks between Canadian and American defence officials and, while the proposal was not acceptable in Washington for a time, the talks took place. Ultimately President Roosevelt personally telephoned Prime Minister King, suggesting that they meet in the Presidential railway car at Ogdensburg, New York, the following week-end when the President hoped to be in the vicinity. There, in an evening and morning discussion, the two leaders



l'assentiment des deux gouvernements, il y eut échanges de vues entre les militaires des deux pays. Toutefois, il n'existait aucun mécanisme officiel de consultation entre les deux gouvernements au niveau politique ou pour l'échange de vues et d'informations entre leurs conseillers militaires. Même les contacts personnels officieux entre Roosevelt et King avaient cessé car les États-Unis étaient encore neutres et espéraient le demeurer alors que le Canada avait déclaré la guerre dès le début presque. Chaque gouvernement devait donc s'efforcer d'éviter toute alliance ou entente militaire avec l'autre.

Toutefois, l'effondrement militaire à l'été de 1940 éveilla brutalement les deux gouvernements à leur péril commun. Le Canada, comme nous l'avons vu, accourut rapidement à la défense de Terre-Neuve alors que la politique américaine mit plusieurs semaines à se préciser. Durant la période d'incertitude, le Premier ministre accepta les échanges entre militaires canadiens et américains, et bien que Washington n'acceptât pas cet état de chose pour quelque temps, des échanges eurent tout de même lieu. Finalement le Président Roosevelt téléphona lui-même au Premier ministre King pour lui proposer une rencontre dans le wagon présidentiel à Ogdensburg, New York, la fin de semaine suivante lorsque le Président prévoyait être dans la région. À Ogdensburg, dans un entretien qui dura une soirée et une matinée, les deux chefs d'état rédigèrent le célèbre communiqué de presse indiquant que les deux pays adoptaient une approche conjointe aux problèmes communs de défense.<sup>17</sup> Bien que ce communiqué de presse ait été souvent cité, il vaut la peine de le reprendre ici car il touche de très près les relations entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve pendant la guerre:

Le Premier ministre et le Président ont discuté des problèmes de défense en ce qui a trait à la sécurité du Canada et des États-Unis.

Il a été convenu que les deux pays établiraient immédiatement une Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense.

La Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense commencerait immédiatement l'étude des problèmes de défense maritime, terrestre et aérienne y compris ceux du personnel et du matériel.

La Commission étudierait dans son ensemble la défense de la moitié nord de l'hémisphère occidental.

La Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense se composerait de quatre ou cinq membres de chaque pays dont la plupart seraient des militaires. Elle se réunirait bientôt.

Bien que singulièrement vague et imprécise, la déclaration d'Ogdensburg marqua un changement profond dans l'approche de la politique de défense des États-Unis et du Canada. Jusque-là la défense était considérée comme un aspect de la souveraineté nationale de chaque pays et par conséquent incomportait unilatéralement à chacun. Par contre, la déclaration admettait qu'à

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<sup>17</sup> Pickersgill, J. W. *op. cit.* p. 130-135.

drafted the famous press release providing for a joint approach to mutual problems of defence.<sup>17</sup> Although the press release has been widely quoted elsewhere, it is worth quoting here since it was of special concern to Canadian-Newfoundland relations during the War:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defence relating to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall be set up at once by the two countries.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall commence immediate studies relating to the sea, land and air problems, including personnel and material.

It will consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.

The Ogdensburg Declaration, although a singularly vague and imprecise document, marked a profound change in the approach to defence policy by both the United States and Canada. Hitherto defence had been considered an aspect of the national sovereignty of each country and therefore of unilateral concern to each. The Declaration on the other hand assumed that at least in some respects defence was a mutual problem demanding a joint approach in the interest of the security of both Canada and the United States.

The positive proposal which institutionalized the new concept of defence was the establishment of a Permanent Joint Board on Defence whose function would be to "study" the problems of defence of the "north half of the Western Hemisphere". The Board was promptly appointed after the Ogdensburg meeting, and it began work within a week. Its first and most urgent problem was that of defence of Newfoundland, which had been consulted neither about its establishment nor about its purposes.

In the absence of agreed defence plans the Board, at its first substantive meeting, approved an appreciation of Newfoundland's strategic significance, both for the defence of Canada and the United States and for the protection of transatlantic trade and air routes. It found Newfoundland inadequately defended, thereby endangering the security of Canada and the United States.

The Board's appreciation of the strategic importance of Newfoundland, adopted in its second meeting, sounded a distinctly North American note:

The island of Newfoundland occupies a commanding position at the entrance to the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterway and on the flank of the sea route between the Atlantic seaboard of North America and Northern Europe. It is on the direct air route between the East Coast of the United States and Northern Europe. It is the point in North America nearest to Europe, from which, if occupied by an enemy, further operations against the North American continent might be effectively initiated. As such, it should be adequately defended.<sup>18</sup>

Since Canada had assumed responsibilities for the defence of Newfoundland, the Board tended to treat Newfoundland as if it were a part of Canada

<sup>17</sup> Pickersgill, J. W. *op. cit.* p. 130-135.

<sup>18</sup> Document 210.

certaines égards la défense était un problème commun nécessitant une approche conjointe dans l'intérêt de la sécurité des deux pays.

La proposition formelle qui donna corps au nouveau concept de défense fut l'établissement d'une commission permanente canado-américaine de défense chargée «d'étudier» les problèmes de défense de la «moitié nord de l'hémisphère occidental». Les membres de la Commission furent rapidement nommés après la rencontre d'Ogdensburg et se mirent au travail en moins d'une semaine.

Le problème le plus urgent auquel devait s'attaquer la Commission était la défense de Terre-Neuve qui d'ailleurs n'avait pas été consultée ni sur la création, ni sur la formulation du mandat de la commission.

Étant donné l'absence de plan de défense, la Commission, lors de sa première réunion formelle, approuva une évaluation de l'importance stratégique de Terre-Neuve à la fois pour la défense du Canada et des États-Unis et pour la protection du commerce et des routes aériennes transatlantiques. Elle constata que les défenses de Terre-Neuve n'étaient pas suffisantes, ce qui mettait en danger la sécurité du Canada et des États-Unis. L'évaluation de l'importance stratégique de Terre-Neuve qu'adopta la Commission à sa seconde réunion avait un caractère tout à fait nord-américain: *L'Île de Terre-Neuve occupe une position de commandement à l'entrée du réseau du Saint-Laurent et des Grands Lacs et est située sur le flanc de la route maritime entre la côte de l'Atlantique et le Nord de l'Europe. Elle est sur la route aérienne directe entre la côte Est des États-Unis et le Nord de l'Europe. C'est le point en l'Amérique du Nord le plus près de l'Europe depuis lequel, si elle était occupée par l'ennemi, d'autres attaques pourraient être portées contre le continent nord-américain. Pour ces raisons, Terre-Neuve devrait être suffisamment défendue.*<sup>18</sup>

Puisque le Canada s'était chargé de la défense de Terre-Neuve, la Commission avait tendance à considérer l'île comme partie intégrante du Canada en matière de défense. Cette attitude ne plut guère au gouvernement de Terre-Neuve qui demanda la permission d'assister aux réunions de la Commission lorsqu'il serait question de défense. Mais l'accord d'Ogdensburg ne prévoyait pas la présence d'un troisième pays. La solution adoptée fut donc d'inviter celle-ci à assister à certaines réunions sans lui reconnaître officiellement le droit de présence. Terre-Neuve fut invitée à envoyer des représentants siéger avec la Commission à cinq reprises au moins et à quatre occasions des représentants se rendirent à l'invitation; évidemment leur statut était davantage celui d'observateur, d'expert-témoin, que celui de membre de la Commission.

#### *L'accord sur les bases cédées à bail et le protocole*

En vertu de l'accord de 1940-1941 sur les bases cédées à bail, les États-Unis obtinrent des baux emphytéotiques de 99 ans pour aménager des bases en trois endroits à Terre-Neuve ainsi qu'aux Bermudes et aux Indes Occidentales.

<sup>18</sup> Document 210.

for defence purposes. This was not satisfactory to the Newfoundland Government which pressed for the right to attend meetings of the Board when the defence of Newfoundland was under consideration. But the Ogdensburg Agreement made no provision for representation by third countries. The alternative adopted was to invite Newfoundland to attend specific meetings without formally recognizing attendance as a right. On at least five separate occasions Newfoundland was invited to send representatives to sit with the Board, and on four occasions Newfoundland representatives attended; but their status was obviously that of observers, or expert witnesses, rather than members of the Board.

### *The Leased Bases Agreement and Protocol*

Under the Leased Bases Agreement of 1940-41, the United States acquired leaseholds to run for 99 years to base areas in three locations in Newfoundland, as well as in Bermuda and the West Indies. The three locations in Newfoundland were: for an army garrison base adjacent to St. John's (Fort Pepperrell); for a naval and army base at Argentia on the South coast (Argentia and Fort McAndrew); and for an air base on the Gulf side (Stephenville), originally intended as a staging field for short-range aircraft between the Maritime provinces and eastern Newfoundland but later turned over to the U.S. Transport Command.

Agreement in principle to the exchange of base rights for destroyers was reached by the British and United States Governments within a few days of the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King at Ogdensburg, but agreement on details was more difficult to achieve. A conference between the two Governments was then convened in London where a formal treaty was ultimately negotiated.<sup>19</sup>

Although Canada was concerned with the establishment of United States bases in Newfoundland, she was invited to be represented at the London Conference only by observers. Canada did not object to the bases—indeed Prime Minister King had personally helped the parties to come to an agreement—but Canada was dissatisfied with several clauses in the draft treaty, in particular with an emergency provision which seemed to authorize the United States to take whatever action it deemed necessary anywhere in Newfoundland in the event of war or other emergency.

Newfoundland, for its part, was dissatisfied with the extensive rights which the United States was to be given in Newfoundland, in particular with the extent to which the United States authorities would retain jurisdiction over their nationals with respect to any offences against Newfoundland law. At a late stage in the conference, on Newfoundland's initiative, the Canadian and Newfoundland delegations made common cause in an effort to

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<sup>19</sup> For negotiations see Documents 232-300; also Stacey C. P. *op. cit.* p. 357-361 and Dziuban, Stanley W. *Military Relations between the United States and Canada 1939-1945*. Washington Office of the Chief of Military History 1959. p. 162 (*United States Army in World War II, Special Studies*, vol. 5).



À Terre-Neuve, il s'agissait d'une base de garnison près de St. John's (Fort Pepperrell), d'une base navale et militaire à Argentia sur la côte sud (Argentia et Fort McAndrew) et d'une base aérienne du côté du golfe (Stephenville) qui originellement devait servir d'étape pour les avions à court rayon d'action faisant la navette entre les provinces maritimes et l'Est de Terre-Neuve, mais qui plus tard fut confiée au Service des transports des États-Unis.

Quelques jours après la rencontre du Président Roosevelt et du Premier ministre King à Ogdensburg, les gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et des États-Unis en arrivèrent à un accord de principe sur l'échange des droits de tenure des bases pour les destroyers, mais il fut plus difficile d'obtenir un accord sur les modalités de l'entente. Une conférence entre les deux gouvernements eut lieu à Londres où un traité officiel fut finalement négocié.<sup>19</sup>

Bien que l'établissement des bases américaines à Terre-Neuve concernât directement le Canada, ce dernier ne fut invité à être représenté à la Conférence de Londres que par des observateurs seulement. Le Canada ne s'opposait pas aux bases—en effet, le Premier ministre King avait personnellement aidé les parties à en venir à un accord—mais il était en désaccord avec plusieurs clauses du projet de traité, surtout en ce qui concernait une disposition d'urgence qui semblait autoriser les États-Unis à prendre toutes les mesures jugées nécessaires sur toute l'étendue de Terre-Neuve en cas de guerre ou d'autre situation critique.

Terre-Neuve pour sa part était mécontente des pouvoirs considérables accordés aux États-Unis sur son territoire et s'opposait en particulier à ce que les ressortissants américains qui enfreignaient les lois de Terre-Neuve soient jugés par les autorités américaines. Plus tard au cours de la conférence, sur l'invitation de Terre-Neuve, les délégations canadienne et terre-neuvienne firent cause commune pour faire en sorte que l'accord concernant Terre-Neuve soit négocié séparément de celui sur les Indes Occidentales. Mais ce fut en vain.

Il fut également difficile pour les Canadiens de s'assurer des amendements au texte (déjà presque établi par les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni) mais en fin de compte il fut décidé d'y annexer un protocole signé par les représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, des États-Unis et du Canada visant à protéger les intérêts du Canada dans la défense de Terre-Neuve.<sup>20</sup>

En vertu du protocole les trois gouvernements reconnaissaient officiellement «que la défense de Terre-Neuve constitue une partie intégrante du plan de défense du Canada et, comme telle, devient une question qui intéresse particulièrement le gouvernement canadien qui, d'ores et déjà a assumé certaines responsabilités à l'égard de ladite défense.» Il fut de plus convenu que dans toute mesure que prendraient les États-Unis à Terre-Neuve dans le cadre de l'accord, «les intérêts canadiens ayant trait à la défense seront pleinement

<sup>19</sup> Au sujet des négociations voir les documents 232-300; aussi Stacey, C.P. *op. cit.* p. 357-361 et Dziuban, Stanley W. *Military Relations between the United States and Canada 1939-1945*. Washington, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959. p. 162 (*United States Army in World War II, Special Studies*, vol. 5).

<sup>20</sup> Appendice B.



have the agreement with respect to Newfoundland negotiated separately from the agreement with respect to the West Indies. This effort proved unavailing.

It proved no easier from the Canadian point of view to secure amendment of the text (already virtually agreed between the United States and the United Kingdom) but eventually it was decided to annex a protocol, signed by representatives of Britain, the United States and Canada for the purpose of protecting the Canadian defence position in Newfoundland.<sup>20</sup>

Under the Protocol, the three governments formally recognized "that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government which has already assumed certain responsibilities for this defence". It was agreed further that, in any action taken in Newfoundland by the United States under the Agreement, "Canadian interests in regard to defence will be fully respected"; that nothing in the treaty should affect arrangements already made in Newfoundland by the United States and Canada in pursuance of recommendations submitted to the two Governments by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence; and finally that, where the treaty provided for consultation with Newfoundland, the Canadian Government, as well as the Newfoundland Government, should be entitled to participate. From a legal standpoint the Protocol was probably less satisfactory than suitable amendments to the text of the treaty—if they could have been obtained—but it was at least some restraint on too liberal an interpretation of the treaty in favour of the United States military authorities.

That Canada had some grounds for uneasiness over American intervention in Newfoundland was evident. Before sites for the United States bases had been decided on, the United States military planners had urged that leased areas should include Gander, Botwood, and naval facilities at St. John's. Inclusion of Gander was vetoed by the President,<sup>21</sup> and it was decided that St. John's was too small and congested to serve as a United States naval base. Later, a special Army Planning Committee set up to recommend base sites proposed that the United States be guaranteed the use of all harbours, anchorages, and air fields in Newfoundland and a modified version of the proposal found its way into the Leased Bases Agreement.<sup>22</sup>

Still more disturbing was the posting of American air and ground forces to Gander as garrison forces, without consultation with Canada or Newfoundland at the political level and despite the fact that Canadian forces were already doing garrison duty there. Such incidents were no doubt due to a desire on the part of the American forces to make sure that vital locations in Newfoundland were adequately protected, but they also tended to raise latent Canadian and Newfoundland suspicions of long-range United States intentions.

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<sup>20</sup> Appendix B.

<sup>21</sup> Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 166.

<sup>22</sup> *Loc. cit.*

sauvegardés» et qu'aucune disposition du traité ne modifierait les ententes déjà conclues à Terre-Neuve entre les États-Unis et le Canada conformément aux recommandations soumises aux deux gouvernements par la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense. Enfin, lorsque Terre-Neuve devait être consultée aux termes du traité, le gouvernement canadien aurait le droit de participer aux réunions au même titre que le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve. Du point de vue juridique, le protocole était probablement moins satisfaisant que les amendements au texte du traité—s'il avait été possible d'obtenir de tels amendements—mais du moins il servait à restreindre une interprétation trop libérale du traité en faveur des autorités militaires des États-Unis.

Il était évident que les inquiétudes du Canada quant à l'intervention américaine à Terre-Neuve étaient fondées. Avant que le site des bases américaines fût choisi, les planificateurs militaires américains avaient insisté sur le fait que Gander, Botwood et les installations navales à St. John's soient inclus dans le territoire sous bail. Le Président avait opposé son veto à l'inclusion de Gander<sup>21</sup> et il fut décidé que le port de St. John's était trop petit et trop congestionné pour servir de base navale américaine. Plus tard, un comité spécial de planification de l'armée formé en vue de recommander des sites de bases proposa que les États-Unis obtiennent le droit d'utiliser tous les ports, tous les mouillages et toutes les pistes d'atterrissage à Terre-Neuve, et une version modifiée de cette proposition fut insérée dans l'accord sur les bases cédées à bail.<sup>22</sup>

La situation se compliqua davantage lorsqu'une garnison américaine de forces aériennes et terrestres fut affectée à Gander, sans consultation préalable avec le Canada ou Terre-Neuve au niveau politique et en dépit du fait qu'il y avait déjà des forces canadiennes en garnison. De tels incidents s'expliquaient sans doute par le désir des forces américaines de s'assurer que les endroits clés à Terre-Neuve étaient adéquatement protégés, mais ils avaient aussi tendance à alimenter les soupçons du Canada et de Terre-Neuve quant aux projets à long terme des États-Unis.

### *Le bastion de l'Atlantique*

Les années 1941 et 1942 virent un grand accroissement des installations de défense à Terre-Neuve. Le Canada ajouta des pistes d'atterrissage et des casernes à Gander et à Botwood pour répondre aux besoins des Américains, pour recevoir un nombre sans cesse croissant de patrouilles aériennes et pour assurer le service transocéanique (dont il est question plus loin). Le Canada construisit également les bases aériennes de Torbay et de Goose Bay. Toutes deux entrèrent en service avant la fin de 1941. Au nom de l'Amirauté britannique le Canada construisit aussi une base navale à St. John's dont le port continua à fonctionner pendant la durée des travaux. La base fonctionnait à plein rendement à la fin de 1942. Les États-Unis commencèrent la construction de leurs bases vers le milieu de 1941, mais les aéroports (Argentina

<sup>21</sup> Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 166.

<sup>22</sup> *Loc. cit.*

## ATLANTIC BASTION

The years 1941-42 witnessed great expansion of defence facilities by both Canada and the United States in Newfoundland. Canada added to the runways and housing facilities at Gander and Botwood to meet the American requirements and to accommodate expanded air patrols and the Atlantic ferry service (discussed later). Canada also constructed Torbay and Goose Bay Air Bases. Both were in operation before the end of 1941. On behalf of the British Admiralty, Canada was also constructing the St. John's naval base which was continued in operation while construction was going on. The base was fully operable by the end of 1942. The United States began construction of its bases in mid-1941 but its air fields (Argentia and Stephenville) were not available much before the spring of 1943.<sup>23</sup> In addition the United States was constructing a large army garrison base at Fort Pepperrel, adjacent to St. John's. Electronic communications were gradually set up between the numerous bases and radar and weather stations were established by both countries.

American and Canadian garrison forces in Newfoundland substantially increased for a time after Pearl Harbour. The high point seems to have been reached in mid-1943 when there were more than 10,000 U.S. army personnel in Newfoundland, and nearly 6,000 Canadian army personnel. Before the end of the year each had scaled down its forces to about 5,000. They remained at about this level until near the end of hostilities.<sup>24</sup>

These figures, however, are for garrison troops, not for totals of armed services in Newfoundland. Such figures would include: naval personnel engaged in convoy duty (mostly Canadian); airmen (mostly U.K.) serving in the Atlantic Ferry Command; the Canadian battery and infantry battalion (some 1300 all ranks) stationed in Labrador for the defence of Goose Bay; and the Canadian airmen serving at Torbay, Gander and Goose and at RCAF headquarters in St. John's. Nor should the Newfoundland militia be excluded.<sup>25</sup> Eventually organized on a two-level pattern of active militia and part-time home guard, by the end of 1943 its active personnel of some 570 all ranks had been organized under the historic name of the Newfoundland Regiment and had taken on the responsibility, under Canadian operational command, of the defence of Bell Island and other sensitive points along the coast.<sup>26</sup>

*Command and Strategic Direction*

The issue of a supreme command of Canadian and American forces in Newfoundland first arose in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at its first series of meetings on the situation in Newfoundland. There were serious competing interests to be reconciled: Canada was legally at war and was

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 168.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* p. 175-177.

<sup>25</sup> Documents 26 and 29-33 and Stacey, C. P. *Six Years of War (Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War)*. Vol. 1, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955. p. 180.

<sup>26</sup> Documents 639 and Stacey, C.P. *loc. cit.*

et Stephenville) ne furent pas disponibles avant le printemps de 1943.<sup>23</sup> De plus, les États-Unis construisirent une énorme base de garnison à Fort Pepperrell près de St. John's. Peu à peu les nombreuses bases furent reliées entre elles au moyen de communications électroniques et les deux pays établirent des postes de radar et des stations météorologiques.

Après l'attaque sur Pearl Harbour, les forces américaines et canadiennes en garnison à Terre-Neuve augmentèrent considérablement. Elles semblent avoir atteint leur plus haut point vers le milieu de 1943 lorsqu'il y avait plus de 10 000 soldats américains et près de 6 000 Canadiens à Terre-Neuve. Avant la fin de l'année, les deux forces avaient été réduites à environ 5 000 hommes. Elles furent maintenues à ce niveau jusqu'à la fin des hostilités.<sup>24</sup>

Ces chiffres correspondent toutefois aux troupes en garnison et non pas au nombre total de militaires à Terre-Neuve, car ils ne tiennent pas compte des forces navales chargées des escortes (surtout des Canadiens); des pilotes (surtout Britanniques) assurant le Service transocéanique de la RAF; le bataillon canadien de batterie et d'infanterie (quelque 1 300 soldats de tous les grades) affecté au Labrador à la défense de Goose Bay; des pilotes canadiens à Torbay, Gander et Goose Bay ainsi qu'au quartier général du CARC à St. John's. La milice de Terre-Neuve non plus n'est pas comprise.<sup>25</sup> Finalement organisée selon un modèle structural à deux paliers,—milice active et garde domestique à temps partiel—cette milice, comptant quelque 570 hommes de tous les grades et regroupée sous le nom historique de Régiment de Terre-Neuve vers la fin de 1943, s'était chargée, sous les ordres du commandant canadien, de la défense de l'île Bell et d'autres lieux stratégiques le long de la côte.<sup>26</sup>

### *Le commandement et la direction de la stratégie*

La question du haut commandement des forces canadiennes et américaines à Terre-Neuve fut soulevée pour la première fois par la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense lors de sa première série de réunions sur la situation à Terre-Neuve. Il y avait d'importants conflits d'intérêt à résoudre: le Canada était officiellement en guerre et s'était engagé à participer aux combats outre-mer, alors que les États-Unis étaient encore une nation non-belligérante dont les efforts militaires consistaient à s'occuper exclusivement de la défense de l'Amérique du Nord. Plus encore, les autorités militaires américaines avaient tendance à prendre plus au sérieux que les Canadiens les possibilités d'attaques à partir des pays occupés d'Europe.

Sous les ordres de la CPCAD, ces militaires préparèrent deux plans de base pour la défense conjointe du Canada, de Terre-Neuve et des États-Unis—le premier, le plan ABC-1 (ou ABC-1940) était un plan d'urgence

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 168

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* p. 175-177

<sup>25</sup> Documents 26 et 29-33 et Stacey, C.P. *Six années de guerre (Histoire officielle de la participation de l'armée canadienne à la Seconde Guerre mondiale)*. Vol. 1, Ottawa, Imprimeur de la Reine, 1957, p. 184.

<sup>26</sup> Documents 639 et Stacey, C.P. *loc. cit.*



committed to participation overseas, whereas the United States was still a non-belligerent whose military efforts were as yet concentrated on making North America secure. Moreover, American military leaders tended to take more seriously than Canada the possibilities of aggression from occupied Europe.

Under instructions from the PJBD its service members prepared two basic plans for the joint defence of Canada and Newfoundland and the United States—the first, ABC-1 (or ABC-1940) was an emergency plan intended to come into force immediately if Britain were overrun, or if the Royal Navy lost control of the North Atlantic; the second and later plan, ABC-22, was more complete and was intended to come into force if the United States joined in the war on the side of the Commonwealth, as it did after Pearl Harbor. Plan 1 allotted tasks and responsibilities between the United States and Canada but omitted all reference to command and strategic direction since no agreement had been reached in this field by the Board. In addition to the plans already mentioned, there was a revision of Plan 1, the so-called “Montreal Revise”, which attempted to fill this gap.<sup>27</sup> (Actually there were two plans numbered ABC-22,—a British-American Plan for co-operation in the event of the United States entering the war, and a Canadian-American one providing if this occurred for co-operation in North America between Canada and the United States, which was treated as a sort of annex to the British-American Plan. This was confusing to military hierarchies at the time and later to scholars. To avoid confusion the first Canadian-American Plan was frequently referred to as ABC-1940.)

The revision of ABC-1940 proposed that the United States should have command and strategic direction of all Canadian and American forces in each of British Columbia, the Maritime Provinces, Gaspé and Newfoundland. The forces in each region would be under American overall command with a Canadian sub-commander under him in charge of Canadian forces. However, when American forces equalled or surpassed Canadian forces in any of these regions, the sub-command would pass to the United States. It was also evident that the Americans intended to incorporate Canadian forces in their regional operational commands.

Responsibility for strategic direction would be vested in the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army who was to consult the Canadian Chief of Staff before issuing orders to Canadian sub-commanders.

Canadian service officers on the PJBD evidently without instructions, accepted these proposals after substantial amendments. However, neither the Chiefs of Staff nor the Canadian Cabinet War Committee were prepared to accept even the amended proposals once the issue was faced in the context of ABC-22 which postulated a war in which Britain was undefeated and the United States had entered on the side of the Allies.<sup>28</sup> From a Canadian standpoint there were two main objections: it would mean that Canadian forces

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<sup>27</sup> Stacey, C. P. *Arms Men, and Governments* p. 349.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 350 and Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 114.



destiné à être appliqué immédiatement si la Grande-Bretagne était envahie, ou si la Marine royale perdait la maîtrise de l'Atlantique Nord; le deuxième plan, ABC-22, était plus complet et devait être utilisé si les États-Unis déclaraient la guerre au côté du Commonwealth comme ils le firent après Pearl Harbour. Le premier plan répartissait les tâches et les fonctions entre les États-Unis et le Canada, mais il ne faisait aucunement allusion au commandement et à la direction de la stratégie, car la Commission n'en était pas arrivée à un accord à ce sujet. En plus des plans déjà mentionnés, il y eut la version révisée du premier plan dite «révision de Montréal» qui visait à combler cette lacune.<sup>27</sup> (En réalité, deux plans furent numérotés ABC-22: un plan de collaboration anglo-américain au cas où les États-Unis entreprendraient en guerre et un plan de collaboration canado-américain en Amérique du Nord qui fut considéré comme une sorte d'annexe au plan anglo-américain. Tous ces plans semèrent la confusion d'abord parmi les autorités militaires de l'époque, puis plus tard chez les historiens. Pour éviter toute confusion, le premier plan canado-américain fut souvent appelé le plan ABC-1940.)

Le plan ABC-1940 révisé proposait que les États-Unis aient le commandement et la direction de la stratégie sur toutes les forces canadiennes et américaines stationnées en Colombie-Britannique, dans les Maritimes, à Gaspé et à Terre-Neuve. Dans chaque région, le commandant en chef serait un Américain ayant sous ses ordres un sous-commandant canadien qui s'occuperait des forces canadiennes. Cependant, lorsque le nombre de militaires américains serait égal ou supérieur à celui des militaires canadiens dans n'importe laquelle des régions, le commandement en second passerait aux États-Unis. Il était aussi évident que les Américains avaient l'intention d'incorporer les forces canadiennes à leurs commandements opérationnels régionaux.

Les pouvoirs décisionnels en matière de direction de la stratégie seraient attribués au chef de l'état-major de l'armée américaine qui devrait consulter le chef d'état-major canadien avant de donner des ordres aux sous-commandants canadiens.

Les militaires canadiens siégeant à la CPCAD acceptèrent, apparemment sans avoir reçu l'ordre, ces propositions après avoir exigé d'importantes modifications. Toutefois, ni les chefs d'état-major ni le Comité de guerre du Cabinet canadien, n'étaient prêts à accepter ces propositions, même modifiées, alors que lesdites propositions envisagées dans le contexte du plan ABC-22 posaient comme postulats une guerre où la Grande-Bretagne ne serait pas défaite et où les États-Unis se joindraient aux Alliés.<sup>28</sup> Le Canada opposait deux objections principales; le plan ABC-1940 révisé signifiait que les forces canadiennes en sol canadien seraient sous les ordres d'un commandant en chef américain et, plus encore, que le Canada risquait de perdre le commandement de ses propres forces.

<sup>27</sup> Stacey, C.P. *Armes, hommes et gouvernements*. p. 387.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 389 et Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 114.

would be under American command in Canada; moreover, Canada might lose control of the disposal of its own forces.

The Americans were astounded that the proposal, although previously accepted by Canadian service members of the Board, was now rejected. The result was a short period of serious tension between American and Canadian members of the Board. The Chairman of the American Section, Mayor LaGuardia, actually appealed directly to Roosevelt for support and suggested that the President take the matter up with the Prime Minister. Although the President did not approach the Prime Minister, he gave assurance of support to LaGuardia and on the advice of the Secretaries for War and Navy, instructed him to take the following line with the Canadians:<sup>29</sup>

- (a) Although not a belligerent, the United States was virtually ready to undertake the defence of eastern Canada and Newfoundland.
- (b) Canada had neither the men, or the matériel for this task except as a participant on a smaller scale than the United States.
- (c) The Canadian war effort was designed primarily to send men and materials overseas.
- (d) Since the defensive effort would fall nine-tenths to the United States, the strategic responsibility should be vested in that country.

There were, however, real differences in approach to the problem. The Americans considered it a military one capable of a military solution. In their view a unified command under an American commander was necessary for security. The Canadians felt strongly that the problem of a higher command could be resolved by co-operation between appropriate commanding officers and that the preservation of Canadian autonomy in command arrangements was politically essential.

Compromise along the lines of the Canadian proposals was eventually accepted and remained generally in effect until the end of hostilities, with the exception of naval arrangements which will be discussed later. The following proposals, among others, were accepted by both Governments, although somewhat reluctantly by the Americans:<sup>30</sup>

1. The forces of each country should be assigned to tasks for which they were specially suited.
2. Each country should retain strategic direction and command of its own forces.
3. Co-ordination of military effort would be by mutual consultation and co-operation.
4. A unified command might be established by local commanders where required, on agreement of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries.
5. Exchange of liaison officers between commands at various levels.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 114.

<sup>30</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 353 and Dziuban, Stanley, W. *op. cit.* p. 115.

Les Américains furent étonnés que leur proposition, bien qu'acceptée antérieurement par les militaires membres de la Commission, soit maintenant rejetée. En conséquence, les relations entre les membres américains et canadiens de la Commission connurent une courte période de forte tension. En effet, le président de la section américaine de la Commission, le maire La Guardia, alla même jusqu'à faire appel directement au président Roosevelt pour obtenir son appui et suggéra que ce dernier discute de la question avec le Premier ministre. Bien que le Président n'abordât pas le sujet avec le Premier ministre, il assura le maire La Guardia de son soutien et sur l'avis des secrétaires de la Guerre et de la Marine lui conseilla d'adopter la ligne de conduite suivante:<sup>29</sup>

- (a) Bien que les États-Unis fussent une nation non belligérante, ils étaient disposés à défendre l'Est du Canada et Terre-Neuve.
- (b) Le Canada n'avait ni les hommes ni le matériel nécessaires pour accomplir cette tâche, sauf à titre de participant sur une plus petite échelle que les États-Unis.
- (c) L'effort de guerre du Canada visait principalement à envoyer des hommes et des matériaux outre-mer.
- (d) Puisque la défense incomberait dans les neuf dixièmes aux États-Unis, les pouvoirs de décision en matière de stratégie devaient leur être attribués.

Il y avait cependant de profondes différences d'approche au problème. Pour les Américains il s'agissait d'un problème militaire auquel il fallait apporter une solution militaire, et pour des raisons de sécurité, il était nécessaire d'avoir un commandement unifié sous les ordres d'un chef d'état-major américain. Les Canadiens pour leur part croyaient fermement que la question du haut commandement pouvait être résolue par des efforts de collaboration entre les commandants concernés et que l'intégrité de l'autonomie canadienne était essentielle du point de vue politique.

En fin de compte, un compromis respectant les principes des propositions canadiennes fut accepté et demeura en vigueur jusqu'à la fin des hostilités, sauf en ce qui touche les questions navales dont nous parlerons plus loin. Les propositions suivantes, entre autres, furent acceptées par les deux gouvernements, quoiqu'avec une certaine réticence de la part des Américains:<sup>30</sup>

1. La répartition des tâches entre les deux pays tiendrait compte des spécialités de leurs forces militaires.
2. Chaque pays conserverait le haut commandement de ses propres forces.
3. La coordination de l'effort militaire se ferait par consultation mutuelle et en coopération.
4. Les commandants locaux pouvaient établir un commandement

<sup>29</sup> Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 114.

<sup>30</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Despite the compromise between Canada and the United States on the question of command the Newfoundland Commission of Government, with United Kingdom support, continued to press for a unified command in Newfoundland under a Canadian officer—evidently preferring to treat with one Canadian military authority rather than with four or five separate military commands (Canadian Army, Air and Navy; U.S. Army and Navy).<sup>32</sup> The Canadian authorities passed on to their American colleagues the Newfoundland proposal, but they could hardly advocate a unified command under a Canadian officer, having previously opposed in principle a unified command under an American officer. Nothing came of the proposal.

One important development, however, was the organization of separate national unified commands by both Canada and the United States. This doubtless improved co-ordination within national services. It also simplified the problems of co-ordination between national services, even if at times relations between national commanding officers were somewhat strained.

### *The Atlantic Ferry*

After the military collapse in Europe in 1940 the United Kingdom was desperately short of aircraft of all types. Britain had a large aircraft industry but far from sufficient to supply its needs in full. For the balance it was heavily dependent on United States industry. New types of bombers and other planes were beginning to roll off production lines in giant new industries in the Western and Pacific states, but the problem of getting them quickly and in adequate numbers to Britain remained to be solved. Average delivery time by sea from factory to combat readiness in Britain was about three months. Moreover, shipping by sea required much precious cargo space and losses by submarines had to be accepted.

In July 1940 the British Ministry of Aircraft Production approached the Canadian Pacific Railway with the proposal that it organize a system of delivering long-range planes to Britain by air from Canada. The system worked out provided that civilian crews should fly planes direct from the U.S. factories to Montreal, where other civilian crews would take them over and fly them to Britain with a refuelling stop at Gander for land planes and at Botwood or Bermuda for seaplanes. Only the longer-range land planes such as bombers could as yet fly the Atlantic, and Gander to Britain was just within comfortable range. In mid-1941, the British Government took over the privately operated system, and the United States developed its own system which, until the completion of Goose, also mainly used Gander. Other ferrying routes were developed later, notably one across the Caribbean, Brazil and West Africa, after the landing of the Allies in North Africa, and a northern route via Goose Bay, Greenland and Iceland for short-range planes including fighters. But the Gander route (Montreal-Gander-Prestwick)—supplemented by the Goose Bay route in the latter half of the war—was the principal ferry route for bombers and other long-range planes.

<sup>32</sup> See Chapter I, Part 5, Section c and Stacey, *C.P. op. cit.* p. 364.



unifié suivant les besoins et avec l'accord des chefs d'état-major des deux pays.

5. Il y aurait échange d'agents de liaison à divers échelons entre les commandements.<sup>31</sup>

Malgré le compromis entre le Canada et les États-Unis, le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve, avec l'appui de la Grande-Bretagne, continuait de demander qu'à Terre-Neuve il y ait un commandement unifié sous les ordres d'un officier canadien—Terre-Neuve préférant évidemment avoir affaire à un commandant canadien plutôt qu'à quatre ou cinq commandants distincts (l'armée, l'aviation et la marine du Canada; l'armée et la marine des États-Unis).<sup>32</sup> Les autorités canadiennes transmirent la proposition terre-neuvienne à leurs homologues américains, mais elles pouvaient difficilement proposer un commandement unifié dirigé par un officier canadien alors qu'elles s'étaient opposées au principe d'un commandement unifié sous un officier américain. Cette proposition n'eut pas de suite.

Il importe de mentionner toutefois que par la suite, le Canada et les États-Unis mirent sur pied des commandements unifiés distincts. Ceci a sans doute facilité la coordination entre les divers corps d'un même pays tout en simplifiant la coordination entre les corps semblables des deux pays, même si les relations entre les commandants canadiens et américains étaient parfois tendues.

### *Le service transocéanique*

Après l'effondrement militaire en Europe en 1940, le Royaume-Uni était désespérément à court d'avions de tous les modèles. La Grande-Bretagne avait une grande industrie aéronautique, mais était incapable de répondre entièrement à la demande. L'industrie américaine comblait en grande partie la demande excédentaire. De nouveaux types de bombardiers et d'autres avions étaient fabriqués dans les grandes usines nouvellement construites dans les États de l'Ouest et du Pacifique, mais il y avait encore un problème clé à résoudre,—comment transporter ces avions rapidement et en nombre suffisant en Grande-Bretagne? En moyenne, le délai de transport par mer de l'usine à la base aérienne en Grande-Bretagne était d'environ trois mois. De plus, l'expédition par mer prenait beaucoup d'espace précieux et il fallait s'attendre à des pertes par suite des attaques de sous-marins.

En juillet 1940, le ministère britannique de la Production d'avions proposa au *Canadian Pacific Railway* d'organiser l'acheminement du Canada à la Grande-Bretagne des avions à long rayon d'action. Pour ce faire des équipages civils conduiraient les avions directement des usines américaines à Montréal où d'autres équipages civils prendraient la relève et effectueraient le reste du vol jusqu'en Grande-Bretagne, après escale pour faire le plein d'essence à Gander pour les avions, et à Botwood ou aux Bermudes pour les hydravions. A ce moment-là, seuls les avions à long rayon d'action tels les bombardiers pouvaient traverser l'Atlantique, la distance entre Gander et la Grande-

<sup>31</sup> Stacey, C. P. *Armes, hommes et gouvernements*, p. 391-392 et Dziuban, Stanley. *op. cit.* p. 115.

<sup>32</sup> Voir le chapitre I, partie 5, section c et Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 403.



The first transatlantic ferry flight consisting of seven planes took off from Gander on November 11, 1940, and landed safely the next day at Prestwick. A new age in mass Atlantic flying had thus begun. The volume of ferry traffic built up rapidly until 1944, after which the demand for planes was declining. In 1940, 26 planes made the crossing; in 1941, 593; in 1942, 867; in 1943, 883; in 1944, 1,864; and in 1945, 686: for a grand total of almost 5,000.<sup>33</sup>

### *Goose Bay*

As early as 1941 Gander was becoming unduly crowded and much more traffic in heavy bombers could be anticipated as U.S. industry got into its full stride. Moreover, the advantages of a ferry service for medium and short-range planes was clearly apparent and a new airfield near the North-West River in Labrador was proposed. It was strategically located for the fulfilment of three main functions: it would strengthen the direct defence of Newfoundland and North Eastern Canada and the United States; it would be an important staging field on a new route for ferrying planes via Greenland and Iceland to the United Kingdom; and it would be a useful operating base in the Battle of the Atlantic. Canada undertook construction of the new field (later designated Goose Bay) which was in use by December 1941, although not yet equipped with paved runways.<sup>34</sup>

The United States did not participate openly in the Atlantic section of the ferry service until after it entered the war (December 8, 1941) but thereafter it moved large numbers of its forces as well as aeroplanes overseas by ferry routes. Indeed, on occasion entire tactical formations crossed via Presque Isle, Gander or Goose, Greenland and Iceland. Nor should the enormous freight tonnage and large numbers of passengers carried by the United States Air Transport Command via Newfoundland (normally through Stephenville with Goose and Gander available as alternates) be overlooked. The RAF Transport Command and Trans-Canada Air lines also participated in these services.

After VE Day the ferry routes were available for the return westward of United States forces for demobilization or service in other theatres. By July over 3,000 tactical aircraft, carrying 50,000 personnel were returned with the loss of only one aircraft and no lives. By mid-September over 80,000 personnel were transported westward. In addition over 160,000 personnel due for demobilization were transported westward without a fatality. The great majority of these returned through bases in Newfoundland including Goose Bay.<sup>35</sup>

### THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Canada's most distinctive contribution to the war at sea was that of escorting convoys over the Atlantic. At the outset of the war the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was allotted two main tasks: protection of Canada's sea-borne

<sup>33</sup> Appendix D.

<sup>34</sup> Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 191 and 192.

<sup>35</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Bretagne étant par trop grande. Vers le milieu de 1941, le gouvernement britannique prit la direction du service privé et les États-Unis établirent leur propre service qui, jusqu'à l'ouverture de l'aéroport de Goose Bay, utilisera principalement celui de Gander. D'autres routes furent mises en service plus tard, notamment une route qui traversait les Antilles, le Brésil et l'Afrique du Nord, et une autre plus au nord via Goose Bay, le Groenland et l'Islande pour les avions à court rayon d'action, y compris les chasseurs. Mais la route de Gander (Montréal-Gander-Prestwick)—complétée durant la deuxième moitié de la guerre par la route de Goose Bay—fut la principale route pour les bombardiers et les autres avions à long rayon d'action.

Le premier groupe d'avions à faire la traversée de l'Atlantique se composa de sept appareils qui décollèrent de Gander le 11 novembre 1940 et atterrirent sans encombre le lendemain à Prestwick. C'était le début d'une nouvelle époque dans l'histoire du transport transatlantique. Le nombre d'avions ainsi livrés augmenta rapidement jusqu'en 1944; après quoi la demande diminua. En 1940, 26 avions effectuèrent la traversée; en 1941, 593; en 1942, 867; en 1943, 883; en 1944, 1 864;<sup>33</sup> en 1945, 686; ce qui donne un grand total de presque 5 000.

### *Goose Bay*

Dès 1941, Gander devint très congestionné et avec l'augmentation de la production américaine, on pouvait prévoir l'arrivée d'un plus grand nombre de gros bombardiers. De plus, il était évident qu'un service de transport d'avions à court et à moyen rayon d'action serait très utile et en conséquence, la construction d'un nouvel aéroport près de North-West River au Labrador fut proposée. Du point de vue stratégique, cet emplacement remplissait trois fonctions principales: il fortifiait directement la défense de Terre-Neuve, du Nord-Est du Canada et des États-Unis; il constituait une importante plate-forme de départ pour le Royaume-Uni grâce à une nouvelle route via le Groenland et l'Islande; et c'était une bonne base d'opérations dans la Bataille de l'Atlantique. Le Canada entreprit la construction de ce nouvel aéroport (appelé plus tard Goose Bay) et il fut disponible dès décembre 1941, bien que les pistes ne fussent pas encore goudronnées.<sup>34</sup>

Avant de déclarer formellement la guerre (le 8 décembre 1941) les États-Unis ne participèrent pas ouvertement au transport transocéanique; mais par après, ils utilisèrent les routes établies pour déplacer un grand nombre de leurs troupes et pour transporter des avions outre-mer. En effet, il est arrivé que des formations tactiques de combat entières traversent l'Atlantique via Presqu'île, Gander ou Goose, le Groenland et l'Islande. Il ne faut pas non plus oublier l'énorme quantité de fret et le grand nombre de passagers que le Service américain du transport aérien transporta en passant par Terre-Neuve (normalement par Stephenville, avec Goose et Gander comme autres escales d'urgence). Le Service du transport de la RAF et *Trans-Canada Air Lines* participèrent au maintien de ces services.

<sup>33</sup> Appendice D.

<sup>34</sup> Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 191-192.

trade, including approaches to ports, and protection of Canada's coastline. This was a formidable assignment for Canada's tiny navy of 6 destroyers (4 on the west coast), 5 mine sweepers (3 based on Halifax, 2 on Esquimalt), 1 sailing ship used for training recruits, and 1 motor launch.<sup>36</sup> Canadian naval policy had been based on two assumptions which were rarely mentioned, that in event of war the Atlantic and Pacific approaches would be under the control of friendly powers, and that, although there were no commitments on the part of Britain or Canada, Canada would not have to fight alone, but would presumably be associated in one way or another with Great Britain.

Enemy attempts at occupation of Canadian territory might be discounted but raids against communities on the east coast by powerful new ships of the German navy, such as the so-called "pocket battle ships", were not impossible. Canada's destroyer navy would have been powerless against such raiders. Fortunately no such raids against coastal communities occurred.

Before war broke out the Royal Navy had based two cruisers on Halifax to strengthen local defence in the area and to initiate a convoy system. The RCN were early directed to co-operate to the "fullest extent" with the RN. In practice when British and Canadian ships found themselves together, they were treated as a single force under the command of the senior naval officer present, whether British or Canadian.<sup>37</sup>

### *The Convoy System*

Protection of Canadian sea trade was also beyond the capability of the RCN at the time of the outbreak of war, but the direction to co-operate "to the fullest extent" with the Royal Navy cleared the way to co-operation in escorting convoys. The experience of the first world war had amply demonstrated the necessity of convoy operations to protect trade against the then new weapon of the submarine. Convoy operations in the second war began at once. From the outset, Halifax was the assembly port for east-bound convoys—the first of which sailed out of Halifax within a week after the Canadian declaration of war, protected by two RN cruisers and two RCN destroyers. The latter, however turned back as soon as the convoy had cleared Canadian waters, while the cruisers continued to a point within protection of British bases.<sup>38</sup>

In the first eight months there was virtually no submarine activity in the Western Atlantic, Hitler having banned U-Boat operations there lest it precipitate intervention by the United States. The main theatre of U-Boat activity for the time being was the approaches to British ports. But after the fall of France, French Atlantic ports gave the U-Boats direct access to the Atlantic, and meantime the German submarine fleet was being rapidly expanded. The U-Boats began to appear wherever ships sailed the broad

<sup>36</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *The Naval Service of Canada*. Vol. 2, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1952, p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 16.

<sup>38</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 12 and Schull, Joseph. *The Far Distant Ships (An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in the Second World War)*. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1961. p. 19.

Après la victoire des Alliés, ces mêmes routes servirent à ramener vers l'ouest les forces américaines qui devaient être démobilisées ou envoyées à un autre front. Au mois de juillet 1945, plus de 3 000 avions de combat transportant 50 000 soldats firent le voyage de retour; un seul avion fut perdu et sans qu'il y eût perte de vie humaine. A la mi-septembre, plus de 80 000 personnes avaient été transportées vers l'ouest. De plus, 160 000 soldats qui devaient être déplacés vers l'ouest firent le voyage de retour sans un seul accident mortel. La plupart de ces avions passèrent par Terre-Neuve ou par Goose Bay.<sup>35</sup>

#### LA BATAILLE DE L'ATLANTIQUE

La plus grande contribution du Canada à la guerre navale fut la protection de convois traversant l'Atlantique. Dès le début de la guerre, la Marine royale du Canada (MRC) assumait deux grandes fonctions: la protection des marchandises canadiennes transportées par mer, les approches des ports et la protection de la côte du Canada. C'était une tâche formidable pour la petite marine canadienne qui se composait de 6 contre-torpilleurs (4 sur la côte de l'Ouest), 5 dragueurs de mines (3 à Halifax et 2 à Esquimalt), 1 navire à voiles pour la formation de nouvelles recrues, et une vedette.<sup>36</sup> La politique navale du Canada avait été élaborée suivant deux postulats rarement mentionnés: premièrement en cas de guerre, les approches de l'Atlantique et du Pacifique seraient entre les mains de puissances alliées; et deuxièmement, malgré l'absence d'engagements formels entre la Grande-Bretagne et le Canada, le Canada n'aurait pas à se défendre seul et que d'une façon ou d'une autre, il serait associé au Royaume-Uni.

Il était improbable que l'ennemi tente d'occuper le territoire canadien, mais il ne fallait pas éliminer la possibilité de raids contre les villes situées sur la côte Est par les nouveaux et puissants navires de la marine allemande tels lesdits «navires de poche». Les contre-torpilleurs canadiens seraient impuissants devant des navires aussi rapides. Heureusement les villes côtières n'eurent pas à subir de tels raids.

Avant le déclenchement de la guerre, la Marine royale avait affecté deux croiseurs à Halifax pour renforcer la défense locale et pour voir à la formation des convois. Dès le début, la MRC reçut l'ordre «d'apporter son entière collaboration» aux projets de la MR. En pratique, lorsque les navires britanniques et canadiens navigaient ensemble, ils étaient considérés comme une seule flotte sous les ordres de l'officier de marine le plus haut gradé, qu'il fut britannique ou canadien.<sup>37</sup>

#### *Les convois*

Au début de la guerre, la MRC ne pouvait assurer l'entière protection des marchandises canadiennes, mais l'ordre «d'apporter son entière collaboration»

<sup>35</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>36</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *The Naval Service of Canada*. Vol. 2, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1952, p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 18.



Atlantic, especially on the main convoy lanes. The battle began to shift to the middle and western Atlantic.

Convoys to or from North America were securing protection at both ends of the voyage but—except for troop convoys which warranted continuous capital ship protection—there was a long gap between the point at which escorts from one side left off and the other took over, and tragic losses in this area began to occur.

Convoy escort ships were exceedingly scarce. What was wanted was many fast, manoeuvrable ships which could be produced quickly and cheaply by Canadian as well as British ship-yards. Just before the war Britain had been experimenting with a new type of small ship, the corvette, for local defence. The new warship was not beautiful; it was not well adapted to high seas operations because of its limited range and the discomfort it imposed on crews; its main weapons were depth charges, not guns. It had not been tried in battle, but there was nothing else suitable in sight.<sup>39</sup>

Contracts were let early in 1940 with nearly every ship-yard in Canada, including those on the Great Lakes; and already, as the submarine menace worsened, the first of the new ships began to come down the ways in British yards. There can be little doubt that the corvette saved the situation. It was to be improved as the war continued and to be succeeded in part by larger and more sophisticated escort ships, such as the frigate, but by that time the turn of the war had come and the corvette had proven itself as a seaworthy and efficient fighting ship capable of great endurance so long as refuelling facilities were available at sea.

### *The St. John's Naval Base*

There was also great need for a mid-Atlantic base where the little ships could refuel and rest crews between convoys, and from which protection could effectively be given to convoys over the long gap in mid-Atlantic. St. John's was the only port available. Hitherto it had not played much part in the war, largely because it was unsuitable for the larger ships of the navy. But it was far from ideal; the harbour was small and already crowded; it opened directly on an area of the Atlantic notorious for fog and storms; it had no substantial industrial base to support a ship repair industry; supplies for construction and maintenance would have to be brought in from the mainland or Britain; and it had a limited supply of skilled labour and of housing facilities and office accommodation for service personnel. But it had the inestimable advantage of location on the great circle route about a third of the way between New York and Britain, and close to or alongside the main sea lanes which would permit air cover for convoys far out into the Atlantic.

The plan proposed by the Admiralty was briefly that the convoy route should be divided for escort purposes into three areas: the Western region where east-bound convoys would assemble under local escort,—Halifax for

<sup>39</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 31-33 and 37-42.

à la Marine royale ouvrit la porte à la coopération dans ce domaine. L'expérience de la Première Guerre mondiale avait amplement démontré la nécessité d'escorter les cargos pour les protéger contre le nouvel engin de guerre qu'était alors le sous-marin. Les opérations d'escorte débutèrent avec le déclenchement de la guerre. Halifax fut le port de rassemblement pour les convois à destination de l'Europe; le premier de ces convois quitta ce port au cours de la première semaine qui suivit la déclaration de guerre du Canada, sous la protection de deux croiseurs de la MR et deux contre-torpilleurs de la MRC. Ces derniers toutefois rebroussèrent chemin dès qu'ils eurent quitté les eaux canadiennes et les croiseurs continuèrent jusqu'à ce que les navires fussent dans le périmètre de protection des bases britanniques.<sup>38</sup>

Au cours des huit premiers mois, il n'y eut à peu près pas de sous-marins dans l'Atlantique Ouest car Hitler craignait que leur intervention ne provoque une déclaration de guerre de la part des États-Unis. Les opérations des sous-marins étaient donc limitées aux approches des ports britanniques. Après la capitulation de la France, les sous-marins allemands eurent directement accès à l'Atlantique à partir des ports du littoral français. Entre temps, les Allemands agrandissaient leur flotte de sous-marins et commençaient à s'aventurer en plein Atlantique, surtout le long des routes principales des convois. Rapidement la bataille commença à s'étendre au milieu et à la partie occidentale de l'Atlantique.

Les convois à destination ou en provenance de l'Amérique du Nord étaient protégés aux deux extrémités du trajet, mais—sauf dans le cas de convois de troupes qui demandaient une protection importante tout le long de la traversée—il y avait une longue distance à parcourir entre le départ d'une escorte et l'arrivée de l'autre. D'importantes pertes commencèrent à se produire dans cette zone non protégée.

Les navires d'escorte étaient excessivement rares. On avait besoin d'un grand nombre de navires rapides et très maniables que l'on pourrait fabriquer au Canada et en Grande-Bretagne rapidement et à peu de frais. Juste avant la guerre, la Grande-Bretagne expérimentait un nouveau genre de petit navire, destiné à la défense locale, la corvette. Le nouveau navire de guerre n'avait pas belle apparence; il ne se prêtait pas très bien aux opérations en haute mer à cause de son court rayon d'action et des inconvénients qu'il comportait pour l'équipage; son armement principal était la grenade sous-marine et non le canon. Il n'avait jamais été utilisé en combat, mais c'était le seul navire disponible.<sup>39</sup>

Au début de 1940, des contrats furent passés avec presque tous les chantiers de construction navale au Canada, y compris ceux des Grands Lacs; et au moment où la menace sous-marine commençait à s'aggraver, les premières corvettes étaient lancées en Grande-Bretagne. Il est incontestable

<sup>38</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 12 et Schull, Joseph, *Lointains navires (Compte rendu officiel des opérations de la marine canadienne au cours de la Seconde Guerre)*. Ottawa, Imprimeur de la Reine, 1953, p. 20.

<sup>39</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 31-33 and 37-42.

fast convoys and Sydney for slow ones—and from which they could be escorted to an agreed West Ocean Meeting Point south of Newfoundland where they would be handed over to a Mid-Ocean escort group based on St. John's and shepherded to a Mid-Ocean Meeting Point east and south of Iceland, there to be escorted to British harbours by ships based on Iceland or Britain, and under air cover. Escort ships would refuel for the return voyage at Londonderry or Iceland, or at St. John's or Halifax as appropriate.

The RCN at once offered to assume responsibility for the Mid-Ocean segment, provided ships then serving with the Royal Navy were returned, and agreed to add corvettes as soon as available. The Admiralty promptly accepted and the RCN began its expanded operations.<sup>40</sup>

The project of a base at St. John's raised political and financial, as well as strategic, considerations. Newfoundland clearly could not finance construction of a base. The United Kingdom could but was short of dollars. Canada could but, with the Canadian taxpayer in mind, the Government felt that Canada should have title or at least long-term occupancy in return for meeting the bill.

An arrangement was eventually agreed to whereby Canada would construct the base for the Admiralty which would be ultimately responsible for capital costs and which would have title to the base. Since the base would be used mainly by Canadian escort forces, Canada would be responsible for its operation and maintenance. The question of post-war use remained to be settled after the war, except that Canada would be consulted if it was proposed at any time to relinquish title or control of the base and shore facilities.

At Bay Bulls, about twenty miles south of St. John's, Canada also constructed a subsidiary repair base which proved highly useful for effecting "running repairs"<sup>41</sup> of the escort ships and occasionally of merchant ships.

The Newfoundland Government made a substantial contribution to the construction of this base and agreed to a 99-year lease to Canada. In the end, this was not taken up by Canada in view of the surplus ship-repair facilities available after the war;<sup>42</sup> nor did the Newfoundland Government want the base to compete with commercial ship-repair facilities at that time.

When the new scheme for escorting convoys became fully operational, the United Kingdom furnished about fifty percent of the protection for North Atlantic trade convoys, Canada forty-eight percent, and the United States two percent. The United States was also responsible for fast freight and troop convoys after it entered the war, but it was soon heavily engaged in the Pacific, as well as along its Atlantic coast, and it withdrew most of its destroyers from Atlantic convoy duty.

The RCN also participated in convoy escort duty in the Mediterranean, in the Caribbean and along the Atlantic coast of the United States. Canadian

<sup>40</sup> Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 310-314 and Chapter I, part 4, Section b.

<sup>41</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 198-199 and Chapter I, Part 4, Section b.

<sup>42</sup> See Chapter I, Part 4, Section b.

que la corvette sauva la situation. Elle allait être perfectionnée pendant la guerre et fut remplacée en partie par des navires d'escorte plus grands et plus perfectionnés telle la frégate. À ce moment-là les sous-marins allemands battaient la retraite devant la corvette qui était devenue un navire de combat redoutable, facile à manœuvrer, d'une grande résistance mécanique mais qu'on devait ravitailler en carburant en haute mer.

### *La base navale de St. John's*

Le besoin d'une base avancée sur le littoral de l'Atlantique où les petits navires pouvaient faire le plein et où les équipages pouvaient se reposer entre les convois, et à partir de laquelle les navires d'escorte pouvaient bien défendre les convois le long de la zone protégée se faisait sentir. St. John's était le seul port disponible. Ce port n'avait pas joué un grand rôle dans l'effort de guerre car il ne se prêtait pas au mouillage des gros navires de la marine. De plus c'était loin d'être un port idéal; il était trop petit et déjà congestionné; il donnait directement sur une partie de l'Atlantique reconnue pour son brouillard et ses tempêtes; il ne possédait pas de secteur industriel assez important pour permettre l'existence d'un chantier de réparation navale et les matériaux de construction et d'entretien devaient être transportés du continent ou de la Grande-Bretagne. Enfin St. John's n'avait pas assez de main-d'œuvre spécialisée et souffrait d'une pénurie de logements et de locaux de travail pour les militaires. Cependant, St. John's possédait l'immense avantage d'être située le long de la route du grand cercle à peu près à un tiers du chemin entre New York et la Grande-Bretagne, et d'être près, ou le long, des principales routes maritimes ce qui permettait aux convois d'être protégés par une couverture aérienne loin dans l'Atlantique.

Le plan de l'Amirauté prévoyait en bref que la route des convois fût, pour fins d'escorte, divisée en trois zones; la région ouest où les convois à destination de l'Europe seraient sous la protection d'une escorte locale—Halifax pour les convois rapides et Sydney pour les convois plus lents; une deuxième région commençant à un point au sud de Terre-Neuve où une autre escorte stationnée à St. John's prendrait la relève jusqu'à un lieu de rendez-vous au milieu de l'Océan à l'est, et une troisième au sud de l'Islande d'où les convois seraient escortés jusqu'aux ports de Grande-Bretagne par des navires venant de l'Islande ou de la Grande-Bretagne sous protection aérienne. Les navires d'escorte pourraient faire le plein pour le voyage de retour à Londonderry, en Islande, à St. John's ou à Halifax, suivant le cas.

La Marine royale du Canada offrit immédiatement de se charger de l'escorte de la zone centrale si les navires affectés à ce moment-là à la MR lui étaient remis, et elle accepta d'ajouter des corvettes à sa flotte dès qu'elles furent disponibles. L'Amirauté accepta immédiatement cette offre et la MRC commença à remplir sa nouvelle tâche.<sup>40</sup>

Le projet d'une base à St. John's souleva des questions d'ordre politique et financier ainsi que stratégique. Terre-Neuve ne pouvait pas de toute

<sup>40</sup> Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 343-348 et le chapitre I, partie 4, section b.



ships under command of the RN took part in landing operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy and finally in the landing in France. But convoy escort in the North Atlantic remained its major responsibility. Indeed, during the last three years of the war Canadian naval ships were the preponderant force in the escort of supply convoys all the way from North America to Britain. This underlines the importance of St. John's, along with Halifax, in the continuing Battle of the Atlantic.

### *Naval Command*<sup>43</sup>

The early pattern of naval relations (between Britain and the United States on the Atlantic) had been largely set by the agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill at Argentia in 1941 that strategic direction of the war in the Western Atlantic, including protection of convoys, should be the responsibility of the United States, while Britain would continue to be responsible for the Eastern Atlantic. Hitherto the Newfoundland Escort Force which Newfoundland had been instrumental in supporting and, to some extent, supplying, had operated under British direction. It would now be under United States naval command at Argentia.<sup>44</sup> Canada had not been invited to the Atlantic Conference; nor, it would appear, had there been any formal consultation with Canada about the proposed transfer to American naval command of the convoy escort forces it had serving with the British in the Atlantic. But what might have been a source of friction was overcome by the good sense and tact of the American and Canadian naval commanders concerned.

American convoy escort forces were almost entirely withdrawn from the North Atlantic route for a time after Pearl Harbour. This raised again the question of command in the Atlantic. Although American naval authorities were at first reluctant to see a separate Canadian command established, this was agreed to in 1943 and a separate Canadian operational command (The Canadian North-West Atlantic Command) with command responsibility for all trade convoys in the Western Atlantic north of the latitude of New York City was established, subject to the United States retaining strategic direction of the war in the Western Atlantic—a largely academic proviso once the North African campaign had run its course. This arrangement continued for the duration of the war. Thus, for the first time, the RCN was awarded command responsibilities appropriate to its actual role in the Battle of the Atlantic. The RN, with which the RCN was serving, and which had much wider responsibilities ranging from Murmansk to Dakar, retained command in the Eastern Atlantic.

The Battle of the Atlantic was at its height during the years 1942-43 and much of the battle raged off Newfoundland's shores. During 1942 alone, some 956 ships were sunk in the North Atlantic by U-Boat action. In the same year twenty-one ships were sunk in the River and Gulf of St. Lawrence,

<sup>43</sup> Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 313-319 and Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 175.

<sup>44</sup> See Chapter I, Part 5, Section c and Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 402-417.

évidence financer la construction d'une base. Le Royaume-Uni était en mesure de le faire, mais n'avait pas assez de dollars. Le Canada le pouvait, mais, compte tenu des contribuables, le gouvernement croyait qu'il devrait avoir des titres de propriété ou au moins un bail emphytéotique s'il défrayait le coût de la base.

Finalement on en arriva à une entente: le Canada construirait la base pour l'Amirauté qui finirait par payer les frais d'immobilisation et qui en serait propriétaire. Puisqu'elle servirait surtout aux navires d'escorte, le Canada serait responsable des frais de fonctionnement. La question de l'utilisation de la base après la guerre restait à déterminer mais le Canada obtint d'être consulté si à un moment ou l'autre on se proposait d'en céder les titres ou la direction des installations portuaires.

A Bay Bulls, à environ vingt milles au sud de St. John's, le Canada construisit aussi une base auxiliaire qui servit énormément à faire les «réparations courantes»<sup>41</sup> nécessaires aux navires d'escorte et parfois aux navires marchands.

Le Gouvernement de Terre-Neuve contribua largement à la construction de cette base et accorda au Canada un bail de 99 ans. À la fin des hostilités cependant le Canada révoqua son bail à cause du surplus d'installations de réparation navale;<sup>42</sup> De plus, à ce moment-là Terre-Neuve ne voulut pas que la base fasse concurrence aux chantiers maritimes privés.

Lorsque le nouveau plan pour la protection des convois fut en vigueur, le Royaume-Uni assurait environ cinquante pour cent de la protection des convois transatlantiques, le Canada quarante-huit pour cent, et les États-Unis deux pour cent. Après qu'ils eurent déclaré la guerre, les États-Unis se chargèrent des convois rapides de marchandises et de troupes, mais en peu de temps ils furent tellement pris dans le Pacifique et le long de la côte de l'Atlantique qu'ils retirèrent presque tous leurs contre-torpilleurs du service d'escorte transatlantique.

La Marine royale du Canada participa aussi à la protection des convois dans la Méditerranée, la mer des Antilles et le long de la côte américaine de l'Atlantique. Des navires canadiens sous le commandement de la MR prirent part aux débarquements en Afrique du Nord, en Sicile, en Italie et finalement en France. Mais la protection des convois dans l'Atlantique Nord demeura la principale tâche de la MRC. En effet, au cours des trois dernières années de la guerre, les navires canadiens furent principalement chargés de la protection des convois de marchandises de l'Amérique du Nord jusqu'en Grande-Bretagne. Ce fait souligne l'importance de St. John's et de Halifax dans la poursuite de la Bataille de l'Atlantique.

### *Le commandement naval*<sup>43</sup>

Le premier schéma des relations navales (entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis dans l'Atlantique) avait en majeure partie été établi par l'accord conclu à Argentia en 1941 entre Roosevelt et Churchill. Cet

<sup>41</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 198-199 et le chapitre I, partie 4, section b.

<sup>42</sup> Voir le chapitre I, partie 4, section b.

<sup>43</sup> Stacey, C. P. *op. cit.* p. 347-353 et Dziuban, Stanley W. *op. cit.* p. 175.

including two escort ships;<sup>45</sup> two ships were sunk at anchor at Bell Island and two more in convoy there;<sup>46</sup> and the *Caribou*, the ferry plying between North Sydney and Port-aux-Basques, was sunk with the loss of some 136 lives;<sup>47</sup> in addition, mines were laid in the approaches to Halifax and St. John's. But by the end of 1943 victory over the U-boats, if not yet achieved, seemed a reasonable prospect. By the end of the year, sinkings were declining, and the construction of new ships in allied yards appeared to be gaining over losses.

### *The Strategic Importance of St. John's*

Dr. Tucker, the official historian of the RCN, sums up the importance of St. John's in the desperate struggle as follows:

The importance of St. John's as a wartime naval base can hardly be exaggerated. In simple terms it was the principal western base and turn-around port for ships flying the white ensign. These were engaged in escorting, on the lap between Newfoundland and the British Isles, the great transatlantic convoys that formed the main pipeline through which the enormous resources and strength of North America were pumped into Europe. For the U-boats in the North Atlantic that small harbour was a hornet's nest, and the naval activities which were carried on there made an inestimable contribution towards winning the war.<sup>48</sup>

The extent to which St. John's was actually used by escort ships is indicated by the following table<sup>49</sup> based on Dr. Tucker's figures:

#### Warships Based at St. John's

	Destroyers	Frigates	Corvettes
Jan. 1942	16	—	52
June 1942	11	—	46
Jan. 1943	23	—	30*
June 1943	12	2	37
Jan. 1944	12	7	39
June 1944	—**	9	31
Jan. 1945	8	27	39
June 1945	3	36	41

\* Many Canadian corvettes participated in the Allied assault on North Africa in the fall of 1942 and remained on convoy duty in the Mediterranean in 1943.

\*\* At this time all destroyers were required for the invasion of Europe.

#### POST-WAR ARRANGEMENTS

With the approaching end of hostilities in Europe, Canada and Newfoundland were confronted with the need to re-examine their mutual

<sup>45</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 391.

<sup>46</sup> Documents 647-649 and 652.

<sup>47</sup> Document 732.

<sup>48</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 203.

<sup>49</sup> *Loc. cit.*

accord prévoyait que la direction stratégique de la guerre dans l'Atlantique Ouest, y compris la protection des convois, incomberait aux États-Unis alors que la Grande-Bretagne continuerait à s'occuper des opérations dans l'Atlantique Est. Avant cet accord, la flotte d'escorte de Terre-Neuve que le gouvernement terre-neuvien avait appuyée et dans une certaine mesure aidé à établir, avait été sous les ordres d'un commandant britannique; dorénavant, elle relèverait du commandement naval américain à Argentia.<sup>44</sup> Le Canada n'avait pas été invité à la Conférence de l'Atlantique; de plus il semblerait que les autorités canadiennes n'aient pas été officiellement consultées au sujet de ce transfert de pouvoir dans le cadre duquel les forces canadiennes d'escorte servant avec les Britanniques dans l'Atlantique relèveraient d'un commandement naval américain. Cette situation critique fut désamorcée par le bon jugement et le tact des commandants américains et canadiens en cause.

Les forces américaines d'escorte furent presque complètement retirées de l'Atlantique Nord pendant un certain temps après l'attaque de Pearl Harbor. En conséquence, la question du commandement dans l'Atlantique fut de nouveau soulevée. Bien que les autorités navales américaines hésitèrent à accepter la création d'un commandement canadien distinct, cette mesure fut acceptée en 1943. Un commandement canadien des opérations (celui de l'Atlantique du Nord-Ouest) chargé de la protection de tous les convois marchands dans l'Atlantique Ouest au nord de New York fut établi sous réserve du maintien par les États-Unis de la direction stratégique de la guerre dans l'Atlantique Ouest—une restriction plutôt théorique une fois que la campagne de l'Afrique du Nord fut terminée. Cette entente resta en vigueur pendant toute la durée de la guerre. Ainsi donc pour la première fois, la MRC se voyait confier un commandement conforme au rôle qu'elle remplissait effectivement dans la Bataille de l'Atlantique. La MR, au côté de laquelle servait la MRC, et qui avait des responsabilités beaucoup plus grandes sur de nombreux fronts de Murmansk à Dakar, conserva le commandement dans l'Atlantique Est.

La Bataille de l'Atlantique atteignit son apogée en 1942 et 1943 et se déroula pour une bonne part près des côtes de Terre-Neuve. En 1942 seulement, 956 navires furent coulés par des sous-marins allemands dans l'Atlantique Nord. Dans cette même année, vingt et un navires furent coulés dans le golfe du Saint-Laurent, y compris deux navires escorte,<sup>45</sup> deux navires ancrés à l'île Bell qui furent torpillés ainsi que deux autres en convoi à destination de cette île<sup>46</sup> sans oublier le *Caribou*, traversier faisant la navette entre North Sydney et Port-aux-Basques, qui fut coulé entraînant la mort de 136 personnes.<sup>47</sup> De plus, des mines furent mouillées aux approches des ports de Halifax et de St. John's. Mais, à la fin de 1943, il semblait raisonnable de prévoir la victoire contre les sous-marins allemands

<sup>44</sup> Voir le chapitre I, partie 5, section c et Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 402-417.

<sup>45</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 391.

<sup>46</sup> Documents 647-49 et 652.

<sup>47</sup> Document 732.



defence arrangements. These arrangements had been made largely piecemeal to take care of immediate military problems. The question now at issue was whether they could be adapted to peacetime conditions.

From a strictly military standpoint it might be argued that there was now no need for Canada to underwrite the security of Newfoundland which, with the United States in strategic control of the Western Atlantic, was probably as secure as it had been while the Royal Navy was in control. The three American bases were still active and, although the United States had made no commitments for local defence except for its base areas, it could be counted on in an emergency to come to the assistance of Newfoundland in its own interests. But there were other than military considerations. Canada's assumption of responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland had been clearly recognized by Britain and the United States in the Protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement of 1941. To repudiate this obligation, or to permit local defence to go by default, would indirectly encourage the United States to take over local defence in the event of an emergency, a situation which might be unacceptable to the people of Newfoundland or to the people of Canada. More generally, while not anxious to assume costly post-war defence commitments outside Canada, the Canadian Government had learned during the war that Newfoundland was indeed essential to the defence of Canada.

One difficulty was the uncertain political future of Newfoundland. Its people had been promised that they would decide their own political future if the Island once again became solvent, a condition which was at least temporarily achieved in the latter years of the war due mainly to the massive construction programmes of the United States and Canada. Any Canadian post-war defence arrangements, to be lasting, would have to be adaptable to various political alternatives. Meantime the Newfoundland Government was reluctant to assume responsibility for decisions which might be unacceptable to the Newfoundland electorate in the event of restoration of responsible government. If Newfoundland were to join Canada, the situation would be automatically solved, as defence would be a federal responsibility. But at the time union seemed very unlikely.

### *Tenure to Defence Installations*

From a legal standpoint Canada's post-war defence position in Newfoundland was much weaker than that of the United States. The United States presence rested on the leased bases agreement of 1941, which defined the rights, powers and privileges of the United States forces in Newfoundland in peace and war. These included the right to operate virtually anywhere in or over Newfoundland in war or emergency. On the other hand, while Canada had enjoyed wide freedom of movement in and over Newfoundland during the war, and the use of whatever facilities for defence were available, its position depended basically on the goodwill of the Newfoundland Government and on government regulations implementing wartime statutes such as the *Visiting Forces (Commonwealth) Act* and the *Emergency Powers (Defence)*

car les pertes de navires diminuaient et le nombre de nouveaux navires construits dans les chantiers alliés dépassait les pertes.

### *L'importance de St. John's*

L'historien attiré de la MRC, monsieur G. N. T. Tucker, résume ainsi l'importance de St. John's dans la lutte contre l'ennemi: *Il serait difficile d'exagérer l'importance de St. John's comme base navale pendant la guerre. Bref, c'était la principale base occidentale et un important point de départ ou d'arrivée pour les navires affichant le pavillon de la marine britannique. Ceux-ci protégeaient, entre Terre-Neuve et la Grande-Bretagne, les grands convois transatlantiques qui transportaient, tel un pipe-line, les énormes ressources de l'Amérique du Nord vers l'Europe. Pour les sous-marins allemands dans l'Atlantique Nord, ce petit port était un guêpier et les opérations navales réalisées à partir de ce port contribuèrent largement à la victoire définitive.*<sup>48</sup>

Le tableau suivant,<sup>49</sup> établi après les données du Dr Tucker, révèle à quel point les navires d'escorte utilisaient le port de St. John's:

#### *Navires de guerre stationnés à St. John's*

	Contre-Torpilleurs	Frégates	Corvettes
Janv. 1942	16	—	52
Juin 1942	11	—	46
Janv. 1943	23	—	30*
Juin 1943	12	2	37
Janv. 1944	12	7	39
Juin 1944	—**	9	31
Janv. 1945	8	27	39
Juin 1945	3	36	41

\* Beaucoup de corvettes canadiennes participèrent au débarquement des Alliés en Afrique du Nord à l'automne de 1942 et restèrent sur le front de la Méditerranée en 1943 pour protéger les convois.

\*\* A cette époque, tous les contre-torpilleurs étaient utilisés pour l'invasion de l'Europe.

#### LES ARRANGEMENTS DE L'APRÈS-GUERRE

La fin prochaine des hostilités en Europe obligea le Canada et Terre-Neuve d'étudier de nouveau leurs ententes de défense. Car elles étaient plutôt hétérogènes et avaient été élaborées pour répondre aux divers besoins militaires qui se posaient. Il s'agissait maintenant de savoir si ces ententes pouvaient s'appliquer en temps de paix.

Du point de vue strictement militaire, on peut soutenir que le Canada n'avait pas à garantir la sécurité de Terre-Neuve qui était probablement aussi bien protégée lorsque les États-Unis assuraient la direction stratégique de l'Atlantique Ouest que lorsque le commandement relevait de la Marine royale. Bien qu'ils ne se soient engagés à défendre que leurs bases, dans un cas urgent les États-Unis viendraient sans doute au secours de Terre-Neuve pour protéger leurs propres intérêts. Mais il y avait encore d'autres facteurs militaires à considérer. La Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis avaient claire-

<sup>48</sup> Tucker, G. N. T. *op. cit.* p. 203.

<sup>49</sup> *Loc. cit.*

*Act.* Broadly speaking, these regulations were intended to be effective for the duration of the war only and they would cease to be valid within a reasonable period after hostilities ended.

In addition Canada had been promised post-war tenure to certain defence installations constructed during the war, but, with the exception of Goose Bay, none of these promises had been implemented when hostilities ceased in Europe.

### *The Defence Agreement of 1946*

After prolonged discussion in Ottawa on Canada-Newfoundland post-war defence relations and, informally, between the governments concerned, the Canadian Government took the initiative in proposing a formal conference between the Canadian and Newfoundland governments (and the United Kingdom Government as required) on the post-war use of military airfields and related defence matters. Before the conference the Newfoundland Government was assured that Canada had no plans calling for the stationing of Canadian forces in Newfoundland in normal times.<sup>50</sup> It was thought desirable, however, that defence facilities in Newfoundland be maintained and that they be readily available to Canadian forces in the event of emergency, so as to enable them to act promptly in the region. It was also proposed that there be a general understanding between the two governments that they consult with one another from time to time as occasion required in order to co-ordinate their defence activities.

The conference was convened in St. John's early in 1946 and quickly achieved a satisfactory agreement, the main points being as follows:<sup>51</sup>

- (1) Canada undertook to vacate Gander, Gleneagles and Botwood, as provided in the Air Bases Agreement of 1941, and to forego fifty-year leases promised by the Newfoundland Government to parcels of land within the air bases on which Canada had constructed housing, hangars and other facilities mainly to meet the needs of American forces. Newfoundland agreed: to pay Canada \$1,000,000 for improvements useful for civil aviation; to store military equipment and supplies at Gander and to permit similar storage by Canada at Torbay; that in the event of hostilities involving Newfoundland and Canada, Newfoundland would transfer control and operation of Gander to Canada on request for duration of the emergency; that the two parties should consult one another on defence matters from time to time (the United Kingdom to be included as required); and that Canadian and United Kingdom military aircraft might fly at any time over Newfoundland and use airports under Newfoundland or Canadian control as required.
- (2) Canada was also to be granted title in fee simple to Torbay airport as promised by Newfoundland in 1941. Torbay was to become a

<sup>50</sup> Document 985.

<sup>51</sup> Appendix H.

ment reconnu le Canada comme défenseur de Terre-Neuve dans le protocole annexé à l'entente de 1941. S'il reniait cette obligation ou négligeait la défense de l'île le Canada encouragerait indirectement les États-Unis à s'en charger. Les Terre-Neuviens et les Canadiens n'étaient peut-être pas prêts à accepter cette éventualité. Bien que dans l'ensemble il ne cherchât pas à s'engager dans la défense coûteuse d'un territoire étranger, le gouvernement canadien avait appris par expérience que la sécurité de Terre-Neuve était essentielle à sa défense.

Une des difficultés fut l'avenir politique incertain de Terre-Neuve. Les Terre-Neuviens avaient reçu la promesse que si l'île redevenait solvable, ils pourraient décider de leur avenir politique. Cette condition avait été remplie en raison surtout des énormes programmes de construction des États-Unis et du Canada, au cours des dernières années de la guerre. Pour durer, toute entente bilatérale de défense dans l'après-guerre devait être assez souple pour s'adapter aux diverses solutions politiques. Entre temps, le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve hésitait à prendre des engagements que l'électorat pourrait rejeter advenant le retour au gouvernement autonome. Si Terre-Neuve s'unissait au Canada, le problème serait automatiquement réglé car la défense relèverait du fédéral. A ce moment-là toutefois, l'union semblait très improbable.

#### *Le droit d'occupation des installations de défense*

Du point de vue juridique, la position du Canada vis-à-vis la défense de Terre-Neuve après la guerre était beaucoup plus faible que celle des États-Unis. La présence américaine était fondée sur l'accord de 1941 qui stipulait les droits, les pouvoirs et les privilèges des États-Unis à Terre-Neuve en temps de paix et en temps de guerre, y compris le droit de manœuvre sur presque tout le territoire de l'île. Cependant, le Canada avait joui d'une grande liberté opérationnelle à Terre-Neuve pendant la guerre et avait utilisé toutes les installations militaires disponibles, mais sa position était fondée principalement sur la bonne volonté du gouvernement terre-neuvien et sur l'application de lois adoptées en temps de guerre telles la *Loi sur les forces étrangères* (*Commonwealth britannique*) et l'*Emergency Powers Defence Act*. Dans l'ensemble, la portée de ces règlements était limitée au temps de guerre et ils seraient annulés quelque temps après les hostilités.

De plus le Canada avait reçu la promesse qu'après la guerre, il pourrait occuper certaines installations de défense construites pendant la guerre, mais à l'exception de Goose Bay, aucune de ces promesses ne fut tenue après la fin des hostilités en Europe.

#### *L'accord de défense de 1946*

Après de longues discussions à Ottawa sur les relations de défense d'après-guerre entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve, et des entretiens officieux entre les gouvernements intéressés, le gouvernement canadien prit l'initiative de proposer une conférence officielle entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve (et le Royaume-Uni, suivant les besoins) sur l'utilisation des aéroports militaires et sur d'autres questions de défense. Avant la conférence, le gouvernement



commercial airport operated by the Canadian Government in the Canada-Newfoundland service. Torbay was also to be available to the RCAF for training purposes and for storage of equipment and supplies.

- (3) Newfoundland also agreed to retain as military reserves a number of small defence sites (e.g. for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery and for radar).<sup>52</sup>
- (4) The agreement was to last for three years and thereafter to continue in force subject to revision or termination by mutual consent on twelve months' notice.

Three important facilities constructed by Canada were omitted from the agreement of 1946, namely St. John's naval base, Bay Bulls ship repair base and Goose Bay air base. It will be recalled that the St. John's naval base was built by Canada on account for the Admiralty which took title to the base. At the close of the war the RN and the RCN agreed that St. John's was a wartime base only and surplus to requirements for peacetime operations, especially in view of the existence of U.S. bases on the Island. Discussions about disposal of the base were being held between the two naval authorities at the time of the conference of 1946 and it was decided not to intervene. In the end the base was dismantled, some shore facilities going to the Newfoundland government on a use and maintenance basis.

It was agreed that Bay Bulls would not be allowed to become competitive in peacetime with other ship-repair establishments. It was accordingly dismantled, declared surplus to requirements and disposed of to private interests by the Canadian War Assets Corporation.

The status of Goose Bay had been decided only two years earlier by the Goose Bay lease agreement under which Canada was entitled to occupation for ninety-nine years.<sup>53</sup> By the end of 1946 Goose Bay was the only defence facility in Newfoundland, including Labrador, under the command and control of Canadian forces. Under the Goose Bay lease the United Kingdom and the United States had rights of use for the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as was agreed by the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments to be necessary or desirable. The primary functions of the base during wartime had been to assist in the Atlantic ferry service and in anti-submarine warfare. These functions, of course, ceased with the end of hostilities, but a new danger was appearing on the horizon. With the onset of "the cold war", Goose Bay became for a time a key base in the defence of North America against possible raids over the Arctic. The PJBD, in discussing Canada-United States post-war defence plans declared in 1946: "Goose Bay is

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<sup>52</sup> For security reasons, this section of the agreement of 1946 was not published at the time.

<sup>53</sup> Appendix F. (Canada had originally requested title in fee simple to the arrangement for Torbay but the Newfoundland Government proposed a ninety-nine year lease instead, apparently on the ground that it would be more acceptable to the Newfoundland public than outright ownership.)

de Terre-Neuve avait reçu l'assurance que le Canada ne prévoyait pas envoyer de force en garnison à Terre-Neuve en temps normal.<sup>50</sup> On croyait toutefois souhaitable de maintenir des installations de défense à Terre-Neuve et de permettre aux forces canadiennes de les utiliser immédiatement en cas d'urgence pour qu'elles puissent agir promptement dans la région. Il fut aussi proposé que, dans le cadre d'une entente générale, les deux gouvernements se consultent de temps à autre, selon le besoin, pour coordonner leur défense.

La conférence eut lieu à St. John's au début de 1946. On en arriva très rapidement à un accord acceptable par les parties. Cette accord stipulait:<sup>51</sup>

- 1) Le Canada s'engagea à évacuer Gander, Gleneagles et Botwood conformément à l'accord sur les bases aériennes de 1941 et à dénoncer les baux de cinquante ans que le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve lui avait accordés sur les parties des bases aériennes où le Canada avait construit des logements, des hangars et d'autres installations surtout pour répondre aux besoins des forces américaines. Terre-Neuve accepta de payer un million de dollars au Canada pour les installations destinées à l'aviation civile; d'entreposer des matériaux et des fournitures de guerre à Gander et à autoriser le Canada à faire de même à Torbay; dans le cas d'hostilités impliquant le Canada et Terre-Neuve, cette dernière confierait sur demande la direction et le commandement de Gander au Canada. Terre-Neuve accepta que les deux parties se consultent de temps à autre sur les questions de défense (et que le Royaume-Uni puisse être invité suivant le besoin); et que les avions militaires du Canada et du Royaume-Uni puissent survoler Terre-Neuve en tout temps et utiliser les aéroports sous contrôle terre-neuvien ou canadien suivant le besoin.
- 2) Le Canada reçut aussi les titres de propriété avec tous droits de jouissance et de possession à l'aéroport de Torbay suivant la promesse que Terre-Neuve lui avait faite en 1941. Torbay allait devenir un aéroport commercial exploité par le gouvernement canadien pour faire la liaison Terre-Neuve-Canada. Torbay devait aussi servir à la formation des nouvelles recrues du CARC et à l'entreposage de matériaux et de fournitures.
- 3) Terre-Neuve accepta aussi de conserver quelques petits sites défensifs comme réserves militaires (par exemple, l'artillerie côtière et anti-aérienne et le radar).<sup>52</sup>
- 4) L'accord devait durer trois ans et par après il serait encore renouvelable par un commun accord et sur un préavis de douze mois.

Trois importantes bases construites par le Canada ne furent pas mentionnées dans l'accord de 1946, notamment la base navale de St. John's, le chantier de réparation navale de Bay Bulls et la base aérienne de Goose Bay. Il faut se rappeler que le Canada avait construit la base navale de

<sup>50</sup> Document 985.

<sup>51</sup> Appendice H.

<sup>52</sup> Pour des raisons de sécurité, cette section de l'accord de 1946 ne fut pas publiée à l'époque.

considered vital to the defence of the United States and Canada and should be maintained as a military base on such a scale as to provide for the stationing of operational squadrons as required.”<sup>54</sup>

The draft agreement worked out at the Conference of 1946 proved acceptable to the three governments concerned. Each of the three countries reaped substantial benefits. To Canada it meant assurance of freedom of action in the Newfoundland area in the event of another emergency; to Newfoundland it meant assurance of immediate support from Canada in the event of a crisis, without loss of sovereignty; to the United Kingdom it meant assurance that the wartime partnership of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland for the maintenance of transatlantic sea and air communications, which had been so important in the achievement of victory in the North Atlantic, still survived in fact. But the 1946 Agreement was soon superseded by events. For the time being, the issue of Newfoundland's political future took precedence, at least among Newfoundlanders. Three years from the day the Agreement of 1946 became effective, Newfoundland became the tenth province of Canada. Henceforth its defence would be the responsibility of the Government and Parliament of Canada.

Ottawa, September 1974

R. A. MACKAY

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<sup>54</sup> Document 1010.

St. John's pour l'Amirauté qui en prit possession. À la fin de la guerre, la MR et la MRC convinrent que St. John's était inutile en temps de paix, compte tenu surtout de la présence de bases américaines sur l'île. Des discussions au sujet du sort de la base eurent lieu entre les deux autorités navales lors de la conférence de 1946 mais on maintint le *statu quo*. En fin de compte, la base fut démantelée et certaines installations côtières furent remises au gouvernement de Terre-Neuve qui en retour devait se charger de l'entretien.

Il fut convenu qu'en temps de paix, Bay Bulls ne devait pas faire concurrence aux autres chantiers navals. En conséquence, les installations furent donc démantelées et vendues par la Société canadienne des biens de guerre.

Le statut de Goose Bay avait été déterminé seulement deux ans plus tôt par la remise d'un bail qui accordait des droits d'occupation au Canada pour quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans.<sup>53</sup> À la fin de 1946, Goose Bay était la seule base militaire à Terre-Neuve et au Labrador, qui était encore sous les ordres et la direction des forces canadiennes. Aux termes du bail de Goose Bay, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis avaient le droit d'utiliser la base pendant la guerre et pour une période ultérieure fixée selon le bon vouloir des gouvernements du Canada et de Terre-Neuve. Pendant la guerre, la base avait servi principalement au service transocéanique et à la guerre anti-sous-marine. Par après, ces fonctions disparurent, mais un nouveau danger apparaissait à l'horizon: la «guerre froide». Goose Bay devint une base clé dans la défense de l'Amérique du Nord contre les raids possibles via l'Arctique. Dans ses discussions sur les plans de défense canado-américaine d'après-guerre, la CPCAD a déclaré en 1946: «la base de Goose Bay est essentielle à la défense des États-Unis et du Canada et elle doit être maintenue comme base militaire de manière à permettre l'installation d'une garnison d'escadrons opérationnels dont l'effectif varierait suivant le besoin».<sup>54</sup>

Le projet d'accord rédigé à la Conférence de 1946 fut agréé par les trois gouvernements concernés; chacun en bénéficia. Il garantissait au Canada la liberté d'action dans la région de Terre-Neuve advenant une autre catastrophe; il assurait Terre-Neuve de l'appui immédiat du Canada en cas de crise, sans compromettre son autonomie; pour le Royaume-Uni, l'accord signifiait la survie effective de la collaboration qui avait uni le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et Terre-Neuve pendant la guerre dans leur effort pour maintenir les communications transatlantiques maritimes et aériennes, effort commun qui avait sensiblement contribué à la victoire dans l'Atlantique Nord. Toutefois, l'accord de 1946 fut bientôt dépassé par les événements. À cette époque, la question de l'avenir politique de Terre-Neuve devint prioritaire, du moins pour les Terre-Neuviens. Trois ans après l'entrée en vigueur de l'accord de 1946, Terre-Neuve devenait la dixième province du Canada et dorénavant sa défense ressortirait au gouvernement fédéral.

Ottawa, septembre 1974.

R. A. MacKAY

<sup>53</sup> Appendice F. Au début le Canada avait demandé d'obtenir les titres de propriété avec tous droits de jouissance et de possession lors de l'accord sur Torbay. Cependant le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve proposa un bail emphytéotique de quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans, alléguant que le bail serait mieux accepté par la population terre-neuvienne que la possession absolue.

<sup>54</sup> Document 1010.



## PROVENANCE DES DOCUMENTS\*

### LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS\*

Bates Papers .....	Archives publiques du Canada /Public Archives of Canada RG 23 Acc. 71/560
BC .....	Banque du Canada/Bank of Canada
C .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada RG 20 B1
Canada House .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada RG 25 A12
CTS .....	Recueil des traités du Canada/Canada Treaty Series
CWC .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada RG 2 7C
DND .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada RG 24
DND(DH) .....	Ministère de la Défense nationale (Direction historique)/ Department of National Defence (Directorate of History)
HCD .....	Débats de la Chambre des communes/Debates of the House of Commons
Howe Papers .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada MG 27 III B20
JWP .....	Pickersgill, J. W. <i>The Mackenzie King Record</i> . Vol. 1, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960. 723 p.
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MacKay Papers .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada MG 30 E48
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PRO .....	Public Record Office, Londres/London
Skelton Papers .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada RG 25 D1
T .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada RG 12 vol. 613
WIB .....	Archives publiques du Canada/Public Archives of Canada RG 36 31

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\*Les renseignements fournis dans cette liste permettent un accès facile aux sources.

\*The information in this list provides easy access to the sources.



## LISTE DES PERSONNALITÉS\*

### LIST OF PERSONS\*

- Anderson (commodore de l'air N. R.), commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est (1938-1942); directeur du personnel militaire au Conseil de l'Air (1942-1943); membre de la CPCAD (1942-1944).
- Anderson (major-général T. V.), chef d'état-major général (1938-1940); inspecteur général au Canada central (1940-1942).
- Angus (H. F.), conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1941-1945).
- Attlee (Clement R.), secrétaire d'État aux Dominions (1942-1943).
- Beatty (Sir Edward), président du *Canadian Pacific Railway* (1918-1942).
- Beaverbrook (lord), ministre de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne (1941-1943); lord du Sceau privé (1943-1945).
- Biggar (colonel O. M.), président de la section canadienne de la CPCAD (1940-1945).
- Bower (R. P.), commissaire au commerce à Terre-Neuve (1943-1945).
- Bowhill (maréchal en chef de l'air, sir Frederick), commandant du Service transocéanique de la RAF (1941-1943).
- Brant (major-général G. C.), commandant en chef des troupes américaines à Terre-Neuve (1941-1943).
- Breadner (maréchal de l'air L. S.), chef de l'état-major de l'Air (1940-1943).
- Bridle (Paul A.), haut commissariat à Terre-Neuve (1945-1946, 1948-1949); secrétaire du Comité interministériel sur les relations Canada-Terre-Neuve (1946-1948); haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve 1948 et mars 1949.
- Anderson, Air Commodore N. R., Air Office Commanding, Eastern Air Command, 1938-42; Air Member for Air Staff, 1942-43; Member of the PJBD, 1942-44.
- Anderson, Major-General T. V., Chief of the General Staff 1938-40; Inspector General for Central Canada, 1940-42.
- Angus, H. F., Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-45.
- Attlee, Clement R., Secretary of State for Dominions, 1942-43.
- Beatty, Sir Edward, President of Canadian Pacific Railway, 1918-42.
- Beaverbrook, Lord, Minister of Aircraft Production of Great Britain, 1941-43; Lord Privy Seal, 1943-45.
- Biggar, Colonel O. M., Chairman, Canadian Section of the PJBD, 1940-45.
- Bower, R. P., Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland, 1943-45.
- Bowhill, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Frederick, Officer Commanding RAF Ferry Command, 1941-43.
- Brant, Major-General G. C., Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command (United States), 1941-43.
- Breadner, Air Marshal L. S., Chief of the Air Staff, 1940-43.
- Bridle, Paul A., High Commission in Newfoundland, 1945-46, 1948-49; Secretary of Interdepartmental Committee on Canada-Newfoundland Relations, 1946-48; Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland, 1948 and March 1949.

\* Les fonctions énumérées dans cette liste se rapportent aux événements auxquels ont participé les personnalités et non pas à toute la période 1935-1949.

\* The positions enumerated in this list relate to the events in which the persons participated and not to the whole of the 1935-1949 period.

- Britton (J. C.), haut commissariat à Terre-Neuve (1943-1945); commissaire au commerce à Terre-Neuve (1945-1948).
- Brooks (général John B.), commandant en chef des troupes américaines à Terre-Neuve (1943-1944).
- Burchell (C. J.), haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve (1941-1944, 1948-1949).
- Campbell (sir Gerald), haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne (1938-1941).
- Carew (W. J.), secrétaire de la commission pour Terre-Neuve et secrétaire aux Affaires intérieures de Terre-Neuve (1934-1949).
- Clark (W. C.), sous-ministre des Finances et secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor (1932-1952).
- Clutterbuck (P. A.), sous-secrétaire adjoint aux Dominions (1940-1942); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions (1942-1946); haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne (1946-1952).
- Cranborne (vicomte), secrétaire d'État aux Dominions (1943-1945).
- Crerar (major-général H. D. G.), chef d'état-major général (1940-1941).
- Croil (vice-maréchal de l'air G. M.), chef de l'état-major de l'Air (1938-1940); inspecteur général du CARC (1940-1943).
- Cuffe (commodore de l'air A. A. L.), membre de la CPCAD (1940-1942); directeur du personnel militaire au Conseil de l'Air (1940-1943).
- Curtis (vice-maréchal de l'air W. A.), directeur du personnel militaire au Conseil de l'Air (1944-1947); membre de la CPCAD (1944-1947).
- Curtis (W. E.), agent des priorités de Terre-Neuve (1942-1945).
- DeCarteret (S. L.), sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air (1941-1944).
- Duff (sir Patrick), haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne (1941-1944).
- Dunn (P. D. H.), commissaire aux Ressources naturelles de Terre-Neuve (1941-1945).
- Dyde (colonel H. A.), secrétaire du Conseil de défense (1940-1944); rattaché au haut commissariat à Terre-Neuve (septembre-décembre 1941).
- Earnshaw (brigadier Philip), commandant des forces militaires canadiennes et terre-neuviennes à Terre-Neuve (1940-1941).
- Britton, J. C., High Commission in Newfoundland, 1943-45; Trade Commissioner, 1945-48.
- Brooks, General John B., Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command (United States), 1943-44.
- Burchell, C. J., High Commissioner in Newfoundland, 1941-44, 1948-49.
- Campbell, Sir Gerald, High Commissioner of Great Britain, 1938-41.
- Carew, W. J., Secretary of Commission of Government and Secretary for Home Affairs of Newfoundland, 1934-49.
- Clark, W. C., Deputy Minister of Finance and Secretary of the Treasury Board, 1932-52.
- Clutterbuck, P. A., Assistant Under-Secretary for Dominions, 1940-42; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions, 1942-46; High Commissioner of Great Britain, 1946-52.
- Cranborne, Viscount, Secretary of State for Dominions, 1943-45.
- Crerar, Major-General H. D. G., Chief of the General Staff, 1940-41.
- Croil, Air Vice-Marshal G. M., Chief of the Air Staff, 1938-40; Inspector General of the RCAF, 1940-43.
- Cuffe, Air Commodore A. A. L., Member of the PJBD, 1940-42; Air Member for Air Staff, 1940-43.
- Curtis, Air Vice-Marshal W. A.; Air Member for Air Staff 1944-47; Member of the PJBD, 1944-47.
- Curtis, W. E., Priorities Officer of Newfoundland, 1942-45.
- DeCarteret, S. L., Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, 1941-44.
- Duff, Sir Patrick, Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain, 1941-44.
- Dunn, P. D. H., Commissioner for Natural Resources of Newfoundland, 1941-45.
- Dyde, Colonel H. A., Secretary to Defence Council, Ottawa, 1940-44; attached to High Commission in Newfoundland, September-December, 1941.
- Earnshaw, Brigadier Philip, Commander, Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces in Newfoundland, 1940-41.



- Edwards (commandant C. P.), sous-ministre des Transports (1941-1949).
- Elkins (major-général W. H. P.), maître général de l'artillerie (1938-1940); général commandant en chef de la région de l'Atlantique (1940-1943).
- Emerson (sir Edward), commissaire à la Justice de Terre-Neuve (1937-1940); commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense de Terre-Neuve (1940-1944); juge-en-chef de Terre-Neuve (1945-1949).
- Flinn (major W. H.), commissaire aux Ressources naturelles de Terre-Neuve (1945-1948).
- Gibson (brigadier R. B.), directeur des opérations militaires et des renseignements (1940-1941).
- Gibson (Colin), ministre du Revenu national (1940-1945); ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air (1945-1946).
- Gill (lieutenant-colonel E. W. T.), secrétaire du Comité des chefs d'état-major (1943-1945); secrétaire du Comité de Défense du Cabinet (1945-1949).
- Goodeve (brigadier L. E.), commandant des forces militaires canadiennes et terre-neuviennes à Terre-Neuve (1945-1946).
- Gordon (Donald), sous-gouverneur de la Banque du Canada (1938-1949); président (en alternance) de la Commission de contrôle du change étranger (1939-1941); président de la Commission des prix et du commerce en temps de guerre (1941-1947).
- Gushue (Raymond), président de la Commission des pêcheries de Terre-Neuve (1936-1952).
- Guthrie (commodore de l'air K. M.), directeur des services de l'état-major de l'Air, région aérienne de l'Est (1939-1942); commandant du CARC à Gander (1941).
- Heakes (capitaine de groupe F. Vernon), directeur des plans et des opérations aériennes (1940-1942); membre de la CPCAD (1942); commandant de l'aviation, premier groupe à Terre-Neuve (1943-1944).
- Heeney (A. D. P.), secrétaire principal du Premier ministre (1938-1940); greffier du Conseil privé et secrétaire du Cabinet (1940-1949).
- Edwards, Commander C. P., Deputy Minister of Transport, 1941-49.
- Elkins, Major-General W. H. P., Master General of the Ordnance, 1938-40; G.O.C.-in-C, Atlantic Command, 1940-43.
- Emerson, Sir Edward, Commissioner for Justice of Newfoundland, 1937-40; Commissioner for Justice and Defence, of Newfoundland, 1940-44; Chief Justice of Newfoundland, 1945-49.
- Flinn, Major W. H., Commissioner for Natural Resources of Newfoundland, 1945-48.
- Gibson, Brigadier R. B., Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1940-41.
- Gibson, Colin, Minister of National Revenue 1940-45; Minister of National Defence for Air, 1945-46.
- Gill, Lt.-Col. E. W. T., Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1943-45; Secretary, Cabinet Defence Committee 1945-49.
- Goodeve, Brigadier L. E., Commander, Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces in Newfoundland, 1945-46.
- Gordon, Donald, Deputy Governor, Bank of Canada, 1938-49; Chairman (Alternate) Foreign Exchange Control Board, 1939-41; Chairman, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, 1941-47.
- Gushue, Raymond, Chairman, Newfoundland Fisheries Board, 1936-52.
- Guthrie, Air Commodore K. M., Senior Air Member, Eastern Air Command, 1939-42; Officer Commanding RCAF, Gander, 1941.
- Heakes, Group-Captain F. Vernon, Director of Plans and Operations, 1940-42; Member of the PJBD, 1942; Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group Newfoundland, 1943-44.
- Heeney, A. D. P., Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1938-40; Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, 1940-49.

- Henry (major-général Guy V.), membre de la section américaine de la CPCAD (1942-1947).
- Hickerson (J. D.), membre de la section américaine de la CPCAD (1940-1945).
- Hopper (George D.), consul général des États-Unis à Terre-Neuve (1941-1945).
- Howe (C. D.), ministre des Transports (1936-1940); ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements (1940-1945); ministre de la Reconstruction (1944-1945); ministre de la Reconstruction et des Approvisionnements (1946-1948).
- Howell (J. Gordon), secrétaire aux douanes de Terre-Neuve (1942-1949).
- Ilsley (J. L.), ministre des Finances (1940-1946); ministre de la Justice (1946-1948).
- James (R. L. M.), commissaire aux Finances de Terre-Neuve (1946-1949).
- Jenkins (colonel J. H.), directeur des opérations militaires et de la planification (1942-1946).
- Keenleyside (H. L.), secrétaire de la section canadienne de la CPCAD (1940-1945); conseiller, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1940-1941); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1941-1944); haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve (1944).
- King (W. L. Mackenzie), Premier ministre (1935-1948); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1935-1946).
- La Guardia (F. H.), maire de New-York (1934-1945); président de la section américaine de la CPCAD (1940-1947).
- Leclerc (major-général P. E.), officier général commandant les forces militaires canadiennes et terre-neuviennes à Terre-Neuve (1943-1945).
- Lockwood (T. C.), régisseur des transports, ministère des Transports (1939-1945).
- London (sir George E.), commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements de Terre-Neuve (1944-1945).
- Macdonald (Angus L.), ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals (1940-1944).
- Macdonald (sir Gordon), gouverneur de Terre-Neuve (1946-1949).
- Henry, Major-General Guy V., Member, United States Section of the PJBD, 1942-47.
- Hickerson, J. D., Member, United States Section of the PJBD, 1940-45.
- Hopper, George D., Consul General of United States in Newfoundland, 1941-45.
- Howe, C. D., Minister of Transport, 1936-40; Minister of Munitions and Supply, 1940-45; Minister of Reconstruction, 1944-45; Minister of Reconstruction and Supply, 1946-48.
- Howell, J. Gordon, Secretary for Customs of Newfoundland, 1942-49.
- Ilsley, J. L., Minister of Finance, 1940-46; Minister of Justice, 1946-48.
- James, R. L. M., Commissioner for Finance of Newfoundland, 1946-49.
- Jenkins, Colonel J. H., Director of Military Operations and Planning, 1942-46.
- Keenleyside, H. L., Secretary, Canadian Section of the PJBD, 1940-45; Counsellor, Department of External Affairs, 1940-41; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-44; Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland, 1944.
- King, W. L. Mackenzie, Prime Minister, 1935-48; Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1935-46.
- LaGuardia, F. H., Mayor of New York, 1934-45; Chairman, United States Section of the PJBD, 1940-47.
- Leclerc, Major-General P. E., General Office Commanding Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces in Newfoundland, 1943-45.
- Lockwood, T. C., Transport Controller, Department of Transport, 1939-45.
- London, Sir George E., Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply of Newfoundland, 1944-45.
- Macdonald, Angus L., Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, 1940-44.
- Macdonald, Sir Gordon, Governor of Newfoundland, 1946-49.

- Macdonald (J. S.), conseiller, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1940-1944); haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve (1944-1948).
- MacDonald (Malcolm), secrétaire d'État aux Dominions (1938-1939); haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne (1941-1946).
- Macdonnell (R. M.), ministère des Affaires extérieures (1944-1947); secrétaire de la section canadienne de la CPCAD (1945-1947).
- Machtig (sir Eric Gustav), sous-secrétaire permanent d'État aux Dominions (1940-1949).
- MacKay (R. A.), conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1943-1947); directeur de la direction du Commonwealth (1947-1952); directeur adjoint du Comité interministériel sur l'union de Terre-Neuve avec le Canada (1948-1949).
- Manning (Raymond), secrétaire aux Services publics de Terre-Neuve (1935-1949).
- Marshall (Walter), secrétaire aux Finances de Terre-Neuve (1938-1949).
- Massey (Vincent), haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne (1935-1946).
- McEwan (capitaine de groupe C. M.), commandant de l'aviation, premier groupe aérien à Terre-Neuve (1941-1943).
- Mills (W. G.), sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals (1941-1945).
- Murchie (major-général, J. C.), directeur des opérations militaires et des renseignements (1940-1941); état-major, quartier général militaire du Canada, Londres (1941-1942); sous-chef d'état-major général (1942-1944); chef d'état-major général (1944-1945).
- Murray (commodore L. M.), sous-chef de l'état-major naval (1939-1941); membre de la CPCAD (1940); commodore commandant les navires et établissements canadiens dans les eaux de Grande-Bretagne (1941); officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve (1941-1942).
- Neill (J. S.), commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements de Terre-Neuve (1945-1948).
- Macdonald, J. S., Counsellor, Department of External Affairs, 1940-44; High Commissioner in Newfoundland, 1944-48.
- MacDonald, Malcolm, Secretary of State for Dominions, 1938-39; High Commissioner of Great Britain, 1941-46.
- Macdonnell, R. M., Department of External Affairs, 1944-47; Secretary, Canadian Section of the PJBD, 1945-47.
- Machtig, Sir Eric Gustav, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Dominions, 1940-49.
- MacKay, R. A., Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1943-47; Head of Commonwealth Division, 1947-52; Deputy Chairman of Inter-Departmental Committee on Union of Newfoundland with Canada, 1948-49.
- Manning, Raymond, Secretary for Public Utilities of Newfoundland, 1935-49.
- Marshall, Walter, Secretary for Finance of Newfoundland, 1938-49.
- Massey, Vincent, High Commissioner in Great Britain, 1935-46.
- McEwan, Group-Captain C. M., Air Officer Commanding, No. 1 Group, Newfoundland, 1941-43.
- Mills, W. G. Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, 1941-45.
- Murchie, Major-General J. C., Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1940-41; General Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters, London, 1941-42; Vice-Chief of the General Staff 1942-44; Chief of the General Staff, 1944-45.
- Murray, Commodore L. M., Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, 1939-41; Member of the PJBD, 1940; Commodore Commanding Canadian Ships and Establishments in Great Britain, 1941; Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, 1941-42.
- Neill, J. S., Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply, Government of Newfoundland, 1945-48.

- Nelles (vice-amiral Percy W.), chef de l'état-major naval (1939-1944); président du Comité des chefs d'état-major (1940-1944).
- Outerbridge (sir Leonard), secrétaire privé honoraire du gouverneur de Terre-Neuve (1930-1944); directeur de la défense civile de Terre-Neuve (1942-1946).
- Page (major-général L. F.), officier général commandant les forces militaires canadiennes et terre-neuviennes à Terre-Neuve (1941-1943).
- Parsons (J. Graham), secrétaire de la section américaine de la CPCAD (1945-1947).
- Pattison (chef d'escadrille (RAF) H. A. L.), directeur de l'aviation civile de Terre-Neuve et représentant du ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne à l'aéroport de Gander (1937-1949).
- Pearson (L. B.), sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1941-1942); ministre-conseiller à la légation aux États-Unis (1942-1944); ministre aux États-Unis (1944-1945); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1945-1946); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1946-1948); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1948-1957).
- Penson (J. H.), commissaire aux Finances de Terre-Neuve (1937-1944).
- Pick (A. J.), haut commissariat à Terre-Neuve (1941-1942).
- Pope (major-général Maurice), directeur des opérations militaires (1939); état-major, quartier général de l'Armée canadienne, Londres (1940-1941); sous-chef d'état-major général (1941); membre de la CPCAD (1941-1945); représentant du Comité de guerre du Cabinet à Washington (1942); président de l'état-major interarmes du Canada à Washington (1942-1944); secrétaire du Comité de guerre du Cabinet (1944).
- Power (C. G.), ministre associé de la Défense nationale et ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air (1940-1944).
- Price (E. C.), président de la Commission des douanes de Terre-Neuve (1937-1942); sous-contrôleur de l'alimentation de Terre-Neuve (1942-1943).
- Puddester (H. G.), secrétaire à la Justice de Terre-Neuve (1944-1949).
- Nelles, Vice-Admiral Percy W., Chief of the Naval Staff, 1939-44; Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1940-44.
- Outerbridge, Sir Leonard, Private Honorary Secretary to the Governor of Newfoundland, 1930-44; Director of Civil Defence, 1942-46.
- Page, Major-General L. F., General Officer Commanding Combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces in Newfoundland, 1941-43.
- Parsons, J. Graham, Secretary, United States Section of the PJBD, 1945-47.
- Pattison, Squadron-Leader H. A. L., RAF, Director of Civil Aviation of Newfoundland and representative of British Air Ministry at Gander Airport, 1937-49.
- Pearson, L. B., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-42; Minister-Counsellor, Legation in United States, 1942-44; Minister in United States, 1944-45; Ambassador in United States, 1945-46; Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1946-48; Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1948-57.
- Penson, J. H., Commissioner for Finance of Newfoundland, 1937-44.
- Pick, A. J., High Commission in Newfoundland, 1941-42.
- Pope, Major-General Maurice, Director of Military Operations, 1939; General Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters, London, 1940-41; Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 1941; Member of the PJBD, 1941-45; Representative of Cabinet War Committee in Washington, 1942; Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, 1942-44; Secretary of Cabinet War Committee, 1944.
- Power, C. G., Associate Minister of National Defence, Minister of National Defence for Air, 1940-44.
- Price, E. C., Chairman, Newfoundland Board of Customs, 1937-42; Deputy Food Controller, 1942-43.
- Puddester, H. G. Secretary for Justice of Newfoundland, 1944-49.



- Puddester (sir John), commissaire à la Santé publique et au Bien-être social et vice-président de la commission pour Terre-Neuve (1934-1947).
- Ralston (J. L.), ministre des Finances (1939-1940); ministre de la Défense nationale (1940-1944).
- Read (J. E.), conseiller juridique, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1929-1946).
- Reid (Escott), ministère des Affaires extérieures (1941-1944); ambassade aux États-Unis (1944-1945); conseiller, haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne (1945-1946); conseiller, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1946-1947); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1947-1948); sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures (1948-1952).
- Reid (commodore H. E.), commandant de la région navale de l'Atlantique (1939-1940); sous-chef de l'état-major naval (1941-1942); officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve (1942-1943).
- Robertson (Norman A.), ministère des Affaires extérieures (1935-1940); conseiller, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1940-1941); sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures (1941); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1941-1946); haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne (1946-1949).
- Rogers (B. A.), conseiller spécial du sous-ministre de la Justice (1943-1945).
- Russell (H. J.), gérant général du chemin de fer de Terre-Neuve (1923-1948).
- St. Laurent (Louis S.), ministre de la Justice (1941-1946 et 1948); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1946-1948); Premier ministre (1948-1957).
- Schwerdt (capitaine (MR) C. M. R.), secrétaire particulier du gouverneur de Terre-Neuve (1936-1942); premier officier de marine, St. John's (1939-1941); capitaine du port de St. John's (1941-1942).
- Stuart (brigadier Kenneth), membre de la CPCAD (1940-1941); sous-chef d'état-major général (1941); chef d'état-major général (1941-1943).
- Puddester, Sir John, Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare and Vice-Chairman, Commission of Government of Newfoundland, 1934-47.
- Ralston, J. L., Minister of Finance, 1939-40; Minister of National Defence, 1940-44.
- Read, J. E., Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, 1929-46.
- Reid, Escott, Department of External Affairs, 1941-44; Embassy in United States, 1944-45; Counsellor, High Commission in Great Britain, 1945-46; Counsellor, Department of External Affairs, 1946-47; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1947-48; Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1948-52.
- Reid, Commodore H. E., Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, 1939-40; Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, 1941-42; Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, 1942-43.
- Robertson, Norman A., Department of External Affairs, 1935-40; counsellor, Department of External Affairs, 1940-41; Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941; Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1941-46; High Commissioner in Great Britain, 1946-49.
- Rogers, B. A., Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Justice, 1943-45.
- Russell, H. J., General Manager, Newfoundland Railway, 1923-48.
- St. Laurent, Louis S., Minister of Justice, 1941-46 and 1948; Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1946-48; Prime Minister, 1948-57.
- Schwerdt, Captain C. M. R., R.N., Private Secretary to the Governor of Newfoundland, 1936-42; Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's 1939-41; Captain of the Port, St. John's, 1941-42.
- Stuart, Brigadier Kenneth, Member of the PJBD, 1940-41; Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 1941; Chief of the General Staff 1941-43.

- Taylor (commodore C. R. H.), officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve (1944-1945).
- Towers (Graham F.), gouverneur de la Banque du Canada (1935-1954); président de la Commission de contrôle du change étranger (1939-1951).
- Walsh (A. J.), agent des relations de travail de Terre-Neuve (1942-1944), commissaire aux Affaires intérieures et à l'Éducation de Terre-Neuve (1944-1947); commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense de Terre-Neuve (1947-1949).
- Walwyn (vice-amiral sir Humphrey), gouverneur de Terre-Neuve (1936-1946).
- Wild (Ira), commissaire aux Finances de Terre-Neuve (1941-1946).
- Wilgress (L. D.), directeur du Service de renseignements commerciaux, ministère du Commerce (1932-1940); sous-ministre du Commerce (1940-1942); président de la Commission canadienne de la marine marchande (1941-1942).
- Wilson (Morris W.), président directeur général de la Banque royale du Canada (1934-1944).
- Winant (J. G.), ambassadeur des États-Unis en Grande-Bretagne (1941-1946).
- Winter (H. A.), commissaire aux Affaires intérieures et à l'Éducation de Terre-Neuve (1941-1944); commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense de Terre-Neuve (1945-1947); juge de la Cour Suprême de Terre-Neuve (1947-1949).
- Winter (J. A.), commissaire aux Affaires intérieures et à l'Éducation de Terre-Neuve (1936-1939).
- Woods (sir Wilfrid), commissaire aux Services publics de Terre-Neuve (1937-1942); commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements de Terre-Neuve (1942-1944).
- Wrong (H. H.), sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1942-1944); sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures (1944-1946).
- Taylor, Commodore C. R. H., Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, 1944-45.
- Towers, Graham F., Governor of the Bank of Canada, 1935-54; Chairman, Foreign Exchange Control Board, 1939-51.
- Walsh, A. J., Labour Relations Officer of Newfoundland, 1942-44; Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education, 1944-47; Commissioner for Justice and Defence, 1947-49.
- Walwyn, Vice-Admiral Sir Humphrey, Governor of Newfoundland, 1936-46.
- Wild, Ira, Commissioner for Finance of Newfoundland, 1941-46.
- Wilgress, L. D., Director of Commercial Intelligence Service, Department of Trade and Commerce, 1932-40; Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, 1940-42; Chairman of Canadian Shipping Board, 1941-42.
- Wilson, Morris W., President and Managing Director, Royal Bank of Canada, 1934-44.
- Winant, J. G., Ambassador of United States in Great Britain, 1941-46.
- Winter, H. A., Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education of Newfoundland, 1941-44; Commissioner for Justice and Defence of Newfoundland, 1945-47; Judge of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland, 1947-49.
- Winter, J. A., Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education of Newfoundland, 1936-39.
- Woods, Sir Wilfrid, Commissioner for Public Utilities of Newfoundland, 1937-42; Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply of Newfoundland, 1942-44.
- Wrong, H. H., Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1942-44; Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1944-46.

## PHOTOGRAPHIES

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## PHOTOGRAPHS

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Photo prise à l'occasion de la première réunion de la CPCAD tenue à Ottawa le 26 août 1940. Assis de g. à d.: S. D. Embick, Armée des É.U.; O. M. Biggar, président de la section canadienne; J. P. Moffat, ministre des É.U.; W. L. Mackenzie King, Premier Ministre; F. L. La Guardia, président de la section américaine J. L. Ralston, ministre de la Défense nationale; H. W. Hill, Marine des É.U. Debouts de g. à d.; H. L. Keenleyside, secrétaire de la section canadienne; J. D. Hickerson, secrétaire de la section américaine; K. Stuart, sous-chef d'état-major général; L. W. Murray, sous-chef de l'état major naval; F. P. Sherman, Marine des É.U.; A. A. L. Cuffe, CARC; J. T. McNarney, Armée des É.U.; J. S. Gullet, attaché de l'air à la légation des É.U.

Picture taken on the occasion of the first meeting of the PJBBD held in Ottawa on August 26, 1940. Seated, l. to r.: S. D. Embick, U.S. Army; O M Biggar, Chairman of Canadian Section; J. P. Moffat, Minister of U.S.; W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister; F. L. La Guardia, Chairman of the American Section; J. L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence; H. W. Hill, U.S. Navy. Standing l to r.: H. L. Keenleyside, Secretary of Canadian Section; J. D. Hickerson, Secretary of American Section; K. Stuart, Deputy Chief of General Staff; L. W. Murray, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff; F. P. Sherman, U.S. Navy; A. A. L. Cuffe, RCAF; J. T. McNarney, U.S. Army; J. S. Gullet, Air Attaché, U.S. Legation.



Premier bombardier de type *Digby* à faire escale à Gander. Août 1941.

First *Digby* bomber to pass through Gander, August, 1941.



Bombardiers de type *Hudson* attendant le signal du départ. Gander, septembre 1941.

*Hudson* bombers awaiting take-off, Gander, September 1941.



Vue d'ensemble de l'aéroport de Gander.  
Août 1943.

General view of Gander Airport, August, 1943.



Avions militaires attendant le départ.  
Gander, août, 1944.

Military aircraft awaiting take-off, Gan-  
der, August, 1944.



Vue d'ensemble des installations de défense  
à Botwood. À l'avant-plan on remarque la  
base d'hydravions. Juillet 1943.

General view of Botwood defence installa-  
tions. In foreground one can see the sea-  
plane base. July, 1943.





Les installations navales à Botwood. Juillet 1943.

Naval installations at Botwood, July 1943.



Construction de l'aéroport de Torbay. Octobre 1941.

Torbay Airport under construction, October, 1941.





Construction de l'aéroport de Goose Bay.  
Mars 1942.

Goose Bay Airport under construction,  
March, 1942.



Canon anti-aérien manœuvré par le Corps  
d'artillerie royal canadien à l'aéroport de  
Goose Bay. Mai 1942.

Anti-aircraft gun manned by Royal Cana-  
dian Artillery, Goose Bay Airport, May  
1942.



Avion de type *Liberator* prêt à décoller.  
Goose Bay, mai 1943

*Liberator* ready for take-off, Goose Bay,  
May, 1943.



Les baraquements de l'aéroport de Goose  
Bay. Mai 1943.

Living quarters, Goose Bay Airport, May,  
1943.



Équipage prêt pour l'envolée. Goose Bay,  
octobre 1943.

Air crew about to fly. Goose Bay, October,  
1943.





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Signature du protocole annexé à l'accord sur les bases cédées à bail aux États-Unis. À la table: un personnage non identifié, J. Winant, Winston Churchill Vincent Massey. Londres, mars 1941.

Signing of Protocol to U.S. Bases Agreement. At table: unidentified person, J. Winant, Winston Churchill and Vincent Massey. London, March, 1941.



Harmon Field, base américaine près de Stephenville. Août 1943.

Harmon Field, U.S. base near Stephenville, August, 1943.



Ruggles Commercial Photographic Studio

Fort Pepperrell, base américaine près du lac Quidi Vidi. St. John's, circa 1944.

Fort Pepperrell, U.S. base on Quidi Vidi Lake, St. John's, circa 1944.



Navire de transport de troupes ancré le long de la jetée de l'armée américaine. St. John's, octobre 1943.

Troopship alongside U.S. Army wharf, St. John's, October, 1943.





Corvettes de la MRC en route de Halifax  
à St. John's. Mai 1941.

RCN corvettes *en route* to St. John's  
from Halifax, May, 1941.



Vue d'ensemble de la ville et du port de St.  
John's. A l'arrière-plan on aperçoit le lac  
Quidi Vidi. Circa 1941.

General view of St. John's city and har-  
bour, showing Quidi Vidi Lake. Circa 1941.



Construction des quartiers généraux de la MRC à St. John's. À l'arrière-plan on aperçoit les filets anti-torilles. Novembre 1941.


RCN Headquarters being erected. In the background anti-torpedo nets. St. John's, November, 1941.



Début de la construction des installations portuaires de la MRC. St. John's, septembre 1941.

RCN Dockyard, St. John's, commencement of construction, September, 1941.





Construction des installations portuaires de la MRC à St. John's. Mai 1942.

RCN Dockyard under construction, St. John's. May 1942.



Les installations portuaires de la MRC vers la fin des travaux, St. John's, mai 1942.

RCN Dockyard, St. John's, at point of completion, May 1942.



Corvettes naviguant dans le brouillard.  
Juin 1941.

Corvettes in station in light fog, June,  
1941.



Vue aérienne des canons postés à Cape  
Spear protégeant l'entrée du port de St.  
John's. Octobre 1941.

Aerial view of gun-sites on Cape Spear,  
entrance to St. John's harbour. October,  
1941.



Corvettes à l'ancre le long de la jetée sud  
du port de St. John's. Mai 1942.

Corvettes alongside southside jetty, St.  
John's. May, 1942.



Navires dans le port de St. John's. Avril  
1943.

Shipping in St. John's Harbour, April,  
1943.





Vue aérienne du port de St. John's. Mai  
1943.

Aerial view of St. John's Harbour, May,  
1943

Collection particulière/Private collection





Corvette dans une mer déchaînée. Septembre 1943.

Corvette in heavy sea, September, 1943.



Opération de sauvetage. Avril 1944.

Rescuing survivors, April, 1944.



Ravitaillement en essence d'une corvette en haute mer. Novembre 1942.

Corvette oiling at sea, November, 1942.



Transport des blessés après une bataille. St. John's, août 1942.

Bringing casualties ashore, St. John's, August, 1942.



Départ d'un sous-marin d'entraînement.  
St. John's, mars 1942.

Casting off training submarine, St. John's,  
March, 1942.



Bassin de raboub flottant remorqué vers  
St. John's. Septembre 1943.


Floating drydock being towed into St.  
John's, September, 1943.



Frégate dans le bassin de radoub flottant à  
St. John's. Mars 1944.


Frigate in floating drydock St. John's,  
March, 1944.






Petit navire marchand en cale sèche. St. John's, avril 1944.

Small merchant ship in drydock, St. John's, April, 1944.



Contre-torpilleur endommagé en réparation à Bay Bulls. Mai 1944.

Damaged destroyer in drydock, Bay Bulls, May, 1944.



Sous-marin d'entraînement en cale sèche. St. John's, octobre 1942.

Training submarine in drydock. St. John's, October 1942.



Quartier général des opérations, St. John's,  
février 1943.

Operations Centre, St. John's, February,  
1943.



Corvette de retour d'expédition. Février  
1944.

Corvette after voyage, February, 1944.





Capture des membres de l'équipage d'un sous-marin allemand. Avril 1943.

Captured members of U-Boat crew, April, 1943.



Sous-marin allemand après sa reddition. St. John's, mai 1945.

Surrendered U-Boat alongside jetty, St. John's, May, 1945.



Station de radio à Bay Bulls. Janvier 1943.

Radio station, Bay Bulls, January, 1943.



Filet anti-torpilles à l'île Bell. Juillet 1943.

Bell Island, showing anti-torpedo net,  
July, 1943.





Les membres de la commission pour Terre-Neuve et d'autres dignitaires photographiés à l'occasion d'un vol inaugural spécial de TCA entre l'île et le continent. De g. à d. P. D. H. Dunn, H. A. Winter, Andrew Carnell (maire de St. John's), deux personnages non identifiés, sir Edward Emerson, C. J. Burchell, sir John Puddester, sir Wilfrid Woods et I. Wild. Gander, avril 1942.

Members of Commission of Government of Newfoundland and other personalities on special inaugural TCA flight, Gander, April, 1942. L to r P. D. H. Dunn, H. A. Winter, Andrew Carnell (Mayor of St. John's), two unidentified, Sir Edward Emerson, C. J. Burchell, Sir John Puddester, Sir Wilfrid Woods and Ira Wild.



Photo prise à l'occasion du premier vol régulier de TCA entre Torbay et le continent. Mai 1942.

First regular TCA flight from Torbay to mainland, May, 1942.

© St. John's Evening Telegram



Lord Beaverbrook, ministre de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne, et le commodore de l'air Guthrie à Gander en août 1941. Lord Beaverbrook était alors en route vers Argentinia où il devait rejoindre le premier ministre Churchill pour la conférence de la Charte atlantique.

Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production of Great Britain, and Air Commodore Guthrie, at Gander in August, 1941. Lord Beaverbrook was then *en route* to join Prime Minister Churchill at "Atlantic Charter" conference at Argentinia.



Le capitaine C.M.R. Schwerdt MR.

Captain C.M.R. Schwerdt RN.




Le maréchal de l'air sir Frederick Bowhill.

Air Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill.






Le vice-amiral sir Humphrey Walwyn.  
Vice-Admiral Sir Humphrey Walwyn.



© Karsh, Ottawa  
Sir Edward Emerson.



© Karsh, Ottawa  
Hon. H. A. Winter.



© Karsh, Ottawa  
Sir Albert Walsh.



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
Le très honorable W. L. Mackenzie King.  
Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King.



Hon. C. G. Power.



Hon. Colin Gibson.



Hon. C. D. Howe.





C. J. Burchell examinant une plaque témoignant du passage de sir Humphrey Gilbert à Terre-Neuve en 1583. Cette plaque fut trouvée lors des travaux à Bay Bulls en septembre 1943.

Hon. C. J. Burchell examining a relic of Sir Humphrey Gilbert's sojourn in Newfoundland in 1583. This relic was found during excavation at Bay Bulls in September, 1943.



Newfoundland Historical Society

J. S. Macdonald



H. L. Keenleyside



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R. A. MacKay



CHAPITRE I/CHAPTER I  
LES RELATIONS DE DÉFENSE  
DEFENCE RELATIONS

PARTIE 1/PART 1  
LA PÉRIODE D'AVANT-GUERRE  
THE PRE-WAR PERIOD

1.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le commissaire aux Finances au secrétaire particulier  
du gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Finance to Private Secretary, Government House*

SECRET

St. John's, May 4, 1936

Sir Murray Anderson<sup>1</sup> informed me that, when early in 1934 the constitution of Newfoundland was temporarily changed, the Dominions Office requested that he would prepare, or have prepared, a Defence Scheme for the Island. He put this work in the hands of Capt. H. B. Robinson. Early in December 1935, as not much progress had been made he transferred it to a Committee consisting of myself, as Chairman, and of Messrs. Dunn, Harper, Dunfield, Manning and Capt. Robinson, as representing the main Departments affected. Capt. Robinson was succeeded by yourself in January last.

The report of the Committee has been signed today, and the original and five copies will be sent to you within a few days by Mr. Dunfield (who has acted as Secretary) for transmission to the Dominions Office. . .

E. N. R. T[RENTHAM]

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<sup>1</sup> Gouverneur de Terre-Neuve de 1932 à 1936.

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<sup>1</sup> Governor of Newfoundland, 1932-1936.

## 2.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Extrait du plan de défense de Terre-Neuve, 1936<sup>1</sup>**Extract from Newfoundland Defence Scheme, 1936<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

St. John's, May 4, 1936

## INTRODUCTORY

The Island of Newfoundland occupies what might in some circumstances be an important strategic position in the Western North Atlantic:

- (a) The Island covers the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the St. Lawrence ports, which can be approached only through Cabot Strait and the Straits of Belle Isle.
- (b) St. John's is the most easterly port in British North America and lies within a few miles of the main steamship track across the North Atlantic.
- (c) Owing to its position, St. John's might in the event of a naval raid in the Atlantic be a convenient port of refuge.
- (d) The Island forms a stepping stone for an air service across the North Atlantic.
- (e) The Island is one of the principal nerve centres of the North Atlantic cable communication system.
- (f) The port of St. John's possesses a dry dock having a length of 570 ft. on keel blocks. The entrance is 70 feet wide at bottom, increasing to 89 feet at top, and the depth on the sill at low water springs is 23 feet 6 inches.
- (g) There is in St. John's an oil storage plant having a capacity of approximately 250,000 gallons.
- (h) During a state of war St. John's would be a minor routeing port for North Atlantic shipping.

2. The principal ports in Newfoundland capable of handling shipping of moderate size and provided with railway communication are: St. John's on the Avalon Peninsula, and the most easterly point of the Island; Botwood on the North Coast; Corner Brook on the West Coast, and Port-aux-Basques at the south-west angle upon Cabot Strait. Besides these there are a very large number of bays and inlets in which vessels could shelter. The ports of Bonavista and Placentia have railway communication, but no facilities for handling large ships. At Bonavista there is no harbour. At Placentia small steamers of draught not exceeding 21 feet can enter at ordinary high tides.

3. With the exception of Grand Falls, a paper manufacturing town of about 7,000 people, all towns and settlements of any importance are on the seaboard and open to attack.

4. The general defence problem will be dealt with under the following main headings:

- (a) Description of area to be defended.

<sup>1</sup> Cet extrait est tiré du texte final publié en 1937. Voir le document 4.

<sup>1</sup> This extract is from the "final prints" issued in 1937. See Document 4.



- (b) Reasons for undertaking Defence.
- (c) Scale and form of possible attacks.
- (d) System of Command and Statement of Garrison.

(A)—DESCRIPTION OF AREA TO BE DEFENDED

(i) *Objectives; Vulnerable Areas; Internal Communications.*

*General*

5. The only extensive road system is upon the Avalon Peninsula. A map (marked A)<sup>1</sup> showing the existing road system in this area is annexed. In other parts of the country there exist short stretches of road as shown on map (marked B)<sup>1</sup> of the Island annexed. Away from the roads practically the whole Island consists of rough uncultivated country, comprising rocky hills, more or less barren moors, extensive stretches of brush and scrub, occasional stretches of spruce and fir timber, and marshes, usually passable on foot, with many lakes large and small. There is little or no country over which small forces of infantry could not readily pass on foot at a slow speed, but away from the roads most of the country would be impassable for wheeled transport. There is very little level ground. There is but little cleared and cultivated land and that in small patches. For the benefit of authorities unacquainted with the Island, the coastal country may be described as not unlike that met with in the north-western portions of Scotland and the Hebrides. The interior, as it does not contain any military objectives whatever, is not material for the purposes of this document.

*Possible Military Objectives*

6. The Island is entirely undefended. The nerve centre of the Island, the only place where large property damage can be done, is the City of St. John's, population with suburbs about 47,000, which is the seat of Government, and the main centre of commercial operations. The town is in part relatively congested, and is built almost entirely of wood. It has on two occasions been for the most part burnt to the ground by accidental fire. If a conflagration were to be brought about by enemy action, the money loss would run into many millions of dollars, while the affairs of the Island would be very largely disorganised.

*Vulnerable Areas connected with St. John's*

7. About two-thirds of the town is in view from the sea and could be fired upon from ships by direct observation. The remainder could be fired upon by indirect observation if aeroplanes were available to the attacking force. Under suitable weather conditions a moderate number of incendiary shells could cause a complete conflagration.

The central transformer station serving the town and street car lines is situated close to the dry dock at the head of the harbour, and is not visible from the sea but is easily within range. The same applies to the dry dock itself and to the principal station of the Newfoundland Railway, including roundhouse, turn-table and open-air coal storage and freight sheds.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The principal electrical installation supplying current to the town is at Petty Harbour, a very small port, some 18 miles by road south of St. John's. It is within sight of the sea and both it and the wooden flume conducting water to it could be fired upon from ships by direct observation. A smaller, but substantial, electrical power station is situated at Pierre's Brook, about 15 miles to the south of St. John's. It also is visible from the sea and could be fired upon from ships by direct observation.

The small house containing the inlet and screens of the St. John's water system is situated at the foot of Windsor Lake, some 3 miles north of St. John's and some 500 feet above sea level. Assuming that the attacker knew where to find it, it could very readily be observed from the air and destroyed by bombing or by a party from a seaplane landing on the Lake.

#### *Other Possible Military Objectives*

8. The Harbour of St. John's is to some extent guarded by Cape Spear, which projects to the south of the harbour and stands about 3 miles off the "Narrows".

The "Narrows", or channel by which the harbour is entered, has a navigable width of 275 feet at its narrowest point and a depth of 54 feet at mean low-water springs. There is complete shelter in the harbour for a limited amount of shipping of moderate size. The largest ship which has used the harbour has been one of 17,000 tons. The harbour is defended from observation from the sea, except through the "Narrows", by Signal Hill, an eminence of about 600 feet.

St. John's is the terminal of four Atlantic cables owned by the Commercial Cable Company; one working between London, Liverpool and New York; one working between France and New York; and two working between London and New York. These cables land at Cuckold Cove, about a mile north-east of St. John's, and are thence led to Quidi Vidi Lake and up the bed of the Lake to the town.

9. On Bell Island, in Conception Bay, there is an iron mine containing vast quantities of ore (red haematite), which runs out under the sea to the northward. Production has gone as high as 3 million tons a year and the mine is capable of almost unlimited expansion. The galleries of the mine extend several miles under the sea. As the whole width of the Island does not exceed 3 miles and the mine works are visible from the sea, they could be destroyed by direct fire. The loading piers are on the east side of the Island at the water's edge and can be approached by large ships. If explosive charges were exploded in the submarine galleries, thus letting in the sea, the mine would be put out of production for an indefinite period.

10. At Bay Roberts, in Conception Bay, are the shore ends of five trans-Atlantic cables; four working between Penzance and New York, and one between the Azores and New York. These are owned by the Western Union Telegraph Company.

11. At Harbour Grace, in the same Bay, a few miles further north is the

shore end of a cable working between Land's End and Halifax and owned by the Cable and Wireless, Limited.

12. At Heart's Content, on the south side of Trinity Bay, are the shore ends of four Atlantic cables owned by the Western Union Telegraph Company and working between Valencia and New York.

13. At Arnold's Cove, in the head of Placentia Bay, are the other shore ends of three of the four cables referred to under the head of Heart's Content. At Colinet, at the head of St. Mary's Bay, is the other end of the fourth cable referred to under Heart's Content. These places, however, are so far up the respective Bays that they are unlikely to be attacked.

14. At Placentia, upon the east shore of Placentia Bay, is the shore end of a cable owned by the Western Union Telegraph Company and working between St. John's, St. Pierre and North Sydney; also the other shore end of three of the cables referred to under Bay Roberts.

15. At Port-aux-Basques is the shore end of a cable owned by the Commercial Cable Company and working between St. John's and Canso, Nova Scotia. At this place also is the western terminal of the Newfoundland Railway. Both are under direct observation from the sea.

16. At Cape Race there is a wireless telegraph station owned by the Government of Canada, having a range of about 700 miles for service of ships at sea. This is open to observation from the sea.

17. At Belle Isle, in the Straits of Belle Isle, there is a wireless station of similar ownership also open to observation from the sea.

18. Other wireless stations on the coast are referred to under the head of "Communications".<sup>1</sup>

19. The other places where serious damage could be done are: Grand Falls, where there is a large and valuable paper mill; Buchans, where there is an important mine producing lead and zinc in quantities for shipment through the port of Botwood; and Corner Brook, where there is a large and valuable paper mill. The former two are so far inland as to be immune from attack by any force likely to approach the Island. The mill at Corner Brook is open to the sea, but being within the Gulf of St. Lawrence is likely to be immune from attack.

### *Internal Communications*

20. In addition to the roads mentioned under head "*General*" above, there is a railway system extending from St. John's via Grand Falls and Corner Brook to Port-aux-Basques, with a branch extending to Bonavista, and another to Placentia. This is shown on the map (marked B) hereto

<sup>1</sup> Les autres stations de TSF étaient situées à St. John's et à trois différents endroits au Labrador. Ces stations étaient exploitées par la *Canadian Marconi Company* sous contrat avec le ministère des Postes et des Télégraphes de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> The other wireless stations were at St. John's and at three points in Labrador; they were operated by the Canadian Marconi Company under contract to the Newfoundland Department of Posts and Telegraphs.

annexed. It is of a gauge of 3 feet 6 inches and is well supplied with engines and rollingstock. In conjunction with this railway the Newfoundland Government operates seven small steamers in the coastal service.

21. There is a Government Telegraph system throughout the Island. In this, however, wireless telegraphy has to a large extent been substituted for land wires and this substitution is still in progress.

...

### (ii) *Shipping Communications*

25. The volume of foreign-going shipping entering and leaving Newfoundland ports every year is of the order of 1,100,000 tons.

26. The following regular steamship lines serve Newfoundland:

(a) British Register. Furness, Withy and Co. (ships owned by Johnston Warren Lines (Limited)).

(i) Steamship *Newfoundland*. Passenger capacity, 300; gross tonnage, 6,791.

(ii) Steamship *Nova Scotia*. Passenger capacity, 300; gross tonnage, 6,796.

Both registered at Liverpool. Trading between Liverpool, St. John's, Halifax and Boston.

(b) Canadian Register. Newfoundland Canada Steamships.

Steamship *Belle Isle*, carrying passengers and cargo. Gross tonnage, 1,960. Trading between Halifax, Sydney, St. Pierre and St. John's in winter, and Montreal, Prince Edward Island, Sydney, St. Pierre and St. John's in summer.

Clarke Steamship Company (Limited).

Steamship *New Northland*, carrying passengers and cargo. Gross tonnage 3,445; trading between Montreal and St. John's in winter, and Montreal, Corner Brook and Labrador in summer.

(c) Newfoundland Register.

(i) Steamship *Humber Arm*. Gross tonnage 5,758.

(ii) Steamship *Corner Brook*. Gross tonnage 5,767.

Both trading between Corner Brook and New York with paper.

(iii) Steamship *Geraldine Mary*. Gross tonnage 7,244. Trading between Botwood, Newfoundland and Great Britain with paper.

(iv) Steamship *Caribou*. Gross tonnage 2,222. Trading between North Sydney, Cape Breton Island and Port-aux-Basques. Owned by the Newfoundland Government.

(v) Steamship *Portia*. Gross tonnage 978. Sailing between Halifax and Newfoundland ports. Owned by the Newfoundland Government.

(d) Bermuda Register. Furness Red Cross Line.

(i) Steamship *Fort Townshend*. Gross tonnage 3,400; passenger capacity 130.



- (ii) Steamship *Fort Amherst*. Gross tonnage 3,400; passenger capacity 130.

These ships trade between New York, Halifax and St. John's with passengers and freight.

- (e) Norwegian Register.

Steamship *Magnhild*. Gross tonnage 1,135. Operated by Newfoundland Canada Steamships, carrying cargo only between Halifax, St. Pierre and St. John's.

27. In addition to the foregoing, three steamships of substantial size are owned in St. John's, viz.:

- (i) Steamship *Blue Peter*. Gross tonnage 4,132 (refrigerator vessel).
- (ii) Steamship *Beothic*. Gross tonnage 1,825 (seal fishing vessel).
- (iii) Steamship *Imogene*. Gross tonnage, 1,638.

28. Other shipping consists mainly of chartered steamers not regularly in local service.

(iii) *Details as to Air Companies, Routes and Landing Grounds*

29. No Air Companies operate in or over the Island as yet. There is a small more or less prepared landing ground at Harbour Grace, which can be used under favourable conditions by small aeroplanes, and has been so used in connection with several transatlantic flights. Apart from this there are no prepared aerodromes in the country. With seaplanes it would be possible to land on the water at a great many places around the Coast, and also upon a great many lakes, including Windsor Lake, about 3 miles north of St. John's, and Bay Bulls Big Pond, about 7 miles south of St. John's.

30. There is only one aeroplane in Newfoundland, a two-passenger machine owned by the Newfoundland Government.

(iv) *Topographical, Hydrographical and Meteorological Details likely to affect Sea, Land and Air Operations*

*General*

...

36. There are on the coasts of Newfoundland a considerable number of uninhabited harbours, where submarines could shelter and probably remain unobserved for considerable periods. These also would be dealt with only by organizing a marine or land patrol.

*Population*

37. The population according to the 1935 Census is 289,560. It may be taken however, that the approximate population is 300,000. The main body of population is in St. John's and around Conception Bay; Trinity Bay, Bonavista Bay and Notre Dame Bay are relatively populous. There is some concentration of population round the Bay of Islands on the west coast. The rest of the Island is thinly populated. The population is, as to 99 per cent, of pure Anglo-Saxon (mostly English West Country) and Irish stock. There are no aboriginals, except a few thousand Esquimaux in Labrador, and a

handful of Micmac Indians of Canadian origin round Hermitage Bay. There is a very small French-Indian, half-breed population near Bay St. George.

### *Rivers*

38. The rivers of Newfoundland are practically valueless as means of communication. The Humber River on the West Coast is navigable by small craft for a few miles only. Except during the seasons of heavy rain or in the Spring when the ice and snow are breaking up, the rivers are as a rule fordable by infantry everywhere.

### *Coast*

39. There are ample though unequipped landing places on almost all parts of the coast.

## (B) — REASONS FOR UNDERTAKING DEFENCE

### *General Reasons*

40. As stated earlier in this Chapter the Island of Newfoundland lies across the mouth of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The possession of any part of it, especially the South-West and North-West parts, by enemy forces would constitute a serious menace to the Dominion of Canada, and might result in the stoppage of the sea channels between the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic.

41. The position of the Island as commanding the main North Atlantic trade routes gives it strategic importance.

42. St. John's possesses a small but very well sheltered though unfortunately unfortified harbour, and might be useful as a mercantile port of refuge in which a certain amount of British shipping in mid-Atlantic would be able to seek safety from molestation or capture in time of war.

43. The large modern dry dock at St. John's capable of taking ships of the length of 570 feet on keel blocks might in some circumstances be of much value. The entrance is 70 feet at bottom increasing to 89 feet at top, and the depth on the sill  $23\frac{1}{2}$  feet at low water springs.

44. Although the importance of Newfoundland as an air centre is small at present, its potentialities from the point of view of trans-Atlantic service are great, and there is every possibility of its developing into an important air base in the not far distant future.

45. The population of the Island, drawn in the past almost wholly from the United Kingdom, is exceedingly loyal and of the best racial type, as has been evidenced by the fine record of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment and the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve during the War of 1914-18. The people are almost all accustomed to seafaring work and are excellent in boats and small craft.

46. The Island is also possibly the most important cable centre, linking the Old with the New World.

47. The nature of the trade of the Island at present is that the people live almost entirely by the production of dried codfish, iron-ore, newsprint paper and timber, all of which things are sold abroad; and, with the exception

of a little fish, a little meat, and some vegetables, which are locally produced, the food of the population is imported and paid for in cash. The dislocation, therefore, of the Island's trade by enemy interference might produce conditions of famine and despair, which would be very embarrassing to the responsible authorities.

### *Summary*

48. To summarize, therefore, the reasons for undertaking the defence of the Island are as follows:

- (i) The strategic and political value of the Island both to the Empire and to Canada.
- (ii) Its possible importance as a refuge port.
- (iii) Its importance as the centre of cable communications.
- (iv) Its potential importance as a source of iron-ore.
- (v) General reasons of patriotism and Imperial solidarity.

### (C)—SCALE AND FORM OF ATTACK

- (i) *Strategic and other Considerations covering the Probable Nature of Attack by Sea, Land and Air*

### *Strategic Considerations*

49. The strategic considerations are outlined in Section (B) of this Chapter.

### *Other Considerations*

. . .

52. *Air*—The distance of the Island from all possible centres of aggression is such that hostile bombing operations from a land base could not in the present state of the science be carried out, nor would the value of any military objectives in the Island warrant the employment of aircraft on any but the smallest scale. It is highly improbable that ships carrying any number of aircraft would have occasion to be in the neighbourhood of the Island.

53. *Supplies*—Newfoundland is largely dependent on Canada and the United States for food supplies, and upon the trade in salt fish with the Mediterranean countries, the West Indies and South America, the trade in newsprint paper with the United States and Great Britain, and the trade in iron-ore with Germany, for the cash wherewith to purchase those supplies. In the event of interruption of the Island's trade, therefore, it would be necessary to take emergency measures for the provisioning of the population. A list of necessary commodities is annexed (see Chapter VI, Section 24, and the Annex thereto.)<sup>1</sup>

It is possible that the programme of agricultural development now envisaged by the Commission of Government may within a considerable number of years make the Island more nearly self-supporting in the matter of food supplies. It is, however, definitely not so self-supporting at present, and that by a large margin.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

- (ii) *Estimated Scale and Form of Attack by Sea, Land and Air, and*
- (iii) *Probable Forms of Attack to be Guarded against*

### *Scale and Form of Attack*

54. The scale and form of attack to which Newfoundland may be considered liable can be taken to be as follows:

- (a) Raiding attack by cruiser, with the intention of creating moral effect and doing as much damage as possible in a short time. It appears possible that a weak enemy raiding naval force escaping into the Atlantic and unable either to return home or to break away to the southward might, if the far more valuable shipping of the North Atlantic had been withdrawn or placed under convoy, find a possible final adventure in the destruction of St. John's, the Bell Island iron mine and the numerous cable terminals near St. John's and in Conception Bay; all of which would have a propaganda value altogether out of proportion to its military importance, since St. John's is a British capital Overseas, the iron mine is a source of ore in immeasurable quantities, and the destruction of the cables would have repercussions upon almost the entire world.

- (b) Attack by a small Raiding Force such as might be landed by one or two cruisers with a view to the destruction of vulnerable points, e.g.:

The town of St. John's, its electric power stations, the water works, and the cable offices and terminals at St. John's, Hr. Grace and Bay Roberts.

- (c) Attack by Armed Merchant Vessel—

- (i) By gunfire.

- (ii) By mine-laying in the approach to St. John's Harbour.

- (d) Attack by Submarines—

- (i) By gunfire at moderate or close ranges.

- (ii) By mine or torpedo on shipping sheltering in St. John's or other Harbours.

- (e) Attack by Aircraft—

- (i) From aircraft-carrying vessels.

### *Attacks by Cruisers, Armed Merchant Vessel, Submarine or Aircraft*

55. As there are at present no defences, vessels armed with modern guns of any size could carry out bombardment of St. John's or of practically any other place in the Island by direct observation; the object of such an attack would be to set fire to the town or to damage shipping lying in the harbour, oil fuel installations, dock, etc., and to create moral effect.

56. Owing to the smallness of the channel leading into St. John's Harbour it could easily be blocked or defended by observation mines, &c.

57. The type of aircraft carried by cruisers is not suitable for bombing purposes, and it seems unlikely that aircraft carriers would ever be in the vicinity. Therefore attack by this means is unlikely.



*Attack by Raiding Forces landed from Enemy Ships, with a view to Destruction of Vulnerable Points*

58. It is considered that the scale of attack would not be likely to exceed a raid such as could be conducted by one or two cruisers, with a maximum landing force of 200-300 men.

59. The most likely vulnerable points have already been described.

(iv) *The "Period before Relief" and the Time Factor of the Defence*  
(There being no defences or garrison, this section is not applicable)

(D)—SYSTEM OF COMMAND AND STATEMENT OF GARRISON  
(There being no garrison this section is not applicable.)<sup>1</sup>

. . .

Signed at St. John's, Newfoundland, this 4th day of May, 1936, by the following members of the Defence Committee:

E. N. R. TRENTHAM  
Commissioner for Finance  
(Chairman)

P. D. H. DUNN  
Chairman, Board of Customs

R. MANNING  
Secretary of Public Works

E. E. HARPER  
Secretary for Posts and Telegraphs

C. M. R. SCHWERDT, Captain, R.N. (Retired)  
Private Secretary to His Excellency the Governor

BRIAN DUNFIELD  
Secretary for Justice (Secretary)

<sup>1</sup>Le restant du plan de défense contenait une énumération des différentes étapes à suivre en cas de guerre. Cette énumération comprenait le contrôle de la navigation, les mesures de sécurité, la censure, l'approvisionnement en denrées essentielles et la défense civile. Étant donné l'absence de troupes armées importantes, on ne pouvait organiser que sommairement la défense des sites et des installations vitaux. La seule référence faite à une force militaire importante était «une flottille anti-soumarine ou de dragueurs de mines» devant être basée à St. John's.

<sup>1</sup>The balance of the defence plan contained a description of the steps to be taken in the event of war. These included naval control, security precautions, censorship, provision of essential supplies and civil defence; in the absence of significant armed forces only skeleton plans could be made for defence of vital localities and installations. The only reference to a military force of any consequence was to "a mine-sweeping or a/s flotilla" to be based at St. John's.

*Mémorandum du Comité interforce d'état-major**Memorandum by Joint Staff Committee*

No. 19

[Ottawa,] March 22, 1937

SECRET

## THE DEFENCE OF SYDNEY AND ITS STEEL INDUSTRY

1. In its survey of the coast defence requirements of Canada, the Joint Staff Committee proposes to submit recommendations for the defence of the seaport town of Sydney and its steel industry. The measures proposed will, in addition, ensure the security of a proportion of the local coal mines, the output of which is necessary to the working of the Dominion Coal and Steel Corporation. The defence of Sydney is also of importance because of the fact that in the event of what may be termed an "Atlantic" war it will presumably be used as a convoy assembly port. It was so used during the Great War.

2. The Dominion Coal and Steel Corporation is one of the important producers of iron in Canada, the others being the Algoma Steel Corporation (Sault Ste Marie), the Steel Company of Canada (Hamilton) and the Canadian Furnace Company (Port Colborne). According to a report of the Bureau of Mines dated December, 1936, on the Metallurgical Works of Canada, this first named corporation possesses upwards of thirty per cent of the rated annual capacity of the iron blast furnaces operated in Canada. The importance of the Sydney works to the Canadian steel industry is clearly indicated and the necessity of affording it protection in war time, in the public interest, would seem to be equally clearly established.

3. The provision of coast defences at Sydney, however, will not in themselves ensure the uninterrupted working of its blast furnaces in time of war for the reason that the ore and limestone required for the production of iron are obtained from Newfoundland. The iron mines are situated at Wabana, on Bell Island in Conception Bay. No alternative source of supply of ore is available and, in any event, the smelting process employed at Sydney is one peculiarly designed to suit the characteristics of the Wabana ore. As a consequence, the protection of the source of ore supply is of no less importance than the security of the blast furnaces themselves. In 1918, it was stated by Sir Louis Jackson, who had been requested to report upon the matter, that one shell in the boiler house or power house on Bell Island might stop production for five or six months. Limestone, obviously, can be freely obtained in Canada.

4. As a result of the recent change in the form of Government of Newfoundland the responsibility for its security, in the last analysis, rests on

the Government of the United Kingdom. In any event, the obligation can in no way devolve upon Canada. And yet, as has been indicated above, upwards of thirty per cent of the iron production of this country is directly dependent on the production of the Wabana mines. Nor should the fact be overlooked that in view of the United States neutrality laws, the industrial capacity of Canada with respect to the production of munitions in time of war is a matter of special importance to the United Kingdom. It is therefore clear that the defence of Bell Island is a matter of Imperial concern.

5. While from the strictly Canadian viewpoint the position could be partially safeguarded by building up reserve stocks of ore at Sydney so that at any time of the year there should always be a minimum of six months' supply in hand, there is another aspect to the problem. Canada has undertaken to make provision for her own local defence and insofar as her Atlantic coast is concerned, that defence is intimately bound up with the defence of Newfoundland. The two problems are really one and no good purpose can be served by treating them separately. It is therefore important that Canada should receive information as to the nature and scope of British plans for the defence of Newfoundland and the waters adjacent thereto and to [sic] take these into account when drawing up her own scheme of defence. This is clearly a case in which co-operation between the two countries is required and to this end it is recommended that the matter be noted for discussion with the responsible British authorities at the forthcoming Imperial Conference.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> La Conférence impériale eut lieu à Londres en mai 1937. Le 14 septembre 1951, commentant une ébauche de l'histoire officielle de l'armée canadienne, le major-général à la retraite H. D. G. Crerar écrivit ceci au colonel C. P. Stacey, alors directeur de la direction historique de l'armée canadienne:

<sup>1</sup> The Imperial Conference took place in London in May, 1937. On September 14, 1951, in comments on a draft of the official history of the Canadian Army, Major-General H. D. G. Crerar, then retired, wrote to Colonel C. P. Stacey, then Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian Army:

The members of the Joint Staff Committee, and myself as Secretary, were carefully instructed by the late Dr. Skelton, before the Conference commenced as to the necessity of avoiding any conversations with our "opposite numbers" on the other Commonwealth delegations—particularly with those of the United Kingdom—which could be interpreted by them as being in the nature of a military commitment, even though only on a Service level.

As an example of how far this was carried, the Joint Staff Committee was informed by Dr. Skelton that it could not even discuss the steps planned by the United Kingdom for the protection of Newfoundland—even though this matter was of the greatest importance to Canada in respect to its own local defence.

4.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Remarques sur le plan de défense de Terre-Neuve faites par un sous-comité  
du Comité de défense impériale*

*Remarks on Newfoundland Defence Scheme by a Sub-Committee of  
Imperial Defence Committee*

O.D.C. 794-R

SECRET

[London,] June [ ], 1937

The Dominions Office have referred to the Oversea Defence Committee for consideration the Newfoundland Defence Scheme, 1936, which was received under cover of a secret despatch from the Governor, dated the 11th May, 1936.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Defence Scheme was printed and issued in provisional form pending its examination by the Oversea Defence Committee. Copies were forwarded to the Governor, Newfoundland, with Dominions Office Secret despatch No. 550, dated the 20th November, 1936.<sup>1</sup>

3. The Governor, Newfoundland, under cover of his secret despatch, dated the 28th December, 1936,<sup>1</sup> returned one copy of the provisional Scheme, in which certain amendments to the Preface, consequent upon the issue of O.D.C. Memorandum No. 664-M<sup>2</sup> and a number of other minor alterations, resulting from changes which have accrued since the Scheme was drafted, had been made. These amendments have been included in the final prints of the Scheme.

4. The final prints of the Defence Scheme<sup>2</sup> are now issued with these Remarks. As this edition varies in some respects from the provisional edition (*vide* paragraph 3 above and Remarks below), all copies of the latter should now be destroyed.

GENERAL REMARKS

5. This is the first Defence Scheme received from Newfoundland since the war, and the Committee wish to place on record their appreciation of the excellent way in which it has been prepared. The *pro forma* laid down in O.D.C. Memorandum No. 653-M<sup>2</sup> has been closely followed, and the Scheme should prove of the greatest value to those responsible for the defence of the Island.

6. The Instructions for the Preparation of Defence Schemes have, however, recently been revised by the Committee, and are contained in O.D.C. Memorandum No. 653-M (Revise), dated the 24th June, 1936.<sup>2</sup> The revised instructions do not necessitate any particular amendments to the Scheme at present under review, but the Committee would draw attention to the new Chapter VII, Passive Air Defence Measures, which will now be required.

*Local Forces*

7. The Committee observe that no plan of any sort exists for the active defence of Newfoundland, and that the only armed forces consist of 255 Constabulary and 50 Rangers, armed with obsolete and inefficient weapons,

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



who must be "regarded as practically unarmed for purposes of modern warfare." In view of the weighty reasons for undertaking the defence of Newfoundland, which are clearly stated in Chapter I, Section (B), this is a state of affairs which gives the Committee serious concern.

8. It is a fundamental principle of Imperial Defence that each part of the Empire should take such steps as are within its capacity to provide for its own local defence. It appears from Chapter II, paragraph 3, that the personnel to form a local volunteer defence force 1,000 to 2,500 strong is readily available, but that no steps have been taken to provide the necessary equipment or to organise and train this manpower.

9. It is clear that without equipment, training or organisation, the part which such volunteers could play in the defence of the Island would be of small account. To postpone the raising of a defence force until a state of emergency actually arises might be to risk the whole security of the country and of the important communications which pass through it.

10. An additional reason for maintaining a local defence force is the need for having available at all times an armed and disciplined body to support the civil power in emergency in the preservation of law and order.

11. The necessity for maintaining local forces, both for defence against external aggression and for the maintenance of civil authority in case of internal disorder, has been referred to in various Memoranda of the Oversea Defence Committee (*vide* O.D.C. Memoranda Nos. 537-M<sup>1</sup>, 618-M<sup>1</sup> and 667-M<sup>1</sup>). Their value for both purposes has been clearly shown in the past on many occasions and in many places. No part of the Empire can be considered immune from the danger of such emergencies arising.

12. The Committee understand that a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve existed in Newfoundland before the war, and that the question of reviving this force or, alternatively, of forming a local branch of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, is now being examined by the Government of Newfoundland. For the reasons given the Committee would welcome any steps that it might be found practicable to take to organise a local force.

5. NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions au gouverneur  
de Terre-Neuve*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions to Governor  
of Newfoundland*

SECRET

[London,] January 21, 1938

My dear Governor,

Sir Francis Floud, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada, has recently raised the question of the supply to the Canadian Government of a copy of the Newfoundland Defence Scheme.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Floud points out that Newfoundland apparently comes within the Intelligence area of the Canadian Intelligence centre and that there is a Reporting Officer at St. John's, Newfoundland, who is theoretically part of the organisation of the Canadian Director of Naval Intelligence, but that the latter had never seen a copy of the Newfoundland Defence Scheme, which had in fact not been communicated to either the Canadian Government or the United Kingdom High Commissioner.

The authorities here agree that it would be desirable that both the Canadian Government and the United Kingdom High Commissioner should have copies of the Newfoundland Defence Scheme and of the Oversea Defence Committee's remarks on the Scheme; and I am accordingly writing to let you know that we have forwarded to the Acting United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada two copies each of those documents with a request that he would communicate one copy of each to the Canadian Government for their information and retain the others for his own use. I feel sure that you will agree as to the desirability of this.

It is suggested that, when the Scheme is next up for revision, the position should be regularised by including in the remarks of the Oversea Defence Committee, if the Scheme itself does not already make provision for it, a recommendation that a copy should be sent to the Canadian Government.

Yours sincerely,

H. F. BATTERBEE

6.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

516 K/2

Ottawa, February 11, 1938

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

I have received from the Government of the United Kingdom, with instructions that I should communicate it to the Canadian Government for their information, the enclosed copy of the Newfoundland Defence Scheme, 1936, together with a copy of the "remarks" thereon of the Oversea Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. These documents are respectively numbered 36 and 45.

You will no doubt be so good as to communicate these documents to the appropriate authorities and I should be very grateful if you would advise me of their safe receipt by you.

Yours very sincerely,

STEPHEN L. HOLMES

7.

DND HQS 7410

*Mémoire du directeur du service de renseignements navals et des plans  
au chef de l'état-major naval*

*Memorandum from Director of Naval Intelligence and Plans  
to Chief of the Naval Staff*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 15, 1938

I agree in general with A/D.N.I.'s remarks.<sup>1</sup>

Factors in the Newfoundland Defence Scheme which affect Canada are:

- (i) Security of Bell Island, from which the ore is obtained for the Sydney Iron Works.
- (ii) Protection of cables, both trans-Atlantic and to Canada.
- (iii) Protection of wireless stations, both for communication and as navigational aids for ships and aircraft. 4 stations are owned by the Canadian Government.
- (iv) Supervision of Newfoundland and Labrador coast lines in which bases for enemy raiders of all types might be established.
- (v) Intelligence Organisation.

2. The following points are noted in the report:

- (a) No indication of the extent of any R.N. forces to be allocated to Newfoundland's defence.

A Minesweeping and A/S flotilla is mentioned but what ships are to be utilized for this purpose is not stated.

Retired R.N. and R.N.R. Officers are to be nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies.

- (b) The Government have two aircraft only and there is no suggestion of any air reinforcement for reconnaissance or counter attack.
- (c) The scale of surface ship attack assumed is generally in agreement with our views.

Air attack is, however, almost completely discounted.

- (d) No suggestion that the Intelligence Centre is connected with Ottawa or that the Reporting Officer at St. John's looks to D.N.I. & P., Ottawa, as his head.

- (e) No indication, and this is probably deliberate, that measures should be co-ordinated with Canada.

3. It is understood the Governor of Newfoundland and his Secretary will be in Ottawa for Easter. It is suggested that the concurrence of the Minister be obtained to a discussion with them during their visit, it being understood that of course no commitments would be made.\*

H. A. C. LANE  
Commander, R.N.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduites.

\*Note telle que dans l'original:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

\*Note as in original:

Suggest this scheme be discussed by Joint Staff Committee at some future convenient date. P. W. N[ELLES] 25.3.38

8.

DND HQS 7410

*Mémorandum du directeur du service des plans et des opérations  
au directeur des services de l'état-major de l'air*

*Memorandum from Director of Plans and Operations  
to Air Staff Officer*

S. 1196

[Ottawa,] March 30, 1938

SECRET

## NEWFOUNDLAND DEFENCE SCHEME—1936

1. In reading through the Newfoundland Defence Scheme, I cannot but feel that the question of air defence has not been given the consideration it requires.

2. In April, 1937, we raised the question of the air defence of Newfoundland in our Quarterly Liaison Letter to the Chief of the Air Staff, and stated that the matter would undoubtedly be brought up at the Imperial Conference. Whether this was done, I am, of course, not in a position to say.

3. Extracts from the Scheme are given below with comments following.

*Extract page 7, para. 36.* "The coast of Newfoundland contains a considerable number of uninhabited harbours where submarines could shelter and probably remain unobserved for considerable periods. These would be dealt with by organizing a marine or land patrol."

*Comment.* An air patrol for this purpose would seem to be essential. It is also presumed that although not mentioned Labrador is included in the term Newfoundland.

*Extract page 7, para. 40.* "The possession of any part of Newfoundland by enemy forces, especially the Southwest and Northwest parts, would constitute a serious menace to the Dominion of Canada."

*Comment.* Canada is vitally interested in the defence of Newfoundland as it affects her communications and shipping routes, and if the accepted scheme for the defence of Newfoundland does not include a part of the Royal Air Force, Canada may be called upon to defend Newfoundland in order to protect itself.

*Extract page 8, para. 52.* "It is highly improbable that ships carrying any number of aircraft would have occasion to be in the neighbourhood of the Island."

*Comment.* As no provision is made in the Scheme for air defence, one aircraft bombing the City of St. John's would have considerable moral effect and cause considerable material damage as there would be no opposition whatever.

*Extract page 9, para. 57.* "The type of aircraft carried by cruisers is not suitable for bombing."

*Comment.* Any aircraft is capable of dropping bombs and will certainly do so in view of the lack of any opposition.

4. As stated by the C.N.S., the Governor of Newfoundland and his Secretary (who incidentally was one of the officers responsible for drawing up the



Scheme) will be in Ottawa shortly, and a discussion with them, as suggested by the C.N.S., would be well worth while. It is suggested that they might be prevailed upon to request the Air Ministry for the aircraft necessary for their defence. It would also appear that some agreement between the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments will be essential to permit the use of base facilities by service aircraft of either country. The advocates of the opinion that Canada is not necessarily at war when Great Britain is at war would have some very interesting problems to solve with respect to Newfoundland if this was actually the case.

G. V. WALSH  
Wing-Commander

9. DND HQS 7410

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

VERY SECRET. URGENT

[Ottawa,] April 8, 1938

Dear Sir,

In the absence of my Minister, I send you herewith a copy of a Joint Staff Committee memorandum on the subject of the Defence of Canada—Atlantic Coast and its relation to Newfoundland.

It would be very much appreciated if permission could be given at an early date for the discussions with the Governor of Newfoundland and his Secretary as referred to in paragraph 6 of the memorandum.

Yours very truly,

L. R. LAFLÈCHE

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du comité interforce d'état-major*

*Memorandum by Joint Staff Committee*

HQS 7410

[Ottawa,] April 5, 1938

VERY SECRET

DEFENCE OF CANADA—ATLANTIC COAST

1. You will remember that prior to the departure of the Canadian Delegation to the Imperial Conference last year, the Joint Staff Committee submitted to you a memorandum on "The Defence of Sydney and its Steel Industry"<sup>1</sup> together with a covering note (dated 2 April, 1937<sup>2</sup>) which terminated as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 3.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 3.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Whatever naval, military and air measures the United Kingdom plan to take with respect to the defence of Newfoundland cannot fail to have an important bearing on our defence plans not only for Sydney, but also for the entire Canadian Atlantic coast, and in consequence it is urged that occasion be sought to explore this question with the British authorities next month.

2. Although certain informal inquiries concerning the steps contemplated by the Admiralty in the matter of the defence of Newfoundland were put forward by the Chief of the Naval Staff, the general exploration of this mutually important problem was not undertaken in the absence of specific authority to proceed to this end.

3. This Department has recently received Copy No. 15 of the Committee of Imperial Defence document O.D.C. 794-R, "Newfoundland Defence Scheme 1936". It has been the subject of study by the Joint Staff Committee and, as a result, the following observations are submitted for your consideration.

4. In view of the dominant strategic position of Newfoundland in relation to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Atlantic seaboard of Canada, it is of vital importance to this country that no actual or prospective enemy should be permitted to utilize that Island, or its Labrador coast line, as a base for naval or air operations.

In addition, as pointed out in the Memorandum previously submitted and referred to in para. 1 above, the security of Bell Island and of sea communications to and from the mines there situated and Sydney, N.S. is essential to the continued operation of the steel industry in Eastern Canada.

5. On the other hand, it would appear from the text of the "Newfoundland Defence Scheme" that the defence preparations contemplated by the British Government in conjunction with the Administration of Newfoundland are of a somewhat superficial nature. In particular, the means allotted for air and naval reconnaissance of its coast line appear dangerously inadequate from the point of view of possible enemy plans for attack on Canadian objectives.

6. It is understood that the Governor of Newfoundland and his Secretary will be in Ottawa for Easter. It is strongly urged that arrangements be made which will permit discussions to be undertaken with these Officials on defence problems of mutual importance during their visit. These discussions would be exploratory and would involve no commitments.

C. F. CONSTANTINE, Major-General  
for Chief of the General Staff

PERCY W. NELLES  
Chief of the Naval Staff

G. M. CROIL  
Senior Air Officer

10.

DND HQS 7410

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre de la Défense nationale*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Deputy Minister of National Defence*

SECRET

Ottawa, April 11, 1938

Dear Colonel LaFlèche,

With further reference to your letter of April 8th (HQS 7410), I wish to say that I am instructed by the Prime Minister to state that while he considers such proposals should be brought up sufficiently in advance to permit full consideration, he sees no objection to the holding of the discussions, which it is indicated would be purely exploratory. He would wish to have a report on the conversations after they have taken place.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

11.

DND (DH) 355.012 (D1)

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] April 11, 1938

NEWFOUNDLAND CONVERSATIONS

April 9, 1938

Sir Francis Floud stated that he had learned today that the Governor of Newfoundland and his Secretary, Captain Schwerdt, who is a member of some Newfoundland Defence Committee, wished to discuss some questions regarding Newfoundland defence with Canadian officials. Sir Francis said ordinarily such a request should, he thought, have been put forward through the Dominions Office.

I told him that I had had an enquiry from the Department of National Defence on the subject this morning, and had brought it to the attention of the Prime Minister. In view of his statement that Captain Schwerdt was to arrive on Monday, I could only say that it was difficult to understand why further notice had not been given.

April 11, 1938

Sir Francis Floud telephoned today to say that he had learned that Captain Schwerdt wished to discuss merely the question of a Reporting Officer under the Naval Intelligence Department, particularly as to whether some Canadian representative could possibly go to Newfoundland and give definite instructions. I told him that I had just heard from the Prime Minister that he had authorized the discussions. So far as the information that had reached me was concerned, it did not indicate that the proposed conversations were to be so definitely limited as he had gathered.

12.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du Comité interforce d'état-major  
au ministre de la Défense nationale*

*Memorandum from Joint Staff Committee  
to Minister of National Defence*

HQs 7410

[Ottawa,] April 21, 1938

SECRET

1. Following the receipt of the letter dated 11th April, 1938, from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, arrangements were made for representatives of the three services to meet the Secretary of the Governor of Newfoundland. On Tuesday, 12th April, Colonel Crerar (D.M.O. and I.), Group-Captain Breadner (A.S.O.) and Commander Lane (D.N.I. and P.) met Captain C.M.R. Schwerdt, R.N., Secretary to the Governor, at Naval Service Headquarters.

2. It was made quite clear to Captain Schwerdt that discussions in regard to the Newfoundland Defence Scheme were purely exploratory and Captain Schwerdt, on his part, made it equally clear that he was in no way able to give any official view, but that he was permitted by His Excellency the Governor to explain any matters referred to in the Scheme, on which information was desired, to the best of his ability.

These discussions, therefore, involved no commitment to either Government.

3. Captain Schwerdt pointed out at the outset of the discussion that the defence of Newfoundland under the particular conditions now obtaining rested entirely in the hands of the British Government authorities and that any points on which we required an official opinion must be raised with that Government.

He also observed that while the Newfoundland Commission of Government desired to take every possible step for Newfoundland defence in accordance with the fundamental principle of Imperial Defence—(i.e. that each part of the Empire should provide, as far as possible, for its own local defence), Newfoundland's financial resources available for defence were very limited.

4. Questions were then raised regarding certain aspects of the problem of Newfoundland defence of particular concern to this country. It was pointed out that unless forces were made available for the effective air and naval reconnaissance of the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador that [sic] enemy air, surface or submarine raiders might establish bases in these waters from which attacks could be directed against our shipping in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and off the East Coast. A further item of marked importance to Canada is the security, in war, of the iron ore mines on Bell Island, Conception Bay, on which the activities of the Dominion Coal and Steel Corporation at Sydney, N.S. depend.



Captain Schwerdt, in reply, stated that the need for joint consideration of the measures required to meet these problems was fully appreciated and that he saw no obstacle to the closest co-operation of the Newfoundland and Canadian authorities provided matters were raised first through the proper channels.

5. The Joint Staff Committee has considered the report of the Service representatives as summarized in the preceding paragraphs. The Committee desires to emphasize the fact that Canadian measures for the protection in war of harbours and shipping in the St. Lawrence and Atlantic Coast area are, of necessity, dependent upon the means of defence which may be made available to Newfoundland. A proper appreciation of the defence requirements on Canada's Eastern seaboard is therefore only possible if the measures to be taken by the British Government in respect to Newfoundland are known.

It is therefore strongly recommended that an enquiry of the British Government should be made to ascertain what measures Naval and Air, for the defence of Newfoundland are contemplated in the event of a European war.

E. C. ASHTON, Major-General  
Chief of the General Staff

H. A. C. LANE  
for Chief of the Naval Staff

G. M. CROIL, Air Commodore  
Senior Air Officer

13. NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire particulier du gouverneur de Terre-Neuve  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions*

*Private Secretary, Government House, to Assistant  
Under-Secretary of State for Dominions*

SECRET

[St. John's,] May 5, 1938

My dear Clutterbuck,

I am still very busy dealing with the work since my return, but I feel sure you would like to know that H.E.'s<sup>1</sup> visit to Ottawa was a great success and has I think been of considerable value.

...

I immediately called on Sir Francis Floud and Stephen Holmes both of them receiving me most kindly. We discussed the Defence business of which I send you a copy of the report<sup>2</sup> which I wrote for H.E. and the Commission of Government.

<sup>1</sup> Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Governor of Newfoundland.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Holmes has also got a copy and telegraphed to me that Sir Francis Floud and Lane both concurred with my statements.

You will notice that I acted with great caution, bearing in mind your comments when we last met. Actually, by coincidence, I had met and knew well every one present at the discussion except the airman with the result that the discussion itself was far less formal and far more friendly than my report perhaps indicates.

The Canadian Department of National Defence as represented by the friends I met are in a very difficult position owing to the attitude of the politicians who are most averse as a body, to committing Canada in any way in the event of a war entered into by the United Kingdom.

It was explained to me that the utmost care should be used in any questions of Empire Defence to avoid giving the Government any reason to believe that they were in fact in the slightest degree committed.

The trend towards increasing Trades Unionism seems to me to be creeping gradually eastward from Canada and the States to include Newfoundland, and it was for this reason that I was impressed by Lord Tweedsmuir's statement to H.E. that he thought it essential to have some force available to support the Police in order to avoid any civil disturbance.

At the same time, as you know, the C.I.D.<sup>1</sup> are anxious that Newfoundland should contribute something, however small, as a defence force (See O.D.C. 794-R)<sup>2</sup>.

How to compete with both these requirements is rather a complex problem but is being considered by H. E. and the Commissioners.

Yours ever,

[C. M. R. SCHWERDT]

14.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Dominions Secretary*

DESPATCH 185

SECRET

Ottawa, July 27, 1938

Sir,

I have the honour to state that during a visit of the Governor of Newfoundland in Ottawa at Easter time, the occasion was taken to arrange for a conversation between his Secretary, Captain C.M.R. Schwerdt, R.N., and representatives of the three defence Services of Canada, who desired to

<sup>1</sup> Comité de défense impériale.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 4.

<sup>1</sup> Committee of Imperial Defence.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 4.

obtain if possible information concerning certain aspects of the defence of Newfoundland.

2. The conversation, which both sides understood to be wholly of an informal and exploratory nature, was held on April 12, 1938, at the Canadian Naval Service Headquarters.

3. The Canadian officers mentioned specially two aspects of the problem of Newfoundland defence as being of particular concern from their point of view in relation to the defence of Canada: (a) the danger of enemy air, surface or submarine raiders establishing bases on the Newfoundland and Labrador coasts to operate against Canadian shipping in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and off the East coast; and (b) the danger of the interruption of iron ore shipments from Newfoundland to the steel works at Sydney, N.S.

4. Captain Schwerdt pointed out in reply that the problem of the defence of Newfoundland now rested entirely in the hands of the Government of the United Kingdom, so that information in that regard should properly be sought from that Government.

5. Accordingly the Canadian Government wish to inquire whether the United Kingdom Government are in a position to state, for the information of the Canadian Government, what measures, naval and air, for the defence of Newfoundland are contemplated in the event of war.

I have etc.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

15.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Mémoire du président du comité de défense<sup>1</sup> à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Chairman of Defence Committee<sup>1</sup> to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

[St. John's,] September 26, 1938

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEWFOUNDLAND DEFENCE SCHEME

The following statement has been prepared for the information and approval of the Commission of Government:

3. (e) . . .

(iii) During the discussions which took place in Ottawa in April this year the Canadian authorities mentioned that it was probable that

<sup>1</sup> Formé en janvier 1938, le Comité de la défense succédait au comité qui avait rédigé le plan de défense de 1936. Le commissaire aux Affaires intérieures (alors responsable de la défense) en assumait la présidence. Le secrétaire était, comme auparavant, le secrétaire à la Justice. Tous deux étaient des Terre-Neuviens.

<sup>1</sup> The Defence Committee formed in January, 1938 to succeed the committee which drew up the 1936 Defence Scheme. Its Chairman was the Commissioner for Home Affairs (then responsible for Defence) and its Secretary, as previously, was the Secretary for Justice; both were Newfoundlanders.

they would ask to base aircraft on the Newfoundland Airport for the reconnaissance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Coast of Newfoundland in order to prevent interference with shipping. It is for consideration whether Squadron-Leader Pattison should be sent for to discuss

(1) What aircraft can be accommodated.

(2) To what degree Canadian aircraft based at the Newfoundland Airport could contribute to the defence of Newfoundland, observing that in the event of any raiding cruiser arriving off Newfoundland aircraft might constitute our sole defence.

It is realized that this is a delicate matter but it may be desirable to let the Dominions Office know that if the Canadian Government desire to base aircraft here for the protection of Canadian shipping, the Newfoundland Government would be willing to co-operate and to suggest to them that as a precautionary measure a representative of the Royal Canadian Air Force might be invited through the appropriate channel to fly over to discuss this question.

J. A. WINTER

16.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le Gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 236

[St. John's,] September 27, 1938

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. In view of your Secret and Personal telegram of the 24th September<sup>1</sup> we have had under consideration provision of defence force that may become necessary if emergency arises. We calculate that numbers required for defence of St. John's and points of importance noted in Defence Scheme is about three hundred. Generally speaking we think that force not less than four hundred should be provided for. Whilst no precise estimate of cost involved is available, we consider that force of 400 would cost not less than \$275,000 a year (including equipment, arms and ammunition, and machine guns).

As you are aware no funds are available to meet such an expenditure, and indeed financial situation here, apart from this special expenditure, would in an emergency be serious in the extreme owing to special liabilities, e.g., Italian insurance and probable loss of revenue.

Commission accordingly desires to lay the whole matter before you, and request your advice and guidance. We consider, however, that in the event of the emergency arising provision of some force is inevitable.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



With regard to training of force we suggest that War Office should be invited to assist by lending us the services of (a) experienced military officer to organize force (b) two non-commissioned officers to help in training it. If so, they should be made available at earliest opportunity and at any rate immediately emergency arises. In the event of your advising that Force should be organized at early date we would suggest approach to Government of Canada to assist in supply of necessary equipment.<sup>1</sup>

17.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[London,] September 27, 1938

SECRET. With reference to Secret Despatch from Canadian Government to you, No. 185 of the 27th July, of which Clutterbuck has copy, and to Private Secretary's letter to Clutterbuck 5th May containing report of conversations at Ottawa, we should be glad to know whether there have been any further developments in regard to question of co-operation between Newfoundland and Canada in defence matters, including use of Newfoundland Airport.

18.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH CANADA 323

London, October 21, 1938

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your secret despatch No. 185 of the 27th July regarding conversations earlier in the year between the Secretary to the Governor of Newfoundland and representatives of the three defence services of Canada, as a result of which His Majesty's Government in Canada enquired what measures, naval and air, for the defence of Newfoundland were contemplated by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the event of war.

<sup>1</sup> Ni cette initiative, ni une autre plus élaborée présentée en décembre 1938 ne suscita une réponse favorable à Londres; cependant un certain progrès fut enregistré à l'été de 1939. Voir les documents 26, 29 à 33.

<sup>1</sup> Neither this initiative nor a more fully elaborated one in December, 1938 elicited a positive response in London; however some headway was made in the summer of 1939. See documents 26, 29 to 33

2. The position in this respect is that no specific measures for the local defence of Newfoundland in war are proposed on the part of naval and air forces of the United Kingdom other than the despatch to St. John's of six auxiliary mine-sweeping vessels and three auxiliary anti-submarine vessels at a later stage after the outbreak of war. It is, however, contemplated that the general defence of the territory would rest on the cover provided by the Royal Navy. Present plans are based on the assumption that, in the contingency envisaged in your despatch, trade protection units of the Royal Navy would be based at Halifax and that an air squadron, if available, would also be located there for the same duties. No squadron of the peacetime Royal Air Force, however, is earmarked for this purpose and, in order to carry out the above plans the necessary Squadron would either have to be raised as a new unit in the United Kingdom after the outbreak of war or be provided from some other source in the British Commonwealth.

I have etc.

DEVONSHIRE  
for the Secretary of State

19. NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions au haut commissaire  
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions to  
High Commissioner of Great Britain*

D.245/11

[London,] October 21, 1938

My dear Campbell,

We are sending an official secret despatch to the Canadian Government by to-day's mail in reply to their despatch No. 185 of the 27th July making enquiries as to the measures proposed for the defence of Newfoundland.

You will see that we have been careful to relate the present plans for basing trade protection units and an air squadron at Halifax to the contingency envisaged in the Canadian Government's despatch; in view of the general nature of that despatch and the specific reference in paragraph 3 to the danger of *enemy* craft operating against Canadian shipping we have felt justified in assuming that contingency to be one in which Canada would be actively co-operating with us. The last sentence of our despatch refers to the possible provision of an air squadron either from the United Kingdom "or from some other source in the British Commonwealth". What we should hope would be that Canada herself would be prepared to provide this squadron, but we thought it wiser not to say this in terms in the despatch. You will no doubt be able to let the Department of Defence know informally

that this is in fact what we had in mind. Whether you make any informal explanation in the sense of the first part of this paragraph is a matter which we leave to your discretion: as to this you will no doubt be guided by the Canadian Government's reactions.

It would, of course, be of great advantage if the Canadian Defence authorities, having displayed this interest in the defence of Newfoundland, were to get into direct touch with the Newfoundland authorities for the purpose of discussing defence questions of common interest. In view of recent events, a suggestion of this kind might possibly commend itself to them more than would previously have been the case. Should you think it advisable, there would be no objection to your mentioning this possibility to them.

Yours sincerely,

H. F. BATTERBEE

20.

NPA GNI/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH NEWFOUNDLAND 501

[London,] October 21, 1938

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to your Secret telegram of the 27th September regarding the question of co-operation in defence matters between Newfoundland and Canada, I have the honour to transmit to you copies of the despatch from the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs No. 185 of the 27th July, and the reply which has now been returned thereto.<sup>1</sup>

2. As regards the particular point mentioned at the end of your telegram, while His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would of course welcome Canadian co-operation in all defence matters including the use by Canadian aircraft of the Newfoundland airports, it will be observed that, so far as concerns trade protection, present plans contemplate that the air squadron (whether United Kingdom or Dominion) which, if available, would be engaged upon these duties would be located at Halifax.

I have etc.

DEVONSHIRE

for the Secretary of State

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 18.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 18.

21.

NPA GNI/3 320/35

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint  
aux Dominions*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
for Dominions*

516 K/8

[Ottawa,] November 22, 1938

SECRET

My dear Batterbee,

I received your letter No. D.245/11 of the 21st October regarding the defence of Newfoundland with interest, and quite appreciate the considerations which you had in mind when the Duke of Devonshire's official despatch No. 323 of the same date to the Canadian Government was drafted.

You may like to know that before any action was taken on your letter Colonel Pope, who, as was reported in Sir Francis Floud's despatch No. 204 of the 22nd July,<sup>1</sup> was recently appointed Secretary of the Joint Staff Committee here, went out of his way to tell Holmes what a very good reply the despatch of the 21st October formed, in his opinion, to the Canadian Government's approach. As was mentioned by Holmes in his letter to Dixon No. 516 K/6<sup>1</sup> of the same date, which crossed your communications on the subject, the Canadian despatch itself represented a considerable triumph on the part of those defence authorities here who are anxious for co-operation between Canada and the United Kingdom on such matters. We gather that what was said in the Duke of Devonshire's reply and the way in which it was put will give those same authorities just what was required to get the question properly considered here.

On the 18th November, on my instructions, Holmes had a private talk with Pope and was able to put to him the various points made in the second and third paragraphs of your letter. Pope agreed that it would have been unreasonable for the Canadian Government to expect, having regard to the terms of their own enquiry, that we should draft our reply on the basis that Canadian co-operation with us in the circumstances envisaged was not to be assumed. He said that there would be no misunderstanding on the part of the Canadian authorities as to the source from which we naturally hoped the air squadron for Newfoundland would be forthcoming. He also stated that the suggestion that the Canadian authorities should get in touch with the Newfoundland Government direct on the subject generally was a sound one, and Holmes gathered that Pope would make this suggestion as one of his own in drafting the Joint Staff memorandum appropriate to the issue.

In fact, Holmes gathered, the existing "Plan for the General Defence of Canada" (and it is encouraging to know that such a plan does exist in some shape or form) provides for a concentration of something like five squadrons

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



of aircraft in the Nova Scotia peninsula and Saint John, N.B. It is being represented to the Government that the proper patrolling of the Gulf of St. Lawrence inevitably involves the patrolling of the much indented Newfoundland coast. It would therefore be entirely natural, assuming that Canada was with us in a European war, for the Canadian Air Force to ask for such aviation facilities as exist in Newfoundland, i.e., a situation for their own purpose, the defence of Canada and Canadian waters.

This is the sort of way in which, as you will realise, the Department of National Defence here must approach the problem, but so far as we can see it suits our own purposes well and the Canadian Government have as you know already expressed concern not only at the possibility of enemy bases being established on the Newfoundland and Labrador coasts, but also at the possible interruption of the present heavy shipments of iron ore (from Bell Island in Conception Bay) required for the steel works at Sydney, N.S. I think that we may therefore take it that the whole of Newfoundland would be regarded as a Canadian defence "commitment" in the technical sense and that plans will be made accordingly.

I imagine that you will agree that this is as far as we can take the matter at present but naturally at a later stage, if the Canadian Government have not reverted to the correspondence officially, we should be able to enquire at least informally how their minds are working on the basis of what was conveyed to them in the despatch of the 21st October.

Yours ever,

GERALD CAMPBELL

22. Skelton Papers 395

*Le conseiller au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Counsellor to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] November 26, 1938

Dr. Skelton,

Herewith is Croil's "Liaison Letter" to London of Nov. 23,<sup>1</sup> which National Defence have now asked to be returned to them for some reason I do not know.

Before it goes back I suggest you read paragraph 4—at page 3 re defence of Newfoundland as part of our East Coast defence.

The D.O. reply—No. 323 of Oct. 21/38—shows quite clearly that the U.K. are not going to make any special preparations for the defence of Nfld. as such. Their interest is protection of trade routes for their own supplies. Their position as shown in this despatch is entirely intelligible and entirely in line with their main defence policy defined by Mr. Chamberlain last March. (See my memos. of June 16/ 38<sup>2</sup> and June 24/38<sup>2</sup>.)

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

I think the D.O. reply speaks for itself and there is no need for "further official correspondence" as Croil suggests.

The practical conclusions which I think the government ought to face are along the following lines:

That Canada hereto assume the defence of Nfld. as part of the defence of her own East Coast

That our General Staff should be instructed to submit plans accordingly

That upon receiving a scheme from the General Staff, if conversations with the U.S. general staff in Washington seem appropriate in this connection, our General Staff be authorised to enter into such conversations at once.

L. C. CHRISTIE]

23.

DND NSS 1440-166/25

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité interforce d'état-major*

*Minutes of Meeting of Joint Staff Committee*

VERY SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 12, 1938

The Chairman read Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs despatch, No. 323, dated 21st October, 1938, which had been received in reply to the Prime Minister's despatch No. 185, dated 27th July, 1938, regarding the defence of Newfoundland, and also C.N.S.'s and S.A.O.'s memoranda thereon, of the 24th<sup>1</sup> and 25th November,<sup>1</sup> respectively, (H.Q.S. 7410, folios 34, 38, 43, and 44).

Some discussion ensued as to the precise meaning of the words "that an air squadron, if available, would also be located there for the same duties", which appear in the British reply. S.A.O. was of opinion that an air squadron located in Newfoundland was implied. In any event it appeared to him that the United Kingdom dispatch had been designed so as to leave the way open for the Canadian Government to state that it would assume a general responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland. C.G.S. thought it was clear that if the defence of Newfoundland was deemed desirable in the Canadian interest we should have to see to it ourselves. Consequently he thought that the course of action suggested by C.N.S. was sound, that is to say, that the defence of Canadian interests on the Atlantic seaboard, if it was to be effective, required naval and air reconnaissance of Newfoundland waters, that this reconnaissance should be carried out by Canadian forces, and that the Minister should be so advised to the end that authority might be obtained for direct conversations to be held with the Newfoundland Government as to the provision of facilities which our forces would require. The only modification he would suggest was that this approach should be made through the British Government. This was agreed to.

*Decision:* The Secretary was instructed to draw up a memorandum to the Minister in the sense of the above.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

24. King Papers C269563

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale au Premier ministre*

*Minister of National Defence to Prime Minister*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] January 9, 1939

My dear Prime Minister,

I beg to forward herewith a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Staff Committee, dealing with the defence of Newfoundland from a Canadian aspect.

You will observe that in the last paragraph a question of policy emerges which probably more concerns external relations than my own department.

I would therefore be very grateful for your advice and instructions in regard to this question.

Yours sincerely,

IAN A. MACKENZIE

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

DND HQS 7410

*Mémorandum du Comité interforce d'état-major  
au ministre de la Défense nationale*

*Memorandum from Joint Staff Committee  
to Minister of National Defence*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 27, 1938

...

9. *Conclusions drawn from British Reply.* It is suggested that the conclusions which can reasonably be drawn from the British reply are:

- (a) That in the early days of an emergency there will be no United Kingdom forces for the reconnaissance and supervision of the waters off Newfoundland and the Labrador coast.
- (b) That although trade protection units of the Royal Navy may be expected to arrive at Halifax at an early stage of an emergency, it will be necessary to rely mainly on Canadian forces for the direct protection of our coasts and the St. Lawrence trade. (It seems reasonable to infer that the primary tasks of the Royal Navy units mentioned will be to police the great North Atlantic trade route which passes to the south and east of the Nova Scotia peninsula. In so doing they will, it is true, provide an element of "cover" to Newfoundland.)
- (c) That the naval and air reconnaissance of Newfoundland and Labrador waters required for the direct defence of the Canadian sea-board and the Gulf of St. Lawrence trade in the early days of an emergency will have to be done by Canadian Forces.
- (d) That without the use of Newfoundland harbours and air bases this essential reconnaissance cannot efficiently be carried out.

10. The Joint Staff Committee are of the opinion that the danger of attack from enemy air, surface or submarine raiders on Canadian shipping in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and off the East Coast of Canada will be at its greatest in the early days of an emergency. There will then be a large number of German vessels on the high seas, many of which are believed to be prepared for immediate conversion to armed raiders and some without doubt will be in the immediate vicinity of our coast. It is during this period that little or no direct assistance from Royal Navy forces is to be expected.

11. In these circumstances it is recommended that a further communication be sent to the Government of the United Kingdom to inform them that note has been taken of the contents of Dominions Office Despatch No. 323 of the 21st October 1938, that Canadian Defence Measures include the basing of several Royal Canadian Air Force Squadrons at Halifax, that for the further protection of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Newfoundland ore supply, base facilities in Newfoundland are required, and that the Canadian Government desire to ascertain whether the United Kingdom Government would agree to this matter being taken up direct with the Government of Newfoundland.

T. V. ANDERSON, Major-General  
Chief of the General Staff

PERCY NELLES, Rear-Admiral  
Chief of the Naval Staff

G. M. CROIL, Air Vice-Marshal  
Senior Air Officer

25.

DND HQS 7410

*Mémoire du secrétaire du comité des chefs d'état-major  
au secrétaire du ministre de la Défense nationale*

*Memorandum from Secretary of Chiefs of Staff Committee  
to Secretary of Minister of National Defence*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 3, 1939

## DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

At its 54th Meeting held this date the Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed me to invite your attention to the fact that to date they had had no word regarding the memorandum dealing with the Defence of Newfoundland which they had submitted to the Minister on 27th December, 1938.\*

MAURICE POPE  
Colonel

\*Note telle que dans l'original:

\*Note as in original:

*Sec'y C. of S. Committee:* The Minister is not prepared at the moment to deal with this question C.N.S.[ENIOR]<sup>1</sup> 5.4.39

<sup>1</sup> Secrétaire particulier du ministre de la Défense nationale.

<sup>1</sup> Private Secretary to Minister of National Defence.



26.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 139

[St. John's,] May 22, 1939

SECRET. Reference Newfoundland Despatch Secret No. 108<sup>1</sup>, Newfoundland Defence Force. Subject has been reconsidered after my return in the light of information obtained by Captain Schwerdt in interviews with War Office, and Commission now recommend establishment of Defence Force to consist in first place of Headquarters and two Companies, eleven Officers and one hundred and seventy-eight other ranks in all. Initial outlay will include rifles, pistols for officers, eighteen Lewis guns, service dress for other ranks and outfit allowance for officers, supplies of ammunition and, subject to further examination, of camp equipment. Capital cost at present estimated \$27,000. Barracks will not be required. The recurrent cost in the first year should not exceed \$23,000, and will thus be within the total of \$50,000 provided in Estimates 1939-40. Cost in subsequent years, apart from any increase in numbers, may slightly exceed this latter figure.

If you approve, it is proposed to arrange immediately for provision of permanent training staff consisting of one British Captain and two Warrant Officers at Normal rates as indicated in correspondence with War Office.

We request authority immediately for steps to be taken to arrange for detailing of this training staff and ordering of equipment as follows: One hundred and seventy-eight service rifles with web equipment, eleven pistols (.38), eighteen Lewis guns, material for one hundred and seventy-eight suits of service dress, (old pattern), fifty-four thousand rounds of .303 ammunition and small quantity of .38 ammunition.

It would be valuable if Emerson before he leaves London could visit Major G. G. Mears, War Office, and take preliminary steps with a view to detailing of training staff and ordering of this equipment. Despatch containing full details follows, but in view of urgency we would be grateful if telegraphic approval could be given forthwith. We should be grateful also if priority could be given to supply of arms and ammunition on above limited scale.

We should be grateful if you would communicate with Emerson, if you approve, so that he could undertake this if prepared to do so.

27.

9475-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 1

Ottawa, June 6, 1939

SECRET. In view of the present international situation, Department of National Defence of Canada are anxious to obtain as much information as

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

possible regarding inlets and harbours of the coast of Labrador which could be made use of by an enemy employing submarines or aircraft against trade converging on the Gulf of St. Lawrence or Atlantic Seaboard. Existing maps and charts are admittedly sketchy, and in large areas the information they contain is believed to be unreliable. The Department of National Defence consider that it would be desirable to make a reconnaissance of this coast by aircraft.

As the season is short, it is considered that an effort should be made this year to reconnoitre the Labrador coast between Hamilton Inlet and the Straits of Belle Isle and, if found feasible, to extend the reconnaissance as far as Nain.

Canadian Government wish to inquire therefore whether the Newfoundland Government are willing to grant permission for a flight of R.C.A.F. aircraft to conduct this reconnaissance of the area mentioned above.

In addition, it is desired to know whether the Newfoundland Government would agree to permit of a liaison being established between the Newfoundland Airport authorities and the Eastern Air Command at Halifax. The assistance of the Newfoundland Airport authorities would be especially valuable in the matter of wireless communication. If this proposal meets with the approval of the Newfoundland Government as being in the common interest of the two Governments concerned, it would be greatly appreciated if full information could be given as far as possible regarding ship communication, weather conditions, likely harbours for use as seaplane bases and any other facilities which, in their opinion, would be of value to the personnel composing the detachment.

28.

9475-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's, June 15, 1939

SECRET. Your telegram No. 1, Secret, June 6th. Newfoundland Government agreeable to reconnaissance of Labrador coast by aircraft of Royal Canadian Air Force and will co-operate to full extent of available facilities. Agree to liaison between Eastern Air Command and Newfoundland airport. The airport Air Defence Officer has been instructed to co-operate with Eastern Air Command at Halifax and will send immediately preliminary information regarding likely harbours, weather and wireless. Several likely temporary bases are possible in Labrador with steamship service from St. John's fortnightly. Weather is suitable for flying in Labrador from now until mid-October.

29.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 191

[London,] June 16, 1939

SECRET. With reference to your telegram of June 12th, No. 166.<sup>1</sup> Creation of Defence Force on lines proposed in your telegram of May 22nd, No. 139, is approved in principle and War Office are pursuing enquiries with a view to secondment of suitable training staff. Desirable for service reasons that arms and equipment should be obtained from United Kingdom rather than from Canada or the United States and further telegram will be sent as soon as estimate can be given of time necessary for delivery. Please confirm in this connection whether number of Lewis guns required, which is given as 18 in your telegram of May 22nd, should not be 8 as given in War Office estimate.

Despatch follows with comments of Oversea Defence Committee in regard both to defence force proposal generally and also to proposal for defence of the airport—your despatch of April 3rd, No. 109.<sup>2</sup>

30.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH NEWFOUNDLAND 283

[London,] June 26, 1939

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Sir William Horwood's<sup>3</sup> Secret despatches Nos. 108<sup>2</sup> and 109<sup>2</sup> of the 3rd April, setting out the proposals of the Commission of Government for the formation of Newfoundland Defence Force and for the defence of the Newfoundland Airport respectively, and to inform you that these despatches have been considered by the Oversea Defence Committee.

2. As regards the question of the formation of a Defence Force, the Committee noted that the scheme outlined in Sir William Horwood's despatch

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Juge-en-chef de Terre-Neuve. Il exerça les fonctions d'administrateur délégué et de président de la Commission pour Terre-Neuve durant l'absence du gouverneur.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Newfoundland Chief Justice. He acted as Administrator and Chairman of the Commission of Government during the absence of the Governor.

No. 108 of the 3rd April was to be regarded as modified by the revised proposals contained in your subsequent telegram No. 139 of the 22nd May. The Committee accepted the scheme as thus modified, and as I informed you in my secret telegram No. 191 of the 16th June, the creation of a Defence Force on the basis of the revised proposals submitted in your telegram of the 22nd May is now approved in principle.

3. In this connection the Committee observed that it would be important in making arrangements for the disposition of the Defence Force that the principle of concentration should be observed so far as circumstances permitted. They accordingly recommended that, in view of the undesirability of dispersing the force to guard a number of military objectives, the Government of Newfoundland should be advised to concentrate on the defence of:

- (1) The Bell Island iron mine,
- (2) The City of St. John's, and that detachments to guard the more important cable landings and the Airport should be reduced to a minimum.

4. As regards the proposals for the defence of the Airport, contained in Sir William Horwood's despatch No. 109 of the 3rd April, the Committee noted that two stages were envisaged:

- (1) Pending the formation of the Defence Force, the immediate training by the Aerodrome Control Officer of members of the airport staff, both as machine-gunners and fire-fighters.
- (2) On the formation of the Defence Force, the allocation of 30 men from the force to provide continuous guards at the Airport in time of emergency.

The Committee felt, on consideration, that the scale of attack to which the Airport would be likely to be subjected was so slight that the first stage should prove adequate to meet defence requirements, and accordingly that it should prove unnecessary to proceed to the second stage. They therefore recommended that the measures to be taken for the defence of the Airport should be limited for the present to the provision of two anti-aircraft Lewis Guns with ammunition, and the training of the necessary personnel from the staff of the Airport to man them.

5. Arrangements are proceeding in cooperation with the War Office with a view both to the supply of the arms and ammunition required for the Defence Force and also to the secondment of an Officer and two Warrant Officers from the Regular Army to assist the Newfoundland Government in organising and training the Force. I am in separate communication with you by telegraph in regard to these matters.

6. I should add that careful consideration has been given to the suggestion contained in paragraph 5 of Sir William Horwood's despatch No. 109 of the 3rd April, viz. that expenditure on capital outlay in connection with the



defence of the Airport should be regarded as part of the construction costs and that current expenditure should be treated as part of the expenses of operation. It is felt however that it would be inappropriate that expenditure on defence measures at the Airport should be treated as part either of the construction or the operation costs for the purpose of the special arrangement with the Air Ministry, and the view taken is that any such expenditure should properly be regarded as the liability of the Newfoundland Government.

I have etc.

T. W. H. INSKIP

31.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 276

[London,] August 30, 1939

SECRET. My telegram 26th August No. 268 Secret.<sup>1</sup> One hundred E.T.R. Rifles and fifty-four thousand rounds of ammunition will be shipped on S.S. *Newfoundland* due to sail on September 5th.

32.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 258

[St. John's,] August 31, 1939

SECRET. Urgent necessity of receiving balance of arms and equipment apparent and should be obliged for information as to when they may be expected. We particularly require material and trimmings for uniforms and caps. Is there any possibility of these being shipped on September 5th.

33.

NPA GN1/8 4

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice à la commission pour Terre-Neuve<sup>2</sup>*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government of Newfoundland<sup>2</sup>*

J.52-39

[St. John's,] August 31, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

Our inability to obtain the necessary arms, uniforms and equipment for our Home Defence Force has necessitated the postponement of plans for its

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Le commissaire Emerson était également responsable de la défense.

<sup>2</sup> Commissioner Emerson was also responsible for Defence.

organization. By the boat leaving England on Sept. 5th Captain Fanning-Evans and two Sergeants will be arriving and as at present advised 100 rifles and 54,000 rounds of ammunition. We have no news however of the Lewis Guns, revolvers or what is of very great importance, the material for the making up of uniforms. It would I suggest be idle to recruit a force for its month's training unless we could put them in uniform and equip them with a rifle at least and also give them some target practice. If the material for uniforms is not coming forward by the boat leaving September 5th I think we should endeavour to see whether we cannot obtain same speedily in Canada.

2. The present plan envisages the recruitment this year of 180 ranks by monthly quotas of 25 per month. We have already lost our quota for July and August and September is upon us. My own view is that we should proceed at once to recruit 100 men, that is the three quotas for July, August and September, and anticipate the quota for October. After the end of October it will probably be too cold and the weather too uncertain to give any outdoor rifle practice to those who come up for training and this is a very important matter. We can of course give training with the miniature rifles in the Central Fire Hall to those who come up during the Winter. If this proposal is agreed to it is possible that the C.L.B. Armoury could be obtained for the housing of the men. If not the lower flat of the Y.M.C.A. building would be suitable. The C.L.B. Armoury is equipped with water and sewerage and the only installations required would be one or two cooking ranges. The men would be supplied with straw filled mattresses and pillows at a very cheap rate and would sleep on the floor. Two cooks would be required. Drill could take place either in the Armoury or in the Police Drill Hall.

3. I would suggest recruiting 50 men from St. John's and 50 men from Bell Island. The mines are the one spot near St. John's which require instant guarding if enemy raiders are loose in the Atlantic. With the assistance of the Manager of the Bell Island Mines, 50 applicants from there could be chosen who are permanently resident on the Island and I think the company should be asked to make up to the men the difference between the allowance paid by the Government and the sum which they would earn in the mines, and that they should be guaranteed that their jobs would be given back to them at the end of their month's training.

4. I think conditional applications might now be sought by the Chief of Police by an advertisement setting forth the terms, being put in the papers. Full particulars of each applicant would be taken so that when Capt. Evans arrives he would be in a position to begin interviewing them.

5. It will not be possible for the Police Force tailor to handle the making of uniforms with sufficient expedition at this late date and I suggest that the Supplies Division should approach the two clothing factories and find out the cost of making the uniforms on the basis that the raw materials would be supplied, and arrange so that they may be made rapidly.

6. In order to obviate the necessity of continually delaying matters of detail in order to bring them before the Commission, I suggest that the Department of Justice be authorized to proceed with arrangements for all obvious minor necessities, in order that no time may be lost before the training officer arrives.

L. E. EMERSON

34.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 263

[St. John's,] September 1, 1939

SECRET. The Defence Act which forms Schedule one to Newfoundland Defence Scheme 1936 has been enacted this morning. It recites the existence of a national emergency instead of imminent danger of war. In addition to powers contained in section two of the draft it enables the Governor in Commission to make regulations controlling foreign exchange transactions and to provide for declarations by persons in Newfoundland of their holdings of foreign exchange and securities. Section 7 (b) of the draft has been amended to permit of possession use or control being extended to ships, vessels, aircraft and all vehicles of every description and animals and food, forage and stores of every description. Certain regulations will be passed this afternoon of which I will inform you.

35.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 6

Ottawa, September 2, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. A request has been received from the Commander-in-Chief of West Indies Squadron Royal Navy for an air reconnaissance of the Newfoundland coast in order to ensure that no enemy ships are in adjacent waters. Canadian Defence authorities are prepared to make reconnaissance using two flying boats. Please inform us at earliest convenience if this reconnaissance is approved by the Newfoundland Government.

## PARTIE 2 / PART 2

LES PREMIERS MOIS DE LA GUERRE  
THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR

36. Skelton Papers 388

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 63 Ottawa, September 3, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Following from Prime Minister for Prime Minister.

1. As you are aware the Canadian Parliament will meet on Thursday of this week.

3. As regards military activities our primary task will naturally be the defence of Canada, which under present circumstances is a more pressing and urgent undertaking than it was in the last war. We are also considering to what extent we could undertake as necessity required and our means permitted action in the Western Atlantic region, particularly in Newfoundland and the West Indies. . .

37. 1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM St. John's, September 3, 1939

With reference to your telegram September 2nd, No. 6,<sup>1</sup> proposed reconnaissance approved by Newfoundland Government, and all facilities will be afforded.

38. 1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM 7 Ottawa, September 5, 1939

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. The Canadian Government would like to have authority for Royal Canadian Air Force to fly over any part of Newfoundland and Labrador and to make use of airport facilities available should it be considered necessary to do so, and trust this will be agreeable to the Newfoundland Government.

A reply as soon as possible would be greatly appreciated.

<sup>1</sup> Document 35.



39.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM

St. John's, September 6, 1939

SECRET. Your secret telegram No. 7, September 5th. It will be entirely agreeable to this Government for Royal Canadian Air Force to fly over any part of Newfoundland and Labrador and to make use of airport facilities available when necessary. Authority is granted accordingly.

40.

Skelton Papers 388

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 59

London, September 6, 1939

IMMEDIATE. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. I am very grateful for your message and for information as to the defence and precautionary measures which the Canadian Government are taking or considering.

2. We realize that, as regards military activities, the immediate task of the Canadian Government will be the defence of Canada. As regards concerted measures, we are most grateful for your offer of assistance, so far as is necessary and possible, in the western Atlantic region. Participation in protection of Newfoundland will be of special value in view of the importance of the Bell Island ore mines. . .

41.

HCD

*Extrait d'un discours du Premier ministre*

*Extract from a Speech by Prime Minister*

Ottawa, September 8, 1939

. . . .  
 Next, we must consider measures of cooperation with the United Kingdom. The safety of Canada depends upon the adequate safeguarding of our coastal regions and the great avenues of approach to the heart of this country. Foremost among these is the St. Lawrence river and gulf. At the entrance of the St. Lawrence stands the neighbouring British territory of Newfoundland and Labrador. The integrity of Newfoundland and Labrador is essential to the security of Canada. By contributing as far as we are able to the defence of Newfoundland and the other British and French territories in this hemisphere, we will not only be defending Canada but we will also be assisting Great Britain and France by enabling them to concentrate their own energies more in that part of the world in which their own immediate security is at stake. The British Government, in reply to the inquiry we have made, have indicated their agreement that this would be an effective and desirable means of cooperation. . .

42.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 293

[London,] September 9, 1939

SECRET. Supplies Division Telegram Sept. 4th<sup>1</sup> to Crown Agents and my telegram Sept. 5th No. 288.<sup>1</sup> War Office agree that it may be possible to obtain remainder arms and equipment for Newfoundland Defence Force more quickly from Canada than from United Kingdom.

My immediately following telegram repeats text telegram to High Commissioner Ottawa asking him to approach Canadian [Government] with a view to meeting needs of Newfoundland Defence Force.

43.

DND HQS 7410-2

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

IMMEDIATE. SECRET

Ottawa, September 13, 1939

My dear Dr. Skelton,

In my letter of the eleventh of September<sup>2</sup> I referred to a telegram which the High Commissioner had received from the Dominions Office regarding certain items of equipment for the Newfoundland Defence Force which it was hoped that the Canadian Government might feel able to supply in the near future.

It now appears from a telegram which the High Commissioner received direct from the Governor of Newfoundland on the twelfth of September that the list of equipment mentioned in the telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and included in my above mentioned letter was settled some months ago, and that it has been revised in the light of recent events. The Governor states that material for uniforms and great coats or boots is not at present required, but that the Defence Force are anxious to obtain all other items required to equip a soldier in modern battle dress for a force of two hundred. Other items urgently required are:

1. 100 rifles complete with bayonets, scabbards, frogs, slings, pull-throughs etc.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

2. 300 revolvers of .38 calibre with holsters, cleaning apparatus and ammunition pouches.

3. 18 Lewis guns with any necessary equipment for field use and 200,000 rounds of .303 ammunition.

The Newfoundland Government are not at present sure of what major equipment they may require.

The High Commissioner will be grateful if the list of items given above may be regarded as revising or, where necessary, supplementing the list contained in my letter of the eleventh of September. Sir Gerald Campbell understands that the Newfoundland Government have already been in direct touch with the Canadian Government authorities in the question of the equipment of the Newfoundland Defence Force, but he has been, nevertheless, requested to ask that consideration may be given as soon as possible to the possibility of supplying this equipment from Canada.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL MASON

44.

NPA GN1/3 39/1-17

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 288

[St. John's,] September 15, 1939

SECRET. In view of Canada's publicly proclaimed interest in defence of Newfoundland we suggest for consideration that Canadian Government be invited to take over for the duration of the war the Newfoundland Airport and the Botwood Seaplane Base for the use of the R.C.A.F. Details of such temporary transfer could best be arranged by direct negotiation in Canada but we think basis of the arrangements should be that Canada should assume entire responsibility for maintenance and operation of the Bases and for all expenditure attributable to meteorological and wireless services and for other expenditure insofar as it is attributable to military as distinct from civil requirements. Incidentally to the above proposal we suggest that the Fairchild and Fox Moth belonging to the Newfoundland Government Internal Air Service should be placed at the disposal of the R.C.A.F. and that the present arrangement with Imperial Airways which is expensive and also incompatible with military use of the planes should be terminated forthwith. The total cost of maintenance and operation of the Bases on the scale required for their continued use for trans-Atlantic flights will be at the rate of about \$180,000.00 per annum exclusive of the cost of wireless and meteorological staff and of any military measures. We are doubtful whether this expenditure will be justified at the present time unless military use can be made of the Bases far beyond anything our resources would permit.

45.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government*  
*of Newfoundland*

J. 58-39

[St. John's,] October 2, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

I annex hereto the report of the Secretary for Justice upon his recent visit to Canada in connection with equipment for the Newfoundland Defence Force.

He seems to have had a good reception and to have covered the ground very fully and to have obtained pretty well everything that we want, subject only to such delays as are inevitable in the circumstances.

. . .

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire du secrétaire à la Justice**Memorandum by Secretary for Justice*

SECRET

[St. John's,] September 30, 1939

REPORT UPON ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA FOR  
 THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE NEWFOUNDLAND DEFENCE FORCE

I arrived at Ottawa on Sunday night, September 17th, and on Monday morning proceeded to the British High Commissioner's office at Earncliffe where I saw Mr. Paul Mason, Chief Secretary, who took me in to see the High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Campbell. We compared notes as to the communications which had passed heretofore and they recommended approach to the Government through the Department of External Affairs. They, accordingly, rang up Dr. O. D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for that Department, and made an appointment, and I went over to see him. He made an appointment, forthwith, for me to see Colonel D. E. Dewar, Director of Clothing, Equipment and Manufacturing Establishments.

I went into the situation fully with Col. Dewar, who was most kind and helpful and spent a very considerable time with me on both Monday and Tuesday, examining our requirements, making suggestions as to our needs and explaining the situation as to supply.

I may summarize at this stage by saying that while perhaps the needs of the National Defence Department are more clearly defined than those of most departments, both they and every department with which I dealt are, admittedly, in a state of furious improvisation. Owing to the political situation, it had not been possible to deal with or mention war matters until the last moment. I heard that many militia units had been called up, and were doing



their own recruiting as units and that others which had not been called up (and were indignant thereat) had had to be stripped of equipment, and I judged that, for the moment, everything was at sixes and sevens. Most of this was gathered outside and not from the Department.

Col. Dewar said he would recommend very strongly that all our requirements should be furnished to us. He was embarrassed in dealing with me by the necessity of attending to constant pressing appointments and I went to and from his Department a great deal during the two days. Towards the afternoon of Tuesday, his report and recommendations having gone before Major-General Elkins, the Master General of the Ordnance, I was taken to see that officer, who was most kind and said that he would do all that he could for us, but that he could not finally authorize that equipment go out of Canada without consulting the Chief of the General Staff, who could, for the moment, not be seen. The matter having reached this stage he asked what I was doing next and suggested that I go on to Toronto and attend to my personal business (the placing of my son at school) and that he would get in touch with me there as soon as he had made progress.

Incidentally, in the course of Monday and Tuesday:

(1) I called upon the Deputy Minister of Justice, on general principles, having received many courtesies from his Department.

(2) At the suggestion of the Commissioner for Justice I asked the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs if he could initiate unofficial enquiries as to the possibilities of individuals from Newfoundland enlisting in the Canadian Forces.

(3) I saw Major-General H. F. H. Hertzberg, Quartermaster General in pursuance of an enquiry from my Commissioner as to the rations given to the troops and to prisoners or internees.

(4) Through the kind offices of Dr. Skelton and of the Under-Secretary of State, Dr. E. H. Coleman, I saw the Chief Censor, Mr. Thompson, to elucidate the question of censorship as between Canada and United States, which I had been asked to enquire into by our censorship staff.

(5) On the introduction of Dr. Skelton, I saw Mr. Norman A. Robertson of his Department, in pursuance of a request from the Secretary for Public Health & Welfare that I should try to get him some regulations, forms or information helpful in the matter of control of foodstuffs, prices, etc.

As to these matters:

(2) *Enlistment* I first saw, on Col. Dewar's suggestion, Col. Goodeve of the Adjutant General's Department, but that Department felt that the matter might have political aspects in view of the non-calling up of some of the existing Militia Units and I was referred back to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. He undertook to look into the matter unofficially, working on the following assumptions which I suggested but, as I said, without any specific authority so to do:

- (a) that men might be medically examined here;
- (b) that their expenses to Canada would not be a Canadian Government expense.

He would, of course, have to see Ministers in this connection. I asked him to include in the scope of his enquiry the question of enlistment in the Royal Canadian Navy should we have requests for the same.

As to (3) *Rations* Major-General Hertzberg referred me for the rations of the troops to a book on Pay and Allowances, copies of which I had, together with instructions modifying the same, copies of which he then gave me. As to prisoners, he said that under some Geneva Convention they were entitled to the same rations as the troops. I communicated this to my Commissioner by telegraph. He added, in so many words, that if there was any earthly thing he could do for us we should on no account fail to let him know. This was typical of the attitude encountered throughout.

As to (4) *Censorship* The Chief Censor said that they were not censoring to the United States as this was at present considered to be almost impossible in practice. He said that while he was in the stage of improvisation (he had in fact only shifted his office that morning) his feeling was that the best course was to exercise a selective scrutiny on mail going to the United States without attempting general censorship the idea being to pick up information, if possible. I pointed out that if they were not censoring to the United States and we were not censoring to Canada the position was wide open so far as we are concerned. He agreed and said he could only recommend that we take a somewhat similar course. He said the public did not know in what direction there was a censorship and in what direction there was not. I incorporated this in the code telegram sent from the High Commissioner's Office, through the kindness of the Chief Secretary.

As to (5) *Control of Supplies* Mr. Robertson said the situation was so undefined at the moment that he really could not give me any material which would be useful to our Food Control Department. He explained that there were three committees, directed more or less to (a) food control and profiteering; (b) supply; and (c) production, and that they were in the stage of attempting to define the fields of action of the different committees. He gave me a short set of published regulations which I thought might be useful.

I also saw the High Commissioner and Chief Secretary again before leaving, so that they might know what point I had reached, besides sending the cable for me.

I discovered, partly through my travels through Government offices and partly on the outside that, at the moment, a change of War Ministers was coming about and the announcement of a decision regarding the Expeditionary Force was on the carpet, which accounted pretty well for the impossibility of seeing senior officers such as the C.G.S. On Monday I gathered about lunch time that that officer had been at a continuous meeting since 8.30 a.m.

On Wednesday morning I proceeded to Toronto and went about my own business.

Not hearing anything further I got in touch with Col. Dewar by telephone on Friday evening and he said he would ring me later. He rang me later and said that the C.G.S. had been approached and that all would be well and that the details could be settled with him on Monday the 25th.

On Saturday I went again to St. Catherine's to complete arrangements with my school and on Saturday night went over to Ottawa. As the Department of National Defence was open, I was able to make contact with Col. Dewar and one or two of his juniors on Sunday, when we brought matters to a further stage and I wired my Commissioner for confirmation. Col. Dewar said that the arms would not cost us anything but would be given us on loan, this being the Canadian Government's own idea. I had asked for them only on the basis of payment. The other equipment was to be on a payment basis. In relation to articles which I thought we could provide here, I asked for samples only. (See annexed letter).<sup>1</sup>

On Monday, having confirmation from St. John's, I got a letter typed to Col. Dewar confirming the situation. Copy of this letter is hereto annexed.<sup>1</sup> They checked this over and said it was all in order though they did not give me any formal confirming letter.

I found revolvers unobtainable either from Government or privately pending repeal of the United States embargo or supplies from some other source. I was told that they do not equip military anti-sabotage guards with revolvers. Messrs. William Scully, Ltd., of Montreal, hoped to get out a small shipment of revolvers from the United States before long as police, not military, equipment. They are to let us know when they have any.

Upon my second visit to Ottawa, I went to Dr. Skelton's office again recruiting. He was away at the moment but I got in touch with Mr. Beaudry, next in order to him, who made contact with him and telephoned later in the day that he was not able to give any definite answer about recruiting yet. Mr. Beaudry also made an enquiry for me, at the request of my Commissioner, as to whether Government in Canada bears the expense of guarding industrial plants. He telephoned me later to say that Government guards only public works, such as bridges, railways and canals, leaving industrial plants to provide their own protection.

In moving about Montreal with my brother, who is superintendent of a large electrical company, I noted un-uniformed guards in some of his plants,

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

whom I gathered to be his company's employees. Soldiers, on the contrary, are on the large bridges, canals, etc. I picked up a rumour of an attempt on one of the C.I.L. plants.

I proceeded to Montreal arriving there at 8.45 a.m. on Tuesday and forthwith saw Messrs. William Scully, Ltd., from whom I obtained quotations on badges and buttons which I communicated by telegraph to St. John's. (See annexed letter).<sup>1</sup> Delivery of badges and buttons will take about four weeks. In the interim, obviously, we shall have to use temporary buttons. The number of regimental buttons on the battle dress is much less than on former uniforms.

They had their designer make a sketch for our badge which, to my mind, is an improvement as compared with our old badge, making a more symmetrical design and one better suited to metal stamping. He produced, however, on his own initiative, an entirely different Caribou head design with Crown which, to my mind, is far handsomer and more symmetrical and more of the type of other regimental badges than the old Caribou in profile, the Caribou in this case showing full face. Feeling that since we had to wait for a month and use temporary buttons meanwhile, the matter of a few more days would not make much difference, I brought the designs home and submit them herewith.

I communicated with St. John's, obtained quantities and confirmed an order subject to approval of design which can be done by telegraph.

I also, on request from St. John's, purchased a few stripes and officers' stars, and on a like request I had already purchased in Ottawa half a dozen Sam Browne belts and half a dozen officers' canes. The former I brought with me; the latter will be forwarded.

...

46.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government  
of Newfoundland*

J. 59-1939

[St. John's,] October 3, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

I annex hereto for the consideration of the Commission a draft Act<sup>1</sup> authorizing the creation of what we have heretofore called the Home Defence Force.

The Act follows closely Chapter 4 of 1914, which authorized the creation of the Newfoundland Regiment. I have adopted however the title "Militia"

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



and I suggest that this is the best one to be used in connection with the type of Force which we are considering.

The Bill is a very simple one and leaves most of the chief administration factors to be dealt with by rules and regulations to be made from time to time by the Governor in Commission.

L. E. EMERSON

47.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au commandant en chef, région de l'Amérique et des Indes Occidentales*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies*

TELEGRAM

[St. John's,] October 19, 1939

Reference my telegram of 3rd September.<sup>1</sup> A three inch jackstay carrying a one inch wire net, length 240 feet, mesh 10 by 6 feet, depth 18 feet, is ready for placing in position across entrance to St. John's Harbour between Chain Rock and a point 50 yards west of Pancake Rock.

Net can be lowered to the bottom or to 30 feet by winches. Estimated time for lowering 3 to 5 minutes and for raising 5 to 10 minutes. Centre of jackstay of net would be 8 feet below the surface of the water.

Object of net is to foul propellers, etc., of any incoming submarine which it is thought would not be submerged on account of depth of water available.

Propose to lower net onto bottom in conditions of low visibility, otherwise when net (to be known as "obstruction") is raised Day and Night Signal to be exhibited.

These Signals will be exhibited at a height of 80 feet above high water from a white flagstaff created at Anchor Point. The Day Signal will be a white ball 6 feet in diameter having a black band 1½ feet wide round the centre of the ball. The Night Signal three electric lights in a vertical line, one over the other, each 6 feet apart, the upper and lower of which shall be red and the middle white. Visibility of signals will be 2 miles.

A net-operating crew will be accommodated close to the winch on the South Side and will keep permanent watch so as to lower the net for incoming vessels. They will be in telephonic communication with the Naval, Customs and Harbour authorities.

Request your concurrence with above arrangements. On receipt of your reply Newfoundland Government will issue a Notice to Mariners on above lines giving one month's warning.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

48.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Mémorandum du commissaire à la Justice à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government*  
*of Newfoundland*

J.66-39

[St. John's,] October 20, 1939

CONFIDENTIAL

I annex hereto report<sup>1</sup> on the Cable stations and Cable landings at Cuckold Cove, St. John's, Harbour Grace, Colinet, Freshwater, Placentia, Bay Roberts and Heart's Content.

This report has been made by Mr. Dunfield, Secretary of the Defence Committee and Captain Fanning-Evans and reviews the situation so clearly that I merely need to summarize their findings, with which I concur.

1. There seems to be no need to provide a continuous guard at the cable landings.

2. It appears to be necessary that sentry guards be appointed at the stations:

- (a) Of the Commercial Cable Company at St. John's, Main Office.
- (b) At the office of the Imperial Company at Harbour Grace.
- (c) At the Western Union Company's office at Bay Roberts and Heart's Content.

3. That the Cable Companies be called upon to install certain structural precautions of a comparatively simple nature, in their stations.

L. E. EMERSON

49.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Le commandant en chef, région de l'Amérique et des Indes Occidentales,*  
*au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies, to Governor*  
*of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 1740

[America and West Indies Station,] October 21, 1939

Your message of October 19th. Concur in arrangements proposed for obstruction erected at entrance to St. John's Harbour.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

50.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 367

[St. John's,] October 31, 1939

SECRET. My telegram No. 288 Secret. We should be glad to know if there is any likelihood of the adoption of our suggestion for temporary transfer to Canada of Newfoundland Airport and Botwood Seaplane base. We are deferring decision on estimate of annual cost of maintenance and operation pending some reply to telegram referred to.

51.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 408

[London,] November 6, 1939

SECRET. Questions raised in your telegram of September 15th No. 288 with regard to use of Newfoundland airport<sup>1</sup> and seaplane base have been carefully considered. While there can be no reason why Royal Canadian Air Force should not have fullest use of facilities available in Newfoundland, on suitable terms for duration of the war if any request to this effect should be put forward by Canadian Government, it is felt there are strong reasons against handing over airports to Royal Canadian Air Force. Newfoundland is destined to play an important part in objective [sic] trans-Atlantic services and it is considered it would be undesirable to allow these airports, which are such an important factor in our bargaining position vis-à-vis Pan-American Airways and United States, to pass out of our control even temporarily.

It had been hoped to use aerodrome Hattie's Camp<sup>1</sup> for trans-Atlantic services with projected new type of land plane in 1941. Owing to war the construction of these aircraft has been dropped and it is not yet possible to say when aerodrome is likely to be required for a regular service. It is however known that Pan-American Airways are contemplating use of land aircraft in 1940 or 1941. Moreover as you know Air Ministry particularly desire to do some experimental work during forthcoming winter in regard to packing or removal of snow and they have two Harrow machines at Hattie's Camp it is proposed to use for test flights in this connection.

<sup>1</sup> L'aéroport de Gander.

<sup>1</sup> Gander Airport.

As regards Botwood it is intended if circumstances permit to resume weekly trans-Atlantic services with flying boats next summer, and it is understood that United States will wish to resume their regular service to Newfoundland with flying boats. It would appear probable therefore that air base facilities in Newfoundland will be required to a substantial extent in near future for civil aviation.

As regards financial position we appreciate advantage of a saving in maintenance costs but having regard to large contribution which Air Ministry have undertaken to make towards construction of the bases they feel that disadvantages of relinquishment of control far outweigh advantage of this saving moreover there will be some considerable return for maintenance expenditure in way of use of facilities by civil aircraft.

In the circumstances it is considered it would be best not to raise matter with the Canadian Government, if they should make request for use of airports we should be ready to consider possibility.

Question of utilising the air base facilities in Newfoundland directly or indirectly in connection with Empire air training scheme will be considered in examination of position of Newfoundland in relation to that scheme which as stated in my telegram No. 393 of October 31st<sup>1</sup> is being undertaken but it is not possible at present to say what will be result.

52.

722-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

SECRET

Ottawa, November 20, 1939

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that a new scheme for the control of navigational lights in war time has just been put into operation on the east coast of Canada. Under such scheme such lights can be extinguished and fog signals and radio beacons discontinued on all or any sections of the Coast at short notice for any required length of time.

Although the lights maintained by Canada on the West and South coasts of Newfoundland have been brought into this organization, the Defence authorities here consider it desirable that the scheme be made complete by making arrangements to have the Lights maintained by the Newfoundland Government also brought under this control. It is therefore requested that consideration be given to the possibility of instituting an organization for the extinguishing of the main navigational lights maintained by the Newfoundland

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Government at short notice, particularly those on the South and East Coasts.

The control of the Lights on the east coast of Canada is exercised by the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, and should the Newfoundland Government be willing to concur this control could be extended to the Lights on the Newfoundland coast through the Naval Control Service Officer who is at present stationed at St. John's.

I shall be grateful for an early indication of the views of the Newfoundland Government in regard to this matter.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

53.

DND HQS 7410

*Mémoire du maître général de l'artillerie au commandant  
de district, Québec*

*Memorandum from Master General of the Ordnance  
to District Officer Commanding, Quebec*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] November 21, 1939

#### EQUIPMENT FOR NEWFOUNDLAND

With reference to your telegram Q.1087<sup>1</sup> and Equipment 1 of 20 November;<sup>1</sup> while the exportation of the shipment has been authorized by the Customs Department it will be noted the machine guns, rifles, etc., are only a "loan" issue and will no doubt be returned to Canada after the termination of the present war or when no longer required by the Government of Newfoundland. This being the case and in order that particulars of the shipment will be on record in the Customs files, it is necessary for the required application forms to be completed and returned to these Headquarters for necessary action.

All items shipped should be detailed and where the items are on loan, the forms should be so endorsed to avoid any difficulties that might crop up in connection with re-entry into Canada.

. . .

W. H. P. ELKINS  
Major-General

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

54.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

516 K/17

Ottawa, November 22, 1939

SECRET. IMPORTANT

Dear Dr. Skelton,

The High Commissioner has recently received from the Governor of Newfoundland a despatch from which it appears that the Commission of Government have been giving anxious consideration to the problem of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay.

A memorandum is enclosed setting forth the main points to which the Governor has drawn attention. It will be observed in particular, and you are naturally familiar with the fact, that the importance of the island rests mainly on the consideration that it is the seat of mining operations of the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation. It is on that ground that the Commission of Government have reached the conclusion that the security of the island requires to be defended against possible enemy attack upon a scale which is beyond the scope of their own resources.

In these circumstances Sir Gerald Campbell would be grateful if you would convey to the appropriate quarter Sir Humphrey Walwyn's suggestion that the appropriate provision for the defence of the Island might be made available by the Canadian Government, and if he might be informed, at as early a date as convenient, of any views which it may be desired to express in reply.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mé morandum**Memorandum*

The Commission of Government of Newfoundland have recently had under consideration the matter of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay. As the Canadian Government are aware Bell Island is the seat of operations of the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation which mines from the various submarine slopes the iron ore which heretofore has gone mainly to Germany and to Sydney, Nova Scotia. The company has also a very large establishment at Sydney where quantities of ore are smelted and their only supply is from Wabana Mines, Bell Island.

2. The shipments of ore to Germany have now of course ceased and the Commission of Government are informed by the Company that its shipments to Sydney are being substantially increased. During the coming year its

production of steel for munitions at Sydney will rise to a point at which upwards of a million tons of ore from Bell Island will be treated. It is also in contemplation, provided that shipping can be arranged, that a certain quantity of ore will be sent to Great Britain in excess of the quantity normally exported there in peace times.

3. Consultations have taken place with officials of the company in which the several possible methods of attack and the varying degrees of risk attached to these methods have been discussed. In regard to internal sabotage the Company is of opinion that the risk therefrom is not great. They are providing a number of watchmen at points of importance, a provision which in their opinion dispenses with the necessity of Government assistance.

4. The possibility of attack by an enemy surface raider or by an airplane flying from a raider cannot be excluded from consideration. The provision of land armament and personnel for defence against a raider would entail an outlay which it is thought is out of proportion to the risk. An aircraft patrol based on the seaplane base at Botwood, however, would materially help to guard against both these methods of attack.

5. The chief source of danger lies in an attack by a submarine rising to the surface and shelling the loading piers and the electrical transformer which supplies all the power to the mines. These are located on the south side of the island and are very much exposed to this form of attack. In addition, the loading piers are also situated on the south side and if a submarine sank a ship while loading at one of the piers export therefrom would be interfered with for an indefinite period. It is thought that the best defence against this danger lies in the establishment of two 4" guns and two searchlights at properly selected points on the south side of the island. The distance from this side of the island to the mainland varies from three to six miles and it is felt that a submarine aware of the existence of these defences would hesitate to rise to the surface.

6. The provision of this form of coastal defence, is, the Commission of Government consider, one for Government and not for private enterprise. Unfortunately in Newfoundland there are neither the guns nor the trained gun crews, nor the personnel to train the crews.

7. The Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation is one whose capital is held entirely outside of Newfoundland and, it is believed, almost entirely in Canada. The ore during the war will be going mainly to Canada and is a vital necessity to the operation at Sydney which is one of the greatest producers in Canada of steel for munitions purposes. The coastal defence of the island therefore appears to be of imperial importance and peculiarly of importance to the Dominion of Canada.

8. In view of all these circumstances the Commission of Government have felt that it would not be inappropriate to ascertain from the Government of the Dominion of Canada whether they would be prepared to make provision for this coastal defence of Bell Island by making available the necessary airplanes, guns, searchlights and crews for their operation.

55.

722-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

St. John's, December 27, 1939

Sir,

With reference to your Secret despatch of 20th November, 1939, concerning control of navigational aids in war time, I annex copies of telegrams exchanged with the Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Station, on this subject.<sup>1</sup>

2. The Government of Newfoundland is prepared to consent to the proposal that the scheme which has recently been put into operation in Canada be extended to include the main navigational aids on the Newfoundland coast which are under the control of this Government (Department of Public Works). This consent is given on the understanding that the discontinuance of the lights in question will be requested only in the event of an emergency and that due regard will be paid to the dangers to Newfoundland shipping which may result.

3. In this connection it is observed that a message received from the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the 7th September last indicated that navigational aids should not be extinguished or removed in ordinary commercial routes or in commercial harbours except as specially ordered or in an emergency.

4. There are one hundred and one main navigational lights and other aids on the coasts of Newfoundland. Thirty-eight of these, however, are located on islands which at times are inaccessible. A list showing the main navigational aids and the available method of communication in each case is annexed. Two copies of Newfoundland, Canadian and French Lights and Fog Alarms on the Coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador are also enclosed.<sup>1</sup>

5. Officials of the Department of Public Works will set up an organization for the extinguishing of all main navigational lights and the discontinuance of fog alarms at the shortest possible notice, having regard to the situation of the light or fog alarm and the available means of communication. It is requested that a list of the navigational aids which it is considered necessary to bring within the proposed scheme should be furnished to this Government as early as possible in order that these preparations may be completed. It is hoped that the number of lights, etc., included in this will be kept to the absolute minimum essential for defence purposes.

6. When the scheme comes into operation requests that lights should be extinguished should be communicated to the Department of Public Works by the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast through the Naval Control Officer at St. John's.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



56.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 1

Ottawa, January 3, 1940

Your telegram September 6, 1939, concerning flying by Royal Canadian Air Force Newfoundland and Labrador and use of airport facilities. During the coming year, it is proposed to establish an advanced base for seaplanes at Red Bay in the Straits of Belle Isle. If the Government of Newfoundland have no objection, it is proposed to erect certain buildings and to install a wharf or slipway on a site of unoccupied ground which has been chosen for the purpose. The site is approximately three to four hundred yards north of the church at Red Bay.

Canadian Government would greatly appreciate it if your Government would grant the necessary permission.

57.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1

St. John's, January 5, 1940

Your telegram No. 1 of January 3rd. Newfoundland Government agree to your using area of unoccupied Crown land selected at Red Bay for as long as necessary for building wharf, etc., for establishment of the Royal Canadian Air Force advance base for seaplanes. We also reaffirm offer of use of facilities at Botwood as intermediate base.

58.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

516 K/17

Ottawa, January 17, 1940

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I should be glad if you would be good enough to let me know whether you expect shortly to be in a position to reply to my letter of the 22nd November (516 K/17) regarding the problem of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay, Newfoundland. The Commission of Government of Newfoundland are pressing the High Commissioner for a reply and Sir Gerald Campbell would like to be able to send an answer as soon as practicable.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

59.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du conseiller juridique<sup>1</sup>  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] January 18, 1940

## BELL ISLAND

The position with regard to Dosco is fundamentally different from the position of Canadian corporations doing business in Canada.

The responsibility is upon Dosco, both in Canada and in Wabana, for doing the sort of protective work that the Prime Minister almost certainly has in mind.

There is no instance in Canada of any corporation undertaking the sort of measures that the Department of National Defence has in mind with regard to the Wabana area. Indeed, no Canadian corporation would be permitted to undertake such measures, and Dosco would certainly not be permitted to undertake them in Newfoundland.

The measures in question are basic defence measures, including the provision of coastal batteries and air patrols.

60.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au président de Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation Limited*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to President  
of Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation Limited*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 19, 1940

Dear Sir,

The Government of the United Kingdom has requested the Canadian Government to adopt certain measures of co-operation with regard to the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay, Newfoundland. In determining the course that the Government should follow in dealing with this request, it is necessary to ascertain the general nature of the protective measures that have been adopted by your company with regard to its mining properties and other plants at Wabana. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would let me have, at your earliest convenience, an indication of the nature of the protective measures that your Company has adopted, with a view to coping with possible enemy activities arising out of the war.

You are, of course, familiar with the extent to which Canadian business enterprises have undertaken protective measures against enemy activity in this country. Your own company will have, undoubtedly, adopted such measures in the Sydney and Glace Bay areas and Halifax and elsewhere. It would

<sup>1</sup> J. E. Read.

be helpful if you would let me know whether the protective measures adopted by you at the Wabana area are as extensive as those which have been adopted, say, in the Sydney and Glasgow Bay areas. If they have been more extensive, you could, perhaps, indicate the difference in practice.

This communication is, of course, of a very secret character, and I should be grateful if you would take precautions to prevent its contents from coming to the attention of any persons, other than the senior officers of your company whom you may have to consult with a view to obtaining the necessary information.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

61.

1156-D-39

*Le conseiller juridique au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Legal Adviser to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] January 26, 1940

The attached letter from Mr. Cross, President of the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation Limited, makes it clear that the company has been doing all that is reasonably necessary in Bell Island to make effective the sort of protective measures that are practised by Canadian industries. He points out that the real danger at Bell Island is from attacks from the sea by submarines or other enemy craft, and the Company is not competent to provide protection from a danger of this sort.

I may say that I should have complete confidence in any arrangements made by Colonel J. A. Macdonald, whom I have known well since the summer of 1915.

I venture to suggest that in the circumstances we should be authorized to write to Earnscliffe along the lines set forth in the draft letter of December 20th, 1939<sup>1</sup>.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le président de Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation Limited*  
*au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*President of Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation Limited*  
*to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

Montreal, January 20, 1940

Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 19th inst. has received careful consideration.

At the outbreak of war Colonel J. A. Macdonald of our organization who was then placed in charge of all policing and protective measures affecting all our properties consulted with Major Haultain of the Sabotage Division

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. A visit was made to Newfoundland and Bell Island by Col. Macdonald and Major Haultain on October 9th and 10th, 1939, and the conclusions finally reached were that the nature of the population on the island reduced to a minimum the danger of sabotage, and that as the avenues of approach to the island were so well controlled the addition of four to the company's police force would be an adequate safeguard.

The real danger is that of damage to the loading piers and other properties by attacks from the sea by submarines or other enemy craft, and the company is not competent to provide protection from this danger.

The importance to Canada and the Empire at this time of the Bell Island iron ore mines, and loading and shipping facilities cannot be too urgently emphasized, as we consider that provision of adequate protection from external attack from the sea is most necessary.

Yours sincerely,

A. CROSS

62.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.*

*High Commission of Great Britain  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

516 K/17

Ottawa, February 6, 1940

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

I hope that you will forgive me for reminding you once again about the problem of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay, Newfoundland, on which I wrote to you on the 22nd November. The High Commissioner would like to be able to send an answer to the Commission of Government of Newfoundland as early as may be practicable.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

63.

King Papers C253683

*Le conseiller juridique au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Legal Adviser to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, February 29, 1940

DEFENCE OF BELL ISLAND, CONCEPTION BAY, NEWFOUNDLAND

1. Mr. Emerson, Minister of Justice of Newfoundland, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Macdonald, D.S.O., of Sydney, N.S., called to



see me this morning at 10:15 a.m. The arrangements for the visit were made by Mr. Hankinson after consultation with Dr. Skelton.

2. Mr. Emerson explained the special position of the Wabana Iron Mines at Bell Island. A large scale sketch map of Conception Bay is annexed.<sup>1</sup>

3. Mr. Emerson strongly emphasized the importance of the protection of Bell Island against raids by enemy submarines. He pointed out that the principal danger was from a possible raid by a single submarine that had escaped Naval cordons. He pointed out that the danger would become serious with the opening up of the spring season.

4. The possible adverse effect of a bombardment, assuming that it was in the nature of a "tip and run" raid, was discussed. Roughly speaking, one-third of the Canadian steel supply was dependent upon the Wabana ores and the destruction of the power-plant and landing facilities, if it occurred at a critical time of the year, might involve a delay to the extent of eight or nine months supply. That would be the maximum adverse effect, assuming effective bombardment at the critical time in the season. Colonel Macdonald, who is head of the company's police force, is a most distinguished and competent artillery officer, and I think his judgment on this point would be reliable.

5. The Newfoundland Government is anxious to get a decision on this question.

6. Mr. Emerson also discussed the question of the advisability of the establishment of a R.C.A.F. station for reconnaissance aircraft at St. John's.<sup>2</sup> At the present time this suggestion is merely made for consideration and he does not make any definite requests or proposals.

7. I told him that I would endeavor to have his request, for decision on the main question, brought to the attention of the Prime Minister at the earliest opportunity after his return.

J. E. READ

64.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du secrétaire principal du Premier ministre  
au conseiller juridique*

*Memorandum from Principal Secretary to Prime Minister to Legal Adviser*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 14, 1940

RE DEFENCE OF BELL ISLAND, CONCEPTION BAY, NEWFOUNDLAND

Regarding your note of February the 29th, for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, which was forwarded to the Prime Minister by Dr. Skelton, I am directed to inform you that the subject was discussed in Council yesterday and it was agreed that:

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Ceci présageait l'établissement de la base du CARC à Torbay, près de St. John's.

<sup>2</sup> This presaged the establishment of the R.C.A.F. base at Torbay, near St. John's.

In view of the circumstances disclosed in your note of February the 29th, with respect to the importance of the supply of iron ore from Bell Island, the Canadian government should undertake, for the defence of the Island against possible attack, such measures as are approved by the Minister of National Defence.

I informed the Prime Minister that it was my understanding that the actual measures contemplated had been considered and approved by the Department of National Defence.

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

65.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures  
High Commission of Great Britain  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

516 K/17

Ottawa, March 16, 1940

SECRET

Dear Mr. Beaudry,

The High Commissioner has asked me to bring to your notice the matter of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay, Newfoundland, regarding which I last wrote to Dr. Skelton in my letter of the 6th February (516 K/17).

As this matter was originally raised with the Department so long ago as the 22nd November last, you will understand that Sir Gerald Campbell wishes to be able to reply to the Commission of Government of Newfoundland without further delay.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

66.

1156-D-39

*Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne  
Prime Minister to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 16, 1940

My dear High Commissioner,

RE: DEFENCE OF BELL ISLAND IN CONCEPTION BAY

As the government of the United Kingdom is aware, the Canadian government has, since the outbreak of war, been prepared to co-operate, and has been actively co-operating in the air defence of Newfoundland, including the approach thereto, as inextricably tied in with the air defence of the Atlantic coast and, at the request of the Canadian government, the Newfoundland government has already granted full use of its existing air facilities to the Royal Canadian Air Force. An air reconnaissance, by aircraft of the

Royal Canadian Air Force, was made of the Labrador coast during the summer of 1939, and of the Newfoundland coast in September.

It is intended, next spring, to locate a R.C.A.F. base at Red Bay, on the Labrador coast for the protection of the Straits of Belle Isle. In addition, a squadron of long-distance, high-speed bomber reconnaissance aircraft will be stationed at Dartmouth and can, if required, reach the St. John's, Newfoundland area within two hours. If circumstances so dictate, a detachment of this squadron could operate from the Newfoundland airport at any time.

The stationing of reconnaissance aircraft, additional to these (to be located at Red Bay), will have to be determined on the availability of aircraft from time to time, and the general plan for the protection of the Newfoundland and Canadian coasts. It is thought that a reasonable arrangement for the air defence of important points in Newfoundland would be for the R.C.A.F. to furnish the aircraft and personnel, and for the Newfoundland government to furnish the necessary operating facilities, such as hangar, slipway, mooring, refuelling and general maintenance requirements.

The defence of Bell Island presents a special problem, which is of direct interest, both to the government of Canada and to the government of Newfoundland. The Canadian government is interested because of the fact that upwards of 30% of the iron produced in Canada is smelted at Sydney from ore obtained from the Wabana Mines. The government of Newfoundland is interested, in so far as the industry provides employment for Newfoundland nationals and revenue, directly and indirectly, for the government. The responsibility for providing a measure of protection in Bell Island is, therefore, one that the Canadian government is also prepared to share with the Newfoundland government.

As the result of careful investigation, since the matter was first considered, it is felt by our Department of National Defence that the coast defence of Bell Island would be adequately provided for by the installation and manning of two 4.7" guns and two defence electric search lights. There are in Canada spare 4.7" mobile equipments, and adequate coast defence mountings can be manufactured in this country. Two search lights, which would be adequate for this purpose, will shortly become available at Halifax. The Canadian government would be willing to overhaul and install these guns and search lights and provide an officer instructor and two assistant instructors for a period of six months. This, it is believed, should be sufficient to ensure the training of the crews to a point of satisfactory efficiency. The government of Newfoundland, no doubt, could provide and maintain the necessary crews and be in a position to carry on after the members of the instructional staff had completed their task.

I should be obliged if you would communicate these views to Sir Humphrey Walwyn. If the project proves to be acceptable, our government will be prepared to make provision for any necessary discussions of detailed arrangements.

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

67.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice to Commission of Government*  
*of Newfoundland*

J.12-1940

[St. John's,] March 23, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

One of the principal purposes of my visit to Canada was to ascertain to what extent the military, naval and air strategy of that Dominion envisaged the defence of Newfoundland. My colleagues will remember that on September 8th, the Prime Minister of Canada made an announcement in regard to the general policy of that country in connection with the war. He made particular reference to the defence of Newfoundland<sup>1</sup> . . .

2. I would have expected to find that as a result of the apparent agreement between Great Britain and Canada on this subject that [sic] the technical advisers to the Government would have been given instructions to coordinate their strategy so as to defend Newfoundland. I interviewed the Chief of General Staff General Anderson, Vice-Admiral Nelles and Air Vice-Marshal Croil and speaking generally I found that no instructions had been issued relating to Newfoundland except:

- (a) In regard to Bell Island to which I shall address myself at greater length, and
- (b) In regard to those parts of our coasts which have to be considered in relation to the defence of Canada.

3. I also had an interview with the Counsellor to the Department of External Affairs and I inferred from my conversation with him that some two years ago correspondence took place between the United Kingdom Government and the Canadian Government in which it was suggested that the defence of Newfoundland should in the case of war be looked upon as part of the burden to be borne by Canada. Nothing however was done to finalize matters as it was felt that in the case of Great Britain declaring war, Newfoundland would find itself automatically at war, whereas Canada would exercise its own discretion as to whether it was to consider itself justified in joining in the fight against Great Britain's enemy. It would appear also that since the declaration of war by Canada the Prime Minister, who is also Minister of External Affairs, has been so occupied that no instructions have been issued to the military, naval or air branches to consider Newfoundland as part of the territory which they are to defend.

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<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 41.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 41.



4. We are also without information from Great Britain. It is true that in the Defence Scheme reference is made to a naval flotilla being based on St. John's. We have however heard nothing further in respect of this matter, nor have we been informed whether it is proposed that the Admiralty or Air Ministry intend to patrol our coasts.

5. The defence of Bell Island had been the subject of consideration by the military and naval authorities and they plan for its defence along the lines of the despatch to Sir Gerald Campbell of 14th November, 1939. General Anderson and Vice-Admiral Nelles were awaiting orders from the Department of External Affairs before moving further in the matter, and we have recently received a telegram to the effect that preparations for the provision of guns and training personnel can now be made.

6. I enquired as to what was intended as to the R.C.A.F. and I found that it is proposed to establish a base for seaplanes at Red Bay in the Straits of Belle Isle and to use Botwood for seaplanes also. It will be noted that no provision is made to base anything on Newfoundland which would cover that very important part of our coast from Cape Freels to Cape Race. I suggested to Vice-Marshal Croil that reconnaissance seaplanes based upon Bay Bulls Big Pond might be considered, or if this particular stretch of water was unsuited a base might be found in Trepassey, St. Mary's or Placentia Bay. He appreciated the value of such a base, but stated that the difficulty at present existing and one which might continue for some time, is that they have not any planes to spare.

7. Vice-Admiral Nelles stated that the question of the patrol of our East coast had not been considered. The Canadian Navy with its destroyers and auxiliary craft will patrol the New Brunswick-Nova Scotian and Gaspé coasts, the West coast of Newfoundland and part of the Southwest coast, all with a view of protecting the seaborne traffic of Canada. He told me that the dockyards of Canada are working at full pressure to turn out as many small craft for this purpose as possible. He does not expect deliveries until September and he sees no hope of providing anything for our defence until next year.

8. On the military side there is not very much that Canada can do. They are providing two guns and two searchlights for the defence of Bell Island and will lend us the necessary personnel to train our militia in their use. It will take a month or two to erect the necessary barracks and install the guns and lights. Colonel Craig in charge of Artillery at Halifax very kindly suggested that I should send a small number of our Militia to Halifax at once and he would put them in training for handling guns and lights so that when the Bell Island defences are installed, some of the men will have had some

training. I propose to take advantage of this offer unless the Commission orders to the contrary. I am of opinion that provision for the coastal defence of St. John's ought to be made in a manner similar to that which is provided for Bell Island, namely two guns and two searchlights installed at such points at the entrance to the harbour as we are advised. I think that an enquiry should be made as to whether Lewisporte is to be a substantial port for the storage and movement of oil for military planes flying the Atlantic this year and if this is so, some coastal protection there would appear to be indicated.

9. I enquired into the question of the control of navigational aids on the East and Northeast coasts and as I expected I found that the only reason the Canadians had not asked to control these lights and to deal with them in the same manner as those of the South and West coasts, was because they did not consider them of such importance to the defence of the coast of Canada. The opinion was expressed however both in Ottawa and in Halifax (Commodore Reid) that if they were responsible for the defence of Newfoundland, navigational aids on all coasts would be treated in the same manner.

10. I could get no idea from any of the Departments as to the nature of the risk of enemy action against Newfoundland and Canada. It is quite clear that all the Authorities there are very much in the same position as we are here. They do not know—there is no information that any plans are being laid and both from the naval and air angle they are guessing as to the extent to which we are in danger. They are however treating the risk as real and serious and making preparations accordingly.

11. I did not feel that I was authorized to suggest to the Canadian Government that they should undertake anything more for the present than to give us assistance in the defence of Bell Island in which I included the provision of reconnaissance planes based on St. John's. I think however that the time has come when we should know exactly what is going to be done by the United Kingdom and by the Canadian Government. It is clear that the Canadian Government can do nothing for us this year, and I think that the Dominions Office should be apprised of this fact. It may be that the United Kingdom Government has been lulled into a sense of security so far as Newfoundland is concerned by the very wide terms of Prime Minister King's statement. It may be that the Admiralty and Air Ministry have information which enables them to place a proper value upon the risks which our undefended position lays us open to, but whatever the true position is I do not think that we should remain in our present state of uncertainty and unpreparedness.

L. E. EMERSON

68.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

516 K/21

Ottawa, March 26, 1940

SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

May I refer to your letter of the 16th March on the subject of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay. Immediately upon receipt of your letter I communicated the views expressed therein to the Governor of Newfoundland and I have now received a reply from Sir Humphrey Walwyn asking me to express to you the appreciation of the Commission of Government of Newfoundland of the proposals of the Canadian Government in this regard.

The Commission of Government confirm that the air bases at Botwood and the Newfoundland airport are at the disposal of the Royal Canadian Air Force either for the defence of Canada or of Newfoundland and that such land at Red Bay, Labrador, as is required by the Royal Canadian Air Force will be made available to them as soon as possible after they have selected them. The Commission of Government would be very glad to discuss with the representatives of the Royal Canadian Air Force the arrangements for the air defence of important points in Newfoundland and they suggest that it will probably be considered advisable that these discussions should take place in St. John's. At such discussions the nature and extent of the relative provision by each Government could be settled.

The Commission of Government state that the proposals in regard to the defence of Bell Island are quite acceptable and that the Newfoundland Government will be glad to receive information as to the date and place of the discussion of details. It is suggested that in this case also the discussions could take place at St. John's. In the meantime two points of detail arise for early settlement. Firstly, the position of guns and lights should be located so that the erection of barracks and other buildings may be proceeded with. If an adviser could visit St. John's soon and settle this point it would be appreciated. Secondly, the Governor states that Colonel Craig at Halifax kindly offered the Commission of Justice to take eight or ten of the Newfoundland militia into barracks there immediately to give them preliminary training during one quarter between now and the completion of the defence works. If the Canadian Government would approve of this proposal the Commission of Government would be deeply obliged and action thereon would be taken immediately.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

69.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions**Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 168

[St. John's,] April 8, 1940

SECRET. The Commission of Government feels that the time has now arrived when an appreciation of the present position of the defence of Newfoundland is in order. As you are aware the defence of Bell Island from an attack from the sea is being dealt with in isolation as being of paramount importance from all angles. The personnel will be provided by Newfoundland Militia and a further number of these will be used as anti-sabotage guards.

When in Ottawa and Halifax the Commissioner for Justice interviewed the heads of Army, Navy and Air Forces and notwithstanding the speech of Prime Minister King on September 8th he could not obtain any assurance that instructions have been issued that the military, naval or air strategies of Canada are to include Newfoundland as a unit for defence. It was quite apparent that Newfoundland is being considered only in so far as the defence of Canada is concerned. Thus we have been requested to install radio receiving sets at our navigational aids on the South and West coasts which will be put out of operation on receipt of prearranged signals from Canada. Land at Red Bay in the Straits of Belle Isle has been sought for seaplane base. The use of Newfoundland Airport and of Botwood seaplane base also sought. In all cases we have agreed to comply with requests. The Navy and Air Force heads stated that the provision of ships to patrol Newfoundland coasts or planes for reconnaissance or defence purposes in Newfoundland is at present out of the question. New vessels for Canadian Navy will begin to be delivered in September and not until next year will there be any available for services on other than Canadian coasts. When the airplane situation will improve was not stated. Whilst both naval and air patrols from Halifax and Sydney will to some extent cover the South and West coasts the whole East coast from Cape Race to Straits of Belle Isle remains entirely uncovered by Canada. From the point of view of Newfoundland this area is of far greater importance than the South or West coasts. St. John's, Bell Island, Lewisporte and Botwood will all have substantial shipping during summer and autumn and pit-prop steamers in White Bay and North will be numerous. St. John's is entirely unprotected but might be made reasonably safe against submarine attack by mounting two medium calibre guns at mouth of Harbour and by placing mines at entrance. Lewisporte we understand will become port for storage of quantities of aviation spirit for bombers flying from America to United Kingdom and probably would justify protection similar to that of Bell Island. We cannot estimate the nature of the naval or airplane protection required to cover this coast but suggest that if Canada is basing planes on Botwood and Airport a base in the waters of the Peninsula of Avalon would appear to be worthy of consideration. The Newfoundland Government is uncertain at the moment as to whether the provision for the defence of Newfoundland is to



come from the United Kingdom or from Canada and would like this uncertainty to be resolved. We could then discuss in the light of the above outline the extent to which assistance will be forthcoming and the risks which we are asked to take.

We would appreciate your views at an early date.

70.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

URGENT. SECRET

Ottawa, April 10, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

May I refer to your letter, dated the 26th March, 1940, addressed to the Prime Minister, on the subject of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay.

In so far as the military, as distinct from the air force, aspect of the questions are concerned, it is agreed that the necessary discussions should take place in St. John's, Newfoundland.

To this end, and also to select the actual sites of the guns and lights it is proposed to install arrangements have been made for Colonel C.S. Craig, D.S.O., M.C., and Captain N.J.W. Smith, R.C.E., to proceed to St. John's by the boat due to leave from Sydney on Sunday next (April 14th); and I should be grateful if you would communicate this information to the Newfoundland authorities.

In the meantime, the manufacture of the two extemporized coast defence mountings which will be required for the 4.7-inch guns, will be put in hand forthwith.

With regard to your reference to the training of some eight or ten men of the Newfoundland militia, at Halifax, the District Officer Commanding Military District No. 6 has been advised that this proposal has been approved and that he is to authorize Colonel Craig to make such arrangements, as may be necessary to this end, direct with the Newfoundland authorities. In his discussions under this head, Colonel Craig will be informed that the Commission of Government of Newfoundland will be asked to meet only the actual expenditures incurred in this connection, that is to say the pay of the men, transportation charges and the cost of the maintenance and sustenance. No charge will be made for tuition fees and expenditures of that sort.

The questions arising out of the Air Defence of Newfoundland will be dealt with separately by a later communication.

Yours sincerely,

[O.D. SKELTON]

71.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
of Great Britain*

URGENT. SECRET

Ottawa, April 16, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald,

May I make further reference to your letter dated the 26th March, 1940, addressed to the Prime Minister on the subject of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay.

In my letter of the 10th April of this year, I referred to the Military as distinct from the Air Force aspects of the questions.

It is now possible to discuss the arrangements with regard to the Air Force.

It will be satisfactory that the necessary discussions should take place in St. John's, Newfoundland.

To this end, arrangements will be made for an officer from Eastern Air Command to proceed to St. John's, at a date convenient to the parties concerned, and I would be glad if the Newfoundland authorities could be so informed and requested to arrange this matter direct with the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, Halifax, N.S.

It would be appreciated if the Newfoundland authorities could be informed also, that it is still the intention of the Canadian Government to proceed with the development of an air base at Red Bay, Labrador, the use of which location has met with their approval already, and to operate from that point if sufficient aircraft are available.

Any other air defence of Newfoundland will of necessity be contingent upon the situation as a whole, and will have to take the form of the despatch of a detachment from a squadron located in Nova Scotia, if and when required, to operate temporarily from Botwood, the use of which airport has also been approved by the Newfoundland Government.

Should necessity arise and the situation in Canada permit, the Canadian Government is prepared to undertake the despatch of an Air Force detachment to Botwood, Newfoundland, for temporary duty. The Air Force officer proceeding to St. John's will be instructed to inform the Commission of Government of Newfoundland that their Government will be asked to provide

quarters and Housing for approximately 12 officers and 50 airmen, an explosives building for storage of bombs and ammunition, and free use of the airport facilities; other operational and maintenance expenses incurred by such detachment, including fuel on repayment, to be the responsibility of the Canadian Government.

I should be grateful if you would bring these points to the attention of the Newfoundland Government.

Yours sincerely,

[O.D. SKELTON]

72.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 229

[St. John's,] April 30, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 408 of 6th November, 1939, Secret. Person reports that during a recent visit to Ottawa Dominion Minister of Transport stated in private conversation that he wished Canada could take over the use and responsibility of the Newfoundland Airports for the period of the war. In view your telegram under reference Person merely replied that he would convey this statement to the Commission of Government. Canadian Government sending officers shortly to St. John's for discussion regarding possible Royal Canadian Air Force operations in Newfoundland. See telegram from High Commissioner repeated to you No. 815<sup>1</sup> Secret. In view of possibilities therein contemplated we venture to urge that suggestion contained in our telegram No. 288 of 15th September, 1939, should be reconsidered notwithstanding objections mentioned in your telegram above referred to. We feel strongly that if Canadians had full use of and responsibility for our Airports during war they would take much more interest in maintaining aerial reconnaissance of whole coast of Newfoundland which we regard as of great importance from defence point of view. We consider also that Newfoundland interests would be served by use of Airports in war time in this way. Moreover course suggested may be expected to relieve Newfoundland budget of considerable dollar expenditure thus in turn avoiding necessity for United Kingdom finding dollars for this purpose which we understand to be a matter of increasing difficulty. Please telegraph reply as early as possible as in the meantime proposed visit of Canadians is in abeyance.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

73.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 276

[London,] May 10, 1940

SECRET. Addressed to Governor of Newfoundland No. 276. Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner for Canada. No. 840. Secret. Your telegram of 8th April No. 168. As regards last paragraph there is no doubt that responsibility for defence of Newfoundland, in so far as this cannot be provided from Newfoundland's own resources, is that of United Kingdom Government. If Canadian Government are prepared in any way to relieve United Kingdom Government of this responsibility by provision of forces or material, such an offer would on general grounds be welcome. At the same time, having regard to questions which are under discussion between the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments as to Canada's general war effort and its financial aspects, we should be glad if we could be consulted before any specific proposals for assistance are put forward to Canadian Government or any offers by Canadian Government are definitely accepted. In so far as any measures taken might involve dollar expenditure by Newfoundland, the matter would have to be considered in relation to general exchange position.

As regards particular question referred to in earlier part of your telegram the importance of adequate protection for vulnerable points in Newfoundland is fully appreciated. It will be realized that defence of Newfoundland depends primarily upon protection afforded by Royal Navy rather than upon local defence measures. At the present time the naval authorities consider the risk of attack upon Newfoundland, either by naval base raider or by submarine, to be remote and in view of other urgent requirements it would not be practicable for them to provide special Naval or Air Forces for patrol purposes as indicated in your telegram. For the same reasons it is felt that provision of guns for St. John's or placing of mines could not be justified. If, however, after discussions with the Canadian Government, the Commission feel that this is a point requiring further examination they will no doubt inform me. The whole position would of course in any case be immediately reconsidered if there should be any change in the situation involving extensions of German submarine operations to the western Atlantic or creating other serious risk of an attack on Newfoundland.

Suggestion contained in your telegram April 30th, No. 229, Secret, is being dealt with separately. If Government of Newfoundland desires to discuss with Canadian representatives suggestion that proposed base at Red Bay should be located further south at Botwood or Harbour Grace, Air Ministry would prefer such an arrangement provided that expenditure to be incurred by the Government is not thereby increased.



74.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 258<sup>1</sup>

[St. John's,] May 14, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram secret No. 276 of May 10th. The Decision as to the control of Newfoundland Airport by Canada for the period of war will materially affect the nature and scope of any discussions with Canadian representatives. These discussions will therefore not take place until our suggestion in telegram No. 229 secret of April 30th has been considered. It is hoped therefore in view of the importance we attach to this matter and to an early meeting with Canadian representatives that consideration will be given urgently.

75.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur*  
*de Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 7

[Ottawa,] May 15, 1940

It would be greatly appreciated if you would furnish Canadian Government with two copies of the report passed by Officer in Charge Newfoundland Airport, on season's operations, covering snow compaction, equipment, procedure, costs and meteorological data.

76.

HCD

*Extrait d'un discours du Premier ministre*  
*Extract from a Speech by Prime Minister*

Ottawa, May 20, 1940

The Royal Canadian Navy, apart from its patrol duties on our own coasts, is assisting actively in the coastal defence of Newfoundland, and in cooperation with the British and French navies in the Caribbean area. It is also taking an active and important share in the convoy duty so essential if the military supplies and foodstuffs required by the allies are to cross the ocean in security. . .

Apart from troops overseas and troops engaged in home defence our troops are assisting in the defence of strategic areas in Newfoundland, and further assignments of duties are contemplated in the Atlantic area.

<sup>1</sup> Ce télégramme fut également transmis au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.

<sup>1</sup> The text of this telegram was also sent to the High Commissioner of Great Britain.

77.

NPA GN1/3 320-35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions**Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 295

[St. John's,] May 25, 1940

SECRET. Following for Admiralty repeated to Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa. Begins. Apart from our anxiety for the safety of shipping using St. John's which has no defences, we have no means of forcibly preventing the entry of any vessels.<sup>1</sup>

There is available here a 4 inch B.L. Mark 9 gun with ammunition and equipment which was removed from S.S. *King Edward* in order to make good the damage to her stern which this ship suffered by collision in convoy. This gun was mounted in the ship at Sydney, Australia in October 1939.

Permission is urgently requested for this gun and equipment to be placed at the disposal of the Newfoundland Government, on the assumption that *King Edward* due to complete her refit about the middle of June could mount another gun at Halifax to which port she must proceed to join a convoy.

In addition we would require a searchlight with range about 3000 yards and a range finder, and 40 practice projectiles, 40 high explosive projectiles with 80 full charges and 100 tubes. If approval obtained promptly training of Militia personnel as gun crew can be done by gun layer of *King Edward*.

78.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions**Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*TELEGRAM 298<sup>2</sup>

[St. John's,] May 26, 1940

SECRET. The defenceless condition of this country causes public alarm in view of occurrences of recent days. The Prime Minister of Canada is reported to have stated in Parliament on May 20th. that Canadian Troops are assisting in guardianship of Newfoundland but we have received no information along these lines or any other. If the Newfoundland Airports are to be used as part of the defence of this country by Canadian Government it is probable that they will require to plan substantial erections and installations to be completed at earliest moment after negotiations have been finalized. We urge

<sup>1</sup> Au début de la guerre le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve avait mis sur pied un contrôle naval sous le commandement du capitaine Schwerdt, de la MR. Au début de juillet 1940, des mesures additionnelles furent prises pour contrôler les navires entrant dans le port de St. John's. Une aire d'inspection fut établie et tous les navires entrant dans le port furent priés d'attendre l'inspection du douanier en chef de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>2</sup> Ce télégramme fut répété au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne.

<sup>1</sup> At the outbreak of the war the Newfoundland Government had set up a naval control under the command of Captain Schwerdt, RN. Early in July 1940, further measures were taken to control shipping entering the harbour of St. John's. An examination area was established and all inbound ships were required to await examination by the Chief Preventive Officer of the Newfoundland Customs.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was repeated to the High Commissioner of Great Britain.

therefore a very early reply on this matter and venture to suggest that at this stage post war problems should not be a decisive factor.

79.

DND HQS 35-8-1

*Le commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est, au secrétaire,<sup>1</sup>  
ministère de la Défense nationale*

*Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, to Secretary,<sup>1</sup>  
Department of National Defence*

SECRET

Halifax, May 29, 1940

Subject: Air Defence of Newfoundland.

Reference: Your S.7410, dated 13th April, 1940.<sup>2</sup>

1. No communication has so far been received from the Newfoundland authorities concerning arrangements to be made by this Command for the Air Defence of that Colony.

2. In view of the present situation in Europe the Joint Service Committee, Halifax, considered it expedient to review the defence of Newfoundland particularly the possibility of the enemy seizing undefended air bases in that Colony with the object of conducting air operations against important objectives on the Atlantic Coast.

3. One of the largest airports in the world is located on the main line of the Newfoundland Railway at Gander Lake, Newfoundland. It has 4 hard-surfaced runways 3 of which are 4500 feet long by 600 feet wide and the remaining runway is 4800 feet long by 1200 feet wide. In addition there is one large hangar 120 feet by 150 feet, very complete W/T, D/F and Meteorological equipment, 7 very comfortable residences for married officials and a staff house having 50 single bedrooms, central dining-room, washrooms and control tower for the civilian operational staff. Approximately 400 gallons of 87 octane and 6000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline are kept on hand. A plan of the Airport runways is attached.<sup>3</sup>

4. Enemy possession of this airport would give control of the main line of the Newfoundland Railway and the Seaplane Base at Botwood, where enemy ships could unload war supplies for the Seaplane Base or for transportation by rail to the Airport. The Airport would bring enemy aircraft within 283 miles of Sydney, N.S. and 451 miles of Halifax. Enemy aircraft using this airport would also be able to attack and disrupt our shipping through the Strait of Belle Isle and Cabot Strait.

5. As stated in paragraph 39 of this Command's letter S. 3-5-2, dated 6th April, 1940<sup>2</sup>, Newfoundland Airport may be of paramount importance to the Allied War Effort as the main aerodrome on this side of the Atlantic from which to dispatch long range bomber-reconnaissance aircraft, manufactured in Canada and the United States, for quick delivery by air to

<sup>1</sup> E. J. Boag.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

England and France should Germany conduct a terrific air bombardment of aerodromes and aircraft factories in those countries.

6. If there is any possibility of increasing the number of squadrons allotted to East Coast Defence it is strongly recommended that one bomber-reconnaissance squadron and one fighter squadron be located at the Newfoundland Airport for the Local Air Protection of Newfoundland. Strong anti-aircraft defences consisting of guns, searchlights and sound locators should also be provided.

7. It is understood that Naval and Military assistance for the Defence of Newfoundland is not immediately available although the Militia Service has already made plans for the provision of an artillery unit with guns for the defence of Bell Island, Conception Bay.

8. The Joint Service Committee sent the attached signal, A. 582, on the 25th of May, 1940<sup>1</sup>, recommending, as a temporary measure, that one flight of five Digby aircraft, No. 10 (BR) Squadron, with personnel, bombs and ammunition, be sent at once to the Newfoundland Airport for General Reconnaissance and Air Striking Force duties in Local Air Defence of Newfoundland. Lewis guns for aerodrome defence should also be sent. It was explained that the flight could undertake training at the Newfoundland Airport in addition to defence duties.

9. It is understood that accommodation can be made available at the Newfoundland Airport for the Officers of the Flight, but tents would have to be provided or temporary barrack and messing accommodation constructed for the Airmen. Since it is recommended that two squadrons be employed at the Newfoundland Airport it is considered that any temporary construction of barracks and messes for personnel undertaken should provide sufficient accommodation for this number.

10. Your further instructions are requested, please.

80.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 314

[St. John's,] June 3, 1940

SECRET. Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, has wired me that Air Vice-Marshal Croil is visiting Maritime Provinces of Canada this week and while there desires visit Newfoundland. I have replied that the proposed visit is entirely agreeable to this Government. It is possible that he will initiate discussions as to the defence of Newfoundland. Such discussions cannot but involve the disposition of the Newfoundland Airport and Botwood air base for the duration of the war. The urgent necessity for a reply therefore to my messages Nos. 229 Secret of April 30th, 258 secret of May 14th and 298 secret of May 26th is apparent.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



81.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 374

[London,] June 5, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Addressed to Governor of Newfoundland No. 374, repeated to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa No. 1143, secret. Your telegram No. 298 of May 26th. We agree that from point of view of defence of Newfoundland it would be desirable that Canadian Air Units should be able to operate from bases in Newfoundland. If this would be facilitated by handing to Canada for period of the war the responsibility for control and maintenance of the Newfoundland Air Bases we should be prepared in present circumstances to agree in principle to such an arrangement and would have no objection to this suggestion being discussed at proposed meeting with Canadian representatives.

If it is found, as indicated by Canadian Minister of Transport, that Canadian Government are prepared to take over full responsibility for both Botwood and Hatties Camp, certain financial questions would arise. We do not wish at this stage to lay down precise and absolute conditions but we should hope that you will be able to secure an arrangement under which Canada would pay for maintenance costs as well as cost of wireless facilities. The Air Ministry would in any case wish to stipulate that no alterations should be made to existing lay out, that any damage would be repaired, and that Air Ports should be handed back on a definite date.

We recognize that if Canadian Government desire to take over Air Ports on some reasonable basis prompt action is important and we should not wish delay to be caused by discussion of financial details. You will no doubt however report position at once if any proposals which you would regard as acceptable to United Kingdom [are made] in the course of discussions with Canadian representatives so that we may have an opportunity of making any comments before definite action is taken. Important thing is however that as stated above discussions should not delay early action by Canadian Government to take over Air Ports assuming they agree to do so.

82.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 324

[St. John's,] June 6, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 324, repeated to High Commissioner for United Kingdom, Ottawa, No. [?], Secret. Your telegram No. 374 Secret of 5th June. This morning

we had discussions with Air Vice-Marshal Croil and Air Commodore Anderson of the R.C.A.F. who arrived here after a visit to the Newfoundland Airport. They made it clear that the object of their visit was solely to ascertain the facts of the situation at our air bases and to report to their Government. They were not empowered to enter into negotiations of any kind or to commit their Government in any way. It appeared from these conversations that it is Croil's personal opinion that as things are now the Newfoundland Airport may become a positive menace because it is not out of the question that the enemy might capture it by a landing party and planes operating from a raider. It is his view that it would be unsafe to use the Newfoundland Airport for defence operations by aircraft until provision had been made for its adequate land defence. He was unable to express any opinion as to the extent of the land defences required but at our request will suggest to his Government sending a military officer to advise us on this aspect of the situation. We gathered that it was Croil's opinion that in addition to land defence against an attack on the Newfoundland Airport itself and against parties landing on the coastline nearest to it the situation calls for the operation of military aeroplanes at the existing Newfoundland air bases and at one or more new seaplane bases, e.g., in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Belle Isle and the neighbourhood of St. John's. We gather further that Canada's resources in aircraft and military equipment generally are under severe strain. Croil will include in his report to his Government an intimation that we hope to receive from them an appreciation of the situation and advice as to the measures which ought to be adopted in order to make it quite impossible for the enemy to seize the Newfoundland Airport and use it as a base for air operations. We do not know whether they will make actual proposals for their own participation in whatever measures are necessary but Croil's own attitude suggested to us that they are likely to be reluctant to assume extensive obligations owing to doubts as to their ability to discharge them. He did not himself suggest the possibility of Canada taking over the air bases for the period of the war even when we gave an opening for such a suggestion. We feel we cannot make further progress in the discussion of this matter until we hear from the Canadian Government but we send this report of our conversations this morning to keep you informed and we hope that you will give us the fullest possible information in order that we may foresee any dangerous situation which we may have to encounter.

83.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 404

[London,] June 10, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram 7th June No. 325<sup>1</sup> Secret. Admiralty regrets that gun and equipment from S.S. *King Edward* cannot be spared.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## PARTIE 3/PART 3

L'EFFONDREMENT EN EUROPE: TERRE-NEUVE ET  
LA DÉFENSE DE L'AMÉRIQUE DU NORD  
THE COLLAPSE IN EUROPE: NEWFOUNDLAND AND  
NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE

## SECTION A

LE CANADA ET LA DÉFENSE DE TERRE-NEUVE  
CANADA AND THE DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

## SOUS-SECTION i/SUB-SECTION i

TERRE-NEUVE DANS LA STRATÉGIE DE DÉFENSE CANADIENNE  
NEWFOUNDLAND IN CANADIAN DEFENCE PLANNING

84.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

. . .

There were present the following members:

The Prime Minister,  
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe),  
The Minister of Finance (Mr. Ralston),  
The Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar),  
The Acting Minister of National Defence and Minister of National Defence for  
Air (Mr. Power),  
The Minister of Munitions and Supply and Minister of Transport (Mr. Howe),  
The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Dr. Skelton),  
The Secretary (Mr. Heeney).

. . .

## NEWFOUNDLAND

18. THE ACTING MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that concern was felt regarding the defensive position of Newfoundland. The location of the island and particularly the large aerodrome and sea plane base located there were of vital interest to Canada.

The Prime Minister, at the outbreak of war, had recognized that Canada was concerned in the defence of Newfoundland.

(See House of Commons debates (Special Session) September 8th, 1939<sup>1</sup>, page 35).

<sup>1</sup> Document 41.

While no large scale attack upon Newfoundland need be anticipated, it was, in his opinion, necessary to provide adequate means of preventing possible raids, particularly upon the sea plane base, aerodrome and harbour. It was not beyond our capabilities to provide adequate defences for this limited purpose.

19. MR. POWER reported that consideration had been given by the Chiefs of Staff to steps which should be taken in the naval, military and air spheres. As a result he recommended as follows:

- (1) That staff talks should immediately be instituted between Canadian and American officers regarding specific problems involved in the defence of the Atlantic Coast.

This was agreed.

- (2) That a communication should be sent to the government of Newfoundland and to the U.K. government, proposing the immediate despatch of a reconnaissance party to review the defence situation and recommend measures to be adopted.

This was agreed, and Mr. Power handed to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs a draft telegram which had been prepared in this respect.

(See Cypher telegram No. 13 of June the 14th, 1940<sup>1</sup>, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Governor of Newfoundland, St. John's).

. . .

85.

DND HQS 3496

*Le comité des chefs d'état-major au ministre de la Défense nationale*  
*Chiefs of Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 9, 1940

1. Herewith Chiefs of Staff Committee Plan (First Draft) for the Defence of Canada.

2. Submitted.

T. V. ANDERSON  
 Major-General  
 C.G.S.

PERCY NELLLES  
 Rear-Admiral  
 C.N.S.

L. S. BREADNER  
 Air Commodore  
 C.A.S.

<sup>1</sup> Document 106.



## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Premier projet d'un plan de défense du Canada*  
*First Draft of a Plan for the Defence of Canada*

SECRET

. . .

[Ottawa,] July 9, 1940

## PART II—NAVAL PLAN

1. *General (East Coast)*

The scale of attack is that which could be provided by the combined forces of the German and Italian Navies, or whatever units might be remaining to these Navies after a major conflict with the British Fleet. It is obvious that the present Naval Forces of Canada cannot meet this scale of attack, neither can they be developed to do so. It is therefore a prerequisite of any plan that the British and/or the U.S. Naval Forces must be available for any Naval defence of Canada.

2. It must be borne in mind that should the British Isles fall to invasion, such pressure might be brought to bear by the enemy on the personnel of the British Fleet through threats to their wives and families ashore that the fleet might not be available for our defence. The only guard against this would be a comprehensive evacuation scheme of wives and families of Royal Navy personnel from the United Kingdom.

3. On the assumption that the Naval Defence of Canada must be conducted by the British and/or American Fleets, their first requirements from Canada will be the provision of adequate bases and in the case of the British, special stores, ammunition, etc., which will no longer be available from the United Kingdom.

4. With regard to bases, the Navy should immediately undertake the provision of Naval defences for additional bases and the improvement of those at present existing. It will be necessary to strengthen the army and air force to provide for the security of the existing and additional bases.

5. It is considered necessary to establish the following new bases without delay:

- (a) Gaspé
- (b) Shelbourne
- (c) An advanced base in Newfoundland.<sup>1</sup>

Appendix I<sup>2</sup> gives details of proposed and possible bases and action on the recommendations shown in this Appendix will be taken.

<sup>1</sup> Un mémorandum de l'état-major général en date du 3 juillet 1940, mentionnait sous le titre "Plan naval":

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum by the General Staff on the defence of Newfoundland dated July 3, 1940, stated under the heading "Naval Plan":

Owing to the total lack of resources at the present moment, all that can be done is to arrange that a destroyer on completion of outward convoy duty from Halifax will call at St. John's.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

6. Regarding the improvement of existing bases, it is considered that Halifax will in all cases be the main Canadian Eastern base. Larger quantities of oil fuel than are already available must be stored there and in a less exposed position. An increase in the facilities for ammunition storage will be essential, such storage being underground. Docking and major repairs could probably be carried out in the United States but increase in repair facilities should be made. A drastic increase in A/A defence is an urgent necessity.

7. Should the American Fleet come to our assistance, some pre-organization will be required to enable co-operation with existing Canadian Defence Forces. A very necessary requirement in this connection is prior arrangement of efficient intercommunication.

#### PART III—ARMY PLAN

. . .

#### 4. *Defensive Measures, Newfoundland*

(a) The Army plan should provide for:

- (i) Ground and anti-aircraft protection at the main objectives and coast defences in the case of Botwood, and Newfoundland Airport.
- (ii) Coast defences and anti-aircraft defence at Bell Island.
- (iii) Coast defences and anti-aircraft defence at ports used as bases by the Navy and Air Force.

(b) The following steps have been or will be taken:

- (i) An infantry battalion for the ground and small arm anti-aircraft defence of the Newfoundland Airport and Botwood seaplane base has been provided. The 1st Battalion Black Watch of Canada is now concentrated at above points. The Royal Rifles of Quebec are now mobilizing and will replace 1st Battalion Black Watch who will then return to 5th Infantry Brigade.
- (ii) To provide fixed defences for Bell Island consisting of two 4.7-inch guns and two Coast Defence Searchlights. Guns and lights are now being prepared. This work is being expedited. Two light machine guns now available with the Newfoundland Militia will be installed for the close protection from sabotage and also for defence against low-flying aircraft.
- (iii) To make arrangements for the training of a Company of Newfoundland Militia to be used for local protection at the more important centres of population.
- (iv) To make arrangements for the opening of a recruiting centre in St. John's for the Canadian Forces generally and the setting up of the requisite medical board.

- (v) Heavy anti-aircraft guns are not available at the present moment for allotment to the defences of Newfoundland. A tentative allotment of twenty 3.7-inch guns and ten Bofors guns has now been made from numbers now on requisition for production in Canada. This will entail provision of manning crews from Canada.

## PART IV—AIR PLAN

...

2. *Operational Zones*

To implement measures for the air defence of Canada, operational zones have been created as described hereunder. These operational zones may be reduced or extended at any time by Air Force Headquarters as circumstances dictate:

...

- (b) Under Eastern Air Command, comprising Greenland, Iceland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Labrador and those portions of Quebec east of a line drawn between Cape Chidley (Hudson Strait) and the mouth of the Saguenay River and extending southerly from the St. Lawrence along the Temiscouata Railway from Rivière du Loup to Edmundston, New Brunswick.

...

86.

Skelton Papers 394

*Rapport d'une réunion tenue à Washington pour discuter  
de la défense de la côte atlantique*

*Report of a Meeting at Washington to Discuss  
the Defence of the Atlantic Coast*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 15, 1940

## [PART I]

1. Our first meeting with officers of the U.S. fighting services was held on Thursday evening 11th July, at the residence of Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S.N.

2. Other U.S. officers present were:

General Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,  
General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,  
Captain Schirman [sic], U.S.N.  
Captain Hill, U.S.N.

3. After an excellent dinner, which succeeded admirably in breaking down restraint, we discussed in general terms, first; the extent to which the U.S. might be able to assist us in the present phase of the war in the field of material supplies and secondly; the possibilities of common action in the event of an unsuccessful conclusion to the present battle for England.

4. We attempted to impress upon our listeners that we were far from pessimistic about the outcome of the present phase of the war. We pointed out that our visit was in no sense dictated by panic but, on our part, was intended to explore the possibilities of common action in the similar problems of defence that confronted both countries. We stressed the vital importance to both of our countries of the present battle for England. If Great Britain was successful it would mean not only her own survival but a postponement of the possibility of extending the war, other than small raids to our respective eastern shores. We expressed the hope, therefore, that any material assistance which might be offered to us in the present phase of the war would not be taken from stocks ear-marked for Great Britain.

5. Each member of the Canadian Group<sup>1</sup> then explained the basic features of our plan of defence in respect of his own branch of the service and either replied to or made a note of questions asked.

6. This concluded the approach to our conversations which approach we initiated at the request of Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

7. This approach was received in the spirit we had hoped for and all subsequent discussion was carried out with the utmost frankness.

8. It became obvious as soon as discussion began that both Admiral Stark and General Marshall were primarily interested in the facilities available in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland for the use of U.S. sea, land and air forces in that area and that neither of these officers, nor those with them, felt that the U.S. could assist us in the present phase of the war with materiel from service stocks. This latter attitude changed the next morning, particularly in the case of the army.

9. It was obvious, also, that both of the two senior officers referred to, who incidentally are the senior ranking officers in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army respectively, were greatly concerned about the need for the maintenance of the strictest secrecy regarding our conversations. Both indicated that any leak at the present time would be disastrous and would have the effect of curbing any further preparatory co-operative efforts. General Marshall, in particular, felt that a leak at the present time, because of its political consequences, might even force the Administration to cut some of his existing and contemplated appropriations.

10. In spite of this fear both Admiral Stark and General Marshall wanted the conversations to continue the next day at the Navy and War Departments respectively, when maps could be consulted and specific answers given to our questions.

11. In consequence of this decision, Brigadier Stuart spent Friday morning with General Strong, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Commodore Cuffe and Capt. Murray spent the morning at the Navy Department with Captain Hill,

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<sup>1</sup> Le brigadier K. Stuart, sous-chef d'état-major général; le capitaine L. W. Murray, sous-chef d'état-major naval et le commodore de l'Air A. A. L. Cuffe.

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier K. Stuart, Deputy Chief of the General Staff; Captain L. W. Murray, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and Air Commodore A. A. L. Cuffe.



Director of Plans, and Capt. Sherman, Chief Aviation Officer. Air Commodore Cuffe saw General Strong in the afternoon.

12. Individual reports of these discussions are attached as Appendices "A",<sup>1</sup> "B" and "C".

## PART II

### Common Defence Measures in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland by U.S. and Canadian Forces

The following questions were put forward by General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff and head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, U.S. Army. Suggested replies follow each question.<sup>2</sup>

...

Q. 2. What part does Newfoundland have in the Canadian defence scheme?

- A. 2. (a) The steel industry of Sydney, N.S., gets a large proportion of its ore from Bell Island, which is north west of Botwood Bay.
- (b) The Newfoundland Airport, 50 miles south of Botwood Bay, has runways from 4500' to 4800' long and 600' to 1200' wide, and consequently is a suitable base for the heaviest type of shore based aircraft. This airport is of obvious use to us and conversely would be of great use to an enemy.
- (c) Botwood Bay is the western terminal of the North Atlantic flying boat route of Imperial Airways.
- (d) Various small ports, bays and coves on the coast-line of Newfoundland, if used as hostile submarine bases, would make more difficult the protection of the two entrances to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the focal sea areas off Halifax, N.S. and Sydney, N.S.
- (e) Our policy is to concentrate our defences at Botwood, the Newfoundland Airport, Bell Island and St. John's. At the present time there is one battalion of infantry distributed between Botwood and the Airport and one flight of Bomber (rece) Aircraft at the Airport. Two 4.7" guns are being shipped to Bell Island. St. John's is to be developed as an advanced operational naval base. Arrangements for its protection will be taken in hand as soon as the necessary equipment can be obtained.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Dans *Armes, Hommes et Gouvernements*, C. P. Stacey affirme que (p. 371) la majeure partie de cette réponse canadienne fut "verbalement" faite le 12 juillet; une réponse détaillée, rédigée substantiellement dans les mêmes termes que ce document, fut envoyée à Washington le 5 août.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> C. P. Stacey says in *Arms, Men and Governments* (p. 335) that much of this Canadian reply was evidently given "verbally" on July 12; detailed written reply sent to Washington on August 5, was in substantially the same terms as in the above document.

Q. 3. What is the time, strength, probable character, objectives and direction of each attack considered likely?

A. 3. General

- (i) The Probable Forms and Scales of Attack on Canadian Seaports and Inland Centres, assessed by the Joint Staff Committee on 6th July, 1938, is attached as Appendix I.
- (ii) In the light of the present trend of events of the war in Europe, and the threat of war in the Far East, it is now necessary to make preparations for a greatly increased scale of attack and to build up the defences of Canada to the maximum of the country's resources in manpower and materials.
- (iii) The method by which it is proposed to prepare for the changed conditions indicated, is set forth in the Plan for the Defence of Canada, which is attached as Appendix II.
- (iv) It is pointed out that the Forms and Scales of Attack, as listed in Appendix I constitute the basis of our present defence organization in respect to the direct defence of Canada. Attacks of the order indicated, may be launched at any time. The assumption underlying these Forms and Scales of Attack is the existence of a Supreme British Navy in the Atlantic, and a Supreme United States Navy in the Eastern Pacific.
- (v) The development of our present defence plans to meet a maximum scale of attack, including the possibility of a major scale invasion of our East Coast, rests upon the possibility that the defensive screen now provided by the British Navy in the Atlantic, may not be effective in the future. Should this eventuality arise, it can be assumed that the liquidation or destruction of British naval power could not be accomplished without very serious losses to the opposing German and Italian Navies. It is probable, therefore, particularly so in view of the severity of our winter and the clearly expressed policy of the United States regarding the defence of the Western Hemisphere, that a major scale invasion of Canada's East Coast could and would not be attempted until the Summer of 1941.
- (vi) In the meantime, namely in that period between the possible liquidation or destruction of British Seapower and the launching of a major scale invasion against our East Coast, raids of a more serious nature than those set forth in Appendix I must be expected. If we are to meet these raids successfully and with our own resources, we shall need the co-operation of the United States in the way of releasing to us, on purchase or loan, of certain equipment for our sea, land and air forces. Our present shortage of naval craft, aircraft and army equipment of all kinds is most serious.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

- Q. 4. What is the viewpoint of the Canadian High Command as to the minimum requirements of ground and air forces necessary for the protection of each strategic area?
- A. 4. (a) Strategic Areas, East Coast and Newfoundland
- (i) It is considered unlikely that Germany and Italy would attempt a major scale invasion of Canada's East Coast without first having established an advanced air base or bases from which the landings could be supported by shore based aircraft. Successive or simultaneous attempts to establish such bases in Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland, and in our Maritime Provinces, are possible. An attack on Iceland for this purpose could be explained as being a necessary move in connection with the present battle for England. Attacks on Greenland and Newfoundland, however, could not be interpreted in any sense other than as preliminaries to an attack on North America. It would seem unlikely, therefore, that serious attacks on the latter areas would be made until shortly before an invasion of North America was attempted. In other words such attacks, with a definite purpose of occupation, are unlikely to be made within the next six to eight months. In the meantime it is Canada's problem, with such assistance as can be obtained from the United States in the way of equipment for our army and airforce, to provide for the effective defence against small scale invasion of the Botwood Bay and Newfoundland Airport areas. In this connection it is important that Canada be made aware of the attitude which the United States Government would take to such an act on the part of Germany or Italy. Can Canada rely upon immediate intervention by the United States in such an eventuality?
- (ii) It is obvious, of course, that unless adequate defensive measures are taken in this area and the necessary equipment provided, United States intervention would probably be too late to save this vital region. It follows, therefore, that the only satisfactory solution would be for the United States to make available to us at an early date, such defensive resources as are mutually agreed upon as being the minimum required to protect the vital Newfoundland Airport region. The understanding being that such resources would be turned back to the United States for operation by their own personnel as soon as the U.S. Government entered the war.
- ...
- Q. 5. What part of the above minimum requirements is Canada prepared to furnish now? at 60m., at 120m., at 240m. [sic]
- A. 5. (i) Canada, with such assistance as the United States can give in the way of equipment, will continue to be responsible for the

entire defence of Eastern Canada and Newfoundland until United States units can be provided to assist subsequent to the entry of the United States into the war.

- (ii) It is suggested that the United States subsequent to their entry into the war, might take over the entire defence of Newfoundland. In respect to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Eastern Quebec, it is suggested that the United States formations be utilized as mobile reserves and kept concentrated in brigade groups.
- (iii) The latter part of this question requires a detailed study of our rapidly changing production programme and will be replied at a later date.

Q. 6. What ground and air forces of the United States will be needed initially to supplement Canadian Forces?

A. 6. Reply in 4.4.

Q. 7. Is it probable that ground forces of the United States will be called upon to operate in Canada or is it desired that their activities be confined to Newfoundland?

A. 7. Reply in A.4 and A.5.

Q. 8. In the event of combat operations by United States Forces in Canada and Newfoundland certain questions of command and responsibility will arise. Under its defence plan is Canada prepared to set up an American sector or sectors in which command and responsibility for operations will be vested in the Commander of the United States Forces.

A. 8. Yes, wherever applicable.

Q. 9. What personnel and material of the United States, in addition to combat zone forces, will be needed to assist in the training of Canadian ground and air forces.

A. 9. Air Forces—Ground Forces—Some assistance might be requested in connection with certain types of U.S. equipment brought into Canadian use.

Q. 10. What Canadian Forces are now in Newfoundland? Is it expected that additional Canadian forces will be sent to Newfoundland in the near future?

A. 10. (i) One (i) infantry battalion and one flight No. 10 (Bomber Recce.) Squadron, R.C.A.F.

(ii) Yes. Coast Defence Artillery and Engineers at Bell Island and St. John's as soon as equipment is available. Fighter aircraft as soon as equipment is available. A.A. units as soon as equipment is available.

Q. 11. In the event that forces of the United States operate in Newfoundland with command and responsibility vested in their Commander, will



Canada set up the administration machinery necessary to control the civil population, supply its needs and continue the existing form of government? (Note, It is assumed that Canada will do this in all areas in Canada which are assigned to United States troops.)

- A. 11. (i) Newfoundland has its own separate administration. The form of government now in being will continue to exercise its usual functions which include those mentioned in the question.  
(ii) In the case of Canada, your assumption is correct.

...

Q. 17. What ports are suitable and available for the debarkation and supply of A.E.F. destined for Canada? Newfoundland?

- A. 17. (i) Any of the main Canadian ports are suitable. Best line of supply for personnel and material is C.P.R. through Montreal and C.N.R. through Montreal.  
(ii) Wire has been sent to Newfoundland requesting information.

Q. 18. Should supply be accomplished direct from the United States? If so, in Canadian bottoms?

- A. 18. As operations off our East coast will probably have started before the United States intervenes, it would be more secure to have the L. of C. to Newfoundland direct from Canada across the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Whether we or the United States will supply the bottoms depends on the losses our shipping may suffer in the intervening months.

...

Q. 20. Are railroads and highway adequate to support contemplated operations? Are suitable means of highway transport (motor, animal drawn, pack) and rolling stock available?

- A. 20. (i) Railways, rolling stock and highways in Eastern Canada are adequate to support contemplated operations.  
(ii) It is assumed the A.E.F. in Canada will provide itself with such highway transport as is required to draw supplies from the rail-heads allotted to its respective parts. It is assumed also that its equipment will include such transport as it will require to fulfill its operational mission. Specific suggestions as to command, operation, accommodation, supply and general maintenance of the A.E.F. in Canada will be forwarded in the near future.  
(iii) In the case of Newfoundland, information is being obtained regarding the capacity of the railway (narrow gauge). Roads are for the most part non-existent.

...

[K. STUART]  
Brigadier  
D.C.G.S.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE 1/ENCLOSURE 1]

*Annexe au rapport d'une réunion tenue à Washington pour  
discuter de la défense de la côte atlantique*

*Appendix to Report of a Meeting at Washington to Discuss  
the Defence of the Atlantic Coast*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 14, 1940

[APPENDIX] B

[NAVAL OUTLOOK APPENDIX]

*General*

On Friday morning, 12th, Air Commodore CUFFE and myself visited an office in the Navy Department where we met Captain HILL, U.S.N., Director of Plans, and Captain SHERMAN, Chief Aviation Officer in the Bureau of Naval Operations. The discussions of naval interest with Captain Hill are given below, those of Air Commodore Cuffe with Captain Sherman will be found in the Air Appendix.

*Bases.*

I again explained to Captain Hill that the Canadian Navy was not at present and could not be built up to such an extent that it could meet the possible scale of attack in either—

- (a) British Navy being forced to leave its bases in the United Kingdom by enemy air power, or
- (b) British Navy being destroyed by combination of German and Italian air and naval power.

Our object at the moment, therefore, was to provide ourselves with suitable operational bases in order to enable us to play host to either the British Navy or the United States Navy.

. . . .

*Situation which would arise if United States  
Fleet wished to be based in Canadian and  
Newfoundland waters.*

In this case they consider their Fleet is sufficiently mobile and supplied with repair ships, seaplane tenders and fleet oilers to be able to operate from an isolated anchorage such as Gaspé. As no fuel will be supplied at Gaspé they may find it necessary to requisition a certain number of oil tankers from the Merchant Service.

It is probable if the United States Fleet should come to Canada and Newfoundland that they would prefer more than one base in Newfoundland. No decision was reached as to exact positions but discussion covered the possibility of one at Pistolet Bay, one somewhere in the vicinity of Botwood, perhaps Lewisporte, and probably St. John's. They were also interested in the possibility of a seaplane base somewhere on the south coast of Newfoundland, probably between St. Pierre and Cape Race.

Their opinion regarding Hudson Bay was similar to ours, that is, it is a possibility which must be considered but most improbable. They would pro-

pose to operate a patrol at the entrance to Hudson Strait during the time that water is open composed of a mother ship and approximately four smaller patrol vessels to give information only. They do not propose these patrol vessels should be sufficiently armed to prevent passage of the Strait.

With the advent of the United States into the war it should be possible with U.S. material resources to provide for mining of the Strait of Belle Isle and provision of suitable patrol to prevent it being swept by enemy forces.

One of the United States' intentions is to place an Army division in Newfoundland and transportation of these troops is a matter which is exercising them at the present time. I suggested that the simplest transportation would probably be via Quebec and Cornerbrook, but explained to them for some reason not known to us troops for Botwood were not landed at St. John's but at Botwood itself and that I would make a point of finding out why this change had been made. If it is connected with the lack of facilities for rail travel in Newfoundland presented by a narrow gauge railway, it may be necessary to land troops more closely to the spot in which they will be quartered.

The importance of a common method of inter-communication was stressed and agreed to by the U.S. Officers. If the United States Navy should come to Canada they will provide the R.C.N. with sufficient codes and cyphers and a sprinkling of personnel to ensure their proper use at the beginning, in order to make this inter-communication possible.

The question of command was discussed and it is the expectation of the United States Navy that if they come to Canadian waters, ports, local defence and A/S patrols connected with local defence will be carried out as now by the R.C.N. and under R.C.N. authority. They will, of course, expect to command their own fleet and I went so far as to inform them that in all probability H.M.C. Ships then operating on the East Coast would be attached to the larger command of the U.S. Navy for operational purposes, though still being administered by the R.C.N.

. . .

L. W. MURRAY  
Captain, R.C.N.,  
D.C.N.S.

[PIÈCE JOINTE 2/ENCLOSURE 2]

*Annexe au rapport d'une réunion tenue à Washington pour discuter  
de la défense de la côte atlantique*

*Appendix to Report of a Meeting at Washington to Discuss  
the Defence of the Atlantic Coast*

MOST SECRET

[Ottawa, July 14, 1940]

APPENDIX C

U.S. NAVY AVIATION OUTLOOK

1. On the morning of 11th July I proceeded with Captain Hill, U.S. and Captain Murray, R.C.N. to the U.S. Navy Department, where we met Commander Forest Sherman, U.S., Chief Naval Aviation Officer with Plans

Division. After a general discussion with these officers, Commander Sherman and myself discussed the aviation aspect.

2. A very keen interest was displayed in the Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland, Labrador and Greenland, but no interest beyond this was shown insofar as the defence of North America is concerned. Definitely no interest was shown in Iceland, though it was appreciated that possession of this island could seriously interfere with shipping in the North Atlantic.

. . .

8. Commander Sherman discussed the advisability of having advanced operating bases throughout the Maritimes and two on the South coast of Newfoundland. He also discussed the problem of some more advanced re-fuelling and re-arming posts along the coast of Labrador and the West coast of Greenland.

9. It was intimated that the U.S. Navy are giving consideration to requesting Canada for permission to extend civil aviation routes to the Maritimes of Canada and that these civil operation companies might be encouraged by the U.S. to build operating facilities, including beams and radio communications. The question of providing R.D.F. stations along the coast of Labrador and the East coast of Greenland were discussed briefly.

10. Figures given are only approximate as an indication of what might be expected.

A. N. CROOSE

[PIÈCE JOINTE 3/ENCLOSURE 3]

*Annexe au rapport d'une réunion tenue à Washington pour  
discuter de la défense de la côte atlantique*

*Appendix to Report of a Meeting at Washington to Discuss  
the Defence of the Atlantic Coast*

MOST SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 14, 1940

[APPENDIX D]

U.S. ARMY AVIATION OUTLOOK

1. Early on the afternoon of 11th of July, by previous appointment, I was shown to the office of General Strong but he was not available at the time and I called later in the afternoon.

. . .

3. From the Army (Air) point of view, facilities for the operation of large numbers of landplanes was the principal concern. The General stressed the desirability of having at least one large aerodrome in Newfoundland and one in the Maritime Provinces with runways 5,000 feet long for the operation of their large 4-engine bombers.



4. In the event of large scale attack upon Canada in from nine to twelve months time, the General visualized the Army Air Corps sending 120 aircraft to Newfoundland composed of large 4-engine bombers, fighters, observation dive bombers and twin-engine bombers accompanied by approximately 2500 all ranks. He visualized a similar force operating from the Maritime Provinces of Canada, i.e., provided the necessary facilities were available.

...

[A. A. L. CUFFE]

87.

DND HQS 3496

*Mémoire du chef d'état-major général au ministre  
de la Défense nationale*

*Memorandum from Chief of General Staff to Minister  
of National Defence*

Ottawa, July 23, 1940

...

10. I am diffident in commenting on PART II, the Naval Plan, except to state that I regard the organization of port facilities and defences on the east coast of Canada, including Newfoundland, to be the primary military necessity at this date. We should be in a position (should the worst befall and the invasion of the United Kingdom by Germany become an accomplished fact) to accommodate, supply naval facilities to and to protect in its Canadian bases a large portion of the British fleet which unquestionably would make its way to this country rather than surrender. With a very considerable portion of the British fleet and possibly of the British Air Force based upon Canada, I maintain that there is still no probability of an attempt by Germany to invade this country for a period of months if not indeed of years. The threat of large scale raids will no doubt be increased but I suggest that the conversion of Iceland into an important enemy naval and air base would be necessary before he can successfully undertake a large scale invasion of the country against the forces which we then should have at our disposal.

11. As I have previously stated, I am quite convinced that United States military co-operation in the defence of North America is inevitable. Having in view the most probable Japanese intentions, however, I do not consider that a high proportion of the United States naval forces will be acting with us in the Atlantic.

...

13. In this preliminary reading of the Chiefs of Staff Committee plan, I have made no attempt to analyse the detail of the army plan although I will undertake this in the next few days. I would, however, recommend that apart from any questions of detailed distribution of forces that the matter of command of the Army forces allotted to the coastal areas be im-

mediately considered. I do not concur in the proposal that operational command of these forces can remain under the District Officer Commanding. I consider that a Command Headquarters (Operational) with adequate staff should be established in the Maritimes with operational control over those army forces earmarked for the defence of the Maritime Provinces, including the Gulf of St. Lawrence area and Newfoundland, and that following this a similar Command Headquarters (Operational) should be established in British Columbia. The function of the several District Headquarters in the eastern area and of the one in M.D. 11 under the conditions which Canada now faces should be restricted to administration and to the command and training of those troops not actually allotted to Command Headquarters for operational purposes. It should be noted, incidentally, that such organization would fit in with the operational zones established by the Royal Canadian Air Force.

H. D. G. CRERAR  
Major-General

88.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D2)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chef d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 7, 1940

. . .

#### 4. *Navy, Army and Air Intelligence Reports on Newfoundland*

The Committee reviewed these reports and decided to refer them to the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, with instructions to prepare a joint report, containing conclusions and recommendations. This will be considered as a draft report pending further information which will become available subsequent to the visit to Newfoundland of Major-General Elkins, Commodore Reid, and Air Commodore Anderson.<sup>1</sup>

. . .

89.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D2)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'états-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 14, 1940

#### 8. Object of Joint Service Plan . . .

##### 3. *Report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee "Synoptic Report and Recommendations regarding the Defence of Newfoundland."*

The Committee reviewed this Report, and instructed that copies should be distributed to the members of the special Committee on

<sup>1</sup> Cette visite eut lieu le 20 août lorsque Power entra en consultation avec le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve. Voir le document 171.

<sup>1</sup> This visit took place on August 20 when Power conferred with the Newfoundland Government. See Document 171.

the Defence of Newfoundland: Minister of National Defence for Air, Chief of the Air Staff, Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, AOC Eastern Air Command.

The remarks and recommendations of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee will be considered in detail on receipt of the Report of the Special Committee.<sup>1</sup>

...

90.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, August 27, 1940

...

2. The first order of business was the discussion of the draft recommendation of the Board in regard to Newfoundland, which had been prepared following the first meeting. Substitute texts were presented and the Board finally decided upon the recommendation which is included in paragraph 8 of the Journal for the 26th of August.<sup>2</sup>

...

91.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum by Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, August 28, 1940

#### CANADIAN DEFENCE ACTIVITIES IN NEWFOUNDLAND

Mr. King said today he would like to obtain a full report on the Newfoundland defence situation. He was anxious about the spending of a million dollars—the orders having been given by Mr. Power before approval had been secured. He thought the people of Canada might question expenditure made in that way—also that it might have been borne by the United Kingdom. If the United States was now leasing areas in Newfoundland as air bases, why should we not at least get a lease on the aerodrome which we

<sup>1</sup> Les recherches ne nous ont pas permis de découvrir un tel rapport. Il semblerait que le rapport attendu des officiers qui visitèrent Terre-Neuve avec Power fut compris dans le compte rendu que ce dernier présenta au Comité de guerre du Cabinet. Voir le document 92.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 210.

<sup>1</sup> Research has discovered no such report. It would appear that it, like the report expected from the officers who visited Newfoundland with Power, was covered by his report to the Cabinet War Committee. See Document 92.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 210.

are spending money on. I told Mr. King my impression was that the field we were guarding was about the most complete and expensive in the world and had cost the United Kingdom forty million dollars. Mr. King said if that were the case, we could hardly ask that they turn it over to us.

He thought we should have a report as to what the British had done in Newfoundland, what we had done, and then consider the advisability of acquiring ownership of areas in which we were spending money. An effort would be made after the war to have us take over Newfoundland. That would be a contingency that would have to be considered very carefully, but in the meantime we should have a definite understanding as to where we stand.

92.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 5, 1940

. . .

## ATLANTIC DEFENCE—NEWFOUNDLAND

26. THE PRIME MINISTER read to the meeting a report prepared by the Associate Minister of National Defence following his visit to Newfoundland.

(See Minutes of meeting of the Associate Minister of National Defence and Canadian officers, with representatives of Newfoundland, held at St. John's, Newfoundland, on August the 20th, 1940<sup>1</sup>).

27. Commenting on his report, Mr. Power stated that Canadian troops were now in possession of the air base at Gander Lake, and in occupation at Botwood. Action taken by Canada, so far, for the defence of Newfoundland had been on an emergency basis, and no attempt had been made to make arrangements with the Newfoundland Government for the determination of Canadian rights by lease or otherwise. This matter, however, should now receive consideration. Newfoundland could not be expected to make any substantial financial contribution to defence expenditures. Its contribution would rather be in the way of materials and services.

28. MR. KING stated that in view of our present and probable future commitments in the island, it had been agreed at the last meeting that serious consideration should be given to the settlement of mutual rights and obligations. The United States were proposing a definite lease of territory with certain jurisdictional rights. Canada should arrange to secure terms which would be of permanent value for strategical purposes in the future. The defence of Newfoundland would always be a primary Canadian interest.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 171.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 171.



93.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 17, 1940

. . .

ATLANTIC DEFENCE  
*Newfoundland*

. . .

26. MR. RALSTON said that he had it in mind to suggest that Canada should obtain leases of areas already occupied by Canadian forces, and surface rights in such localities as might be needed; the question of contribution by Newfoundland could be settled by subsequent negotiation and agreement.

26. MR. KING observed that in considering steps which should be taken by Canada, the probability of Canada's having eventually to take over Newfoundland and possibly Labrador should constantly be borne in mind. In the course of negotiations leading to the solution of the immediate problem, it was important that full regard should be had to such probable future circumstances. Newfoundland and Labrador would always continue to be essential Canadian interests.

. . .

94.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D2)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] February 5, 1941

. . .

3. *Security Measures on Labrador Coast.*

In Minute 5 of the 95th Meeting<sup>1</sup> D/C.A.S. requested information regarding potential enemy bases on the Labrador Coast.

C.N.S. stated that owing to the gradual slope of the shoreline and the many off-lying navigational dangers, the Coast-line from Belle Isle northward to HAMILTON INLET was unlikely to be used by enemy vessels; but that the coast from HAMILTON INLET north to SAGLEK BAY had several deep bays and inlets providing fairly good anchorage and the cover of steep-to cliffs. Due to ice, this coast was only navigable between July and mid-October.

The question of air and sea patrols of this portion of the coastline was discussed, particularly in connection with the possibility of enemy air operations from this vicinity directed at such vulnerable points as the Aluminium

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Plant at ARVIDA, P.Q. The Committee felt that the possibility of sabotage against such points was so paramount that any attempt by the enemy at air operations, involving a flight across the wastes of Labrador and Northern Quebec of over 1400 miles there and back was most unlikely. It was felt that air and sea patrols off Labrador could be given consideration at a later date, and that in the meantime no action in this regard was necessary.

...

95.

DND HQS 5199

*Le secrétaire du Comité des chefs d'état-major au chef d'état-major général*  
*Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Chief of the General Staff*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] February 7, 1941

I beg to acknowledge receipt of Copies No. 1 to No. 5 (both inclusive) of Part III—Army Plan—February 1941,<sup>1</sup> which has been substituted for the same Copy Numbers of the Plan Part III dated "August 1940".

[F. L. HOUGHTON]  
 Commander, R.C.N.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Annexe au plan de défense du Canada de février 1941*  
*Appendix to the Defence of Canada Plan of February, 1941*

SECRET

[Ottawa, January, 1941]

#### APPENDIX D

#### ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR ATTACK

##### 1. Newfoundland—

In the event of a major attack becoming imminent, the United States have agreed to despatch the following to Newfoundland:

- (a) One division (triangular reinforced)
- (b) One composite group of aircraft (about 72 aircraft)

NOTE: It has been agreed that this composite group of aircraft will now move to Newfoundland Airport as soon as accommodation and facilities are provided by the R.C.A.F. Work on this project is in hand.

...

<sup>1</sup> Le plan de défense du Canada de février 1941 était substantiellement le même que celui d'août 1940, sauf pour l'appendice D du plan de l'armée reproduit ici.

<sup>1</sup> The Defence of Canada Plan of February 1941, was substantially the same as the August, 1940 plan except for the addition of Appendix D to the Army Plan, which is reproduced herewith.

96.

Skelton Papers 391

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 35

Ottawa, March 2, 1941

MOST SECRET. Part I. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister, Begins. Since outbreak of the war we have, on the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, consistently followed a policy of sending all possible aid to the United Kingdom, despite the fact that this has necessarily involved the weakening of Canada's own defences. We have recently requested the Chiefs of Staff to review the state of home defences and to advise the Government whether any modification should be made in present policies in the light of their appreciation of the military situation. The text of the Chiefs of Staff appreciation of the present position is given, for your information, in my immediately following telegram. We should of course be glad to receive from time to time any appreciations of the war situation which may affect Canada or Canadian defence in any way and which has received the approval of your Cabinet.

2. Naval defences do not appear to be adequate to deal effectively with "tip and run" raids of the kind which must be regarded as a possibility with the coming of spring. Naval protection for the Atlantic Coast consists at present of one R.C.N. destroyer fit for service and more powerful units engaged from time to time in convoy duty to and from Canadian ports, and forces in the West Indies area.

3. On the Atlantic Coast we have now four bomber-reconnaissance squadrons, one of which can operate 600 miles from its base, capable of acting as a deterrent to raids by enemy naval units. Trained pilot personnel in these squadrons has been reduced to meet demands for instructors in the Air Training Plan.

4. Coast defences from the army viewpoint are reasonably strong except as regards anti-aircraft guns and equipment, in respect of which existing provision is inadequate.

5. Summary in the preceding paragraphs in respect of naval, air and Coast defence position of Eastern Canada should be read as supplementing memorandum of Chiefs of Staff Committee. Together they indicate a situation which has been causing War Committee of Cabinet a good deal of concern. We have, from the beginning, realized the serious implications in regard to home defence of sending you every possible assistance, naval, military and air. Our Chiefs of Staff believe the policy followed has been wise and justified by results. At the same time we cannot be unmindful of our direct responsibility for the defence of Canadian shores, and of the effect upon the common effort and Canadian morale should our coast and harbours be attacked and our defences prove inadequate to an emergency. In particular the importance of adequate protection for the convoy assembly port of Halifax and strategic approaches thereto cannot be too strongly emphasized. We should be very

glad to have your views on the situation and to learn whether, having in mind the requirements of various theatres of war, it will be possible to strengthen those features of our home defence position which Chiefs of Staff's analysis has shown to be inadequate.

Part II follows immediately.

97.

Skelton Papers 391

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 36

Ottawa, March 2, 1941

MOST SECRET. Part II. Following from Prime Minister for your Prime Minister, Begins. Following is brief appreciation by Chiefs of Staff Committee of defence position as of February 24th. Begins.

1. The probable Forms and Scales of Attack, which have been and are now accepted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in respect to direct action against Canadian territory and territorial waters, are given in the Defence of Canada Plan, dated August 1940, Part I.<sup>1</sup> These are generally as follows:

*Atlantic Coast*—bombardment by a capital ship; one or two 8" cruisers; or by a merchant raider mounting 6" guns; attack by submarines and small surface craft; attack by small raiding parties; torpedo, bomb or gas attack by shipborne or long-range shore-based aircraft on sea-borne, coastal and inland objectives.

*Pacific Coast*—similar to the above but on a smaller scale and lesser intensity.

2. It will be particularly noted that the Chiefs of Staff Committee do not anticipate any attempt at invasion by actual or potential hostile Powers. It is the opinion of the Committee that no such attempt would be feasible so long as the defence of the British Isles successfully continues. Even should Germany succeed in overcoming the resistance of our Empire Forces and the conquest of the United Kingdom ensue, there is still no probability that a large scale attack on these shores, with a view to invasion, is a contingency we need anticipate or plan for. A German-dominated Europe, and an Eastern Asia controlled by Japan, could wield such tremendous economic pressure that there would be no need on the part of enemy Powers to attempt a most difficult military invasion in order to force Canada (and the United States) eventually to accept humiliating terms of peace.

3. On the other hand, the greater the need for Germany to obtain a quick decision—and this situation increasingly obtains—and the more important and effective the assistance given by the United States to the British Empire countries, the more obvious it must become to Hitler that no consideration on his part can deter the United States from pursuing a course aimed at his eventual overwhelming defeat. In these circumstances, every

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



day increases the chances of "tip-and-run" sea and air raids against ports and other military objectives in Newfoundland and Eastern Canada.

4. Should Japan join with the Axis Powers in war against us—and this eventuality is becoming more probable—it may be that she will actively engage in similar raids against our Pacific Coast. Such a contingency, however, should be considered as a possibility rather than a probability, as there are important political (U.S.A.), strategic and tactical reasons for Japan retaining all her forces in the Western Pacific.

5. Our plans for the defence of the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts are still in course of execution. In general, it may be said that our Army formations now manning Coast Defences, or in mobile reserve in coastal areas, are sufficient rapidly to contend with any limited enemy raiding forces which might attempt to land in the vicinity of suitable objectives and attack them; but we continue to find ourselves inadequately furnished with Naval and Air forces, and with anti-aircraft guns and equipment, to ensure that raids by hostile naval or air forces against ports, the shipping in them, and other important objectives, are met with adequate resistance. In the existing circumstances, covering forces provided by the Royal Navy in the form of ocean escorts are a vital part of the defences of the western Atlantic, but these are barely adequate for this essential duty.

6. The maintenance and protection of Canadian Defended Ports, of focal points of shipping, and of the North Atlantic sea-routes, are essential to victory. To ensure this, we must have adequate Naval and Air forces to protect our shipping lanes and bases. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is of the opinion that in the defence of the North American continent, Newfoundland represents a highly important outpost, and is in many ways our first line of defence. Flanking as it does the trans-Atlantic air and sea-routes to North America, a strongly-held Newfoundland upon which are based adequate Navy, Army and Air forces, represents a powerful deterrent to enemy air and surface action against our coasts and territorial waters.

7. On the Pacific coast, the possibility of serious attack by surface-vessels or ship-borne aircraft of the Axis Powers is remote. The volume and importance of shipping in the Eastern Pacific is far less than that in the Atlantic, and there are no military objectives of sufficient importance to justify other than very small-scale tip-and-run raids, the effects of which would have little military significance. An actual attempt at invasion on this coast by Japanese forces is considered highly improbable.

#### 8. *Conclusions*

The Chiefs of Staff Committee consider that in the present circumstances and in those likely to obtain in the near future, the basing of adequate Naval and Air Forces to provide a Striking Force adequate to protect our shipping is of the first importance. These naval and air forces must operate from secure bases. An increase of Naval and Air forces on the East Coast of Canada is therefore necessary, and this is only possible by the active co-operation of such United States forces as can be made available for this purpose. Ends.

98.

Skelton Papers 391

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 47

London, March 24, 1941

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Your telegram of March 2nd, No. 35. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister, Begins. We have been weighing very carefully important questions raised in your messages No. 35 and No. 36 of March 2nd, and my immediately succeeding telegram sets out views of our advisers on these matters.

We think these views are sound. The position is bluntly that we have not all the equipment that would enable us to give complete protection on both sides of the Atlantic, and the question is therefore how can we make best use of material we have, having regard to what the enemy is trying to do and probabilities as to his future course of action. The issue of war will clearly depend on our being able to maintain traffic across the Atlantic. All our advice is that our present dispositions afford best means of achieving this. If we were to divert any substantial part of our forces from their present area of operations to cover wider areas where there is admittedly some risk of enemy action, we should only imperil the whole and play into his hands.

We are indeed most deeply appreciative of all that Canada has done, and in particular how you have stripped yourselves of protection on your Atlantic coasts to help us. As soon as we get more ships, or should dangers of enemy attack on western side of the Atlantic become greater, we shall not hesitate to consider re-dispositions at once. Ends.

99.

Skelton Papers 391

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 48

London, March 24, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram of March 2nd, No. 35, and your telegram No. 36. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister, Begins.

1. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have studied most carefully your views, and are in full sympathy with your anxieties and responsibilities regarding adequacy of Canadian defences. Military advisers have also examined your Chiefs of Staff analysis of Canadian home defence position. The following summarizes our assessment of the situation and our ability to assist.

2. In weighing possibility of assisting in strengthening of those features of Canadian home defence position to which Canadian Chiefs of Staff have drawn attention, we have had to bear in mind most carefully position here, and in other theatres where we are facing the enemy's attack. As you are aware, Germany is now making a supreme effort both at sea and in the air against our trade. We, ourselves, are making corresponding effort to defeat these attacks by assembling all the escort vessels we can lay our hands on, by transferring anti-aircraft weapons from our home defences to merchant shipping, and by diverting still more air forces to defend our ships against German long range aircraft which attack our shipping in areas hitherto regarded as immune. At the same time, with improving weather conditions, we have to be ready to meet increasing attacks of German bomber force against objectives in this country. Finally, we have from now on to be fully prepared to meet a large scale attempt at invasion. Our military advisers have just completed a detailed examination of requirements necessary to meet these threats, and it is clear that if we are not to fall below the danger line we have very little to spare from the force immediately available at home. At the same time, the recent developments in the Balkan and the Middle East theatres make it essential for us to maintain flow of our reinforcements to the Middle East. We have the fullest confidence in our ability to defeat threats to this country and to build up our growing offensive power, but you will appreciate that we are bound in common interest, referred to in your Chiefs of Staff appreciation, to weigh with the greatest care any additional withdrawals from the United Kingdom and its north western approaches.

3. While we fully realize the possibility of tip and run raids on Canadian eastern seaboard, we are of the opinion that such raids are unlikely in view of risk raiders would run of air attack and possible shadowing. They are more likely to attack shipping routes in western Atlantic. Moreover, an additional deterrent is likelihood that operations against Canadian seaboard must precipitate entry of the United States into the war. This we feel is particularly the case in the neighbourhood of Newfoundland, where our enemies must realize sensitiveness of United States to operations in area of her newly acquired bases.

4. We note that Canadian Chiefs of Staff make no specific reference to strengthening anti-submarine protection of shipping near Canadian coast. In view of indication that U-boat activity may be extending to western Atlantic, the question of strengthening naval and air forces now available in Canada for anti-submarine duties is now under consideration between the Admiralty and Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa. We are of the opinion that enemy will only adopt less economical use of submarines in western Atlantic for the purpose of making us over-insure ourselves there at the expense of decisive areas in western approaches. Every effort will be made to strike right balance between providing essential anti-submarine force for Canadian coast and maintaining our freedom on this side of the Atlantic.

5. With regard to air attack, the threat of attack by German land based aircraft is virtually non-existent as no German aircraft is capable of making Atlantic flight from existing air bases with any appreciable bomb load.

6. It is in this light that we have considered request in final paragraph of your telegram. We feel in view of situation shown in paragraph 2 of above, our present combined naval dispositions not only are best in common interest in existing circumstances, but are adequate to deal with scale of attack which we think probable in western Atlantic. Nevertheless, you may rest assured that redispotion will be made if situation there changes.

7. We agree that four reconnaissance squadrons, covering Canada's Atlantic approaches, are hardly adequate for area in question. In view, however, of urgent and pressing need for this type of aircraft elsewhere, it is difficult, at present, to provide aircraft for formation of additional squadrons. We are giving full consideration to your views on expansion of Royal Canadian Air Forces in preparation of revised air training programme. Ends.

100.

Skelton Papers 391

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 57

Ottawa, April 10, 1941

SECRET. Your telegrams Nos. 47 and 48 of March the 24th. Following for your Prime Minister, Begins.

1. I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your personal telegram to him of March the 24th.

2. The views of your military advisers, as set out in your telegram No. 48, of March the 24th, have been considered carefully by the Cabinet War Committee, and referred to our Chiefs of Staff for their examination.

3. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff have now expressed their agreement in the views of the U.K. government's military advisers, as described in your telegram No. 48, but desire to point out, with regard to Paragraph 4 of that telegram, that the statement therein, that, Quote, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff make no specific reference to strengthening anti-submarine protection of shipping near Canadian Coast, Unquote, does not appear to take into account paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Appreciation.

4. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff observe that all forms of attack were included in their Appreciation, although no specific reference was made to detailed defensive measures of any particular type. They desire to make it clear that Canada has spared no effort to build up and strengthen anti-submarine measures for the protection of shipping near the Canadian coast's. They draw attention, in this connection, to the fact that already large sums have been spent on this score and that every effort is being made to provide



as many ships and aircraft fully equipped with anti-submarine devices, as possible.

5. We feel it desirable to have these observations drawn to the attention of the United Kingdom government, lest there be any misunderstanding of the importance which the Canadian government and their service advisers attach to this matter, or of the extent of the measures being taken by Canada to meet this problem.\*

101.

DND HQS 7410-7

*Le chef de l'état-major général à l'officier général commandant en chef,  
région navale de l'Atlantique*

*Chief of the General Staff to General Officer Commanding in Chief,  
Atlantic Command*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] May 1, 1941

JOINT DEFENCE PLANS  
ATLANTIC COMMAND

1. I am directed to acknowledge your A.C.S. 10-11-1 dated 28th April, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

2. In reply to para. 3 thereof, I am to refer to para. 2 of the Appreciation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee which is attached as an Appendix to the Defence of Canada Plan, March, 1941.<sup>2</sup> It is considered that even though the United Kingdom were overrun by Germany, no large scale attack on the North American continent with a view to invasion is a contingency that needs to be anticipated or planned for. Therefore, while the scales of attack would remain the same with the additional risk in regard to Airport,<sup>3</sup> it might be anticipated that raids and/or bombardments on the scale laid down would become more probable and more frequent, if the worst contingency happened.

3. Your recommendations with regard to the Airport area have been considered, but in view of the Joint reconnaissance to be carried out it is felt that the outcome of this reconnaissance and your recommendations as a result should be awaited before a final decision is reached.

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\* Note telle que dans l'original:

As approved by War Cabinet Committee amended  
by P.M. A. D. P. H[EENEY] 9.4.41.

\* Note as in original:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Aucune copie de la version de mars 1941  
du plan n'a été trouvée.

<sup>2</sup> No copy of the March 1941 version of  
the plan has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Gander Airport.

<sup>3</sup> L'aéroport de Gander.

4. I am to request, however, that consideration be given to the ancillary troops and services required for the Airport area based upon the recommendations contained in para. 5 of the letter under reply and that detailed requirements be submitted with your further recommendations.

5. Finally, I am to confirm that the action referred to in para. 17 (b) of the Joint Operational Plan No. 1<sup>1</sup> is also contingent upon the Plan being placed in effect.

R. B. G[IBSON], Colonel  
D.M.O. and I  
for Chief of the General Staff

102.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 5, 1941

21. REAR-ADMIRAL NELLES, in answer to an enquiry by the Prime Minister, said that the Navy were not altogether happy about the defence of Greenland. They had as yet received no detailed information as to measures which the United States were taking.

As to the proposed convoy escort base at St. John's, Newfoundland, the Admiralty now planned a substantial increase in the force to be based there. The base would be an R.C.N. undertaking, and Commodore Murray would be in command. Of the thirty destroyers perhaps eight would be Canadian and Canada would probably supply all of the intended twenty-four corvettes.

22. THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, speaking for the Army, stated that coast defence measures were proceeding pretty well according to schedule and there would be no delay in manning defence works as they were completed. In this connection it was recommended that authority be given for the employment of an additional Canadian infantry battalion in Newfoundland.

23. MR. RALSTON described the present disposition of Canadian troops in Newfoundland. There was one Canadian battalion at St. John's, and

<sup>1</sup>Partie du premier plan interarme des opérations relatives à Terre-Neuve; ce plan, à l'instar du premier plan canado-américain de 1940 (sur lequel il se fondait), était destiné à faire face à l'éventualité où la marine britannique ne contrôlerait plus l'Atlantique et où l'Amérique du Nord serait exposée à une invasion. Ces plans ne furent jamais appliqués et furent bientôt remplacés par de nouveaux plans fondés sur l'hypothèse que la Grande-Bretagne continuerait à contrôler l'Atlantique et que les États-Unis entreraient en guerre. (Voir la section 5 c i)

<sup>1</sup>Part of Joint Operational Plan No. 1 related to Newfoundland; this plan, like the "Joint Canadian-United States Plan No. 1-1940" (on which it was based) was intended to take care of a situation in which the British Navy no longer controlled the Atlantic and North America was exposed to invasion. These plans were never put into effect and were soon overtaken by new plans based on the assumption that Britain would continue to control the Atlantic and the United States would enter the war. (See Section 5 c i)

another responsible for the defence of Botwood and Newfoundland Airport, and its approaches. It was important to provide what the United States regarded as adequate military protection for air personnel at the Airport.

24. MAJOR-GENERAL CRERAR said that the protection of the Airport had been the subject of joint reconnaissance by Canadian and U.S. officers. Both had come to the conclusion that further troops were required, and it was feared that if Canada were not prepared to provide them, the United States would send forces of their own. This would be unfortunate in view of Canadian policy with regard to the island's defence. Air personnel at the Airport would be approximately 3,400<sup>1</sup> U.S. Air Corps, 500 R.C.A.F., 600 civilian ferry service personnel, as well as construction personnel.

If the recommendation to despatch an additional Canadian infantry unit were approved, it was proposed to use an already mobilized battalion without, for the present, mobilizing another unit to replace it.

25. MR. KING agreed that all steps necessary should be taken to keep Newfoundland within the Canadian orbit. In the circumstances described, a further Canadian infantry battalion for the protection of the airport should be provided.

26. The Committee, thereupon, approved the employment of a further Canadian infantry battalion in Newfoundland, as recommended.

...

103.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 29, 1941

...

#### CANADIAN POLICY WITH REGARD TO NEWFOUNDLAND

20. THE SECRETARY reported that the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had submitted to the Prime Minister a memorandum regarding the policy to be pursued in relation to Newfoundland.

In his covering letter to Mr. King, Mr. Biggar had observed that certain of the decisions taken in regard to Newfoundland and referred to in the memorandum were, in some degree, inconsistent with others. It would be of assistance to Canadian members of the Board if the general principle which would govern were to be as specifically defined as circumstances permitted. The specific enquiry for direction was formulated by Mr. Biggar as follows:

Is it desirable that Newfoundland, outside the United States leased bases, should for the purposes of defence be treated so far as possible as a part of Canada, or should the United States be encouraged to assume responsibility for the defence

<sup>1</sup> Le nombre réel du personnel américain à Gander n'atteignit jamais plus qu'une fraction de ce nombre.

<sup>1</sup> The actual number of United States personnel at Gander never reached more than a fraction of this figure.

of the country in order to permit the release of Canadian forces for service in other areas?

Mr. Biggar's memorandum had been circulated to members of the War Committee.

(See Mr. Biggar's memorandum of October 18th, 1941<sup>1</sup>, re Newfoundland.)

21. THE PRIME MINISTER said that, in recent conversations with him, the Governor of Newfoundland had expressed the view that Canada should assert her interests in Newfoundland *vis-à-vis* the United States.

Canada should recognize her continuing intimate interest and concern in Newfoundland which constituted a vital link with Britain. The Canadian members of the Board should be instructed that Canadian responsibility in regard to the Island is accepted by the government.

22. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE referred to the financial implications of Canadian policy in Newfoundland. Before further commitments were made, a statement of existing U.S. and Canadian commitments should be prepared and examined.

23. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES pointed out that U.S. expenditures in the Island were on a very large scale.

Canada should be able to retain her own position and, at the same time, to co-operate fully with the United States. It should be possible, for example in respect of the Torbay aerodrome, to get over the legal difficulty which was held to prevent U.S. government expenditures where the United States had no title.

24. THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS pointed out that, while the vital nature of the Canadian interest in Newfoundland was clearly understood by the Canadian government, it was probably not sufficiently appreciated by the other parties concerned, namely, the United Kingdom, the United States and Newfoundland itself. Newfoundlanders were apprehensive, both as regards Canada and the United States.

25. MR. KING suggested that the possibility of extending U.S. assistance under the lease-lend law might be explored.

26. After further discussion, the War Committee agreed:

- (a) That the defence of Newfoundland was an integral part of the defence of Canada, and that, in agreeing to dispositions for the defence of the Island, it should be assumed that, after the war, Newfoundland would continue to be a primary Canadian interest;
- (b) That the possibilities of having the U.S. government undertake expenditures in connection with Newfoundland defence, without taking title to the property involved, and by the extension of the provisions of the lease-lend law, should be explored.

The Secretary was directed to advise the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Board of these decisions.

...

<sup>1</sup> Voir la pièce jointe au document 104.

<sup>1</sup> See Enclosure to Document 104.



104.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire à  
Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 21

Ottawa, November 3, 1941

MOST SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for your examination copies of the following documents:

1. Memorandum entitled "Newfoundland" prepared by the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence;
2. Memorandum entitled "The Future Relations of Canada and Newfoundland, addressed to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs by the Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence;
3. A copy of the letter covering (1) above addressed to the Prime Minister by the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence;<sup>1</sup>
4. Copy of the letter in reply to (3) above addressed to the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence by the Clerk of the Privy Council.<sup>1</sup>

As you will observe from an examination of the documents listed above, the Canadian Government has been giving careful attention to the question of long range relationships between Canada and Newfoundland.

I shall be grateful if you will study these documents and let me have, at your early convenience, whatever comments you wish to make on the ideas and proposals set forth therein. You will, of course, realize the necessity for treating this subject with the most complete secrecy and discretion.

I have etc.

NORMAN ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum du président de la section canadienne de la CPCAD*  
*Memorandum by Chairman of the Canadian Section of PJBD*

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE RE: NEWFOUNDLAND

[Ottawa,] October 18, 1941

1. It is expected that at the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence the United States members will suggest that facilities for the operation of United States army aircraft should be provided at the recently completed aerodrome near St. John's, Newfoundland. How sympathetically such a proposal should be received by the Canadian section depends in part upon service exigencies, but in part also upon considerations of Canadian Government policy.

2. The principal steps taken during about the last year in relation to Newfoundland are six in number. The first was taken before the agreement between the British and United States Governments for the establishment of bases by the latter on the island. The other five were all taken subsequently to that agreement. These steps were:

- (a) The assumption of certain responsibilities for the defence of Newfoundland which have resulted in the stationing of units of the Canadian forces and the construction of defence works and buildings at and near St. John's, at Gander Lake, and in the neighbourhood of Botwood and Lewisporte;
- (b) The provision under agreement with the United States of accommodation and facilities for United States air forces at Gander Lake, and the agreement to provide similar facilities at Botwood;
- (c) The construction of an aerodrome primarily for fighter operation at Torbay near St. John's;
- (d) The arrangement that the British Government should meet the cost of construction of a Naval Base at St. John's, the work to be carried out by the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Base operated by them;
- (e) The undertaking by Canada instead of the United States of the construction and operation of a new aerodrome at Goose Lake [sic] (Northwest River) in Labrador; and
- (f) The decision that the rehabilitation and re-equipment of the Newfoundland Railway should be financed and overseen by the United States rather than by Canada and the Canadian National Railways.

3. Disregarding all considerations except those affecting the prosecution of the war as it is now being waged, the commonsense course for Canada would

be to let the United States assume every responsibility it is prepared to assume on this side of the Atlantic, and thus free all possible Canadian forces for service in the critical theatre overseas. By so doing part at least of the Canadian forces presently in Newfoundland might be replaced by United States forces, and no further Canadian forces detailed for duty there, for example at Torbay.

4. The advisability of adopting such a programme depends, however, not only on how soon the United States may be expected to become a full belligerent, but also upon what it is considered desirable that the future relations of Canada and Newfoundland should be.

5. From a strictly military standpoint apart from the existing war situation two views are open. One of these is that Canada must continue strongly to assert her vital interest in Newfoundland owing to the position of the island in relation to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The other is that having regard to the relative national strengths of Canada and the United States it is of no real military significance whether the undefended boundary between the two countries runs eastward from Juan de Fuca Strait only to Passamaquoddy Bay or bends northward and continues to Hudson Strait.

6. If political considerations are taken into account the question arises whether a British colony should be allowed without Canadian opposition to fall into United States control, or whether, on the other hand, Canada desires to face the financial burden which ultimate assumption of responsibility for the civil Government of Newfoundland would almost certainly entail.

7. The expenditures incurred by Canada for the defence of the island either directly by Canadian forces or indirectly by providing accommodation for United States forces are already heavy. They are, however, probably small by comparison with those made by the United States. The local phrase comparing the scales of outlay and explaining the difference between them is: "The United States is here for a hundred years; Canada only for the duration". While the Congress continues to make generous provision for the construction, equipment and manning of United States bases, the local comparison may become even more unfavourable.

8. Under United States law the United States Government is not free to incur expenditure for works on land to which it has no title. It was for this reason that the accommodation for the United States forces at Gander Lake was provided by Canada. The same difficulty will arise if accommodation for a United States detachment is to be made at Torbay.

9. It would in the circumstances greatly assist the Permanent Joint Board if some general indication could be given of the line which it is considered desirable that Canada's future policy in relation to Newfoundland should follow.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE 2/ ENCLOSURE 2]

*Mémorandum du secrétaire de la section canadienne de la CPCAD<sup>1</sup>  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Secretary of the Canadian Section of PJBD<sup>1</sup>  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa, October 18, 1941]

## THE FUTURE RELATIONS OF CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

1. In connection with the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, problems are constantly arising, the solution of which would be infinitely easier if we could have an indication of some clear and consistent policy which the Canadian Government proposes to follow in seeking a solution of the long-range problems of Canadian-Newfoundland relations. Colonel Biggar has prepared and presented to Council a memorandum in which he has indicated certain points at which present decisions should be taken only in the light of the principles embodied in such a fundamental or basic policy. As yet no such policy exists. A copy of Col. Biggar's memorandum is attached hereto.

2. The basic questions to which such a policy should provide answers are these:

- A. Should Canadian policy be predicated upon the assumption that Newfoundland must eventually enter Confederation?
- B. If so, should the Canadian Government endeavour to hasten that development, or should matters be allowed to develop without stimulation from Ottawa?
- C. If not, should Canada continue to take the prime responsibility for Newfoundland defence or should we be prepared to have that duty taken over by the United States?

3. It would be easy to prepare an extended argument which would show that admission of Newfoundland into the Dominion would

- (a) increase, rather than reduce, Canadian economic burdens;
- (b) multiply the political dilemmas of Confederation;
- (c) add new and perhaps insoluble social problems to the difficulties with which Canada is already faced in this field;

and that Canada would have nothing to lose but much to gain by allowing the United States to take over full and sole responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland.

4. There are really only two arguments against the adoption of this course; it would not be consistent with Canadian dignity, and it would be contrary to the sentiment of the people in Newfoundland, Canada and Britain alike.

5. There is, of course, the third possibility: that Newfoundland be left in its present constitutional position and that defence responsibilities should

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.



continue to [?]<sup>1</sup> Washington and Ottawa. Apart from the anom[aly the] situation creates there there is the reasonable pr[esumption that] Britain may well soon tire of paying the defi[cit of a] colony that is geographically, economically and [politically] a North American problem. If this should happen [some] constitutional change would be inevitable.

6. All things considered it would seem to be lik[ely] that Canada must prepare eventually to accept Newfoundl[and] as a tenth partner in Confederation. This being the ca[se] would it not be wise for the Canadian Government, without trying in any way to hasten the ultimate union, to take its present decisions in regard to the practical problems arising in Newfoundland in accordance with this assumption? We could then have a simple and consistent rule upon which to base our day to day decisions.

105.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State for  
External Affairs*

DESPATCH 91

St. John's, December 3, 1941

MOST SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your most secret despatch No. 21 of November 3, 1941.

2. The only comment I would make is to say that I am glad that after many years someone in Canada had vision enough to see what Lord Baltimore saw over three hundred years ago when he described Newfoundland as "a key to the gulf of Canada which if the English were in possession they might give the law to all foreign kings."

3. May I also add that my comment is entirely apart from the question of Newfoundland entering the Canadian Confederation. That would be an impractical preposition for Canada unless it met with the approval of a substantial majority of the people of Newfoundland. That approval would certainly not be given at the present time. Whether such approval would be given at a future time depends upon developments. An essential preliminary step is the re-education of Newfoundlanders about Canada and Canadians—and that problem is one to which we should all give more thought than perhaps we are now doing.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

<sup>1</sup> La seule copie disponible de ce document fut endommagée. Les mots ou les lettres apparaissant entre parenthèses furent ajoutés dans un effort de reconstruction visant à compléter les phrases partiellement amputées.

<sup>1</sup> The only available file copy of this document was mutilated. Words or parts thereof, appearing in parentheses, have been added in an attempt to complete those sentences partially destroyed.

## SOUS-SECTION ii/SUB-SECTION ii

L'AÉROPORT DE GANDER ET LA BASE D'HYDRAVIONS À BOTWOOD  
 GANDER AIRPORT AND BOTWOOD SEAPLANE BASE

106.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 13

Ottawa, June 14, 1940

SECRET. The Canadian Government having reviewed the matter of the defences of Newfoundland in the light of existing conditions are now of the opinion it would be advisable to have additional defence forces stationed in Newfoundland for protection of aerodrome and Botwood seaplane base. The Forces considered desirable for the purpose are one flight of bomber reconnaissance aircraft to be stationed at the Newfoundland aerodrome and to be augmented by one flight of fighter aircraft when suitable aircraft become available. Also a military force for ground protection consisting of one infantry battalion with personnel of other arms attached as required. If the Newfoundland authorities approve it is proposed that a reconnaissance party will proceed by air as soon as practicable. May we have prompt reply indicating whether sending of reconnaissance party is approved by Newfoundland authorities. Canadian Government would also be glad to have Newfoundland authorities consider in the meantime whether the Commission of Government of Newfoundland would be prepared to assume a share of the responsibility involved in these measures and an early reply on this point would be appreciated.

107.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 14

Ottawa, June 15, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram No. 13, June 14th.

We find that if proposed arrangement were acceptable to your Government it would be possible to send military forces for ground protection by vessel leaving afternoon of Sunday June 16th. We should greatly appreciate it if you found it possible to reply by noon Sunday or as early as possible thereafter.

108.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's, June 16, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Infantry Brigade. The Commission of Government have examined proposals contained in your telegram No. 13, secret,

June 14th for defence of Newfoundland airport and Botwood seaplane base, and approve them. The proposed visit of reconnaissance party may take place at your convenience. Moreover the Commission accept in principle suggestion that it should assume a share of the responsibilities involved but before a financial burden of this nature can be assumed we feel that we must seek the views of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. You will, we know, appreciate that in existing circumstances the financial share which we can assume must necessarily be small.

109. 1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM St. John's, June 16, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Your No. 14 of June 15th. We agree.

110. DND HQS 7410

*Le chef d'état-major général au commandant de district, Québec*  
*Chief of the General Staff to District Officer Commanding, Québec*

TELEGRAM G.S. 0371 Ottawa, June 16, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. RUSH. SECRET. Following for Officer Commanding Black Watch from Chief of General Staff. You will command army detachment proceeding Newfoundland. Detachment R.C.E. proceeding separately will come under your command when it arrives Newfoundland. Your task will be protection Newfoundland Airport and Botwood Seaplane Base against sabotage and or ground attack by enemy armed forces. You will also provide small arm anti-aircraft defence to above localities. You will be provided with National Defence cipher by D.O.C. M.D. Five. This cipher will be used all messages. On arrival contact Newfoundland authority and arrange telegraphic address notify N.D.H.Q. same when arranged. N.D.H.Q. telegraphic address Defensor. Pending receipt telegraphic address communication with you will be through External Affairs Ottawa and Newfoundland authorities. Separate instructions regarding your relation Newfoundland authorities will be sent later.

111. 1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM St. John's, June 16, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 14, secret. Please advise immediately where and when vessel will arrive, number of personnel and where it is intended to send them. Will they have complete camp equipment and for what period will they have rations.

112.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 15

Ottawa, June 16, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram No. 14, June 15 and your telegram of today. Black Watch of Canada, strength approximately 900 all ranks leaves Quebec by S.S. *Antonia* on Monday, June 17th, and will arrive St. John's approximately 8 a.m., June 20th, for the purpose of protecting Newfoundland airport and seaplane base.

Will you please make necessary arrangements for disembarkation of troops and stores, and also for special troop and goods train to proceed to destination as soon as possible after disembarkation is completed. Full camp equipment will be carried and rations for thirty days.

113.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's, June 17, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram June 16th. Secret. No. 15. In view of size and draft of vessel and having regard to rock obstruction at entrance of St. John's harbour and general difficulties of manoeuvring a large ship inside the harbour, we strongly advise that the vessel should proceed to Botwood instead of St. John's. At the latter port there is deep water, wharfage space and train facilities and it is actually nearer to Newfoundland airport. Please advise immediately that ship has been instructed accordingly and inform us as to date of arrival at Botwood.

114.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est,*  
*au commandant, aéroport de Gander*

*Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command,*  
*to Officer Commanding, Gander Airport*

S 30-3

Halifax, June 17, 1940

SECRET

SUBJECT: AIR DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

1. A review of the Air Defence of Newfoundland has been made and it is considered expedient to take every precaution to prevent the possibility of the Enemy seizing undefended air bases in that colony with the object of conducting air operations against important objectives on the Atlantic Coast and shipping off the Atlantic Coast.



2. Two organized air bases exist in Newfoundland. One base is the Newfoundland Airport situated on the main line of the Newfoundland Railway at Gander Lake. The other air base is the Seaplane Station located at Botwood. Enemy possession of the Newfoundland Airport would give control of the Newfoundland Railway and the Seaplane Base at Botwood where enemy ships could unload war supplies for the Seaplane Base or for transportation by rail to the airport. All shipment of ore and paper from Botwood to England by boat would thus be prevented, and air attacks could be carried out on the Port of St. John's, Bell Island iron mine, Bishop's Falls and Grand Falls pulp and paper mills and the lead and zinc mines at Buchans.

3. Enemy possession of the Newfoundland Airport or the Seaplane Base at Botwood would bring enemy aircraft within 283 miles of Sydney, N.S. and 451 miles of Halifax. Enemy aircraft would also be able to attack and destroy our shipping through the Strait of Belle Isle and Cabot Strait.

4. Your flight of 5 Digby aircraft is based at the Newfoundland Airport for the following duties:

- (a) General Reconnaissance of the East Coast of Newfoundland from Cape Race to Belle Isle in the Strait of Belle Isle, and to seaward from the East Coast of Newfoundland
- (b) An Air Striking Force for delivering bombing attacks on any enemy ships located within range of the aircraft based at Newfoundland Airport
- (c) Local Air Defence of the Newfoundland Airport and Seaplane Base at Botwood
- (d) Anti-aircraft Defence of the Newfoundland Airport.

5. During General Reconnaissance particular attention is to be paid to any ships which cannot be identified as proceeding on a legitimate route in the Newfoundland Coastal Trade, or shipping route to and from the Atlantic Coast. Close liaison is to be established with the Senior Naval Officer, St. John's, and information obtained as to the name, nationality, time of sailing and route of all ships using Eastern Newfoundland ports. A careful watch is to be kept on East Coast bays, which extend inland to the vicinity of the Newfoundland Railway, in order to ensure that enemy ships do not enter these bays with the object of disembarking a landing party and munitions.

6. Attached is a map<sup>1</sup> showing 2 patrols covering the East Coast of Newfoundland. These patrols are Number 1 which extends from Cape Race to Fogo Island and Number 2 from Fogo Town to Gull Island centre of north channel, Strait of Belle Isle, Partridge Point then Base.

7. Orders for those patrols will quote patrol (1) or patrol (2) or both. In addition to these patrols other special patrols to sea may be ordered which will be defined by the bearing and distance from some definite feature of the Newfoundland Coast.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

8. Orders for patrols will be transmitted to you on forms GREEN and will be in R.A.F. Station Cypher. In this connection you are to ensure that all officers of your Flight are instructed in the use of this high grade cypher.

9. Serviceable aircraft not on patrol are to stand by as an Air Striking Force and for Local Air Defence from dawn to dusk each day, unless the weather is totally unfit for flying.

10. Lewis Guns for Anti-aircraft Defence of the Newfoundland Airport are to be placed so that complete control of the runways can be effected at all times. The high ground in the centre of the runway "V" opposite the administration Building is particularly suitable for this purpose. Gun positions are to be dug in and protected by a wall of sand bags. They are also to be camouflaged so as to give no indication of their location from the air or the ground until it becomes necessary to bring the guns into action. Premature disclosure of these Anti-Aircraft Defence positions to any attacking enemy aircraft is to be avoided since by so doing while the enemy is still out of range will effect no useful purpose and will give away the position to the enemy so that he can put it out of action by bombing. It would appear advisable to withhold fire until the enemy aircraft is in the process of landing and then only those guns nearest the aircraft should open fire, the remainder to stay concealed to deal with any other enemy aircraft that might attempt to land on a different part of the runways.

11. The Military Forces being sent to the Newfoundland Airport should be organized to deal with parachute troops or raiding parties attempting to seize the Airport from the direction of the Railway. The transmitting and receiving W/T Stations should be well protected against raid by parachute troops or raiding parties on the ground.

12. You are to arrange with the W/T Station at the Newfoundland Airport to maintain a constant listening watch on your General Reconnaissance Frequency while aircraft are on patrol.

13. You are to also arrange for the Meteorological Officer at the Airport to keep your Aircraft on patrol informed of any weather conditions developing which may prevent the safe return of the aircraft to the Base. Weather reports for Sydney and Halifax should also be available for the information of your Aircraft while on patrol.

14. Information is to be obtained of all possible emergency landing fields and beaches in Newfoundland where your Aircraft might make a safe landing under stress of bad weather conditions or for other cause, and this information should be made known to all pilots and navigators of your Flight.

15. The general instructions of Operation Order No. 3/40<sup>1</sup> are to be observed in your operations. These instructions are tentative and will be confirmed and altered later by a suitable Appendix to the Operation Order.

N. R. ANDERSON  
Air Commodore

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

115.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 371

[St. John's,] June 18, 1940

SECRET. My telegram secret No. 355 of June 16th.<sup>1</sup> Canadian Government telegraphed on June 16th asking our permission to embark immediately a battalion for defence of airport and air base. We agreed and S.S. *Antonia* now en route to Botwood with 900 troops equipped and provisioned for one month. Botwood should be reached June 20th. Meantime a flight of 5 planes has arrived at airport. It is probable that construction of necessary quarters at airport and Botwood will commence forthwith. No further questions as to our responsibility have arisen.

116.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 16

Ottawa, June 18, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. A unit of the Canadian Active Service Force, consisting of Officers 21, warrant Officers 1, Staff Sergeants and Sergeants 46, Rank and File 781, with one Supply Officer and two Clerks attached, embarked on the S.S. *Antonia* and sailed at 1515 hours, E.S.T., on the 17th June, 1940.

Upon receipt of secret cypher from the Governor of Newfoundland dated 17th June, S.S. *Antonia* has been advised to proceed to Botwood, and the approximate day and hour of arrival are Friday A.M., June 21st. Confirmation of exact time will be sent when available.

117.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's, June 19, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram of June 18th. Please advise immediately how unit will be distributed as between Botwood and Newfoundland airport and any other destination.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

118.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 19

Ottawa, June 20, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Part I. Your telegram June 19th. Instructions already issued to Officer Commanding Black Watch that his task is to protect Newfoundland airport and Botwood seaplane base from sabotage and ground attack. Also to provide small arm anti-aircraft protection to above localities. Actual distribution of force therefore rests with Officer Commanding Black Watch.

Part II. Following for Officer Commanding Black Watch. Begins. In continuation G.S. 0371 dated 16th June, 1940. In making your dispositions defence of Newfoundland airport is of primary importance. Ends.

119.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 470

[London,] June 23, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram of the 16th June No. 355.<sup>1</sup> Your telegram 19th June No. 371.<sup>1</sup> We note arrangements made Newfoundland and Canadian Governments for defence of Airport and Air Base. Glad if you will keep me informed of developments. I should also wish to be advised as to any further discussions with Canadian Government on financial side.

Your telegram of June 6th No. 324<sup>2</sup> has now to some extent been overtaken by subsequent events. As regards more general question raised in it you should know the view taken here as to risk of attack upon Newfoundland still remains as stated in my telegram No. 276 of May 10th<sup>3</sup> but we will of course keep position under view and you would at once be informed of any change in situation.

120.

Skelton Papers 395

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's, June 25, 1940

SECRET. Following for Secretary, Department of National Defence, from Officer Commanding Black Watch, Begins. All equipment and stores unloaded. Battalion established Botwood and Newfoundland Air Port, where Headquarters have been set up. Will make full report later. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Document 82.<sup>3</sup> Document 73.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



121.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 21

Ottawa, July 2, 1940

SECRET. Following from Defensor for Officer Commanding Black Watch Begins. Submit urgently appreciation of situation which would arise should enemy attempt to land either by air or water and seize existing facilities, bearing in mind primary importance of Newfoundland Airport.

Newfoundland Minister of Justice, Mr. L. E. Emerson, now in Ottawa has been pressing for small detachments for protection St. John's, Lewisporte, Argentia and Bell Island. Would such detachments be of any value in your main responsibility.

Report on nature country in vicinity Botwood, Lewisporte and Newfoundland Airport also required.

Report your telegraphic address in order that we may communicate with you by National Defence Cipher. Ends.

122.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's, July 3, 1940

Following for Secretary, Department of National Defence from Officer Commanding Black Watch, Begins. Telegraphic address of Red Hackle Airport, Newfoundland has been approved. Conferences have been held over week-end with Newfoundland authorities and my report<sup>1</sup> will await Mr. Emerson's arrival this week. Ends.

123.

NPA GN1/3 320 35

*Le commandant de la force d'escorte navale de la MR*  
*au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Commander of RN Ocean Escort Force to Governor of Newfoundland*

PERSONAL

Halifax, July 6, 1940

Dear Sir Humphrey [Walwyn],

We had a visit from J. D. Cunningham<sup>2</sup> last week, flying his flag in the *Devonshire*. He had been all through the Norway show, eventually evacuating the King of Norway, Olaf, his suite and twenty ladies, in his ship.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Vice-amiral, commandant du premier escadre de croiseurs de la Marine royale.

<sup>2</sup> Vice-Admiral, Commanding First Cruiser Squadron, Royal Navy.

He flew up to see C.N.S. at Ottawa to try and shake them up. He told me until you have seen the Hun at work, it is impossible to realise what losses they are prepared to sustain in ships, aircraft or men, provided they gain their object.

He was extremely worried about Botwood<sup>1</sup>, and I enclose a copy of the notes<sup>2</sup> he took up to Ottawa. The first two paragraphs only are interesting to you but I thought you would like to see them all.

I have sent a copy to the Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies.

Yours sincerely,

STUART S. BONHAM-CARTER

124.

Skelton Papers 395

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 30

Ottawa, July 23, 1940

SECRET. Major-General T.V. Anderson is leaving shortly to inspect Canadian troops at Newfoundland Airport and Botwood. Method of transport not yet determined. He will visit St. John's and would be glad to discuss military defence matters. General Anderson will notify you of dates later.

125.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 5, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald [Campbell],

May I refer to your letter, dated the 26th March, 1940,<sup>3</sup> on the subject of the defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay, and also dealing with the broader questions affecting the defences of Canada and of Newfoundland. In the second paragraph of your letter you pointed out that the Commission Government of Newfoundland confirmed that the air bases at Botwood and Newfoundland airport were at the disposal of the Royal Canadian Air Force, either for the defence of Canada or of Newfoundland. I have received the following request from the Department of National Defence for Air:

<sup>1</sup> Le vice-amiral Cunningham pensait évidemment davantage à Gander qu'à Botwood.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduites.

<sup>3</sup> Document 68.

<sup>1</sup> Vice-Admiral Cunningham was evidently thinking more of Gander than of Botwood.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Recently one flight of a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron has been located at the Newfoundland Airport. In accordance with the revised plans for the defence of Canada, however, it is proposed to develop the air defence at Newfoundland Airport to the extent where the present accommodation and facilities will be totally inadequate. The proposed air defence forces at Newfoundland will require facilities for at least one Fighter and two Bomber Reconnaissance Squadrons, which will necessitate the erection and installation of services of the items contained on the attached paper, Appendix "A".<sup>1</sup>

The Department of National Defence is prepared to proceed at once with the necessary construction work, the expenditure having been approved.

Prior to proceeding, however, it is desired that the Newfoundland Government be approached regarding the provision of land, right-of-ways, etc., this to be at no cost to the Canadian Government, and, procuring their consent to the erection and installation of the buildings and services as listed.

If this consent is granted, the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, will be instructed to co-operate with the representatives of the Newfoundland Government as to suitable siting of the buildings and services.

In view of the urgency of the work and the desire of the Canadian Government to make as much progress as possible before winter sets in, it is desired the consent of the Newfoundland Government should be requested with the least possible delay, please.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the Commission of Government in Newfoundland, if possible by telegram, in order that substantial progress may be made with the matter before winter sets in.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

126.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 7, 1940

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 6th August,<sup>2</sup> I write to tell you that I have to-day received a reply from the Governor of Newfoundland in regard to the desire of the Canadian authorities to establish increased air defence forces at Newfoundland airport.

The Governor of Newfoundland will provide the specified land and rights of way, etc. at no cost to the Canadian Government and will consent to the erection and installation of the buildings and services mentioned.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

127.

DND HQS 7410

*Le chef d'état major général au général commandant en chef,  
région navale de l'Atlantique*

*Chief of the General Staff to General Officer Commanding in Chief,  
Atlantic Command*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 20, 1940

I am directed to inform you that recent reports of the Inspector General and the Captain of H.M.S. *Caradoc*<sup>1</sup> indicate that the military camp at Botwood presents a very conspicuous target from the sea and air.

2. The Inspector General also reports that there is room for improvement with regard to the matter of field defences at both Botwood and Airport.

3. I am to request, therefore, that appropriate action be taken to ensure that the conditions referred to above will be improved as soon as possible.

J. C. M[URCHIE]

## SOUS-SECTION iii/SUB-SECTION iii

*LA DÉFENSE DES INSTALLATIONS NAVALES*  
*NAVAL DEFENCES*

128.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 29

Ottawa, July 19, 1940

SECRET. Following from J. L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence. Begins. We are considering practicability of operational Naval Base in Newfoundland subject of course to Newfoundland's concurrence and cooperation. An officer from our Naval Services is ready to go at once for purpose of consultation with your Government regarding possibilities and most advantageous location and nature of development. Please advise if you concur. If so how soon can you receive our officer. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 130. La section de ce document concernant Botwood n'est pas reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 130. The part of this document which concerns Botwood is not printed.



129.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 26

St. John's, July 20, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 29, Secret, July 19th. Following for Mr. Ralston, Minister of National Defence. Begins. Following upon prior request of Naval Headquarters, Ottawa to which we had agreed, H.M.S. *Caradoc* arrived this morning carrying sailing orders No. D. 030-1/3, July 17th,<sup>1</sup> from Commodore Jones, S.O., Halifax, of which copy should now be at Naval Headquarters, Ottawa. We assume this will cover subject matter of your message. Ends.

130.

DND HQS 5119-Y

*Le commandant du H.M.S. Caradoc au commodore commandant*  
*le détachement d'Halifax*  
*Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Caradoc to Commodore Commanding*  
*Halifax Force*

[H.M.S. *Caradoc*], August 1, 1940

With reference to your No. D. 030-1/3 of 17th July, 1940<sup>1</sup>, the attached report is submitted.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Rapport du commandant du H.M.S. Caradoc*  
*Report by Commanding Officer of H.M.S. Caradoc*

INTELLIGENCE REPORT—NEWFOUNDLAND

[H.M.S. *Caradoc*], August 1, 1940H.M.S. *Caradoc*'s REPORT NO. 280/011 DATED 1ST AUGUST 1940*General Remarks*

## Area

The area covered by this report stretches from Cape Race up the East Coast of Newfoundland to Goose Cape to the north of Hare Bay. Only a few harbours could be covered in the time available, but they were considered the most suitable after consultation with the Naval Officer-in-Charge at St. John's who had already given the matter considerable attention.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND—GENERAL

## Naval

8. Although there are any number of harbours, well protected from weather and far from the beaten track, eminently suitable for use as an advanced base for an enemy raider or submarine, it is considered that the large number of fishing boats which abound everywhere would make it extremely difficult for one to do so undetected, provided that it is impressed upon the fishermen that they must remain undetected and report any unusual vessel seen near the coast. Some similar organisation for rewards as given in A.F.O. 837/40<sup>1</sup> might be instituted.

9. Certain harbours, of which particulars are given later in this report, are considered suitable for use as an advanced base for ships on special services.

...

*Harbours Visited*

22. Pages 5-19<sup>2</sup> of this report give particulars of the harbours visited by H.M.S. *Caradoc*.

A table of harbour facilities in the area, a report on communication systems and a list of immediate recommendations are included in Appendices A<sup>1</sup>, B<sup>1</sup> and C<sup>1</sup>.

Chart 298<sup>3</sup>

*St. John's*

## 1. Harbour, Berthing etc.

Chart 298<sup>3</sup>

An excellent harbour, well protected from bad weather with good holding ground. Berths are available alongside for ships up to 500 feet in length drawing 30 feet of water, and there is ample accommodation for a number of small vessels such as minesweepers and escort vessels alongside. More room could very simply be made in the anchorage by shifting the hulk *Briton* to a more convenient position, or by mooring buoys.

## 2. Communications

It is the terminus of railway, coastal shipping and telegraph communications in Newfoundland, and is connected by road to most places in the Avalon Peninsula. There is no road yet to the main part of the island from the Peninsula.

There is a small seaplane base on Quidi Vidi close northward of the city.

## 3. Supplies

Supplies of food are readily available in bulk. Good water can be supplied to ships alongside but there are no water boats in the port.

Coal, gasoline and Diesel oil are all available, but not oil fuel at present. Arrangements could be made with the Imperial Oil Company to maintain stocks of oil fuel at about three months notice, it is understood.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Reproduits partiellement.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Partly printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

#### 4. Docks, Repair Shops and Lifting Appliances

There are good repair facilities and machine shops owned by the Newfoundland Railway, which is a Government concern. There is also a modern graving dock, 575 feet by 70 feet with 27 feet of water on the sill.

There is a 40 ton crane.

#### 5. Hospitals, Medical Service, etc.

There are several hospitals and a number of doctors resident in St. John's.

#### 6. Accommodation

Accommodation for Base and/or Depot staffs and necessary offices is readily available in buildings on or near the quayside. One building, suitable for 50-60 ratings, will be falling vacant during August. Accommodation for harbour defence guns' crews is available at Fort Amherst.

#### 7. Ice Conditions

St. John's has the great advantage over other ports in Newfoundland in being almost ice-free. The harbour is seldom blocked for more than a week, and some years not even that. Navigation can however be made difficult on account of icebergs in the approaches.

#### 8. Access, Navigational Considerations and Proximity to Focal Areas

The harbour is easy of access and is provided with a wireless D/F station which can also be used as a Fog Radio Beacon on request or by arrangement.

It is only 60 miles from the Cape Race area, and 285 miles from the Belle Isle Strait.

#### 9. Harbour Defence

The present defences consist solely of an anti-submarine net across the entrance, which can be lowered to permit of entry of shipping. This net has a 10 ft. mesh, and when raised is at present brought up to [within] 8 feet of the surface, to allow passage of small motor-boats etc.

The entrance channel is narrow and rocky, and it is doubtful if a submarine would ever try and dive in, but, although a difficult shot, torpedoes might be fired up the channel to hit a vessel at anchor or alongside one of the main wharves. It is therefore thought that a modern anti-torpedo baffle net would be of much greater value.

Good sites for guns and accommodation for their crews exist at Fort Amherst on the south side of the entrance, but no guns can be obtained.

The harbour lends itself readily to modern anti-torpedo net defence and could be very easily defended by the minimum number of guns. The best berths in the harbour are at present exposed to gunfire from seaward, and could easily be bombarded by a submarine.

#### 10. Military Aspect.

Even if an enemy force were not to attempt an entrance to the harbour, there are several beaches, not far distant, on which troops and armoured fighting vehicles could be landed in boats and horse boats or motor landing craft

carried in a raider, and there does not seem to be much difficulty in the country inland from the beaches. It would therefore appear that a mobile defence force, well equipped with light automatic weapons is required to deal with them.

Although the beaches are good for landing, they also seem comparatively easy to defend if positions can be taken up in time, but, as there are too many for all to be permanently manned, the earliest information of an expected landing is essential and some communications system—possibly by rockets or Verey lights—between the local fishing boats (of which large numbers always seem to be about) and a coast watching organisation would help very materially in this area.

In general, St. John's is a difficult town to defend from landwards against any strength of determined enemy, especially if they are equipped with Armoured Fighting vessels, unless they can be "contained" on landing.

### 11. Conclusion

St. John's is the best equipped port in Newfoundland for use as a Naval base. As the only ice free port in Newfoundland, and the terminus of the railway, it has an important winter trade as the outlet of the mineral resources of the interior.

At present it is entirely undefended. It is most strongly recommended that it should be equipped as early as possible with one or two guns to defend the harbour and with an examination service.

...

131.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le commandant en chef, région de l'Amérique et des Indes Occidentales,  
à l'Amirauté*

*Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies, to Admiralty*

TELEGRAM 352

[America and West Indies Station,] August 8, 1940

Admiralty 352 repeated to Governor of Newfoundland [as No. 1316], Naval Headquarters Ottawa, from Commander in Chief, America and West Indies. Commanding Officer of H.M.S. *Caradoc* who has been investigating question of Newfoundland defences on instructions from Naval Headquarters, Ottawa, has handed me a copy of his report. This, together with information received from C.S.I. when he recently visited Halifax, on rapidity with which the Germans organized air bases in Norway, shows that deficiencies in Newfoundland defences are most serious. I am not conversant with what is being done to make these good, either by home or Dominion authorities but matters seem of such importance that H.M.S. *Caradoc*'s recommendations are forwarded.

Part one of my telegram No. 1316 August 8th.

Part two follows.



132.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le commandant en chef, région de l'Amérique et des Indes Occidentales,  
à l'Amirauté*

*Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies, to Admiralty*

TELEGRAM 352

[America and West Indies Station,] August 9, 1940

From Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies, Part 2 my telegram No. 1316 August 9th. [sic] These are briefly:

- (1) Examination Service and Battery required at St. John's.
- (2) Examination Service and Battery required at Botwood.
- (3) Organisation and regulations to prevent neutral and/or alien seamen etc. from landing from merchant vessels at Botwood, St. John's and Bell Island.
- (4) Removal of surplus aviation spirit from Botwood.
- (5) Organisation for quick destruction of railway and also oil and gasoline stocks at Lewisporte in event of alarm.
- (6) Organisation for destruction or defence of railway and uncompleted road foundation on neck of land joining Avalon Peninsula to Newfoundland.

I further suggest immediate formation of Newfoundland R.N.V.R. at the expense of the Home Government, and arming of Customs patrol vessels and other available craft.

Captain V. L. A. Campbell late Senior Naval Officer at Trinidad where a flourishing R.N.V.R. has been organised since the war began is now available in Newfoundland for any services required of him.

133.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 665

[London,] August 20, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram of August 15th, No. 531.<sup>1</sup> We recognise that owing to collapse of France position has altered since my telegram of May 10th, No. 276, Secret.<sup>2</sup> We would prefer, however, to postpone our observations on specific points mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief, America & West Indies, in his telegram No. 352, until we receive report to which he refers, with his comments. At this stage we need only to say that it is unlikely, in the present circumstances, it will be possible to provide assistance in material from United Kingdom resources.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Document 73.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

We are glad to learn of the visit of Canadian representatives to St. John's and should be grateful if you will keep us fully informed of progress of discussions.<sup>1</sup> With regard to possible financial commitments we assume that their attitude will be that set out in your telegram to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, repeated in your telegram of June 16th, No. 355.<sup>2</sup>

Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada No. 1844. Ends.

134.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*L'Amirauté au commandant en chef, région de l'Amérique et des Indes Occidentales*

*Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies*

TELEGRAM 557

[London,] August 22, 1940

Commander-in-Chief America and West Indies No. 557, repeated to Governor of Newfoundland, Naval Service Headquarters No. 590 from Admiralty. Recommendations in yours August 9th are noted and will be fully considered on receipt of information as to proposed action by Canadian authorities from Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa.

135.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le commandant en chef, région de l'Atlantique et des Indes Occidentales, à l'Amirauté*

*Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies, to Admiralty*

TELEGRAM 464

[America and West Indies Station,] August 25, 1940

Repeated to Governor of Newfoundland, from Commander-in-Chief, America & West Indies. Governor of Newfoundland's Telegram No. 552<sup>3</sup> to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Concur in desirability of Newfoundland local Naval defences being responsibility of R.C.N. but I hope that proportion of personnel required will be provided by Newfoundland. Also that if necessary R.N. Officers be loaned to assist R.C.N. in these duties observing that experienced R.C.N. Officers are very fully employed in their own heavy expansion.

At the risk of infringing on political and possibly financial questions consider Naval and Air bases in Newfoundland should be Canadian, United

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 171.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 108.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 171.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 108.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

States of America having right to use only. Case is different to West Indies, where United States of America object is direct defence of Canal Zone and Caribbean and leased Bases are reasonable. In Newfoundland case, while object is defence of United States of America, Canada, a First Class Power, lies between and should be responsible for defence of North East gateway on behalf of both parties. A third party assuming rights in Newfoundland will in my opinion, lead to endless trouble in years to come. Strongly urge leases of Bases in Newfoundland to United States of America be not granted if this can possibly be avoided and provided Canada can undertake to provide efficient Bases herself.

136.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*L'officier de marine canadien principal, Halifax, au premier officier de marine,  
St. John's*

*Senior Canadian Naval Officer, Halifax, to Naval Officer-in-Charge,  
St. John's*

TELEGRAM

Halifax, September 14, 1940

General Constantine, Commander Gow and Colonel Craig will be visiting Botwood and St. John's by air and rail early next week.

Commander Gow has been instructed to contact you regarding site for anti-torpedo baffle St. John's.

137.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve  
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 50

Ottawa, September 30, 1940

Arrangements are being made to move one Infantry (Rifle) Battalion to St. John's as soon as satisfactory temporary accommodation can be arranged in Memorial Hall or other suitable Building. It is not considered advisable to put troops under canvas.

It would be helpful if your officials would discuss the matter with Officer Commanding "W" Force and District Officer Commanding at Halifax to expedite investigation of the suitability and time available and cost of making ready temporary quarters pending the completion of arrangements for permanent hutments.

138.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 48

[St. John's,] October 1, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 50, Sept. 30th. St. John's has been exhaustively examined on several occasions for temporary accommodation for troops. Generals Elkins and Constantine and your and our engineers agree that only building suitable is Memorial University College (referred to in your message as Memorial Hall), which is now in session with 170 university students and 100 teachers in training. It is not a boarding establishment and educational authorities state that difficulties attendant upon obtaining alternative class accommodation, whilst great, would not be insuperable for a period of three months while buildings are being constructed. If your military advisers are satisfied that military necessity justifies such action, we will order evacuation of college. You should know, however that maximum accommodation is 500 according to report of your and our engineers. Two weeks will be required to prepare buildings after decision reached, and cost will be between three and four thousand dollars exclusive of cost of alternative accommodation and installation of equipment, which is difficult to estimate but will not be excessive.

139.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires,*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

[Boston,] October 2, 1940

. . .

*Action by Canadian Army*

C (a) Approval granted to send an additional infantry battalion to Newfoundland. Hutments now under construction in St. John's. One company of this battalion will proceed on or about 1st November, remainder of battalion on or about 7th December. Approval granted for the setting up in S./John's of an H.Q. Canadian Troops in Newfoundland. This will consist of a Brigadier with an augmented brigade staff.

C (b) Approval granted to install two 4.7 inch guns at S./John's and two at Botwood. The pedestals for these guns are now under construction at Sydney. Installation of these guns should be complete by end of December. It is intended to install two 10-inch guns at S./John's and two at Botwood when received from the United States.

. . .



140.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[Ottawa,] October 3, 1940

Your telegram of 1st October No. 48. Accommodation for troops.

Revised decision is not (repeat not) to use Memorial Hall or other temporary quarters but proceeding erection of permanent huts immediately, moving Rifle Battalion to St. John's (Newfoundland) by Companies independently as construction progresses.

141.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le quartier général de la Défense nationale au premier officier de marine,*  
*St. John's*

*National Defence Headquarters to Naval Officer in Charge, St. John's*

TELEGRAM<sup>1</sup>

Ottawa, October 31, 1940

1. It is intended to institute a Naval examination service at St. John's, Newfoundland, to commence functioning 1st. December, 1940.
2. Naval Officer-in-Charge, Halifax is requested to arrange for personnel in accordance with recommendations contained in his 501-8-1 of 7th. October, 1940.<sup>2</sup> Provision of Naval Signal ratings for examination batteries is not however approved.
3. H.M.C.S. *Ambler* when released from duty *vide* N.S.H. Ottawa 1421/30 (not to N.O.I.C. St. John's) is to proceed to St. John's and assume duties of examination vessel.
4. Naval Officer-in-Charge, Halifax, is requested to make recommendations regarding provision of relief examination vessels for St. John's, Newfoundland. In this connection examination service Canso will probably be discontinued December 5th. The establishment of a temporary Port War Signal Station in Cabot Tower is approved.
5. Signal ratings as watch keepers will be required.
6. Request N.O.I.C. St. John's, Newfoundland make all necessary arrangements for accommodation of personnel.
7. It is presumed that this action is in accordance with the wishes of Government of Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Ce télégramme fut également envoyé au premier officier de marine à Halifax et à Québec.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was also sent to Naval Officer in Charge in Halifax and in Quebec City.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

142.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 58

St. John's, November 6, 1940

SECRET. We were informed generally at meeting here with Minister for Air and his colleagues on August 20th<sup>1</sup> of your desire to establish advance naval bases at St. John's and Botwood and examination services connected therewith. This was noted in Minutes handed to your delegation. Subsequently our representative learnt from the Permanent Joint Defence Board that they intended recommending these establishments to your Government. You have probably overlooked the fact that the Canadian Government has not indicated to us their approval of these proposals, and you would no doubt wish to do so before steps are taken to bring them into effect. Naval Officer in Charge at St. John's has received telegram dated October 31st from Naval Headquarters, Ottawa, requesting him to take certain steps for institution of examination services at St. John's, which includes obtaining Government approval of plan for management of St. John's Harbour and provision for accommodation of personnel. Latter will call for expenditure on Naval Service account and probably some construction, particularly with regard to port war signal station. Telegram is silent on the question of provision of funds and technical assistance in construction. As Naval Service Headquarters looks for institution of this service by December 1st, situation should be clarified at an early date.

143.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Victoria, November 14, 1940

...  
*Action by the Canadian Navy*

Item C(d). Underwater defences of St. John's and Botwood are still in the survey and estimating stage. Examination Service is being established at St. John's commencing tomorrow, 15th November. Unless some serious action is taken by the enemy in the meantime, Examination Service will not be established at Botwood until the season opens in the spring of 1941. Investigation is being made into the matter of an operating base further north in the Strait of Belle Isle vicinity and, as only light naval craft are to be accommodated and no mercantile shipping, it is now intended to base the ships operating in the Belle Isle Strait on a mobile base ship which can shift, as required, from one bay to another thereby avoiding the extremely complicated defences of any one particular harbour with the attendant disadvantages of being tied to one harbour only.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 171.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 171.

...  
*Action by the Canadian Army*

- (a) The newly appointed Commanding Officer, Canadian Troops in Newfoundland, has now taken up his duties.
- (b) The accommodation for the Canadian Garrison in St. John's will be completed by 1st December. Elements of one Infantry Battalion have already arrived in St. John's.
- (c) Sites for the 4.7" and 10" armaments at St. John's and Botwood have been tentatively selected and survey parties are now completing their work.
- ...

144. 1156-D-39  
*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 9 Ottawa, November 20, 1940  
SECRET  
Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence relating to the defence of Newfoundland, I have the honour to outline below the naval projects which the Canadian Government proposes to undertake in order to carry out its obligation to provide for the protection of the Island.

<i>Place</i>	<i>Service</i>	<i>Proposals</i>
St. John's	Examination Service	Supply and man two examination vessels; Provide personnel for Examination Service ashore.
	Examination Battery	Sited at Fort Amherst. Military taking necessary action.
	Port War Signal Station	To be established primarily on Cabot Tower.
	Boom Defence	Provide Anti-torpedo baffle, removing present Anti-submarine net.
	Boom Defence Depot	Building a skidway near the Dry Dock and construct a storage building for winter repairs.
Botwood	Examination Service	Provide two small examination vessels, to be available opening of 1941 season.
	Examination Battery	To be sited at Phillips Head. Military are taking action.
	Port War Signal Station	To build P.W.S.S. at Wiseman Head during this winter.
	Boom Defence	To place an A/S net at entrance of Harbour.
	Boom Defence Depot	To build depot, wharf etc. at the site chosen inside Phillips Head.
	Accommodation	To construct various buildings, including administration building, depot workshop, quarters for personnel, wharf and boathouse, etc.

In addition to the projects outlined above, the Canadian military authorities are putting in fixed defences, consisting of a battery of two 6 inch guns in each port. This is in addition to the Examination Battery and sites for these guns were chosen during the recent combined Military and Naval reconnaissance.

I hope that the proposals outlined above will meet with your approval and that we may enjoy your co-operation in the steps necessary to carry them out.

I have etc.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

145.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH

St. John's, December 6, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 9 of November 20th in which you outline certain naval projects which the Canadian Government propose to undertake in this country.

These proposals meet with the approval of the Commission of Government, and the various Departments will extend to those entrusted with the carrying out of these projects the fullest co-operation.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

146.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 17, 1940

...

#### SECOND RECOMMENDATION

##### *Action by the Canadian Army*

(a) Accommodation for one Infantry Battalion at St. John's, Newfoundland, now complete. About 775 men of the Battalion posted to St. John's have now arrived.

(b) Arrangements proceeding regarding installation of Coast Defences at St. John's and Botwood.

...

##### *Action by the Canadian Navy*

(d) St. John's. Examination Service is in operation. Nets for A/T baffle



will be on the spot by the 23rd of December but will not be placed in water until spring, due to ice conditions.

Botwood. Plans in advanced state. Gear is expected to be in position to lay as soon as ice goes out in the spring and Examination Service will be installed with opening of navigation.

Belle Isle Area. Mobile base ship has been selected and will be ready for use by early July when ice conditions allow for operations in this area.

...

147.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 3

St. John's, January 7, 1941

SECRET. Consultations with G.O.C. at St. John's and Naval Officer in Charge during the past few days have brought sharply into relief dangerous position of shipping which exists in St. John's Harbour, and we feel it our duty to advise the Canadian Government of the facts.

On December 26th there were 46 merchant ships in the harbour, aggregating 118,948 tons. Today there are 39 ships of 92,615 tons. Most of these ships need repair due to heavy weather, enemy action and machinery defects, and others are loading and discharging. With limited repair facilities available, and notwithstanding every effort, the ships that sail are being constantly replaced by new arrivals, and during the winter months it is expected that approximately 100,000 tons of shipping will be daily in this port and open to destruction with impunity by a raider.

Botwood is closed by ice and paper shipments are being loaded here.

The only gun defence consists of two 75 mm. French guns on field mountings.

The Canadian aircraft at the airport could not, even in clear weather, arrive under an hour and a quarter, during which time the congestion of shipping could be subjected to unopposed shell fire.

53rd Battalion of Canadian unit assisted by our local militia is stationed in the city to counter a landing party and an American infantry battalion is due shortly.

We understand that it is advised that two 4.7 guns are to be mounted on Signal Hill, and two 10 inch guns at Spearhead in the course of time, and G.O.C. has urged you that these defences be rushed.

Under the circumstances we suggest for consideration, and in this the G.O.C. concurs, the immediate provision of two modern 6 inch guns. We feel that less than this provision is inviting disaster to large volume of shipping.

148.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 3

Ottawa, January 10, 1941

SECRET. With reference to your telegram of the 7th January, 1941, No. 3. Arrangements are being made to complete installation of two 4.7 inch guns at St. John's on temporary platform by the end of February. The two 10 inch guns will be installed by the end of June.

Unfortunately no modern 6 inch guns are available, but it is possible that the United States Army may be able to take some mobile 6 inch armament with them to St. John's which will provide additional security until the 10 inch guns are mounted.

We recognize the importance of the considerations outlined in your telegram and would be glad to hasten the provision of adequate defences if that were possible. The present programme, however, is the utmost that can be promised in the light of existing conditions.

149.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CIRCULAR M. 8

London, January 17, 1941

SECRET. Newfoundland No. 45, Secret. We have had under consideration the question of providing some form of fixed defences for relatively isolated ports throughout the Empire which are of some commercial or other importance, but for which it has not hitherto been possible to provide defences, and which have not been included in category of Defended Ports. It is thought that a certain number of such places may form attractive targets for enemy raiders for destruction of trade facilities, or of shipping found in port. With our present lack of cruisers we cannot hold out any hopes of German surface raiders, which are known to be operating at the moment, being rounded up in their entirety in the near future, while the greater becomes the efficiency of our measures for protection of shipping at sea, the greater also becomes the temptation for raiders to attack our trade ports.

It is moreover considered that to a raider, far from its nearest base, a relatively low scale of defence should prove an effective deterrent. On the other hand, our available resources of guns which could be mounted for the purpose are very limited, and we have to take into full account, in assessing claims of individual ports overseas, necessity for maintaining the highest possible scale of defences [against?] threat of German invasion of the United Kingdom.

As Dominion Governments are aware, programme of modernization of defended ports overseas is under constant review, and claims of each major port are taken into careful account and are being met as production permits. It should be emphasized that the present review is confined to minor ports for which no fixed defences have yet been provided at all.

It is, however, suggested that the Dominion Governments should consider whether in their reinforcements of defence areas there are any such places which appear to them to be in urgent need of defence, and whether if guns were provided that[sic] arrangements for mounting could be made and personnel be found and trained to man them. Any recommendations which may result would be taken into most careful consideration, though so far as the supply of guns from United Kingdom supplies is concerned, we should have to bear in mind claims of other places in the Empire, including of course the defence of the United Kingdom itself.

150.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, January 20, 1941

...

*Action by the Canadian Army*

(a) Surveys of the St. John's and Botwood areas have been completed and sites selected for the proposed 4.7-inch and 10-inch batteries at each of these points.

(b) The 4.7-inch battery at St. John's will be installed on temporary platforms by the end of February, 1941, the 4.7-inch battery at Botwood by the end of March.

(c) The 10-inch equipment for St. John's will be mounted by the end of June, 1941, and that for Botwood slightly later.

...

151.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

516K/38

Ottawa, January 21, 1941

My dear Dr. Skelton,

May I refer to telegram circular M.8 of the 17th January from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs

regarding the question of providing some form of fixed defences for relatively isolated ports throughout the Empire which are of some commercial or other importance.

I have received a telegram from Lord Cranborne asking me to inform the Canadian Government that in the course of their examination of this question the United Kingdom authorities have felt that St. John's, Botwood and Bell Island in Newfoundland are of particular importance and should be given if possible a relatively high order of priority though, as indicated in telegram M.8, the number of guns likely to be available will be very limited. Lord Cranborne states that in this connection he has received a telegram from the Governor of Newfoundland reporting that, on the recommendation of the General Officer Commanding and the Naval Officer in Charge, the Newfoundland authorities have asked the Canadian authorities to provide two modern 6 inch guns at the earliest possible moment for the defence of St. John's and Botwood harbours. The United Kingdom authorities would be glad to know whether they may assume that on considering telegram M.8 the Canadian Government will take into account the needs of Newfoundland and make their recommendations accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

152.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 24

Ottawa, February 16, 1941

SECRET. Your secret circular telegram M.8, January 17, 1941. St. John's is provided with two 75 mm. guns, and two 4.7" Coast Defence guns and it is expected that a battery of two 10" counter-bombardment guns will be completed by June. It has also been learned that United States authorities are sending the following guns to St. John's: four 155 mm. mobile guns; four 3" A.A. guns; a number of light A.A. guns; all with ample supply of ammunition.

The Canadian Government therefore feel that further defences for the port of St. John's are not required.

Other Newfoundland defences are as follows:

Botwood: preparations being made to complete by late summer installation of one 4.7" battery and one 10" battery similar to those at St. John's.

Bell Island: two 4.7" Coast Defence guns have been in action for several months.



153.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 8, 1941

My dear Prime Minister,

I have just been informed by telegraph by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that a telegram in the following terms has been addressed to the Governor of Newfoundland.

The Prime Minister has received a message from President Roosevelt, stating that he was concerned at the possibility of raids by surface naval vessels against Newfoundland which might, in addition to local damage, adversely affect the construction of the United States bases. He was therefore proposing to send United States forces to St. John's on a transport leaving New York on the 18th April, arriving at St. John's on the 20th April. The forces consist of a half battery of 8 inch guns, to be mounted at St. John's, one squadron of three medium and three heavy bomber aeroplanes, 57 officers and 575 men. The United States Government propose to discuss the despatch of these forces to Newfoundland informally with the Canadian authorities and to consult with their officers at St. John's as to the mounting of the 8 inch guns there. It is added that the aeroplanes will occupy the quarters constructed for their use by the Canadian Government.

The Prime Minister considers that the action proposed is to be welcomed as affording valuable security to the island and has informed President Roosevelt that he agrees.

Lord Cranborne adds that the United Kingdom Government recognise that the Canadian Government have assumed certain responsibilities with regard to the defence of Newfoundland. At the same time it is clearly of the highest importance that the Canadian military authorities in Newfoundland should work in close consultation with the Newfoundland Government with regard to the arrangements which are now contemplated, and I have been asked to invite the Canadian Government urgently to take the necessary steps to ensure this.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

154.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, April 9, 1941

...

## DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND—ADDITIONAL U.S. ASSISTANCE

31. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR read a letter from the U.K. High Commissioner to the Prime Minister reporting that the Prime

Minister of the United Kingdom had received a message from the President of the United States stating that he was concerned at the possibility of raids by surface naval vessels against Newfoundland, and, therefore, proposed to send U.S. forces to St. John's in the near future. These forces would consist of a half battery of 8" guns, and one squadron of three medium and three heavy bomber aeroplanes, in all 57 officers and 575 men. Mr. Churchill had informed Mr. Roosevelt of his agreement to the proposal and the U.K. government invited the Canadian government to take the necessary steps to assure appropriate arrangements being made in Newfoundland.

(See letter of April 8th, 1941, from the U.K. High Commissioner, to the Prime Minister.)

32. MR. POWER stated that, so far as air personnel and equipment were concerned, the necessary steps for the reception of U.S. forces were being taken. A request had already been made, in accordance with the Permanent Joint Board's recommendation that a U.S. fighter squadron be despatched to the Newfoundland Airport. This was not the force mentioned in Mr. MacDonald's communication, though the bombers would be welcome.

It was strange that there had been no direct approach by the U.S. government with regard to the forces mentioned by Mr. Roosevelt. The Permanent Joint Board had been quite unaware of the President's proposals in this respect.

33. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE stated that he was without information as to the additional artillery for St. John's, mentioned in Mr. Roosevelt's message, and was doubtful when mountings could be made available. It would be helpful if Brigadier Stuart, Vice-Chief of the General Staff, could attend the meeting.

34. THE VICE-CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, who entered the meeting some minutes later, at the Committee's request, said that until now, he had not heard of the proposed U.S. additions to Newfoundland defence. The present situation with respect to artillery protection for St. John's was as follows:

4 6" guns were in position, supplied and manned by the United States; Under recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 2 4.7" guns, supplied and manned by Canada would be mounted by June the 15th; and 2 10" guns, to be supplied by the U.S. and mounted and manned by Canada, would be mounted by July the 15th.

It was not possible for him to say, offhand, how long it would require to mount the 8" guns which the President had now proposed to send. It was doubtful if this could be accomplished by June the 20th.

...

155.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister of National Defence for Naval Services*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, April 9, 1941

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

I am enclosing, for your information, copy of a most secret letter of April 8th from the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister, regarding certain steps the United States Government propose to take within the next fortnight to strengthen the United States coast defences and Air Force stationed at St. John's, Newfoundland, against the risk of raids by surface naval vessels.

I might add, with reference to the general question of Atlantic coast defences, that the Prime Minister has received this morning a personal message from Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, advising him that "as long as there is a danger of our convoys from Halifax to the United Kingdom being attacked by powerful enemy ships, it will be necessary to escort these convoys by a capital ship, and that one of the capital ships used for escort duties will nearly always be in a Canadian port".

Your sincerely,

[NORMAN A. ROBERTSON]

156.

1156-D-39

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>  
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>  
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] April 10, 1941

With reference to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's most secret letter of April 8th, regarding the reinforcements in aircraft and coast defence artillery which the United States propose to despatch to Newfoundland next week, I am enclosing, for your information, copy of a secret telegram of April 9th<sup>2</sup> from Brigadier Letson, our Military Attaché in Washington, to National Defence Headquarters, giving further particulars of the United States reinforcements. From discussions with National Defence officials, it seems clear

<sup>1</sup> N. A. Robertson.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

that the President has taken a personal initiative in this matter, which normally would have been handled through the Permanent Joint Defence Board.

Brigadier Letson's telegram states that the reconnaissance squadron of 6 B 18's despatched to the Newfoundland airport will be accompanied by 52 officers and 415 other ranks. This is a much heavier complement of officers and men than would normally be attached to such a squadron. The most probable inference from the size of the detachment is that the President regards the despatch of this bomber squadron not only as an immediate reinforcement of Newfoundland coast defences, but as a transit stage in plans for ultimately flying American service planes to Europe by the northern route.

157.

King Papers C287991

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale au Premier ministre*

*Minister of National Defence to Prime Minister*

Ottawa, April 11, 1941

Dear Mr. King,

I had a brief memorandum prepared by Brigadier Stuart<sup>1</sup> for your information regarding additional equipment and personnel for Newfoundland, as proposed by the President in his wire to Mr. Churchill which was quoted in Mr. MacDonald's letter of April 8th.

You will note Brigadier Stuart's comments under each of the additional items proposed by the President. You will also note Brigadier Stuart's memorandum of April 9th.<sup>1</sup>

I have only one thing further to add—the information from our Military Attaché at Washington is even the war plans division in Washington knew nothing about this sudden decision by the President.

What strikes one is that it might be conveyed to the President somehow or other that we are not just non-contributing partners in the Newfoundland situation. We are vitally concerned, and we took the initiative and the early effective steps in this business. Consequently, we ought not to be regarded as unreasonable if we suggest there might be consultation with us before a decision is arrived at, or at least, before direct communications are sent to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The Joint Defence Board provides such an excellent and instant means of collaboration that it seems almost elementary to suggest that it be used. Otherwise, there is bound to be confusion and over-lapping between *ad hoc* and sudden measures taken by the President and the plans worked out by the Board and being put in effect by the plans divisions of the United States and Canadian staffs pursuant thereto.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



I was sorry indeed that you felt the situation was such that you had to rob yourself of a much needed change of surroundings, but I do trust that over the weekend you may find it possible to start on your visit.

I don't think anything more important could be done on this side of the Atlantic at the moment than to have the President and yourself sit down together and talk matters over as only you two can.

With kindest regards,

Yours very truly,

J. L. RALSTON

158.

1156-D-39

*Le quartier général de la Défense nationale au premier officier  
de marine, St. John's*

*National Defence Headquarters to Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, April 15, 1941

Please transmit following message to Honourable C. G. Gibson, Canadian Minister of National Revenue for his information. Begins. Following is summary of proposed naval developments by R.C.N. in Newfoundland:

St. John's Port war signal station. W/T Station. A/T nets. Boom defence building. Examination Service of two ships. Necessary office accommodation. Imperial Oil Company constructing 30,000 barrel fuel tank which will be available for naval purposes.

Botwood Port war signal station. Floating base ship (Now under construction to be ready by end of year. In meantime temporary arrangements will be made for small supply ship etc.). Special defences consisting of underwater and surface detecting apparatus but no A/T or A/S nets.

Examination Service. One ship. Limited shore accommodation and office space for C.X.O. and staff and small storehouse. One 20,000 BBL. fuel tank, location not yet selected.

Probable Disposition of H.M.C. Vessels

Five corvettes based either on St. John's or Botwood as N.F. patrol force. One M/S and 1 coil skid M/S based St. John's. One M/S based Botwood 4 Fairmiles based St. John's, four based Botwood, and four based on Red Bay or harbour in this vicinity for Belle Isle patrol. A base ship for Belle Isle patrol being constructed but will not be ready till spring 1942. Belle Isle patrol may be reinforced by corvettes if available. Above ships will be provided as and when they become available. Disposition of larger units (destroyers etc.) cannot be forecast and must depend on strategic situation but policy is to provide facilities as far as possible so that bases will be ready to accommodate any larger units.

159.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 16, 1941

. . .

7. Mr. Hickerson explained to the Board the sequence of events which led to the decision of the United States Government to send immediately 2—8 inch guns and 6 medium bombardment planes to supplement the defences of Newfoundland. He pointed out that in the correspondence between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt it was made clear that the action that was taken was to be co-ordinated with the activities of, and carried out in consultation with, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

. . .

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 16, 1941

. . .

SECOND RECOMMENDATION

*Action by United States Army*

(a) The defence of Newfoundland will be improved by the decision to reinforce the United States Newfoundland garrison by one half battery of 8-inch guns and one bombardment squadron consisting of six medium bombardment aeroplanes. . . Sufficient aviation personnel is being provided to permit the replacement of the B-18 aeroplanes by a full squadron of B-17 bombers if this becomes necessary. . .

(b) It has been suggested that all details should be arranged, as regards Newfoundland, by the United States of America-Canadian Defence Board informing the Government of Newfoundland.

(c) A United States Army Air Corps officer (Major Abbey) conferred with Canadian Air Force officers at Ottawa and worked out numerous details regarding housing and technical facilities being provided at the Newfoundland Airport for United States Army Air Corps. Similar procedure is contemplated in future.

. . .

(e) The signing of the Lease Agreement for the bases and its Protocol on March 27, 1941 clarifies the status of United States forces in Newfoundland, both within and without the base areas. The air squadron being sent to Newfoundland Airport proceeds under agreement concluded in pursuance to Article XIX of the Lease.

. . .

160.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures au haut  
commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
of Great Britain*

MOST SECRET

Ottawa, April 19, 1941

My dear Mr. MacDonald,

The Prime Minister very much appreciated your informing him in your letter of April 8 of the steps which are being taken by the United States to strengthen the defences of Newfoundland. The Canadian forces there will of course co-operate fully in making arrangements for the reception of the United States advance party.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

SOUS-SECTION iv/SUB-SECTION iv

LES CONFÉRENCES/CONFERENCES

161.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM<sup>1</sup>

[St. John's,] June 23, 1940

SECRET. You are already aware of the contents of our telegram No. 374<sup>2</sup> secret to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and his reply No. 469<sup>3</sup> secret, in reference to the position of the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Emerson leaves tonight for Ottawa to confer with the appropriate Ministers there on this question. You are also aware of the arrival in Newfoundland of Canadian troops and aeroplanes. It is possible that this may be merely the forerunner of further defence measures by the Canadian Government. It is desirable that the whole question of the defence of Newfoundland should if possible now be considered, but if this is not practicable then such problems as are likely to arise might be discussed. I shall be grateful if you will make arrangements for Emerson to see the appropriate Ministers as soon as possible after his arrival and for such other assistance as you are able to give him.

<sup>1</sup> Ce télégramme fut répété au secrétaire  
aux Dominions.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to Dominions  
Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

162.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence to Commission of  
Government of Newfoundland*

J.24(a) '40

[St. John's,] July 9, 1940

## CONFIDENTIAL

During my recent visit to Ottawa I discussed with the Minister for National Defence, Colonel Ralston, and with various other military, naval and air chiefs the general question of the defence of Newfoundland as part of the defence of British North America. It seems to be generally accepted that if an expedition were sent to this side of the Atlantic an effort would be made to establish an enemy base on this Island.

The question of the defence naturally comes for consideration under four headings:

- (a) The plan.
- (b) The provision of material and personnel.
- (c) The command.
- (d) Newfoundland's contribution.

2. In regard to a plan of defence, if any exists, then it is being kept extremely secret. I frankly do not believe that the Island has been studied with a view to laying down a definite scheme as to the nature of the defences which should be established. If this Island is to be attacked it will require coastal defences, naval ships, aeroplanes and a certain number of military forces. I could obtain no statement as to any proposals for the establishment of any of these forms of defence. This is probably due to the existence of two factors:

- (1) The collapse in France was not anticipated and came with great suddenness. The necessity for the reorganization of the Canadian Government and of Canadian industry to meet the new demands, together with such problems as conscription in Canada, has so occupied the attention of all senior officials, that there has not been time since it was realized that France's collapse was to be total to consider a plan for the fortification of the Eastern seaboard.
- (2) The second factor is that they do not know in Canada how far they may look to the British Navy for assistance in cases of serious emergency arising.

3. When it comes to the provision of materials the situation is alarming. Everything which Canada can possibly spare has been very properly sent to the United Kingdom. There are many important items, such as artillery and aeroplanes, which are not manufactured in Canada and which will not be manufactured for some time. Even rifles are impossible to obtain. Efforts are being made to obtain supplies in the United States, but here again they are



facing difficulty, because of the priority which must of necessity be given to orders from the United Kingdom and it is anticipated that the arming of the Forces of the United States for their own defence will cause further delays in this respect. I pointed out however, and it is agreed, that it is from Canada and the United States that material for the defence of Newfoundland must come, as we cannot look to the United Kingdom for these supplies.

4. I discussed with these officials the question of the continuation of the enlargement and training of the Newfoundland Militia. I pointed out that in view of the arrival of Canadian Forces at the Newfoundland Airport<sup>1</sup> we had to consider the rather weak position of having two military forces within the country under separate commands. I expressed the opinion that the command should be unified and that Canada should form a military district in Newfoundland and enlist men here in the non-permanent militia on the same basis as those enlisted in Canada, with the idea of ultimately forming a Newfoundland Regiment commanded as far as possible by its own officers. This appealed to the Military Officers but Colonel Ralston was inclined to believe that there might be political difficulties in the way. He is asking Colonel Blackader to make a report to him on the efficiency of our Recruiting Division to see whether it would be necessary to establish a Canadian Recruiting office here, if the proposal were ultimately accepted. I expect to be seeing him within a few days and will arrange that his report be expedited and when it is going forward I will write Colonel Ralston again on this subject.

5. My colleagues will remember that in the course of the exchange of telegrams with the Secretary of State for External Affairs at Ottawa in reference to their proposal to defend the Botwood Airport and Seaplane Base reference was made to the share which we could assume of the financial burden and in our telegram of June 16th<sup>2</sup> we accepted in principle the responsibility for some share which we stated must necessarily be small. In the course of my discussions about the general defence problem I stated that we would expect to be called upon to bear some financial burden but that this share must necessarily be small and that it could not be proportioned to the extent of the defences now increased if the defences were added to from time to time. This point was appreciated. Canada is definitely interested, as one would naturally expect, in our making some offer of a financial contribution and Colonel Ralston, who was when I left still Minister for Finance as well as for Defence, asked me if I would take this matter up at an early date after my return to Newfoundland.

6. After giving consideration to these matters I have come to the conclusion for the present that we cannot do better than proceed to bring our Militia up to the strength of say 500. I discussed with the Department of Militia whether we could expedite our training by sending 100 men at a time to the Airport where there is a substantial supply of Officers and N.C.O.'s. Colonel

<sup>1</sup> L'aéroport de Gander.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 108.

<sup>1</sup> Gander Airport.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 108.

Ralston accepted this proposal in principle and subject to Colonel Blackader's views this matter is agreed. I will discuss it with the latter in the course of a few days.

7. In the meantime I have taken over a field to the north-west of the Christian Brothers Monastery on Newtown Road, which I think is the best site in St. John's for training. It is a large field, well fenced and overlooked only on one end by private houses. There is ample space for a large number of tents or huts and room to drill and manœuvre as well. My present arrangement with the President of St. Bonaventure's College, Brother O'Connell, is that we shall not be liable for any rent but shall compensate them for any damage done to the field.

L. E. EMERSON

163.

DND HQS 7410

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
au ministre de la Défense nationale*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence to Minister of National Defence*

St. John's, July 19, 1940

Dear Colonel Ralston,

I have deferred writing you since my return from Ottawa as I wished first of all to visit the Airport, and since my return from there certain action to which I shall refer in a moment, has been taken by your Government, upon which I wished to report to you. I will deal first of all with the matters which we discussed during my visit to you.

*Defence of Newfoundland generally.* I discussed this matter with you and certain of the military officers of your Department in Ottawa, on the basis that the defence of Newfoundland had now become part and parcel of a co-ordinated strategy involving either the three countries, Canada, the United States, and Newfoundland in a continental scheme, or the two Governments, that of Canada and of Newfoundland in a scheme for the protection of British North America. You agreed to give consideration to my proposal that the general command of strategy should be centered at Ottawa and as a corollary some form of unification within Newfoundland of the Canadian and Newfoundland military forces. The extent to which the United States will participate in this general plan had necessarily to be left in abeyance pending diplomatic exchanges which were progressing during the months of June and early July.

Since my return Colonel Blackader has, I understand made a report<sup>1</sup> at some length on the general military situation. A Flight-Lieutenant, Price in a seaplane arrived here a couple of days ago and is I understand flying over

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

various portions of the Southeast and South coasts, with a view to reporting to his superiors upon their character and availability, should a decision be reached that a seaplane base should be established in Newfoundland. As I write we are expecting H.M.S. *Caradoc* whose Commander will confer on the question of the establishment of an advance naval base in Newfoundland, and possibly on the matter of coastal defences.

So far our contribution to this activity has been merely to place at the disposal of your visiting officials such services and amenities as we have at our disposal and I need hardly assure you that you will find, once the plans have been made, there will be full co-operation on the part of all Departments of this Government.

When I saw Colonel Blackader he had received instructions from you to discuss with me the question of the recruiting of Newfoundlanders into the Canadian non-permanent Militia. It is his duty to report to you on the characteristics of our present Recruiting Division so that you may decide whether it would be necessary to set up a separate Canadian recruiting establishment in this country. The M.O. of the Black Watch is to visit St. John's in the near future and report to Colonel Blackader on this aspect of the matter, and doubtless I shall hear from you when you have studied this report and considered the political implications.

I also discussed with Colonel Blackader the question of extending to me facilities for the training of 100 men at the Airport. I found him most anxious to assist. Unfortunately there are two difficulties. In the first place he is very short of Officers and N.C.O's. If my memory serves me right he is 8 Officers and 12 N.C.O's short, and his difficulties in managing under these conditions are increased by having his force divided and by there being a number of recruits included in the other ranks. Furthermore he tells me that his supply of ammunition is not more than sufficient for his own needs. Under all these circumstances however, and in spite of the strain upon his Officers he very kindly offered to take 50 men at a time from me, subject of course to your approval, and I believe he has so reported.

I recognize of course the great difficulty which you, in common with other countries are suffering, at the present time, through lack of personnel and supplies, but if it is at all possible to relieve Colonel Blackader's present distressed condition in regard to personnel, I hope that you will see that it is done. With his divided forces and his shortage of Officers and N.C.O.'s his cadre is under very great strain. Furthermore if he could be assisted by bringing his Officers and N.C.O's up to strength, he would be in a position to materially help in the training of our Militia.

While on this point I feel that I cannot but again refer to my present condition in regard to rifles, machine guns and ammunition. It not only affects the question of defence but also hampers training. At the earliest possible moment I really must have 500 rifles and 150,000 rounds of .303. I hope you will bear this in mind and give the order for their release either in whole or in part as soon as you possibly can. The lack of ammunition is very serious

because machine guns, as you know are extremely wasteful and at the present moment the limits which have to be placed upon training with these guns, have to be very strict.

Whilst I was at the Airport I was a little alarmed that no progress had been yet made with the building of the semi-permanent quarters. I had with me Sir Wilfrid W. Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities who has had great experience with difficulties of doing this kind of work in this country. In the interest of your troops I do hope that an early start will be made with this work, as otherwise they are going to find themselves under canvas in a very exposed spot when the cold weather comes on them.

Another matter which came up in the course of conversation with Colonel Blackader was the question of something in the nature of a Y.M.C.A. building for the troops. You will remember that I expressed certain fears on this subject when I was discussing it with you at Ottawa, and I find that he has arrived at the same conclusion independently. The need at Botwood is not so great—they are living in a settlement of some size and a highroad and railway give them communication with Bishops Falls and Grand Falls which are also populous. At the Airport there is absolutely nothing. At the present moment a few of the men who are sufficiently keen, get a little bit of trout fishing. The Airport authorities have some connection with a moving picture circuit and can have shows a few times a week, but the seating capacity of the room which they use is quite inadequate for the purposes which I envisage. I beg to support therefore (although perhaps I am trespassing upon matters which are not my immediate concern) the recommendation which I understand Colonel Blackader is making on this point.

I do not know that I can usefully add anything to this rather lengthy letter, but I feel that you are entitled to have a general survey of the present situation at the earliest possible moment. I will write you again when matters develop.

Yours sincerely,

L. E. EMERSON

164.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Mémorandum du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense*

*Memorandum by Commissioner for Justice and Defence*

[St. John's, July 21, 1940]

On the evening of July 20th Col. J. L. Ralston, Minister for National Defence at Ottawa telephoned me and informed me that Major-General Anderson, who heretofore had been Chief of the General Staff, had been appointed Inspector General of the Forces, and he proposed making a tour immediately of Eastern Canada and Newfoundland. Colonel Ralston wished to make an announcement that this tour was about to take place, but did not



wish to include Newfoundland in the announcement without obtaining our previous approval. I consented to his doing this and General Anderson will arrive here within the course of the next fortnight, informing us a little time before of the probable date of his arrival.

L. E. EMERSON

165.

DND HQS 7410

*Le commandant, 1<sup>er</sup> bataillon du Black Watch, au ministère  
de la Défense nationale*

*Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, Black Watch, to Department  
of National Defence*

TELEGRAM

[St. John's,] July 22, 1940

MOST SECRET. From short conversation with Governor Sunday he appears most anxious that Canada's Defence Policy as it concerns Newfoundland should be defined as soon as possible. Do not wish to overstep my duties but consider matter important enough to warrant this.

BLACKADER

166.

DND HQS 7410

*Mémoire du chef d'état-major général au ministre de la Défense  
nationale*

*Memorandum from Chief of General Staff to Minister of National Defence*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 27, 1940

1. Please see the attached report of the D.M.O. & I. with reference to the points raised in your memorandum of 25th July.<sup>1</sup>

2. With regard to item (c) of the memorandum of the D.M.O. & I., I concur in his opinion that we should let the Newfoundland Government have rifles and ammunition and, if the correspondence may be returned to me, I will take up with the M.G.O. the question as to how these can best be provided.

3. I will also take action to see that there is an amelioration of conditions before The Black Watch are relieved by the Queen's Own.

H. D. G. CRERAR  
Major-General

<sup>1</sup> Le mémorandum du ministre (25 juillet) reprenait en substance la lettre de Sir Edward Emerson en date 19 Juillet.

<sup>1</sup> The minister's memorandum (July 25) reproduced the substance of Sir Edward Emerson's letter of July 19.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum du directeur des opérations militaires et des renseignements  
au chef d'état-major général*

*Memorandum from Director of Military Operations and Intelligence to  
Chief of General Staff*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 26, 1940

1. Reference the attached Minute<sup>1</sup> from the Minister, the following remarks are submitted:

(a) *Shortage of Officers and N.C.Os*

Certain Black Watch officers and N.C.Os. are at present on courses in England. O.C. Black Watch recently asked for 8 officer reinforcements to be despatched. No action has been taken in view of the proposal to release the Black Watch on about the 9th August.

(b) *Shortage of Ammunition*

Approximately 295,000 rounds of S.A.A. were despatched with Black Watch to Newfoundland. This, in addition to providing equipment ammunition for Battalion, also provided a reserve of approximately 150,000 rounds. It was not the intention that any of this ammunition should be for the Newfoundland Government. O.C. Black Watch recently requested additional ammunition to carry out certain small arms practices. Information has been requested as to the amount he requires.

(c) *Newfoundland's request for rifles, machine guns and ammunition*

The number of Machine Guns, both Vickers and Light Automatic, which we have are hardly sufficient to meet our operational and training requirements. While we have not a superabundance of rifles and small arms ammunition at the present time, I am of the opinion we should let the Newfoundland Government have 500 rifles and 150,000 rounds of ammunition in order that they may make some effort to assist in the defence of Newfoundland.

(d) *Construction Quarters at Airport*

D.E.S. informs me that money has now been provided and arrangements made for the necessary material to be purchased through the Newfoundland Purchasing Agent. Necessary instructions have been issued for the work to proceed as quickly as possible.

(e) *Recreational facilities*

A member of the Auxiliary Services has now joined Force "W" in Newfoundland. I have asked A.G. branch to take action regarding recreational buildings for which D.E.S. informs me funds are available.

J. C. MURCHIE  
Colonel

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

167.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire particulier du gouverneur au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Private Secretary, Government House, to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[St. John's,] July 27, 1940

General Anderson reported due to arrive St. John's 11 a.m. tomorrow, Sunday, from Airport. May stay overnight or longer. Bethel<sup>1</sup> arrives Monday evening for 24 hours. Suggest you may wish to come in by train leaving Black Duck<sup>2</sup> tomorrow, Sunday, and leaving St. John's again Tuesday, July 30th. Please telegraph if you are coming.

CAPTAIN SCHWERDT

168.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve à son secrétaire particulier*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Private Secretary, Government House*

TELEGRAM

Black Duck, July 28, 1940

Am not returning. Was not advised of Anderson's arrival and as no decision can be taken without my authority please try and arrange he meet me Corner Brook Monday Tuesday or Wednesday preferably latter. Reply Black Duck.

169.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire particulier du gouverneur au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Private Secretary, Government House, to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[St. John's,] July 28, 1940

General very much regrets short notice and inability to meet you at Corner Brook. Am attending meeting tomorrow at which am informed no decisions will be taken<sup>3</sup> and after which General must return direct to Halifax.

CAPTAIN SCHWERDT

<sup>1</sup> Commandant du H.M.S. *Caradoc*.

<sup>2</sup> Village situé à une dizaine de milles de Stephenville.

<sup>3</sup> Le major-général Anderson, les commissaires Emerson et Woods, et leurs conseillers se rencontrèrent le 29 juillet. Voir le document 837.

<sup>1</sup> Commanding Officer of H.M.S. *Caradoc*.

<sup>2</sup> Village located some ten miles from Stephenville.

<sup>3</sup> Major-General Anderson met Commissioners Emerson and Woods, with advisers on July 29. See Document 837.

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 7, 1940

. . .

## NORTH ATLANTIC DEFENCE—NEWFOUNDLAND

13. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR said that he proposed shortly to visit Newfoundland with the objects of:

- (1) Surveying the requirements for the defence of Botwood and the Newfoundland airport, particularly with reference to what would be required in the way of accommodation for aircraft and possible U.S. forces in that area. This followed upon staff talks with American authorities<sup>1</sup>. It was estimated that an expenditure of over \$1,000,000 would be required to provide facilities for joint defensive purposes, in the event of attack.
- (2) Completing a general defensive survey of the Atlantic area. It would be necessary in this connection for him to confer with the Newfoundland government.

14. THE PRIME MINISTER observed that the three Defence Ministers should, so far as possible, acquaint themselves personally with actual problems of Atlantic defence.

It was important that the U.S. government be kept informed of what was being done in these respects and also that the U.K. government should be informed of Mr. Power's proposed trip to Newfoundland. Dr. Skelton would get in touch with Mr. Power and work out what might be required in the way of messages to the two governments.

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<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 86.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 86.



171.

1156-D-39

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à St. John's pour discuter  
des questions bilatérales de défense*

*Minutes of Meeting at St. John's to Discuss Bilateral Defence Questions*

St. John's, August 20, 1940

Present:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| His Excellency the Governor. <sup>1</sup>   | Hon. L. W. Emerson, K.C.,<br>Commissioner for Defence. <sup>3</sup> |
| Hon. C. G. Power, Minister of<br>National Defence for Air. <sup>2</sup>                     | Sir Wilfrid W. Woods,<br>Commissioner for Public Utilities.         |
| Air Vice-Marshal Breadner,<br>D.S.C., Chief of the Air Staff.                               | Hon. J. H. Penson,<br>Commissioner for Finance.                     |
| Major-General Elkins, C.B.E., D.S.O.<br>General Officer Commanding the<br>Maritime Command. | Capt. C. M. R. Schwerdt,<br>R.N., C.V.O.                            |
| Commodore R. E. Reid, R.C.N.  | Lieut. Colonel W. Rendell.  |
| Air Commodore Anderson.   | Mr. G. B. Summers, K.C.,<br>Secretary for Justice.                  |
| Squadron-Leader Stewart.  |   |

His Excellency the Governor offered a welcome to the Canadian delegation and expressed on behalf of the Commission of Government and of the Newfoundland people, his assurance that every co-operation would be given to Canada in carrying out any proposals for the defence of North America. He expressed appreciation of what Canada had already done for the defence of Newfoundland, and asked if the Hon. Mr. Power would then state what was now sought to be done by Newfoundland.

The Hon. Mr. Power stated that what was required was for Newfoundland to help Canada and Canada to help Newfoundland. It was to be understood that there would be no encroachment whatever on the autonomous rights of Newfoundland. He asked if the principle could be admitted that Canada should be in charge of Newfoundland defences without any modification. Mr. Emerson replied that the question in that broad form could not be answered "yes" or "no". There might be some modifications and it would be necessary for the Government to consider just what these might be.

1. *Command of Forces in Newfoundland.* It was made clear that by "command of forces" was meant the right to order forces to do or abstain from doing any act necessary to the carrying out of military operations during the existence of an emergency, real or apprehended. The Commander

<sup>1</sup> Sir Humphrey Walwyn, K.C.M.G.	
<sup>2</sup> Power et les personnes mentionnées après lui représentaient le gouvernement du Canada.	<sup>2</sup> Power and those listed under him repre- sented the Government of Canada.
<sup>3</sup> Emerson (plus tard sir Edward) et ceux mentionnés après lui représentaient le gou- vernement de Terre-Neuve.	<sup>3</sup> Emerson (later Sir Edward) and those listed under him represented the Government of Newfoundland.

would accept responsibility for the reasonable consequence of his orders. The powers and rights which would be exercised in connection with both civil and military affairs would be in no way different from those exercised in Canada and the relation between the Newfoundland Civil and the Canadian Military Authorities would be in no way different. The operational command of Newfoundland Forces (military) would be assumed by the Canadian General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. The operational command of Newfoundland Forces (naval) would be assumed by the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast. The operational command of Newfoundland Forces (air) would be assumed by the Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command. It was agreed that unified command is accomplished through the medium of the Joint Service Committee.

Newfoundland would not appoint officers of rank higher than Colonel.

Legislation (9. Visiting Forces Act) and necessary orders in Commission would be passed to give effect to this agreement.

2. *Staff Headquarters.* It is probable that St. John's will be the site of a Staff Headquarters for both the Army and Navy, While the main operations of the R.C.A.F. are confined to the Airport, Headquarters in Newfoundland do not appear to be necessary.

### 3. *Establishments.*

A. *Military.* There will be stationed in or in the vicinity of St. John's a battalion of Canadian and Newfoundland soldiers. Temporary quarters will be sought at the Rinks and the location of the huts will be settled by the General Officer Commanding on his return to St. John's about ten days hence.

The urgency for provision of coastal defences for St. John's at once was appreciated. Ultimately 2, 4.7 guns will be provided together with the anti-submarine nets and A.A. battery. As these cannot be presently supplied 2, 75's will be furnished with requisite Canadian military personnel pending this duty being assumed by Newfoundland militia.

B. *Navy.* Progress was being made with deliveries in Canada of ships necessary for the provision of Naval Bases on the East Coast of Canada and the Coast of Newfoundland. Ultimately there will be an advance Naval Base at St. John's and probably a summer advance base at Botwood. The number of ships would gradually increase to a probable total of 10 or 12. For the present the best that could be hoped for this fall was one ship.

The establishment of the examination services at St. John's and Botwood was noted and an officer or officers from the R.C.N. will be detailed shortly to ascertain that proper drill exists—ultimately the whole personnel will be R.C.N.

It was agreed that the creation of a Newfoundland R.N.V.R. was not at present necessary. One exists in Canada and Newfoundlanders would be accepted in competition with Canadians.

The position of the Commander-in-Chief, North America and West Indies was discussed. Present discussion would appear to indicate that Naval command in Newfoundland should be assumed by the R.C.N. It was suggested that the Commander-in-Chief, West Indies might welcome the change. The situation will be explored.

In the event of a change in Naval command it was suggested that Captain Schwerdt might become S.N.O. R.C.N.

C. *Air Force.* The present force at the Airport will be increased and buildings to accommodate this increased force are now being built.

Consideration is being given to the establishment of an airport for fighters, in the vicinity of St. John's, and an engineer from Canada will arrive shortly to examine possible sites.

4. *Recruiting Newfoundland soldiers.* The recruiting of Newfoundland soldiers into the Canadian forces was accepted in principle. Questions remain for discussion with the General Officer Commanding on his return, e.g. recruiting for the battalion stationed in Newfoundland, recruiting from existing Newfoundland Militia.

5. *Newfoundland's financial contribution.* The Commissioner for Finance explained that Newfoundland appreciated the generosity of the Canadian undertaking. The Newfoundland Government could not offer to pay any sum commensurate with the expense involved. It was felt however that a financial contribution was due. What he had in mind was a fixed sum which would not be inconsiderable, so far as the means of Newfoundland permitted. He explained that prior to the war the annual deficit had been met by grants-in-aid from the British Treasury. The Newfoundland Government considers that its most important war effort consists in so managing its finances that there will, if possible, be absolutely no call on the British Treasury for sterling. Nonetheless Newfoundland was willing and anxious to bear its share of the common financial burden.

Mr. Power felt that he could not speak with authority on this point for his Government. His personal view was that the whole financial burden should be shouldered by Canada. He appreciated the desire of Newfoundland to do its share but he thought it would be repugnant to the ideas of both countries that Newfoundland should, as it were, pay tribute to Canada and thus appear in a somewhat servient role. He suggested that Newfoundland would probably wish to contribute by providing certain services and concessions in its own Island, e.g. transportation of troops etc.

This matter will be further considered and taken up formally with the Canadian Government.

6. *Services and Concessions.* It was agreed that subject to certain safeguards, the Newfoundland Government would, as part of its contribution,

absorb the cost of transport of fighting forces when travelling on duty or being moved from point to point. Furthermore members of the Forces travelling at their own cost would be accorded transportation on the same basis as in Canada, i.e., a return fare at one way rate. No concession is sought as to meals or sleeping accommodation.

Matters relating to the cost of certain commodities sold in the Canteen will be discussed by the Commissioner for Finance with the O.C. Queen's Own Rifles, on his next visit to St. John's.

7. *Relations with United States of America.* The probability that the Government of the United States may wish to establish bases in Newfoundland was noted. Mr. Power stated that so far as Canada was concerned no question of transfer to the United States of sovereign rights over any part of that country would be considered. The right to use Canadian military facilities would be accorded if sought, as also the right to erect on Canadian soil, American facilities, but the soil would remain Canadian and all sovereign rights and powers over it. He presumed that Newfoundland would assume the same position.

On the part of Newfoundland it was urged that as discussions are now impending on this subject between the Governments of Canada and the United States, the rights of Newfoundland might be compromised and its position and views might not be given due consideration unless the Government of Newfoundland was represented at discussions where questions affecting Newfoundland were directly or indirectly involved. In view of the temporary nature of this form of Government and its unrepresentative character it is of grave importance that this point be borne in mind and that Newfoundland should be invited to attend discussions where its interests may be involved.

Mr. Power appreciated the importance of this matter and would take it up with the Prime Minister of Canada on his return.

172.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 552

[St. John's,] August 23, 1940

SECRET. With reference to our telegram No. 531 secret of August 15th, 1940<sup>1</sup> we have now conferred with the Canadian Minister for Air and High officers of their three fighting forces. It is clear that the defence of Newfoundland will entail the establishment in Newfoundland of military and air forces in substantial numbers and the creation of an advanced naval base at St. John's and probably a summer one at Botwood, two mobile 75's at St. John's presently to be replaced by two 4.7's later. Certain anti-aircraft protection at St. John's and Botwood are[sic] also envisaged. Further details

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



will be available on the next visit of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Command, Major-General Elkins who returns in about ten days and will then tour the Island and elaborate the defence plan. We have agreed that there should be only one Military Command and that this would be Canadian. The relations between Newfoundland Civil and Canadian Military Authorities would be the same as in Canada. It was proposed that the Naval coastal Command should also be Canadian and it was suggested that the Commander-in-Chief North America and West Indies would probably welcome this. We undertook to explore this suggestion and we would value your and the Commander-in-Chief's views. Newfoundland would fall into the respective Eastern Commands with Headquarters at Halifax and Staff Headquarters both Military and Naval would be maintained here. Necessary legislation e.g. Visiting Forces Act (See telegram secret No. 499 of July 25th.<sup>1</sup>) and Orders in Commission would be passed to cover these points. Canadian Air Minister stated that he had no authority to settle Newfoundland's financial contribution but that he felt Newfoundland should not appear as paying tribute to Canada. We could he said furnish certain services such as Railway transportation, temporary accommodation for troops from time to time, maintain our Militia Force, etc. He would place his views before Canadian Government on his return. We are considering possible political implications of this offer.

We stressed necessity for Newfoundland's representation at discussions between Canada and United States when Newfoundland interests are directly or indirectly involved, particularly when considering facilities and bases in Newfoundland to be used by United States forces. Air Minister will take this up with Canadian Prime Minister.

We feel on this last mentioned point, although we did not inform the Canadian representatives that during the negotiations with the United States regarding the acquisition by lease or sale of bases in this country, certain aspects of our peculiar position might be borne in mind and when favourable opportunity arises should be brought forward. We fully appreciate need for speed and secrecy and do not in any way wish to hamper the negotiations nor do we wish to qualify the assurance given in our telegram No. 533 secret of August 16th<sup>1</sup>. It might however be pointed out to the United States that a Government of a temporary nature and of unrepresentative character is taking serious steps vitally affecting the future of a country used to representative Government which must be restored. It is vitally necessary therefore in United States interests that the Agreement now reached should bear the hallmarks of being reasonable and fair so as to ensure its meeting with the wholehearted approval of future Governments, and none of the appearance of being forced upon a small country by powerful nations. The fact that special Customs and Immigration arrangements and facilities must necessarily rise in the settlement of the details of the agreements might be mentioned even at this stage and this will provide an opportunity for suggesting that

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

when the present need for haste has passed the United States will give favourable and sympathetic consideration to certain compensating advantages to Newfoundland in such matters as Customs tariffs and immigration arrangements. It is not proposed to suggest more than that a record in general terms along the above lines should be made at this stage. Such an undertaking by the United States would create the most favourable impression here and place beyond doubt any question of opposition.

173.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 55

Ottawa, October 19, 1940

Referring to the correspondence and conversations that have taken place regarding Canadian defence measures in Newfoundland the following is a brief outline of headings of the proposed agreement between the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada for your consideration.

1. The acquisition of property in Newfoundland for the use of the Government of Canada, whether in fee simple or for a term of years including the acquisition of private property by arbitration or otherwise and the procedure to be followed in the expropriation of any such property.

2. Defence Forces. The strength of Canadian forces stationed or to be stationed in Newfoundland, subject to consultation with the Newfoundland Government and the military advisers of the Canadian Government.

3. The question of the command of Canadian and Newfoundland forces in Newfoundland.

4. Newfoundland troops. The question of additions to the defence forces of contingents which may be raised by Newfoundland.

5. Relations between the civil community and the military forces, including the requirements and applicability of the Visiting Forces Act or similar legislation and the bringing into effect of such provisions as will ensure adequate treatment of the problems arising out of the presence in Newfoundland of Canadian troops.

6. The most economical and advantageous method of providing supplies for the forces including personal and unit equipment.

7. Transportation costs of troops travelling on duty in Newfoundland.

8. Financial arrangements generally. The extent and form of the contribution by the Newfoundland Government to the cost of Canadian defence measures, whether in cash, services or property or by waiver of customs duty.

A full discussion of the points involved is desirable and it is suggested that a representative of the Newfoundland Government come to Ottawa at an early date for this purpose.

174.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 53

St. John's, October 25, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 55, October 19th. In general it would appear that a meeting for the purpose of discussion of details on so many matters would reach conclusions more easily if the Canadian Government would outline under each of headings given in your message its views as to what it would wish the Newfoundland Government to do or to concede. On certain of the questions we have already expressed views. For instance (1) on procedure for acquisition of property, see my despatch to you of October 2nd.<sup>1</sup> (3) has been agreed to in principle. (5) We have passed a Visiting Forces Act copied *mutatis mutandis* from your Statute. Copy was mailed you today. (7) We have agreed to absorb cost of carrying Canadian troops on our railway whilst on duty. Further the important question raised by you as to future control of airport remains for development on each side (see my telegram No. 47, September 30th<sup>2</sup>). We recognize the desirability of agreement on all points as soon as possible, and upon some, at a very early date. For example, delay in arranging procedure for early settlement of claims arising out of expropriations of land will be embarrassing in itself, and may have undesirable repercussions affecting your efforts in other directions. We shall be glad therefore if you will take early steps to let us have your views on all matters so that we can limit the number of points that call for discussion. In any event, as so many of our Departments would appear to be involved, we think that meeting should take place in St. John's.

175.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 61

Ottawa, November 10, 1940

SECRET. 1. Your telegram No. 53, October 25th. Following your suggestion we are quite agreeable to have the meeting take place at St. John's. Honourable Colin Gibson, Minister of National Revenue, will represent the Canadian Government at the meeting and is ready to proceed to Newfoundland at once.

2. As pointed out in your No. 53, general agreement has been reached on certain of the headings in our No. 55 of October 19th. These are the questions of Command, The Visiting Forces Act and the arrangement regarding the cost of carrying Canadian troops on duty on the Newfoundland Railway.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 772.

<sup>2</sup> Document 398.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 772.

<sup>2</sup> Document 398.

The Canadian Government has adopted regulations under our Visiting Forces Act to implement the provisions of the Act and presumably Newfoundland Government will do likewise where necessary.

3. On the remaining points raised in the above mentioned telegrams, we suggest that it would be more satisfactory for all concerned if before arriving at definite views on the subjects mentioned, each Government have the benefit of the discussion which Mr. Gibson's visit will afford, so that views can be crystallized in the light of facts and considerations brought out in the interview. We trust that this method will approve itself [sic] to you.

4. It would also be appreciated if in your reply you would mention any other subjects not covered by our No. 55 which you would like to have discussed in the conference, so that Mr. Gibson may be able before leaving to inform himself of the considerations relevant to such subjects.

5. Since preparing the foregoing, we have your further cable No. 58 of November 6th.<sup>1</sup> The Canadian Government regret any omission to keep the Newfoundland Government informed which was entirely inadvertent. Possibly Newfoundland Government did not understand that announcement of Canadian Government's approval of Joint Defence Board recommendations has under the procedure adopted to be preceded by communication with United States and *vice versa* and then simultaneous announcement is to be made. For your confidential information communication has now gone forward to United States approving recommendations with certain modifications which do not affect Newfoundland situation, but no reciprocal communication has been received although anticipated shortly. Canadian Government understood that Newfoundland Government would desire that in meantime steps be taken to accelerate as much as possible the measures to which informal assent had been given. The other matters dealt with in your No. 58 can be discussed on ground with Mr. Gibson.

6. May we be advised if Newfoundland Government concur in this method of procedure and if it is convenient to have Canadian representatives proceed to St. John's forthwith on receipt of information mentioned in paragraph 4 above.

176.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 60

St. John's, November 12, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 61, November 10th. We shall be very pleased to see Mr. Gibson and will appreciate knowing a few days in advance of his arrival.

<sup>1</sup> Document 142



2. There does not appear at present any important subject for discussion other than those mentioned in our previous exchange, but doubtless some will arise during discussions.

3. As to penultimate sentence in paragraph 5 of your telegram, we wish and will continue to accelerate all measures. Our telegram was intended to safeguard position that whereas proposals referred to had been discussed, your Government had not informed us of their intention to proceed with them in return.

177.

1156-D-39

*Mémorandum d'une réunion tenue à St. John's du 28 novembre au 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 1940 pour discuter des questions bilatérales de défense*

*Memorandum of a Meeting at St. John's to Discuss Bilateral Defence Questions, November 28 to December 1, 1940*

SECRET

St. John's, December 1, 1940

There were present:

Hon. Sir John C. Puddester,  
Vice-Chairman of Commission  
of Government, Commissioner for  
Public Health & Welfare.<sup>1</sup>

Hon. J. H. Penson, M.C.,  
Commissioner for Finance.

Hon. Sir Wilfrid W. Woods,  
K.C.M.G.,  
Commissioner for Public Utilities.

Hon. L. E. Emerson, K.C.,  
Commissioner for Justice and Defence.

Mr. G. B. Summers, K.C.,  
Secretary for Justice.

Mr. H. V. Hutchings,  
Secretary for Customs.

Hon. Colin Gibson, M.C.,  
Minister of National Revenue.<sup>2</sup>

Brigadier P. Earnshaw, D.S.O., M.C.,  
Officer Commanding Canadian Forces  
in Newfoundland.

Captain H. A. Dyde, M.C.,  
Special Assistant to Associate  
Minister of National Defence.

It was decided that the matters first for discussion would be those outlined in the telegram from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 55 dated Oct. 19th, and this memorandum is a résumé of the situation on December 1st.

<sup>1</sup> Sir John Puddester et les personnes ci-après indiquées représentaient le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>2</sup> M. Gibson et les personnes ci-après indiquées représentaient le gouvernement du Canada.

<sup>1</sup> Sir John Puddester and those listed under him represented the Government of Newfoundland.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Gibson and those listed under him represented the Government of Canada.

# 1. ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY IN NEWFOUNDLAND FOR USE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

(a) Nature of tenure, and

(b) Procedure to be adopted in settling claims by private owners.

A discussion took place with reference to the method of acquiring property for defence requirements. When Crown Lands are involved, it is understood that title will be conveyed or a lease granted to the Canadian Government without charge. When private property is involved it was recommended that the Canadian Government appoint an agent to negotiate privately. If private agreement cannot be reached it is recommended that the Newfoundland Government appoint a Board of three presided over by a Judge of the Supreme Court, the two others being chosen for their particular qualifications. This Board would sit and hear Counsel and take evidence adduced either by the parties or called of its own motion, and a decision arrived at by this Board would be binding on the claimant and on both the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland, with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. DEFENCE FORCES

The strength of Canadian Forces in Newfoundland. It was agreed that there would be no substantial changes made in the strength of the forces assigned to the defence of Newfoundland without reasonable prior notification to the Government of Newfoundland.

## 3. COMMAND OF COMBINED FORCES IN NEWFOUNDLAND

Newfoundland has passed a Visiting Forces Act identical, *mutatis mutandis* with the Canadian Act. The Governor in Commission has made an Order that the Canadian and Newfoundland Military Forces are now acting in combination. The Canadian Government has passed similar Order in Council and Colonel Gibson handed a copy of this Order in Council to Mr. Emerson. The Canadian Government has formally consented to the Newfoundland Government appointing Brigadier Earnshaw as Commanding Officer of the combined Force. He will be Gazetted on Tuesday next. It was pointed out that under the arrangement recommended by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the Canadian Defence Forces are to control the defence of the nearby waters, harbours and bays of Newfoundland, including the Harbour of St. John's.

## 4. NEWFOUNDLAND TROOPS

Enlistment in Canadian Army. Mr. Emerson stated that Major-General Elkins had already indicated that it was not possible to consider the formation of a Newfoundland Regiment in the Canadian Army. The forces which go overseas are enlisted on a voluntary basis and in most battalions at the present

<sup>1</sup> Cependant, aucune commission de cette nature ne fut mise sur pied.

<sup>1</sup> In the event, no such Board was set up.

time there are long waiting lists of volunteers for this service. Under these circumstances it would not be possible to announce that the Canadian Government would welcome Newfoundland volunteers.

It is understood that the Newfoundland Government will be responsible for the maintenance of the Newfoundland Militia, and if this Militia has to be relocated the provision of quarters, etc., will be borne by the Newfoundland Government.

#### 5. CIVIL RELATIONS

The Canadian Officer Commanding will be advised as to the Newfoundland official responsible for calling for military aid. Further consideration will be given this matter by the Newfoundland Government, and also to the matter of any legislation which may be necessary, including the passing of an Act of Indemnity. Apart from this point it would appear that the Visiting Forces Act covers all points for the present. Brigadier Earnshaw is working out the details of the relations between the military and civil authorities, with the relevant Departments.

#### 6. SUPPLIES FOR THE FORCES

This subject will be dealt with under the heading of "Financial Arrangements Generally".

#### 7. TRANSPORTATION COSTS OF TROOPS TRAVELLING ON DUTY IN NEWFOUNDLAND

It has already been agreed that the Newfoundland Government will pay the Newfoundland Railway for the transportation on the Railway system of all Canadian soldiers when travelling on duty, whether individually or in groups. Such cost to be considered as part of Newfoundland's contribution to the cost of Canadian defence measures in Newfoundland. It was agreed that, particularly in the case where substantial numbers of troops are being moved to and from Canada, the Canadian Government will use all possible efforts to land them at and move them from the nearest port at which there is rail communication to their intended station.

The Anglo Newfoundland Development Company is the owner and operator of a Railway from Bishops Falls to Botwood and of another from Millertown Junction to Buchans. When Canadian troops are carried by the Newfoundland Railway cars over these railways the cost is to be borne by the Newfoundland Government.

#### 8. CONTROL OF NEWFOUNDLAND AIRPORTS

Colonel Gibson referred to the proposal contained in the despatch from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Government of Newfoundland, No. 7 of the 13th September, 1940,<sup>1</sup> in which this Government

<sup>1</sup> Document 395.

was requested to provide for the discussion of certain proposals under which Canada would assume control of the Newfoundland Airport (and, presumably, the Botwood Seaplane base also) during the period of hostilities. It was explained to Colonel Gibson that this Government had been waiting for a further communication from the Canadian Government in response to this Government's telegram to the Secretary of State No. 47 Secret of the 30th September, 1940,<sup>1</sup> in which this Government expressed its willingness to enter into discussion of the details of an arrangement such as that proposed by Canada provided agreement could first be reached in regard to certain specified fundamental points. In that telegram we had suggested that a discussion of details should be deferred until December because of the preoccupation of the staff at the Airport with current duties, but we had expected to hear in the meantime what the reactions of the Canadian Government were to the fundamental points specified in our telegram. Colonel Gibson explained that a reply to the telegram had not been sent owing to pressure of business on the Canadian Ministers primarily responsible and he added that he was not aware that anything in the fundamental points mentioned in our telegram had contributed to the delay.

In the course of a general discussion on the proposal that Canada should take over the Newfoundland Airport and the Botwood seaplane base for the duration of hostilities, Colonel Gibson brought out the point that his Government was anxious that it should have security of tenure of the sites on which it had erected huttled accommodation for personnel and hangars for aeroplanes at an expense of approximately \$1,300,000.00.

It was agreed by the Newfoundland representatives that it was quite reasonable that the Canadian Government should seek an assurance which would meet the possible criticism that the Canadian Government had expended a large sum of public money on buildings without security of tenure of the site on which the buildings had been erected. It was necessary, however, that regard should be had to the fact that the Airport and seaplane base had been constructed at a capital cost of over £900,000 sterling provided by the British Exchequer primarily for North Atlantic Commercial Air Transport and consequently it was necessary that we should consult the Civil Aviation Department of the British Air Ministry before agreeing to continued occupation after hostilities ceased, of the sites of the hutments and hangars constructed by the Canadian Government. This was all the more necessary because the sites in question were in both cases in close proximity to the runways and in the case of the Royal Canadian Air Force hutments and hangars between the ends of two runways. Subject to the views expressed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Newfoundland Government considered that it was a practical certainty that general strategic considerations justified this Government in giving the Canadian Government security of tenure extending over a substantial period and the Newfoundland Government would inform the British Government accordingly.

<sup>1</sup> Document 398.



The Newfoundland Government wishes to ensure the facilities at the Airport and seaplane base for British civil aircraft operating across the North Atlantic or undertaking local flights and in particular, that delivery of military aircraft across the Atlantic would be regarded as a matter of paramount importance, and be included as one of the fundamental points.

It was agreed that the Newfoundland Government should await a reply to their telegram No. 47 of the 30th September, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs before taking further steps in this matter.

#### 9. CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT OPERATING IN NEWFOUNDLAND

The Canadian representatives raised the question of the establishment of uniform control of aircraft operating over Newfoundland and stated that it would be desirable if Newfoundland were declared a prohibited area in order that flights may be regulated in a manner similar to flights over the east coast of Canada under direction of the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command. The Newfoundland representatives stated that under the Defence Regulations no aeroplanes can fly to or from Newfoundland without a permit. Arrangements will be made to inform the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command of any flight.

#### 10. INTERNEES

The Newfoundland representatives stated that it was their wish that arrangements might be made whereunder it would be possible to make use of the internment camp that had been constructed at Carbonear. Colonel Gibson pointed out the difficulties that would arise from a defence point of view in permitting a considerable group of military prisoners to be concentrated near the Newfoundland coast. It was suggested that a group of representative officers examine and report on the feasibility of using the camp for civilian internees.

#### 11. NEWFOUNDLAND RAILWAY

On the point being raised, the Canadian representatives were informed that little or no delay in the railway service was likely to be suffered by reason of winter conditions. Adequate snow removal facilities were available.

#### 12. BLACKOUT

The Canadian representatives were informed that black-out regulations had been drafted and could be put into effect by order at any place at any time. Practice black-outs have been held in St. John's. Black-out regulations were in existence at the Airport but were relaxed for construction purposes at the request of the R.C.A.F.

### 13. TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SERVICE

For military purposes it was suggested that a 24-hour service should be instituted by the Newfoundland Commission of Government. The Newfoundland representative stated that this would receive consideration.

### 14. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS GENERALLY

The Government of Newfoundland believes that insuperable administrative difficulties will arise if bulk goods and consumable stores which enter into the normal economic life of the community are imported by the Canadian Government on a duty free basis.

On the other hand the Government of Newfoundland declares that it does not desire to use these administrative difficulties as a ground for raising revenue out of the importations of the Canadian Government on behalf of service units.

It was suggested that Customs duties should be paid on all goods imported by the Canadian Government into Newfoundland, with the exception of arms, munitions, military equipment, service vehicles and construction materials not available in Newfoundland, and soldiers parcels, the last named during the period of hostilities only.

In order that Newfoundland might contribute to the expense of maintaining the Canadian Forces in Newfoundland, the Newfoundland Government is prepared to consider a contribution that would cover the amount of duties paid, together with such further amounts as may be agreed upon. Railway transportation and other services to be included as part of the Newfoundland contribution.

Until such time as a final agreement has been reached the situation should continue as at present, that is to say:

- (1) All equipment and supplies to enter Newfoundland duty free, with the exception of canteen supplies and goods for resale, provided that special arrangements be made as to the entry of cigarettes in parcels consigned to individual members of Canadian units, and further provided that there shall continue the arrangement now in effect as to the purchase by the Canadian Government of goods produced and manufactured in Newfoundland.
- (2) No drawback to be allowed on local purchases in Newfoundland.
- (3) Free transportation for Canadian troops travelling on duty; a return ticket for a one way fare when on leave.
- (4) Exemption from income tax for members of Canadian Forces during the period of hostilities.
- (5) The Newfoundland stamp tax on cheques to be paid.
- (6) Motor licenses to be free, but payment to be made for license plates.

178.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 13, 1940

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9. MR. POWER stated that the Minister of National Revenue and the Special Assistant to the Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Dyde) had reported fully upon their discussions in St. John's with the Newfoundland government.

(See memorandum of meeting at St. John's, Newfoundland, November the 29th to December the 1st, 1940; also memorandum<sup>1</sup> from the Associate Minister, with reference to Newfoundland.)

10. It was now recommended that the Canadian government should express agreement upon matters which had formed the subject of discussions. These related to:

(1) The acquisition of property

The appointment of a Canadian agent to deal with property owners, and the establishment of an advisory board for contentious cases, was recommended.

This was approved by the Committee.

(2) Defence forces

It was recommended that no substantial change in strength should be made without reasonable prior notification to Newfoundland.

This was approved by the Committee.

(3) Transportation costs of troops on duty

Newfoundland's agreement to pay these costs should be confirmed.

This was approved by the Committee.

(4) Control of Airports

Three bases were involved, viz., Newfoundland Airport at Gander, the sea plane anchorage at Glencables, and the sea plane base at Botwood.

It was recommended that, upon condition of obtaining effective control of the Airport for the R.C.A.F., the government should agree to Newfoundland's "fundamental points", as stated in telegram No. 47 of September the 30th<sup>2</sup> from the Governor of Newfoundland to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, also to

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Document 398.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

allow facilities for British civil aircraft, local flights and Trans-Atlantic delivery of military aircraft. This would involve assumption, by Canada, of financial responsibility which amounted to some \$180,000 annual maintenance, and \$100,000 annual cost of operation of wireless services. Newfoundland, however, should be asked to continue its present contribution towards cost of maintenance.

With regard to Botwood and Gleneagles, the same general principles were practicable, but there was not the same urgency.

Mr. Power read to the meeting a draft telegram to the Governor of Newfoundland, on this subject, which was approved by the Committee, for despatch.

(5) Internees

It was suggested that the Camp at Carbonear, of which Newfoundland was anxious to make use, might be utilized for civilian internees.

The Committee agreed that, so far as the Canadian government were concerned, civilian internees might be sent to Carbonear. It was pointed out, however, that the U.K. government, so far, had not been prepared to intern civilians there.

(6) Telephone and telegraph services

A specific request for increased and improved service might be made, failing agreement to which, steps would have to be taken by Canada.

(7) Financial arrangements generally

It was recommended that Canada should agree to the payment of Customs duty upon goods entering Newfoundland, on the understanding that sums paid would be refunded as part of the Newfoundland contribution to the defence costs. This arrangement should, if possible, be made at an early date, before Newfoundland-U.S. negotiations, in this respect, were completed.

The Minister of Finance explained the difficulty of the Newfoundland government as regards Customs duties. It was feared that if free entry of bulk goods and consumable stores were permitted, insuperable administrative difficulties would result. Mr. Gibson considered that this constituted a serious problem for the Newfoundland government.

It was agreed that Mr. Power should take this matter up further with Mr. Gibson, with a view to reaching a satisfactory conclusion and that meantime the present *modus vivendi* should be continued.



179.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 4

Ottawa, January 20, 1941

Reference Memorandum of Meeting November 28th and the title Acquisition of Property, the Canadian Government desires to express its deep appreciation of the provision whereby title to Crown lands required for Canadian Defence measures will be conveyed or a lease granted to the Canadian Government without charge. This is a very welcome contribution on the part of the Newfoundland Government. The Canadian Government agrees with the proposal to appoint an agent to negotiate privately in cases where private property is involved and steps are being taken to implement the recommendation of the Memorandum in this respect. The proposal by the Newfoundland Government to establish an Advisory Board in contentious cases is also approved and the co-operation of the Newfoundland Government in this matter is also greatly appreciated.

2. Referring to the same Memorandum and to the title Defence Forces, the Canadian Government agrees that no substantial change will be made in the strength of the Canadian forces assigned to the defence of Newfoundland without reasonable prior notification to the Newfoundland Government.

3. Referring to the same Memorandum and to the title Telephone and Telegraph Services, inquiry is made as to whether it has been possible to give further consideration to the enlargement of these Services and as to whether the Newfoundland Government is now prepared to say what additional service can be provided with special reference to communications necessary for the effective operation of the Military, Naval and Air forces stationed in Newfoundland.

180.

1156-D-39

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à St. John's pour discuter*  
*des questions bilatérales de défense*

*Minutes of a Meeting at St. John's to Discuss*  
*Bilateral Defence Questions*

St. John's, April 14, 1941

There were present:

Hon. Sir John C. Puddester,  
Vice-Chairman of Commission  
of Government, Commissioner for  
Public Health & Welfare, and  
Acting Commissioner for Finance.

Hon. Colin Gibson, M.C.,  
Minister of National Revenue.

Captain H. A. Dyde, M.C.,  
Secretary to the Defence Council.

Hon. Sir Wilfrid W. Woods, K.C.M.G.,  
Commissioner for Public Utilities,  
and Acting Commissioner for  
Defence.

Hon. J. A. Winter, K.C., Commissioner  
for Home Affairs & Education,  
and Acting Commissioner for  
Justice.

Hon. J. H. Gorvin, C.B.E.,  
Commissioner for Natural Resources.

Mr. G. B. Summers, K.C.,  
Secretary for Justice.

Brigadier P. Earnshaw,  
D.S.O., M.C., Officer Commanding  
Combined Canadian and  
Newfoundland Forces.

Wing-Commander Bryans.

Major Hugh Lumsden.

The agenda for discussion was as set out in a memorandum submitted by the Hon. Colin Gibson with a letter to His Excellency the Governor, dated at St. John's, April 11th, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

## 1. *Communications*

### A. Railway.

#### (1) Adequacy of rolling stock.

Information is required as to what tonnage the Canadian and American Forces will be likely to ask the Newfoundland Railway to move in any future period which can now be foreseen. The Commissioner for Public Utilities will ask Brigadier Earnshaw and Colonel Welty if this information can be supplied. Brigadier Earnshaw will be asked if he can supply the information on behalf of all branches of the Canadian Forces. When information as to the tonnage to be moved is available a committee representative of the Canadian and U.S. Forces and of the Newfoundland Government should be formed to keep in touch with the Railway situation and to review the requirements from time to time.

#### (2) Deliveries of freight.

Enquiry was made as to whether present deliveries of freight could be speeded up even with the equipment at present available to the Railway. It was noted that under present circumstances the Railway's facilities appear to be strained to capacity.

#### (3) Upkeep.

The arrangements made for general maintenance of the road bed and equipment can be regarded as efficient. There are difficulties with regard to the overhauling of equipment, because it is continually in use.

#### (4) Spur trackage.

It was stated that light weight rails and switches are available for use as spur trackage.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

(5) Station at Gander.

A new freight shed is to be built at Gander.

(6) Harbour and transhipment facilities.

Enquiry was made as to whether there was any avoidable delay in freight deliveries. The difficulties of transhipment at Sydney due to ice conditions were mentioned. Further enquiry into the questions raised will be a matter for the committee to be formed.

(7) Site at St. John's for gasoline storage.

The R.C.A.F. are anxious to obtain a site for the storage in tanks or barrels of a quantity of about 25,000 gallons of aeroplane gasoline. The site should be accessible to rail and sea. The gasoline will be for transhipment to Labrador. A suitable site has not yet been chosen but the request was made that the Newfoundland Government should agree to facilitate the acquisition of such a site as would be required and an undertaking that the Newfoundland Government would co-operate in this respect was given.

B. Telephone, Telegraph and Wireless

(1) Permission to establish necessary facilities in consultation with appropriate Government Department.

It was stated on behalf of the Newfoundland Government that the Government was prepared in principle to facilitate the Canadian Government in establishing all necessary communications for the Canadian Forces in Newfoundland. Arrangements would be carried out in consultation with the appropriate Government Departments.

(2) Organizing Aircraft detection Corps.

(3) Arrangements to hook up air detection corps by telephone.

These matters have been the subject of previous correspondence with the Canadian Government and have been discussed with a representative of the R.C.A.F. sent for the purpose. Wing-Commander Bryans will ascertain the present position from the Secretary for Natural Resources and the Secretary for Posts & Telegraphs and will suggest some extension of the system proposed.

*2. Defence Generally*

(1) Reciprocal undertaking re foreign commitments.

The undertaking which Canada would like Newfoundland to give in this respect will be drafted by Captain Dyde for discussion at next meeting.

(2) Provision of aid to civil power.

The Canadian Officer commanding would like to be advised specifically as to the Newfoundland officials responsible for calling for military aid. The matter will be taken up by the Commission of Government and discussed further with the Canadian Authorities.

(3) Co-operation in establishing refuelling bases in Newfoundland and Labrador.

In addition to such co-operation as may be required in the acquisition of sites the Canadian Government would like the Newfoundland Government to co-operate in ensuring shipping facilities for supplying the Labrador bases with gasoline and other supplies. It was agreed that this co-operation would be given.

(4) Control by R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. at Botwood. This has reference to the control of persons and of craft in the vicinity of the air base at Botwood. The requirements of the Canadian Government will be more precisely defined and later discussed.

### 3. *Financial*

(1) Customs.

(2) Property taxes.

(4) Permits and licenses.

(4) Foreign exchange control.

(5) Postal facilities.

There was no detailed discussion of the matters under this heading. It was agreed that they should be separately discussed between the Canadian representatives and the acting Commissioner for Finance and Departmental officials concerned.

As to (2) it was pointed out that apart from Municipal taxation there is no property tax in Newfoundland. There is a registration fee on conveyances of property.

The request that free postage be granted to Canadian Forces on service in Newfoundland as granted in the United Kingdom was noted for future consideration.

### 4. *Acquisition of Property*

The Canadian representatives expressed the appreciation of their Government for the undertaking previously given by the Newfoundland Government to make Crown Lands available without charge. It was asked that the arrangement whereby private property should be acquired by the Canadian Government at its own cost, should be reconsidered. The request was made that the Newfoundland Government would undertake to acquire such property and to pay for the same as part of its contribution. The difficulties of such an arrangement were pointed out. Further discussion under this heading, as on financial matters generally, was held over.



181.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister of National Defence for Air*

Ottawa, April 14, 1941

Dear Mr. Power,

I enclose a copy of a telegram<sup>1</sup> from L. E. Emerson of the Newfoundland Commission of Government. Mr. Emerson and Mr. Penson have been attending the London discussions on the United States bases in Newfoundland and, as you will see, they want to call at Ottawa on their way back to St. John's for the purpose of discussing certain common defence problems.

I have sent Emerson a telegram<sup>1</sup> (copy of which is enclosed) saying that we will be prepared to discuss these matters with him on Tuesday afternoon at 2:30. I shall be very much obliged if you will appoint one of the officers of your Department to take part in this discussion.

I am addressing a similar request to the Honourable Mr. Ralston, Honourable Mr. Macdonald and Honourable Mr. Howe.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

182.

1156-D-39

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue pour discuter  
des questions bilatérales de défense*

*Minutes of a Meeting to Discuss Bilateral Defence Questions*

Ottawa, April 15, 1941

Present:

Newfoundland

Mr. L. E. Emerson

Mr. J. H. Penson

Mr. E. C. Price

Canada

Department of External Affairs

Mr. N. A. Robertson

Mr. H. L. Keenleyside

Mr. C. F. Fraser

Department of National Defence

Major-General H. D. G. Crerar

Colonel R. B. Gibson

Department of Finance

Mr. H. F. Gordon

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Department of National Defence (Naval Service)

Commander R. E. Bidwell

Commander F. L. Houghton

Department of National Defence (Air)

Group-Captain Heakes

Department of Munitions and Supply

Mr. D Stairs

1. A meeting was held in Room 123 in the East Block at 2:30 p.m. on Tuesday, the 15th of April, 1941 to discuss the following problems that have arisen in connection with the Defence of Newfoundland:

(a) United States Bases in Newfoundland

(b) Control of Airports, Draft Agreement

(c) Labour Problems

(d) Use of Carbonear Camp

(e) MV *Schulamite* and M. V. *Marvita*

(f) Relations with Greenland.

2. Mr. Keenleyside opened the meeting with a few words of welcome to the members of the Commission of Government of Newfoundland. Mr. Penson and Mr. Emerson had just returned from London and Washington where they have been discussing problems of Newfoundland Defence. Mr. Emerson presented a brief summary of the ground covered by Mr. Penson and himself during their sojourn in Washington. He stated that the United States, in negotiating their agreement with the United Kingdom respecting Newfoundland, were endeavouring to meet the eventualities of the next hundred years. Mr. Penson pointed out that this long range view taken by the United States authorities had presented certain difficulties and that the British and Newfoundland authorities were more concerned with a practical solution of immediate local problems.

3. The more difficult of these local problems was the question of jurisdiction. The United Kingdom—United States Agreement in its final form would limit United States jurisdiction over British subjects to offences committed within the leased area. Officials of the United States State Department had assured the Newfoundland representatives that the United States does not recognize the leased areas as United States territory. The United States authorities hoped that the Agreement could be interpreted and applied in a very liberal fashion. Mr. Emerson observed that the working out of the Agreement with the United States in actual practice was the most serious problem confronting the Newfoundland authorities.

4. Major-General Crerar outlined the difficulties which have arisen out of the question of command in Newfoundland. He pointed out that some system of consultation and liaison between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and Newfoundland was essential. The presence of United States and Canadian armed forces in Newfoundland made it essential that some system of joint command should be worked out. General Crerar expressed the opinion that if a unified Canadian command for all Forces in Newfoundland was not possible, it would then be essential

to subdivide the Island on geographic lines and to assign certain areas to United States command and other areas to Canadian command. Mr. Emerson stated that the Newfoundland authorities would greatly prefer a unified Canadian command to any other type of control. Commodore Heakes pointed out that the Royal Canadian Air Force had established their own bases in Newfoundland for the express purpose of maintaining separate control.

5. Certain points in connection with the Canada-Newfoundland Draft Agreement were then discussed. It was decided to defer for the consideration of a smaller group the Airport question. A fundamental problem was that raised in paragraph 17 of the Draft Agreement, viz., the use of the Newfoundland Airport and the Botwood Seaplane Base by United States authorities. It was pointed out that the use of these facilities by United States forces did not constitute the establishment of a new United States Base, since Canadian control over both the Airport and the Seaplane Base was to be maintained. It was suggested that a separate agreement regarding accommodation for United States forces at the Airport and Botwood would be desirable.

6. A question was asked regarding the effect of paragraph 19 B. of the Canada—Newfoundland Draft Agreement. It was suggested that the effect of this paragraph might be to prohibit the flight of United States aircraft over Newfoundland. This point was reserved for further consideration. The suggestion was also made that British civil aircraft might be prevented from flying over Newfoundland by reason of 19 B but, it was pointed out that British civilian aviation was expressly protected by a clause in paragraph 3 (8) and that the organization for ferrying of aircraft across the Atlantic was covered by paragraph 5.

7. At this point Mr. Penson enquired whether the Newfoundland authorities should discuss with Canada any new United States proposals regarding leased areas. Mr. Keenleyside pointed out that the right of Canada to participate in such future discussions was reserved in paragraph 4 of the Agreement.

8. The attention of the meeting was then directed to labour problems. Mr. Keenleyside presented a draft telegram<sup>1</sup> addressed to the Governor of Newfoundland, suggesting that the Commission of Government should set up and administer a centralized organization for handling labour problems. Mr. Emerson pointed out that the Newfoundland authorities had steadfastly refused to interfere with wages and labour problems generally. Both he and Mr. Penson felt that to ask the Newfoundland authorities to devise and administer a formalized labour policy would present great difficulties. It was decided that Mr. Emerson should take the draft telegram to St. John's with him and consider it further in the light of conditions there.

9. Commander Bidwell stated that the Royal Canadian Navy was most anxious to acquire the *M. V. Schulamite* and the *M. V. Marvita*, on a loan basis. He added that the proposed rate of hire of \$35.00 a day which had

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

been suggested by the Newfoundland authorities was felt to be somewhat high. Mr. Price intimated that the suggestion made by the Canadian authorities regarding terms of acquisition of these vessels was too vague. It was agreed that Mr. Price should discuss the matter privately with Canadian Naval Officials with a view to arriving at some definite agreement.

10. Mr. Penson stated that he wished to learn the attitude of the Canadian Government regarding the deterioration of certain roads in Newfoundland due to the traffic of heavy army trucks. He pointed out that certain roads both in the city of St. John's and elsewhere had been rendered dangerous due to heavy army traffic and that there was no money available to put these roads in shape. General Crerar stated that in Canada the Department of National Defence makes no commitments for the repair and upkeep of roads, the matter being one for the Municipal and Provincial authorities.

11. Mr. Robertson enquired whether Mr. Penson wished to express any views as to the use of Carbonear Camp. It had been originally intended that this Camp should house 1,000 German airman prisoners. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence had objected to the presence of prisoners, civilian and military in Newfoundland on the ground that it might lead to an incident. Some discussion followed as to what disposition might be made of the Camp at this time. Mr. Emerson was of the opinion that it might prove useful for quartering of troops.

12. The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of the Greenland situation.

183.

1156-D-39

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion pour discuter  
des questions bilatérales de défense*

*Minutes of a Meeting to Discuss Bilateral Defence Questions*

St. John's, April 16, 1941

At the office of the Commissioner for Public Utilities and Acting Commissioner for Defence.

The meeting was in continuation of a meeting held on April 14th for the discussion of matters set out in a memorandum submitted by the Honourable Colin Gibson, Minister of National Revenue, in a letter to His Excellency the Governor dated April 11th, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

The meeting was attended by all of those present at the meeting of April 14th, with the exception of Wing-Commander Bryans.

Notes of the meeting held on April 14th were read and agreed as a correct record, and discussions were resumed on certain of the matters held over from that meeting.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



## DEFENCE GENERALLY

*Reciprocal undertaking re foreign commitments.*

The Canadian representatives submitted a request that the Newfoundland Government give an undertaking to the Canadian Government in the following terms:

During the period of hostilities the Newfoundland Government will make commitments or concessions of a defence nature to a foreign Government only with the prior consent of the Canadian Government, save and except such commitments or concessions as are now in effect or which necessarily result from any existing agreement. The Newfoundland Government will inform the Canadian Government of requests received from the United States Government when such requests relate to or are likely to relate to Articles I (4) II and XI (5) of the Agreement of 27th March, 1941<sup>1</sup>, or when such requests are likely to involve an extension of existing defence commitments or concessions.

This was referred to as a reciprocal undertaking in as much as the Canadian Government had undertaken not to enter into foreign commitments at the Newfoundland air bases which are being transferred. It was pointed out by the Newfoundland Government representatives that the undertaking of the Canadian Government referred to was a condition of the transfer of air bases in Newfoundland, designed to secure the protection of United Kingdom and Newfoundland interests in the development of the bases for the purposes for which they were constructed.

The Canadian representatives in further support of their request stated that it would be embarrassing to Canada, while responsible for the defence of Newfoundland to have another nation take defence measures in Newfoundland of which Canada was unaware and which might conflict with Canadian interests.

The Newfoundland Government representatives drew attention to the fact that the Canadian Government had not in any communication to the Newfoundland Government acknowledged a responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland. It was pointed out that somewhat similar statements affirming the interests of their respective countries in the defence of Newfoundland, have been made by the Prime Minister of Canada and by the President of the United States. The appreciation of Newfoundland for the assurance given by the Prime Minister of Canada, and for the defence measures taken, was expressed, but it was stated that the Newfoundland Government does not feel free to assume definitely that the statement made may not be regarded, if the Canadian Government sees fit, as limited to such defensive measures in Newfoundland as appear to be in the interest of Canadian defence, nor to assume that the Canadian Government regards the statement as an undertaking given Newfoundland.

With further reference to the undertaking sought of the Newfoundland Government, it was pointed out by the Newfoundland representatives that

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B.

it would not necessarily be in Newfoundland's interests to bind itself to rely solely on Canada as responsible for its defence. It was also indicated that it might not be within the province of the Newfoundland Government to give such an undertaking, as the United Kingdom Government is principally responsible for Newfoundland's defence.

It was stated by the Newfoundland Government representatives that the Commission of Government would give consideration to the request for the undertaking.

*Control by R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. at Botwood.*

The control which is contemplated is in general along the lines of what is usual in harbour traffic regulations and it will be necessary to provide for mooring areas around the air base.

The Newfoundland Government representatives gave an assurance that the Government would cooperate in carrying out all measures necessary to facilitate operations of the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F. at Botwood.

#### ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY

*Sites for the Royal Canadian Navy at Fort William and Blackhead.*

It was noted that the Royal Canadian Navy may desire to acquire a site at Fort William in the vicinity of St. Joseph's Parish Hall. The Newfoundland Government is asked to notify the Royal Canadian Navy before taking any action to make such site available for the use of any other persons. This site is probably not at present property of the Crown.

The Canadian representatives submitted a request to have made available for the use of the Royal Canadian Navy for a wireless station, an area on Blackhead promontory comprising a tableland area of about half a mile by eight hundred feet. The Canadian Authorities will write the Department of Natural Resources making formal application for the site and describing its boundaries more explicitly, and it will be made available for the duration of the war for the purpose mentioned.

#### LESTER'S FIELD

Attention was drawn to the fact that private owners of property taken over by the Canadian Government at Lester's Field, had not received compensation. The Canadian representatives agreed to pursue this matter and to expedite payment without waiting for settlement of the general question which had been raised, as to whether the Canadian or Newfoundland Government should pay for the cost of acquisition of private property. The Newfoundland Government will cooperate in making an official available to negotiate on behalf of the Canadian Government, if asked to do so.

#### CUSTOMS CUTTERS

It has been agreed to make these available to the Canadian Government, and a communication will be sent to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

184.

1156-D-39

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à Ottawa pour discuter  
des questions bilatérales de défense*

*Minutes of a Meeting at Ottawa to Discuss Bilateral Defence Questions*

Ottawa, April 19, 1941

There were present:

Hon. Colin Gibson, K.C., M.C., M.P.  
Minister of National Revenue.

Dr. H. L. Keenleyside,  
Department of External Affairs.

Hon. L. E. Emerson, K.C.,  
Commissioner for Justice and Defence.

Hon. J. H. Penson, M.C.,  
Commissioner for Finance.

Mr. E. C. Price,  
Chairman, Board of Customs.

The agenda for discussion comprised matters left over from the discussions held between representatives of the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments at St. John's, Newfoundland, on the 14th and 16th April, 1941.

*Communications: Railway.*

It was understood that the whole question of the adequacy of the existing railway and rolling stock to meet prospective requirements had been considered by the Joint Defence Board, which, it is understood, will make specific recommendations.

*Financial: Customs.*

This matter had been left over from the previous discussions held in December, 1940, pending negotiations between the Newfoundland Government and the United States.

Mr. Gibson expressed the view that Canadian troops in Newfoundland should receive no less favourable treatment than that accorded to the United States troops and pointed out the existing differences in costs to the troops of canteen supplies. He stated that when the Canadian and United States troops were serving in the same area a marked difference in the price of articles, such as cigarettes or beer, would undoubtedly arouse unfavourable comment. At the present time Canadian cigarettes sell for 25 cents a package as compared with 8 to 10 cents for American cigarettes in U.S. army clubs.

Mr. Penson replied that the Customs arrangement with the United States must be regarded as a whole and that any changes in the existing Customs agreements, to put the Canadian troops in the same position as the U.S. troops, might necessitate the withdrawal of other concessions in order to make up loss of revenue. He pointed out, for example, that Canadian troops are not charged Customs Duty on gifts direct to units or personal parcels (subject to a limitation as to the number of cigarettes included in such parcels) whereas U.S. troops will, under the Bases Agreement, pay duty on consumable stores, including groceries, cigarettes and liquor imported by

other than U.S. Government agencies. He further pointed out that the canteen price of Canadian cigarettes in Newfoundland is the same as the canteen price in Canada, and that even if all duty was removed the sale price would remain considerably higher than that of U.S. cigarettes.

Concerning the sale of beer, Mr. Penson pointed out that the sale price of Canadian beer has already been reduced from 35¢ to 25¢ a bottle, and is being further reduced to 20¢. The actual landed cost is about 13¢, to which must be added charges for duty, cartage, warehousing and breakage.

Other canteen articles, such as chocolate bars, razor blades, etc., sell at standard prices in all canteens.

It was suggested that the Customs Arrangements should remain as they are until it has been ascertained what concessions are actually to be received by the U.S. forces and what adjustments, if any, should be made to put the Canadians on a similar basis.

The Newfoundland representatives stated that, should any change in the existing Customs charges be considered desirable, a re-adjustment of the financial arrangements between the two countries would be sought to offset the loss of revenue; e.g. by modifying or cancelling the payment now being made by the Newfoundland Government to the Railway for transportation of Canadian forces.

#### *Property Taxes:*

While there are no property taxes in Newfoundland on property outside municipal areas, there are municipal taxes to cover costs of services, including water, sewer, fire, street lighting and roads. In St. John's the property tax is 16% of the assessed rental value of property and users of large quantities of water pay an additional meter charge at commercial rates on additional water used. The United States forces in St. John's are paying this meter charge. The Newfoundland Government pays a 5% tax on Government property in St. John's.

In addition, there is in St. John's a coal tax of 70 cents a ton on all coal brought in and consumed in the city. This tax is collected by the Department of Customs as agent for the city. (The Newfoundland Government is willing to forego the ordinary Customs Duty chargeable on coal of 35 cents per ton.)

It was pointed out that the coal tax is part of the St. John's municipal revenue and the Customs Department has no option but to collect this tax unless other arrangements are made with the city. Already the city has exempted the vessels of the R.C.N. from water tax. R.C.N. vessels are exempt from harbour and light dues.

Mr. Emerson intimated that some contribution from Canada may be asked for by the Municipality of St. John's for the repair of streets.

It was suggested that Canadian representatives should negotiate with the St. John's municipal officers as to taxes generally, and that consideration might be given to the payment of an annual sum for municipal services.



*Permits and Licenses:*

The question of license fees was discussed and it was intimated that generally the position is as follows:

*Motor Vehicle License*, no fee charged on Canadian Government cars, but cost of license plate collected. All privately owned vehicles pay ordinary license fees.

*Driving Licenses* will be issued free to Canadian troops driving Government vehicles.

*Liquor License* not charged for messes or canteens.

*Liquor Permit* (personal) free. At request of a former O.C., Canadian troops at Airport, only beer and wine are supplied to Canadian forces at Airport and Botwood, other than commissioned officers.

*Radio Licenses*, no fee being charged for radios in barracks or camps.

*Dog Tax*, a municipal tax.

*Foreign Exchange Control:*

Mr. Gibson asked for information concerning the issuing of licenses to import goods from the United States. Mr. Penson stated that, while there is no general restriction of imports of any commodities from the United States, the Newfoundland Government maintains close contact with the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board.

*Postal Arrangements:*

A request was made that the Canadian forces in Newfoundland should secure free postage as granted to other Canadian forces overseas. This had been discussed in Newfoundland, and left over for discussion with the Commissioner of Finance. Mr. Penson was agreeable to the proposal, provided that Canada established an Army Post Office to handle Canadian mail. Such mail would be franked, and would be carried on the Newfoundland Railway and by ship at the usual rates. Canadian letters to points within Newfoundland or outside Canada would be required to bear Newfoundland stamps. If the proposal is to be proceeded with, consultations should be entered into with the Departments of the Newfoundland Government concerned, as questions will arise as to postal orders, parcel post and telegrams.

*Acquisition of Property:*

The request of the Canadian Government that the Newfoundland Government should assume the cost of acquiring private property required by the Canadian forces was further considered.

Mr. Penson stated that, since Newfoundland had foregone the annual grant-in-aid from Great Britain of between four and five million dollars, the financial resources of the country were strained to the utmost, and many important services have been seriously curtailed or abandoned. Under the circumstances, the Newfoundland Government was not in a position to assume financial liability for the purchase of property.

In addition, the Newfoundland representatives stated that on political grounds, also, difficulty would be seen in making contributions for the purchase of property required by Canada.

No payment has yet been made by Canada to the owners of Lester's Field, and it had been suggested to the Newfoundland representatives that a lease be procured for one year with an option for renewal from year to year.

The Newfoundland representatives stated that, when this Field was taken over for military purposes, it was understood that the occupation was to be for the period of hostilities and for a reasonable period thereafter; and that this should be taken into consideration when acquiring rights to the property.

The Newfoundland representatives stated that their Government will assist in every way possible the acquisition by Canada of private property and that a Board had been set up, consisting of the Hon. Mr. Justice Higgins, F. W. Bradshaw and J. B. Baird, to settle compensation, in the event of failure to reach agreements with private owners.

The Newfoundland representatives further indicated that the development of an Airfield at Torbay would entail a considerable expenditure on upkeep of about eight miles of road between the Airport and St. John's, the present road not being constructed to carry heavy vehicles. This matter was left over for further consideration.

#### *Aircraft Detection Corps:*

No further progress could be made on this subject until plans have been submitted by the Canadian forces outlining definite plans and requirements.<sup>1</sup>

185.

NPA S-4-2-1

#### *Procès-verbal d'une réunion de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

#### *Minutes of a Meeting of Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, June 19, 1941

His Excellency the Governor presided.

The following Commissioners were present:

- The Honourable Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare.
- The Honourable Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education.
- The Honourable Commissioner for Public Utilities.
- The Honourable Commissioner for Justice.
- The Honourable Commissioner for Natural Resources.

<sup>1</sup> Les deux gouvernements avaient l'intention de se rencontrer à nouveau afin de «conclure un accord général», mais avec la nomination d'un haut commissaire canadien en juillet 1941 (section 3 a v), la nécessité de cette rencontre disparut.

<sup>1</sup> Both governments intended to have a further meeting for the purpose of "concluding a general agreement" but, with the appointment of a Canadian High Commissioner in July, 1941 (Section 3 a v) the need for such a meeting ceased to exist.

There were also present:

Major-General H. D. G. Crerar, D.S.O., Chief of the General Staff, Canadian Army.

Major-General W. H. P. Elkins, O.B.E., D.S.O., Chief of the Atlantic Command, Canadian Army.

Brigadier Phillip Earnshaw, D.S.O., M.C., Officer Commanding Canadian Forces in Newfoundland.

Colonel R. B. Gibson, V.D., General Staff Officer, Canadian Army.

Commodore L. W. Murray, R.C.N., Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Forces, R.C.N.

Captain C. N. R. Schwerdt, C.V.O., R.N., Second in Command of the Newfoundland Forces, R.C.N.

After welcoming the visitors His Excellency stated that the relations between the Canadian Naval and Military Forces and Newfoundlanders were cordial and pleasant.

He stated that the question of command, as between the Canadian and United States Forces, was rather obscure and wondered if Major-General Crerar could throw any light upon this point.

Major Crerar said there had been two different conceptions as to the way in which the war would develop and plans had been made to meet either contingency. The first envisaged North America against the Axis Powers. Recent developments, however, had inclined the Joint Defence Board to the view that the battle front will be confined to the United Kingdom and the Middle and Far East. Consequently the question of a unified command does not arise. The respective forces are carrying along happily. The plan for Newfoundland does not indicate that Canadian troops will come under control of United States Commanders nor that United States forces will be under the control of Canadian Commanders.

The present position is that Canadian Forces will be responsible for the defence of Newfoundland and will co-operate with United States forces in the defence of their Bases.

The United States forces will be responsible for the defence of the Eastern area (whatever that means) and will co-operate with the Canadians.

This arrangement would be difficult if large scale operations developed but such operations are not anticipated. There might possibly be sporadic bombing or bombardment or a small scale landing, and these would have to be dealt with by whatever troops were on the spot. This would apply also if the United States entered the war. There will be centralised Canadian command consisting of Brigadier Earnshaw, Commodore Murray and [Group-Captain] Guthrie, R.C.A.F. This will apply to the Newfoundland Airport also. The Canadian Government had approved the despatch of another Battalion which would probably be centred around the Airport, but rather more for political than military reasons. In the event of an attack the defences of the Airport would be mainly guns and aircraft. The United States are rather

sensitive about the Airport and rather than have them send troops the Canadians are doing it. The United States will be providing the Canadians with the necessary anti-aircraft guns. Six batteries have been asked for but at present the United States are short of the 3.7 guns required. The Canadians can provide the men to operate the guns.

With regard to the anxiety of the Canadian officer in charge at the Airport concerning the capacity of the Railway to cope with the increased requirements there, Major Crerar said the Joint Defence Board had discussed that point and thought the matter had been exaggerated. He understood they were providing 100 tank cars and some locomotives to operate between the Airport and Botwood. He agreed that it would probably be a long time before the main line would be unable to cope with requirements.

He did not think that a "Defence of the Western Hemisphere" complex was now governing developments. On the contrary the pronouncements of President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox indicated they believed the fighting would be confined to Europe. An attempted invasion of North America would be a most complicated military operation requiring command of the sea and command of the air neither of which the enemy would have at that distance from his bases. If the worst happened and England were over-run, an invasion of South America would follow, and North America would be isolated.

Commodore Murray expressed the opinion that if England were conquered and Africa and South America under enemy control there would be no necessity for an invasion of North America. An invasion of Greenland would only be on a small scale and for the twofold purpose of assisting raiders on the Atlantic and obtaining meteorological information. By an arrangement with the United States no meteorological information can now get to Germany to help their bombers attack England. He did not believe Newfoundland could be invaded. It is not a place that troops could be operated on an invasion scale.

Major Crerar said the Joint Defence Board met about fortnightly. Sometimes the Services Committee met apart from the Board. They are now engaged in working out Basic Plan 2 which involves the problem of convoying supplies to Great Britain. He was not a member of the Board but promised to take up with it the point raised regarding notifying the Newfoundland Government when any matter concerning Newfoundland was being considered. He stated the Canadians were up against the same position in their relations with the United States and had on several occasions been confronted with agreements already made between the United Kingdom and the United States, without prior consultation.

Commodore Murray stated that anti-submarine operations coupled with longer hours of daylight on the approaches to the Western Atlantic had been so successful that submarines had been driven further afield and it had become a necessity for the Admiralty to extend the anti-submarine escort system. They had selected St. John's as being the most convenient and, in



fact, the only port available. Hard pressed in the Mediterranean and hard pressed also financially, they had turned this operation over to Canada to run for them. They had selected him to take control and Captain Schwerdt ceased to be Naval Officer in Charge and was now his second in command. Canada and Newfoundland were thus sharing in half the Battle of the Atlantic. His Naval Command extended over the whole of the Island, including the Straits of Belle Isle, round the outside and waters to the seaward. Cabot Strait and the Gulf of St. Lawrence are under Canada.

It had been formally decided by the British Government that Canada should control the advanced Naval Base in Newfoundland. It would be necessary to acquire certain property on the waterfront and it was hoped it could be done with the least possible disturbance to commercial interests. In acquiring such property either by negotiation or requisition, the Canadian Government would not expect any better terms than a body such as the Compensation Board would obtain for them. He expected shortly to have a Real Estate Valuator come down who would appraise any properties to be taken.

He accepted the suggestion that it would be desirable to keep in touch with the Department of Public Works regarding matters connected with the acquisition of property, particularly in view of the fact that certain property owners were at present unaware of the fact that their premises might be taken. In cases where compulsory acquisition had to be resorted to it was of course essential that he should approach the Commissioner for Public Utilities.

The possibility of developing Harbour Grace as a subsidiary base is still under consideration. Use of it would involve the building of a breakwater and some buoys.

With the creation of a Naval Base in St. John's, the danger of an attack on the City is naturally increased. He did not know of any instance which quite paralleled the operation by Canada of a Naval Base in Newfoundland. In Halifax the Navy worked in co-operation with the commercial interests. The Harbour Master there, though not under Navy control, co-operates with it, and the pilots are occasionally controlled by the Navy.

Captain Schwerdt stated that no trouble had been experienced in working with the civilian authorities in St. John's except they were not organized on a war basis. It was inconvenient not to be able to get the Harbour Master at any hour of the night if required.

The Commissioner for Public Utilities stated arrangements were being made to appoint an Assistant Harbour Master which would overcome this difficulty.

Commodore Murray suggested the inauguration of a persistent campaign to discourage idle and loose talk concerning war developments and movements of shipping in St. John's.

W. J. CAREW

## SOUS-SECTION V/SUB-SECTION V

LA NOMINATION D'UN HAUT COMMISSAIRE CANADIEN  
APPOINTMENT OF A CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER

186.

1793-40

*Mémoire du conseiller<sup>1</sup> au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim  
aux Affaires extérieures<sup>2</sup>**Memorandum from Counsellor<sup>1</sup> to Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs<sup>2</sup>*

[Ottawa,] March 27, 1941

## CANADIAN REPRESENTATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND

1. Since the outbreak of war in September 1939 Newfoundland has been playing an increasingly large part in considerations relating to Canadian defence. Members of the Government have visited the Island on two occasions, a number of special emissaries have been sent to St. John's for specific discussions, and a more or less constant intercourse has been maintained through Service channels and by telegraphic communication between the Department of External Affairs and the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

2. Representatives of the Newfoundland Government have visited Ottawa and have attended meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence when Newfoundland matters have been under review.

3. At the present time there are at least six channels of communication between Canada and Newfoundland. These are as follows:

- (a) External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland;
- (b) National Defence to Officer Commanding in Newfoundland to Newfoundland authorities;
- (c) National Defence for Naval Services to Naval Officer Commanding, St. John's, to Newfoundland authorities;
- (d) National Defence for Air to Air Force and/or Munitions and Supply or Transport representatives at air bases in Newfoundland to Newfoundland authorities;
- (e) External Affairs to Dominions Office to St. John's;
- (f) Munitions and Supply or Department of Transport to officials in charge of construction at Newfoundland air bases to Newfoundland authorities.

4. The Canadian Government has now been asked to appoint representatives to meet with Newfoundland officials to work out a solution of certain problems of mutual interest which still require decision.

5. Although it would be inaccurate to say that our relations with Newfoundland have been prejudiced by the diversity of the channels of communication

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>2</sup> N. A. Robertson.

and certain failures on our part to keep the Newfoundland authorities fully apprised of Canadian plans, it would be fair to suggest that certain minor misunderstandings and delays might have been obviated if we had had a representative of the Newfoundland Government stationed in Ottawa and a Canadian representative stationed in St. John's.

6. It is quite clear that rather than decreasing in importance, our relations with Newfoundland during the remainder of this year, and until the end of the war, will be more important than they have been in the past. With Canada taking a very large measure of responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland; with Canadian military, naval and air forces established in, and possibly operating from, Newfoundland bases; with the expenditure of some \$5,000,000,000 [sic] by Canadian representatives in the Island immediately in prospect; with United States forces established in Newfoundland bases and with the United States Government maintaining a Consular representative (Consul General) in St. John's; with problems relating to the operation of foreign trawlers off the Newfoundland Banks and to fishing vessels from St. Pierre and Miquelon; with the increasing use of Newfoundland facilities for civil as well as military aircraft; and with a rapid growth in the number of financial, legal, immigration and customs problems which will require settlement by Ottawa and St. John's, it is most desirable that consideration should be given to the advisability of appointing an official representative of the Canadian Government to be stationed permanently, or at least until the end of the war, in St. John's. The value of such an appointment is recognized by officials of the defence Departments and it would do much to simplify and strengthen the contacts between the two Governments.

7. Although Newfoundland is not a Dominion it would perhaps please the people of the Island if the Canadian representative in St. John's were to be designated a "High Commissioner". If for any reason the Government of the United Kingdom should take exception to this designation, the Canadian representative could be described as "Canadian Commissioner" or "Canadian Agent".

8. If it should be decided to select a member of the External Affairs Service for this post, consideration might be given to bringing Kirkwood to St. John's and filling his post in Greenland by either A. E. Porsild or one of the junior officers of the Department, or both. If this should prove impracticable, Mr. H. A. Dyde might profitably be selected. Mr. Dyde has already visited Newfoundland and has been intimately associated with all the recent negotiations between Canada and the Government at St. John's. His personal qualities, moreover, would make him an admirable incumbent for such a post,

9. It is suggested that whoever may be appointed to St. John's should also be accredited as Canadian Consul to St. Pierre and Miquelon.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C. C. Eberts fut nommé vice-consul canadien à Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon le 19 août 1941.

<sup>1</sup> C. C. Eberts was appointed Canadian Vice-Consul in Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon on August 19, 1941.

187.

1793-40

*Mémoire du conseiller<sup>1</sup>*  
*Memorandum by Counsellor<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa,] April 21, 1941

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION IN NEWFOUNDLAND

I took advantage of the visit of Mr. Emerson and Mr. Price to remind them that a year ago Dr. Skelton had mentioned to Mr. Emerson the possibility that beneficial results might be obtained by an exchange of official representatives between Ottawa and St. John's. I asked Mr. Emerson if he had given any further thought to this matter. He replied that although at first it had appeared to the Commission of Government as though the appointment of a resident agent in Ottawa would be unnecessary extravagance he was inclined to think that the proposal might be viewed differently now as it has become apparent that relations between the two countries are becoming more intimate and more extensive. The difficulty from the Newfoundland point of view is now purely financial, but Newfoundland would be glad to receive a Canadian representative even if they find it impossible to finance an agent of their own in Ottawa.

I told Mr. Emerson and Mr. Price that we had not come to any definite conclusion with regard to making such an appointment but that further consideration would be given to the matter now that we were sure that Newfoundland would approve. In reply to a question, I said that in my opinion if we decided to send an agent to Newfoundland it would be an official with the rank of the order of a consul general, but that the question of title would have to be worked out and that I would be glad to have suggestions. Neither Mr. Price nor Mr. Emerson was able to suggest anything more satisfactory than "Canadian Agent" or "Canadian Commissioner".

There is no doubt, from the way in which the suggestion was received by the Newfoundland representatives, that the appointment of a Canadian Agent to St. John's would be very well received in the Island.

188.

1793-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*  
*to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] July 15, 1941

The question of Canadian representation in Newfoundland is again on the agenda of the War Committee. I am, therefore, summarizing, for your consideration, some of the reasons why the early appointment of a Canadian representative in Newfoundland would appear to be necessary.

<sup>1</sup>H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside



(1) As a result of the war, direct Canadian participation in the defence of Newfoundland has developed very rapidly. The R.C.A.F. are in charge of Newfoundland Airport and Botwood and are going ahead with plans for establishing a new base at Torbay. The Canadian Army has two battalions at Newfoundland Airport<sup>1</sup> and Botwood, a third at St. John's and coast defence artillery units at a number of points. The Canadian Navy has been given responsibility for the operation of the convoy escort force to be based on St. John's. The presence of Canadian armed forces in the Island has created a good many points of contact with the civilian authorities. Colonel Gibson's visits have resulted in the satisfactory clearing up of the principal outstanding points of difference, but there are continually questions arising, the settlement of which would undoubtedly be facilitated by the presence in the Island of an official representative of the Canadian Government as distinct from the officers commanding the various service detachments.

(2) The United States has, within the last few months, acquired a leased base at Argentia in Newfoundland, assumed further responsibility for coast defences at St. John's, and for the protection of the Newfoundland Airport. Local relations between the Canadian and American forces sharing in the defence of Newfoundland have been good, and it is important that they remain so. The major questions of policy defining Canadian-American responsibilities *vis-à-vis* Newfoundland will have to be settled between Ottawa and Washington, but there is room for useful work to be done in this field by a good Canadian representative on the spot. The recent decision of the United States Government to appoint a new and senior Consul General at St. John's, who will have the confidence of his Government and the local authorities to a greater degree than his predecessor did, is another argument for having Canadian representation in the Island of at least equivalent rank.

(3) The constitutional position of Newfoundland in the Commonwealth is anomalous. It is not a dominion, nor is it a colony. It has, during the last seven or eight years, been to a large extent under direct Dominions Office control. At the same time it is economically, socially and strategically closer to Canada than to any other part of the British Empire. Inevitably Newfoundland's international position is the resultant of a three-way pull—to the United Kingdom, to the United States and to Canada. Any modification of the present precariously balanced position is of direct interest to this country, and it would seem important that Canada be adequately and directly represented in the Island, particularly during the next year or two, which are likely to see important developments in the Island's relations with the three countries with which it is most closely connected.

(4) The internal political situation in Newfoundland is the counterpart of its anomalous constitutional position. Local government has been suspended for seven or eight years, while the administration has been under the control of a mixed Commission nominated from London, consisting half of United Kingdom officials and half of Newfoundlanders. The Commission is probably

<sup>1</sup>L'aéroport de Gander.

<sup>1</sup>Gander Airport.

giving Newfoundland better government than it has had for a long time, and has undoubtedly helped to put its financial house in order. British, Canadian and American spending for war purposes in Newfoundland is already reflected in the Island's income, which for the first time in years, has provided a surplus over current expenditures. This easing of the budgetary position is likely to strengthen the demand for a return to self-government. Any demand for structural changes in the internal government of Newfoundland is likely to be linked with a demand for a new definition of its external relations, and thus precipitate the always latent issue of Newfoundland's interest in Confederation.

(5) Our commercial, customs and fishery connections with Newfoundland are chronically unsatisfactory. The reasons for this state of affairs are pretty deep seated, though they have undoubtedly been aggravated by misunderstandings and lack of appreciation of the other country's problems and interests. A Canadian representative in Newfoundland could help to straighten out some of the snarls in which our trade and fishing relations with Newfoundland are now entangled.

(6) Apart from the continuing questions of commercial and fishery policy in which Canadian and Newfoundland interests tend to be at odds, attention might be drawn to a matter now before the Minister of Finance, who is being urged by the Canadian newsprint industry to make representations to the Newfoundland authorities against the price cutting policies of Newfoundland newsprint producers, which are alleged to be undercutting Canadian export business to the United States. This is an important and difficult question, in which our Government is naturally rather reluctant to move without fuller information than is provided by the *ex parte* statements of the Canadian producers. Clearly, if we had a High Commissioner in St. John's, our first step would be to ask him for a report on the facts, and, if they were found correct, the second step would be to ask him to discuss the whole situation informally with the Newfoundland authorities with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution of the problem. As matters stand, it is not a question which we can very well take up direct with London, and the prospects of reaching an agreement with Newfoundland by cable negotiations are poor.

(7) Under present conditions, the special position of St. Pierre and Miquelon has to be taken into account in any review of Canada's relations with Newfoundland. Newfoundland naturally takes a particular and almost proprietary interest in the future of these islands, but her interest is not quite the same as that of Canada. On grounds of general security, Newfoundland would be happier if St. Pierre and Miquelon were definitely outside the orbit of Vichy control. At the same time, Newfoundland would like to have the Islands, for both fisheries and customs purposes, assimilated to Newfoundland. In addition to our common interest in the greater security of the approaches to the St. Lawrence, Canada would naturally take a more sympathetic interest than Newfoundland in the importance of St. Pierre and

Miquelon as an outpost of Free France. At the same time, we might also be interested in keeping St. Pierre and Miquelon outside the Newfoundland customs and fisheries regime. Conceivably, under Canadian supervision, it might provide Nova Scotia fishermen with the base near the Banks for storing supplies and unloading fish which Newfoundland has hitherto refused to Canadian fishermen.<sup>1</sup>

(8) The foregoing paragraphs indicate the major political questions outstanding or in prospect between Canada and Newfoundland with which a Canadian High Commissioner in St. John's might be expected to deal. Apart from the fact that the presence of a resident Canadian representative in St. John's should make it easier to deal with dispatch with these questions of substantive policy, it may be noted at the present time that communications between the Canadian Government and the Newfoundland Commission of Government are complicated, first by the fact that in dealing with any given subject one is always in some doubt as to whether one should take it up direct by telegram with the Governor or whether one should approach Newfoundland through the intermediary of the United Kingdom Dominions Office. This uncertainty about channels of communication is a reflection of the anomalous political status of the Island Government. It should, I think, be clarified by the designation of a responsible Canadian High Commissioner in the Island, through whom all official communications from Canada to the Newfoundland authorities would pass.

(9) It is clear from an inspection of the files of the Department of External Affairs for the past six months that Canada has more varied, more important and more urgent business with Newfoundland than with all the self-governing Dominions in which we maintain High Commissioners put together. It may be difficult to get a good man to go to St. John's as High Commissioner, but it is clearly a post which requires an able man who is capable of gaining the confidence and friendship of the Newfoundlanders. One man who I think could fill it well is Mr. C. J. Burchell, now High Commissioner in Australia. He is a Maritimer, familiar not only with questions of Dominion-Provincial relations but with Commonwealth constitutional theory and practice—both important qualifications in view of the special problems which Newfoundland relations with Canada present. He is, however, doing a good job in Australia, and has not been there very long. He might feel that translation to Newfoundland was not a promotion, and in any case would probably not be available for two or three months. As a possible alternative nominee, you might wish to consider Mr. J. McGregor Stewart, presently Coal Administrator. Mr. Stewart is also a Maritimer, with a special knowledge of the problems of Dominion-Provincial relations, kept up to date by his experience as Dominion Counsel before the Rowell-Sirois Commission. I do

<sup>1</sup> La question de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon ainsi que des démêlés entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve à ce sujet sont documentés au volume 8, chapitre 3.

<sup>1</sup> The issue of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Canada's dealings with Newfoundland over this, are documented in Volume 8, Chapter 3.



not think he has Mr. Burchell's familiarity with questions of Commonwealth relations. On the other hand, as Coal Administrator, he has shown, in handling the very difficult wages and labour problems of the coal industry, qualities of imagination and sympathy which might stand him in good stead if the Government thought of asking him to go to Newfoundland as High Commissioner.

189.

763-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire en Australie*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to  
High Commissioner in Australia*

TELEGRAM 56

Ottawa, July 17, 1941

SECRET. Following from Prime Minister for High Commissioner. Begins. We have been giving a good deal of consideration in recent months to general question of Canadian relations with Newfoundland. In the past six months, Canada has had more varied, more important and more urgent business involving Newfoundland than with all the self-governing Dominions. These developments, due directly to the war and Canada's primary interest in the defence of Newfoundland, arise out of our taking over Newfoundland Airport and Botwood, the presence of a substantial Canadian infantry and artillery force in the Island, and, most recently, from Canadian assumption of responsibility for the operation of a convoy escort force which is to be based on St. John's. The political implications of these defence arrangements are obviously important. They are complicated by the fact that the United States is also maintaining substantial forces in the Island, over and above its naval establishment in the leased base at Argentia.

In addition to our immediate military and strategic interest in Newfoundland, we have had to take into account long run trends in the development of Newfoundland relations with Canada which are likely to be accelerated by war developments. The suspension of self-government and the resulting anomalous position of Newfoundland within the Commonwealth are both likely to be transitional phases in the evolution of the Island.

During the next year or two the question of Newfoundland's relation to Confederation is quite likely to become an important issue. In the circumstances, we think it desirable to emphasize Canada's special relationship with Newfoundland, and propose to do so by appointing a High Commissioner there.

Your knowledge of Maritime situation, familiarity with Commonwealth constitutional problems and Dominion-Provincial relations and your faculty for making friends, which has stood you in such good stead in Australia, have led my colleagues and me to the conclusion that you are particularly well



fitted to handle the Newfoundland situation better than anybody else. We are reluctant to suggest your return from Australia, where the usefulness of your work has been everywhere appreciated. Menzies,<sup>1</sup> in particular, spoke most warmly of you when he was in Ottawa. I would, however, be grateful if you would give your immediate and serious consideration to the suggestion put forward in this telegram, and let me know, as quickly as possible, whether you would, in all the circumstances, be willing to assume Newfoundland post and if so, how soon you would be able to take it over. Ends.

190.

1793-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 56

Ottawa, July 19, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Canadian Government have been increasingly aware of inadequacy under war conditions of present contacts between Canada and Newfoundland. We feel that presence of a Canadian High Commissioner in St. John's would facilitate settlement of questions of mutual concern to our Governments and strengthen our collaboration in defence field. In the circumstances we would wish to make an early announcement of our intention to appoint a High Commissioner to Newfoundland, and should be glad to learn, as quickly as possible, that this step would be acceptable to your Government. We shall of course advise you of our nomination for the post before any public announcement is made. A copy of this telegram is being communicated to the Government of the United Kingdom for their information.

191.

1793-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 46

St. John's, July 22, 1941

Addressed to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 46, repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 379.

Your telegram of July 19th, No. 56. Government of Newfoundland would welcome the appointment of a High Commissioner in Newfoundland to represent the Government of the Dominion of Canada. It is noted that you will advise us of your nomination for the post before any public announcement is made. A copy of this telegram is being communicated to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

<sup>1</sup> Robert Menzies, premier ministre d'Australie.

<sup>1</sup> Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia.

192.

1793-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 58

Ottawa, July 23, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 46 of July 22nd. I have pleasure in informing you that Charles J. Burchell, K.C., first High Commissioner for Canada in the Commonwealth of Australia, has been appointed as High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland. It is expected that announcement of Mr. Burchell's appointment will be made public in Ottawa within the next day or two. In the meantime, it would be appreciated if it could be kept confidential.

193.

1793-40

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*  
*to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] October 10, 1941

I am enclosing copy of a letter from the United Kingdom High Commissioner about the title of our representative in Newfoundland confirming a conversation which you had with Lord Cranborne in London. The objection to Burchell's designation as High Commissioner seems to me to be pretty far-fetched, and, as long as the United Kingdom sends a High Commissioner to the Native Territories in South Africa, I do not think we should be unduly worried about the fact that Newfoundland's form of Government prevents it using the style of High Commissioner for any representative whom it may have occasion to send abroad.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

766/45

Ottawa, September 9, 1941

My dear Mr. Robertson,

I have heard from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that while you were in England he spoke to the Prime Minister about the title of the Canadian representative in Newfoundland. The position is that, though Newfoundland used to have a High Commissioner in London, they discontinued the practice when the new form of Government was instituted in

1934, and it might accordingly be embarrassing for any Newfoundland representative in Canada, should there be one hereafter, to be designated "High Commissioner".

I understand that Mr. Mackenzie King agreed that this point should be borne in mind for consideration when the next appointment to this post has to be made; and as you will have been assailed with such hosts of matters through every hour of your stay in England I have thought it might be helpful if I wrote this note to you by way of record.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOM MACDONALD

194.

1793-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au Premier ministre*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Prime Minister*

PERSONAL

St. John's, October 14, 1941

Dear Mr. King,

I have become quite settled here and will be very happy if there is enough work for me to do.

I note that there have been recent changes in command here under which both the Canadian Navy and the Canadian Air Force come under the command of the American Navy and I can understand how it might very well happen that with the constantly changing program, it may be that the American Forces may take over complete command of the defence of Newfoundland. In that event, I am afraid there might not be sufficient work for this particular High Commissioner in Newfoundland.

In the possible event of such contingency, I thought it might be advisable for me to let you know that I should be very glad to return to my former post in Australia.

I think perhaps I might be of special value there since the change of government, as my relations with Mr. Curtin and several members of his Party, and also with the Labour Premiers of both New South Wales and Queensland, were particularly happy. I have a great respect, and indeed admiration, for Mr. Curtin, Mr. Forgan Smith and Mr. McKell. My relations with them have been very friendly. I am afraid that possibly you may have some difficulty in finding a suitable man to go to Australia who would fit in with the Labour leaders there.

Please understand, however, that I am writing this letter only in view of the possible change which I mentioned in the opening paragraph.

I have a host of friends in Newfoundland who have been exceedingly kind to me and so long as I have any work of value to perform for Canada, I should be glad to remain here as long as you desire me to do so.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

195.

1793-40

*Le Premier ministre au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Prime Minister to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] November 18, 1941

Dear Mr. Burchell,

Thank you very much for your letter of October 14, which I have read with great interest. I am glad to know that you are comfortably settled in St. John's and I am glad to hear from time to time of the work that you are doing there.

The position in regard to command in Newfoundland is rather complicated. It is true, as you say, that the Canadian Naval Forces there are for certain purposes subject to the direction of the United States Admiral. The Royal Canadian Air Force units in Newfoundland, on the other hand, stand in a different relationship to the United States Commander, their activities being coordinated with those of United States units on the basis of "cooperation". The contingency to which you refer, namely, the taking over by the United States of complete command of the defence of Newfoundland is not, in my opinion, a likely development, although in time of war we cannot rule out any possibility, especially any that might make for efficient action. Even in such a contingency, however, the amount of work to be done by the Office of the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland would not be materially reduced. You occupy a post of very real importance and one that is likely to remain such for the duration of the War and for some time afterwards. I need hardly add that I am glad that it is in such capable hands.

Much as I appreciate your offer to return to Canberra, therefore, I am convinced that you can perform a larger national service by continuing in your present post. It was in the light of this conviction that the Government offered the Australian post to General Odlum who has now accepted the appointment.

I appreciate the desirability of having in Canberra as Canadian High Commissioner a man who will understand and be able to cooperate with the leaders of the Labour Party in that country. This, I am confident, General Odlum will be able to do.

In closing may I take this opportunity to send my best wishes to Mrs. Burchell as well as yourself.

With kindest regards, I am

Yours sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING



196.

1793-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 5

St. John's, January 6, 1942

My telegram No. 4<sup>1</sup> of January 5th concerning my status here. I should perhaps have pointed out to you that in the days of their Dominion status Newfoundland Government had a functionary in London called High Commissioner but he was almost completely ignored and all communications passed direct between Dominions Office and Newfoundland Government and High Commissioner was not even informed about them. You will appreciate therefore how important it is if I am to be of any service here that I should not be degraded in the eyes of the Newfoundlanders to the position of a Newfoundland High Commissioner.

197.

3768-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

St. John's, May 29, 1942

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Mr. Raymond Gushue spent last evening with me at my home and told me that he has been asked by the Commission of Government to be the representative of Newfoundland in Canada. He told me that what was proposed was that he should be appointed as High Commissioner to Canada. He said that this appointment would, of course, have to be subject to the approval of the Dominions Office and he did not know whether or not they would approve of Newfoundland appointing a High Commissioner.

Mr. Gushue has been running back and forth between St. John's, and Ottawa and Washington during the past three or four months, having made three or four trips since the 1st of March, and Sir Wilfrid Woods told me a few days ago, in the course of a casual conversation, that he had under consideration the matter of sending Mr. Gushue to reside in Ottawa in order to look after the interests of Newfoundland, both at Ottawa and at Washington. It did not occur to me at the time of this conversation that the idea was to appoint him High Commissioner. Indeed, I do not think

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Sir Wilfrid had that idea in mind himself when talking to me but that is the proposition under consideration at the present moment.

I would like to receive instructions from you by return airmail as to the attitude of Canada to such a proposal. My own recommendation would be that we should encourage the idea and perhaps should even go farther and recommend it to the Dominions Office in case the Dominions Office has any hesitation in approving such an appointment.

Sir Wilfrid Woods has not talked over the proposition with me but may do so within the next three or four days and I would like to be in a position to tell him definitely what Canada's attitude would be in the matter.

Mr. Gushue was born at Brigus, Newfoundland and is now in his forty-second year. He is a graduate of Dalhousie Law School, where he was Gold Medallist in Law and winner of the Carswell prize. He is a member of the Bar of Nova Scotia and of the Bar of Newfoundland. He was President of the Newfoundland Board of Trade in the years 1933-34. In 1936 he gave up his law practice to become the Chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board. The acceptance of this appointment meant a considerable sacrifice for him as he was getting well started on a lucrative practice.

Since my arrival in Newfoundland, I have heard nothing but good words of him in the fulfilment of his duties as Chairman of the Fisheries Board, both from the members of the Commission and from the public generally. Admittedly, he has one of the most difficult positions to fill satisfactorily in Newfoundland. I understand that at the time he accepted the appointment it was on the understanding that he be given a free hand, without interference from the Commission, and that the Act creating the Board gave him almost absolute powers. I understand, however, that his relations with the members of the Commission have been agreeable and I know they all think very highly of him and of his work. He is a very patriotic Newfoundlander and believes in Newfoundland for the Newfoundlanders. However, he may receive an enlarged vision after spending a year or two at Ottawa.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

198.

3768-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 16, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

I am sorry I have not replied before this to your letter of May 29th regarding the possible appointment of a representative of Newfoundland in

Canada. The Prime Minister, with whom I have only now had an opportunity of discussing the question, concurs in your own recommendation that we should cordially welcome such a development.

It is understood that such an appointment would have to be subject to the approval of the Dominions Office, and that such approval might conceivably not be forthcoming. I should be surprised, however, if any difficulties were put in the way of what would seem to be a sensible and useful arrangement. It is, of course, possible that the Dominions Office may have some observations to offer about the prospective representative's formal designation. As you know, the United Kingdom Government demurred a bit at your designation as High Commissioner in Newfoundland, suggesting that this style might appropriately be reserved for representatives exchanged between the fully self-governing members of the Commonwealth.

I am glad to be able to add that Mr. Gushue would be very welcome in Ottawa as the first representative of Newfoundland. He has many friends here with whom his work as Chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board has brought him in touch. They have all a high respect for the vigour and zeal with which he has always pursued Newfoundland's interests.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

199.

3768-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

766/49

Ottawa, September 16, 1942

My dear Mr. Wrong,

The Newfoundland Government recently suggested to the United Kingdom Government the appointment of an official Newfoundland representative accredited to the Canadian and United States Governments with a rank comparable to that of a High Commissioner.

The United Kingdom Government agree as to the desirability of the appointment of a Newfoundland representative on the North American continent, though they take the view that it would be constitutionally inappropriate for such a representative to be given the status of a High Commissioner. On the understanding, however, that the diplomatic representation of Newfoundland in Washington will continue to be undertaken by His Majesty's Embassy and that similarly matters on a political level would continue to be handled in Canada by this Office, the United Kingdom Government see no objection to the appointment of a Newfoundland representative with a status lower than High Commissioner, but with a title somewhat more impressive than "Trade Commissioner".

It is proposed that the Newfoundland representative should have his own office in Washington and his own communications with the Newfoundland Government and that he should not be attached to the Embassy there. He would have access to the various United States Departments, (excluding the State Department) and to agencies dealing with commercial, technical and supply matters affecting Newfoundland. He would not, however, have diplomatic status and for diplomatic purposes would come under the wing of the Ambassador with whom he would keep in close touch in all important matters.

The United States Government have agreed to an appointment involving the functions described in the preceding paragraph and to a proposal that the person appointed should be described as "Agent for Newfoundland". It is understood that they would have no objection to the Agent's duties being extended to include Canada.

In the circumstances I have been asked by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to enquire whether the Canadian Government would have any objection to the extension of the sphere of activity of the proposed Agent being extended to include Canada.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOM MACDONALD

200.

3768-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] November 4, 1942

On September 16th the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom enquired whether the Canadian Government would agree to receive an "Agent for Newfoundland". It was proposed that this officer should be appointed jointly to Washington and Ottawa, and that his duties would be confined to supply, commercial and technical questions. He would not be a political representative of the Government of Newfoundland and would not have access to the Department of State in Washington nor, presumably, the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. Political questions concerning Newfoundland would continue to be handled by the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada and by the British Ambassador to the United States.

We have not yet replied to this enquiry. When the question was first raised, informally, through Mr. Burchell it was thought that the Newfoundland Government desired to have a representative in Ottawa corresponding in function and position pretty much to our High Commissioner in St. John's.



We told Burchell that such an arrangement would be quite acceptable to us. The scheme now put forward, officially, differs in two important respects from that first suggested:

- (a) the representative of Newfoundland would be something appreciably lower than a High Commissioner, though senior to a Trade Commissioner. The appointment would not really correspond to Burchell's; and
- (b) the Agent for Newfoundland would be appointed to the United States as well as to Canada.

We have always objected to proposals from foreign governments for accrediting in Ottawa their ministers originally appointed to Washington. As regards lower ranks, this rule has not been rigorously enforced, particularly under war conditions. It is, however, I think still a sound rule and a strong case has to be made for breaking it.

I do not see much to be gained, either by Newfoundland or ourselves, from the type of representation the United Kingdom authorities are prepared to concede to Newfoundland. However, we do not want to be put in the position of discouraging an opportunity for closer contact between Canada and Newfoundland.

I am sending copies of the papers on the subject to our High Commissioner in St. John's and think we might defer a reply until we receive his views on the question.

201.

3768-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 1, 1942

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

In your letter of September 16th, 1942, you inquired whether the Canadian Government would be prepared to agree to the extension to Canada of the sphere of activity of an "Agent" to be appointed to Washington as a representative of Newfoundland. The delay in sending you a reply has not been due to any doubt as to our willingness to establish closer contacts with Newfoundland. It has been the result of our desire to re-examine the arguments upon which we have in the past based our consistent opposition to "sharing" an official representative with the United States.

On review the general considerations which have determined policy in the past seem still valid and perhaps particularly apposite in the case of Newfoundland.

The range and importance of our contacts with Newfoundland, particularly since the outbreak of the war, do make a strong case for stationing a Newfoundland representative here who would, insofar as the constitutional position of Newfoundland allows, be the counterpart of our High Commissioner in St. John's. So much for the question of "dual appointments".

As regards direct Newfoundland representation in Canada, we should certainly welcome it. For our part we would not see any real difficulty in the designating of the Newfoundland representative in Canada as a "High Commissioner". If your Government, however, maintain their objection to this title, it might be feasible to adopt a variation of the usage initiated in Ottawa by South Africa and to receive an "Accredited Representative of the Newfoundland Commission of Government." If the Newfoundland representative were to be known as an "Agent" and if his functions were to be circumscribed to a degree appropriate to that title, it would probably be difficult to find a Newfoundlander of adequate standing and ability who would be prepared to accept the appointment.

In the circumstances, the Canadian Government wishes it to be known that it would welcome the appointment of a Newfoundland representative in Ottawa, but on the understanding that such a representative would be accredited to Canada alone, that his title would be "High Commissioner" or "Accredited Representative" or some such suitable designation other than "Agent" and that his duties would generally correspond with those of a Dominion High Commissioner, though subject to whatever limitation in practice the present constitutional status of Newfoundland may make necessary.<sup>1</sup>

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

202.

2267-K-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, March 12, 1943

Dear Charlie [Burchell],

Your letter of February 25th<sup>2</sup> relative to the supply of dried fruits for Newfoundland incidentally brings up the question as to the appropriate means of communication on such matters between the Commission of

<sup>1</sup> Aucune réponse à cette lettre n'a été trouvée.

<sup>1</sup> No reply to this letter has been found.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Government and the Department of External Affairs. My letter of February 19th<sup>1</sup> was not explicit on this matter, though I may assure you that I did not intend to imply that communications should be routed directly from the Newfoundland authorities to the Department of External Affairs.

Under the procedure which is normally effective when there has been an exchange of diplomatic representatives between two countries or two members of the British Commonwealth of Nations each Government desiring to bring a matter to the attention of the other uses the facilities and channel of its own representative in the Capital of the other.

Such a procedure, however, is impossible in view of the anomalous situation existing between Newfoundland and Canada under which no reciprocal action has been taken by Newfoundland with respect to the opening of a High Commissioner's Office, (for reasons for which the Newfoundland authorities are by no means wholly responsible).

As a result of this situation your Office has undertaken a heavy burden of work which extends beyond what would ordinarily be the limit of your functions as a Canadian representative abroad. Indeed, you and members of your staff have been performing valuable service on behalf of the Newfoundland Government and people which, it is hoped, will be as much appreciated by them as it is commended by us.

In view of the fact that you are undertaking these "extra curriculum" activities it is obviously essential that you be fully and immediately informed of communications addressed by the Commission of Government to the Canadian Government as well as *vice versa*.

While we cannot instruct the Commission of Government to this effect, we shall avail ourselves of every occasion which presents itself to bring it into practice, and I would suggest that you informally suggest to the Commissioners that under existing circumstances it would be advantageous to both Governments to have communications from Newfoundland transmitted through your Office.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

203.

3768-40

*Mémoire du conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures<sup>2</sup> au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>2</sup> to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] September 20, 1943

#### NEWFOUNDLAND REPRESENTATION TO CANADA

1. Mr. Burchell has raised again the question of a representative for Newfoundland in Ottawa. He points out that he is in a rather invidious

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> R. A. MacKay.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

position without an opposite number in Ottawa. He suggests that if a representative were appointed he might supervise Newfoundland's relations with the United States as well. He notes that Newfoundland has already appointed a trade representative to Washington. Mr. Burchell points out, however, that it would be virtually impossible to get a Newfoundlander of standing to accept a post of lesser rank than that of a High Commissioner.

2. My own opinions, for what they are worth, correspond in general with those of Mr. Burchell. My opinions have been reinforced by impressions of the conference between Newfoundland, Canadian and United States officials held last week on the subject of civilian supplies for Newfoundland. The Newfoundland delegation came to Ottawa with several grievances, most of which evaporated completely after discussion. Moreover, Newfoundland has not been getting all the supplies of certain items to which it was entitled by the Agreement of last March, partly because they haven't known how to go about getting them. Most of these difficulties probably would not have arisen had Newfoundland even a trade representative in Canada.

3. While the Canadian Government has opposed the appointment by any foreign government of a single representative to act for it in Ottawa and Washington jointly, Newfoundland's position is not on all fours with that of any foreign government. Canada's relations with Newfoundland are more intimate, and ordinarily of greater importance to Newfoundland than are Newfoundland's relations with the United States. In the case of an appointment to both Governments jointly, official business with the United States would likely be less in quantity than official business in Canada, unlike the case, say, of a South American country.<sup>1</sup> Assuming the consent of the Dominions Office, which has hitherto not been forthcoming, there would thus appear to be no serious objection to the appointment of a single representative to Ottawa and Washington jointly. It might, of course, be desirable to enter certain reservations in accepting a representative of Newfoundland on these conditions: for example, it might be on the understanding that he reside in Ottawa; or that his functions as representative to the United States might be of a commercial or consular rather than of a diplomatic character; or he might be accepted as the accredited representative of Newfoundland to Canada on the understanding that we should have no objections to his acting as a temporary representative to the United States when official business between Newfoundland and the United States required.

4. It would probably be improper for Canada to propose to the Dominions Office that a representative be appointed, but it should not be improper for us to suggest, quite informally, that we should have no objection should the Dominions Office see fit to withdraw its objection of the appointment of a High Commissioner for Newfoundland to Canada.

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<sup>1</sup> Dans les années qui suivirent, le gouvernement canadien accepta plusieurs représentants de pays de l'Amérique latine en résidence à Washington.

<sup>1</sup> In later years the Canadian Government accepted several representatives of Latin American countries who were resident in Washington.



It is suggested that advantage might be taken of Dr. Keenleyside's approaching visit to the United Kingdom in connection with the Fisheries Conference<sup>1</sup>, and that he might sound out Dominions Office in the matter.\*

204.

Canada House AR 26/7

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve<sup>2</sup>*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland<sup>2</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, May 18, 1944

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

It has become customary when a new Chief of Mission is appointed for him to be given an informal letter or memorandum setting forth in general terms the principal questions which should engage his attention after his arrival at his new post. I enclose a memorandum of this nature which is intended for your general information and guidance on your assumption of your duties as High Commissioner in Newfoundland.

Yours sincerely,

H. H. WRONG

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Mémoire

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, May 17, 1944

THE PURPOSE AND WORK OF THE  
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
IN NEWFOUNDLAND

On the occasion of your acceptance of the post of Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland it may be useful to indicate in a brief form

<sup>1</sup> Aucune documentation relative à ce projet ne fut trouvée. Il semble que le projet mourut du manque d'accord entre les gouvernements impliqués.

<sup>1</sup> No further documentation of this project has been found. It seems to have died for want of agreement among the governments concerned.

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

This seems the least unsatisfactory arrangement. R[OBERTSON]

<sup>2</sup> C. J. Burchell demeura haut commissaire jusqu'en janvier 1944 alors que H. L. Keenleyside lui succéda et assura l'intérim pendant dix semaines. En mai 1944, J. S. Macdonald fut nommé haut commissaire et détint le poste jusqu'en mai 1948. En septembre 1948, après que le gouvernement canadien eut réagi positivement à un vote favorable à la Confédération lors du second référendum tenu cette année-là, C. J. Burchell retourna à Terre-Neuve en tant que haut commissaire et y demeura jusqu'en mars 1949.

<sup>2</sup> C. J. Burchell remained High Commissioner until January, 1944, when he was succeeded by H. L. Keenleyside who was Acting High Commissioner for ten weeks. J. S. Macdonald was named High Commissioner in May, 1944 and held the post until May, 1948. In September, 1948, after the Canadian Government had reacted positively to a vote favourable to Confederation in the second referendum of that year, C. J. Burchell returned as High Commissioner and remained until March, 1949.

some of the considerations underlying the establishment and maintenance of this Office. The following paragraphs are, of course, not intended to give a complete record of Canadian purposes in and policies relating to Newfoundland, but to indicate the general plan along which it is desired that the High Commissioner should proceed and the major lines of policy which he should follow.

While Newfoundland has relinquished for the time being its right to self-government, it has been and is being treated as an autonomous country in all formal relationships by the Canadian Government. The purposes of your office being to further the execution of national policies, it is perhaps possible to summarize these in the case of Newfoundland by saying that the Canadian Government desires:

- (a) to overcome the traditional suspicion of Canada in the minds of the people of Newfoundland and to substitute therefor an attitude of confidence and friendship;
- (b) to strengthen the economic relationships between the two countries to their mutual advantage;
- (c) to obtain and retain the co-operation of Newfoundland in the defence of that country, of Canada, and the Continent, and in the prosecution of the war.

These are generalities, but they are generalities against which individual instances and problems can profitably be measured and judged.

#### Removal of Suspicion and Promotion of Confidence

With regard to the first of these objectives of policy,—to overcome the traditional suspicion and to encourage confidence and friendship,—it is perhaps worth noting that Canada's defence activities in Newfoundland have given rise to considerable misunderstanding and misapprehension as to Canada's intentions. The people of Newfoundland are jealous of their position as "Britain's oldest colony" and naturally many, and perhaps most, Newfoundland people would prefer to see Newfoundland continue as a separate political community within the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Canadian Government has consistently respected this desire and, although it has been necessary to have due regard for the exigencies of defence, the Canadian Government has carefully avoided taking any steps or using any methods which might be interpreted as tending to manœuvre Newfoundland into federation.

In this connection the statement of the Prime Minister to Parliament on July 12, 1943 should be constantly borne in mind:

I would say that Canadians like and admire the people of Newfoundland. They are attached to them by bonds of sentiment and by the memory of dangers shared and victories won together. They look forward to a continuation of the friendship and co-operation which have increasingly marked our relations during recent years. Canadians are interested in the defence of Newfoundland which is so vital a part of the defence of the continent and the hemisphere. They hope that the people of Newfoundland will find some wholly satisfactory solution of the

political and economic problems which confront them. They will be happy if, in any way, they can contribute to the solution of these problems, many of which are common to both countries.

If the people of Newfoundland should ever decide that they wish to enter the Canadian federation and should make that decision clear beyond all possibility of misunderstanding, Canada would give most sympathetic consideration to the proposal.

It is only to be expected that the presence of large numbers of Canadian armed forces in Newfoundland may, from time to time, give rise to friction with the people of Newfoundland. While the discipline of the armed forces is exclusively the responsibility of the officers commanding the respective services, it should be your constant care, in co-operation with the officers commanding, to assist in preserving harmonious relations between the armed forces and the people of Newfoundland. Moreover, any negotiations with the Government of Newfoundland covering matters of policy relating to defence or the relations between the armed forces and the Government of Newfoundland, should be conducted through your Office.

#### Economic Relations

With regard to the second objective of Canadian policy,—that of strengthening economic relations between the two countries,—it may be observed that Canada is the main source of supply to the people of Newfoundland and that Canada has assumed definite responsibilities with the United States, for assuring Newfoundland a fair share of available supplies during the present stringency. The appointment of a Trade Commissioner to Newfoundland has relieved the High Commissioner's Office of most of the responsibility for this undertaking, but close co-operation between you and the Trade Commissioner will be essential.

In the marketing of one commodity, fish and fish products, Newfoundland and Canada were serious competitors in pre-war years. It is hoped that co-operative measures for the conservation and the development of the Atlantic fisheries, in which Newfoundland and Canada have a common interest, can be developed and that at least the worst features of competition for markets in the post-war era can be avoided. It should be your concern to report carefully on all matters relating to fisheries and any suggestions you may have for fostering co-operation between the two countries in dealing with fisheries problems will be welcomed.

Recently Newfoundland has been undergoing a serious inflation due to the rising cost of imports, the relatively large expenditures there on defence, the shortage of supplies, and the failure of local price control administration. This situation is of importance to Canada. It is also probable that the cessation of defence construction may result in serious economic difficulties for Newfoundland. These conditions should be carefully watched and reported.

As you know, the mining industry in Newfoundland is an essential source of supply for the steel and aluminum industries of Eastern Canada. Recent

discoveries in Newfoundland, notably of iron ore deposits on the west coast of Newfoundland and in Labrador, and the fluoride deposit at Bay St. Lawrence, are of considerable significance to all Eastern Canada. It is suggested that these developments should be carefully watched and reported.

## Defence

With respect to the third objective of policy,—to maintain the co-operation of Newfoundland in defence and in the prosecution of the war,—it may be observed that co-operation between the two Governments during the war has been wide-spread and satisfactory. The Canadian Government appreciates the readiness with which the Newfoundland Government has made available facilities essential for the purposes of defence, and there is every reason to anticipate that this co-operation will continue throughout the present emergency.

It is, however, obvious that Canada's defence interests in Newfoundland will not terminate with the war. By the Protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement of April, 1941, both the United Kingdom and the United States have expressly recognized that "The defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence." Presumably, this recognition covers the whole period of the lease agreement, i.e. ninety-nine years. In general, it should be your concern to see that Canada's long-term defence interests in Newfoundland and Labrador are secured. There has been some opposition among the people of Newfoundland towards granting Canada property rights beyond the duration of the war. In general, the Canadian Government has not pressed for post-war defence rights, except in the case of certain specific properties of vital interest to the defence of Canada in Newfoundland. Canada has requested, and has been promised by the Newfoundland Government, title to defence areas as follows:

To Goose Air Base—ninety-nine year lease;

To Bay Bulls Naval Property—ninety-nine year lease;

To Torbay Air Base—title in fee simple;

To areas at Gander and Botwood on which hangar and other permanent defence structures have been erected, "security of tenure" up to fifty years.

To none of these properties has title yet been confirmed. It should be your concern in general to secure the completion of these agreements, but you will receive specific instructions about them from time to time.

The presence of United States forces and the possession by the United States of bases in Newfoundland raise special problems of Canadian-United States relations. Co-operation between Canadian and American defence forces in Newfoundland has so far been harmonious, and this condition may be expected to continue. Normally, relations between the armed forces of the two countries are the responsibility of the respective Officers Commanding in Newfoundland, but it should be your concern to assist in



straightening out any difficulties which may not be settled through the usual channels, and, in general, to facilitate the co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries. In such matters you will no doubt have the continued assistance of the United States Consul General.

It should be remembered that under the Bases Agreement Canada, as well as Newfoundland, should be consulted, should the United States desire to acquire further properties or rights for defence purposes in Newfoundland. While it is not suggested that the United States is seeking further defence rights in Newfoundland, Canada's interests with respect to the United States position in Newfoundland should be constantly borne in mind.

#### Civil Aviation

Canada is also interested in Newfoundland because of its strategical position with respect to trans-Atlantic civil aviation. The use of airfields in Newfoundland and Labrador will be almost essential if Canada is to participate on equal terms in post-war civil aviation across the Atlantic. Present arrangements between Canada and Newfoundland in the matter of civil aviation are only temporary, but it is hoped mutually satisfactory arrangements can be made for the post-war period. In the meantime it should be your concern to watch carefully any developments in civil aviation in Newfoundland which may seem of adverse or beneficial interest to Canada.

#### Cultural Relations

As indicated in the Prime Minister's statement of July 12, 1943, Canada's policy towards Newfoundland is that of a "Good Neighbour", prepared to consider Newfoundland's problems sympathetically and, by inference, to assist, if possible, when assistance is desired. One way in which Canada has been assisting Newfoundland is by the provision of educational films. From time to time also, Newfoundland has also requested the services of technical personnel in medical and scientific services. It is suggested that this policy should be fostered as occasion offers.

#### The Future of Newfoundland

The future of Newfoundland is obviously a matter of concern to Canada. Reports on economic development, social conditions, public finance, and especially reports on opinion in Newfoundland as to the island's future status will, therefore, be useful. In view of the peculiar geographical relationship of Labrador to Canada, and in view of the interest of certain sections of the Canadian people in Labrador, reports about opinion in Newfoundland as to the future of Labrador may also be useful.

#### Travelling

Finally, it is hoped that you will take or find opportunities to acquaint yourself with conditions and opinion in settled areas outside St. John's. Although business and government are centred in St. John's it can scarcely be said that conditions or opinion there are a true picture of those in the "outports".

## SECTION B

LA COMMISSION PERMANENTE CANADO-AMÉRICAIN  
DE DÉFENSE (CPCAD)<sup>1</sup>THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE (PJDB)<sup>1</sup>

205.

JWP vol. 1 p. 134

*Extrait de The Mackenzie King Record**Excerpt from the Mackenzie King Record*

[ , August 17, 1940]

. . . Mackenzie King "asked how soon the Board would meet and where. The President added a sentence [to the statement] to say that the Board would meet shortly. I [Mackenzie King] said I thought it might be well to have them meet this coming week and asked if he had any preference as to where they should meet. As he did not express a preference, I suggested it might be well for them to meet in Ottawa." Mackenzie King felt "it would be logical in that we had been working on the problems and the first thing would be for their men to become familiar with what we already knew. Power, for instance, today was in Newfoundland.<sup>2</sup> He would be back and could state the situation as he found it there. The President said that that would be first rate. His idea was after a meeting in Ottawa, they might all wish to go to Newfoundland or to the Maritimes generally with a view to viewing matters concretely.

"The President read the statement a second time. I approved it in its entirety. Mr. Stimson thought it was all right." The statement<sup>3</sup> was then given to the press . . .

<sup>2</sup> Le 16 août 1940, le président Roosevelt téléphona à Mackenzie King et l'invita à le rencontrer le lendemain soir à bord de son train à Ogdensburg, N.Y. Il voulait s'entretenir avec King sur «l'échange de destroyers pour des bases» ainsi que sur «la défense mutuelle de nos côtes de l'Atlantique». Au cours d'une réunion tenue après dîner le 17 août, les deux chefs s'entendirent sur l'établissement d'une commission conjointe pour étudier les problèmes de défense commune, commission devant également faire des recommandations au gouvernement du Canada et des États-Unis. Ils convinrent également de l'appeler, la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense.

<sup>3</sup> Voir le document 171.

<sup>3</sup> L'accord d'Ogdensburg (voir l'appendice C).

<sup>1</sup> On August 16, 1940, President Roosevelt telephoned Mackenzie King and invited him to meet him the following evening in his train at Ogdensburg, N.Y. He wanted to talk to King about the "destroyers for bases deal" and about "the matter of mutual defence of our coasts on the Atlantic". In the course of an after-dinner meeting on August 17, the two leaders agreed on the establishment of a joint board to study common defence problems and to make recommendations to the Canadian and United States governments. They also agreed to call it the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 171.

<sup>3</sup> The Ogdensburg Agreement (See Appendix C).

206.

King Papers C282268

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, August 18, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE, MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

11. The President [Roosevelt] will take up direct with your Government matters pertaining to bases in colonies including matters pertaining to Newfoundland. As you are aware, Canadian government is already assisting in defence of Newfoundland and is, at the moment, contemplating additional large expenditure for developments there. There will probably be necessity for co-operation between the three governments in matters pertaining to that island.

207.

703-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in the United States*

TELEGRAM 176

Ottawa, August 19, 1940

SECRET. With reference to announcement by Prime Minister and President regarding appointment of a Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Will you please get in touch at once with appropriate officials. Point out that the Announcement under reference stated that the Board would be "set up at once" and "commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems". In view of this fact the Canadian Government proposes that the first meeting of the Board should be held in Ottawa on Thursday the 22nd of August.

Questions of organization will require decision. It is hoped, however, that these can be followed immediately by consideration of certain of the major aspects of the problems with which the Board is being appointed to deal. United States suggestions for the Agenda will be most welcome. For its part the Canadian Government proposes that attention be given at once to the following matters:

1. The defence of Newfoundland, including
  - (a) Sea defences
  - (b) Air defences
  - (c) Coastal defences
2. The defence of the West Coast under the same headings
3. The question of reciprocal manoeuvres
4. Procurement of armament and ammunition

208.

JWP vol. 1 p. 138

*Extrait de The Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>*  
*Excerpt from the Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa, August 20, 1940]

. . . "Hanson said if there were no Minister, it would not have a political significance. I [Mackenzie King] said it was quite possible a Minister would sit in with Board as, for example, Power, when he returns, would be able to speak of conditions in Newfoundland. . ."

209.

DND (DH) 193.009(D2)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 21, 1940

. . .

1. Proposed Formation of Permanent Joint Defence Board

Consideration was given to the procedure which should be adopted and the subjects which would require discussion at these meetings. It was suggested that one or more preliminary meetings between high-ranking members of the Services would be necessary to deal with explanations of policy, with the ways and means of giving effect to recently approved governmental policy and with practical measures of co-operation in the present and subsequent phases of the war. In other words, the task of these first meetings would be to prepare the basis for a Joint Plan of Defence. The Committee felt that the actual working out of the Plan in detail would be best carried out by a number of ad hoc committees reporting to the Permanent Board.

The Committee considered it essential that it should be provided with information on the following:

- (a) The general nature of the agreement, if any, between Great Britain and the United States with regard to the leasing of bases in Newfoundland and other Atlantic islands,
- (b) Details, if any, regarding the location of bases by the United States,
- (c) It is possible that the United States might request the lease of Botwood Bay (Nfld.) as a sea-plane base, Gander Lake Airport (Nfld.) as a base for shore-based aircraft and St. John's (Nfld.) as an advanced naval base.

<sup>1</sup>R. B. Hanson, chef de l'opposition officielle et Grote Stirling, député conservateur et ancien ministre de la Défense nationale durant les derniers mois de l'administration Bennett, reçoivent de Mackenzie King des renseignements concernant la CPCAD. La rencontre entre ces trois hommes eut lieu à la demande de Hanson.

<sup>1</sup>R. B. Hanson, Leader of the Official Opposition and Grote Stirling, Conservative M.P. who had been Minister of Defence in the closing months of the Bennett administration, are being briefed by Mackenzie King on the PJBD. The meeting took place at Hanson's request.



Each one of these bases is important from the standpoint of Canadian defence. Our defence plan would be prejudiced if we were to lose the privilege of using these facilities. Any lease by G.B. to the U.S. should provide for the joint use of the bases mentioned.

It must be remembered that we are at war and the United States is not at war. Moreover, we have no indication at the moment that the United States will intervene until such time as an operation for purposes of occupation is directed at our shores.

It is suggested that:

- (i) Every effort be made to persuade Great Britain that leases of bases in Newfoundland should be qualified by a clause which would enable Canada to be joint users [sic] of such bases.
- (ii) Every effort be made to find out the attitude which the United States would adopt subsequent to the occupation of such bases. Will she patrol such areas as we patrol and resist the entry of enemy forces by sea or air into such areas or will she patrol for exercise purposes only and resist only after she has entered the war.
- (iii) In consequence of (ii) above it is important that we attempt to obtain from the United States a specific statement as to the type of warlike action in the Western Atlantic which would cause her entry into the war.

The Committee further considered that some of the problems to be dealt with by ad hoc Committees were:

- (a) United States facilities available to Canada
- (b) Canadian facilities available to United States
- (c) Newfoundland—sea defences
- (d) Intercommunication arrangements
- (e) Material and supplies
- (f) Armaments and ammunition
- (g) Reciprocal manoeuvres
- (h) West Coast

. . .

210.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, August 26, 1940

1. The first meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was held in Room 479, House of Commons building, Ottawa, commencing at 3:00

P.M. on Monday the 26th of August, 1940. The following members participated:

Canadian Members<sup>1</sup>

Mr. O. M. Biggar,  
Brig. Kenneth Stuart,  
Capt. L. W. Murray,  
Air Commodore A. A. L. Cuffe,  
Mr. H. L. Keenleyside,

United States Members<sup>1</sup>

The Hon. F. H. LaGuardia,  
Lieut-Gen. S. D. Embick,  
Capt. H. W. Hill,  
Commader F. P. Sherman,  
Lt.-Col. J. T. MacNarney,  
Mr. J. D. Hickerson,

Major Gullett, United States Military Attaché in Ottawa and Major Gailey, aide-de-camp to Mayor LaGuardia, were also present.

2. Mayor LaGuardia suggested that Mr. Biggar should act as Chairman. The latter proposed that Mayor LaGuardia should join him in a joint chairmanship and this was accepted.

3. After appropriate introductory remarks by the Chairman, there followed a brief general discussion from which it was clear that all members of the Board recognized that the Board's functions are to make recommendations to the two Governments in respect to the defence of Canada and the United States.

...

6. At the request of Mr. Biggar the Service representatives of the Canadian Section of the Board gave a general statement of Canada's defence position.

(A) Captain Murray described the naval situation. In answer to questions arising from Captain Murray's statement Mr. Keenleyside outlined briefly the constitutional position of Newfoundland *vis-à-vis* Canada and the United Kingdom.

...

8. The Board then turned to an examination of the problem of the defence of Newfoundland. The following statement was prepared and, after revision at its second meeting, adopted as the Second Recommendation of the Board:<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> La composition de la délégation et la présidence de chacune des deux sections de la CPCAD changea à plusieurs reprises. Ces changements ne sont pas signalés dans ce volume.

<sup>2</sup> Cette seconde recommandation de la CPCAD était la première d'une série de dix ayant trait à Terre-Neuve. Les autres recommandations (nos 5, 8, 9, 14-18 et 20) avaient également trait à Terre-Neuve. Ces dix recommandations représentent la moitié des résolutions adoptées par la commission lors de la première année de ses opérations. Les recommandations nos 7, 21-22 et 26 touchaient indirectement Terre-Neuve. L'appendice A contient une liste sommaire de toutes les recommandations relatives à Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> During the life of the PJBD the chairmanship on both sides has changed several times, as has the membership. These changes are not indicated in this volume.

<sup>2</sup> This second recommendation was the first of ten recommendations of the PJBD dealing with Newfoundland. Other recommendations nos. 5, 8, 9, 14-18 and 20 also related to Newfoundland. They constitute half of all the recommendations passed by the Board in the first year of operations. Nos. 7, 21, 22 and 26, indirectly related to Newfoundland are also reproduced where appropriate. Appendix A contains a summary list of all recommendations relating to Newfoundland.

- (A) The island of Newfoundland occupies a commanding position at the entrance to the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterway and on the flank of the sea route between the Atlantic seaboard of North America and Northern Europe. It is on the direct air route between the East Coast of the United States and Northern Europe. It is the point in North America, nearest to Europe, from which, if occupied by an enemy, further operations against the North American continent might be effectively initiated. As such it should be adequately defended.
- (B) The forces in Newfoundland now consist of one battalion of infantry for the defence of Botwood and the Newfoundland airport, a battery of two 4.7-inch guns now being installed at Bell Island, and a flight of five Digby (Douglas) landplanes operating from Newfoundland airport. These forces are considered inadequate for the defence of the island at the present time and the security of Canada and the United States is thereby endangered.
- (C) The Board considers that the defence of Newfoundland should be materially strengthened by:
- (a) Increasing the strength of the Canadian defensive garrisons immediately;
  - (b) Establishing as soon as practicable, and not later than the spring of 1941, a force of aircraft of suitable types adequate for patrolling the seaward approaches to Newfoundland and Canada and for the local defence of the Botwood area;
  - (c) Selecting and preparing, as soon as practicable, bases permitting the operation of United States aircraft, when and if circumstances require, in numbers as follows:
    - (1) A minimum of four squadrons of patrol planes (48 planes).
    - (2) A minimum of one composite group of land planes (73 planes).
  - (d) Completing, as early as practicable, and not later than the spring of 1941, the installation of appropriate defences for the port of St. John's, Newfoundland, for Botwood, and for other points as required.
  - (e) Taking such additional measures as further examination of the defence problem and local reconnaissance show to be necessary.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Le 5 septembre le Comité de guerre du Cabinet approuva la seconde recommandation:

<sup>1</sup> On September 5, the Cabinet War Committee approved the second recommendation:

... subject to subsequent concurrence by the Ministers of the Departments concerned, after opportunity for consultation with their Departmental officers.

211.

JWP vol. 1 p. 140

*Extrait de The Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>*  
*Excerpt from The Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa, August 27, 1940]

Ralston, Crerar, and Lapointe "were quite out-spoken and indignant." Mackenzie King said he had "thought of ignoring it. They rather felt an answer should be sent which would let Churchill see that his reply had not been appreciated, and make clear how exceptionally wise our action was in the light of the despatch regarding the approach of a U-boat through Newfoundland waters on the day previous."

212.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 26

[Ottawa,] August 31, 1940

MOST SECRET. Have received telegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that you have urged importance of representation of Newfoundland in detailed discussions with United States and further that this was mentioned in course of recent discussions with Canadian Air Minister who undertook to take it up with Canadian Government on his return. Air Minister has not yet returned to Ottawa but presumably matter was raised by Newfoundland Government during recent visit to St. John's of Naval and Air members of permanent Canadian-United States Board. Should be glad to know if this was done and if so whether you regard result as satisfactory.

213.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 32

[St. John's,] September 1, 1940

MOST SECRET. Your telegram most secret No. 26 of 31st August. Naval and Air members of permanent Canadian-United States Board visited New-

<sup>1</sup> En réponse au télégramme de King concernant les pourparlers que celui-ci avait eus avec Roosevelt à Ogdensburg, Churchill manifesta une certaine froideur vis-à-vis l'établissement de la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense. Dans ce passage de son journal, King fit état de la réaction des membres du comité de guerre du Cabinet.

<sup>1</sup> In reply to the telegram from King about his talks with Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, Churchill had been cool toward the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence; in the above passage of his diary, King recorded the reaction of members of the Cabinet War Committee.



foundland Airport but did not come to St. John's and there has been no opportunity for discussion between this Government and them of matter referred to in your telegram.

214.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 42

St. John's, September 6, 1940

Addressed to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 42, repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 580, and the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa, No. 34.

We understand that Minutes of meeting held here on August 20th<sup>1</sup> between the Honourable C.G. Power and his service associates and representatives of the Newfoundland Government have been forwarded to you. At this time when discussions of the utmost importance to our respective countries relating to establishment of American and Canadian bases in Newfoundland are about to take place, we wish to reiterate our view that at the meetings of the Joint Defence Board at which decisions affecting this country are in contemplation this Government should be represented. It appears to us that only in this manner can we co-ordinate in our mutual interests the discussions regarding the defence of Newfoundland.

We should be grateful for an early expression of your views on this matter.

215.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte-rendu des débats et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Washington, September 10, 1940

2. Mayor LaGuardia stated at the outset that his attention had been called to statements in the Canadian press to the fact that the Government of the United States was seeking to acquire naval and air bases in Canada. He commented that all of the discussions in the Board had clearly shown the inaccuracy of any such statements. He added that if, in the opinion of the Canadian Section of the Board, it would serve any useful purpose, he would be glad to issue a statement to the effect that the United States had no such intention and was not interested "in acquiring Canadian real estate." Colonel Biggar stated that there had been such articles in the Canadian press and agreed that it might be useful if, on a suitable occasion, Mayor LaGuardia issued such a statement.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 171.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 171.

216.

1156-Y-39

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au greffier du Conseil privé*  
*Minister of National Defence for Air to Clerk of the Privy Council*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, September 14, 1940

Dear Mr. Heeney,

RE: MINUTES OF WAR CABINET COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 5, 1940<sup>1</sup>

In reply to your letter of September 10th<sup>2</sup> re recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, paragraph 32;<sup>3</sup> after consultation with the Chief of the Air Staff I have to report as follows:

*Exchange of Information.*<sup>4</sup> Concurred in.

*Defence of Newfoundland.* Paragraphs A, B, and C. Concurred in.

C. (c) Concurred in provided Canada Bay, Lewisporte and Newfoundland Airport are reserved or leased as Canadian bases. United States to have such use of these sites as strategical situation dictates and provided they are willing to accord similar facilities to our Service at United States bases. Further that United States bases should not be established in the Avalon Peninsula or around Conception Bay.<sup>5</sup>

The remainder of Paragraph 32 is concurred in insofar as it relates to the Air Force.

Yours sincerely,

CHARLES G. POWER

217.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 43

St. John's, September 17, 1940

SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 43, repeated to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa, No. 37. We beg to refer you to our message to you of September 6th, No. 42, which remains unacknowledged, and we would appreciate a very early reply.

We yesterday had lengthy discussions with visiting American experts as to nature and extent to which the American Government is to take part in fortifying Newfoundland. In the course of these discussions it became apparent that they were thinking in terms of a plan settled by Joint Defence Board under which Canadian and American Governments have agreed as to the part to be played by their respective forces in this operation.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>3</sup> Paragraphe 32 du procès-verbal de la réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet.<sup>4</sup> Première recommandation de la CPCAD.<sup>5</sup> Seconde recommandation de la CPCAD.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 32 of Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee Meeting.<sup>4</sup> First Recommendation of the PJBD.<sup>5</sup> Second Recommendation of the PJBD.

We had previously heard nothing of the plan and must not be regarded as committed to it.

When we agreed with the United Kingdom Government that they should offer on our behalf to the United States Government lease of areas in Newfoundland for naval and air bases, we did not contemplate the disposition of our facilities and settlement of rights granted either to your Government or to the American Government without consultation with this Government.

218.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 51

Ottawa, October 1, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. 1. Your telegram of the 17th September, 1940, No. 43.

2. The impression received from your discussion with the United States experts appears to have been misleading. There is no "plan settled by the Joint Defence Board under which Canadian and American Governments have agreed as to the part to be played by their respective forces" in fortifying Newfoundland.

3. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence is purely an advisory body. It has been appointed to consider, and to advise the Governments of Canada and the United States in regard to, the most effective means of consolidating continental defences. We understand that its members have commenced work on a tentative draft of a plan for the defence of the Eastern seaboard but this has not been shown to, much less considered by, either Government.

4. The only recommendations which the Board has made regarding Newfoundland have had to do with the assignment of certain additional personnel to the Canadian garrison; the augmentation, when practicable, of defensive equipment for St. John's and Botwood; and the provision by the United States of defensive aircraft to operate from the bases which are to be leased by that country. These recommendations envisage prospective action which, except in the case of the increase of Canadian personnel, can take effect only after the lapse of considerable time. They will, of course, be made the subject of discussion between the Canadian Government or the United States Government and the Government of Newfoundland.

5. With regard to the defensive plan referred to in paragraph 3 above I am sure that the Canadian members of the Board would be glad to have authorized representatives of the Newfoundland Government present at the discussions of the Board on the Newfoundland aspects of the draft now being prepared with a view to Newfoundland being represented at Halifax on the 4th and 5th October[sic]. A proposal to this effect is being made to the Joint Board. We shall advise you as soon as possible of the outcome.

219.

Skelton Papers 395

*Le conseiller<sup>1</sup> au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Counsellor<sup>1</sup> to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, October 1, 1940

NEWFOUNDLAND REPRESENTATION AT MEETINGS OF THE DEFENCE BOARD

1. I telephoned to Reid at the Legation and asked him to get in touch with Hickerson at once. This he did and his reply has now been received.

2. In Mr. Hickerson's opinion, if this proposal<sup>2</sup> were to be made to the President, Mr. Roosevelt would ask: "What does the Board think about it?" He also is of the opinion that if a decision of this kind were taken without prior consultation with the Chairman of the United States Section, additional difficulties would develop.

3. In Mr. Hickerson's opinion, the best way to handle the matter would be for the Board to consider the proposal at its first meeting tomorrow morning<sup>3</sup> and to telegraph a recommendation to Washington and Ottawa. The Legation can be informed of the opinion of the President and transmit that information to Ottawa. If it is favourable, as is of course expected, the Department of External Affairs can then telegraph at once to St. John's and suggest that a representative proceed to Halifax for the meetings on the 4th and 5th.

220.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire*  
*de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State of External Affairs to High Commissioner*  
*of Great Britain*

Ottawa, October 2, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald [Campbell],

I enclose copies of telegrams exchanged with the Governor of Newfoundland, No. 43 of September 17th from the Governor and our reply No. 51 of October 1st, with reference to the desire of the Government to participate in some way in the discussions with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence when Newfoundland questions were under discussion.

We were advised that the matter was taken up with the Joint Board at its meeting in Boston this morning and that it was not considered feasible to take it up formally with the Government of the United States so far as the present meeting is concerned. The situation was met by a telegram

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>2</sup> Que Terre-Neuve soit représentée aux réunions de la CPCAD à Halifax.

<sup>3</sup> La commission allait se réunir à Boston.

<sup>2</sup> That Newfoundland be represented at the Halifax meetings of the PJBD.

<sup>3</sup> The Board was about to meet in Boston.



from the Board to the Governor of Newfoundland stating that they were meeting at Halifax on October 4th and 5th, and at that meeting certain problems involving defence dispositions in Newfoundland would be discussed. The Board would be glad to have a representative of the Government of Newfoundland attend the meeting to advise the Board while Newfoundland defence was under consideration.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. [SKELTON]

P.S. I have since been in touch by telephone with Mr. Emerson who said that he had been designated to represent the Government of Newfoundland, and would be glad to attend the meetings at Halifax. As time was short it has been arranged to send a plane to bring him from Newfoundland to Halifax tomorrow.

O. D. SKELTON

221.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Halifax, October 4, 1940

. . .

3. At 11:45 a.m. the Board resumed its meeting with Mr. Emerson, Commissioner of Justice and Defence, and Mr. Penson, Commissioner of Finance, both of the Newfoundland Government, present as observers pursuant to the Board's telegram to His Excellency, the Governor of Newfoundland, on October 2.<sup>1</sup>

4. Colonel Biggar explained to Messrs. Emerson and Penson the nature of the Board's work and its recommendations in regard to the defence of Newfoundland, and these matters were discussed in some detail with the Newfoundland observers.

5. Mr. Emerson discussed the contributions which Newfoundland itself could make to its defence. He said that there had been a large number of Newfoundlanders enlist in the British forces and some in the Canadian armed forces, but that the Newfoundland Government could not, in view of its budgetary position, maintain a larger force than 500 infantry troops, the number now being maintained in the Island.

. . .

7. The Board approved the draft First Report to the two Governments, a copy of which is annexed.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

[Halifax, October 4, 1940]

## PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

FIRST REPORT<sup>1</sup>

4. The present report is directed to indicating the allotment of responsibility as between Canada and the United States for the direct defence of North America so far as that defence may require joint or concerted operations by the two countries and also the steps which should be taken by the two Governments in advance of such joint or concerted operations.

5. In order that joint or concerted operations may be promptly and effectively proceeded with when they become necessary and are ordered to be taken, the Board recommends that each Government should independently, as soon as possible, take the following steps.

## EAST COAST

*Canada*

- (a) Provide facilities in Newfoundland for the operation of United States aircraft in numbers as follows:
  - (i) A minimum of three squadrons of patrol planes (36 planes)
  - (ii) A minimum of 73 land planes.
- (b) Provide radio and other facilities at Sydney and Newfoundland Airports, for land plane staging
- (c) If physically possible, provide a fighter aerodrome near St. John's
- (d) Complete defences for the port of St. John's and for Botwood
- (e) Complete the harbour defences (including underwater defences) at Halifax, Sydney, Gaspé, and Shelburne
- (f) Expand the aircraft operating facilities in the Maritime Provinces, so as to provide for the operation of United States aircraft in numbers as follows:
  - (i) Gaspé and Maritime Province Harbours
  - (ii) One composite wing of approximately 200 planes

*United States*

- (g) Select and complete a base or bases in Newfoundland sufficient to permit the operation of at least one squadron of patrol planes (12 planes)

<sup>1</sup>Ce rapport fut le seul et unique rédigé par la commission. Par la suite, la commission jugea inutile ce genre de rapport. Le 10 octobre, le Comité de guerre du Cabinet approuva ce premier rapport mais émit une réserve mineure au sujet de la côte ouest. Le gouvernement des États-Unis approuva le rapport le 19 novembre.

<sup>1</sup>This report was the Board's first and last report to governments; thereafter such reports were considered unnecessary. On October 10, Cabinet War Committee approved the First Report subject to a minor reservation relating to the West Coast; the United States Government approved the report on November 19.

- (h) Provide staging facilities in Newfoundland for short range aircraft between Sydney and the Newfoundland Airport; these to include radio facilities
- (i) Develop airways and other transportation facilities in New England so as to permit the rapid reinforcement of the Canadian Forces in the Maritime Provinces
- (j) Provide ground, anti-aircraft and harbour defences of United States bases in Newfoundland.

. . .

#### EAST COAST OPERATIONS

##### *Canada*

- (a) to exercise initial control of Canadian, British and friendly shipping on the Atlantic and to inform the United States immediately of the location and routes of all important units
- (b) to undertake the initial ground, anti-aircraft, coast and air defence of Newfoundland and its harbours, except insofar as the United States may be in a position to participate in such initial defence
- (c) To provide for the surface and air patrol of Belle Isle Strait and the initial security of the sea communications between the mainland and Newfoundland
- (d) to provide initial air patrol over other sea approaches to Newfoundland
- (e) To provide for the ground, anti-aircraft and coast defence of the Maritime Provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula and the initial air defence of these areas
- (f) To provide for the naval and air defence of:
  - (i) Gaspé and Maritime Province Harbours
  - (ii) The Gulf of St. Lawrence to the line Sydney-Port-aux-Basques
  - (iii) The Bay of Fundy to the line United States-Canadian Border to Yarmouth and
  - (iv) The sea area within a thirty mile radius from the entrance to Sydney, Halifax, Shelburne, St. John's, Botwood, and any other naval bases operated by Canada
- (g) Provide facilities in aid of the movement, by water, of United States forces from the Maritime Provinces to Newfoundland.

##### *United States*

- (h) To augment its forces in Newfoundland to one reinforced division and a composite air group (73 planes)
- (i) To establish off-shore surface and air patrols to seaward of waters to be patrolled by Canada also in-shore patrols of Placentia Bay
- (j) To control shipping in areas patrolled by the United States
- (k) To augment the mobile ground and air defence of the Maritime Provinces in the event of a major attack.

222.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 50

St. John's, October 8, 1940

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 651, repeated to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington No. 4, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa No. 50, High Commissioner for United Kingdom, Ottawa No. 52.

Penson and Emerson have now returned from a meeting at Halifax of the Permanent Joint Defence Board. This meeting was called to approve first set of recommendations on North American defence to be made to the United States and Canadian Governments. This Government was asked to send representatives to express Newfoundland point of view on these recommendations so far as they affect this country. The American recommendations do not vary materially from Greenslade proposals (see my telegram No. 608 of September 22nd).<sup>1</sup> They propose, in addition, an emergency landing field in the vicinity of St. George's and would like to send flight of planes from time to time to Newfoundland airport. The Canadian proposals include:

(a) An Army Headquarters at St. John's, consisting of a Brigadier and staff of one Rifle Battalion for which buildings have already been commenced. Two 75 MM. guns at Fort Amherst and two 4.7 guns at Signal Hill. Further artillery will be substituted for 75's later. Anti-aircraft defence when guns available. A battalion is at present divided between airport and Botwood. This will be supplemented with anti-aircraft defence later. A detachment of motor cycle corps with machine guns will be stationed at Deer Lake to protect main dam from attack by raiding party.

(b) Navy

Advanced naval bases at St. John's and Botwood and one further to the northeast to be agreed with Air Force (see below). Naval base services to be established at these ports.

(c) Air Force

For defence of ships, in and around St. John's, an air establishment near St. John's will be maintained. A survey is now being made of an area between Tippbay and Bauline line. The airport forces will be increased to two bomber squadrons, one fighter squadron and probably other flights. Construction of hangars and of quarters for personnel of about 1,000 is now proceeding at Newfoundland airport. Two flying boat squadrons at Botwood and a submarine station to be agreed with navy with a view to joint occupation at Horne Bay, Labrador, or Canada Bay, Newfoundland, or an intermediate port. Fuel reserves at St. John's and Botwood.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Our representatives concurred in these and American recommendations. Commencement of Canadian enterprises has been made from time to time with our concurrence, and problems as they arise are settled *ad hoc*, but no formal agreements have been sought. The American members of the Board state that United States Government construction work of any kind outside of the United States is prohibited by law unless proper title is vested in their Government. It was pointed out by our delegates that if all points upon which agreement is to be reached are to be included in leases of bases, a considerable period may elapse before they are executed. The Board were strongly of the opinion that such a delay might be serious. The idea was then suggested [that] upon boundaries of areas being delimited and agreed we should grant leases for ninety-nine years at once and leave to the future negotiating of terms, solving immediate problems as they arise. The members of the Board did not at first appear to appreciate that a number of quite important matters might call for solution before final agreement could be reached. They are very anxious, however, for early action in Newfoundland and thought that documents would be short and simple. At subsequent conferences with Biggar, the Canadian Chairman, and Keenleyside of External Affairs Department, the problems were further explained. United States Government may take line that no war material will be exported from United States until troops or naval forces are established here, and this cannot take place until they have title to land. If execution of leases is postponed until all terms of agreement are settled many months may elapse. We would like you to consider whether representations should not be made by our Ambassador at Washington with a view of overcoming possibility of delay, and whether the Canadian Government might not be asked to make similar representations. It may be strongly urged that a simple lease (to be subject to terms subsequently settled) can be entered into by both parties, each depending upon the good faith of the other. By doing this the United States will gain the inestimable advantage of speedy action. Both Biggar and Keenleyside proposed to urge this matter semi-officially, and we are satisfied that all members of the Board are agreed upon the need for speed. If you agree that representations should be made, you might wish us to outline for you and the Ambassador the general nature of the problems as we see them here and our views thereon.

223.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 427

London, March 28, 1941

SECRET. Addressed to High Commissioner at Ottawa, No. 427, Repeated to the Newfoundland Government No. 263. The Newfoundland Government have been in communication with us regarding a proposal which has been put forward following a recommendation of the Joint Defence Board for

despatch of United States personnel and aircraft to the Newfoundland Airport. The Newfoundland Government stated in this connection that they understood that schemes for establishing sea-plane bases at Botwood and Gleneagles for United States flying boat squadrons were also under preparation by the Board. Negotiations regarding temporary transfer Newfoundland Air Bases to the Canadian Government for the duration of the War are nearing completion but the Newfoundland Government are of course still vitally interested and have expressed some concern that control such as the above involving use and operation of their aeroplane bases should be made without consultation with them during the formation of such plans. Generally they feel that they have been and still are insufficiently in touch with the activities of the Joint Defence Board. It may be observed that although two members of the Commission of Government attended meetings of the Board last October no copy of the report resulting from those meetings was sent to the Newfoundland Government.

In the Protocol to the Agreement leasing bases to the United States it has been agreed that, in all consultations concerning Newfoundland involving defence considerations the Canadian Government as well as the Newfoundland Government would have the right to participate.

We regard it as important that suitable arrangements should be made to enable the Newfoundland Government to be kept in touch with all future deliberations of the Board which may affect Newfoundland and we should be glad if you would take this matter up with the Canadian Authorities but before doing so it would perhaps be well to discuss the position with Emerson and Penson who are leaving this country today for the United States on their way back to Newfoundland and will probably visit Ottawa en route. They will inform you direct on arrival in the United States of their plans in this respect.

224.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 16, 1941

. . .

8. The Board gave consideration to its relations with the Newfoundland Commission of Government and arrangements were made to have the Honourable L. E. Emerson and the Honourable J. H. Penson attend the next meeting of the Board.<sup>1</sup>

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Emerson et Penson étaient à Ottawa pour conférer avec des fonctionnaires du gouvernement canadien.

<sup>1</sup> Emerson and Penson were in Ottawa conferring with officials of the Government of Canada.

225.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 17, 1941

1. The Board met at 9:30 a.m. The participants were the same as on the previous day except for the presence of the Honourable L. E. Emerson and the Honourable J. H. Penson of the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

2. The representatives of the Newfoundland Commission of Government were welcomed by the Chairmen and in reply expressed their pleasure at being present and thanked the members of the Board for the opportunity of taking part in the meeting while Newfoundland matters were under consideration.

. . .

8. The Board then discussed the question of Newfoundland representation at meetings in which problems relating to the defence of that country would be up for discussion. In this connection, Mr. Emerson suggested that he thought it probable that the Board would be used as the instrument of consultation under the United States-United Kingdom Agreement and the Protocol in which Canada was a participant. It was agreed that the Board would, if possible, notify the Newfoundland Commission of Government of the probable discussion at any of its meetings of a subject likely to be of interest to the Commission and would, in any event, inform the Commission as early as possible of the date and place of each meeting of the Board in case the Commission should wish to present to the Board any matter relating to the defence of the Island.

. . .

226.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 57

Ottawa, July 22, 1941

Following for Emerson from Keenleyside. Begins. Permanent Joint Board on Defence will meet on or about Tuesday, July 29th. Certain matters relating to defence of Newfoundland will be considered and members of the Board would be glad to have you or other Newfoundland representative present.

Meeting will probably be held in Montreal but full details as to time and place will be forwarded later. Ends.

227.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, July 30, 1941

. . .

7. There was a discussion of holding the next meeting of the Board in Newfoundland. Mr. Emerson<sup>1</sup> pointed out that in his opinion it would be of considerable help politically for such a meeting to be held there. After a considerable discussion it seemed clear that it would probably not be possible to hold the next meeting in Newfoundland but it was the sense of the Board that as many members of the Board as possible should arrange to visit Newfoundland prior to the next regular meeting of the Board.

. . .

228.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

. . .

2. Reference was made to the suggestion at the meeting of the Board at Montreal at the end of July that as many members of the Board as possible should visit Newfoundland. Since that meeting of the Board, the following members have visited Newfoundland: Mr. Biggar, Brigadiers Pope and Vanier, Captain Houghton, Commander Sherman and Colonel Bissell. During the course of these visits, all major Canadian and United States activities were visited and first-hand information was acquired in connection with matters of interest to the Board.

. . .

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

UNITED STATES ARMY

. . .

A United States Army Member visited Newfoundland and secured first-hand information. The Governor; Sir Wilfrid Woods, Department of Public

<sup>1</sup> La commission discuta avec Emerson de l'état des routes, du chemin de fer, des télécommunications ainsi que du marché du travail à Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> The Board discussed with Emerson the condition of roads, the railway and telecommunications as well as the Newfoundland labour market.



Utilities; Mr. Emerson, Department of Justice and Defence; all United States Army and Navy Commanders; Canadian Air and Ground Commanders; the American Consul; the Manager of the Railroad; and others were contacted and pertinent problems discussed. Four flights were made across Newfoundland. All airports, completed and under construction, were visited as well as all United States installations. All Canadian installations were inspected from the air. The docking facilities at St. John's, the railroad terminal there, and roads and communications between United States bases in Newfoundland were inspected.

. . .

229.

703-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 569

St. John's, September 30, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence arrived at St. John's on Sunday afternoon, September 27th, and remained here until the following morning.

2. Apart from the information which the Board obtained from their visit to the airports at Goose Bay, Gander, in this city and at Argentia, the visit of the Board to St. John's has been of service in cementing the relationships between the American and Canadian Forces and the people of Newfoundland.

3. The following interesting editorial appeared in the St. John's *Evening Telegram* under date of September 29th:

#### GETTING KNOWN

Scarcely has one distinguished visitor completed a visit to Newfoundland than another arrives. Unfortunately, such is the demand upon the time of the statesmen, heads of the Fighting Services, and others in these days of strenuous duties that their stay has had to be of the briefest and, under the stress of war, it has been impossible to do much more than bid them welcome and wish them farewell.

But anyone failing to perceive in these visits the new importance that is attached to Newfoundland would be somewhat short-sighted. The Island has suddenly become the cynosure of the British, American and Canadian authorities. In some quarters, the attention being paid to the country seems to be regarded almost with apprehension, and they ask whether overnight Newfoundland is to be 'sold down the river?' Why it should be suggested that nations with whom we are on the most friendly terms and who, it must be conceded, are animated by ideals no less

honourable than our own should be regarded as capable of conspiracy against a neighbour is a matter difficult to understand.

The increased importance attached to Newfoundland must surely be regarded as the surest guarantee of its future well-being, politically as well as economically. That is this paper's view. Further, by such visitors as Newfoundland has received, new and far more favourable publicity will be given the country than accorded it by persons whose main object in coming here seemed to have been to find the filthiest mire in which to wallow, and to attract attention to their stories by raising a stink. In respect of their insight into affairs and of their ability to judge of conditions, it can be taken for granted, the distinguished visitors who have come to these shores are not inferior to the newspaper columnist of the type referred to. The favourable impressions which they have received of the climate, of the spirit in which Newfoundland is applying itself to aid in the common cause, of the evidence of good fellowship existing between the people and the various forces stationed here and, too, of the manner in which she is surmounting her past difficulties, are certain to be passed on to, it cannot be otherwise, the certain and lasting advantage of the country.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

230.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 23

Ottawa, November 6, 1941

Following from Keenleyside for Emerson. Have just been informed by our United States colleagues that they propose to bring up certain questions relating to Newfoundland at the meeting of the Defence Board which is to open in Montreal on Monday next. Most of the items mentioned are questions of detail affecting relations between Canadian and United States forces. Reference is also made, however, to use of United States tank cars by commercial oil companies and to Newfoundland roads and highways. If you consider it worth while to come to Montreal for discussion of these points we will be glad to welcome you. Please indicate your intentions by wire to me at the Windsor Hotel, Montreal, as I shall be there on and after Friday, November 7, on other business.\*

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

Emerson didn't attend.

231.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

St. John's, September 27, 1942

1. After visiting the Goose Bay, Gander Lake and Torbay aerodromes in a United States naval transport plane, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence met in St. John's on Sunday, September 27, 1942. The following members participated:

## Canadian Section

Colonel O. M. Biggar  
Major-General M. A. Pope  
(assisted by Col. J. H. Jenkins)  
Captain H. G. DeWolf  
(vice Commodore H. E. Reid)  
Air Commodore F. V. Heakes  
Brigadier G. P. Vanier  
Mr. H. L. Keenleyside

## United States Section

Mayor F. H. LaGuardia  
  
Captain F. D. Wagner  
  
Lt-Col. E. W. Hockenberry  
  
Mr. J. D. Hickerson

The meeting was held in the office of the Hon. L. E. Emerson, Commissioner of Justice and Defence. In addition to Mr. Emerson, the meeting was attended by Major-General E. L. Page, and by Major-General G. C. Brant and Col. D. F. Myer of the United States Army.

. . .

2. The Chairmen expressed their satisfaction at the opportunity which they had had of seeing developments in Labrador and other parts of Newfoundland and of holding a meeting in St. John's. They thanked Hon. Mr. Emerson for allowing the Board to meet in his office and expressed their pleasure in having him present to participate in the consideration of matters of common concern.

3. In the discussion which followed there was a general exchange of information and thought was given to the present state of and future plans for the defence of Newfoundland and Labrador. In the course of the discussion it became apparent that neither the Canadian nor United States Governments have at present any definite plans for the initiation of new large-scale projects in the area under consideration. It was estimated that the larger part of the present construction programme would be completed in the first half of 1943 but it was recognized that there would be continuing problems which would involve the employment of smaller numbers of civilian personnel over a much longer period.

As a result of its review the Board was satisfied that good progress had been made and that current plans would, when completed, provide defence facilities appropriate to the local needs and general circumstances.

. . .

SECTION C  
LES BASES AMÉRICAINES<sup>1</sup>  
UNITED STATES BASES<sup>1</sup>

232.

285(s)

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions<sup>2</sup>*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary<sup>2</sup>*

MOST SECRET. PERSONAL

Ottawa, June 17, 1940

Following personal message from Mr. Mackenzie King to Mr. Churchill.  
Begins.

. . .

4. My opinion is that not an hour should be lost in having plans carefully worked out on the understanding that in the event of it becoming impossible to continue resistance in British waters the surviving units of the fleet will be transferred to overseas bases before there is any possibility of their surrender to Hitler. So far as the North Atlantic is concerned, it would be desirable that the United States be immediately afforded opportunity to plan defences or bases at strategic points such as Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland, the West Indies and elsewhere in case of developments taking such a turn that United States co-operation will be required to prevent the Germans gaining a foothold in these areas. There is, unfortunately, with our lack of equipment, little of an effective nature that Canada alone could hope to do in these areas. Moreover our own Canadian coasts have become increasingly vulnerable as a consequence of our having parted with aircraft and destroyers to assist the United Kingdom in the present emergency . . . Ends.

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<sup>1</sup> Le volume 8 (chapitre I partie 3) présente une documentation plus complète sur l'origine du plan visant à l'établissement des bases américaines dans les territoires britanniques de l'hémisphère occidental. Par contre, la section suivante du présent volume contient la documentation relative aux négociations de l'accord de 1941 sur les bases, ainsi que sur les événements ayant conduit à cet accord. Ces documents ont été sélectionnés en vue de faire la lumière sur les relations entre Terre-Neuve et le Canada; pour plus de détails, consultez les documents originaux du ministère des Affaires extérieures.

<sup>2</sup> Le texte complet se trouve au volume 8, document 57.

<sup>1</sup> Volume 8, Chapter I, Part 3 contains a fuller documentation of the origins of the plan to establish United States Bases in British territories in the western hemisphere. The ensuing Section of the present volume, on the other hand, contains documentation on negotiation of the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941, and events leading up to it. These documents have been selected to throw light on Canada-Newfoundland relations; for a fuller account see the original files of the Department of External Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> For complete text, see Volume 8, Document 57.



233.

King Papers C282207

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 13, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that from informal discussions between His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington and United States authorities, it is understood that the United States Government desires to obtain air facilities in certain West Indian Colonies and in Newfoundland, to meet their immediate needs for purposes of national defence.

The facilities in question are:

- (a) Facilities for United States aircraft to land in Jamaica, Georgetown (British Guiana) and Trinidad
- (b) A lease to Pan-American Airways (acting as the agents of the United States Government) of an area near Trinidad aerodrome where certain facilities would be required
- (c) A lease of approximately a square mile for an aerodrome in British Guiana
- (d) Permission for Pan-American Airways to start construction of an aerodrome near Kingston, Jamaica
- (e) Authority for United States army to send occasional training flights to a Newfoundland airport

The question whether these facilities should be offered in an attempt to forestall more far-reaching requests from the Havana conference, meeting on July 20th<sup>1</sup> is under urgent consideration in London.

In view, however, of the general interest of the Canadian Government in the position and more particularly of the responsibilities which they have assumed in Newfoundland and in the Caribbean area, the United Kingdom Government regard it as important that you should be informed immediately of the above and they have instructed me to ask you if you would be so good as to let me have your comments at the earliest possible date.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

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<sup>1</sup> Les États-Unis et les autres états membres de l'Union panaméricaine se réunirent à La Havane afin d'étudier les mesures à prendre au cas où éventuellement les possessions européennes dans les Amériques passeraient aux mains de l'Allemagne.

<sup>1</sup> The United States and the other member states of the Pan-American Union met in Havana to consider what to do when it appeared likely that European possessions in the Americas might be taken over by Germany.

234.

976-40

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, July 15, 1940

Dear Doctor Skelton,

I have your letter of July 14th<sup>1</sup> enclosing copy of a communication dated July 13th from the High Commissioner regarding the desire of the United States Government to obtain air facilities in certain West Indian colonies and Newfoundland.

From the point of view of defence, all these projects would seem to be advantageous.

I also understand that there may be some movement or request to extend United States civil aviation facilities into Canada as far as Moncton. Here again, from the point of view of defence, I would think that this would be useful.

I think that the Minister of Munitions and Supply would see no objection to this from the point of view of Trans-Canada Airways or other civil aviation projects over which he has jurisdiction.

Yours very truly,

J.L. RALSTON

235.

King Papers C282210

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
of Great Britain*

Ottawa, July 16, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald [Campbell],

I wish to acknowledge your letter of July 13th stating that it is understood that the United States Government wishes to obtain air facilities in certain West Indies Colonies and in Newfoundland to meet their immediate needs for purposes of National Defence.

I am instructed to state that the Canadian Government are of the opinion the proposed activities would be an effective contribution to co-operation in North American defence and consider it highly desirable that the facilities in question should be afforded.

Yours sincerely,

O.D. SKELTON

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

236.

285(s)

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne<sup>1</sup>*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain<sup>1</sup>*

TELEGRAM 1812<sup>2</sup>

[London,] August 14, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. DECRYPTER YOURSELF. Please let Mr. Mackenzie King know for his own most secret and personal information that Prime Minister recently made an urgent personal appeal to President Roosevelt to let us have immediately a number of destroyers, motor torpedo boats and flying boats. . . . Destroyers are frightfully vulnerable to air bombing and yet they must be held in air bombing area to prevent seaborne invasion. We could not keep up present rate of casualties for long and if we cannot get a substantial reinforcement the whole fate of the war may be decided by a minor and easily remedial factor. The air is holding well. But loss of destroyers by air attack might well be so serious as to break our defence of food and trade routes across the Atlantic.

Lord Lothian reported that President's reactions were favorable but he pointed out that legislation in Congress would be necessary and that he did not think it possible to get legislation through Congress without what he called "MOLASSES" that is some concessions which would enable Congress to say that the United States was safe from interference as a result of trading destroyers to us. "Molasses" the President thought would have to be of two kinds:

- (1) In the interest of public assurance by the U.K. Government [sic] that if things went badly in no circumstances would the British fleet be handed over to Germany but would if necessary leave the U.K. waters and continue to fight for the British Empire overseas.
- (2) An arrangement whereby U.K. Government would give air and naval facilities to the U.S. for hemispheric defence which would imply that if any of our possessions in the western hemisphere were likely to fall into the hands of the enemy the U.S. would be able to assure protection over them on lines of recent Havana resolution<sup>3</sup> until their destiny could be determined at the end of the war. . . .

<sup>1</sup> Une copie de ce télégramme fut remise au ministère des Affaires extérieures.

<sup>2</sup> Le texte complet se trouve au volume 8, document 80.

<sup>3</sup> La résolution de La Havane était une sorte d'application de la doctrine Monroe adaptée au contexte de 1940. Elle mettait sur pied un comité d'urgence, puis une commission permanente pour l'administration provisoire des colonies et des possessions européennes dans les Amériques (au cas où il deviendrait nécessaire de les empêcher de tomber aux mains de l'Allemagne). Aucune des mesures envisagées ne fut prise.

<sup>1</sup> Copy of this telegram was delivered to Department of External Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> For complete text, see Volume 8, Document 80.

<sup>3</sup> The Havana resolution was a sort of application of the Monroe doctrine to the particular circumstances of 1940. It set up an Emergency Committee, and then a permanent Commission for "provisional administration of European colonies and possessions in the Americas" (in the event that this seemed necessary to prevent their being taken over by Germany). No action of the kind contemplated was ever taken.

As regards (2) Mr. Mackenzie King will remember that the U.K. Government had already considered offering to the U.S. Government certain air facilities in the West Indies and Newfoundland (see my telegram No. 1673 of the 13th July)<sup>1</sup> and the offer was actually approved before the receipt of the President's reply. Lord Lothian was accordingly instructed to inform the President that in any communication to Congress he could give an assurance that as soon as we obtained destroyers motor torpedo boats and flying boats contemplated the U.K. Government would make these facilities available. It was understood however that the U.S. Govt. had in mind the lease of air and sea bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Trinidad and "possibly one or two minor islands" and Lord Lothian was authorized to inform the President that subject to the prior consent of the Govts. concerned (which include Canada) the U.K. Govt. were prepared to give a similar assurance in regard to these bases also. . .

237.

285(s)

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne<sup>2</sup>*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain<sup>2</sup>*

TELEGRAM 1814

[London,] August 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. DECYPHER YOURSELF. My telegram No. 1812 August 14th please inform Prime Minister for his most secret and personal information that further message has now been received from President Roosevelt. The President now thinks it may be possible to furnish as immediate assistance at least fifty destroyers and a number of motor torpedo boats and flying boats provided that in return American people and Congress can be made to understand that security of U.S.A. would thereby be enhanced. President therefore thinks it necessary to ask us to take two following steps:

- (1) An assurance by the Prime Minister (which would not be a public statement but merely an assurance to President and might take form of reiteration of P.M.'s statement to Parliament on June 4th) that if waters of Great Britain become untenable for British navy, the ships of Royal Navy will not be turned over to Germany or sunk but would be sent to other parts of British Empire for the Empire's continued defence.
- (2) An agreement on the part of Great Britain that the British Government would authorize use of Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana as naval and air bases by United States in the event of an attack on American hemisphere by any non-American nation; and in the meantime

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Une copie de ce télégramme fut remise au ministère des Affaires extérieures.<sup>2</sup> Copy of this telegram was delivered to Department of External Affairs.



U.S. to have right to establish bases and to use them for training and exercise purposes with understanding that land necessary for above could be acquired by U.S. through purchase or through a ninety-nine year lease.

The Prime Minister thinks there need be no difficulty over (1) though exact form of assurance will require to be carefully framed so as not to give the impression that any such collapse is envisaged. As to (2) my immediately following telegram repeats to you what we are saying to Newfoundland Govt. on the subject so far as Newfoundland is concerned. May we assume that Mr. Mackenzie King would agree to proposals from Canadian aspect? Please telegraph reply immediately.

238.

285(s)

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve<sup>1</sup>*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland<sup>1</sup>*

TELEGRAM 641

[London,] August 15, 1940

IMMEDIATE. Addressed to Governor of Newfoundland No. 641, repeated to High Commissioner Ottawa, No. 1815. Most secret and personal. Decypher yourself. Secret discussions have recently taken place with President Roosevelt as to the possibility of the U.S. sending us a number of destroyers. He has now sent a message saying that it may be possible to furnish as immediate assistance at least fifty destroyers, with a number of motor torpedo boats and flying boats. The destroyer position at the moment is our most serious weakness. Destroyer casualties have recently been heavy and if we cannot get substantial reinforcements the fate of the war may be affected by this factor. Loss of destroyers in air attacks in English Channel might seriously impair our defence of food and trade routes across the Atlantic.

President Roosevelt in his message has pointed out that Congress will require to be satisfied that security of United States of America will be enhanced by proposed transfer. President thinks concessions to be made by us would have to include an arrangement whereby air and naval facilities in West Indies and Newfoundland were made available to the United States. As stated in my telegram No. 630 of August 10th<sup>2</sup> facilities in Newfoundland referred to in my telegram No. 542 of July 13th<sup>2</sup> have already been offered to the U.S. Govt. in this connection. President has however indicated that use of Newfoundland (and certain West Indian islands) is essential as a naval and air base in the event of an attack upon America and that in the meantime they would expect to be allowed to use Newfoundland for naval and air training purposes. President has expressed desire to secure this either by purchase or by ninety-nine year lease of necessary areas. No doubt latter will be much easier from

<sup>1</sup> Une copie de ce télégramme fut remise au ministère des Affaires extérieures.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Copy of this telegram was delivered to Department of External Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Newfoundland point of view, and we propose to make it plain that we prefer this alternative.

In a matter of this nature we should naturally wish to carry Newfoundland public opinion with us. On the other hand it is essential that the matter should be kept strictly secret at this stage. May I take it that in view involved [sic] Commission of Government would feel able when matter can be made public so to present the case as to ensure that no difficulty from point of view of public opinion in Newfoundland would arise. Subject to your concurrence we propose to inform the United States that we agree to their proposal. Please telegraph reply with least possible delay.

239.

JWP vol. 1 p. 132

*Extrait de The Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>*  
*Excerpt from The Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>*

[ , August 17, 1940]

... When he came to the end of a despatch referring to the role of Canada, the President said: "This is where you come in." Mackenzie King replied "that Churchill had already communicated with me and that I had sent word to him that we were wholly agreeable to the United States being given bases on the islands of the Atlantic and that, as he knew, I had put this forward to Churchill some time ago. As to Newfoundland, I said both the British and our Government would probably have to do with that matter as well as the United States." Mackenzie King added that Power had left for Newfoundland that very day and that Canada was about to spend a million on facilities at Gander airport.

240.

Skelton Papers 395

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*au Premier ministre*  
*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*  
*to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] August 22, 1940

NEWFOUNDLAND BASE[S]

Under the proposed arrangement between the United Kingdom and the United States the latter country will lease land for air and naval bases in Newfoundland, as well as in other islands, for a term of 99 years.

In any arrangement made for giving facilities to the United States in Canada you had made it clear that there will be no leasing or transfer of territory. Presumably any additional facilities will be under Canadian control whether built by Canadian funds or United States funds.

<sup>1</sup> King fait état d'une conversation qu'il a eue avec Roosevelt lors des négociations sur l'accord d'Ogdensburg.

<sup>1</sup> King is describing a conversation with Roosevelt during negotiation of the Ogdensburg Agreement.

In view of the definite possibility of a movement on the part of Newfoundland to enter Confederation, the question arises whether we should seek to have any arrangement made by the United States as regards Newfoundland brought into harmony (in the event of Newfoundland becoming part of Canada) with the Canadian arrangements. Possibly we can take a chance on that being settled satisfactorily when the day comes but it might be well at least to issue a *caveat*.\*

O. D. S[KELTON]

241.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] August 22, 1940

General Crerar and Brigadier Stuart called yesterday to obtain any further available information as to the bearing of the Air Bases agreement on our relations with Newfoundland. (I asked Mr. Keenleyside to be present).

General Crerar had assumed that this new arrangement between the United Kingdom and the United States would mean that Canada would retire from Newfoundland defence arrangements in favour of the United States. (*No?*)<sup>1</sup> He considered Newfoundland so vitally important for Canadian defence that we should retain a footing there. (*Certainly all three govts. will be concerned*)

I told him so far as I was aware there was no suggestion whatever that Canada should desist from efforts she was making to cooperate in the defence of Newfoundland. You had made it clear in discussions with Mr. Churchill that defence in Newfoundland in the future would be a matter for the three Governments to consider, the United Kingdom, United States and Canada, or four, to include the Government of Newfoundland itself. (*Yes*) Presumably all that was intended was that additional bases should be provided for United States naval or air use. Brigadier Stuart said there was only one good air base, that at Gander Lake. It would take a long time to build up a new base for United States use. (*U.S. will wish to be the judge of this*) He said he assumed there would be no objection to the United States and Canada using the same base pending the construction of any additional facilities that might be agreed upon. I said I had assumed there would not be. (*All this for Joint Board to consider*)

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

This I should think all that is necessary at present K[ING] 22.8.40

<sup>1</sup> Le Premier ministre fit des annotations en marge du texte, annotations reproduites ici en italique et entre parenthèses.

<sup>1</sup> The italicized comments in parentheses were marginal annotations by the Prime Minister.

General Crerar was anxious to learn any details as to the discussions that had taken place between the United Kingdom and Newfoundland or the United Kingdom and the United States about Newfoundland before the Joint Board held its first meeting as it would be awkward not to have information on this subject which was possessed by United States members. I said we would ask Sir Gerald Campbell for any information available. (O.K.)

General Crerar seemed to think cooperation with the United States would require to be mainly naval and air. He did not see much value in large scale troop manoeuvres under present conditions; for one thing, all facilities in the Eastern Command were used for our own divisions. I said that of course would be a matter for detailed consideration by the Board. (Yes)

242.

1156-D-39

*Le conseiller au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*  
*Counsellor to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 22, 1940

Dear Sir Gerald [Campbell],

You will recall that you gave the Prime Minister a copy of the telegram of the 14th of August, 1940, No. 1812, from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, in which the following sentence occurs:

It was understood however that the U.S. Govt. had in mind the lease of air and sea bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Trinidad and possibly one or two minor islands, and Lord Lothian was authorized to inform the President that subject to the prior consent of the Govts. concerned (which include Canada) the U.K. Govt. were prepared to give a similar assurance in regard to these bases also.

Mr. King informs me that when you gave him this telegram he assured you that Canada would have no objection to the consummation of the proposed leases. This letter is written in order that this assurance may be a matter of written record.

While considering this subject reference might perhaps be made to two aspects of the situation upon which it would be desirable to ensure that there is no likelihood of misunderstanding. In the first place we assume that the proposed arrangements with the United States will not affect the understanding upon which Canadian participation in the defence of Newfoundland is based.

The second point has to do with the details of the discussions regarding Newfoundland which have taken place between London and Washington—and possibly St. John's—in regard to which we have received only incidental, or inferential, knowledge. It would, I think, be desirable that we should know precisely what commitments are under consideration before decisions are taken, and I hope that you may be able to enlighten me in this regard.

Yours sincerely,

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE



243.

Skelton Papers 395

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire  
de la section canadienne de la CPCAD*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary,  
Canadian Section of the PJBD*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 27, 1940

Dear Mr. Keenleyside,

I enclose a copy of a letter from the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom to the Prime Minister (26 Aug.) on the subject of Newfoundland. The Prime Minister has instructed me to have it brought to the attention of the Canadian Section of the Joint Board.

The Prime Minister informed Sir Gerald last night that he would have no hesitation in saying that if the United Kingdom were prepared to agree to the proposals he was quite sure the Canadian Government would raise no objection.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre  
High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 26, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

I have just received a most immediate telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to inform you that the United Kingdom Government have to-day learnt that the President has indicated that his proposals in so far as Newfoundland is concerned are as follows:

- (1) that the naval and air facilities should be determined as soon as possible by a board to be appointed by the two Governments;
- (2) that in the event of any disagreement within the board the matter should be referred to the joint decision of the British and American Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs. He also suggested the usual proviso that if they cannot agree the matter shall be referred to the adjudication of an arbiter appointed by themselves, in order to get finality;
- (3) that the kind of facilities to be granted should be defined now in outline. The President said what he had in mind was:
  - (a) an area in Newfoundland, probably in Placentia Bay, unless further investigation proved it unsuitable, which the United States should lease for naval purposes in

which it should have the right of constructing a channel entry for any size vessels who may seek to enter there, together with any docks, warehouse, supply stores etc., and in the neighbourhood of which it can establish guns and anti-aircraft posts. These need not necessarily be within the leased area.

- (b) That in the above area the United States should exercise local jurisdiction while undertaking to hand over British subjects to British courts outside.
- (c) That the United States should have the right to build an aerodrome either in the leased territory or near it and supplementary to Botwood which had better remain under exclusive British Control.

His Majesty's Ambassador reports that the President is leaving Washington on tour to-morrow (Tuesday) afternoon and the United Kingdom Government are most anxious to be able to reply affirmatively to the above proposals subject to some modification or re-definition of paragraph (3) (b) above.

Lord Caldecote has asked me to consult you immediately and inform him, if possible, to-day, whether you concur in the President being informed that the United Kingdom Government are prepared to secure the grant of the facilities in Newfoundland which he proposes.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

244.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 28, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of the 26th August and to our conversation on that day, I received a telegram last night from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to express to you Mr. Churchill's sincere thanks for your prompt reply which was most helpful and made it possible for messages to be sent to the President of the United States yesterday agreeing in general to the proposals made by him for the grant of facilities.

The following are the terms in which His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been authorised to convey the formal offer.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom make the following offer to the President of the United States: We are prepared, in friendship and goodwill, to meet your representatives forthwith in order to consider the lease for 99 years of areas for the establishment of naval and air facilities in the following places:

- (a) Newfoundland
  - (b) Bermuda
  - (c) Bahamas
  - (d) Jamaica
  - (e) Antigua
  - (f) St. Lucia
  - (g) Trinidad
  - (h) British Guiana.
2. Subject to later settlements on points of detail, the facilities which His Majesty's Government are prepared to offer at the above places are:
- (a) facilities to develop naval and air establishments together with the necessary sea-ward, coast and anti-aircraft defences;
  - (b) provision of localisation sufficient for the military garrisons;
  - (c) facilities for accommodating these garrisons together with stores, etc;
  - (d) such measures of jurisdiction, and of local administrative control in each of the areas, as may be determined by mutual agreement to be necessary, in order to give effect to the objects of the lease and for the security and effective exercise by the United States of America of all the above facilities.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

245.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 30, 1940

My dear Sir Gerald [Campbell]

I am instructed by the Prime Minister to refer to your note of August 28th, regarding arrangements which are under way between the United Kingdom and the United States in connection with naval and air facilities in Newfoundland.

The Prime Minister has indicated to you orally that he would have no hesitation in saying that if the United Kingdom were prepared to agree to the proposals, he was quite sure the Canadian Government would raise no objection.

There are some supplementary points to which it is desired to call attention.

In communicating with Mr. Churchill on August 18th, following the conversations with the President of the United States, Mr. King referred to

the desirability of co-operation between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada on the subject of the defence of Newfoundland. Mr. Keenleyside dealt with some detailed phases of the question in a letter to you of August 22nd.

In view of the fact that arrangements are being made between the United Kingdom and the United States for the allotment to the United States of naval and air facilities in Newfoundland, and of the further fact that the Canadian Government has, in accordance with the desires of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments and because of its own immediate and unavoidable interest in the matter, undertaken and in considerable measure already carried out, certain defence obligations in Newfoundland, and that the Minister of National Defence for Air has recently been discussing various phases of further co-operation with the Newfoundland authorities, it seems desirable that steps should be taken as early as possible to co-ordinate these activities. The Canadian Government propose to furnish the Government of the United Kingdom shortly with a summary of the arrangements already made and of the proposals for further action with regard to Newfoundland which are under consideration. They will be glad to be advised of any arrangements regarding Newfoundland defence which the United Kingdom has under consideration in its discussions with the United States.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

246.

King Papers C282310

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET

Ottawa, August 31, 1940

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of the 28th August, I have received a telegram from Lord Caldecote asking me to communicate to you the enclosed memorandum<sup>1</sup> containing a full explanation of the present position regarding the grant of naval and air facilities to the United States and the conveyance of destroyers.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



247.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/6

Ottawa, September 2, 1940

MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

Thank you for your letter of the 30th August on the subject of the defence of Newfoundland and the desirability of co-operation between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada in this connection. The substance of your letter has been communicated by telegraph to the authorities in London and I will let you know as soon as I receive any reply.

In the meantime you may like to know that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs has informed me that the Governor of Newfoundland has urged on them the importance of the representation of Newfoundland in the detailed discussions with the United States. As Newfoundland interests will necessarily form part of the discussions not only between the United States and the United Kingdom but also between them and Canada, the Governor hopes that a Newfoundland observer, whom he would wish to appoint, would be able to keep in touch with the Canadian Government, visiting Ottawa when necessary, in order to learn progress and advise on such questions regarding the Island as may be under consideration by the Permanent Canada-United States Defence Board.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Caldecote adds that the Newfoundland representatives in the recent discussions with the Canadian defence representatives in Newfoundland stressed the necessity for Newfoundland representation in the Canadian-United States discussions and that the Minister of National Defence for Air undertook to take this up with the Canadian Government on his return.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

248.

King Papers C282312

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

1000/7

Ottawa, September 2, 1940

IMPORTANT, MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Prime Minister,

With reference to my letter of the 31st August regarding the grant of naval and air facilities to the United States and the conveyance of destroyers, I

<sup>1</sup> Voir les documents 214 et 217-218.<sup>1</sup> See Documents 214 and 217-218.

have now received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs asking me to inform you that the exchange of letters between His Majesty's Ambassador and the United States Secretary of State will take place at Washington to-day, September 2nd.

I am informed that certain modifications have been made in the text of the letter to be addressed by Lord Lothian as set out in the memorandum<sup>1</sup> enclosed in my letter and the full text (as received by telegram) is enclosed herewith. The reply by the United States Secretary of State will be on the lines indicated in the above mentioned memorandum. Lord Caldecote promises to telegraph to me the full text as soon as possible.

It is contemplated that the United States President will present the letters to Congress on its reassembly at 12 noon (Washington time) on Tuesday, September 3rd, and that the letters will be released for publication in England at 6 o'clock (B.S.T.) the same evening.

Immediate examination is being given to the arrangements for the constitution of a joint committee of experts to settle the sites for lease to the United States. In the meantime the United States are arranging for a preliminary visit of representatives to the various proposed sites.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

King Papers C282314

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne aux États-Unis  
au Secrétaire d'État des États-Unis*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in United States  
to Secretary of State of United States*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

[Washington,] September 2, 1940

TEXT (TELEGRAPHED) OF LETTER FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR  
TO THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE

I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that in view of the basis of friendship and the sympathetic interest of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in the national security of the United States and their desire to strengthen the ability of the United States to co-operate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the western hemisphere, His Majesty's Government will secure the grant to the Government of the United States, freely and without consideration, of leases for immediate establishment and use, of naval and air bases, and facilities for entrance

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the Avalon Peninsula and on the southern coast of Newfoundland, and on the east coast and on the Great Bay of Bermuda.

Furthermore, in view of the above and in view of the desire of the United States to acquire additional air and naval bases in the Caribbean and in British Guiana, and without endeavouring to place a monetary or commercial value upon the many tangible and intangible rights and properties involved, His Majesty's Government will make available to the United States for immediate establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of Jamaica, the western coast of St. Lucia, the west coast of Trinidad in the Gulf of Paria, in the Island of Antigua, and in British Guiana within 50 miles of Georgetown, in exchange for naval and military equipment and material which the United States will transfer to His Majesty's Government.

All the bases and facilities referred to in the preceding paragraphs will be leased to the United States for a period of 99 years free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property for loss, expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question. His Majesty's Government in leases to be agreed upon will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent or in the vicinity of such bases necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases and appropriate provisions for their control.

Without prejudice to the above mentioned rights of the United States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which those areas are situated shall be determined by common agreement.

The exact location and bounds of the aforesaid bases, the necessary seaboard, coast and anti-aircraft defences, the location of sufficient military garrisons, stores and other necessary auxiliary facilities shall be determined by common agreement.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to designate immediately experts to meet experts of the United States for these purposes. Should these experts be unable to agree on any particular situation except in the case of Newfoundland and Bermuda, the matter shall be settled by the Secretary of State of the United States and His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

249.

.1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/10

Ottawa, September 4, 1940

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 2nd September on the subject of the defence of Newfoundland, I have now had a reply from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to the telegram which I sent him on receipt of your letter of the 30th August.

Lord Caldecote states that the general plan of procedure on which the United Kingdom Government are working is as follows:

- (a) Preliminary examination is being given in London to the maximum concessions which can be made in each area to the United States from the strategic and administrative points of view;
- (b) The United States authorities are themselves about to make preliminary examinations and inspections on the spot;
- (c) As soon as the United Kingdom authorities have reached provisional conclusions as a result of (a) above, they propose to communicate them, so far as Newfoundland is concerned, to the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments for their observations before making any proposals to the United States authorities or committing themselves to any proposals by the United States;
- (d) It will then be possible to start expert discussions with the United States as contemplated in the last paragraph of the letter addressed by His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington to the United States Secretary of State. In view of the present difficulty of sparing military and civil experts from the United Kingdom, it is being suggested that the discussions envisaged in (d) above should take place in London.

With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, Lord Caldecote asks me to explain that the United Kingdom authorities fully agree as to the necessity of co-ordinating the discussions regarding the defence of Newfoundland which have been taking place between Canada and United States representatives with those which are to take place between the United States and the United Kingdom. These discussions on the part of the United Kingdom, so far as they will relate to Newfoundland, must clearly be linked up with those regarding Bermuda and the West Indian Islands. The United Kingdom authorities had in fact already reached the conclusion that the best course would be that the Canadian Government and the Government of



Newfoundland also should appoint representatives to attend the proposed discussions in London. They therefore hope that the Canadian Government will consider the question of such representation. They will, as indicated above, communicate to the Canadian Government the result of their own preliminary examination of the concessions to be granted to the United States in Newfoundland and keep the closest touch with the Canadian Government as regards the arrangements for the forthcoming expert discussions with the United States.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

250.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/12

Ottawa, September 7, 1940

MOST SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 4th September (1000/10) on the subject of the defence of Newfoundland, I have now received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs stating that the question of the maximum concessions which could be made to the United States from the strategic point of view has now been considered and the following is the view taken by the United Kingdom authorities as regards bases in Newfoundland from this standpoint:

- (a) *Avalon Peninsula*. It would be preferable that the United States should be excluded from Conception Bay but if they present a very strong case for facilities in this Bay it would not be possible to resist it. It would, however, be necessary to retain full possession of Bell Island as a defended area and an important source of iron ore, and (2) the city and harbour of St. John's.
- (b) *South Coast of Newfoundland*. No military requirements need to limit the selection of United States bases in this area.

As regards both the above, it will be necessary to retain control of the cable stations at Bay Roberts, Harbour Grace, Heart's Content, Arnold's Cove, Colinet, Placentia and Port-aux-Basques.

- (c) While facilities for local communications of bases will of course be granted to the United States authorities, the control of these communications should remain in British hands.

The United Kingdom authorities would be glad to receive the observations of the Government of Canada on the above. They are also asking the Government of Newfoundland for their observations.

Lord Caldecote states that as regards other aspects of the matter it is difficult to make progress without more detailed information as to the areas which the United States Government have in mind. His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington has been informed that it would be of the greatest assistance to the United Kingdom Government if the United States authorities could give them at the earliest possible moment as precise an idea as possible of what they would like to obtain.

Further information may be available after the visit to Newfoundland of the naval and military experts referred to in my letter to the Prime Minister of the 3rd September.<sup>1</sup>

The United Kingdom authorities have asked the Government of Newfoundland for any information which they may be able to obtain informally as a result of this visit as well as any observations on administrative problems in regard to the areas in question which will be dealt with in the course of the proposed expert discussions in London.

It has been ascertained that the experts visiting Newfoundland consist of seven naval officers and three army officers, the head of the Mission being Rear-Admiral J. W. Greenslade and the senior Army officer Brigadier-General J. L. Devers. Information is not yet available as to the probable date of arrival in Newfoundland.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

251.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Washington, September 11, 1940

. . .

3. After a brief discussion of the defence of Newfoundland, the Board agreed to the following as its Eighth Recommendation:

That the United States initiate as expeditiously as practicable such portions of the increased defence of Newfoundland, covered by the Second Recommendation of the Board approved in Ottawa on August 26 and 27, as may be found to fall within the limits of bases now being acquired by the United States.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

252.

DND HQS 5199

*Mémoire du Comité interforce d'état-major au ministre de la Défense nationale, au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air et au ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals*

*Memorandum from Joint Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence, to Minister of National Defence for Air and to Minister of National Defence for Naval Services*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 11, 1940

### The Ministers

Certain agreements have recently been reached between the United Kingdom and the United States with regard to the leasing of defence facilities, in particular in Newfoundland, to the United States. It is not known whether the Canadian Government was consulted in the matter of these arrangements. In any event, the proposals were at no time communicated to the Chiefs of Staff of the three Defence Services and consequently no opportunity prior to settlement, was given the heads of the Services to comment upon them.

2. The Committee desires to place on record its apprehension of the serious military situation which Canada may face if important decisions concerning the defence of North America are taken without opportunity for consideration by the Defence Services of Canada. Not only do such decisions affect the present problems which are the direct responsibility of the Navy, Army and Air Force, but new problems are created which may require immediate and drastic alterations to our defence policy.

3. Submitted for consideration.

E. S. BRAND

for Chief of the Naval Staff

H. D. G. CRERAR, Major-General  
Chief of the General Staff

L. S. BREADNER, Air Vice-Marshal  
Chief of the Air Staff

253.

Skelton Papers 395

*Mémoire du Comité interforce d'état-major au ministre de la  
Défense nationale, au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air et  
au ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals*

*Memorandum from Joint Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence,  
to Minister of National Defence for Air and to Minister of  
National Defence for Naval Services*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 16, 1940

The Ministers

The Chiefs of Staff have had under consideration two communications, 1000/10 of the 4th September, 1940, and 1000/12 of the 7th September, 1940, addressed to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs by the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada.

2. Observing that the United Kingdom authorities have requested the observations of the Government of Canada regarding the general proposals contained in the communications quoted above, the Chiefs of Staff Committee submit herewith their opinions on the questions raised.

3. The Committee agrees in general with the concessions in Newfoundland that it is proposed to grant to the United States. They feel very strongly, however, that such concessions should only be made on the clear understanding that the Canadian Government should at the same time be permitted to establish any sea, land and air defences in Newfoundland which are considered to be in the interests of the direct defence of Canada. The above remarks must, however, be subject to any recommendations which may be made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

4. With regard to the last paragraph of the High Commissioner's letter 1000/10 of the 4th September, the Committee notes with satisfaction the intention of the United Kingdom to co-ordinate the discussions regarding the defence of Newfoundland which have been taking place between Canada and the United States with those which are to take place between the United Kingdom and the United States. The Committee, however, wishes to stress their considered opinion that it is essential for Canadian Services representatives to be present at these discussions.

5. Submitted for consideration.

E. S. BRAND  
for Chief of the Naval Staff

H. D. G. CRERAR, Major-General  
Chief of the General Staff

L. S. BREADNER, Air Vice-Marshal  
Chief of the Air Staff



254.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/12

Ottawa, September 24, 1940

MOST SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

In his letter No. 1000/12 of the 7th September the High Commissioner gave you an outline, which he had received from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, of the view taken by the United Kingdom authorities in regard to bases in Newfoundland.

The High Commissioner has now learned that the Newfoundland Government have considered this statement of the views of the United Kingdom Government, and have offered the following observations intended to emphasise Newfoundland's point of view.

We wish you to know that we are satisfied that public opinion would wish broad Imperial considerations to be given fullest weight. As regards (a) of your statement you have not indicated why it would be preferable that the United States of America should be excluded from Conception Bay, but we ourselves can see certain political objections to their presence in this highly populated area near the capital even assuming the physical conditions are such as to make it suitable for a base. On the other hand Newfoundland opinion, especially in the east of the island, might consider that a definite attempt should be made to attract Americans to the Conception Bay area on the ground that it would bring economic advantages to the most highly populated part of the country. We agree as to (b). We will send our further comments particularly as to Mortiz after the visit of the American experts.

In reply to this communication the United Kingdom authorities have assured the Newfoundland Government that their observations are being taken fully into account. The United Kingdom Government do not contemplate putting forward proposals themselves to the United States of America, whether as regards the location of bases or as regards the problems of jurisdiction and administration which will arise. The procedure which they envisage is that, when discussions between British and United States experts take place, the United States representatives will formulate their proposals as regards these matters, and the object of the examination of problems which is at present being undertaken in London is to consider provisionally the lines on which the British representatives, including representatives of the Government of Newfoundland, might deal with the proposals which the United States of America may be expected to put forward. As soon as they have been able to investigate further the issues which are likely to arise the United Kingdom Government will communicate again with the Newfoundland Government.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

255.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/18

Ottawa, September 25, 1940

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

May I refer to previous correspondence ending with Mr. Hankinson's letter of the 24th September in regard to bases in Newfoundland.

I have now had repeated to me two telegrams which the Governor of Newfoundland has sent to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs regarding the discussions which have recently taken place between the Newfoundland authorities and the United States representatives who recently visited the Island. I enclose copies of these two telegrams as the Canadian Government will wish to be aware of the result of these discussions.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE 1/ENCLOSURE 1]

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions  
Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM

[St. John's,] September 17, 1940

We had the first conference yesterday with Admiral Greenslade, General Devers and the American service members who accompanied them. It would appear that the discussions of the Joint Defence Board (of which none of the visiting party is a member) have resulted in a large measure of agreement as to the part to be allotted to each country in taking defensive measures in Newfoundland. We have not been informed of more details than are sufficient for the immediate discussions. The Canadian Government has not been approached by us with a view to any agreement of a formal nature and their presence at the airport and Botwood depends only upon an exchange of telegrams asking our permission to land forces and erect semi-permanent buildings. We had also discussed with the army authorities the establishment of about 1,000 infantry at St. John's. The American proposals envisage:

- (1) the establishment in or near St. John's of a reinforced battalion of about 2,200 men and 150 officers—reinforced means supplied with guns of various sizes and particularly A.A. guns. This battalion will be in substitution of the Canadian battalion. Informally it was

ascertained that the reinforcement will be deliberately excessive so that material can be distributed to other parts of Newfoundland, particularly those occupied by Canadians, to make up deficiencies. Building would commence forthwith but the early arrival of at least some of the troops is expected in order to justify the export of material;

- (2) the establishment at some point on the Peninsula of Avalon as well placed as, say, Whitbourne of a supply base capable of holding supplies for a division of 16,000 men. This force which will arrive later and be stationed at the base will be drawn on for the St. John's battalion, for the defence of their other bases and for the defence of the airport if they and Canadians decide that this should be defensible by Americans. It may be supplemented by a further 16,000 men if emergency arises and this supplement may be either American or Canadian. From these forces would be drawn any forces needed for an expedition to Greenland should an expedition to that country be undertaken;
- (3) the establishment of two emergency landing places for land planes, one between Port-aux-Basques and St. George's, and one between the Newfoundland Airport and St. John's.
- (4) The Joint Board seem settled that Canada would assume naval responsibility for the whole of the western coast of Newfoundland and for harbour and nearby waters of the rest of Newfoundland. The American responsibility will be the deep water defence of the south and east coast which will be effected with destroyers and submarines, of which initially there will be nine and twelve respectively. An American naval base will be established and the naval and naval air bases will if possible be located together. Argentia is presently favoured but other alternatives will be examined during the four day stay of the United States *St. Louis* and two naval seaplanes and one army plane.
- (5) Freedom from customs duties on construction material and on supplies for ships, jurisdiction of the Naval Court, definition of the right of command in the case of joint action by the American and Canadian forces have been mentioned for discussion but not yet discussed.

Discussions are proceeding and we will keep you informed.

Meantime we have had no acknowledgement from the Canadian Government of our telegram of September 6th, repeated to you No. 580,<sup>1</sup> and we are telegraphing them this evening in terms of a message<sup>2</sup> which we are repeating to you. We appreciate that the defence of Newfoundland is vital in itself and on broad imperial grounds the entry of the Americans into our

<sup>1</sup> Document 214.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 217.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 217.

defence should be (group omitted). Our meetings with the visitors are in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality. The public has welcomed the visit of the Americans wholeheartedly but if decisions are reached over our head the public will become aware of the fact and the reaction will then in our opinion be extremely adverse.

[PIÈCE JOINTE 2/ENCLOSURE 2]

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM

[St. John's,] September 23, 1940

The American experts have now finished their examination of St. John's and Argentia and their exploration by air of the south coast as far as Port-aux-Basques and other portions of the Island. They conferred with us this morning and presented a memorandum in which they outlined the recommendations which they propose to make to the President as follows:

- (1) An area on the Argentia peninsula for the establishment of a naval and a naval air base which will accommodate the principal major naval and air facilities.
- (2) A base on the south side of the harbour of St. John's with a frontage of about 1,200 feet and a depth of about 800 feet for berthing, replenishing supplies, making minor repairs and for resting the crews of submarines and destroyers while on patrol duty.
- (3) An area of approximately 160 acres either in the western suburbs of St. John's near Waterford Bridge railway station where the old Petty Harbour road joins the Bay of Bulls road or alternatively in the eastern suburb of St. John's on the north side of the road which runs on the north side of Quidi Vidi Lake, this area to be the permanent establishment of the reinforced battalion referred to in our earlier message.
- (4) An area of about two square miles on the south side of Argentia harbour (marked on Turner's map 1925 Placentia Sound) to serve for a base and for training a division of 16,000 men referred to in our earlier telegram.
- (5) The Canadian Government are contemplating the building of an air field in the vicinity of St. John's. If they do this the Americans will seek joint user. If they do not build, the Americans request the right to do so. The areas referred to in Nos. (1) to (4) above involve 99 year leases. We have accepted in principle the above proposals subject
  - (i) to unforeseen difficulties in regard to any particular site, and



- (ii) to the observations of the United Kingdom Government, and
- (iii) to such consultation of the Government of Canada as is considered desirable.

Although at our first conference it appeared as if administrative problems were to be discussed we found later that the visiting delegates did not feel that these problems fell within the terms of their reference and these will be dealt with by the respective governments at the appropriate time. In view of the reference to St. John's in paragraph (a) of your telegram 715 September 6th<sup>1</sup> we should explain that at our first conference Admiral Greenslade mentioned that he had considered St. John's as a possible naval base but since his arrival had abandoned it. He reopened the matter in his memorandum today making it clear that he had subsequently come to the conclusion that a small lease of green area in St. John's was absolutely essential to United States requirements. The visitors left for home today and will report direct to the President probably on Monday. Meantime no announcement except in the most general terms and on lines agreed with Admiral Greenslade is being made by us. We should value your observations or directions at the earliest possible moment and also an indication when and where you expect discussions to take place between experts on administrative and other problems.

256.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/18

Ottawa, October 1, 1940

SECRET

My dear Dr. Skelton,

With reference to my letter of the 25th September (1000/18) regarding the discussions which recently took place between the Newfoundland authorities and representatives of the United States, you may like to see the enclosed telegram which the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs sent to the Governor of Newfoundland on the 27th September in reply to the two telegrams enclosed in my letter of the 25th September.

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[London,] September 27, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram 23rd September. From the strategical point of view we see no objection to proposals (1) to (5). As regards proposal (4) we assume that this replaces proposal mentioned under (2) in your telegram of the 17th September that supply base should be established at Whitbourne but that one of the purposes of the land force mentioned would still be the defence of the Newfoundland Airport if it were decided that this should be undertaken by United States and not Canadian forces. As to this it seems to us most important that, so long as the United States is not participating in the war, the defence of the Airport should be entrusted to Canadian forces (or failing them to United Kingdom forces).

From the standpoint of jurisdictional and administrative problems it appears to us that the proposals (2) and (3) which would involve United States bases in close proximity to the capital may give rise to considerable difficulty particularly as regards an inland enclave such as is mentioned under (3). The selection of separate areas as is suggested might however be of advantage as making it easier to limit the extent of jurisdiction to be exercised by the United States and it might be possible to secure different degrees of jurisdiction in several areas. These will be questions to be discussed when conversations between British and United States experts take place.

It is not yet possible to say how soon these conversations can begin. We are strongly of opinion that they should take place in London and we have so informed the United States Government.

As regards preliminary consultation with the Canadian Government as to the defence aspect of the United States proposals we assume that the Newfoundland Government will undertake this and we shall be glad to be informed of developments.

257.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du conseiller<sup>1</sup> au sous-secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Counsellor<sup>1</sup> to Under-Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] October 11, 1940

## CANADIAN REPRESENTATION IN U.K.—U.S. TALKS

You may wish to remind the Prime Minister that no steps have yet been taken to arrange for Canadian representation in the talks which are about to be

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

initiated between the United Kingdom and the United States Governments with reference to the terms upon which the latter will be permitted to establish bases in Newfoundland and other British territories in the Western Hemisphere. The representatives of our General Staffs are very definite in their recommendation that Canada should seek to participate in these conversations.\*

258.

976-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 21, 1940

Dear Dr. Skelton,

May I refer to the telegram from the Governor of Newfoundland to the Dominions Office of the 8th October, which was repeated to the Secretary of State for External Affairs as No. 50<sup>1</sup>, regarding the meeting of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Defence Board which was held at Halifax and at which Mr. Penson and Mr. Emerson of the Commission of Government of Newfoundland were present. In the latter part of that telegram the suggestion was made that a simple form of lease should be adopted for the naval and air bases in order to avoid the delay which would inevitably occur if all details had to be settled before the United States authorities could commence the necessary construction work.

The High Commissioner told me that in the course of a conversation with you on another matter, he had mentioned that we had had repeated to us various telegrams from London, Washington and Newfoundland dealing *inter alia* with this suggestion and that he assumed that the Canadian authorities were being kept informed by Mr. Loring Christie of developments in this matter. Sir Gerald Campbell gathered from the conversation that you would be glad to have a note of the relevant portions of these communications and I accordingly enclose a memorandum on them which I trust will prove of assistance.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

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\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

When are these talks to take place? We are already talking in N. America, including Newfoundland, London, Singapore. S[KELTON]

<sup>1</sup> Document 222.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire de haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire  
d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 21, 1940

In the course of a telegram of the 10th October<sup>1</sup> to the Foreign Office regarding certain questions which had arisen about the location of the bases in Bermuda, His Majesty's Ambassador reported that Colonel Knox said that he was most anxious to make a beginning with some of the bases, that the money had been appropriated and Congress would become restless unless it could be assured that some of the work was actually being put in hand. In order to expedite this, Colonel Knox handed the Ambassador a draft lease which one of his lawyers had compiled. The Ambassador reported that the lease attempted to provide legally for every conceivable contingency from the American point of view and that if ever it was signed, it would lead to every kind of legalistic dispute. Lord Lothian proposed to tell Colonel Knox and if necessary the President, early the following week that he was sure that relations could not be based on any attempt to provide for every contingency by law in a legal document, and that the terms of the lease ought to be as short and simple as possible, leaving the detailed adjustment to be worked out between the American and British authorities on the spot in the light of experience. It was obvious, however, that it was going to take some time before all these matters could be brought to a focus for settlement in London. Lord Lothian asked whether, in the meantime, it would not be possible for the United Kingdom Government to state to the United States Government that wherever agreement has been reached as to the site for a naval or air base, the United Kingdom Government would have no objection to the American authorities beginning to construct piers and wharves, and aerodromes with some of the necessary buildings, or to undertake dredging without waiting for final adjustment of the exact boundaries or legal matters. Lord Lothian instanced the agreement that the naval base in Newfoundland should be at Placentia and asked whether the United States authorities could not be authorised to go ahead there.

2. The Governor of Newfoundland telegraphed to the Dominions Office on the 12th October, referring to the Ambassador's message in paragraph (1) above, stating that the Government of Newfoundland entirely agreed with the reasons put forward by the Ambassador for urging the United

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



States Government to proceed with active construction pending a settlement of all the questions of the terms of the leases. They referred to the telegram to the Dominions Office of the 8th October (which was repeated to the Canadian Government as No. 50)<sup>1</sup> in which they urged the execution of a simple lease in order to expedite action because the United States representatives on the Permanent Joint Defence Board had stated that the United States Government could not constitutionally spend on real estate in a foreign country until legal title was invested in the Government. The telegram went on that if this difficulty could be overcome, the Government of Newfoundland were quite willing that work should be commenced as soon as the sites had been definitely delimited to the satisfaction of the United Kingdom Government, even though in some cases the final and accurate description could not be given.

3. On the 13th October the Foreign Office telegraphed to the Ambassador at Washington, saying that before they could consider the suggestion of entering into a simple lease as a means of overcoming possible delay, it was essential that they should have a sufficient idea as to the form which the United States Government desired the settlement to take. It must, incidentally, be recollected that they had as yet no final particulars as to the location and extent of the areas to be leased elsewhere than in Newfoundland and were reluctant to proceed to an arrangement in Newfoundland which would create a precedent which might be awkward.

4. In a separate telegram to the Ambassador, the Foreign Office said that provided that there was no objection from the point of view of United States law, the United Kingdom Government would see no objection to the American authorities beginning construction work at Placentia. They were also disposed to agree that if in any particular case, complete agreement was reached between the United States authorities, the United Kingdom Government and the Colonial Governments as to the location of sites, preliminary construction should be begun without waiting the experts discussions in London or the conclusion of the formal lease. A final assurance on this point could not however be given without reference to the Governors of the Colonies concerned, whose concurrence was being sought.

5. The Ambassador at Washington reported on the 14th October that he had informed the President and Colonel Knox that day that the United Kingdom Government was quite agreeable to work being undertaken on any bases where the United Kingdom and the United States Governments and the local authorities were agreed as to the site while leaving the precise definitions of all other matters to be finally embodied in the lease in London; and that he had said further that so far as he could understand there was

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<sup>1</sup> Document 222.

agreement in the case of Newfoundland as to the naval base, etc. at Placentia Bay and as to the emergency landing ground and a small navy yard at St. John's. Lord Lothian reported that both the President and Colonel Knox seemed entirely satisfied with this proposal, though the latter said that some sort of temporary lease giving the United States Government title to these areas would be necessary before Congressional money could actually be spent. He told the President and Colonel Knox that the latter's original draft form of the lease was much too legalistic and would only lead to friction and that for two nations setting out to live together on the same island, a simpler form was preferable with some clause providing for an umpire nominated by one of the Secretaries of State, who could adjust minor local difficulties where disagreement arose on the spot. They agreed generally to this and Colonel Knox withdrew the draft lease. The Ambassador then said that he would arrange for his legal advisor to find out from the State Department what kind of interim title would be necessary and to arrange for the Naval Attaché to ascertain from the Navy Department the interim definition of the area in which the United States may begin its works in Newfoundland. At the same interview, the Ambassador also reserved the right of persons removed from these bases to receive compensation and asked that British firms should be invited to tender.

6. In a telegram of the 18th October<sup>1</sup> to the Dominions Office, the Governor of Newfoundland reported the arrival at Placentia the previous week of a party of engineers and hydrographers, who are making surveys of the harbour for naval purposes and of the surrounding lands for an airport. He also stated that a party of army and civilian engineers have come to St. John's and have commenced the survey of the site on the north side of Quidi Vidi Lake for buildings for reinforced battalion. One of the party has been looking for a location in the harbour for mooring a steamer of about sixteen hundred feet in length to act as barracks for one thousand troops, pending the building of temporary quarters. The engineers state that these temporary quarters are to commence at an early date and will take only a few weeks. They will be occupied during the period of construction of permanent buildings which will take twelve months. It is clear that the engineers are unaware that there are many formalities still to be finalised before construction can commence and the Government of Newfoundland have not so informed them. The Newfoundland Government have secured for them the necessary permissions from the owners of property to enter and make examinations. The Newfoundland Government also stated that the Greenslade Commission informed them that their instructions were explicit on the employment of local labour and that the engineers have told them that they are not to import any labour, skilled or otherwise, unless local supply is exhausted.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

259.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du conseiller<sup>1</sup> au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Counsellor<sup>1</sup> to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 24, 1940

CANADIAN REPRESENTATION IN UNITED KINGDOM—UNITED STATES TALKS

You may wish to remind the Prime Minister that no steps have yet been taken to arrange for Canadian representation in the talks which are about to be initiated by the United Kingdom and the United States Governments with reference to the terms upon which the latter will be permitted to establish bases in Newfoundland and other British territories in the Western Hemisphere. The representatives of our General Staffs are very anxious that Canada should be represented in these conversations.

. . .

260.

976-40

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/25

Ottawa, November 2, 1940

SECRET

Dear Dr. Skelton,

In my letter of the 21st October, I enclosed a memorandum on certain developments which had taken place regarding the suggestion that a simple form of lease should be adopted for the naval and air bases to be leased to the United States. I now write to let you know of further developments in this matter which have come to our notice.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington reported that at an interview on the 18th October between the Secretary of the Navy and the Naval Attaché and Legal Adviser it was suggested to the Secretary that the temporary lease might take the form of a letter from the Ambassador to him which would purport to lease an area, the exact boundaries of which would be embodied in a subsequent formal lease, to the United States for 99 years. The text of the proposed letter is enclosed, marked "A".<sup>2</sup> The Secretary of the Navy after consulting his legal department agreed that the form of the letter would be sufficient under United States law to permit constructional work to proceed. It was made clear that the letter had been drafted without reference either to London or Newfoundland and that it

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

might well not prove acceptable to the British authorities, at all events in that form. Lord Lothian urged, however, that if the United Kingdom and Newfoundland authorities saw no strong objection to some such letter, it should be sent so that the United States could make a beginning at Newfoundland.

Certain difficulties were seen both in Newfoundland and London to the actual terms of the letter. The Newfoundland Government pointed out that they were not yet in possession of any of the sites and that therefore the use of the term "hereby leased" was premature, and that even after they had expropriated the lands they would have to pass a special statute covering the final leases. They therefore suggested that the words at the beginning of the proposed letter "Pending the preparation of a formal lease" (which technically assume that all the terms have already been agreed) should be deleted and the words "Pending the settlement of the terms of the formal lease" substituted. The United Kingdom authorities agree with this suggestion and consider also that, since the letter itself does not and cannot constitute a lease, it would be preferable in sub-heading (2) of the proposed letter that the words "it is hereby agreed that the said area shall be leased" should be substituted in place of the phrase "the said area is hereby leased". Although the United Kingdom authorities would reluctantly acquiesce if the United States Government insist on the original wording, they hope that the latter will be prepared to accept at this stage such an agreement to lease.

The Newfoundland authorities also suggested that in sub-heading (3) all words after the word "base" should be deleted (as the implication was that payment of compensation was to proceed with the commencement of the works) and a new paragraph (4) substituted to read "the Government of the United States shall forthwith take steps to agree with the Government of Newfoundland on a procedure to be adopted for a settlement and payment by the United States Government of the claims of owners of private property for compensation for loss or damage which may be caused by expropriation". They consider that delay in tackling the problem of compensation would be very embarrassing.

These amendments with one or two minor verbal ones are incorporated in the enclosed revised version of the letter marked "B".<sup>1</sup>

His Majesty's Ambassador has been informed that subject to these amendments the United Kingdom authorities agree to the text of the letter. He has, however, been asked to make it clear to the United States authorities that this arrangement in respect of Newfoundland cannot be regarded as a precedent for the various Colonies where conditions widely vary as between each other and as between them and Newfoundland.

The Ambassador has also been informed that, although no such clause figures in the draft letter, the United Kingdom authorities do not favour the suggestion to the President and Colonel Knox (recorded in paragraph 5 of the memorandum enclosed in my letter of the 21st October) that the two Secretaries of State should nominate an umpire who would adjust minor

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



local difficulties where disagreement arose on the spot. Apart from the great difficulty in most if not all of the Colonies concerned in finding an umpire on the spot of the requisite standing, the view of the United Kingdom authorities is that if any difficulties arise which cannot be resolved locally they are likely to be points of constitutional or political principle which would have to be referred to London, and, in the event of disagreement by the United Kingdom, settled—excepting in the case of Newfoundland and Bermuda—by the United States Secretary of State and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the concluding sentence to the Note to the United States Government of September 2nd. The Ambassador has been asked to endeavour if possible to withdraw his suggestion and to intimate to the United States authorities in general terms that the United Kingdom Government are convinced that any difficulties arising locally can be overcome amicably in the ordinary course of negotiations.

Yours sincerely,

W. C. HANKINSON

261.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Victoria, November 14, 1940

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2. Mayor LaGuardia raised the question of the leases for the proposed United States bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda and, owing to the importance of these bases to the joint defence of Canada and the United States, expressed regret that these leases had not yet been signed. He stated that he did not know where the difficulty lay, but suggested that the Board consider any steps which it might appropriately take to expedite this matter. It was the sense of the Board that this matter should be settled at the earliest possible moment and that the Chairmen of the two Sections of the Board should bring this view to the attention of their Governments.

...

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Victoria, November 14, 1940

...

#### SECOND RECOMMENDATION

##### *Action by United States Navy*

Since the last meeting of the Board, the U.S.A. *Bowditch*, survey vessel, proceeded to Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, and will complete this week the hydrographic survey of that area, together with certain topographic

survey incident to the construction problem. Two P.B.Y. patrol planes were stationed at Argentia during this period to assist in this task.

#### *Action by United States Army*

Elements of initial ground garrison have been selected and informed of their prospective departure on December 1. Steamer *America* is in dry dock being refitted to house this garrison until quarters can be completed on shore. The British Government has been asked to authorize such use of the *America* in St. John's harbour. Such authority has not yet been given and no information has been received relative to accomplishment of leases. Air Corps and Engineer officers made preliminary surveys for staging field and selected a site near Stephenville. Metes and bounds are being surveyed. The lease as drawn includes the staging field.

Provision for group of Army aeroplanes has been included in Army plans.

. . .

262.

1156-D-39

#### *Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*

#### *Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] December 3, 1940

You will recall some correspondence with Sir Gerald Campbell the end of August and the beginning of September, regarding co-ordination of discussions on the defence of Newfoundland. In our letter of August 30th we suggested, in view of the discussions between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding Newfoundland bases and the action already taken by the Canadian Government, that it seemed "desirable that steps should be taken as early as possible to co-ordinate these activities". Sir Gerald Campbell replied on September 4th that "the United Kingdom authorities fully agree as to the necessity of co-ordinating the discussions regarding the defence of Newfoundland which have been taking place between Canada and United States representatives with those which are to take place between the United States and the United Kingdom". He added that the United Kingdom had already reached the conclusion that the best course would be that the Canadian Government and the Government of Newfoundland should appoint representatives to attend the proposed discussions in London between the United Kingdom and the United States.

We have had no definite information as to such a meeting in London. We have been informed that Newfoundland expects to be represented by Emerson and Penson. The Defence authorities, I believe consider it highly desirable that we should also be represented.

Letters of August 30th and September 4th attached.

263.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 17, 1940

. . .

## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

*Action by United States Navy*

The contract is being let this week for the construction of the Argentina Base, with facilities for one squadron of patrol planes, and including a landing field.

*Action by United States Army*

Elements of initial ground garrison will sail for Newfoundland on S.S. *Edmund B. Alexander* early in January, 1941. The steamer is out of dry dock and is at Brooklyn being refitted to house this garrison. Remainder of the garrison will proceed to Newfoundland as soon as facilities are available. Funds for necessary construction are available or will be included in 1941 supplemental estimates. The British Government has authorized use of St. John's harbour by the *Alexander*. Authority has been received to proceed with developments in Newfoundland pending accomplishment of leases. Metes and bounds are still under survey. The draft of lease, as now drawn, includes the staging field near St. George's and funds have been made available to start it. Modification of the proposed lease to include an area at Newfoundland airport will be discussed at this meeting. Provision for a group of Army aeroplanes has been included in Army plans.

. . .

264.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, January 20, 1941

. . .

## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

*Action by United States Navy*

A contract has been awarded for the construction of the naval air station at Argentina and the contractor is preparing actively to execute the contract. Surveys are proceeding meanwhile. This station is to have a capacity of one patrol squadron initially, with a landing field and piers for large tenders. Facilities will be provided eventually for an overflow capacity of two additional seaplane squadrons and one carrier aircraft group. Cost over \$10,000,000.

. . .

*Action by United States Army*

Newfoundland. *Alexander* sailed January 15, 1941. Will delay about 36 hours at Bayonne, N.J., and then proceed at slow speed to Newfoundland. . . . The United States War Department has authorized construction of facilities for one pursuit squadron near Argentia. Seacoast defence equipment for Newfoundland approved.

. . . .

265.

Skelton Papers 385

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au conseiller<sup>1</sup>*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Counsellor<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa,] January 21, 1941

It was agreed by the War Cabinet yesterday that Canada should be represented at the Base discussions shortly to be held in London. Presumably so far as the Newfoundland base is concerned, it will be necessary to take the matter up definitely with the United Kingdom, and in the event of concurrence, to arrange for the appointment of a representative selected from persons now overseas. The Prime Minister suggested that Mr. Pearson might act. Some consideration might be given to the possibility of associating with him some Defence representative now in London, who would have some knowledge of the Newfoundland situation.

266.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 156

London, January 27, 1941

United Kingdom-United States Atlantic bases. Discussions on the subject of strategical air and naval bases to be leased to the United States, to attend which delegations from United States, Newfoundland and Bermuda have arrived, start tomorrow morning. Cranborne has asked me whether Canadian Government would like to send an observer to these meetings. Would appreciate instructions. I have been invited to attend opening session, and have arranged to do so.

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.



267.

976-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 139

Ottawa, January 27, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Your telegram No. 156 of January 27th, Atlantic bases. As previously arranged with United Kingdom Government we have intended to be represented at discussions but had no intimation they were to begin tomorrow. I shall be obliged if you can attend opening session as arranged, and would suggest that Pearson together with Commodore L. W. Murray who has just arrived in United Kingdom and is familiar with Newfoundland situation should carry on afterward. Instructions will be furnished in my immediately following telegram.

268.

976-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 140

Ottawa, January 28, 1941

IMMEDIATE. With reference to my immediately preceding telegram No. 139, re Atlantic bases.

1. While it is difficult, in a case of this kind, to formulate precise instructions, the Canadian representatives should, in general, be prepared to ensure that in reaching decisions the Conference does not disregard the interests of Canada. In pursuing this aim the following information may be found helpful.

2. The concern of the Canadian Government in this Conference arises particularly from the fact that the welfare and defence of Newfoundland is now and is likely to be a problem of increasing importance to Canada. We wish, therefore, to be kept fully and accurately informed with regard to the conditions on which the U.S. is to establish bases on the Island. The presence of Canadian representatives at the Conference will enable the Canadian Government to make their views known if

A—The U.S. should ask for concessions which are considered unnecessary or unwise;

B—Newfoundland is not prepared to accede to reasonable U.S. suggestions.

3. The Canadian Government, while not wishing to initiate the discussion, is likely to be particularly interested in the agreements reached on the following subjects: Currency; labour; construction; materials and supplies; import duties; health conditions; and problems of military, naval and air command. We would prefer to have the question of command omitted from the agenda.

4. Through his work in Ottawa and as a member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Murray is already acquainted with most of the present arrangements between Canada and Newfoundland with respect to the stationing of Canadian forces in Newfoundland and in relation to the general obligations which we have undertaken there. Nevertheless the following summary may be useful:

- (a) Acquisition of and title to property: the Government of Newfoundland have undertaken to acquire whatever lands may be required as a war measure under powers conferred upon the Government by the Newfoundland Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940. In the case of Crown lands required for Canadian defence purposes, those lands will be conveyed or a lease granted to the Canadian Government without charge. In the case of privately owned land the Canadian Government have agreed to appoint an agent to negotiate privately. The Government of Newfoundland propose to establish an Advisory Board to act in contentious cases. In the case of lands on which R.C.A.F. buildings are being erected, the Canadian Government have agreed to accept a lease instead of a grant provided the term of the lease corresponds reasonably to the life of the buildings being built thereon.
- (b) Supplies and materials: the Canadian Government have agreed to purchase in Newfoundland certain materials required for defence purposes, and other materials manufactured in Newfoundland, on condition that the price quoted compares favourably with that of similar materials when imported and subjected to the laid-down customs duties.
- (c) The relations between the civil community and the Canadian forces in Newfoundland are governed by the Newfoundland Visiting Forces Act, copied *mutatis mutandis* from the corresponding Canadian legislation, and an Order in Council, No. 3822 of August 13, 1940, passed under the Canadian Visiting Forces Act.
- (d) The Government of Newfoundland have agreed to absorb the cost of transportation of Canadian troops on Newfoundland railways while on duty.
- (e) The Canadian Government have agreed that no substantial change will be made in the strength of the Canadian forces assigned to the defence of Newfoundland without reasonable prior notification to the Newfoundland Government.
- (f) The Canadian Government have agreed that no alteration shall be made to the existing lay-out of air bases in Newfoundland without prior consent of the Newfoundland Government.

(g) Canada has agreed to provide and is preparing extensive facilities for the operation of U.S. aircraft at the Newfoundland airport.

5. While not unconcerned with the arrangements being made for the leasing to the U.S. of bases in Bermuda and other British possessions in this hemisphere, our major and immediate interest is in seeing that an early and satisfactory agreement is reached in relation to Newfoundland. Anything that our representatives can do to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement will be viewed with the greatest satisfaction.

269.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 176

London, January 30, 1941

Further to your telegram No. 139, Atlantic bases discussions. There has been some doubt as to whether Canadian representative at the discussion should act merely as observer or be in exactly the same position as other delegates. I have been trying to clear this up with Dominions Office, and on the point Lord Cranborne has written me to the effect that there are important considerations which give rise to considerable difficulties in respect of full representation of Canada at the discussions. These discussions, in so far as they do not relate to actual sites of bases, deal, so far as Newfoundland is concerned, mainly with questions of jurisdiction to be exercised in leased area and administrative arrangements arising out of leases, which matters are, of course, within the competence of the Newfoundland Government. For political reasons United Kingdom authorities consider it most important that it should be made clear to public opinion in the United States, United Kingdom and Newfoundland that Newfoundland is the principal in this matter, and that any views expressed in discussions, as regards Newfoundland, should be expressed directly by their representative to the United States representatives. Accordingly, inasmuch as any question affecting Newfoundland arises, United Kingdom representatives at the conference are, as far as possible, refraining from making any statement, and leaving it to the Newfoundland representatives to present their case and conduct their negotiations. If a Canadian representative were to take part in discussions affecting Newfoundland, there is, according to Lord Cranborne, some risk that, however helpful his intervention might be in practice, the political implications mentioned above might well be misunderstood. He feels, therefore, that under the circumstances the Canadian representative should attend meetings as an observer, and that the chairman and Newfoundland representatives should keep in closest touch with him on all matters of interest, so that Canadian point of

view *vis-a-vis* United States delegates may receive fullest consideration. Lord Cranborne adds that in the special circumstances referred to above, he hopes that this arrangement will be satisfactory to the Canadian Government. Would appreciate your views.

Commodore Murray arrived in London this morning, and will attend meetings of conference from now on.

MASSEY

270.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 31, 1941

NEWFOUNDLAND

U.K.-U.S. DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON

1. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR raised the question of the status of and instructions for those attending, on behalf of Canada, the discussions regarding the transfer of Atlantic bases to the United States. A long and detailed agenda had been agreed upon by the conference and had been communicated to the government by the Canadian High Commissioner.

(See telegram No. 173 of January 29th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Canadian High Commissioner, London, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.)

Lord Cranborne had suggested to Mr. Massey that Canadians attending the meetings should do so in the capacity of observers rather than delegates, inasmuch as the discussions, so far as Newfoundland was concerned, would deal mainly with questions of jurisdiction and administration within the competence of the Newfoundland government. For political reasons the U.K. government considered it important that Newfoundland should appear as the principal in negotiations in these matters with the U.S. representatives.

(See telegram No. 176 of January 30th<sup>1</sup> from the Canadian High Commissioner, London, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.)

2. It was pointed out that in so far as Newfoundland was concerned, the items on the agenda involved questions almost exclusively of interest to the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Newfoundland itself, and that Canada's primary concern was to preserve rights "actual or potential" in the operational control of the Newfoundland Airport and related services.

3. It was agreed, in the circumstances, to accede to the request of the U.K. government that Canadian representatives should attend the discussions in London as observers only, and that a communication to that effect

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



should be sent to the Canadian High Commissioner, with a reminder that the major Canadian interest lay in the preservation of Canadian rights under arrangements with Newfoundland authorities regarding operational control of the Newfoundland Airport.

(See telegrams No. 158<sup>1</sup> and 161 of January 31st, 1941, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian High Commissioner, London.)

. . .

271.

976-40

*Mémoire du conseiller<sup>2</sup> au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim  
aux Affaires extérieures<sup>3</sup>*

*Memorandum from Counsellor<sup>2</sup> to Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs<sup>3</sup>*

[Ottawa,] January 31, 1941

TELEGRAM RE ATLANTIC BASES DISCUSSIONS

1. This telegram should go tonight, if possible.
2. The question of Canadian "observers" or Canadian representatives has been discussed with both Navy and Army Chiefs of Staff who are agreed that it is essential that our representatives should be full members of the Conference. (The Acting Chief of the Air Staff was not available.)\*

272.

976-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 161

Ottawa, January 31, 1941

Your telegram No. 176 of January 30th, Atlantic bases discussions. In circumstances we are prepared to agree to United Kingdom request that Canadian representatives at Conference should attend in capacity of observers. Major Canadian interest, as outlined in my previous telegrams, lies in preservation of our rights under arrangements with Newfoundland authorities regarding operational control of air base.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>3</sup> N. A. Robertson.

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

This draft telegram was considered by War Committee yesterday but they felt quite strongly that we should be content to be represented by "observers" and the High Commissioner advised accordingly. N. A. R[OBERTSON] 1.2.41

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 166

Ottawa, February 1, 1941

SECRET. Reference Atlantic bases discussions, the following notes may be of assistance in connection with some of the items in the agenda as set out in your 173 of January 29th<sup>1</sup> and as supplementary to my previous telegrams.

1. In negotiations between Canadian and Newfoundland governments no form of lease has been discussed. The Canadian government however is interested in being informed as to any unusual concessions which may be asked for by or granted to the United States on their Newfoundland lease.

2. Reference title 3 of agenda boundary of sites. It is understood that United States lease in Newfoundland will cover part of Argentia Peninsula together with a naval base site of some twenty-two acres on the south side of St. John's harbour and a site of some one hundred and sixty acres north of Quidi Vidi Lake and staging facilities in St. George's. We would wish to be informed if any other or more extensive areas are being considered.

3. Reference title 4 of agenda questions relating to Services. Informal discussions have taken place between Canadian and American Service representatives as to command and policy of defence. This was the reason for the preference previously expressed to omit this subject from agenda. The situation in this respect is a delicate one. The Commander of Canadian Forces in Newfoundland is by agreement with Newfoundland Government in command of Newfoundland troops as well. With reference to military aerodromes the Canadian Government subject to concurrence by Newfoundland Government has already agreed to provide additional facilities at Newfoundland airport to permit a composite group of 72 United States aircraft to operate from that base beginning early summer 1941. (See below)\*

Local flying regulations have been discussed with Newfoundland government who agree that it is desirable that Air Officer Commanding Eastern

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

Insert: Although agreement to transfer operational control of airport has not been reduced to writing final disposition of the matter is in reality subject only to the working out of details.

Air Command at Halifax be informed of any proposed flight in Newfoundland area.

The meteorological station at Newfoundland airport is and has for some years been operated by and at the expense of the Canadian Government but there are local reporting stations supported by Newfoundland. This station is an important feature of Newfoundland Airport and is of the greatest value to fliers in Newfoundland area and to those engaged in trans-atlantic flights.

4. A number of other subjects on agenda such as customs duties, employment of local labour, use of locally manufactured goods and products, telephone and telegraph facilities have been the subject of discussion with Newfoundland. There is at present under discussion a proposal that Canadian goods shall be subject to duty on entering Newfoundland but that as part of its contribution to Canadian defence measures Newfoundland will repay the amounts so collected. The Newfoundland government is examining the possibility of improving telephone and telegraph facilities for the use of our own troops.

274.

976-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CIRCULAR TELEGRAM D. 59

London, February 8, 1941

SECRET. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. Discussions on United States bases were formally opened in London on Tuesday, January 28th, in a friendly and cordial atmosphere and tentative agreement has already been reached on many questions involved, while good progress is being made with others. The two most difficult questions are jurisdiction and powers to be granted to the United States in land and waters adjacent to the leased areas. Former is being dealt with by sub-committee, and good progress has been made. We found ourselves completely divided with the United States representatives on questions of powers referred to above, as they felt unable to depart from wide provisions in their draft leases which we have objected to on more than one occasion. With the unofficial assistance of Mr. Hopkins<sup>1</sup>, the basis for a compromise has now been drafted, and there is every prospect of agreement. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Probablement Harry Hopkins, conseiller spécial du président Roosevelt, qui était à Londres à ce moment-là.

<sup>1</sup> Probably Harry Hopkins, special adviser to President Roosevelt, who was in London at this time.

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 278

London, February 15, 1941

Atlantic Bases Conference. Newfoundland delegation are perturbed at powers which United States are seeking outside leased areas as necessary to effective occupation of those areas. Sections (a) (c) and (g) of my telegram No. 258, February 13th<sup>1</sup>, are examples. Other examples are the following clauses suggested by the United States:

- (1) United States shall have right to control anchorages, moorings and movements of ships and water borne craft, and anchorages, moorings, landings, take offs, movements and operations of aircraft.
- (2) To employ and use all utilities, services and facilities, roads, highways, bridges, viaducts, canals and similar channels of transportation belonging to or controlled or regulated by the Government of territories or United Kingdom Government, under conditions no less favourable than those applicable from time to time to the United Kingdom Government.
- (3) Except as otherwise herein provided, to use all public lands, areas, sites, forts, docks, piers, quays, salvage shops, repair facilities, arsenals, magazines and hospitals, to extent that may become necessary or convenient for protection of property, instrumentalities and activities of United States of America, or otherwise to safeguard its national interests without compensation other than reimbursement of any additional cost directly resulting from such use.
- (4) Solely to establish and operate such post offices, which shall be United States post offices, as may be required in leased areas.

Newfoundland delegation realize that above rights are subject to clause that power given will not be used by United States unreasonably, or so as unnecessarily to interfere with rights of sea navigation to or from ports or areas to or from and within [sic] territory, but are doubtful whether these will provide adequate safeguards, especially in respect of St. John's harbour.

Newfoundland delegation feel that they would be in a better position if negotiations were being conducted separately on their behalf with United States, as many of the provisions, which United States delegation is attempting to include in agreement, are to avoid difficulties which may exist in the case of the West Indies bases but not in the case of Newfoundland.

MASSEY

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



276.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 342

London, February 27, 1941

## ATLANTIC BASES

Newfoundland delegation, who asked to see me this morning, feel strongly that their agreement with the United States should be worked out separately and not as part of a general agreement. They point out that Newfoundland's position constitutionally and in other ways is different from the Colonies. For one thing their relation to and their defence arrangements with Canada put Newfoundland in a special position. Certainly the draft agreement now under discussion might well affect arrangements of Joint Defence Board; and Canada's defence commitments in Newfoundland, as well as Canada's interests in Newfoundland as a Trans-Atlantic civil air base. In this connection I have already mentioned that there is clause dealing with rights and powers in leased and adjacent areas and civil aviation. There is also a defence clause, American version of which reads "When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergency, it shall have all such rights, powers and authority in territories and surrounding water and air spaces as may be necessary for conducting any military operations deemed by it desirable". Not only does this give the United States authority to control St. John's harbour and other coastal waters to the detriment of Newfoundland, but can also be construed as giving authority over Newfoundland airport.

The effect of this clause and others on Canada's defence responsibilities for and her interest in Newfoundland will be appreciated, especially in view of United States efforts to change the consultation clause of the agreement from "between the Governments concerned" to "between the United Kingdom and the United States". The Newfoundland delegation have not had a very warm reception from the Dominions Office to their suggestion for separate discussions and a separate agreement, as the Dominions Office think the United States and possibly some of the other Colonies will not like this.

It has occurred to me that, if you thought it wise the Canadian Government might help in this connection by informal approach in Washington with a view to emphasizing Newfoundland's special position in this matter and Canada's special interest there. Ends.

MASSEY

277.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Buffalo, February 27, 1941

. . .

## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

*Action by the United States Navy*

Work has commenced at the Naval Air Station, Argentia, and a base guard detachment of marines has been established. . .

*Action by the United States Army*

The Commanding Officer, American forces in Newfoundland, was advised of the difficulty of installing net at St. John's. He reports the position of the *Alexander* is defilated; that he conferred with local Commanders, and completed arrangements for putting the 155 [mm.] guns in position.

By lease arrangements between Great Britain and the United States, the status of American personnel outside leased areas has been determined.

. . .

The Stephenville staging field project has been revised on the basis of two runways in order to simplify construction and expedite completion. The project is now estimated to cost 2½ million dollars and to be completed by the fall of 1941.

. . .

278.

976-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire*  
*en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner*  
*in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 305

Ottawa, March 1, 1941

Your telegram of February 27, No. 342, Atlantic bases. We have been disturbed by the possible implications of the developments described in this telegram and hope to be able to send you a statement of Canadian views early in the coming week. In the meanwhile, we hope that no definite decisions will be taken.

279.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 370

London, March 4, 1941

PART I.

## ATLANTIC BASES

Foreign Office yesterday sent a telegram to the British Ambassador at Washington on this subject, paragraph 1 of which reads: "It is now clear that there is no prospect of obtaining agreement with the United States representatives under their present instructions on articles relating to defence, and also general description of rights, and we should therefore be grateful if you would take these two matters up with the Secretary of State in the same manner as questions relating to jurisdiction and customs".

Telegram then outlines difference between United Kingdom and United States positions in respect of defence clauses, taking exception to American amendment which would eliminate all reference to position of Governors and to mutual interest in defence of leased areas and territories, and proposed staff discussions on subject. This considered to be the more serious, as in a separate article United States specifically disclaims any responsibility for defence of territories. Telegram then states: "While our policy is to give the United States all accommodation they require in bases for their own safety, in return we should expect the United States not to interfere with our sovereign rights".

British also perturbed because they have been informed "orally and confidentially" that State Department hope that proposal to put forward a joint commission to consider defence questions in West Indies and Bermuda would not be presented "at this time". British attach great importance to this proposal.

Position is therefore that United Kingdom feel that they must press some reference to mutual defence in published agreement, and United States wish no such reference.

Foreign Office telegram goes on:

A clear understanding of defence matters before the agreement is concluded is necessary from our point of view because:

- (a) The defence of leased areas cannot be divorced from that of territory, and in present circumstances the sooner we get together and work out a scheme the better, and
- (b) We shall be placed in an impossible position on publication of agreement if it not only omits any reference to mutual defence, but includes a disclaimer on the part of the United States for any responsibility for defence of territory, and moreover a clause giving the United States additional rights when at war without giving us corresponding rights in respect to leased areas in similar circumstances.

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 370

London, March 4, 1941

PART II.

It will be represented with justification that in making this agreement we have subordinated the security of these territories to the defence problems of the United States, and that this constitutes a setback to the policy of close co-operation between the two countries, which was strikingly advanced in the exchange of notes, which are the basis for the present agreement. In other words, the spirit of this agreement will be entirely foreign to that of the exchange of notes.

We cannot accept any suggestion that references to mutual defence might be embarrassing to the United States. In our view, this was the main principle underlying the granting of leases. We appreciate, however, that reference to mutual defence in published agreement might conceivably be criticized in the United States, but we suggest that such criticism could be met by pointing out the urgency of providing adequate defence for bases, and that the necessary measures, including the dovetailing of existing British defences with future United States ones, can adequately and most expeditiously be determined and carried out in consultation with the British naval and military authorities.

The above has reference primarily to the position in the case of the Colonies. As regards Newfoundland, special considerations arise in view of:

- (1) Its geographical position;
- (2) The vital interest of Canada in the defence of Newfoundland; and
- (3) The existence of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Defence Board, which would naturally have to consider, in consultation with Governments of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland, questions arising as to Newfoundland defence, and has already considered such questions and recognized the primary concern of Canada in defence measures in Newfoundland.

It follows that the consultation envisaged in the first part of our draft article as the preliminary to the agreement would, in the case of Newfoundland have to include consultation with the Canadian Government, and no doubt consideration by the Joint Defence Board, and that the last clause of the draft is not wholly applicable to Newfoundland. It will be necessary to make plain the position in this respect, either in the article itself (which may, perhaps, not be desirable) or in a separate exchange of notes. We understand that the High Commissioner for Canada has informed the Canadian Government of position as regards this article, and you may, perhaps, wish to discuss the matter with your Canadian colleague.

Foreign Office telegram then discusses the articles dealing with rights in and adjacent to leased areas as outlined in my previous telegram, taking the view that they give excessive powers to the United States in time of peace.

MASSEY



281.

DND HQS 5119

*Mémoire du Comité interforce d'état-major au ministre de la Défense nationale, au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air et au ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals*

*Memorandum from Joint Staff Committee to Minister of National Defence, to Minister of National Defence for Air and to Minister of National Defence for Naval Services*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] March 4, 1941

## The Ministers

The Chiefs of Staff Committee view with grave concern the developments of the United Kingdom—United States discussions now taking place in London in regard to strategical air and naval bases in Newfoundland to be leased to the United States.

2. These discussions appear to be leading in a dangerous direction inasmuch as the U.S. Delegation appears to be insisting on rights, or on the inclusion of clauses, which, in an emergency, would give to them complete control of the whole of Newfoundland (sea, land and air).

3. The following clauses provide examples of those which it is considered require to be rejected if the political integrity of Newfoundland is to be adequately retained and the dominant Canadian interest in the defence of that Island is to be protected.

(i) (Telegram No. 258 of 13th February 1941 from High Commissioner to Department of External Affairs).

- (a) the United States to have the right, except as otherwise provided, to regulate and control all communications within, to and from areas leased.
- (c) It is recognised that defence of leased areas and territories in which they lie is of mutual concern to the United States and the United Kingdom and the question of mutual defence shall be subject of conversations between the two Governments, it being agreed that when the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergencies, it shall have all such rights, powers and authority in territories and surrounding waters and air space as may be necessary for conducting any military operations deemed by it desirable.
- (g) With respect to Newfoundland, if United States shall decide to improve leased areas, in whole or in part for use as naval or air bases, in that event harbour and anchorage areas and landing fields of entire Island of Newfoundland shall be available for joint use by forces of both Governments. Docks and other facilities of United States base at St. John's shall also be available for use of His Majesty's Government, when and as conditions permit, the control thereof nevertheless remaining unimpaired in the United States of America.

(ii) (Telegram No. 278 of 15th February 1941, from High Commissioner to Department of External Affairs).

- (1) United States shall have right to control anchorages, moorings and movements of ships and water borne craft, and anchorages, moorings, landings, take-offs, movements and operations of aircraft.

(iii) (Telegram No. 337 of 26th February 1941 from High Commissioner to Department of External Affairs).

. . . United States now definitely insist that clause shall be inserted specifying their rights, powers and authority inside and adjacent to leased areas, which would include the following clause: "To regulate and control all communications within, to and from the areas leased". This strenuously objected to by the British Delegation.

(iv) (Telegram No. 342 of 27th February 1941 from High Commissioner to Department of External Affairs).

. . . When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergency, it shall have all such rights, powers and authority in territories and surrounding water and air spaces as may be necessary for conducting any military operations deemed by it desirable.

4. The Chiefs of Staff Committee are of the considered opinion that:

(a) Discussions and agreements in regard to Newfoundland should be held separately from those in connection with other leased bases in the Western Hemisphere. The problems involved are entirely different to those connected with Bermuda and the West Indies; and in addition Canada is vitally interested in Newfoundland and has in fact assumed responsibility for its defence.

(b) That in the proposed discussions, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Newfoundland should have equal representation. It would be preferable if these discussions were held in Canada.

(c) That the Permanent Joint Board on United States—Canadian Defence should review the recommendations resulting from the above proposed discussions before any Governmental action by any of the Parties concerned is taken to implement such recommendations. Further, that the results of such a review should also be considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and reported upon by them to the War Committee of the Cabinet.

5. Finally, the Chiefs of Staff Committee desire to make it very clear that in their opinion Newfoundland represents a most important outpost, and is in fact Canada's first line of defence in this hemisphere, the preservation and protection of which is absolutely vital to her interests.

6. Submitted for urgent consideration.

PERCY W. NELLES, Rear-Admiral  
Chief of the Naval Staff

H.D.G. CRERAR, Major-General  
Chief of the General Staff

L.S. BREADNER, Air Vice-Marshal  
Chief of the Air Staff

282.

DND HQS 7410-7

*Le général commandant en chef de la région militaire de l'Atlantique  
au secrétaire, ministère de la Défense nationale*

*General Officer Commanding in Chief, Atlantic Command,  
to Secretary, Department of National Defence*

SECRET

Halifax, March 6, 1941

## RELATIONS—U.S. FORCES

## NEWFOUNDLAND

The following notes concerning the American Forces in Newfoundland have been received and are forwarded for information. This information was obtained by my A.A. & Q.M.G., from Colonel Welty, American Forces, on the *Admiral Edmond B. Alexander*, on which ship his Headquarters are temporarily established:

- (a) Their four 6" guns, mobile mountings, are situated on Signal Hill. Two of the guns are in action and the other two will be shortly. They are constructing concrete platforms for the split trail and it is planned that all four guns will be manned by day and that two guns with skeleton crews will be in action at night.
- (b) Accommodation for gun crews is projected a few yards from the gun positions on the reverse slope of the hill. A plotting room has already been built and is ready for action. This construction is being done at Canadian expense.
- (c) R.D.F. (C.H.) is projected. Three stations will be built on the southern coast of Newfoundland. They have a Gunnery Officer already there making a preliminary survey, pending receipt of experimental equipment next May. I propose to discuss this matter with the A.O.C., Eastern Air Command, as the Americans desire to know what action, if any, we propose to take in northern Newfoundland.
- (d) At Argentia U.S. plan a 10" gun battery with a separate garrison of one infantry battalion with A.A. Bty. and separate supporting arms, in all approximately 1300 all ranks.
- (e) In St. John's accommodation is planned for 3200 all ranks, inclusive of an Infantry battalion, A.A. and 6" mobile artillery, M.G.'s., mortars, etc., inclusive of U.S. Force Headquarters.
- (f) A 24 foot concrete road is projected from St. John's to Argentia, and preliminary surveys are now being made.
- (g) U.S., A.A. lights are lorry mounted with individual power plant per light on each lorry. The question of garage accommodation should be considered for the various technical vehicles accompanying same.

- (h) The camp site at Quidi Vidi<sup>1</sup> is being projected on a permanent basis, all buildings with concrete foundations and permanent construction. Married quarters, schools, hospitals, theatres, dance halls and various phases of permanent garrison life are projected.

W. H. P. ELKINS  
Major-General

283.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 378

London, March 6, 1941

My telegram No. 370 of March 4th, Atlantic Bases. Churchill has telegraphed Lord Halifax not to take the action mentioned in paragraph 1 of above-mentioned telegram, adding that he hopes to get matter smoothed out and clarified here with Mr. Winant before troubling the President and Mr. Hull.

MASSEY

284.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 382

London, March 7, 1941

IMMEDIATE Part I. Your telegram No. 305, Atlantic Bases. Prime Minister, accompanied by Dominions and Colonial Secretaries, had two long conversations with United States Ambassador Tuesday and Wednesday, upshot of which was that most of the alterations for which the United States delegates were pressing in the draft clauses had been accepted, subject to any representations which might be made on behalf of Service Departments or Empire delegations. Important therefore that statement referred to in your telegram above should be cabled immediately.

Part II follows.

MASSEY

<sup>1</sup>La base de l'armée américaine à Fort Pepperrell.

<sup>1</sup>The United States Army base at Fort Pepperrell.



285.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 382

London, March 7, 1941

PART II.

## ATLANTIC BASES

United Kingdom Ministers have definitely agreed to insertion of article dealing with rights along lines previously indicated, including a clause that in the practical application of these rights consultation shall be between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. United Kingdom promise to give written undertakings to the Governments of the territories that they would be consulted in all cases where their interests would be likely to be affected in such consultation. United Kingdom Ministers have agreed that reference to mutual interest and concern in defence, or to any agreement for that purpose, should be omitted, and accept United States suggestion that defence clause should be merely "when United States is engaged in war, or in time of other emergency, it shall have all such rights in the territories and the surrounding waters and air bases as may be necessary for conducting military operations". Newfoundland delegation have objected to this text on account of special responsibility of Canada for the defence of Newfoundland. On this point I saw Lord Cranborne this morning, who agreed that this provision to some extent cuts across the arrangement reached between the United States and the Canadian Government on Permanent Joint Defence Board, to the effect that Canada was primarily interested in defence of Newfoundland. Lord Cranborne agreed that it was essential that article should somehow be brought into harmony with above mentioned arrangement, but felt that an actual provision to this effect in the article would for other reasons probably give rise to difficulties. He has suggested, therefore, that if you agree, United States Government should be urged to agree that simultaneously with conclusion of the agreement there should be a separate exchange of notes making clear the special interests of Canada under present conditions in regard to defence of Newfoundland, and ensuring that Canada would be brought into consultation on any matters arising under the above article. My own view is that in any such exchange of notes it should be made clear that Canada should be brought into consultation on any matter under any article of this agreement which affects Newfoundland defence, e.g. under the civil aviation article referred to below.

As regards jurisdictional article, United States have maintained their demand for jurisdiction over British subjects charged with offences against the security of United States when those offences are committed in leased area and when offender is apprehended there. Ministers have agreed to this

proposal, and a draft was being prepared to give effect to the decision. Newfoundland and Bermuda have objected strongly.

In civil aviation clause, I regret United States proposal mentioned in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 373<sup>1</sup> of March 5th, has been accepted.

United States have proposed a clause dealing with supplementary lease as follows:

United States may by common agreement acquire by supplementary lease for unexpired period of lease granted in territory and (under same conditions as are contained in this agreement unless otherwise agreed) such contemplated areas, sites and locations as may be found necessary for defence and use of bases.

British would replace words within above brackets by "on such terms and conditions as may be agreed".

It was pointed out that United States authorities in Newfoundland had indicated during the past few days that an additional site would be required for a wireless station in the vicinity of St. John's. Moreover, intimation had been received that the United States Government would ask for leases of all sites received for batteries and anti-aircraft gun emplacements which were to be established outside leased areas.

MASSEY

286.

976-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 323

Ottawa, March 8, 1941

IMMEDIATE. With reference to your telegram of March 7th No. 382. Atlantic Bases.

1. As a result of the representations made by the United Kingdom through your telegram of January 30th, No. 176, the Canadian Government agreed that Canadian representatives at the discussions should attend as observers. This was understood to be for the purpose of making clear to public opinion that Newfoundland was the principal in this matter in so far as the discussions referred to the leased areas in Newfoundland.

2. It now appears, however, that United States representatives are pressing for terms and concessions which, while they may be reasonable in the case of other Atlantic Bases, have the effect in Newfoundland of encroaching on a sphere which the Canadian Government feels is of direct concern to Canada, and would in an emergency give to the United States complete control of the whole of Newfoundland by sea, on land, and in the air.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

This is in addition to any objection which the Newfoundland representatives may have in their own right. Particular reference is made to the defence clause quoted in your No. 342 of February 27th, to the first paragraph of your No. 337 of February 26th,<sup>1</sup> and to clauses (a), (c) and (g) mentioned in your No. 258 of February 13th,<sup>1</sup> and to clause 1 quoted in your No. 278 of February 15th. The Canadian Government feels that these clauses provide examples of those which it is considered require to be rejected if the political integrity of Newfoundland is to be adequately retained and the dominant Canadian interest in the defence of that Island is to be protected.

3. In connection with the above it is emphasized that the Canadian Government while not requesting extensive concessions in Newfoundland has assumed a responsibility for defence measures in Newfoundland which requires that some degree of control should be given to the Canadian Government, the most important item of which is control of the Newfoundland airports (excluding those constructed by the United States) during hostilities, but which also include items connected with the Navy and the Army. Newfoundland represents a most important outpost and is, in fact, Canada's first line of defence in this Hemisphere. Its preservation and protection are absolutely vital to Canadian interests. Substantial financial commitments have been made by Canada on this assumption and these include expenditures of five million dollars at Newfoundland Airport, the major portion of which is for the accommodation of American aircraft and personnel.

4. The Canadian Government has also a vital interest in the future development of civil aviation in Newfoundland as the latter place is an important link in the Trans-Atlantic air route. To an extent Canadian interests in this connection are identical with those of Newfoundland.

5. You are requested to convey the foregoing general remarks to the United Kingdom Government together with the following specific suggestions which the Canadian Government feels are of urgent importance.

- (a) Discussions and agreements in regard to Newfoundland should be held separately from those in connection with other leased bases in the Western Hemisphere. The problems involved are entirely different from those connected with Bermuda and the West Indies; and in addition Canada is vitally interested in Newfoundland and has in fact assumed responsibility for its defence.
- (b) That in the proposed discussions the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Newfoundland should be represented.
- (c) That the Permanent Joint Board on United States-Canada defence should review the recommendations resulting from the above proposed discussions before governmental action is taken by any of the parties concerned to implement such recommendations. Such a review could be initiated at short notice as the Board would be prepared to assemble at any time.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

287.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 412

London, March 11, 1941

Further to your telegram No. 323 of March 8th, Atlantic Bases. I have taken up your proposal with the United Kingdom Government who thought that though separate discussions with Newfoundland might have been possible three weeks ago, it would be most difficult now, owing to the fact that after many difficulties, general agreement was now almost completed with United States, and it was hoped to sign it at the time of signing of the Lease-Lend Bill, or shortly afterwards. The United Kingdom have reverted to proposal mentioned in my telegram No. 382, that at the signing of Agreement there should be an exchange of notes between the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada recognizing special interests of Canada in Newfoundland. This afternoon I also discussed question with Winant who, while showing a sympathetic understanding of Canadian position *vis-à-vis* Newfoundland, felt that initiating separate discussions at this time would create difficulties in Washington, and might prejudice the reaching of general agreement on bases, so much to be desired. He was anxious to avoid anything that would cause delay. Winant stated, however, that the United States would agree to a tripartite exchange of notes as mentioned above, and felt that these notes could safeguard Canadian interests in defence of Newfoundland as effectively as a separate agreement. He suggested, for instance, that it should be made clear in these notes that if any of the arrangements in the Agreement affecting Newfoundland should conflict with any arrangements of the Joint Defence Board, the latter should prevail. Also exchange might provide for Canadian participation in consultations over Newfoundland matters arising out of the Agreement. These notes might, he hoped, be exchanged at the same time as the signing of the Agreement.

If you agree to this procedure, could you cable immediately points to be included in notes in question if exchange is to take place here when the main Agreement is signed. General Malony, who was present at discussion with Winant, seemed to think there need not be any conflict between Joint Defence Board arrangements and the terms of agreement, and it was suggested if there were such a conflict, Hickerson, who is working on the Agreement and who is also on the Board, would have brought it to the attention of the American delegation.

Please cable at once your views on this alternative proposal of an exchange of notes designed to cover points mentioned in your telegram No. 323.

MASSEY



288.

976-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 354

Ottawa, March 12, 1941

Your telegram No. 412 of 11th March, Atlantic Bases. Although the Canadian Government adhere to their view as expressed in my telegram No. 323 dated 8th March that discussions and agreements in regard to Newfoundland should be held separately from those in connection with other leased bases in the Western Hemisphere, they have reluctantly come to the conclusion that as a general agreement has now practically been reached, recourse will have to be had to the expedient of a tripartite exchange of notes between United States, United Kingdom and Canada as and when the general agreement is signed by the two first mentioned Governments.

In consequence the Canadian Government desire that the tripartite notes should state that as Newfoundland constitutes part of Canada's first line of defence in the Western Hemisphere and that as they have already in fact assumed responsibility for its defence,<sup>1</sup> the United States and the United Kingdom Governments recognize that the general agreement they have made in respect of leased areas in Newfoundland is a matter of special concern to Canada and that in all powers they may exercise and in such actions as they may take under the agreement they undertake fully to respect these Canadian interests.

In addition the Canadian Government would desire it stipulated that in all consultations arising out of the agreement the right of participation therein shall be accorded to the Canadian Government.

The Canadian Government desire that the exchange of notes should provide that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence should review the provisions of the Agreement made between the United Kingdom and the United States Governments and that where the terms of the Agreement conflict with the recommendations which have previously been made by the Board, the recommendations of the Board shall prevail.

You are authorized to arrange for the exchange of notes in London and to sign on behalf of Canada but the text should be cabled to Ottawa for confirmation before signature takes place. The agreement of the United Kingdom and of the United States to the text to be used in the exchange of notes should be obtained before the signing of the general agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>1</sup> Dans un télégramme informant le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve sur le contenu de ce télégramme-ci, le gouvernement canadien dit simplement :

<sup>1</sup> In a telegram informing the Newfoundland Government of the contents of this telegram the Canadian Government said simply :

The Canadian Government desires that the notes should emphasize the importance of the Canadian interest in Newfoundland . . .

289.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 424

London, March 12, 1941

My telegram No. 412, Atlantic Bases. After discussions with Dominions Office and Newfoundland delegation this afternoon, it was suggested that, if you agree to principle of an exchange of notes rather than a separate Agreement, something along the following lines might be considered:

It is recognized that the defence of Newfoundland is a matter of dominant interest to His Majesty's Government in Canada, and that this matter is already the subject of arrangements through the medium of Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the United States[sic]. It is accordingly agreed that arrangements in respect of defence of Newfoundland, reached before signing of this agreement, as a result of discussion by the above Board, shall take priority over any provisions of the present Agreement with which such arrangements may be found to be in conflict.

It is further agreed that application to Newfoundland of Articles 1, 2 and 8(6) (the Defence and Civil Aviation Articles), or any other Articles involving defence considerations, will be the subject of discussion, in which His Majesty's Government in Canada as well as the Government of Newfoundland will take part, and that, before effect is given to any conclusion reached in such discussion, opportunity will be taken to lay matter before the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

MASSEY

290.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 444

London, March 14, 1941

Atlantic Bases. Your telegram No. 354 of March 12th. On further consideration with Dominions Office and Newfoundland delegation, in the light of your above telegram, it is suggested that text of Agreement might read as follows:

- (1) It is recognised that defence of Newfoundland is a matter of special concern to His Majesty's Government in Canada, which has, in fact, already assumed certain responsibilities for this defence.
- (2) It is agreed therefore that in all powers which may be exercised, and in such actions as may be taken under the Leased Bases

Agreement (by any of the participating Governments) in respect of Newfoundland, these Canadian interests will be fully respected.

- (3) It is further agreed that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence of Canada and the United States should, in consultation with the Government of Newfoundland, review the provisions of the Leased Bases Agreement, and where the terms of that Agreement conflict with the recommendations which have previously been made by the Board, the recommendations of the Board, if accepted by the Governments concerned, shall prevail.
- (4) It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Articles Nos. I, II and VIII (6) of the Agreement, or of any other article involving considerations of defence, His Majesty's Government in Canada, as well as the Government of Newfoundland, will have the right to participate and that, before effect is given to any conclusions reached as a result of such consultations, opportunity will be taken to lay the matter before the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Newfoundland delegation were anxious to be associated in review under paragraph 3 above, while it was thought, in respect to paragraph 4, the Canadian Government would not desire to be consulted on all articles of the Agreement, many of which deal with administrative and purely domestic questions. Felt here that reference, in formal Agreement of this kind, to Newfoundland being part of Canada's first line of defence in the Western Hemisphere might be omitted.

If you agree, will take up at once with the United States delegation above text, which it is thought might be incorporated in a separate Agreement rather than an exchange of notes.

MASSEY

291.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A. 155

London, March 15, 1941

Sir,

...

2. Since I last wrote you, the Conference proper has been practically moribund. As the copies of the Foreign Office telegrams which I have been able to cable to you will have shown, negotiations have, to a great extent, been transferred from the delegates to Cabinet Ministers in London, the State

Department in Washington and the Ambassadors in both countries. As a result, there has been no formal meeting of the Conference proper since I last wrote. It would appear that as a result of these ministerial discussions, the Agreement will embody most of the points on which the United States delegation has been insisting, though there will probably be concessions to the British point of view here and there. I hope to be able to send you a completed draft within the next few days.

3. Earlier it was thought that signature might take place on Wednesday or Thursday of this week, but that has now been found impossible. I understand that efforts are being made to bring the matter to a conclusion during the early part of next week. It is probable that the Bermudan and Newfoundland delegates will register a formal protest on certain Articles.

4. The imminence of a final agreement prompted me to cable you on March 7th, suggesting that your statement on the relation of the Agreement to Canadian interests in Newfoundland should be cabled at once. Immediately on receipt of your telegram No. 323 of March 8th, which embodied this statement, I took up the question of separate discussions and a separate Agreement in respect of Newfoundland with the Dominions Office, both by letter and verbally. It appeared clear that the United Kingdom was reluctant to support this proposal as they felt it might result in a demand for similar separate discussions from some of the Colonial Delegations, rouse the suspicions of the Americans and have a delaying effect on the main Agreement, which they were most anxious to conclude as soon as possible. The United Kingdom authorities therefore reverted to the suggestion made earlier, that Canadian interests in this matter might be protected by an exchange of notes between Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, at the same time as the signing of the main Agreement.

5. Later, accompanied by Mr. Pearson of this Office, I saw Mr. Winant, the United States Ambassador, with General Malony, of the American Bases Delegation, and I put before them as strongly as I could the case for separate discussions and a separate Agreement in respect of Newfoundland. As pointed out in my telegram No. 412 of March 11th, Mr. Winant, though sympathetic, also felt that there were difficulties in this Agreement and he too advocated a separate exchange of notes to accomplish the purpose desired. As a result I cabled you on March 12th a draft of certain paragraphs which might be included in any such note, if this procedure met with your approval. On receipt of your telegram No. 354 and after discussion with the Dominions Office and the Newfoundland delegation, this draft was modified with a view to the inclusion of the points which you mentioned. I may say that the Newfoundland delegation, while fully appreciating the value to them of Canadian intervention in this matter, were anxious that this intervention and any arrangements resulting therefrom, should be couched in such terms as to take



due regard of the susceptibilities of the people of the territory. For that reason they were reluctant to have it stated in black and white in a formal document that Newfoundland constituted Canada's first line of defence in the Western Hemisphere, especially as, in their view, this would not add anything to the force of the Agreement in question. Nor did they desire that the impression should be given that the Joint Defence Board could make arrangements for the defence of Newfoundland without prior consultation with the Island authorities. For this reason also they were anxious that they should be included with the United States and Canada in any references to consultation made in the exchange of notes. Finally, they felt that the Canadian Government would not desire to be consulted on all matters arising out of the Agreement, many of which would be merely domestic questions of administrative detail to be arranged on the spot with the United States authorities.

6. As a result of the discussions yesterday at the Dominions Office, the revised draft text referred to above was cabled to you by our telegram No. 444. At the same time a copy of it was sent informally and unofficially to the United States Embassy for their consideration. It was emphasised, however, that the views of the Canadian Government on this draft had not yet been obtained.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON  
for the High Commissioner

292.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 460

London, March 18, 1941

IMMEDIATE. My telegram No. 444, March 14th. United States are hoping that Atlantic Bases General Agreement can be signed on Friday the 21st. Their delegation takes the line that Tripartite Agreement over Newfoundland can be signed later. We are emphasizing again however that two agreements should be signed simultaneously. Hope this point can be stressed in Washington, where I understand that discussions are taking place on draft cabled in my telegram above mentioned.

MASSEY

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 382

Ottawa, March 18, 1941

Your telegram No. 444 of 14th March, Atlantic Bases.

1. The Canadian Government concurs in the proposal to incorporate the final text in a separate agreement rather than in an exchange of notes.

2. In view of your intimation that it is felt in London that reference in the separate agreement to Newfoundland being part of Canada's first line of defence might be omitted, and although the Canadian Government feels the phrase to be but a simple statement of fact, the Canadian Government concurs in such omission subject to the views expressed in the immediately following paragraph hereof.

3. The Canadian Government is prepared to concur in clause 1 of the text of the proposed agreement amended to read as follows: (1) It is recognized that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government which has, in fact, already assumed certain responsibilities for such defence.

4. Clause (2) is concurred in.

5. With reference to clause 3, the Canadian Government notes with satisfaction the inclusion of the provision for consultation with Newfoundland. In this connection, however, it is presumed that, in view of the status of the Board, such consultation will be with a representative or representatives of the Newfoundland Government, and to clarify this point clause 3 should read . . . (3) It is further agreed that the Canada—United States of America Permanent Joint Board on Defence should, in consultation with a representative or representatives of the Government of Newfoundland, etcetera. With this alteration, clause (3) is concurred in.

6. Provided that no clause in Leased Bases Agreement other than those mentioned in your No. 444 might be construed in such a way as to give the United States rights the exercise of which might adversely affect the Canadian interests clause (4) is concurred in.

7. With reference to proposal mentioned in your telegram of March 18th, No. 460, the Canadian Government feel that the two agreements should be signed concurrently.

294.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 463

London, March 18, 1941

Further to my telegram No. 444, Atlantic Bases. Re paragraph 3 of draft, United Kingdom authorities anxious to know whether recommendations have been made by Joint Board concerning Newfoundland other than those in first report, and, if so, what are their terms. Please telegraph reply at once. Incidentally, on this point, Newfoundland delegation, this afternoon, claimed that they had not seen the first report of the Board, and obviously felt that they might have been kept more closely informed of its activities, in so far as they concern Newfoundland.

Re paragraph 4 of draft, United Kingdom authorities now suggest that last three lines should be left out, and paragraph end with the words "to participate". They point out that lines in question do not add anything to draft, as Joint Board could, at any time, be included in consultations referred to, while they thought that it might be inappropriate to mention in a formal agreement that a Board of this kind could be consulted before conclusions reached by Governments could become effective. I would be grateful for your views on this matter at once, and also if you could take up this point with Washington.

There was unanimity at the Dominions Office meeting this afternoon that the general agreement should not be signed before the Newfoundland agreement, but it was also hoped that the latter agreement might be concluded in time to permit the signing of the general agreement within the next few days. I had telephone conversation with the American Ambassador this morning urging early, but simultaneous, signing of the Agreements.

MASSEY

295.

976-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 383

Ottawa, March 18, 1941

SECRET. With reference to your telegram of March 18th, No. 463, Atlantic Bases.

1. There have been no additions to or material changes in the recommendations contained in the First Report of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence

on Newfoundland except for the agreement to provide for one additional squadron of United States patrol planes in the Botwood area.

2. Messrs. Emerson and Penson were completely informed as to all proposals relating to Newfoundland when they met with the Board in Halifax.

3. We agree to deletion of last three lines of paragraph (4) as suggested.

296.

976-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister in the United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 93

Washington, March 20, 1941

IMMEDIATE 1. State Department have proposed the following changes in draft of Tripartite Agreement<sup>1</sup> concerning United States bases in Newfoundland: Paragraph 2 delete "Leased Bases Agreement" and substitute "Agreement for use and operation of United States bases, dated March 25th, 1941". Omit "by any of the participating Governments" as superfluous and possibly ambiguous. Paragraph 3 delete entire text and substitute: "Nothing in Agreement shall be deemed to conflict with arrangements relative to defence of Newfoundland already made by Governments of the United States and Canada, in pursuance of recommendations submitted to those Governments by Permanent Joint Board on Defence—United States and Canada". Paragraph 4, reference to Article No. 8(6) should read 11(5) which is final numbering of provision respecting civil aviation.

2. State Department maintain that their revision of paragraph 3 is in effect identical with previous drafts. They will not consent to postponement of effective date of main Agreement pending review by Permanent Board, nor admit main Agreement can be reviewed after its signature by representatives of Governments not parties to it. They say that all recommendations of Joint Board respecting Newfoundland have already been accepted by the Governments of the United States and Canada respectively.

3. Some objection was made to form of paragraph 1 on the assumption that Tripartite Agreement will be recorded in exchange of notes, but this was not pressed for. Intention is to sign main Agreement March 25th for publication next day. I assume that you intend Tripartite Agreement to be signed and published simultaneously with the main Agreement.

4. State Department still have to consult other Departments on text, but does not anticipate proposal of further amendments. Foreign Office are pressing British Embassy to reach accord with State Department and ourselves as soon as possible. British Embassy are cabling suggested amendments to London tonight. Please inform me of your views tomorrow if possible.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 290.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 290.



297.

976-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CIRCULAR TELEGRAM D. 153

London, March 21, 1941

My telegram February 8th, Circular D. 59. Following for your Prime Minister. Begins. Substantial agreement has now been reached in discussions on United States bases, and it is hoped to sign Instrument Tuesday, March 25th. This takes the form of an Agreement covering administration and jurisdictional matters, to which are appended draft leases in respect of each territory concerned and special provisions as to particular territories.

Main provisions of the Agreement<sup>1</sup> are as follows:

- (1) United States are given within leased areas and adjacent territorial waters and air spaces, rights necessary for defence and access.
- (2) When the United States engaged in war, or in time of other emergency, United States may exercise in territories and surrounding air spaces rights necessary for conducting military operations.
- (3) United States under no obligation to improve leased areas or to exercise any rights therein or to provide defence thereof.
- (4) United States given various rights of jurisdiction, including right to try British subjects charged with having committed in leased area a security offence against the United States and arrested in the area.
- (5) Various categories of goods imported for the United States Government and United States personnel to be exempt from customs duties.
- (6) Certain exemptions from taxation for United States personnel.
- (7) Provision as to administration matters, such as light and harbour dues, immigration and postal facilities.
- (8) Provision for acquisition by common agreement of additional areas.

Further telegram will be sent as to arrangements proposed for publication, and in the meantime matter is strictly confidential. Ends.

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<sup>1</sup> Le texte se trouve à l'appendice B.

<sup>1</sup> The text is in Appendix B.

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 407

Ottawa, March 22, 1941

With reference to your telegram of March 20th No. 485,<sup>1</sup> Atlantic bases.

We have agreed with Washington on the following text. Begins.

Clause 1. It is recognized that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence as well as of that of the United States, and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government which has, in fact, already assumed certain responsibilities for such defence.

Clause 2. It is agreed, therefore, that in all powers which may be exercised and in such actions as may be taken under the leased bases agreement in respect of Newfoundland, Canadian interests in regard to defence will be fully respected.

Clause 3. Nothing in this agreement shall be deemed to conflict with arrangements relative to defence of Newfoundland already made by the Governments of the United States and Canada in pursuance of recommendations submitted to those Governments by the Canada—United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Clause 4. It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Articles Nos. 1 (4), 2 and 11 (5) of the agreement, or of any other Article involving considerations of defence, the Canadian Government as well as the Government of Newfoundland will have the right to participate. Ends.

In Clause 1 the words “as well as of that of the United States” may not be insisted upon by Washington and in that case should be omitted.

We agree to Clause 4 as quoted above on the understanding that the Articles mentioned are the only Articles in the leased bases agreement which can be construed in such a way as to give the United States rights the exercise of which might adversely affect Canadian interests.

We would prefer to substitute the following for the first eleven words of Clause 3: “Nothing in this agreement shall abrogate the arrangements already made . . .” but we do not insist on this.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

299.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 496

London, March 24, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. Further to your telegram No. 407, Atlantic Bases. Proposed that Agreement on Newfoundland should be attached to main Agreement as Protocol, and signed at the same time with the following preamble:

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of Canada, United Kingdom, United States, having been authorized by respective Governments to clarify certain matters concerning the defence of Newfoundland arising out of the Agreement signed this day, concerning bases leased to the United States, have drawn up and signed the following Protocol.

Then follows text.

Assume authorization for me to sign exchange of notes extends to Protocol.

MASSEY

300.

976-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH A. 176

London, March 28, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

I have the honour to forward, under separate cover, the Protocol on Newfoundland attached to the Leased Bases Agreement, signed yesterday, March 27th, at 10, Downing Street, by representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. I am also enclosing, as Annex 1 to this despatch, copies of the Main Agreement,<sup>1</sup> with Annexes, and two additional copies of the Protocol.<sup>1</sup>

2. The ceremony of signing yesterday afternoon was a pleasant, informal affair, held in the Cabinet Room at No. 10. Mr. Churchill was in high spirits and gave considerable evidence of that untiring and eager vitality which is so characteristic of him. Already, and the day was only half over, he had made two public speeches and a statement in the House of Commons, but he showed no signs whatever of fatigue. His buoyant good humour was due in part, no doubt, to the successful conclusion of the Leased Bases negotia-

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B.

tions in which he had taken such a personal interest. But it was due also—his words showed this—to the good news which had been coming in from Jugo-Slavia during the morning. The Prime Minister kept referring in conversation to these events and made the comparison with the rising of the Spanish people against Napoleon in 1808.

3. The cablegrams exchanged during the week between this Office and the Department tell the story of the final arrangements in connection with the Agreement and the Protocol. The first draft of the latter document, prepared in this Office on the basis of your cabled suggestions, was discussed with and found generally acceptable by the United Kingdom Government. As you know, one or two of the changes which were proposed were to meet the wishes of the Newfoundland delegation, who took part in these discussions. Mr. Emerson and Mr. Penson, as I have indicated in a previous despatch, were grateful for Canada's intervention in this matter but were anxious that the resulting document should be expressed in such a way as not to suggest to Newfoundland opinion that a tug-of-war was going on between Canada and the United States for the control of the Island, with the United Kingdom Government a referee and Newfoundland itself hardly more than a spectator. The final draft should satisfy them in this respect and, indeed, has done so. Incidentally, though your telegram No. 383 of March 19th<sup>1</sup> stated that Messrs. Emerson and Penson were completely informed as to all proposals of the Joint Defence Board relating to Newfoundland, the two gentlemen in question still seem to be under an impression to the contrary.

4. As stated in my previous despatch, the draft Protocol was sent to the United States Embassy on March 14th. The Embassy's reply to the letter accompanying this draft (Annex 2)<sup>2</sup> indicated that the American delegation would prefer that final agreement on the text of the Protocol should be reached at Washington. Meanwhile the second draft, embodying certain changes made as a result of your suggestions, had also been submitted to the United States Embassy here (Annex 3)<sup>2</sup> and acknowledged by them on March 21st (Annex 4)<sup>2</sup>.

5. On March 22nd, by your telegram No. 407, we received the text of the Protocol as agreed on at Washington. The Dominions Office had also received a text which differed in some minor respects from ours. These differences were resolved after consultation with you by cablegram.

6. Your telegram No. 411 of March 24th<sup>2</sup> stated that some reference to the Protocol should occur in the Main Agreement, a view in which, if I may say so, I heartily concurred. Telegram No. 414<sup>2</sup> stated, however, that the proposal to this end had been withdrawn owing to the United States Government's stand that such a reference was "unnecessary". It occurred to me, however, that if I could secure support for your proposal from the United Kingdom Government and persuade Mr. Winant to recommend it to Washington, the authorities there might reconsider the matter. In any case, there

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 295 en date du 18 mars.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 295 under date March 18.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



could be no harm in trying. The United Kingdom had no objection to the inclusion of the reference in question, and accepted our proposal that a sentence should be added for that purpose to Article XXVI, along the following lines: "The Provisions of this Agreement insofar as they concern the defence of Newfoundland should be read in the light of the attached Protocol". Mr. Winant, to whom this additional clause was submitted, felt that it was unnecessary but agreed to send an amended version of it to Washington with his blessing. His draft, which he felt stood a greater chance of acceptance, read: "That part of this Agreement relating to the defence of the Bases in Newfoundland shall be read in the light of the Protocol signed this day on behalf of the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States."

7. Word was received on Tuesday, however, that the State Department still opposed any reference to the Protocol in the Agreement; not so much, it was stated, because it was unnecessary as because it was inappropriate in view of the fact that the Main Agreement arose out of the declarations made by Lord Lothian in his letter of September 2nd, which letter is referred to in the Preamble of the Agreement, but bears no relation to the Protocol. The State Department for this reason held that the latter should not be mentioned in the text of the Agreement. I may say that I am not much impressed by this argument, but it was sufficient to show that there was no possibility of including the reference desired. In any case, the absence of a reference to the Protocol in the Agreement has no effect on the validity of the former document.

8. I think I should add that, though there is great satisfaction here at the fact that the discussions have resulted in an acceptable Agreement, there is a feeling that the United States have driven a fairly hard bargain. There is also some anxiety that the Agreement may have progressive and unfortunate consequences so far as British sovereignty in the territories affected is concerned. This anxiety is, I think, greater in the minds of the Colonial delegations than in those of the Home Government. I am bound to state that in my own view it has some basis in fact. It is to be hoped, however, that there will be no public criticism of the Agreement in the various Colonies concerned, so that the personal relations between the United States Forces and the local community can have the best possible chance of being established on a friendly and co-operative basis. It is also to be hoped that the United States Government will not find it necessary to exercise all the powers conferred on them by the Agreement. In any event, it is difficult to see how any further concessions to the British viewpoint could have been secured in the more controversial clauses, in view of the larger considerations involved and of the firm stand taken, not so much by the United States delegation here, which had little independent authority, but by the State Department in Washington.

9. In the present circumstances, therefore, it is all the more satisfactory that Canadian interests in the defence of Newfoundland should have been recognised and, to some extent at least, protected by the Protocol.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

301.

DND HQS 5199-W-1

*Mémoire du chef adjoint de l'état-major général  
au chef de l'état-major général*

*Memorandum from Assistant Chief of the General Staff  
to Chief of the General Staff*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] May 8, 1941

UNITED STATES HEMISPHERIC DEFENCE POLICY

1. When listening to Mr. Stimson's<sup>1</sup> broadcast on U.S. Naval aid to Great Britain on 6 May 41, it struck me that there was a passage on Western Hemispheric defence of exceptional interest. Accordingly, the following day I carefully studied the published text, a copy of which is attached hereto<sup>2</sup>. The passage in question is marginally lined.

2. While doubtless we have all for long been aware of the United States' extreme sensitiveness to any development which might have the effect in the smallest degree of impairing their complete immunity from overseas attack, I cannot recall any public address which so clearly states the thought that is uppermost in their minds. Just as an Englishman instinctively reacts to the slightest threat to his country's vital sea communications, so does it seem that the United States similarly react to anything which might affect either British or their own control of the Western Atlantic and the Eastern Pacific for in the event of the loss of either, said Mr. Stimson, "these oceans overnight would become easy channels for the path of attack against us".

3. Proceeding, Mr. Stimson argued that the development of modern air power has intensified the necessity of friendly control of these oceans. It now made it necessary for the United States to command not only the reaches of ocean adjacent to their own shores but the entire reach of the oceans surrounding the Western Continent;

...for, if hostile nations possessing powerful armies and air power can once make a landing on the shores of our weaker neighbour nations either north or south of us, our immunity is gone. It would then become a comparatively simple matter for them to establish air bases within striking distance of the great industrial cities which now fill our country. And the only way in which we could prevent this would be the intolerable method of ourselves maintaining armies large enough to command the areas of our continent for thousands of miles beyond our borders. Such a condition would transform the good neighbour relations which now prevail throughout the American republics, into the same abhorrent system of forceful domination which we are seeking to keep out of the hemisphere. In short, to the nations of America, friendly control of the surrounding oceans is a condition of the reign of freedom and mutual independence which now prevail in that continent.

4. I think that the above passage fully and satisfactorily explains the somewhat hasty manner in which the United States have acted, and are acting, in respect of Newfoundland. They simply will not, even for one moment,

<sup>1</sup> Henry Lewis Stimson, secrétaire à la  
Guerre des États-Unis.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Henry Lewis Stimson, Secretary of War  
for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

tolerate anything which, however remotely, might risk the impairment of the friendly control of the Western Atlantic which they now enjoy. I have at times entertained some doubts as to the political consequences which might result from the granting of the United States leased bases in Newfoundland. And that things might turn out adversely for us, were we to be neglectful of our legitimate interests, I have no doubt, but there is no reason why we should be neglectful. Nor do I now believe that such doubts as I may have once entertained were well-founded not only by reason of the foregoing but also because when we were drafting Joint Operational Plan No. 1 (the black contingency) the United States Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence freely conceded to Canada tactical command of the joint army and air forces in Newfoundland in return for our proposed concession of strategic direction, subject to consultation, of all forces assigned to the joint defence of Canada and the United States, to the Chief of Staff, United States Army.<sup>1</sup>

5. In these circumstances, I think it is pretty clearly indicated that our future policy should be to make it abundantly clear to the United States, that our provision for land defence not only in Newfoundland, but also on our own coasts, will be such not [only] as to meet our needs as we see them, but also theirs as they see them, with possibly a proviso that their appreciation as to what is required should not be too unreasonable.

MAURICE POPE  
Brigadier

302.

976-40

*Mémorandum du conseiller au sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim  
aux Affaires extérieures<sup>2</sup>*

*Memorandum from Counsellor to Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs<sup>2</sup>*

[Ottawa,] May 26, 1941

Regarding the attached letter from Mr. Hickerson to Mr. Moffat concerning Canadian dissatisfaction at the procedure adopted at the Leased Bases Conference, recently held in London, I am, of course, at some disadvantage in commenting thereon because I do not know what Mr. King said to Mr. Hull in Washington on this matter beyond the general reference made in Hickerson's letter that Canada felt she had been overlooked in recent conferences between the United States and the United Kingdom. Hickerson seems clear in his mind that the particular conference to which Mr. King was referring was the Atlantic Bases Conference recently held in London.

Hickerson must, however, surely have misunderstood the nature of Mr. King's complaint, if any was in fact made. He assumes that the Canadian

<sup>1</sup> Voir également le document 894.

<sup>1</sup> See also Document 894.

<sup>2</sup> N. A. Robertson.

Government could only have been worried because of the lack of information reaching them from London in respect of the deliberations and conclusions of the Conference in question. This assumption, which is not borne out by the facts, rests on another equally false assumption that Canada was not adequately represented at the Conference. It is true that the *status* of the Canadian representatives was not satisfactory. It is not true, however, that they were not in a position to keep the Government here fully informed of the deliberations in question. A reference to the files will show that Ottawa was in fact kept continuously and fully informed. That being the case, Hickerson's assurance that, if the Americans had only known that the Canadian Government was not being kept informed, they would have been glad to give the Canadian Legation in Washington all the information that they received from their own delegation, is somewhat irritating.

I think it should also be pointed out that, when the proposal for a separate agreement in respect of Newfoundland was finally made, the main objection to it came from the United States and, only secondarily, from the United Kingdom. Furthermore, my own feeling is that the United States were even reluctant to accept the idea of a separate protocol recognizing Canadian interests in Newfoundland, a proposal which the United Kingdom and Newfoundland both heartily supported. I note that Hickerson states that if the Canadian Government in the early stages of the negotiations had made any suggestion that a distinct agreement be concluded in respect of Newfoundland, the United States would have been inclined to go along with that suggestion. I must say that I feel somewhat sceptical on that point, but if my scepticism is ill-founded then it is a thousand pities that we did not make the suggestion at the very beginning of the Conference.

In my view we should have had full representation at this Conference and not that of observers only. I think the United Kingdom were very much at fault in that they did not give us enough notice of the Conference to make good our claim to such full representation. There is nothing on the file to show that any information reached Ottawa concerning the date of the proposed conference until January 27, 1941, when the High Commissioner cabled that it was to open the next day and that Canada had been invited to send an observer. At the same time a letter from Sir Gerald Campbell of September 4, 1940, referred to the forthcoming conference and Canadian representation at it. This letter is not on the file but a paragraph from it is quoted in a draft telegram dated January 31st, 1941, to the High Commissioner, as follows:

The United Kingdom authorities had in fact already reached the conclusion that the best course would be that the Canadian Government and the Government of Newfoundland also should appoint representatives to attend the proposed discussions in London. They, therefore, hope that the Canadian Government will consider the question of such representation.

If this draft telegram had reached London, the High Commissioner would undoubtedly have been able to insist that the United Kingdom carry out the suggestion made in Sir Gerald's letter for full Canadian representation.



The telegram, however, was not sent; a notation on it by Mr. Robertson explains why. "This draft telegram was considered by the War Committee yesterday—but they felt quite strongly that we should be content to be represented by observers".

The Canadian Government could not therefore have been displeased at the United Kingdom suggestion that they should not be accorded full representation. We in London, however, were certainly of the opinion that this status was only accepted reluctantly and because full representation was not agreeable to the United Kingdom authorities. Telegram 161 to the High Commissioner dated January 31st seemed to confirm this view as it read "In circumstances we are prepared to agree to United Kingdom request that Canadian representatives at Conference should attend in capacity of observers".

It might also be complained that there should have been a separate conference on Newfoundland at which Canada could have been a full participant without running the risk of becoming involved in questions concerning the Bermuda and West Indies Bases.

Though it was known by September 1940 that a general bases conference was to be held, and though that conference opened on January 28th, 1941, no suggestion, so far as I am aware, was made by the Canadian Government until March 8th, 1941, for a separate conference over Newfoundland. By this time the general conference had all but completed its work and it was practically impossible for obvious reasons to initiate new and separate discussions over Newfoundland.

There is, of course, no point at this date of rehashing these matters, but I think steps should be taken at once to clear Mr. Hickerson's mind of the misconception suggested by the following paragraph from his letter:

We of course gathered by the time the Agreement was signed that there had been certain gaps in Canada's contacts with the negotiations going on in London. Any suggestion that we were responsible for those gaps is, however, astonishing to me.

It is equally astonishing to me to learn that there were any such gaps in the contacts in question or that Canadian representation at the Conference was responsible for them.

L. B. PEARSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le département d'État des États-Unis au ministre des États-Unis*  
*Department of State of the United States to United States Minister*

Washington, May 6, 1941

Dear Pierrepont [Moffat],

While Mr. King was talking to the Secretary in Washington on the occasion of his recent visit, he remarked to Mr. Hull that in a number of instances where conferences were held, between this Government and Great

Britain, Canada was overlooked, notwithstanding the fact that she had interests involved, either direct or indirect. Mr. King did not specifically mention Newfoundland and the Base-Lease Agreement, but the events of the last few days prior to the signature of that Agreement suggest to me that it may have been one of the things he had in mind.<sup>1</sup> It, therefore, seems to me that it might be advisable to send you a brief account of what actually happened in respect of Newfoundland.

We were informed by the delegation which we sent to London to take part in these negotiations that the Canadian Government was represented in the negotiations by the Canadian High Commissioner to London, Mr. Massey, and Commodore L. W. Murray of the Canadian Navy as observers. These officers attended the first meeting and we assumed that they would attend all meetings or would, if they desired, designate subordinate Canadian officials to keep in touch with the meetings and to keep them adequately informed. Naturally we had no means of knowing the extent to which the High Commissioner's office followed the day to day discussions or kept Ottawa informed concerning the negotiations.

We were in no sense standing on ceremony or protocol. We had no secrets whatever from the Canadian Government in regard to Newfoundland. As I said we assumed that Canadian representatives were actually sitting in the discussions and that they were currently informing Ottawa of the negotiations. Had this not been our assumption and had we received any sort of inquiry from the Canadian Government on the subject, for my part, I should have had no hesitation in making available to Canadian officials in the Legation in Washington our day to day telegraphic exchanges with our delegation. I recall, however, no inquiries whatever from the Canadian Government or any Canadian officials which indicated that Ottawa was not being kept adequately informed of what was going on at London.

I should interject at this point that we did not wish to negotiate the Base-Lease Agreement in London. Twice we turned down a request by the British Government to conduct the negotiations there, the last time obtaining the President's approval in advance of communicating our decision to the British Government. The negotiations took place in London only because of the fact that Mr. Churchill made a personal request of the President that we send a delegation there to handle the negotiations. Had the negotiations taken place in Washington, as we desired, naturally we would have known whether Canadian observers were sitting in the negotiations.

The suggestion by the Canadian Government a day or so before the Agreement was finally signed in London that all references to Newfoundland be deleted and that a separate Agreement in which Canada would participate

<sup>1</sup> Ce fût peut-être vrai. Mais l'événement que, selon toute vraisemblance, King avait le plus à l'esprit était la décision du président (prise en avril) d'envoyer d'importants renforts dans les régions de Terre-Neuve défendues par le Canada. Voir les documents 153 et 157.

<sup>1</sup> This may have been the case. However, the event King evidently had most on his mind was the President's decision in April to send substantial reinforcements to areas of Newfoundland which Canada was defending. See Documents 153 and 157.

be negotiated in respect to Newfoundland came as a bombshell to us. Frankly we sent a delegation to London with the expectation that a separate lease setting forth in addition to metes and bounds our rights, powers and authorities in regard to each area [was] to be negotiated in respect to each of the eight territories involved and that each lease, although practically identical to the others, would be a separate document unrelated to any other. The procedure which was actually adopted was suggested by the British Government. The very first telegram we had from our delegation after their arrival in London (the Embassy's No. 294, January 25)<sup>1</sup> dealt with this subject. The telegram itself is fairly long and I do not have available extra copies of it but the appropriate section reads textually as follows:

294, 25th. (section two).

Colonial office suggests that one lease for each base containing all provisions, separate documents assumedly, viz. (1) a separate lease for each base to contain full description of geographic areas and the usual provisions having to do with occupation and use of land, and (2) a general agreement to cover the administrative and jurisdictional matters for all bases.[sic] This agreement would be embodied in an exchange of notes or other agreed form and would be incorporated in each lease by reference. We request your views.

The reason for this as stated to us is the belief that this would facilitate the task of the British Government in persuading possibly obstructive local legislatures to enact necessary legislation without resorting to an act of parliament.

To this we made the following reply on January 29:

The suggestions regarding the form of the leases set forth in Section Two of your telegram No. 294 appear to us to be satisfactory.

We assumed that Canadian officials were sitting in the negotiations and that they knew all about this suggestion on the part of the U.K. delegation. Had the Canadian Government in the early stages of the negotiations made any suggestion that a distinct agreement be concluded in respect to Newfoundland we should frankly have been inclined to go along with that suggestion. The notes which we exchanged recognizing the special position of Newfoundland and the possibility of her regaining her Dominion status are indicative of our realization that Newfoundland is in a special position. We recognize quite fully that the possibility always exists that Newfoundland will resume her Dominion status.

After two months of intensive negotiations we suddenly received through London the Canadian suggestion for a separate agreement for Newfoundland. It was then frankly too late to be adopted. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Winant were both strongly urging that the negotiations be brought to a close as soon as possible. Our Army and Navy Departments were impatient to get under way with the Bases and thought that the negotiations had been unduly protracted anyway.

We were glad however to sign the protocol recognizing that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian defense scheme, agreeing to consult Canada as well as Newfoundland in pursuance of those

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduct.

sections of the Agreement providing for consultation and providing that nothing in the Agreement should affect the arrangements relative to the defense of Newfoundland already made by the Governments of the United States and Canada in pursuance of the recommendations submitted to the Governments by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

We of course gathered by the time the Agreement was signed that there had been certain gaps in Canada's contacts with the negotiations going on in London. Any suggestion that we are responsible for those gaps is, however, astonishing to me.

If you think that it would be helpful, you are at liberty to show this letter to Norman Robertson, Hugh Keenleyside, or to anyone you choose, or to make any use you see fit of the information contained in it.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN HICKERSON

303.

1156-D-39

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 284

Washington, July 9, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 247 of June 30th, paragraph 1.<sup>1</sup> At first discussion today between members of the British Mission and United States staff on the defence of leased bases it was agreed that all questions affecting Newfoundland should be deferred in accordance with proposals in appendix No. 4 of Military Attaché's report of June 27th.<sup>2</sup> Military Attaché and Assistant Air Attaché were present at this meeting but will not participate in further discussions in view of our comparatively remote interest in other leased bases.

304.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, July 29, 1941

...

5. Captain Hill raised the question of the desirability of the installation by the United States of certain underwater defences in the Argentinia area. He stated that the Navy Department had already received approval from

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit. Les propositions suggéraient évidemment que les questions relatives à l'application de l'accord sur les bases, étant donné leurs implications pour Terre-Neuve, fussent soumises à la CPCAD.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. The proposals evidently were that questions arising from implementation of the Bases Agreement as it affected Newfoundland should be taken up in the PJBD.



the British Government and that the appropriate Canadian authorities had given informal assurance that they would not object to such installation. He therefore proposed and the Board approved the following as its *Eighteenth Recommendation*:

That the United States proceed with the installation of underwater defences in the Argentia-Ship Harbour area.

. . .

305.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

. . .

7. It was agreed that an informal communication should be sent to the Newfoundland Commissioner for Defence requesting his assistance in expediting the removal of civilian residents from the United States air bases in Newfoundland. (The Secretary of the United States Section will send such a communication to Mr. Emerson.)

. . .

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

New York, September 9-10, 1941

UNITED STATES NAVY

. . .

*Eighth Recommendation*

One runway at the Naval Air Station, Argentia is ready for emergency use, and the station is serving as a base for patrol planes engaged in active operations. Work is progressing rapidly. Considerable delay is being experienced in the evacuation of civilians from the reservation, which delay is interfering with the progress of work.

. . .

UNITED STATES ARMY

Inability of contractors to procure certain essential construction materials on schedule is delaying somewhat the progress of housing construction for the United States garrison in Newfoundland.<sup>1</sup> Action has been initiated with

<sup>1</sup> Cette garnison devait être logée à Fort Pepperrell, base américaine construite à proximité de St. John's.

<sup>1</sup> To be housed in Fort Pepperrell, the U.S. base to be built near St. John's.

a view to providing temporary housing for certain American units in the vicinity of St. John's if permanent construction cannot be completed before weather makes present tentage unsuitable . . .

Concrete paving of runways at Stephenville is proceeding. . . The U.S. Army recently decided to construct the third runway and work on it has been initiated . . .

Adjacent to the Stephenville landing field, is a small lake known as Stephenville Pond. It is ample for the operation of PBYS or any other type of flying boat. This sheltered water enhances the value of the installation at the Stephenville staging field.

. . .

306.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 10-11, 1941

UNITED STATES NAVY

. . .

## 2. Defence of Newfoundland

Progress of U.S. construction at St. John's<sup>1</sup> continues generally satisfactory. Permanent barracks are 35% completed. It is expected U.S. Forces can be quartered in permanent barracks by December 1, 1941. . .

307.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 7, 1942

UNITED STATES NAVY

. . .

## Second Recommendation

Construction of facilities at Argentia is progressing satisfactorily. Three landplane runways are completed, except for a surface course, and are usable. Facilities for seaplanes are also complete and in use. Industrial facilities are approximately 85% complete. U.S. Navy amphibian patrol planes and some Army planes operate from this base. . .

<sup>1</sup> i.e., à Fort Pepperell.

<sup>1</sup> i.e., at Fort Pepperrell.

*Eighteenth Recommendation*

. . . A double line anti-torpedo net across the entrance to Placentia Sound will be completed about April 15, 1942. . .

308.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, April 27, 1942

UNITED STATES NAVY

. . .

*Second Recommendation: Defence of Newfoundland.*

Construction work at Argentia continues to progress satisfactorily. With reference to the Progress Report of February 25, 1942,<sup>1</sup> negotiations are now underway and plans are being made for the rearrangement of the water front and the terminal of the Newfoundland Railroad to provide docking space for submarines, patrol vessels, and harbour utility craft.

. . .

309.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Quebec City, May 26-27, 1942

UNITED STATES NAVY

. . .

*Second Recommendation: Defence of Newfoundland.*

. . .

Plans are being made to provide a sectional floating drydock of about 7,000 tons capacity at Argentia, about September 1, 1942. . . It is anticipated that by July 15th a total of nine moorings will be available in Argentia Harbour behind nets.

*Eighth Recommendation: Underwater Defence of Argentia Harbor.*

The work of laying the anti-torpedo nets has been completed.

. . .

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

310.

DND HQS 35-1-3

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 382

St. John's, June 26, 1942

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 319 of June 4<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of a communiqué<sup>2</sup> issued by the Newfoundland Government concerning the lease of additional areas to the United States Government in accordance with Article XXVII of the Atlantic Bases Agreement.

2. The enactment of a statute entitled "An Act to Authorize the Execution of a Supplementary Lease to the United States of America" was officially announced a few days ago, but without any explanation of its meaning or significance. I therefore informally asked the Secretary for Justice what areas were going to be affected. He said that it was a matter of making relatively minor adjustments to the areas already leased rather than the granting of new bases. He said that the supplementary lease would provide for, among other things, a target range for the White Hills area, which is on the coast near St. John's and sites for light-houses for the naval base at Argentia. He said that most of the changes were considered at the time of the original leases but that it was not then possible to define their boundaries exactly. Naturally my enquiry was of a most informal nature and I did not wish to make an official request for information.

3. The announcement of the granting of a supplementary lease without explanation as to its meaning or importance aroused criticism in the local press. I reproduce herewith the following editorial from *The Daily News* of June 22:

#### New Leases

In view of the extraordinary constitutional position which exists in this country it is not unnatural that the news that supplementary leases had been executed in favour of the United States should excite some public curiosity.

Provision was made in the Bases Agreement for the leasing of lands not included in the original plans but unless national security were to be imperilled by publicity, it is highly desirable that there should be no secrecy about such matters.

It is not only supplementary leases to the United States that have to be considered but also leases which may have been made to the Canadian authorities for defense purposes. Certainly there is very definite feeling that apart from the original American grants, no long-term leases are necessary or should be made.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



4. *The Evening Telegram* of the same date under the heading "What Further is Leased" contained the following comments:

What are the terms of this supplementary lease? On what authority has any thing or any rights in Newfoundland been leased? The Commission of Government as trustees have no power to pass over to any other country one inch of its territory or to transfer to any outside country authority that might be exercised to restrict individual liberties. If any such legislation is enacted at the dictation of the Dominions Office, the latter is acting in complete disregard of those principles recognized in connection with the administration of parts of the overseas Empire ever since was perpetrated that supreme blunder which led to the Boston Tea Party.

The Dominion status of Newfoundland may be in a state of suspended animation, but if the Imperial authorities or the Commission of Government assume that, *ipso facto*, the independence of Newfoundlanders is dead, both those authorities are due for a disconcerting awakening. When and if it may be necessary for this Dominion to make sacrifices to further the prosecution of the war against tyranny and oppression, it will accept them. It shall not, however, tolerate the acceptance of sacrifices of its inalienable rights by arbitrary dictates.

Failing to inform the general public of the purpose of legislation, the Commission of Government, whether deliberately or unintentionally—and the fact is the same in either case—display a deplorable indifference to the view held in the matter by Newfoundland. Either that, or the Government have come to regard their judgement as so profound as to be above question. As to that, let their record speak.

5. I shall forward you the Act authorizing the supplementary lease as soon as it is published.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

311.

10298-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 69

Ottawa, March 12, 1943

Sir,

With reference to your confidential despatch No. 82 of February 12th, 1943,<sup>1</sup> relative to the exchange of notes between Canada and the United States dated January 27th, dealing with United States Defence Projects in Canada, I have the honour to advise you that there has not been any similar exchange of notes arising out of matters in connection with the Newfoundland Bases Agreement since it was executed.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The Canadian Government naturally expects the Government of the United States to adhere to its obligations *vis-à-vis* Canada. To date there has been no evidence of any violation nor of any disposition to contravene the spirit of the protocol.

In view of the attitude of whole-hearted co-operation which has animated both Governments in this matter, the Canadian Government does not desire to apply an excessively technical interpretation to the terms of the protocol so as to insist upon unnecessarily strict adherence by the United States authorities to its provisions in implementing minor details of the defence program.

Operations of Canadian and United States Armed Forces in Newfoundland are regularly discussed at meetings of the Joint Board on Defence. In the course of these meetings there was a detailed discussion of the proposed construction by the United States of the items of defence equipment to which you refer in paragraphs 11 and 12 of your Despatch under reference.

The Canadian authorities received information concerning the extension of United States properties at Quidi Vidi Lake but felt that this was not of such a nature as to require express and formal consent from them.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON

312.

10298-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 179

St. John's, March 16, 1943

Sir,

I have received your despatch No. 69 of March 12, 1943 relative to the exchange of notes between Canada and the United States in connection with the Newfoundland Bases Agreement.

2. I am pleased to note that relations between the Canadian Government and the Government of the United States have been those of wholehearted co-operation in respect of matters in Newfoundland. This was my own observation but I felt that I should call your attention to certain matters which have taken place here since the signing of the Bases Agreement and obtain instructions from you as to whether or not you desire me to keep you informed. This was the reason for my calling to your attention certain matters in my despatch No. 82 of February 12, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

3. In my despatch, I referred in particular to the fact that the United States had constructed an extensive system of communication lines which, I understand, extend across country in Newfoundland for a distance of upwards of 800 miles.

4. I also understand that they have acquired a ninety-nine year lease of the right-of-way of these communication lines.

5. It would, I think, be surprising if the United States Government had proceeded with this project which involved the expenditure of several million dollars, without first communicating with the Canadian Government.

6. In looking through my files, after writing my despatch No. 82 of February 12, 1943, I found a copy of the letter which the Honourable Pierrepont Moffat sent to Mr. Robertson under date of February 9, 1942,<sup>1</sup> in which he states that in accordance with the spirit of the protocol of the Bases Agreement, he gave Mr. Robertson complete information about the proposal of the United States Government to obtain an easement for ninety-nine years for a right-of-way in Newfoundland for a wire-communication project, covering a distance of approximately 800 miles.

7. I had overlooked this communication when writing my despatch.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

313.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Debates, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, April 1-2, 1943

UNITED STATES ARMY

. . .

# 1. *Exchange of Information:*

## a. Eastern Defense Command:

### (1) *General Progress of U.S. Projects:*

- (a) General construction has been completed to the extent of 95 per cent at Fort Pepperrell, 97 per cent at Fort McAndrew<sup>1</sup> and 95 per cent at Harmon Field.<sup>2</sup>

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Base de l'armée américaine près d'Argentinia.

<sup>2</sup> United States Army base near Argentina.

<sup>3</sup> Base de l'armée et de l'aviation américaine à Stephenville.

<sup>3</sup> United States Army and Air base at Stephenville.

PARTIE 4/PART 4  
TERRE-NEUVE ET LA POURSUITE DE LA GUERRE  
NEWFOUNDLAND AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

SECTION A  
LES OPÉRATIONS AÉRIENNES  
AIR OPERATIONS

SOUS-SECTION i/SUB-SECTION i  
*LE SERVICE TRANSOCÉANIQUE<sup>1</sup>*  
*THE ATLANTIC FERRY SERVICE<sup>2</sup>*

314.

DND HSQ 19-55-1

*Mémorandum de la direction des Services aériens, Canadian Pacific Railway*  
*Memorandum by Air Service Department, Canadian Pacific Railway*

[Montreal,] September 11, 1940

AIRCRAFT FERRYING TO UNITED KINGDOM

General Scheme

All aircraft for delivery to the United Kingdom should be delivered by the aircraft constructors to our base at St. Hubert Aerodrome or to whatever base in British territory from which we may have to operate. Lockheed Hudson III's will be delivered by the Lockheed Corporation from Burbank, Calif. to St. Hubert where they will be handed over to the Air Service Department of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

It is proposed that a representative or representatives of the aircraft constructors and the engine manufacturers should be appointed to St. Hubert and to Hattie's Camp<sup>2</sup>, Newfoundland, in order to insure that:

1. The aircraft are in perfect condition when handed over.
2. That they are perfectly serviceable at the commencement of the ocean crossing.

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<sup>1</sup> Au milieu de 1940, le ministère de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne, dirigé depuis peu par Lord Beaverbrook, avait de nombreux contrats avec des firmes américaines. En Grande-Bretagne le besoin d'avions était pressant. On espérait donc leur faire survoler l'Atlantique en éliminant les risques de pertes en mer et en libérant les aires de livraisons au profit d'autres marchandises essentielles. Les documents qui suivent démontrent le rôle que le Canada et Terre-Neuve jouèrent dans cette entreprise. Les données statistiques se trouvent à l'appendice D.

<sup>2</sup> L'aéroport de Gander.

<sup>1</sup> By the middle of 1940, the Ministry of Aircraft Production of Great Britain, recently taken over by Lord Beaverbrook, had many contracts with United States firms. In Britain the need for war planes was acute and it was hoped that they could be flown across the Atlantic, thus avoiding the risk of loss at sea and freeing shipping space for other essential cargoes. The documents which follow depict the role which Canada and Newfoundland played in this enterprise. Statistical data are included in Appendix D.

<sup>2</sup> Gander Airport.



It is also proposed that an engineer should be provided by the Air Service Department at St. Hubert who will be responsible for all engineering records, stores, and also act as liaison with Trans-Canada Air Lines, who will be carrying out the general maintenance of these aircraft. A radio servicing engineer will be provided by the makers of the radio equipment and he will be responsible for all wireless servicing before the aircraft leave St. Hubert. At Hattie's Camp, Newfoundland, it is considered that two ground engineers will be required to service the engines and one ground engineer to service the aircraft. One wireless servicing engineer will also be required at this station.

It is understood that the Wright Corporation desire to keep direct watch on their own engines and arrangements have been made for Mr. Maidment of the Wright Corporation to be available at Montreal in an advisory capacity, other engineering personnel will be supplied by the Canadian Wright Corporation for servicing ferry aircraft at St. Hubert. Arrangements are also in hand for the Wright Corporation to supply a mechanic for Newfoundland.

Provision will also have to be made at the ocean terminal in the United Kingdom (presumably Aldergrove) for one engine and one aircraft ground engineer. The W.T. equipment could be looked after by the radio officer on board the aircraft. These personnel would be available for looking after the suggested land plane service between the United Kingdom and Canada. The main turn-round servicing for these aircraft will presumably be done in England and in this connection it should be pointed out that on the service operated by Imperial Airways Limited the turn-round at New York was carried out by a staff of four ground engineers. These consisted of three engine mechanics and one rigger. They also had assistance from P.A.A. whenever necessary. A somewhat equivalent organization will be required in the United Kingdom in order to deal with a large four-engine aircraft of the type visualized. An alternative to this is that the turn-around maintenance should be carried out by an English concern having the necessary facilities.

#### CONTROL

It is considered that a control officer should be appointed to both ocean terminals. . . .

The following names are put forward:

	Control Officer
Hattie's Camp, Newfoundland	—Squadron-Leader Griffith Powell. (Now R.C.A.F.)
Aldergrove	—Squadron-Leader Godsave or Williamson. (Now R.A.F.)

Squadron-Leader Powell would be available for use in connection with the organization of the South Atlantic Route, and has had considerable experience at Bermuda and has knowledge of the South Atlantic bases.

. . .

Should it be found impossible to obtain a qualified control officer for Newfoundland, the Group Leader will be responsible for all pre-flight planning and will be the senior official of the Air Service Department. The general

control of the flight after departure will be in the hands of Squadron-Leader Pattison who will be responsible for the initiation of distress procedure, etc., in exactly a similar manner to which he handles the present B.O.A.C. flights.

#### MAINTENANCE OF AIRCRAFT

Arrangements have been made for the training aircraft to be serviced at Montreal by the Trans-Canada Air Lines' Organization. Unfortunately, the two training aircraft now about to be delivered are of the short range type and therefore are not to be changed over as we had first expected. This means that these two aircraft will be in need of more or less continuous maintenance. The aircraft due for delivery to the United Kingdom would only need a general checking before proceeding to Newfoundland. This would be done by personnel supplied by the Wright Corporation. The number of hours flown by these aircraft on arrival at Montreal would be approximately eighteen.

. . .

#### GENERAL DETAILS

It is proposed that the aircraft to be ferried should be sent over in formation led by an experienced pilot and first class navigator, who will be known as a group leader.

At the commencement of the delivery flights it is suggested that this formation should consist of not more than nine aircraft or less than five. These numbers have been decided upon in the first case because a larger formation might be unwieldy and, in the second case, because it becomes uneconomical to send a trained group leader with too small a convoy. Our ideas on this subject may have to be modified owing to the late delivery of the aircraft as it appears now that ferrying will have to start in bad weather conditions.

The crew of the leading aircraft should consist of a captain holding a first class navigator's license, and an experienced second captain. Two radio officers will be carried on the leader owing to the amount of work involved and the long period on duty. Another aircraft should be appointed to act as deputy leader but this will not be possible until we have a larger number of qualified navigational personnel. The crew of this aircraft will consist of an experienced captain, a first class navigator and one radio officer. The duties of the deputy leader would be to take over in the event of any trouble on the leading aircraft. The crew of the other aircraft will consist of an experienced captain, a second captain and one radio officer.

Every endeavour should be made to obtain more captains with a working knowledge of navigation and trained in the practical use of a sextant—at the present moment we are limited to three. I am sure that navigating personnel of this description could be obtained in England should someone there press the matter. Radio officers with air line experience and practical use of the loop aerial are required on all aircraft. A number of these should be obtainable from the United Kingdom, in fact it would be preferable if

we could obtain all our operators from this service as it would avoid having to give our codes to alien personnel.<sup>1</sup>

#### FLIGHT ORGANIZATION

The type of formation to be used for this work has not yet been definitely settled but may be either the "V" formation or in "Line-Ahead". It is proposed that the group leader will be responsible for all navigation and will exercise control over the whole formation. These duties would be taken over by the deputy leader should any trouble occur to the leader.

The main points required to make this scheme an operating possibility are as under:

- ...
5. Aircraft will leave Montreal for Hattie's Camp in small formations and will wait at Hattie's Camp until the main formation is completed and the weather forecast for the ocean crossing and landing conditions are favourable.

- ...
9. It is proposed that aircraft would leave Newfoundland during daylight and in good weather conditions so that good visual formation can be kept up to the operating altitude. The speed of the flight must be computed before leaving so that the arrival in the United Kingdom can be made shortly after dawn. This will enable accurate fixes to be obtained shortly before arrival and a land fall made in daylight.

- ...
12. All watches will be synchronized before departure from the Newfoundland airport.

315.

DND HQS 19-55-1

*Le directeur des Services aériens, Canadian Pacific Railway,  
au chef de l'état-major de l'Air*

*General Manager of the Air Service Department, Canadian Pacific Railway,  
to Chief of the Air Staff*

SECRET

[Montreal,] September 14, 1940

Sir,

As you know, the Air Service Department of the C.P.R. has been established at very short notice to deliver aircraft for the Ministry of Aircraft Production, from Montreal to the United Kingdom and is, in the main, recruiting all but key personnel in Canada and the United States.

<sup>1</sup> Finalement, la plupart des opérateurs de radio furent fournis par le ministère des Transports du Canada.

<sup>1</sup> In the end, most of the radio operators were provided by the Canadian Department of Transport.

It was originally expected that deliveries would begin in August when the weather conditions over the Atlantic are normally at their best. The manufacturers have been delayed and the first delivery flight is now expected to coincide with the period of equinoctial gales and shortening hours of daylight. As time goes on weather conditions become worse.

It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that all possible precautions shall be taken to ensure that the first few groups of aircraft to be flown across the Atlantic shall reach the United Kingdom successfully in spite of the absence of the experience that ought to have been acquired during the summer.

One of the precautions we should like to take is to place at Hattie's Camp a pilot who has had actual recent experience of flying the Atlantic and who is familiar with the wireless and meteorological organization and Atlantic conditions. His duties there would be to help in the pre-computation of the navigation for the flights in the light of the meteorological conditions prevailing, and to plot the course of the flight and act as liaison officer between the airport, meteorological and wireless organizations and the aircraft crews on the one hand and our office at Montreal on the other.

There are, of course, very few such people and those we have at our disposal are scheduled to lead groups of aircraft across the Atlantic and to train their crews. Squadron-Leader Griffith Powell, now in the R.C.A.F. and stationed at Halifax, is perhaps the only other man in Canada with this particular experience, and we would be grateful if his services could be loaned to this organization for, say, two months to help in the initial organization and "running in".

If Squadron-Leader Powell's services can be made available to us we would, of course, take care of his expenses while away from Halifax. Further, if the loan of his services could best be arranged by granting him leave without pay, we can doubtless make a suitable financial arrangement direct with him for the period.

Unofficial information now leads us to expect that the manufacturers may recover from the earlier delays and deliver aircraft to us at the rate of two a day in the near future. This will intensify our difficulties and, in consequence, we would be very grateful if early consideration could be given to this request so that, in the event of your finding it possible to accede to it, Squadron-Leader Powell could reach Newfoundland before the first group of aircraft assembles for the crossing.

Knowing the need in the R.C.A.F. for officers with the experience of Squadron-Leader Powell, I would hesitate to make this application but for the vital importance of establishing the ferrying of bombers to the United Kingdom on a sound and reliable basis; and the belief that no assignment would enable him to turn his knowledge and experience to better account in the common cause.

I am, sir,

Yours obediently,

H. BURCHALL



316.

PRO AIR 38 1 801

*Rapport sur les aspects techniques d'un plan pour livrer des avions  
en Grande-Bretagne par la voie des airs<sup>1</sup>*

*Report on Technical Aspects of Scheme for Delivery of Aircraft  
by Air to Great Britain<sup>1</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

[London,] October 8, 1940

1. ORGANIZATION AT MONTREAL

I arrived at Montreal on 31st August by flying boat *Clare*, and made contact with Mr. Woods Humphery who had set up an organization, within that of the Canadian Pacific Railway<sup>2</sup>, for the delivery of aircraft to Great Britain by air. He requested me to examine into and report upon the technical aspects of the proposed scheme, and the performance of the aircraft concerned.

The organization at Montreal was as follows:

General Manager:	Lt.-Col. H. Burchall
Superintendent of Operations:	Capt. A. S. Wilcockson
Flying Superintendent:	Capt. D.C.T. Bennett
Assistants:	Capt. Page and Ross

I found that no Hudson III's for delivery to Great Britain had yet arrived at the airport, but that there were on hand two Hudson II training aircraft, one of which was fitted with dual control. Intensive training operations—both flying and ground—were in progress, and a keen and energetic spirit was apparent. The working week was seven full days and some nights. Up to that time the organization had been going through a period of great difficulty in selecting flying personnel whose qualifications gave a reasonable prospect of successful delivery flights. A considerable number of applicants from both Canada and the United States had been interviewed, but a large proportion had proved to be quite unsuitable. It was clear that every endeavour had been

<sup>1</sup> Ce rapport se fondait sur une visite effectuée au Canada et aux États-Unis par le major R. H. Mayo, conseiller technique de *Imperial Airways* et de *British Overseas Airways Corporation*, en septembre et octobre 1940.

<sup>2</sup> Le 8 juillet 1940, Morris W. Wilson, représentant au Canada et aux États-Unis du ministère de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne, écrivit une lettre à Sir Edward Beatty, président de *Canadian Pacific Railway*, dans laquelle il disait:

<sup>1</sup> This report was based on a visit made to Canada and the United States by Major R. H. Mayo, Technical Adviser to Imperial Airways and British Overseas Airways Corporation, during September and October, 1940.

<sup>2</sup> On July 8, 1940, Morris W. Wilson, representative in Canada and the United States for the Ministry of Aircraft Production of Great Britain, wrote a letter to Sir Edward Beatty, President of Canadian Pacific Railway in which he said:

I have heard... that you have very generously offered to place the experience and facilities of your company at our disposal in order to enable us to ferry those aircraft which are being constructed in the United States for the British Government and which have the necessary range to be flown to England instead of being sent by sea. Needless to say we are very grateful to you for this offer and glad to accept it.

made to retain for training only personnel whose ability and experience gave reasonable prospects of ultimate success. No pilot had been retained without being put through a flight test.

Although less than two weeks had elapsed since the two training aircraft had arrived at Montreal, and some mechanical trouble had been experienced with them, good progress had already been made by Capt. Bennett and his assistants in training personnel for the delivery flights. The experience of Capts. Wilcockson and Bennett in in trans-Atlantic flying had, of course, been an invaluable asset.

. . .

After seeing the organization at Montreal I made a study of the specifications of the several types of aircraft ear-marked for delivery by air, with particular reference to performance and range for the proposed delivery flights. While I was engaged on this work word was received from Lockheeds that the first long-range Hudson III was ready for trials, and Captain Bennett therefore proceeded by air to Burbank in order to take part in these trials. On 16th September a telegram was received from Captain Bennett stating that the results of the trials were not satisfactory, and it was arranged, therefore, that I should start immediately on a projected short visit by air to the several plants on the Pacific Coast, so as to arrive at Burbank while Capt. Bennett was still there.

. . .

#### 6. PROGRESS OF PREPARATIONS FOR DELIVERY FLIGHTS

As the progress made up to date will be dealt with fully in a report<sup>1</sup> now being prepared by Col. Burchall no useful purpose would be served by my making more than the briefest reference to this subject. While at Montreal I have myself seen the training work proceeding, and have been greatly impressed by the thoroughness and ability with which it has been tackled. As mentioned above, some 21 complete crews of three each have been trained, and each member of each crew has been passed out in the various aspects of the work he will be called upon to do. The two training Hudson II aircraft have been in almost continuous use during the day, and a considerable amount of instruction in night flying has also been given. The fact that these two aircraft are still intact, reflects a good deal of credit on the instructors, and also on the two engineers who have maintained the aircraft and engines.

At the time of completing this report (8th October), no Hudson III has yet arrived at Montreal, but the first is reported to have left Burbank on 4th October, and it should have arrived by now. It is to be hoped that subsequent deliveries from Burbank will be accomplished in a shorter time than four clear days.

Non-delivery of the Hudson III's has precluded the possibility of full-scale practice in formation flying as proposed for the delivery flights, but the two training aircraft have been used to give each of the crews practice in following

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and maintaining position in relation to another aircraft. Opportunities for further practice in formation flying will no doubt occur during the final preparations for the first delivery flight.

As regards the prospects for success of the formation scheme on these first delivery flights, it is obvious that the major factor will be the weather actually experienced, and it must be emphasised that delay in getting the aircraft has greatly increased the risk of bad conditions. I believe that everything possible under the circumstances has been done to build up competent and reliable teams from the material available, and generally to ensure success. Given reasonably good weather I believe that these flights will be brought off successfully. But if, through bad weather or other unfavourable circumstances, the results are not 100% successful in the first instance, I hope it will not be concluded that the scheme itself is not feasible. I think there is every reason to believe that this scheme can be put into effect on a large scale from next Spring onwards, with the prospect of a high degree of success.<sup>1</sup>

317.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 29, 1941

. . .

FERRYING OF AIRCRAFT TO THE U.K.

10. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY reported that the U.K. government were most anxious to have the Canadian government undertake responsibility for the obtaining of pilots and the ferrying of planes across the Atlantic. Existing arrangements under the U.K. Ministry of Aircraft Production had not been a success. The problem would grow progressively heavier as British orders were filled in the United States.

11. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR expressed the view that if the R.C.A.F. were requested to assume responsibility for obtaining pilots for ferry purposes, this could be done, but so long as existing arrangements continued, it would not be possible for the Canadian government to interfere.

13. [sic] THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE confirmed Mr. Howe's report of the anxiety of the Air Ministry on this score. Shipping space

<sup>1</sup> En effet, la vraisemblance du plan fut démontrée par la livraison, via Gander, de 25 bombardiers Hudson en novembre et décembre 1940, et le plan alla de l'avant grâce à un nombre sans cesse croissant de vols le printemps suivant. Voir la section 4 a ii.

<sup>1</sup> It was. Feasibility of the scheme was demonstrated by delivery, via Gander, of 25 Hudson bombers in November-December 1940, and the scheme moved ahead with increasingly frequent flights in the following spring. See Section 4 a ii.

would be insufficient by a very large margin, to transport the planes purchased by the British in the U.S. The U.K. government would be most grateful if Canada could undertake to train bomber pilots from the B.C.A.T.P., for ferrying purposes.

14. After further discussion it was agreed that the Minister of National Defence for Air should take up with the Air Staff the possibility of setting up a suitable organization to train and provide pilots for ferrying purposes.

#### GREENLAND

##### ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR BASE

15. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY stated that a landing field in Greenland was regarded by the U.K. government as of vital importance in view of the numbers of short-range aircraft which could make the Atlantic crossing only if landing facilities were available in Greenland.

16. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR stated that very high priority was given to this project by the U.K. government. As yet no reply had been received from the U.S. government to our enquiries in this respect, although an acknowledgement had been received stating that the matter would be dealt with as urgent.

17. It was agreed that the project should again be taken up with the U.S. government, and the Canadian Legation in Washington should be instructed to press for an early answer.

. . .

318.

Howe Papers 16

*Le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements  
au quartier général militaire du Canada, Londres  
Minister of Munitions and Supply  
to Canadian Military Headquarters, London*

TELEGRAM 308

[Ottawa,] January 31, 1941

Howe to Banks for Lord Beaverbrook: Have discussed with Beatty problem of ferrying bombers across Atlantic and am informed that Beatty is now organized to ferry two hundred planes per month with help of Royal Air Force. Assume ferrying situation satisfactory to yourself without my intervention. Had previously ascertained that Royal Canadian Air Force would undertake special training for pilots for this duty if required. In any event we will assist whenever called upon. Would you favour making available first four Boeing four-engined bombers for transport service across Atlantic for mails and flying personnel. Understand that these planes are completed and in factory having bomb sights changed and can be fitted for ferrying work if desired. Believe planes are well adapted for that work.



319.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

[Ottawa,] February 3, 1941

. . .

## FERRYING OF AIRCRAFT TO THE U.K.

10. MR. POWER and MR. HOWE both impressed upon the meeting the urgent need of completing, at an early date, arrangements for an adequate ferry service for the delivery of planes across the Atlantic. While the Air Ministry were anxious for the Canadian government to tackle this problem, the organization set up in North America for this purpose by the U.K. Minister of Aircraft Production was still in existence, though the results it had obtained were far from satisfactory.

. . .

320.

Howe Papers 16

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au ministre des Transports*  
*Minister of National Defence for Air to Minister of Transport*

SECRET

Ottawa, February 10, 1941

## TRANS-ATLANTIC FERRYING—ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

My dear Colleague,

There have been informal discussions between Air Commodore Slessor representing the Air Ministry and the Royal Canadian Air Force staff regarding the organization necessary to cope with the Trans-Atlantic Ferry problem in the immediate future. The contents of those discussions were transmitted by Air Commodore Slessor to the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Ministry, London, and from Sir Henry Self to the Ministry of Aircraft Production in long messages which explained the situation and recommendations in considerable detail.

Copies of these messages are attached.<sup>1</sup>

In brief, the recommendations were as follows:

- (a) That the Trans-Atlantic Ferry problem is too large to be handled by the present civilian organization operating as the air services of the Canadian Pacific Railway.
- (b) That the receipt and despatch organization should be a Royal Air Force unit which would absorb as many of the civilian personnel presently employed by the Canadian Pacific Railway as are willing to be so absorbed and be augmented by experienced R.A.F. personnel, particularly in respect of first pilots, but making every

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

possible use of the Joint Air Training Plan output as second pilots, navigators and wireless operators.

- (c) That a training organization is essential to train the crews for Trans-Atlantic ferry work and that it should be a Royal Air Force unit.

...

Yours faithfully,

CHARLES G. POWER

321.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, February 11, 1941

...

GREENLAND

ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR BASE

29. THE PRIME MINISTER reported that word had been received from the Canadian Legation in Washington, that the State Department were seized with the urgency of the aerodrome problem, and had agreed to the sending of an expedition in the immediate future. The U.S. Consul had reported that Greenland would be pleased to receive a group of U.S. experts.

(See telegram No. 47 of February 5th, 1941<sup>1</sup>, from the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires, Washington, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa).

FERRYING OF AIRCRAFT TO THE U.K.

30. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported that he was now advised that it would be probably impossible to establish staging facilities in Greenland, in time to permit fighters and medium bombers to be ferried this year. Alternative plans, involving the construction of improvised runways on rafts were being considered.

31. MR. POWER said that the situation with regard to the supply of ferry pilots was confused. The Air Ministry wanted the R.C.A.F., to take the matter over; the Aircraft Production Ministry were apparently unwilling that this be done. The R.C.A.F. were prepared to make an aerodrome available to the R.A.F., for the training of ferry pilots, but no request had yet been received. It was hoped that Mr. Howe would be able to clarify the situation upon his return to Canada.<sup>2</sup>

...

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Howe était alors en Angleterre pour s'occuper de questions de guerre.

<sup>2</sup> Howe was then in England on war business.

322.

CWC

*Le quartier général de la Défense nationale au quartier général militaire  
du Canada, Londres*

*National Defence Headquarters to Canadian Military Headquarters, London*

TELEGRAM 459

[Ottawa,] February 16, 1941

SECRET. Following from Howe, for Banks, for Lord Beaverbrook, also for Capt. Harold Balfour. Having been requested both by Lord Beaverbrook and Balfour to enlist Canada's help in Trans-Atlantic ferrying problem, have discussed subject with my colleague Power, also with Beatty, Wilson, Self, Slessor, Pirie and others associated with present organization. Consider present organization wholly inadequate and feel those directing here have no clear conception of magnitude of undertaking, with result that Canada may be blamed for delay of United States planes in Canada. Can advise you secretly that project for facilities for moving fighter planes is progressing which adds to magnitude of operation.

Power states RCAF view as follows: It can provide an aerodrome in Nova Scotia for operational training JATP graduates as second pilots and for collection point land aircraft proceeding to Newfoundland airport. These pilots are of course at the disposal of RAF on graduation from the plan under the Plan Agreement. RAF direction therefore necessary if they are to be employed on ferry duties. Power suggests that R.A.F. and ATFERRO supply first pilots for ferrying and RAF supply instructors and maintenance staff for training school since none of these categories available in Canada either from JATP or Home War Establishment. He further stresses necessity for construction of new hangars to provide for accommodation large four engine type of aircraft. Moreover provision must be made for increased personnel accommodation at Newfoundland and if requirements large in Nova Scotia additional buildings required there. No start has been made on construction owing to absence of any precise information as to your requirements. Apparently no clear understanding amongst UK authorities here and Washington as to whether personnel of ferrying organization as distinct from ferry training school shall be civilian or RAF. This should be cleared up immediately. Power states all available Canadian facilities at disposal of UK Government but suggests that UK authorities give specific indication of what is required. End of Power statement. We are ready to schedule Trans-Canada Air Lines planes into Newfoundland to assist return movement of pilots whenever we are requested to do so. Strongly urge definite direction from London as planes have already accumulated in considerable numbers at Montreal. Feel that I personally have done all I can except on instructions from your Government. Ends.

323.

Howe Papers 16

*Le ministre de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne  
au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Minister of Aircraft Production of Great Britain  
to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM APX 686

London, February 19, 1941

IMMEDIATE. For Howe from Beaverbrook. Begins. Replying to Cable M 459. With grateful thanks we accept the offer of an Airdrome in Nova Scotia at Debert and we have asked the Air Ministry to acknowledge their concurrence in your kind offer. We have asked the RAF to approve of the employment of J.A.T.P. graduates on Ferry duty. ATFERO will supply first Pilots for ferrying out of Civilian Personnel. You may have to call upon R.A.F. for assistance which we hope will be given. RAF will be asked for Instructors for Training School. Maintenance Staff will be supplied by M A P construction of new hangars will be undertaken at once and plans have been developed for increasing accommodation at Newfoundland. If additional buildings are necessary in Nova Scotia this Ministry will provide for them. Personnel of Ferrying Organisation will be Civilian with assistance from RAF and the Organisation will be under control of MAP in the future as in the past. We are indebted to Power for his generous offer to help us with the facilities and we gladly accept. It is comforting to know that we may have Canada Airline Planes to assist the return movement of Pilots from Newfoundland. It is our hope that we will be in a position shortly to ferry Pilots and crews from Great Britain to Newfoundland thus creating a satisfactory Shuttle Service. I hope that this general understanding will be sufficient to enable Morris Wilson to carry on all our arrangements in a form satisfactory to you and with your co-operation. Ends. Please repeat the above to Morris Wilson.

324.

Howe Papers 16

*Le représentant au Canada et aux États-Unis du ministère de la  
Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne au ministre de la  
Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Representative in Canada and in the United States of the  
Ministry of Aircraft Production of Great Britain to  
Minister of National Defence for Air*

Montreal, February 25, 1941

Dear Major Power,

ATFERO

When Mr. Howe was in England recently he was good enough to say to our Minister, Lord Beaverbrook, that he would render any assistance he



could in connection with our programme of trans-Atlantic flight deliveries of aircraft. To this end he has been in communication with our Minister since his return, one result of which was that we were directed by Lord Beaverbrook to submit a detailed statement of our requirements for the consideration of your good self and other members of the government concerned. Such a statement is enclosed herewith. It naturally covers a number of items that have already been discussed, and, in some cases, definitely arranged for, but it was thought well that a more or less comprehensive statement should be on file.

Several definite requests made by Sir Edward Beatty are now before you for consideration. As soon as we are advised of your decision, we shall take the various matters up in detail with the appropriate officers of your Department.

May we express once again our real appreciation of the assistance you and your colleagues are giving us in this important operation.

Yours very truly,

M. W. WILSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE / ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum*

*Memorandum*

[Montreal,] February 20, 1941

REQUIREMENTS OF CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR SERVICES IN CANADA AND  
NEWFOUNDLAND TO COPE WITH TRANS-ATLANTIC FLIGHT  
DELIVERIES OF AIRCRAFT

1. To handle the volume of large aircraft proposed during 1941, it is essential to have at the disposal of the C.P.A.S.<sup>1</sup> Organization two large, well-equipped airports somewhere in Canada east of Ottawa.

Under arrangements already completed, Debert, N.S., airport and buildings have been made available to the U.K. authorities with whom C.P.A.S. has a satisfactory working agreement. This station will handle approximately half of the aircraft on delivery in addition to a training unit set up by the R.A.F.

In order to most efficiently handle the balance of flight delivery aircraft, another airport complete with buildings, lighting, and all facilities is required. Dorval would be an ideal location and would involve less disturbance to others, as no one has yet incurred any expenses in moving or getting located at Dorval. The field development at Dorval is very suitable for medium types of aircraft.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Les services aériens du *Canadian Pacific Railway*.

<sup>1</sup> Canadian Pacific Railway Air Services.

2. If a fully-equipped airport is made available as requested in "1", then the buildings required are:

- (a) Additional quarters for at least 150 persons at Newfoundland.
- (b) Two additional hangars at Newfoundland.
- (c) Additional large hangar at Debert.

Plans for all these buildings have been approved or are in hand and contractors have the Newfoundland projects in hand. They inform us that, due to the limited quantities of lumber and materials, it will be impossible to start on these works for some time. The R.C.A.F. have a large building program in hand which at present has priority. It is requested that the R.C.A.F. grant to C.P.A.S. authority to detach approximately 25% of the labor and to release sufficient materials to allow the contractor to start at once on quarters which are most urgently required.

...

4. The Controller of Radio has been requested to establish 3 clear channels of wireless communication.

#### Point to Point Communication

- I Newfoundland—Debert—Montreal
- II Aircraft to ground—on ferry flights
- III Training and practice wireless communication

...

5. It is requested that the Canadian Government, either R.C.A.F. or Department of Transport, provide eighteen fully-experienced aircraft and engine mechanics. These men are required as foremen of sections of mechanics. They would be divided between Newfoundland, Montreal and Debert.

C.P.A.S. will house, feed, and pay the men whilst on this work.

It is impossible to obtain from outside sources experienced mechanics to act as foremen under supervision of C.P.A.S. Chief Engineers at each Base. It is believed such men are available from the R.C.A.F. or Department of Transport services.

Additional experienced men will be required later in 1941 if expansion continues.

The items outlined constitute the large and most urgent requirements of C.P.A.S. to cope with the Atlantic flight deliveries. The importance of having proper facilities to handle a job of this magnitude will be appreciated and it is respectfully requested that favorable consideration be given to these requirements at the earliest possible moment.

6. In addition to mechanics, other personnel are required for crew duties. These are:

#### (a) First Pilots

All civilian pilots both in U.S. and Canada who have applied and measured up to standards required have been trained and approximately 35 first pilots have been found to date.

Many more first pilots are needed—men who are capable of flying

these types of aircraft both by day and night. It is requested that the R.C.A.F. and the Department of Transport be asked to provide as many as possible—up to 100—as all the balance must be obtained from the U.K., where they are sorely needed, and shipping space is at a premium. The R.C.A.F. should be requested to set up an additional part of the training scheme to produce first pilots, capable of taking an aircraft on trans-Atlantic delivery flights.

- (b) Navigators, Wireless Operators, Second Pilots and Flight Engineers for certain types are being drawn from J.A.T.P. sources through the U.K. Air mission, Ottawa, and sufficient numbers are assured from this source in Canada.
- (c) Experienced Flight Engineers are required for the larger types of 4-engined aircraft, and R.C.A.F. and Department of Transport should be requested to supply 40 experienced flight engineers. Any balance will have to be obtained from the U.K.

325.

Howe Papers 16

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air et le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements au ministre de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne*

*Minister of National Defence for Air and Minister of Munitions and Supply to Minister of Aircraft Production of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, March 3, 1941

I have fully discussed whole ATFERO matter with Power. The question is one which he believes should be handled between Government and Government as there is possibility of danger arising out of so many people being involved. For example in Canada ATFERO, Clayton-Knight<sup>1</sup> and three departments of the Canadian Government. Power and I would appreciate your Prime Minister cabling Canadian Government specific indication of what is required so that we may completely integrate all interests concerned. Canadian Government fully appreciates difficulties of the undertaking and extremely anxious to assist to best of our ability.

<sup>1</sup> Le comité Clayton-Knight fut formé au États-Unis dans le but de recruter des pilotes susceptibles de combattre contre l'Allemagne.

<sup>1</sup> Clayton-Knight Committee was formed in the United States to recruit pilots for service in war against Germany.

326.

Howe Papers 16

*Le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements  
au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Minister of Munitions and Supply  
to Minister of National Defence for Air*

[Ottawa,] March 8, 1941

My dear Colleague,

With reference to our communications with Lord Beaverbrook and his representative in North America, Mr. Morris Wilson, I am advised by telephone from Lord Beaverbrook that the cable from Prime Minister Churchill to Prime Minister King will be forthcoming immediately.

Sir Edward Beatty called me yesterday to advise that Morris Wilson and himself will be in Ottawa on Monday evening and Tuesday next to discuss the proposal forwarded by Mr. Morris Wilson. Perhaps we can arrange to discuss the matter with them Monday evening.

In the meantime, I understand that "Punch" Dickins is in Ottawa discussing details of the proposed arrangements with officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force and Transport Department.

Yours faithfully,

[C. D. HOWE]

327.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet  
Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 21, 1941

. . .

FERRYING OF PLANES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

28. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported that arrangements for the ferrying of fighters and medium bombers to Great Britain had recently been under further examination. U.S. technical officers were inclined to favour a more northerly route than that which had first been proposed. The United States had expeditions going to East and West Greenland. Canada had undertaken to explore suitable sites for staging facilities in Labrador, and on an alternative northerly route. The question of cost would be one for consideration later on.

. . .



328.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 27, 1941

FERRYING OF AIRCRAFT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM—PROVISION OF  
AERODROMES IN CANADA FOR USE OF U.K. SERVICES

32. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported the measures which had been taken to meet the request of the U.K. government, on March the 9th, for aerodrome facilities in connection with the ferrying of aircraft across the Atlantic. Facilities required would include accommodation of an R.A.F. school to train personnel and for a receipt and despatch unit to be operated, on behalf of the U.K. Ministry of Aircraft Production, by Canadian Pacific Air Service.

After careful investigation of available facilities, and on the recommendation of the Chief of the Air Staff:

- (a) the Air Station at Debert, N.S., which had originally been developed for R.C.A.F. emergency use, and subsequently allocated to accommodate an R.A.F. general reconnaissance school and an air navigation school, had been re-allotted to accommodate the R.A.F. unit to train Atlantic ferry personnel, and the Canadian Pacific Air Service receipt and despatch unit.

In this connection the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs had informed the Acting High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of the detailed arrangements which had been made to meet the U.K. government's requirements.

(See letter of March 25th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Acting U.K. High Commissioner).

- (b) The aerodrome at Charlottetown, P.E.I., originally intended as a Joint Air Training Plan bombing and gunnery school, had been re-allocated to accommodate the R.A.F. general reconnaissance school and air navigation school which would otherwise have been located at Debert.
- (c) The R.C.A.F. was also withdrawing from the aerodrome being developed by the Department of Transport at Dorval, P.Q., in order that accommodation might be available there, when the aerodrome was completed, for a second Canadian Pacific Air Service receipt and despatch unit. The J.A.T.P. air observer school, which was to have been located at Dorval would now be located at St. Johns, P.Q.; the flying squadron of No. 1 Wireless School would remain at St. Hubert.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

329.

Howe Papers 16

*Le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements au président du  
Conseil d'approvisionnement de Grand-Bretagne en Amérique du Nord*

*Minister of Munitions and Supply to Chairman,  
Great Britain Supply Council in North America*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] April 26, 1941

Dear Arthur [Purvis],

Referring to our conversation of last evening regarding the Atlantic ferrying operation, I enclose a copy of letter that I sent Mr. Morris Wilson under date of April 7th,<sup>1</sup> and a copy of his reply.<sup>1</sup> You will agree that the nature of his reply does not build up great confidence in the situation.

The most competent man in Canada to handle the situation is, of course, D.B. Colyer, Vice-President of Operations for Trans-Canada Air Lines. Colyer tells me that all the civil transport organizations in the United States and Canada combined would not now have personnel enough to do the ferrying job as it will develop. The present organization is operating with cast-off personnel and without adequate ground facilities, and while young Long (who is a son of Dick Long of C.N.R.) and Punch Dickins are working hard, neither has the experience or organizing ability to do the job.

If I were responsible for Atfero I would get Phil Johnson, President of the Boeing Aircraft Company in Seattle, back to handle the job. I have already sounded out the principal shareholders of the Boeing Company in this regard, and I know that we can get Johnson if he is needed and the way is clear. Johnson is a driver and a most careful operator, and with him in charge our troubles would be over.

I feel that I have gone as far as I can in trying to straighten out this organization. I have given them the use of two of our best airports, one in Montreal, and one near Truro, N.S. We are building facilities for them at these two airports, and at Botwood, in Newfoundland. I have induced Chubby Power to give them all the help he can from the Air Training Plan, even at the risk of a good deal of criticism from killing his pupils.

Confidential word from the other side is that the Ministry of Aircraft Production is not on speaking terms with the Ministry for Air. Certainly we cannot move to re-organize Atferro until Lord B. gives his consent. Some time ago, pressure was brought on the Government from J. W. McConnell to turn over the resources and personnel of Trans-Canada Airlines to this service. I would not hesitate to break up Trans-Canada for that purpose if I thought it would solve the problem, but I am not prepared to do so under present management.

This is the situation, and as I see it today. I hope that you can find the solution, otherwise both Canada and yourself are headed for serious trouble.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

You are, no doubt, aware that I have expressed my views freely, direct to Lord B. by cable, and have made myself thoroughly disliked in many quarters.

I am informed that within the last week Atferro has separated itself from Canadian Pacific Railways,<sup>1</sup> and that the latter are no longer interested in the operation. I am not sure that this last is correct, but I am inclined to think that it is.

With kind regards,

Yours truly,

C. D. HOWE

330.

DND HQS 15-24-30

*Le commandant, aéroport de Gander, au chef de l'état-major de l'Air*  
*Commanding Officer, Gander Airport, to Chief of the Air Staff*

SECRET

Gander Airport, May 29, 1941

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF AIR BASES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND

1. Capt. Elliott Roosevelt, son of the President of the United States, is stationed here with the 21st U.S. Reconnaissance Squadron. His particular mission is to investigate the provision of air bases along the coast of Labrador, Fort Chimo at the southern tip of Ungava Bay, the East Coast of Baffin Island, Greenland, Iceland, and thence via the Faeroe Islands to England.

2. The motive underlying his mission is to provide landing fields for the delivery by air of short range fighter aircraft from the United States to England.

3. He visited this unit and intimated that any information we might be able to give him in this regard would be very acceptable. He already had information to the effect that R.C.A.F. aircraft would be carrying out a photographic survey of a portion of this territory during the coming season and suggested that, rather than explore the same territory over again, he might be able to avail himself of the information which we would have obtained.

4. It was suggested to him that he pay a visit to our Chief of the Air Staff at Ottawa and obtain from him permission to interview the Plans and Operations Staff there.

5. R.C.A.F. Headquarters will be advised immediately of the exact date of Captain Roosevelt's visit.

A. LEWIS  
Group-Captain

<sup>1</sup> Le 27 mai, le ministère de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne mit officiellement fin à l'accord conclu avec le *Canadian Pacific Railway* afin de pouvoir opérer seule son service et «en étroite collaboration avec les gouvernements des États-Unis et du Canada».

<sup>1</sup> On May 27, the Ministry of Aircraft Production of Great Britain formally terminated its agreement with the Canadian Pacific Railway in order that it might operate the service discretely and "in close collaboration with the Governments of the United States and Canada".

331.

DND HQS 7410-7

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 92

London, June 2, 1941

IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL. Following for Prime Minister from my Prime Minister. Begins. I received on May 29th following message from President Roosevelt. Begins.

In spite of the best efforts of the organization now handling flight delivery of combat aircraft from this country to England, I am advised that substantial numbers of these planes are accumulating in this country, and that this condition is apt to grow worse as production reaches an accelerated rate over the next few months. In our common interest, and in order to relieve situation as much as possible, I am prepared to direct the army and the navy to assume full responsibility of transfer of American built aircraft from factory to point of ultimate take off, and to supply maintenance and servicing facilities along the way and at ultimate landing field. This should release a number of civilian pilots now delivering planes. Many such pilots can reasonably be expected to increase pool corps of Atlantic ferry pilots now engaged in this work. Since military and naval pilots and ground crews would be engaged in delivery of planes, I am advised that closest co-operation, necessary to carry through successfully this continuous operation, can best be obtained if responsibility for Atlantic flights could be undertaken by their sister services under Air Ministry, using, of course, the present civilian pilots and such additional ones as may become available. This procedure would enable planes to be brought under control and direction of Royal Air Force prior to scheduling of take off and approach to their designated landing fields in England. The success of this operation would depend in large part upon provisions for adequate westbound aircraft transportation, but I am confident that with good will on both sides, such problems can be solved and greater assurances given of ability to handle delivery of increased quantity of combat aircraft anticipated during the summer months. I hope you will comment frankly on this proposal.

For example, the American Army and Navy could deliver planes at Botwood, Newfoundland, ready and serviced for R.A.F. to take them over and fly them across. Later, and depending on developments, we might be able to deliver them to your people in Iceland. Ends.

I replied on May 31st as follows. Begins.

- (1) Am deeply grateful to you for your proposals of May 29th which we at once accept in principle.
- (2) I must, moreover, consult the Canadian Government, but I have no doubt about their response.  
 The Air Ministry has been instructed to plan the reorganization of ferrying service in accordance with your views. A senior officer will be sent out at once to study the problem on the spot and to consult your Navy and War Departments.
- (3) We are bent on speeding flow of aircraft from your factories to our squadrons, and the R.A.F. will welcome the opportunity of working with the officers of the United States services on this task. Ends.

2. Arrangements proposed by the President will presumably involve use by United States service personnel of same aerodromes in Canada and Newfound-



land as are at present used as intermediate stops in ferrying route via Newfoundland, and they will no doubt wish to establish ground and maintenance crews at these aerodromes. These and other arrangements could be worked out in detail once principle is accepted, and I would propose that senior R.A.F. officer whom we are sending to the United States should proceed via Canada.

3. I know you will recognize the vital importance of this matter to us. May I ask for your acceptance and count on your co-operation in putting into effect arrangements which President Roosevelt has proposed.

4. I am causing the Governor of Newfoundland to be informed of these proposals and asking him to co-operate with the Canadian Government. I should be very grateful for any early reply. Message ends.

332.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 3, 1941

. . .

## ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERY OF U.S. AIRCRAFT

9. THE PRIME MINISTER read a telegram from the U.K. Prime Minister, describing a proposal of the President of the United States for committing to the U.S. Army and Navy responsibility for delivery of American combat aircraft to the point of their ultimate take-off from North America. Mr. Churchill had immediately accepted the proposal in principle and requested Canadian co-operation in putting suitable arrangements into effect in Canada and Newfoundland.

(See telegram No. 92 of June 2nd, 1940, from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.)

10. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR said that he would favour acceptance of Mr. Roosevelt's proposal. Detailed arrangements would require study by the Air Staff with the R.A.F.

11. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY observed that the existing plane ferrying organization, ATFERO, had recently been more successful in arranging substantial plane deliveries. The present proposal, however, would permit the release of large numbers of continental ferry pilots for Atlantic service.

12. After further discussion, it was agreed that a reply be sent to the U.K. government, agreeing in principle to the President's proposal, and expressing Canada's willingness to co-operate fully in making suitable arrangements accordingly.

. . .

333.

Howe Papers 16

*Le représentant au Canada et aux États-Unis  
du ministère de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne  
au ministre de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne*

*Representative in Canada and in the United States  
of Ministry of Aircraft Production of Great Britain  
to Minister of Aircraft Production of Great Britain*

PRIVATE

Montreal, June 3, 1941

Dear Colonel Moore-Brabazon,

## ATFERO

I enclose a chart<sup>1</sup> of the ATFERO organization that has just been completed and which I thought you and your officers might be interested in having on file. You will observe that the organization has been divided into nine departments, each with a competent man in charge. As a result, the important Operating Department has been relieved of all responsibility except the actual receipt and despatch of aircraft and the training of personnel, which it is still necessary to carry on. Mr. C.H. Dickins is Operating Manager. Captain A. S. Wilcockson and Captain D.C.T. Bennett are Assistant Operating Managers in charge of the return ferry service, flight deliveries and training, respectively.

The heavy construction programme now under way at Dorval (the chart shows St. Hubert base. This is at Montreal and will be replaced by Dorval when that airport is ready.) and Gander is being personally supervised by Mr. John Schofield, Chief Architect of the Canadian National Railways, who built all the T.C.A. facilities across Canada and who has had a very wide experience in the design and construction of hangar accommodation. He is assisted on a full-time basis by Mr. J.H. Norris, an experienced engineer contractor, who is devoting his entire time to completing our construction programme as soon as possible. Between them, they have developed an impressive organization, much of which, like themselves, is on a voluntary basis. As advised you in a recent signal, our present construction programme involves an expenditure approximating five million dollars.

The Publicity Department, designed to control and intelligently direct the inevitable publicity surrounding such an operation, is under the direction of Mr. John G. McConnell, President of the *Montreal Standard*. (He is the son of Mr. J. W. McConnell.)

Mr. F. B. Walls, Director and General Manager of the T. Eaton Company of Montreal, (the largest departmental store business in Canada, with 50,000 employees) is in charge of the Security Department as well as the hotels and commissary. He is particularly well qualified because he has had many years

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

experience in both of these specialties. It so happens that the T. Eaton Company, in connection with their employees, operate the largest commissary departments in Canada.

Mr. B. W. Roberts, who in normal life is General Purchasing Agent of the Canadian Pacific Railway, is Manager of our Purchasing Department.

Mr. G. Meredith Smith, C.A., a partner in a leading firm of Chartered Accountants, is Manager of our Financial Department with full responsibility for accounting and financial control.

Mr. R. B. Jackson, a Canadian who has recently retired, after ten years, as Operations Manager of the Aerial Transport Company Limited of Thai, and who has just returned to Canada, has volunteered his services and is in charge of our Traffic Department, including passengers and freight. He is also in charge of our Personnel Department.

All of these men, like Mr. Long, who is my executive assistant and who is in direct charge of the enterprise, are on a "Dollar-a-year" basis.

Our total personnel at to-day's date stands at approximately 900 men. Of these, slightly over 500 are flying personnel. Maintenance personnel, which stood at some 26 people three months ago, is now approaching 300. Only recently, we secured the services, as Maintenance Manager, of Mr. H. W. Beals, the chief maintenance expert of American Air Lines, Inc. We consider this a particularly fortunate stroke of business because Mr. Beals is regarded as one of the two or three leading maintenance experts on the American continent and his services were made available only because the President of the American Air Lines happens to be a friend of Mr. Long's and both he and his Company are extremely friendly to our cause.

To date, ATFERO has been able to move promptly all planes delivered to them for transport to the United Kingdom or elsewhere. You will have noticed from our weekly report sent you yesterday that at that date, we only had two planes in Canada for delivery to the United Kingdom. These were being prepared. It is true that there has been a slowing down in Hudson deliveries from the United States in recent weeks due to Embodiment Loan and manufacturers' deficiencies, and when these are made good, as expected within the next few weeks, there will probably be a deluge of planes. You will understand, of course, that this hold-up is in no way ATFERO's responsibility, which does not begin until the planes are delivered into their hands at our base in Montreal.

There is a splendid spirit animating the whole ATFERO organization and it is our aim to build up our personnel to fifteen hundred or more people because this size organization is necessary to meet the delivery programme anticipated.

In developing ATFERO, we have had two objectives. First, to deliver the planes immediately they came into our hands. This we have succeeded in doing. Secondly, to replace service personnel as quickly as possible with American and Canadian civilian pilots. Steady progress is being made in this direction, which will be accelerated if recent discussions with the United

States authorities, with which you are familiar, produce the results they anticipate. Then we should be able to release the R.A.F. personnel which we are temporarily using and which now total approximately 74 pilots, 69 flight engineers and 24 radio operators, an aggregate of approximately 167, out of our total flying personnel of over 500.

Yours very truly,

M. W. WILSON

334.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 520

[London,] June 9, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram 2nd. June No. 281.<sup>1</sup> Your assurance of co-operation of Newfoundland Government is greatly appreciated. Canadian Government have also assured us of their full co-operation.

It has been decided that Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill shall take charge, under Air Ministry, of Trans-Atlantic ferrying arrangements. It is proposed that he should fly to Canada via Newfoundland Liberator aircraft leaving about June 13th, or June 14th. He will be accompanied by a party of 3 or 4 including a finance representative and we are asking Air Attaché at Washington to arrange to join party either at the Newfoundland Airport or Montreal and to accompany Bowhill on his tour.

Purpose of his visit is to study the problem on the spot and to consult responsible authorities in Canada and the United States and with Newfoundland authorities so far as may be necessary. It is proposed that he should return to this country as soon as possible with proposals for formal assumption of control of ferrying arrangements.

We have no doubt that Newfoundland Government will wish to arrange for Bowhill to be met by a senior Newfoundland representative on his arrival at Newfoundland Airport. His stay in Newfoundland on outward journey may only be a matter of hours as he will wish to push on to Montreal. We are asking the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Ottawa to consult Canadian Authorities as to a provisional program for Bowhill's movements and will telegraph again as soon as possible.

Please note that it is most important that information as to Bowhill's appointment should be treated as strictly confidential pending an official announcement which is not likely to be made for several days.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



335.

DND (DH) 181.009 (D976)

*Le commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est,  
au commandant, aéroport de Gander*

*Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command,  
to Commanding Officer, Gander Airport*

SECRET

Halifax, June 11, 1941

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PERIODIC ATLANTIC FLIGHTS

1. The following information has been received through Air Force Headquarters from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs:

It is proposed to make periodic flights between Foynes, Baltimore, Botwood and Gander Lake with three Boeing 314 Flying Boats, registration letters GAGBZ, GAGCA and GAGCB respectively. These flying boats are to be used primarily on United Kingdom-West African service, but at present they have to return periodically to the United States of America for maintenance. The maintenance trips will provide a trans-Atlantic service frequency of which will depend on a number of factors at present under consideration. A rough estimate is once in every ten or fourteen days when all three flying boats are in service. GAGBZ is the only flying boat so far delivered to Europe and is at present on a trial flight to West Africa. It is expected to make westbound Atlantic crossing during second half of June. Further information will be sent as soon as details have been decided.

2. This information has been forwarded direct to the Governor of Newfoundland.

M. COSTELLO, Wing-Commander  
for Air Officer Commanding  
Eastern Air Command

336.

2059-40

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chief of the Air Staff to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 18, 1941

Dear Sir,

Captain Elliott Roosevelt, U.S. Army Air Corps, acting under special direction from the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, U.S. Army, visited Ottawa on the week-end of June 6th. During his visit, he attended conferences with officers of the R.C.A.F. Headquarters to obtain information concerning potential aerodrome sites on the coast of Labrador and on Baffin Island.

The U.S. authorities are especially interested in establishing an air route via the Arctic by which Fighter and short-range aircraft could be ferried from the United States to the United Kingdom. They are anxious to supplement

their investigations of potential sites in Greenland with a survey of sites in Canadian territory partly in the vicinity of Fort Chimo, Akpatok Island—Cumberland Sound and the east coast of Baffin Island. It is Captain Roosevelt's intention to conduct an aerial reconnaissance this summer and he was anxious to obtain co-operation and to get permission to use caches being established on the Labrador coast and Hudson Strait by the R.C.A.F. He also wished to make arrangements for the transportation of gasoline supplies for his requirements on the ships that will establish the R.C.A.F. caches. The officers of the R.C.A.F. assured him of their interest and willingness to co-operate.

Conferences with Captain Roosevelt have been completed and he has returned to his squadron in Newfoundland. Final details of transportation to establish caches and supplies at Cartwright, Hebron and Lake Harbour are being arranged.

F. V. HEAKES, Group-Captain  
for Chief of the Air Staff

337.

Howe Papers 16

*Le représentant en Grande-Bretagne  
du ministère des Munitions et des Approvisionnements<sup>1</sup>  
au ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements*

*Representative in Great Britain  
of the Department of Munitions and Supply<sup>1</sup>  
to Minister of Munitions and Supply*

London, June 25, 1941

Dear Mr. Howe,

Maybe by now you have got the inside information concerning the re-organization of ATFERO, but here are a few more details which might be useful.\*

The United States Army Air Corps have decided to establish a Flight Ferry Command to deliver all the planes manufactured in the States on the understanding, since these planes are delivered by U.S. Service personnel, that they should be received by British Service personnel. This having the effect of killing right off the bat the C.P.R. organization.

. . .

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<sup>1</sup> Réal Rousseau.

\*Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

I undertand you had dinner with Sir Frederick [Bowhill] and Jack Burchall on June the 17th, then you must have been given the complete story.

338.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D3)

*Rapport d'une enquête sur des sites d'atterrissage  
près de Northwest River, Labrador*

*Report on an Investigation for Landing Areas  
near Northwest River, Labrador*

SECRET

Northwest River, July 10, 1941

With the object of locating a possible site for a landing-field in the vicinity of Northwest River, the general district was first examined from the air. Most of the level areas were seen at once to be too swampy, that portion of land lying between the foot of the Mealy Mountains and Carter Basin being one extensive flat marsh.

(1) A flat area westward from the coast at Montagnais Point, three miles northeast of the settlement of Northwest River was first examined on foot, but found to be mostly wet muskeg, heavily timbered with spruce. Developing this site would entail clearing completely of timber, stripping the surface of the overburden of moss and peat to allow lengthy drying out, and then filling to depth with material brought in. Permanent drainage would even then be a very difficult problem as the land is too low. Through this area isolated ridges run from ten to fifteen feet high.

(2) On the peninsula on which the settlement of Northwest River stands, a one-direction only runway, following the eastern shore of the peninsula, could be laid out north and south. Ridges to the west of this location, rising from fifty to one hundred and fifty feet in height, would offer serious obstacles to approach even for this runway.

(3) The peninsula between Carter Basin and the mouth of the Kenamu River was examined. Carter Basin with its deep-water harbour and steep sand shores offers ideal seaplane shelter and also an excellent unloading site for landplane base construction and operation, but the peninsula itself was found to be swampy, cut up with deep channels and entirely undrainable.

(4) A section of bench land on the south side of Goose Bay, lying west of the mouth of the Hamilton River, was investigated. This site proved to be rather small, the total available area measuring one half mile north and south by one mile east and west. Extensive shallows ran out a long way into Goose Bay, making approach by water difficult.

(5) The fifth location, here called the "Goose Bay" site, is a large raised bench, over three miles in length and one mile in depth, standing higher than the rest of the surrounding country, its surface being some one hundred and twenty feet above sea-level, and its northeastern or nearest edge just one mile southwest from the western shore of Terrington Basin, the western extremity of Goose Bay. This latter site is chosen as the only logical site for airport construction in the district, and is reported on in detail in the following paragraphs.

## GOOSE BAY LANDING AREA

A raised plateau, locally known as "The Berry Bank", lies between the westerly end of Goose Bay and the Hamilton River. Approach in the past has been chiefly by a footpath, used for generations of berry-pickers, who frequent the bank in the fall of the year to pick cranberries. This footpath strikes in from the north bank of the Hamilton River about seven miles above its mouth. Approach to the southern end of the site was first considered by this route, but better access has since been located from Goose Bay, as later described.

Description of Site. The entire plateau appears to be composed of a coarse yellow sand, with no sign of any gravel or boulders. The surface is turfed with a mat of white caribou-moss, which however is loosely rooted and would not stand up to any tramping or traffic. The forest-cover is sparsely scattered black spruce up to eight inches in diameter (see photographic roll No. 707 previously forwarded).<sup>1</sup>

The bank being composed of coarse sand requires no artificial drainage. After grading the runways at least would require either crude oil or some type of asphalt composition to bind the loose sand.

The front of the bank, facing northeast, drops off sharply for from fifty to seventy feet, at the foot of which is a timbered plain sloping gently to the shores of Terrington Basin, composed in great part of shallow swamp. The subdrainage coming from the bank breaks all along the foot of the front in springs of extremely pure water, and good wells could be sunk anywhere along this line.

Access. Any large seagoing vessel which can negotiate the channel south of Sandy Point, at the entrance to Goose Bay proper, shown on the chart as having a depth of three and one half fathoms of water, can proceed right through to Terrington Basin and approach to within six hundred and fifty feet of the west shore, as shown on the accompanying plans. On the chart there is shown to be only one and a half fathoms of water just east of the entrance to Terrington Basin, but there is actually a good channel right through this strait, which we sounded throughout its length and found it to have well over four fathoms of water.

Terrington Basin itself is an excellent seaplane harbor, in most part over four fathoms, with perfect shelter and a difference of level between high and low tide of not more than two feet. The water is slightly brackish at most stages. The bottom is sand and mud. No boulders or rocks are in evidence.

Weather and Surroundings. The weather at the western end of Lake Melville can be safely taken to be the best and clearest in Labrador. The effects of coastal phenomena are lost long before reaching this vicinity, the fog said to never penetrate inland much beyond Rigolet. Throughout the three and

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



one half weeks we have been in the district it has enjoyed a high ceiling with the exception of only one day, July 2nd, when a passing area of extremely low pressure brought low clouds and heavy rain all day. The only other day's rain experienced was on June 22nd, with a comparatively high ceiling. Strong winds from west-northwest and east-northeast making rough seas on Lake Melville held us up from boat travel for days on end, but would not necessarily have been a deterrent from flying.

The weather in general followed the form usually noticed in the vicinity of all large bodies of inland water—continuing clear weather overhead and for several miles back inland from the shore, even when low clouds and bad weather persist still farther back inland.

The Berry Bank is a plateau standing alone as the highest point in any direction for eight or ten miles, with therefore no obstacles by way of approach. The most frequent wind in the district comes from the west-northwest, and the one of next frequency from the east-northeast. These two prevailing winds appear to govern the climatic conditions throughout the greater portion of the year.

Labor Conditions. Throughout the summer months seventy or eighty local men would be available for labor. This given number is for white men only and does not include Indians. These local men are all excellent workers and would welcome employment. The usual local wage for labor is two dollars per day with board. Six to eight small motorboats, each capable of from three to five tons load, would also be available for light freighting jobs, towing, etc.

Timber and materials. Good timber for wharfage, bridges, piling, etc., can be obtained readily on the banks of the Hamilton River a few miles upstream from its mouth. The nearest known gravel deposits appear to be in Grand Lake a few miles above Northwest River or at Muskrat Falls fourteen miles up the Hamilton River.

Photographs. One or two rolls of small camera photographs are expected to be taken over the proposed site and vicinity within the next few days, and if obtained will be forwarded out at the same time and to accompany this report.

Surveys. Lines were cut out and measured around the outside boundaries of blocks A and B. Chainage was commenced at the southeast corner of block A and carried anti-clockwise around these blocks, stakes being driven and numbered every three hundred feet. Levels were taken at all these points.

Block C, lying to the north of Block B, has not been surveyed, but its boundaries were walked over and it appears to be more level than either Blocks A or B.

ERIC FRY  
Dominion Land Surveyor

339.

DND HQS 15-24-30

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion pour discuter de la construction d'aérodromes  
pour le Service de livraison d'avions*

*Minutes of a Meeting to Discuss the Construction of Staging Aerodromes  
for Ferry Command*

SECRET

[London,]<sup>1</sup> July 10, 1941

Present.

Mr. J. B. Abraham (D.U.S.)—Chairman	Air Vice-Marshal Breadner (C.A.S., R.C.A.F.)
Air Chief Marshal Bowhill	
Air Vice-Marshal Hollinghurst (D.G.O.)	Air Commodore Johnson
Doctor Johnson (D.M.O.)	Squadron-Leader MacFarlane.
Mr. W. E. L. Courtney (F.1)	
Squadron-Leader Fraser (O.8)	
Mr. Whittuck (S.9)—Secretary.	

The meeting which had been called at short notice to discuss a telegram received by Air Vice-Marshal Breadner (copy at Appendix A)<sup>2</sup> took note of:

- (a) A statement by Air Vice-Marshal Breadner that, following a conference between Air Chief Marshal Dowding and General Spatz in Ottawa to discuss the Trans-Atlantic ferrying of Aircraft via Greenland, Canada had been asked to survey the Hamilton river area and the north of Labrador for aerodrome sites from which to take off for Greenland. A survey party had been sent out and had made a preliminary report.

Captain Roosevelt, the son of the President of the U.S.A., had since arrived at Ottawa and said that the U.S.A. were carrying out surveys of Labrador and Baffin Land and also the east coast of Greenland to find aerodrome sites.

The Canadian authorities would prefer themselves to construct any aerodromes needed in Canada but they had not so far received any official request from the British authorities to construct any staging aerodromes in the Northwest River area. It seemed inadvisable to start construction on an aerodrome in Canada until a chain of aerodromes all along the route had been definitely planned.

- (b) A statement by D.G.O. pointing out the difficulties of operating the ferrying route in question. Experience on the Takoradi-Cairo route had shown that a great many ferry pilots were locked up and that difficulty was found in returning them to the starting point. Good facilities were needed at all staging points along the route and this locked up further personnel. Moreover, the Greenland-Ice-

<sup>1</sup> Cette réunion eut lieu au ministère de l'Air.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> This meeting was held at the Air Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

land route could, owing to weather conditions, be used for part of the year only.

The ferrying of the medium bombers such as the Baltimore, Boston III, B.25 and B.26 would be easier to arrange than the ferrying of fighters and dive bombers, but if, as seemed likely, it would be 18 months before the route could be brought into full operation, we must consider what aircraft the U.S.A. would be producing at that date. Most of their production bombers would be heavy bombers, which could fly direct from North America to the United Kingdom, while the majority of American fighters would be sent to the Middle East without touching the United Kingdom.

A full appreciation of the extent to which the route would be used and the practical possibilities seemed to be called for.

- (c) A statement by Air Chief Marshal Bowhill that the U.S. authorities were strongly in favour of developing the route and that the saving of shipping space by the ferrying of as many aircraft as possible was most desirable. Captain Roosevelt had said that the Americans would like all aircraft produced by the U.S.A. for this country to be delivered by air. He agreed that an appreciation of the problem should be made, taking into account the report by Sir Hugh Dowding which had not been seen by anyone present at the meeting.
- (d) That the Air Ministry registered file showed that the emphasis so far had been throughout on the development of an aerodrome and other facilities in South Greenland. The U.S. of S. had pressed strongly for these facilities to be developed as quickly as possible, and this pressure had been passed on by the U.S. and Canadian authorities. There had been little consideration by higher authority in the Air Ministry of the provision of additional facilities at the Canadian end.

## Conclusions.

The meeting decided:

- (a) that it was not possible to make an official request to the Canadian authorities for construction of a staging aerodrome in the North-west river area in order to reduce the length of the hop to Greenland, until it was known whether the Greenland-Iceland hop could also be reduced. This depended on the report of the U.S. survey party sent to east Greenland. (A copy of a reply drafted for Air Vice-Marshal Breadner to send to Canada is at Appendix B).<sup>1</sup>
- (b) that D.G.O. should arrange for a full appreciation of the possibilities of the ferrying route via Greenland and Iceland to be made. This appreciation would take account of the report by Sir Hugh Dowding . . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

340.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 360

[St. John's,] July 11, 1941

SECRET. Following for Machtig from Woods Begins. Your telegram No. 557.<sup>1</sup> Long, Executive Director of Atfero, Montreal, who is here on a visit reports that co-operation on the part of R.C.A.F. at Gander still falls short of what is urgently required and he attributes this to absence of instructions from Ottawa to R.C.A.F. authorities at Gander to carry out arrangements made with the Air Ministry at Ottawa before latter's departure for England. I foresee a really disastrous situation unless Atfero's building programme is much accelerated. As explained in my memo of 16th June<sup>1</sup> of which I sent you a copy by plane from Gander nothing like the anticipated winter programme of flights will be possible without accommodation for planes and their crews. Venture to suggest contact should be made with Air Minister Power in London and that he should be urged to communicate with Ottawa immediately. Am repeating this to United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada. Ends.

341.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 649

[London,] July 15, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Addressed to Governor of Newfoundland. No. 649. Repeated to High Commissioner, Ottawa, No. 1263. Your telegram 11th July No. 360. Following for Woods from Machtig. Begins.

1. Thank you for your telegram. Position in regard to Atfero requirements at Gander has been discussed with Power, Breadner Canadian Chief of the Air Staff and Bowhill.

2. Difficulty of Royal Canadian Air Force Authorities affording help needed arises from the fact that they have undertaken commitment to United States Authorities which absorbs all their resources of man-power, equipment and material. Only way in which Royal Canadian Air Force can be enabled to give more substantial assistance to Atfero at Gander is for them to be relieved of some of their commitment to United States.

3. Bowhill will consult General Arnold as to reduction of United States requirements at Gander but it is first necessary to determine to what extent these requirements would have to be reduced to enable Atfero's needs to be met. Power and Bowhill state that so far they have not been furnished with details of help which Atfero needs.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



4. It is important that Long should get into touch at once with Deputy Minister National Defence (Air) at Ottawa and give full details of help needed from R.C.A.F. When it is known exactly what is required Canadians will be able to estimate extent to which United States commitment must be reduced if Atfero requirements are to be met. If Long is still in Newfoundland please inform him accordingly. If he has returned to Canada we should be glad if High Commissioner at Ottawa would communicate with him.

5. It is very important that this should all have been worked out by time Bowhill arrives in about 3 days time so that he may know on what basis to negotiate with General Arnold.

6. Meanwhile Power is communicating necessary instructions to Ottawa. Ends.

342.

Howe Papers 17

*Le représentant adjoint au Canada et aux États-Unis du ministère  
de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne au ministre  
des Munitions et des Approvisionnements*

*Assistant Representative in Canada and in the United States  
of the Ministry of Aircraft Production of Great Britain  
to Minister of Munitions and Supply*

PRIVATE

Montreal, July 28, 1941

Dear Mr. Howe,

. . .

As you are aware, Mr. Wilson and I are relinquishing control of ATFERO. The ministerial responsibility has been transferred from the Minister of Aircraft Production to the Secretary of State for Air and Sir Frederick Bowhill has been appointed by the latter as Commander-in-Chief of the British Ferry Command. While personally, both Mr. Wilson and I, as well as our volunteer associates, regret this development, nevertheless we are loyally carrying out the edict and are now in the process of turning ATFERO over to Sir Frederick Bowhill and his associates.

A suggestion was made by the Air Ministry that the present ATFERO organization remain in the new picture but all of us regretfully concluded that our business training would make it difficult for us to function effectively in a hybrid organization under service control and that, under the circumstances, the war effort would be better served if we retired from the picture. In any event, when we had carefully examined the chart of the proposed new set-up, which was sent forward from London, it became apparent that if we remained in the organization we would be little more than "hewers of wood and drawers of water", which was hardly in keeping with our previous responsibilities. Furthermore, the suggestion that, after holding

ministerial responsibility for ATFERO, Mr. Wilson should take second place to Sir Frederick Bowhill, showed a complete lack of understanding on the part of those who made it.

It goes without saying that, having made our decision, we are co-operating wholeheartedly with Sir Frederick Bowhill and his associates in order that the enterprise may be transferred to its new masters without any harm to the war effort, and you may rest assured that we will carry through in a manner which will ensure the continued speedy delivery of much needed bombers to the United Kingdom.

...

Speaking personally and as a Canadian, I must express the bewilderment which I feel in attempting to understand the decision which has been made by our friends in England. After all, although ATFERO is to all intents and purposes a Canadian operation, based in Canada and, in the meantime at least, largely paid for by Canadian taxpayers, nevertheless a group of Canadian business men who have, without cost to the taxpayers, been giving their unstinted services in successfully building and operating this important war enterprise, are suddenly supplanted by a group from the United Kingdom, brought to Canada for that specific purpose. When it is so obviously apparent that the total manpower of the Empire is needed to successfully conclude the war effort, such a decision is, to say the least, disconcerting.

In conclusion, I have informed Sir Frederick Bowhill that I have kept you advised of the "delivery" and "on hand" position of aircraft weekly by writing you briefly each Monday and have strongly recommended that he continue sending you similar weekly reports.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

H. M. LONG

343.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, July 29, 1941

...

2. The Board discussed at length the difficulties experienced in the Newfoundland area in aircraft operations and in ferrying of aircraft between North America and the United Kingdom and considered a proposal that an alternative to the Newfoundland Airport should be established in the Northwest River area of Labrador. It was pointed out that weather conditions in Newfoundland are so uncertain that difficulties are being experienced resulting in losses of personnel and equipment and serious losses in time. It was submitted by the Service Members of the Board that the most hopeful approach to a

solution of this problem would be found in the establishment of an air base in that part of the Northwest River area that is relatively free from the adverse weather conditions prevailing in Newfoundland. It was emphasized in the discussion that the Government of the United Kingdom is urgently desirous of having such a base established.

In view of these considerations and having in mind the policy of the Canadian Government in relation to the provision of defence facilities in its own territory and in Newfoundland, the Board agreed to adopt the following as its Seventeenth Recommendation:

In order to facilitate the ferrying of long and medium range aircraft across the Atlantic, to enhance the effectiveness of plans for hemisphere defence, to prevent congestion at the Newfoundland Airport and to provide greater security for crews and equipment, the Board recommends:

That the Canadian Government should undertake the construction of an air base in the vicinity of Northwest River, Labrador, and provide the following facilities *as quickly as possible*:

- (a) At least two runways, minimum 150 x 5000 feet, to enable take off and landing into prevailing winds.
- (b) Storage facilities of 450,000 gallons aviation gasoline, for 11,250 gallons aviation oil, and for other supplies.
- (c) Seven 100 gallon per minute gasoline pumping units for servicing aircraft.
- (d) Technical housing and equipment as follows:
  - 1. A direction finder station.
  - 2. An aircraft radio range station.
  - 3. Instrument landing equipment.
  - 4. An airways radio station capable of communicating with stations in the U.S., Canada, Newfoundland, and Greenland and with aircraft in flight, for purposes of aircraft control, forwarding and receiving weather data and airplane movement communications.
  - 5. A meteorological station.
  - 6. A maintenance hangar (heated), minimum dimensions 160 x 200 feet.
- (e) Housing for personnel.

That if the Canadian Government should decide for any reason that it will not undertake the desired construction immediately, this decision should be made known at once to the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Newfoundland and that the Government of the United States be invited to provide the necessary facilities in the area under reference;

That Governments of Canada and the United States should co-operate to make provision for the necessary priorities to permit the earliest possible completion and that the Government undertaking the project

should also immediately initiate the necessary measures to ensure provision of an installation suitable for safe operations from the ice in the North West River area during the winter of 1941-42.

3. Lt.-Col. Bissell referred to the matter of surveys of the East coast of Labrador and Baffin Island. He recalled that in a letter dated July 16, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from Mayor LaGuardia to Colonel Biggar a specific inquiry was raised as to whether the Canadian Government will undertake to survey this year the East coast of Labrador and Baffin Island, with a view to locating suitable sites for additional staging fields in the general vicinity of Hebron, Labrador and Frobisher Bay, Baffin Island. In this same letter it was stated that if Canada is unwilling or unable to undertake these surveys the United States might be disposed to give consideration to undertaking them if an agreement in that sense could be arranged.

The Canadian Air member commented that Canada had contemplated making these detailed surveys but it is not prepared to go forward with this work this year. He recalled that primary utility of staging fields in the Hebron and Frobisher Bay areas would be as part of the project to ferry short range planes across the North Atlantic, and that staging fields in those areas would be required for that purpose only if a suitable staging field should be constructed on the east coast of Greenland. He inquired whether a suitable site for such a staging field had as yet been found by the United States survey party in Greenland. The United States Air Service members replied that a United States survey party in Greenland was now searching for such a site but had not yet found one. The Canadian Air member then stated that in view of the serious doubt as to whether an air staging field could be located in Eastern Greenland, he considered that the Canadian Government in view of its other war activities would not be justified in diverting planes and equipment to make the surveys of Labrador and Baffin Island. It was added that Canada would have no objection to these surveys being made by United States forces even though there was considerable doubt as to the utility of the surveys.

...

344.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, July 30, 1941

...

6. With reference to the proposed establishment of an air base at Northwest River Mr. Emerson stated that he thought that there would be no difficulty in arranging for Canada to obtain a lease of any suitable site.

...

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



345.

2059-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*

TELEGRAM 295

Ottawa, July 31, 1941

MOST SECRET. At Montreal meeting of Permanent Joint Board on Defence United States Members stated that Air Marshal Harris has been pressing United States Military and Air authorities to proceed with survey and construction of a new air base at Northwest River, Labrador.

Will you please ascertain from Harris whether this report is correct and if so whether the said air base is required for staging fighter aircraft en route to United Kingdom or to provide an alternate base to Newfoundland Airport in connection with despatch of medium and long range bombers across the Ocean.

346.

2059-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 325

Washington, August 2, 1941

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 295 of July 31st. Air Marshal Harris states that the proposed aerodrome in the Northwest River area was subject of approach to him by General Arnold on July 17th. Arnold considers it essential to establish the aerodrome this summer to ensure uninterrupted ferrying of aircraft to the United Kingdom. Assistant Air Attaché has informed the Chief of the Air Staff of this, and also of Air Ministry's view that provision of aerodrome in this area is an urgent requirement.

Chief purpose is to provide alternative Newfoundland airport for delivery of bombers in order to eliminate delays through unfavourable flying conditions in Newfoundland. Later, aerodrome would be used for staging of short range aircraft by Greenland route.

347.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 64

Ottawa, August 3, 1941

With reference to discussion at the Montreal meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which Mr. Emerson attended, concerning possibility of establishing an air base in the Northwest River area of Labrador. The Canadian Government would like to send a survey party immediately to a point South of Goose Bay on Terrington Basin for the purpose of surveying and investigating suitable sites in that district.

I shall be grateful if I may have the approval of the Newfoundland Government for the initiating of this survey.

348.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 51

St. John's, August 4, 1941

Your telegram of August 3rd, No. 64. Commission of Government approve of survey to be taken by Canada at point south of Goose Bay on Terrington Basin, Labrador.

349.

HOWE PAPERS 17

*Le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements au représentant adjoint au Canada et aux États-Unis du ministère de la Production d'avions de Grande-Bretagne*

*Minister of Munitions and Supply to Assistant Representative in Canada and in the United States of the Ministry of Aircraft Production of Great Britain*

PERSONAL

[Ottawa,] August 4, 1941

Dear Mr. Long,

I have your letter of July 28th, and note the reasons that have led Mr. Morris Wilson and yourself to sever your connection with ATFERO. I have no doubt that you are taking the proper course, having in mind the transfer of control to a service ministry. Personally, I think that a mistake has been made, but I find from experience that our friends in Great Britain are not disposed to accept Canadian advice on matters of this kind.

You are entitled to great credit for having built this operation into an effective one. Whatever its future may be, you will have the satisfaction of knowing that when you left it, it was adequate to handle the current situation and capable of whatever expansion might be demanded in the future.

. . .

Yours very truly,

C. D. HOWE

350.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 13, 1941

. . .

AIR BASE AT NORTHWEST RIVER, LABRADOR

40. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR observed that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had recommended the early

construction of an air base in the vicinity of the Northwest River, Labrador, for combined defensive and staging purposes. Such a base would require runways, storage capacity, technical housing and equipment, radio and meteorological stations, hangar, and housing for personnel. If the Canadian government were to decide not to undertake this project, the U.S. government were to be invited to do so.

41. MR. POWER said that the U.S. government were unwilling to undertake partial development of the base, though they would be prepared to do the whole job.

In the circumstances, and in view of the urgency, it was recommended that the Canadian government acquire the necessary property and complete the proposed development. Four to five million dollars might be required for the whole project, of which not more than one million would be needed in the current fiscal year.

42. THE SECRETARY reported that the Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had advised him that the U.S. Government were of the opinion that the whole development should be handled by one country or the other; in the circumstances, it seemed desirable that the Department of Transport proceed as rapidly as possible with land construction.

43. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY expressed the view that Mr. Power's recommendation, in this connection, should be approved.

44. The Committee, thereupon, approved, in principle, the granting of authority for the acquisition of property and the completion of the development of the air base at Northwest River, Labrador.

. . .

351.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 71

Ottawa, August 26, 1941

With reference to your telegram of August 4, 1941, No. 51, Northwest River. As a result of the work of the survey party which has been in the Northwest River area since August 3rd it has been made clear that an aerodrome can be constructed and the Department of Transport has been authorized, subject to the approval of the Newfoundland Government, to undertake the development. It is, as you are aware, most desirable that the work should be proceeded with as rapidly as possible.

I shall be very grateful if you will inform me that the Newfoundland Government approves of the construction of an aerodrome in this area. Details as to the location will be submitted to your government very shortly

by the Department of Transport, and representatives of that Department will discuss with you the steps to be taken with a view to acquiring the necessary lands.

An early reply would be deeply appreciated.

352.

2059-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 58

St. John's, August 29, 1941

Your telegram No. 71 of August 26th. No objection in principle to construction by your Department of Transport of an aerodrome in area referred to, but before work starts we expect that information as to exact location and question of control and operation of airport during and after the war, especially in regard to use for commercial purposes, will have to be settled in good time.

353.

2059-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*  
*au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 73

Ottawa, August 30, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. With reference to my telegram of August 26, 1941, No. 71, Northwest River. In view of imperative necessity that materials reach destination before close of navigation we are proceeding with necessary arrangements and assuming that Newfoundland Government will approve construction. Contract will be with MacNamara Construction Company which is doing work at Torbay. It is hoped that Newfoundland Government will waive Customs duties on materials and will agree to the admission of the necessary labour.

354.

2059-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État suppléant*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 59

St. John's, August 31, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Please see my telegram No. 58 which deals with proposals advanced in your telegram No. 73 of August 30th, secret. We agree to waive customs duties on construction material and to admission of necessary labour. We assume latter applies to technicians and specialists, and that common labour will be recruited from Newfoundland or Labrador.



355.

DND (DH), 193.009 (D3)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 3, 1941

. . .

1. NORTHWEST RIVER AERODROME—REPORT ON PROPOSED DEFENCES

The Report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee on this subject (HQ.S. 8860-1, undated—covering memo dated 30 August 1941) was considered, and the following points made:

- (i) Paragraph 9 (III): this Reconnaissance should be made at the earliest convenient date, but as long as it could be completed during the Fall the Committee did not feel that it should be commenced without full preparation.
- (ii) Paragraph 9 (IV): The Committee is of the opinion that the Examination Vessel and the Coast Artillery Battery should be sited in the vicinity of the Narrows, and that in this event the War Watching Station could be dispensed with. They also feel that the value of having any Infantry stationed at the Aerodrome is doubtful.

With the above exceptions, the Joint Planning Sub-Committee's Report was approved, the Reconnaissance party to take (i) and (ii) above into account when making their Report.

. . .

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Rapport du sous-comité mixte de planification du Comité*  
*des chefs d'état-major*

*Report by Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa, August 30,] 1941

General

1. The Government of Canada has approved of the Seventeenth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, . . .

2. A suitable aerodrome site has been selected on a raised plateau, locally known as "The Berry Bank", lying between the westerly end of Goose Bay and the Hamilton River and approximately 17 miles from the Northwest River settlement on Lake Melville, Labrador. A general description of this area is attached as Appendix I.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

*Aerodrome Development*

3. The development will be divided into two stages:

- (a) Immediate limited development for operations during winter 1941-42.
- (b) Ultimate development.

4. The flying operations envisaged during the coming winter are mainly in connection with the reception of either R.A.F. Ferry aircraft or R.C.A.F. aircraft which have been forced to return to a different base from which they left. Tests will also be carried out to determine the practicability of an air route from Labrador via Greenland and Iceland to Britain for medium bombers. If possible, routine ferry operations of these medium bombers via this route will be carried out later in the winter. For this reason, large supplies of aviation gasoline will be stored during the coming winter.

5. A survey party has been on the ground since 3rd August, 1941. Engineers and a contractor have seen the site and every effort is being made to have this aerodrome ready for emergency operations by January 1942. During the coming winter, it is planned to prepare runways and erect accommodation for 10 Officers, 25 N.C.O's, 129 O.R.'s and 30 transient personnel. In addition, approximately 90 tons of rations and 100,000 gallons aviation gasoline will be stored.

6. The ultimate development will be based on the requirements outlined in Para. 1 and will include facilities for large scale ferry operation. The ultimate establishment provides for 17 Officers, 42 N.C.O's and 285 O.R's with additional accommodation for 80 transient personnel.

*Considerations*

7. The Sub-Committee have considered the measures necessary for the defence of the Northwest River aerodrome.

8. The Sub-Committee are of the opinion that:

- (I) The risk of enemy action against the air base during the winter 1941-42 is very small for the following reasons:

- (a) Any enemy attack would have to be airborne, as Lake Melville is frozen from late November to May.
- (b) The development proposed during the coming winter is not sufficiently extensive to make an attractive target for enemy aircraft. In addition when lakes are frozen, enemy aircraft are not limited to developed aerodromes for landing purposes.

- (II) In view of the proximity of the winter freeze-up and the present shortage of A.A. equipment, any Army defences that could be provided during the winter 1941-42 would be limited to an infantry detachment, armed with rifles and L.M.G. Similar weapons will be available with the R.C.A.F. detachment stationed at the aerodrome during the winter.

- (III) Accommodation that can be completed before the winter freeze-up is limited and the addition of an infantry garrison would materially increase the immediate accommodation requirements.
9. The Sub-Committee therefore recommends that:
- (I) The defence measures for the Northwest River air base should be considered in two phases, viz.:
- (a) Those required during the winter 1941-42 and based on limited emergency development.
  - (b) Those required by summer 1942 and based on the full operational role of the air base.
- (II) The R.C.A.F. should accept sole responsibility for the defence of the air base during the winter 1941-42.
- (III) A reconnaissance should be made not later than 15th September, 1941, to determine the Naval and Army defence measures required for the protection of the air base, subsequent to spring 1942.
- (IV) While definite assessment of the defence requirements is dependent on the results of this reconnaissance, the following scale of defences appears necessary (on the basis of reports and maps available):
- (a) R.C.N. — War Watching Stn.—To be stationed at small settlement of Rigolet in the Narrows —for R/T communication with Sandy Pt.
    - Examination Vessel—Near entrance to Goose Bay.
    - Combined C.X.O. and X.D.O.—With C.A. Bty.
  - (b) Army — Coast Arty.—One 2 gun bty. for Close Defence and Examination role—suggested site Sandy Pt. at entrance to Goose Bay.
    - A.A. Arty.—40 mm. Bofors for defence against low-flying attack on aerodrome.
    - Garrison — Two Inf. Coys.—with any details from Bn. H.Q. necessary for administration purposes.
  - (c) R.C.A.F.—Internal Security Guards.

10. Submitted.

R. B. GIBSON  
Colonel

F. V. HEAKES  
Group-Captain  
R.C.A.F.

P. MCGAUGHEY,  
Lt.-Comdr.  
for Commander, R.C.N.

356.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

. . .

*United States Army*

. . .

17. Northwest River Landing Field. Air Marshal A. T. Harris substantiated the statement made by a United States Army member at the last meeting that the British desired the Northwest River field constructed at the earliest practicable date. Air Marshal Harris reported that he had requested Canadian authorities to proceed. The Canadian Chairman wired on August 14th that the Canadian Government would undertake construction without delay. Subsequent information indicates that material progress has been made. All data procured by the American survey was forwarded to the Canadian Air Force August 6. Similar data secured by Canada was made available to the United States. Range courses for the Northwest River radio range station have been coordinated by Canada with the United States Army. The United States Army is very appreciative of the courtesy of the Canadian Air Force in forwarding copies of the Northwest River progress report and hopes this procedure may be continued.

. . .

*Royal Canadian Navy*

. . .

It is intended to establish an Examination Service in the vicinity of the Narrows near the mouth of the Hamilton Inlet.<sup>1</sup> Action in this matter will not however be taken before Spring, 1942.

. . .

*Royal Canadian Army [sic]*

. . .

Northwest River Air Base

Arrangements have been made for officers of the three Canadian Services to carry out, during September, a reconnaissance of the Northwest River Air Base site in order to assess the scope and nature of defence requirements in that area.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Donnant accès à Goose Bay.

<sup>1</sup> Giving access to Goose Bay.



*Royal Canadian Air Force*

## Seventeenth Recommendation

This project has been approved by the Canadian Government.

Detailed survey of site completed on August 20th. Anticipated survey of road and wharf to be completed on August 27th. Clearing of road from the aerodrome site to wharf site to commence on August 23rd. Anticipated time to complete, two weeks. Radio Engineer and Airways Inspector proceeded to site on August 25th for selection of radio range site.

Assistant Airway Engineer and engineering party proceeded to site on 1st instant to lay out aerodrome on location by which time it was anticipated that the radio range site would be selected. Three boats and a motor-driven barge have been secured for transportation purposes and the first boat loaded with contractor's equipment will leave Quebec City on the 8th instant. The boat will also carry approximately 60 key personnel, a doctor and two orderlies.

More information will be available on return of the Assistant Superintending Engineer and his party on the 8th or 9th instant but from information available, to date, there is every reason to be optimistic that an aerodrome suitable for winter operations complete with essential radio facilities can be completed this Fall.

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357.

2059-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 81

Ottawa, September 16, 1941

MOST SECRET. With reference to your telegram of August 29th, No. 58. The Canadian Government has acted upon your acceptance in principle in the matter of the construction of an aerodrome in the Northwest River area. The approximate location of the site selected is Latitude 53 degrees 20 minutes North, Longitude 60 degrees 23 minutes West, i.e. South shore Terrington Basin. Contractors' supply vessel en route to commence operations. Question of control and operation of airport suggested same as for Royal Canadian Air Force Stations, Newfoundland. Commercial use after war cannot be forecast until experience gained. Immediate object is to provide facilities for ferrying medium and long-range aircraft across the Atlantic to alleviate congestion at Newfoundland airport and to provide greater security for crews and equipment, also to enhance the effectiveness of plans for hemisphere defence.

358.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 856

[London,] September 27, 1941

SECRET AND PERSONAL. Your telegram of 5th September No. 446.<sup>1</sup> Labrador aerodrome. Following are our views.

1. Military use. We think it important that use of the aerodrome should be open without restriction to R.A.F. units and Royal Canadian Air Force units and also, since it may be a stage on route to Greenland and Iceland, to the United States Army Air Corps. All such use should however be limited to the duration of the war.

2. Wireless Control. The United States Government, by agreement with the Canadian Government are arranging to equip, man and operate Wireless and Meteorological Stations and emergency landing grounds at Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay and Cumberland Peninsula. As arrangements at Goose Inlet will be interdependent with above, we suggest that they should be discussed in the first place between the Newfoundland Government, Royal Canadian Air Force, R.A.F. (represented by an [sic] O.C. in C. Ferry Command, Montreal who is being informed accordingly) and United States Army Air Corps. Here again arrangements to be made as to control should be limited to the duration of the war.

3. Ground Organization. We understand that Royal Canadian Air Force are prepared to provide this and to assume responsibility for manning and running the aerodrome. We trust that this arrangement will be satisfactory to the Newfoundland Government.

4. General Control. We see no objection to control by Canada but suggest period should be limited to duration of the war and that transfer to a third party should not be allowed. Post-war control should be left for consideration in the light of circumstances at the time.

5. Commercial Use. On information available here no reason at present to expect that commercial air services will wish to use the aerodrome during the war and it would be as well to stipulate that commercial use should be prohibited. This would safeguard the post-war position. At the same time we should like it to be provided that facilities should be made available as required for any British Commonwealth civil aircraft engaged in ferrying or other operations directly concerned with war effort.

6. In accordance with above we think that any leases of land or buildings, whether for military or civil purposes should be limited to the duration of

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

the war. (Some concession on this point may be necessary, if representations are received especially in view of arrangements made in connection with Newfoundland Air Bases but this can be left for the present).

7. This telegram is being repeated by Air Ministry to an [sic] A.O.C. Ferry Command Montreal. Please repeat direct to him any further telegram on this subject which you send me.

359.

PRO AIR 38 6 921

*Le ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne au quartier-général,  
Service transocéanique de la RAF*

*Air Ministry of Great Britain to Headquarters, RAF Ferry Command*

TELEGRAM X 442

[London,] October 17, 1941

Further our X 478 2/10<sup>1</sup> Canadian and Newfoundland Governments have agreed W/T station to remain an Air Ministry W/T station for duration. As bulk of services carried out by Gander are in connection Ferry Command this station is now placed under HQ Ferry Command with effect—7/10/41. Arrangements are to be made to ensure that Gander continues to give service to civil aviation as at present. Further signal follows regarding civil staff.

360.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D3)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major  
Minutes of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 29, 1941

. . .

# 1. Second Report of J.P.C. on Defence of Northwest River Aerodrome

The Committee concurred in the recommendations contained in paragraph 9 of the Report of the Joint Planning Committee, dated 18th October 1941,<sup>1</sup> regarding the Defences for the Northwest River Aerodrome. The Committee consider that a small War Watching Station with an attendant motor craft for examination purposes should be established in the Narrows in the vicinity of Burntwood Cove, upon the opening of navigation in 1942.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

361.

PRO AIR 38 6 921

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au quartier général des Forces aériennes*  
*Chief of Air Staff to Air Force Headquarters*

TELEGRAM A 443

[GANDER,] November 3, 1941

SECRET. Commanding Officer RCAF Station Gander states advice received from local Ferry Command manager and S/L Pattison that Air Ministry Wireless Stations equipment and personnel being placed under control of Ferry Command. This change affects Canadian Newfoundland Government Agreement<sup>1</sup> (see paragraphs #3 and #4) and creates uncertainty at Gander in respect to following matters (a) who is responsible officer for operation of Wireless Stations? Pattison says he will no longer be Officer in Charge. (b) equipment (c) accommodation of personnel. Some personnel both civilian and service now being accommodated by RCAF and Station Commander anxious to have Ferry Command supply accommodation and messing thereby relieving pressure on RCAF for these facilities. (d) finance. See paragraph 4 of Agreement regarding adjustment of UK contribution for expansion of A.M. Wireless Organization<sup>2</sup> and S/L Pattison's relationship to proposed organization. Relationship to date clearly defined in agreement but C.O. Gander has received nothing official regarding future position. Recommend AOC in C Ferry Command be approached officially regarding above points as his local representative at Gander unable or unprepared to define policy.

362.

PRO AIR 38 6 921

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au commandant en chef de l'aviation,*  
*Service transocéanique de la RAF*  
*Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding in Chief,*  
*RAF Ferry Command*

SECRET

Ottawa, November 4, 1941

Dear Sir Frederick [Bowhill],

Reference attached copies of wire from Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command,<sup>3</sup> and paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Canadian Agreement with Newfoundland.<sup>1</sup>

This Headquarters has no objection to Ferry Command taking over the Air Ministry Wireless at Newfoundland and no difficulty is seen in adjust-

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice E.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>3</sup> Le document 361 reprend en substance ce télégramme.<sup>1</sup> See Appendix E.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.<sup>3</sup> Document 361 gives the substance of this telegram.



ing the Agreement with the Newfoundland Government if it is the policy of Ferry Command to take over the Air Ministry wireless.

I think it would be preferable if the Air Ministry wireless personnel were accommodated in Ferry Command buildings.

May I be apprised of your wishes as soon as possible, please.

Yours sincerely,

L. S. BREADNER  
Air Vice-Marshal

363.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

...

15. With regard to the Northwest River Aerodrome the Board agreed:

- (a) that it is essential that the construction of the aerodrome proceed during the present winter,

and, with the exception of the Canadian Air Force Member, it was also agreed that a solution should be sought along the following lines:

- (b) the United States Army Air Force to arrange for the necessary planes to carry in equipment that cannot be carried in the types of aircraft available in Canada.
- (c) Canada to accept responsibility for providing necessary additional transport to carry personnel in and out as required.

...

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

...

*Royal Canadian Air Force*

...

#### SEVENTEENTH RECOMMENDATION

*Goose Inlet (To October 31st, 1941)*

Three cargo ships and a fuel tanker remain to be discharged. Shipments are in excess of expectations, and this, coupled with a shortage of labour,

will delay our original building program. Temporary storage accommodation is being made ready.

It is anticipated that three landing strips 5,000 ft. by 300 ft. in triangular form will be available for the landing of aircraft on wheels from December 1st, 1941. Priority will be given to the construction of one nose hangar which will be followed by the construction of the permanent hangar. Dates of availability cannot be estimated as yet. Building construction is concentrated on erection of powerhouse, and radio range station. It is possible that these may be made available by the end of December, 1941.

The completion of all personnel buildings cannot be hoped for until late in the winter.

. . .

364.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

. . .

*Royal Canadian Air Force*

. . .

#### SEVENTEENTH RECOMMENDATION

The R.C.A.F. is gratified at the provision of transportation aircraft by the U.S. Army Air Corps for Goose Airport. The aircraft and crew, in addition to undergoing familiarization flights in the Maritimes, have now made two transportation flights to Goose Airport.

Goose Airport is now in operation. The first landing was made with a chartered ski-equipped aircraft on December 3rd, 1941, by an airways inspector, Department of Transport, who reported: "Three landing strips are covered with 2 inches of compacted snow, and 3 feet of frost is present in the ground. Sides and ends of strips are marked by spruce trees and smudge pot placed on the edge of strip which is into the wind." . . .

365.

PRO AIR 38 8 921

*Le commandant en chef de l'aviation,  
Service transocéanique de la RAF,  
à la délégation de la RAF aux États-Unis*  
*Air Officer Commanding in Chief,  
RAF Ferry Command,  
to the Delegation of the RAF in the United States*

Fy. C/2910/Sigs<sup>1</sup>

Dorval Airport, February 2, 1942

SUBJECT: SIGNALS COMMUNICATIONS AND METEOROLOGICAL FACILITIES  
GOOSE BAY, LABRADOR

1. I intend to use Goose Bay as a terminal aerodrome for delivery flights to Iceland and the U.K. as soon as suitable signals and other facilities are provided.

2. The Commanding General A.C.F.C.<sup>2</sup> has also stated that he expects to make extensive use of Goose Bay.

3. The R.C.A.F. intend to use Goose Bay as an operational aerodrome, and under the decisions of the U.S.-Canadian Joint Defence Board are required to set up certain facilities at Goose as an alternative to Gander.

4. In order that the above intentions and decisions may be implemented, it is essential that adequate ground and air Radio communications be established together with the necessary Meteorological facilities. Moreover, in view of the fact that there will be four parties interested in the development of these facilities, namely R.A.F. Ferry Command; the R.C.A.F.; Air Corps Ferrying Command, and the Department of Transport I consider it essential that the Radio and Meteor requirements should be examined as a whole, and that their provision and operation should be co-ordinated as far as possible to ensure efficiency and avoid duplication.

5. In this connection I consider that it should be possible to establish a centralised Operations; Signals Communications; and Meteor organisation at Goose Bay by the provision of a central operations room; Meteorological office; cypher office; Transmitter and Receiver offices. This view is shared by the Commanding General of the Air Corps Ferrying Command who has requested the Communications Division to make plans on these lines in conjunction with the other interested parties.

6. The question of providing these centralised facilities as they affect the R.C.A.F. was discussed between the Chief Signals Officers of this Headquarters and of the R.C.A.F. on January 15th, when it was decided that the R.C.A.F. would have to consider the matter from an operational aspect. Should the R.C.A.F. not consider it practicable, for operational reasons, to

<sup>1</sup> Une copie de cette lettre fut envoyée au quartier général du CARC.

<sup>2</sup> Le corps d'aviation du service transocéanique de l'armée américaine.

<sup>1</sup> Copy of this letter was sent to RCAF Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup> Air Corps Ferrying Command of the United States Army.

join in a central radio and cypher organization, I am of the opinion that a centralised Meteor organization could be provided, and that the radio and cypher organization required for the R.A.F. Ferry Command and Air Corps Ferrying Command should be set up as a joint service.

7. In order to arrive at the necessary decisions I propose that a meeting should be held at Hq. R.A.F. Ferry Command, Montreal at 10:30 hours (Montreal time), on Tuesday, February 17th. . .

[FREDERICK BOWHILL]

Air Chief-Marshall

366.

PRO AIR 38 8 921

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au commandant en chef de l'aviation,  
Service transocéanique de la RAF*

*Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding in Chief,  
RAF Ferry Command*

SECRET

Ottawa, February 11, 1942

Reference: Your letter FYC 2910-Sigs. Dated 2-2-42.

1. In acknowledging receipt of the above letter, I wish to state that we are most anxious to continue the development of R.C.A.F. Station, Goose Bay, in conformity with the approved Seventeenth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. This, as you are doubtless aware, stipulates that the Canadian Government is responsible for the construction of this R.C.A.F. Station and the provision there of certain facilities for Atlantic ferrying, for hemisphere defence requirements, and for the security of crews and equipment. In accepting this development and in arranging a long term lease of the property, the Canadian Government had no intention of relegating control to other parties. Agreement is given to your suggestion that a meeting be held in order to expedite development as necessary to meet the requirements of all concerned.

2. In view of the particularly isolated nature of this base, it appears most advisable that all accommodation and facilities required should be pooled to the fullest extent. You are probably aware of the details of the interim development programme now under way. Broadly speaking, accommodation is now being provided for 50 officers, 70 N.C.O's and 304 Other Ranks, together with ancillary buildings such as hospital, canteen, stores, garage, one large hangar and a nose hangar, workshop, etc. This accommodation is, in the initial stages, for common use but will be available for re-allocation if further accommodation becomes necessary. Though plans are not final,



it is possible that R.C.A.F. facilities will include accommodation for a Station Headquarters, a fighter squadron, and a bomber reconnaissance squadron.

3. It is agreed that a common operations room in a building that would accommodate the combined staffs of the R.C.A.F., the two ferry commands and their communications and cypher services is a prime requisite and that the Department of Transport meteorological organization, in the same building, may be common and available to all Services, including civilian companies operating under military contracts. The R.C.A.F. is prepared to recommend to its Government that such a building be now constructed. It is probable, however, that the peculiarities of R.C.A.F. Service operations, accentuated in particular by proposed R.D.F. installations, may require the provision of certain operational space exclusively for R.C.A.F. use in close proximity to the combined operations room.

4. It is necessary that we have our W/T receiving centre adjacent to the operations room, with either direct or remote control of the actual receivers. Our wireless transmitters will be remotely controlled from the receiving centre. As it is assumed that your wireless layout will be similar to the foregoing, it is for consideration whether a common transmitter building is feasible. In view of the danger of having too many transmitters in one building however, it is considered that each organization should have its transmitters in a separate transmitter building.

5. As aforesaid, the R.C.A.F. is prepared to carry out the terms of the approved Recommendation of the Joint Board on Defence, and will recommend to its Government the construction and maintenance of all necessary buildings, including those for wireless facilities. However, it is for consideration whether it would be more advisable for the ferry organizations, in view of their peculiar operational requirements as opposed to R.C.A.F. Service operations, to supply and man their own W/T equipment. Such an arrangement would be agreeable to the R.C.A.F. This matter should be fully discussed at the forthcoming meeting.

. . .

8. Your proposed Agenda is considered a suitable basis for discussion at the conference, taking into consideration the aforementioned points, and with the addition of the following item—

All personnel at Goose Bay shall be under the general control of an R.C.A.F. officer who will be placed in command of the whole station.

. . .

L.S. BREADNER  
Air Marshal

367.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D5)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] March 3, 1942

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## 5. DEFENCES FOR NORTHWEST RIVER AERODROME

The Committee approved the Report<sup>1</sup> of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee on the defence of Northwest River Aerodrome, and their recommendation that an infantry battalion should be provided for ground defence, to be available by the opening of navigation in the Spring of 1942. The Committee also directed that attention of those concerned should be drawn to paragraph 9 (i) of the Report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, (HQ.S. 8860-1 of 18th October 1941<sup>1</sup>) dealing with the location and survey for a suitable battery position in the Narrows.

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368.

PRO AIR 38 14 849

*Le directeur principal des services de l'état-major,*  
*Service transocéanique de la RAF, au commandant du service*  
*des transmissions, Service transocéanique de la RAF*

*Senior Air Staff Officer, RAF Ferry Command*  
*to Commanding Signal Officer, RAF Ferry Command*

MOST SECRET

Dorval Airport, March 6, 1942

We have been advised by the U.S. Army Air Corps that the first movement of their bomber groups to United Kingdom will take place in May, when they expect to despatch through Dorval two groups each of four squadrons.

They intend to send here the radio personnel concerned in these first two groups for a preliminary course preparatory to more complete instruction when the whole crews are here.

The despatches will be by squadrons, each squadron spending two days here.

G. J. POWELL  
 Group-Captain

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

369.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 7-8, 1942

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

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## SEVENTEENTH RECOMMENDATION: GOOSE BAY

On the 17th February, 1942, a meeting was held attended by representatives of the R.A.F. Ferry Command, U.S. Army Air Corps Ferry Command, Department of Transport, and R.C.A.F., to clarify the situation with respect to operation, signals and meteorological requirements of the R.A.F. and U.S. Army Air Corps Ferry Commands and the R.C.A.F. It was agreed that the operations and signals organizations for all delivery and ferry flights using this airport should be under the direction of the R.A.F. Ferry Command; that the meteorological organization should be under the Department of Transport (Controller of Meteorology) but that its service would be available to all users of Goose Bay; that the operations and signals organization for R.C.A.F. operations would be under R.C.A.F. control.

It was also agreed that there should be one main Operations Room for the plotting and keeping up-to-date of movements of all aircraft.

The details of necessary signals and meteorological layout were discussed and agreed to.

Detailed minutes, which included a study of the accommodation, were distributed to all concerned.

Since this meeting the Canadian Government has approved of providing one Fighter Squadron and one B.R. Squadron at this airport.

Field Development—Three runways, 5000 ft. by 300 ft. are snow compacted and serviceable. Sides and ends of landing strips are marked with spruce trees and smudge pots. Servicing facilities, tie-down anchors and crash tender are available, and electric flare path is in operation. A hangar area 200 ft. by 400 ft. has been prepared and a loop entrance is provided from the taxi-strips. A well has been bored to a depth of 415 ft. with clay encountered at 300 ft. No water was reported and the drilling was discontinued. Samples of water from Otter Creek and Hamilton Rivers have been sent to St. John's for testing, and a weir was constructed to measure

the flow. Flow reported to be 400 gals. per minute at mouth of Otter Creek and at a point 4000 ft. up the Creek there is a flow of less than 40 gals. per minute. Natives report the Otter Creek water is very poor. It is believed water supply will have to come from Hamilton River.

Buildings—Stores building is 98% complete and now in use. Supply Depot 95%, officers' quarters and officers' mess 98%. The nose hangar is 98% complete and ready to admit planes. Other Rank's mess 75%; hospital 25%; root house 98%. Erection of other ranks' quarters has been commenced.

Roads—The Northwest River road is cleared, grubbed 100%, and graded 75% towards completion. The Hill near the camp has been cut to a 5% grade. A stockpile of 205,000 cu. yds. gravel is available for future use.

Electric Services—Power will be available and in use from March 13th.<sup>1</sup> The ceiling projector and alidade is installed. Power to operate equipment is being provided by 5 kw. plants borrowed from Radio Division and set up in the workshop lean-to. This plant operates ceiling projector. Construction of transmitter building is 95% complete. Installation of refrigeration plant is under way.

Radio Range—95% of range site has been cleared and graded. Range buildings completed and in operation. Temporary telephone communication is available between transmitter and range building. The counterpoise is completed.

General—A saw and planing mill is in operation and 530,000 bd. ft. have been sawn. All surveys are completed except Terrington Basin which is 75% complete. Officers' quarters are being occupied with all ranks. 375 men are now employed in the various projects.

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### *United States Army*

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17. Ground Defense for Northwest River—The Department of National Defense advises that allotment of anti-aircraft guns has been made for the defense of Northwest River and that the equipment will be delivered in early summer. One Canadian Infantry Battalion is to be stationed for the ground protection of this locality.

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<sup>1</sup> De toute évidence ce rapport fut préparé avant le mois de mars.

<sup>1</sup> Evidently this report was prepared before the month of March.



370.

PRO AIR 38 14 849

*Le commandant en chef de l'aviation, Service transocéanique de la RAF,  
au sous-secrétaire d'État du ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne*

*Air Officer Commanding in Chief, RAF Ferry Command,  
to Under-Secretary of State for Air of Great Britain*

[Dorval Airport,] April 13, 1942

Dear Hollinghurst,

You will remember the original signal I received from the Air Ministry about the movement of the U.S. Army Air Corps bomber groups to the United Kingdom, and the reply which I sent: copies are attached.<sup>1</sup>

I have now heard through one of my Signals Officers, who was in Washington on April 11th, that the number of aircraft to be moved has been very much increased and that the movement covers the following:

3 Heavy Bomber groups each of 35 aircraft.

1 Medium Bomber group of 57 aircraft.

3 Light Bomber groups each of 57 aircraft.

5 Pursuit Groups each of 80 aircraft.

200 Transport aircraft.

All these are said to be due in England by July 1st, and a similar number by October 1st.

I have not told the Air Ministry this because I am awaiting confirmation of these figures from Washington, but I am passing the information on to you for comment as there is a point of policy involved as to whether we try to make these aircraft follow our control and signals organization or not. Personally I think we should, as the signalling arrangements would become otherwise hopelessly involved.

If the figures are confirmed, we will need to make some extensive plans for W/T spares and equipment, as well as briefing personnel, and I would be glad, therefore, if you will investigate the matter and let me know what transpires.

Yours sincerely,

G. P. P[OWELL]  
for the Air Chief Marshal

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduites.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

371.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 14, 1942

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## EXTENSION OF GOOSE RIVER AIRFIELD, LABRADOR

34. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR stated that the U.S. Ferry Command were planning to expand their operations substantially so as to permit of the ferry via Greenland and Iceland of large numbers of short-range aircraft.

As a consequence, additional accommodation would be required at Goose River. Expenditures of \$400,000 would be required, immediately, to provide accommodation for personnel. Further expenditures might follow.

Though the airfield itself was part of the Canadian defence system, these extensions referred to were solely to meet U.S. requirements.

35. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE expressed the view that this expenditure should be met by the United States, on the basis of the principle already settled by the War Committee in such matters.

36. THE WAR COMMITTEE approved the expenditure of \$400,000, for U.S. account, for the purpose described by the Minister.

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372.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Quebec City, May 26-27, 1942

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4. The United States Army Air Member outlined the additional facilities that are needed at Goose Bay. . . It was agreed that these facilities should be provided and that they should be paid for in accordance with the formula already agreed upon at the meeting of the Board in New York on April 27, 1942.<sup>1</sup> Colonel Douglass reported on the increase of ferrying activities through Goose Bay and mentioned a number of personnel and operating problems that have arisen. It was agreed that a solution for these problems should be sought through direct Service channels.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Quebec City, May 26-27, 1942

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*United States Army*

...

17. NORTHWEST RIVER LANDING FIELD

Due to projected ferry operations, the Army Air Forces has been promised by the R.A.F. Ferry Command to conduct negotiations with the Canadian Government to widen the gravel runway from 100 feet to 150 feet and construction of housing and messing facilities for 100 officers and 100 men.

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*Royal Canadian Navy*

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5. GOOSE INLET, LABRADOR

A War Watching Station is being established by the R.C.N. at Goose Bay in connection with the defences of the Northwest River aerodrome.

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373.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 28, 1942

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NORTHERN AIR FERRY ROUTES TO EUROPE

28. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR raised, as a question of urgency, proposals of the U.S. Army Air Forces Ferry Command for the early development of aerodromes in Northern Canada and Labrador, for the purpose of ferrying operational aircraft to the United Kingdom.

Preliminary discussions with high U.S. officers had taken place in advance of the formulation of a complete scheme to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

The proposals envisaged three routes, the first from San Francisco via Regina and Churchill, the second, from Detroit via Chimo and York Sound, the third, a modification of the existing route from Presque Isle, or Montreal, via Goose Bay.

The capacity contemplated was 1,000 aircraft per month, 100 per day, 30 per hour. The United States were prepared to pay for the whole or any

part of the development, undertake surveys and construction, and furnish necessary defences. They would, however, appreciate Canadian assistance and advice. The cost would run up to 200 million dollars.

(D.C.A.S. memorandum to the Minister, May 28, 1942<sup>1</sup>),

29. MR. POWER said that two principal questions emerged, the first concerned defence aspects of the scheme; the second, the high political implications. It was suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to look immediately into the former, while the latter should be reviewed by the Prime Minister from the point of view of American expenditure in Canada, and possible American garrisons in aerodromes within the Canadian boundaries.

While both the R.C.A.F. and the R.A.F. staffs had reservations as to the practicability of these routes, and felt that losses in passage would inevitably be great, the U.S. government accorded the project the highest priority and wished to have an immediate decision. The object was to bring the full weight of American plane production to bear in air offensives against Germany.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence were holding a special meeting on the subject on June 1st, and their early recommendation could be anticipated.

30. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after some discussion, expressed general agreement that Canada should give her consent to the scheme. It was decided, however, to refer defence aspects of the project to the Chiefs of Staff for immediate report, and higher political aspects of the plan for the views of the Prime Minister.

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374.

DND HQS 15-24-30

*Mémoire des chefs d'état-major au ministre de la Défense nationale,  
au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air et au ministre  
de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals*

*Memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff to Minister of National Defence,  
to Minister of National Defence for Air and to Minister of National Defence  
for Naval Services*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] May 30, 1942

The Chiefs of Staff have considered the Service aspects of an application made by the U.S. Army Air Force to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence for Canadian co-operation in the construction of three Ferry routes between Canada and Europe, as follows:

Route a. Regina—The Pas—Churchill—Baffin Is.—Greenland, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Route b. North Bay—Kapuskasing—Moosonee — Richmond Gulf — Chimo—Baffin Is.—Greenland, etc.

Route c. Dorval—Arvida—Goose Bay (Labrador)—Greenland, etc.

2. The aspects considered and the conclusions reached by the Chiefs of Staff are as follows:

(A) The practicability of the routes for the purpose for which they are now intended.

The Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that given time, the routes are practicable, but that the problems of construction and transportation are very great.

(B) R.C.A.F. responsibilities in control and air defence of the routes.

(C) The Army's responsibility for land defence of the aerodromes.

(B) and (C) involve the control and defence of all aerodromes within Canadian territory. The Chiefs of Staff concurred in proposals put forward by C.A.S. and recommend:

- I. that Canada undertake the control of air defence of the portion of the aerodromes at Churchill, The Pas, Regina on Route a, Kapuskasing in Route b and Goose Bay in Route c.
  - II. that Canada undertake initially Army responsibility for the defence of the aerodromes at Churchill, The Pas, Regina on Route a, Moosonee and Kapuskasing Route b. While it is considered that the defence of all aerodromes located within Canadian Territory should be the responsibility of the Canadian Authorities, in view of the time factor involved, protection of the aerodromes, other than those mentioned above on Routes a and b, can at present only be provided by depleting the defences of the West Coast or by using units of the 4th (Armoured) Division or 2nd Army Tank Brigade, thereby delaying the completion of the Canadian Army Programme Overseas.
  - III. that control and defence of remaining aerodromes by U.S. Forces be subject to the following provisos:
    - (a) Canada reserves the right to take over air and ground defence and control of all aerodromes when able to do so.
    - (b) The U.S. scheme of defence must be adequate in the opinion of Canadian Defence authorities and should include preparation for demolition of aerodromes.
3. It is pointed out that Goose Bay is already controlled and defended by Canada.
4. Submitted for consideration.

PERCY NELLES, Vice-Admiral  
Chief of the Naval Staff

G. O. JOHNSON  
for Chief of the Air Staff

J. C. MURCHIE, M.G.  
for Chief of the General Staff

375.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 12, 1942

NORTHEAST AIR FERRY ROUTES—CANADA-U.S. PERMANENT JOINT  
BOARD ON DEFENCE

16. THE SECRETARY submitted the Journal for the Board's recent meetings, at Quebec and Montreal, on May 26th and June 9th. Copies of the Journal had been received the previous day and communicated immediately to the Prime Minister, the Ministers of National Defence and the Minister of Munitions and Supply.

The Journal for these meetings, included the Board's twenty-sixth Recommendation, reading as follows:

In order to facilitate the greatly increased ferrying projects of the United States Government in transporting fighter, light, medium, and long range bombardment aircraft across the North Atlantic, the Board recommends:

- (a) That the airfields in Canadian territory on the ferry routes outlined in the Army Air Force appreciation dated June 6th be constructed with such variations as the detailed survey, now under way, may determine to be advisable.
- (b) That the Canadian Government construct or authorize the United States Government to construct these fields and inform the United States Government as promptly as possible what fields, if any, Canada will construct.
- (c) That the existing ferry airdrome facilities in Canada and Newfoundland, including Labrador, form a part of the proposed ferrying project and be increased, wherever necessary, to appropriate capacity.
- (d) That such additional radio weather-reporting facilities for these routes be provided and maintained as may be agreed upon by the United States and the Canadian Governments.
- (e) That all costs of constructing air fields and other installations in connection with this project be borne by the Government which agrees to undertake that part of the project.
- (f) That suitable arrangements be made in Washington and Ottawa to insure the proper centralization of responsibility for and control over the work of construction, and to provide the maximum facilities for instant and effective contact and co-operation between the appropriate authorities of the two countries.
- (g) That the proposals relating to defence, to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and the post-war disposition of the new installations as outlined in the memoranda under reference be accepted by the two Governments.
- (h) That these airfields and facilities be made available for the use of the Royal Air Force Ferry Command.  
(P.J.B.D. Journal, May 26,<sup>1</sup> and June 9, 1942<sup>2</sup>).

17. MR. HEENEY pointed out that, on May 28th, the American proposals had received consideration, the War Committee expressing general agreement

<sup>1</sup> Partiellement reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Reproduced in part.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

and referring defence aspects of the project to the Chiefs of Staff, and higher political aspects for the views of the Prime Minister.

The Chiefs of Staff had since examined the Service questions involved, and Mr. King had had an opportunity of considering the proposals from the national point of view. Copies of the Chiefs of Staff report had been circulated.

(Chiefs of Staff's report to the Ministers, May 30, 1942—C.W.C. document 180<sup>1</sup>).

18. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE observed that the Chiefs of Staff recommended that Canada undertake control and air defence of the Canadian portion of each route, as far north as Churchill, Kapuskasing and Goose Bay, and, for the present, Army responsibility for defence of a limited number of aerodromes. Control and defence of remaining aerodromes by U.S. forces should be subject to Canada's right to assume responsibility when able to do so, and compliance, meantime, with the standards of defence regarded as adequate by Canadian authorities.

The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff had estimated, roughly that \$10,000,000 would be involved in the construction of aerodromes recommended to be under Canadian control.

19. THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that, since the United States attached such high value to these routes, Canadian approval to their establishment should be given.

Possibly the question as to the actual projects to be undertaken by Canada should be referred to a committee of interested Ministers.

20. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY again expressed his scepticism as to the practicability of the most northerly routes. That via Goose Bay was proving satisfactory and was under Canadian control. The United States should be permitted to build other routes at their own expense.

21. THE MINISTER OF MINES AND RESOURCES referred to possible wage difficulties in the event of American construction of aerodromes in Northern Canada.

As to the political aspect of the scheme, so long as the question of ultimate control by Canada was settled, there should be no political objection.

22. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE suggested that Canada could not altogether avoid responsibility for defending any point in Canadian territory which required defence, irrespective of any arrangements made with the United States.

23. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after further discussion, approved, on behalf of the government of Canada, the Twenty-sixth Recommendation of the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

The question of the extent to which construction in Canada, along the new routes, should be undertaken by the Canadian government, and to what extent by the United States, was referred, for examination and report, to a sub-committee consisting of the Ministers of National Defence, Finance, and Munitions and Supply.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

376.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 17, 1942

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## NORTH ATLANTIC AIR FERRY ROUTES

15. THE SECRETARY reported that the U.S. Minister had indicated that the authorities in Washington were anxious to know just as soon as possible what part of the projected programme for the construction of ferrying routes in Northern Canada the government proposed to undertake.

It would be recalled that reports from Major-General Pope had, on the contrary, indicated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had decided to postpone consideration of the northern routes until such time as a modified plan had been worked out.

16. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, agreed to defer decision pending report<sup>1</sup> by the special sub-committee appointed on June the 12th.

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## NORTH ATLANTIC AIR FERRY ROUTES

24. THE SECRETARY reported that a message had been received from Major-General Pope in Washington, indicating that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been informed by General Marshall that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff desired to postpone consideration of the North Atlantic ferry routes proposal until such time as some modified plan had been worked out.

It was thought that this modification might consist of deferring work on the Regina, Churchill, Southampton Island route and that new proposal[s] would not be presented until reconnaissances, now in progress, had been completed.

(National Defence telegram from Major-General Pope to N.D.H.Q., June 16, 1942<sup>1</sup>).

. . .

377.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 1, 1942

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## NORTH ATLANTIC FERRY ROUTES

7. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that modified proposals had now passed the Combined Planning Committee. As submitted for

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the scheme now involved the conversion of the original fighter route via Regina, The Pas, Churchill, etc. to a bomber route, the abandonment of the proposed route via Kapuskasing, Moosonee, Chimo, etc., and the further development of the existing route via Presque Isle and Goose Bay.

The question of Canadian participation in the construction of new aerodromes and their defence had been considered further with the Chiefs of Staff who had now prepared a further report, copies of which had been circulated.

The Chiefs of Staff recommended that, subject to the provisions of the Twenty-sixth Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Canada undertake and pay for completion of facilities at Goose Bay (as arranged) and construction at Regina, The Pas and Churchill, and that the United States develop Southampton Island and the winter fields at Chimo, Frobisher Bay or Cape Dyer. As to defence, they recommended that Canada accept responsibility for aerodromes at Regina, The Pas and Churchill. In fact, this involved defence at Churchill only, defence of the other two points being regarded as unnecessary.

(Chiefs of Staff memorandum, undated, to the Ministers—C.W.C. document 208<sup>1</sup>).

8. MR. RALSTON expressed the view that the Canadian government need not undertake financial responsibility for the construction of any of the new aerodromes involved. Further, the United States should be asked to provide, for these stations, defences adequate to Canadian requirements. Construction, maintenance and administration by the United States should be carried on in collaboration with Canadian authorities so as to take into account all considerations of defence, labour and material supply, and other conditions affecting Canadian war activities.

9. THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF expressed the opinion that the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff was in line with government policy regarding construction of U.S.-Canada joint defence projects. They provided for concurrent financial and defence responsibilities.

10. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE said that the project was an American one and there was nothing whatever to prevent the United States paying for the whole of it. Canadian financial commitments connected with the war were already enormous and the task of raising the money required for all war needs was already critical. To permit the United States to bear the whole cost of this development might later prove embarrassing, but it must be done nevertheless if other obligations of the Canadian war effort were to be performed.

In the circumstances Mr. Ralston's suggestions should be accepted.

11. THE MINISTER OF MINES AND RESOURCES was inclined to the view that Canada should undertake defence of Churchill and Canadian points. There

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduct.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

was no objection to the United States paying the costs involved in construction. There might, however, be difficulties in accepting American administration.

12. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR agreed with Mr. Ralston's proposals. As for Regina, it was already constructed and would be under Canadian control. It was important that the Canadian staff should have recognized authority to decide upon the standards of defences to be provided.

13. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after further discussion, agreed that the U.S. government be informed that Canada would co-operate fully in granting permission for the construction, maintenance and administration during the war, of additional aerodromes and facilities included in the modified North Atlantic ferry routes project, provided:

- (a) that all costs of new aerodromes and facilities involved were borne by the United States;
- (b) that construction, maintenance and administration were carried on in collaboration with Canadian authorities so as to take into account considerations of defence, labour and material supply, and other conditions affecting Canadian war activities; and
- (c) that defences for all aerodromes and facilities were provided by the United States to the extent regarded as adequate by the Canadian authorities.

...

378.

PRO AIR 38 14 849

*Mémorandum du directeur principal des services  
de l'état-major, Service transocéanique de la RAF,  
à l'officier de liaison, Corps d'aviation de l'armée américaine*

*Memorandum from Senior Air Staff Officer, RAF Ferry Command,  
to Liaison Officer, United States Army Air Corps*

Dorval Airport, July 3, 1942

The Air Ministry are expressing grave concern about the unheralded arrival in Iceland and the U.K. of U.S. aircraft, either as part of the Bolero movement<sup>1</sup> or on transportation or reinforcement duties.

I see by your memorandum of July 3rd<sup>2</sup> to the C.S.O. that you have mentioned some dispositions of your aircraft but this is not sufficient information as it does not give final destination and will not prevent what

<sup>1</sup> Le programme transocéanique du Corps d'aviation de l'armée américaine.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> The ferry programme of the United States Army Air Corps.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

might well result in your aircraft being fired upon as well as the nuisance that exists when these unexpected movements take place.

There seem to me to be two ways of doing it properly;

- (a) That our Liaison officers at Goose, Gander and Presque Isle be properly informed of these movements which would then be sent to us and then sent by ourselves to the Air Ministry in a consolidated signal.
- (b) The other method would be for your Central Control in Washington to advise us in the form of a daily statement and this might well be done by our own Liaison Officer in your Ferrying Command Headquarters, S/Ldr. H. F. Suren. This is not likely to work as well as (a) as I believe your own communications are more congested and advice to Washington might be much delayed after the actual movement.

We do not require, of course, to know in detail the movements of your aircraft but simply, for instance, that such and such a type left Goose for BW1<sup>1</sup>, final destination U.K. It is not sufficient, however, to say that the aircraft left Goose for BW1 as this would leave it open to doubt as to whether it was proceeding to Iceland or Prestwick.

In view of the concern expressed in an Air Ministry signal received this date and the present danger that exists, will you please make strong representations to your Headquarters to have one of these two systems adopted.

C. J. POWELL  
Group-Captain

379.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, July 6, 1942

. . .

2. The United States Army Air member announced that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved on July 2, 1942, the North Atlantic Air Ferry Route Project, dealt with in the Board's Twenty-Sixth Recommendation adopted at Montreal on June 9, 1942. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the construction or improvement of air fields in connection with this project in the following order of priority:

- (1) Goose Bay  
    Bluie West 8  
    Bluie West 1

<sup>1</sup> Bluie West 1.

- (2) Le Pas  
Churchill  
Southampton Island
- (3) Winterized fields; that is snow compacted runways at the following places:  
Crystal 1  
Crystal 2 or 3  
Bluie East

The Secretary of the Canadian Section announced that the Canadian Government, after giving most serious and sympathetic consideration to the whole project and the responsibilities that Canada could undertake in relation to it, had come regretfully to the conclusion that it would be impossible under existing conditions of manpower, material supply and finance to undertake any new obligations involving extensive expenditure of labour, materials or money on airport construction at this time. The Canadian Government will carry out the responsibilities already accepted at Goose Bay and will do everything in its power to facilitate the construction of the other airports by the United States.

The Senior War department member stated that the United States War Department fully understands the position of the Canadian Government in this matter and that the United States Government is prepared to carry out this construction.

The Secretary of the Canadian Section further reported that the Canadian Government is still considering the extent to which it can undertake responsibility for the defence of the new air bases and that a decision in this regard would be made known to the United States Government in the immediate future.

. . .

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, July 6, 1942

. . .

*Canadian Army*

. . .

SEVENTEENTH RECOMMENDATION—PROTECTION OF GOOSE BAY

3. The coast artillery battery at the entrance to Lake Melville on which Goose Bay is located was manned ready for action on the 22nd of June. The first flight of the army garrison for Goose Bay arrived on the 26th June. Four 40mm. A.A. Bofors are in action there.

. . .



380.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 547

St. John's, September 24, 1942

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Hon. Sir Wilfrid W. Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities, called my attention to the fact that the Newfoundland Commission of Government has not been supplied with information as to the plans of the Canadian Government in connection with the airport at Goose Bay.

2. I have the honour also to refer to my despatch No. 74 of November 25<sup>1</sup>, 1941, with which I enclosed a copy of a letter from Sir Wilfrid W. Woods to myself, dated the 24th of November, 1941, in which he suggested that the Newfoundland Government should be supplied with an authoritative and complete statement of the places in Newfoundland (including Newfoundland-Labrador territory) in which bases had been established by the Canadian Government.

3. Sir Wilfrid apparently considers that he is entitled to have information as to the construction work already carried on at Goose Bay, including the work which is now in progress.

4. Please instruct me as to what reply I should make to Sir Wilfrid Woods' enquiry.

5. I may add that following his recent visit to Goose Bay Mr. Pick informed me that he had learned that coastal defence installations had been erected at Rigolet on the Narrows between Hamilton Inlet and Lake Melville, which are being manned by some two hundred men. As far as I am aware the Newfoundland Government has never been informed of the defence measures taken at Rigolet and in view of Sir Wilfrid Woods' general request referred to above I think that he should be supplied with some information regarding the defence work there.

. . .

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

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<sup>1</sup> Document 665.

381.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 306

Ottawa, December 22, 1942

Sir,

With reference to your request for a detailed list of all places in Labrador where Canadian troops are stationed, I have the honour to advise you that the Deputy Minister of National Defence (Army) has advised me that Canadian Army troops are stationed at Goose Bay and Rigolet. The Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air states that the R.C.A.F. Station at Goose Bay is the only location in Labrador where R.C.A.F. are presently stationed. The R.C.A.F. wireless stations at Cartwright, Hopedale, Hebron and Cape Chidley are summer establishments which are at present closed.

I have etc.

HUGH L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

382.

DND (DH) 181.009 (D976)

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air  
au commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est  
Chief of the Air Staff  
to Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] February 10, 1943

TRANS-ATLANTIC FERRY OPERATIONS—R.A.F. FERRY COMMAND  
U.S.A.A.F. AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND

1. Information has been received that the United States is committed to deliver 3,000 aeroplanes per month to the United Kingdom over the North Atlantic Ferry routes commencing as soon as general weather conditions permit. The United States Army Air Transport Command is charged with the delivery of these aircraft, and the R.A.F. Ferry Command will receive a portion of this number to deliver. Because of the volume of anticipated deliveries, representations were made by the U.S.A.A.F. that they should institute a control system for flying the North Atlantic, including the taking over of the principal control centre, Prestwick.

2. As a result of subsequent negotiations a Board of Officers was set up consisting of three officers of the R.A.F. Ferry Command and three officers of the U.S.A.A.F. Air Transport Command. This Board of Officers examined

in detail the requirements for effective control, and the facilities available at Dorval, Presque Isle, Goose Bay, Gander and in the United Kingdom. The results of their meetings and investigations are contained in the attached report,<sup>1</sup> and it would appear that the plan which they have drawn up constitutes the most satisfactory solution of the problem. In brief, they have proposed to establish a joint control at terminals and at intermediate points on the North Atlantic Ferry Routes.

3. On January 19th a meeting was held at Air Force Headquarters to discuss and consider the implications of the plan for joint control of Trans-Atlantic Ferry operations and its effect on R.C.A.F. commitments, particularly those at Goose and Gander. This meeting was attended by representatives of the R.C.A.F. and by officers from the R.A.F. Ferry Command representing both the A.O.C.-in-C., and the Commanding General, U.S.A.A.F. Air Transport Command.

4. The principal concern of the R.C.A.F. was the effect that this plan would have on the Combined Operations Buildings and other common facilities which had previously been planned for Goose and Gander to meet the requirements of the R.C.A.F., the R.A.F. Ferry Command, U.S.A.A.F. Squadrons, and the Canadian Meteorological Organization which serves the three Services.

5. The Combined Operations Room at Gander was planned to meet the joint requirements of the three Services and it had been previously agreed that the Department of Transport meteorological service would be common to all and that a common communications centre would be established. At the time this building was planned and designed, however, large ferry operations by the U.S.A.A.F. Air Transport Command through Gander were not contemplated. This building is now under construction, and as outlined in the attached report it will be impracticable for the R.A.F. Ferry Command and the U.S.A.A.F. Air Transport Command to set up a joint control centre in this building. The requirements of the R.C.A.F. and those of the squadrons of the U.S.A.A.F. will remain the same and it is anticipated that the proposed operations by Coastal Command will utilize some of the space that Ferry Command will not now require.

6. It will be noted that it is also proposed to move the Canadian Meteorological Section to the joint control centre in Ferry Command hangar at Gander. While this was viewed with some concern, the Director of Meteorological Service, Department of Transport, has given assurance that the extent of operations out of Gander will require two Forecasting Offices, one of which will be subsidiary to the main Forecasting Office, and that it will be practicable to provide the necessary staff to furnish the required meteorological facilities for R.C.A.F. operations and of [for ?] the proposed Coastal Command operations out of Gander. The space that has been provided for the Meteorological Service will, therefore, be required on a reduced scale.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

7. At Goose Bay also a Combined Operations Building has been planned for the R.C.A.F., R.A.F. Ferry Command and the Department of Transport Meteorological Service. The proposal now is that a joint control centre for ferry operations be established on the U.S.A.A.F. side of the aerodrome, including the Department of Transport Meteorological Section. Although we have designed a Combined Operations Building at Goose, construction has not commenced and it will be possible, if necessary, to alter the design and layout to meet our own requirements, including those of the Coastal Command. The Director of Meteorological Service, Department of Transport, has confirmed that the requirements for meteorological services at Goose Bay will necessitate the establishment of two Forecasting Offices, one for trans-Atlantic ferry operations and one for anti-submarine operations, and that it will be practicable to meet these new requirements.

8. The plan for the joint control of ferry operations over the North Atlantic has been concurred in by the A.O.C.-in-C. R.A.F. Ferry Command and the Commanding General of the U.S.A.A.F. Air Transport Command. The extent of the ferry operations for 1943 undoubtedly warrants a revision of plans that were previously made to accommodate the three Services, and in view of this situation, the Chief of the Air Staff has signified his approval of the new proposals that have now been put forward.

9. You will be kept fully advised if any further revision of our plans is decided upon. In the meantime it is requested that the A.O.C. No. 1 Group should be informed of existing commitments.

K. M. GUTHRIE, Air Commodore  
for the Chief of the Air Staff

383.

DND (DH) 181.002 (D366)

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au commandant en chef de l'aviation,  
Service transocéanique de la RAF*

*Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding in Chief,  
RAF Ferry Command*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 5, 1943

My dear Sir Frederick [Bowhill],

On January 29th I wrote to you with reference to the Joint Control Centres which are being set up at Goose and Gander for the Royal Air Force Ferry Command and the United States Army Air Forces. There is one aspect of this project which I neglected to mention and, that is, the necessity of keeping Eastern Air Command fully informed about the movement of aircraft leaving or approaching these two bases, particularly at Gander.

My reason for raising this point is that the number of aircraft which it is proposed shall be ferried from these bases during 1943 is greatly in excess



of any previous movement. Since the Royal Canadian Air Force is responsible for the fighter defences of Newfoundland and Labrador, it is essential that the Filter Room should have full information about the movement of all ferry aircraft; otherwise the whole aircraft detection system will break down.

To assist the defence forces of Newfoundland in carrying out the duties that have been assigned to them and, at the same time, obviate any possible difficulties, I would suggest that your Senior Officer in Newfoundland might discuss this problem with the Air Officer Command, No. 1 Group, St. John's, Newfoundland. Your co-operation will be appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

L. S. BREADNER  
Air Marshal

384.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Northwest trip, July 1-14, 1943

. . .

*Royal Canadian Navy*

. . .

2. Movements to Goose Bay are continuing as requisite, the first convoy proceeding from Quebec on the 16th of June, consisting of four Liberty ships, S.S. *Fleuris* with Air Force personnel and passengers, C.G.S. *Laurentian* to act as tender for Department of Transport at Goose Bay and the C.G.S. *N.B. McLean*, ice-breaker en route to Hudson Bay. Four Corvettes have been detailed as escorts for these convoys.

. . .

385.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 21, 1943

. . .

#### GOOSE BAY; ADDITIONAL U.S. FACILITIES

12. THE SECRETARY reported that a request had recently been received from the U.S. Army, through the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, for permission to construct certain additional facilities, including garages, ammunition dump and extensions to existing buildings.

The request had been considered by departments concerned, who had agreed that the request be granted and recommended that funds to the extent of \$148,000 be made available for the purpose.

THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR had requested that the project be brought to the attention of the War Committee, to determine whether payment should be made by the U.S. government or by Canada. An explanatory note had been circulated.

(Secretary's note, Oct. 20, 1943—C.W.C. document 638<sup>1</sup>).

13. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, confirmed approval of the project and agreed that the question of payment remain in abeyance for the present, on the same basis as other expenditures for U.S. facilities at Goose Bay.

...

386.

PRO AIR 38 25 873

*Mémorandum du directeur principal des services de l'état-major,  
Service transocéanique de la RAF*

*Memorandum by Senior Air Staff Officer, RAF Ferry Command*

No. 176

Dorval Airport, December 16, 1943

SECRET

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED JOINTLY BY U.S.A.T.C.  
(N.A.W.) AND R.A.F.T.C. (45 GROUP)<sup>2</sup> REGARDING AIR ROUTE  
CANADA, NEWFOUNDLAND, BERMUDA AND ANY OTHER  
CANADIAN OR U.S. BASE TO AZORES

### *Introduction.*

Arrangements have been made for the use of the R.A.F. airfield at the Azores (Lagens) by a maximum of 200 aircraft per month with an overriding condition that not more than 25 aircraft are on the field in any one day. These numbers to include delivery, transport and other special flights.

At present it has been agreed to allocate up to 130 aircraft per month to the U.S.A. and the balance of 70 to R.A.F. aircraft. The R.A.F. have agreed to offer any unused balance of their daily quota to the U.S.A., and similarly, the U.S.A. have agreed to offer the R.A.F. any like balance. In order to implement the agreements made between the U.S.A.T.C. and the R.A.F.T.C., it has been decided to issue the following instructions which will later be incorporated in the Joint Control Instructions for the North Atlantic Air Routes.

### *Control Areas and Frequencies.*

1. Montreal, Presque Isle or other U.S. or Canadian bases to the Azores via Gander, Goose or Stephenville

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> En 1943 le Service transocéanique de la RAF fut incorporé au Service des transports de la RAF et l'unité basée à l'aéroport de Dorval devint le groupe 45 de ce nouveau service.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> In 1943 the RAF Ferry Command was incorporated in the RAF Transport Command, and the unit based at Dorval Airport became its No. 45 Group.

- (a) The existing control areas and frequencies as laid down by Joint Control Instructions will apply as far as Gander, Goose, Stephenville and the Canadian Maritime Airfields.
- (b) From Gander, Goose, Stephenville or the Maritimes, Gander will be in Control from take-off to 40° West and Lagens from 40° West to Lagens. The control frequency will be 6500 kcs., until such time that U.S.A.T.C. control frequencies and facilities are available, and the approach control frequency at Lagens will be 3105 kcs.

...

C. J. POWELL  
Air Commodore

387.

NPA GN1/3 1/44

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint  
aux Dominions*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities to Assistant Under-Secretary of State,  
Dominions Office*

[St. John's,] January 29, 1944

My Dear Clutterbuck,

It appears to me that the R.A.F. Transport Command at Gander do not appreciate the position of the Newfoundland Government in relation to the Newfoundland-owned Air Bases (Gander, Gleneagles and Botwood) operated by Canada for the period of the war. Two matters have led me to this conclusion. Recently Group-Captain Anderson started a piggery<sup>1</sup> at Gander—an excellent scheme for increasing the food supply of the station and making good use of waste food from the various cook houses. He has, however, not only started a piggery but has entered into an agreement with a Newfoundland citizen<sup>2</sup> whereby the Transport Command provided a building (of the value of somewhere about \$30,000) and the other party provided the pigs. The value of the building is to be the first charge on the profits and thereafter the balance is to be shared equally between the R.A.F. Transport Command's Welfare Fund and the other party. He did not consult us before making this agreement and probably thinks that everything is all right provided the Canadians agree. In this case, however, there is an agreement which may establish an individual in the piggery business permanently even after control of the

<sup>1</sup> Le «journal de guerre» tenu par le Service transocéanique de la RAF à Gander faisait de temps en temps mention de la livraison de porcs. Ainsi, un certain jour, le journal ne portait que la mention suivante:

Weather fine and sunny, fifteen new pigs arrived.

<sup>2</sup> J. R. Smallwood, futur premier ministre de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> The "war diary" kept by the RAF Ferry Command at Gander contained occasional references to the delivery of pigs. One entry, in its entirety, read:

<sup>2</sup> J. R. Smallwood, later Premier of Newfoundland.

Airport has reverted to the Newfoundland Government as it will do at the end of the war.

2. More recently the R.A.F. Transport Command informed Pattison that they would like the Newfoundland Government to purchase the Eastbound Inn and Gander Inn so that they might concentrate their own organization near their own hangars, i.e., in the South Eastern portion of the Airport between runways Nos. 2 and 3. It appears that the O.C.'s higher authorities would not agree to this reorganization unless they can recover the value of their investment in the two Inns, hence his suggestion of sale to the Newfoundland Government. It is quite obvious from this that the O.C. does not understand that we shall be under no obligation to purchase at the end of the war any buildings put up at Gander by anyone.

3. I really think it would be a good thing if the Air Ministry would give definite instructions to the R.A.F. Transport Command to the effect that the Newfoundland Government are interested in regard to all buildings erected at Gander including buildings erected by themselves and in all agreements between themselves and third parties, especially if such agreements are likely to affect the operation of the Airport in any way after the war. They should be requested to keep us fully informed of all future developments such as new buildings or new agreements and in appropriate cases they should obtain our prior approval.

4. I am asking Pattison to let the O.C., R.A.F. Transport Command at Gander know that I have raised this matter with you in this informal way, but I will not make any official representation to the R.A.F. authorities at Gander until I have received from you a reply to this letter and have heard what approach, if any, you have felt able to make to the Air Ministry in the matter.

Yours sincerely,

W. W. WOODS

388.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 15, 1944

...

R.C.A.F.; PROPOSED FERRY COMMAND ACTIVITIES

23. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported that the R.C.A.F. had under consideration the possibility of negotiating with U.K. authorities for assumption by the R.C.A.F. of the North American activities of the R.A.F. Ferry Command.

24. THE WAR COMMITTEE noted this report.

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389.

PRO AIR 38 25 873

*Mémorandum du directeur principal des services de l'état-major,  
Service transocéanique de la RAF*

*Memorandum by Senior Air Staff Officer, RAF Ferry Command*

No. 190

Dorval Airport, May 4, 1944

TOP SECRET

## MOVEMENT OF RUSSIAN PBN'S—ELIZABETH CITY TO MURMANSK

1. No. 45 Group is to assist the Russian Air Force in the delivery of 48 PBN-1 flying boats from Elizabeth City to Murmansk according to the following arrangements.

These aircraft (a modification of the PBY-5) are being supplied to the Russians by the U.S. Navy and will be handed over for delivery at Elizabeth City.

2. Aircraft markings will be identical with U.S. markings, except that a red star is substituted for white.

There will be a red star on top of the port main plane, a red star on bottom of the starboard main plane and red star on each side of hull immediately below the pilot's cockpit.

Camouflage scheme is white for all under-surfaces and blue for top surfaces.

3. No. 45 Group will be responsible for the dispatch, airborne control and routing arrangements for the movement from Elizabeth City to approximately half way between Reykjavik and Murmansk (i.e. 69°N.05°E). Code word for the operation is "PITCH".

4. Route to be followed will be Elizabeth City—Gander Lake—Reykjavik—Murmansk.

C. J. Powell  
Air Commodore

. . .

390.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Cabinet de guerre*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 23, 1944

. . .

## GOOSE BAY; ARMY GARRISON

10. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE submitted a recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff, approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee,

for reduction of the Army garrison at Goose Bay by withdrawal of heavy anti-aircraft units, involving 392 personnel. Copies of the recommendation had been circulated.

(National Defence memorandum, September 19, 1944—C.W.C. document 864<sup>1</sup>).

11. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved the recommendation submitted.

391.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D41)

*Mémorandum du directeur des opérations et des plans militaires  
au Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Memorandum from Director of Military Operations and Planning  
to Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 5, 1945

C & AA ARTY DEFENCES, RIGOLET—GOOSE BAY

1. The purpose of this memo is to review the necessity for continuing C and AA Arty defences at Rigolet-Goose Bay, as plans have to be made now for next summer's reliefs.

CST ARTY—RIGOLET (2-75 mm guns & 2 CASLs<sup>2</sup>)

2. Last September, in view of the satisfactory situation overseas, the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed to the withdrawal of this battery, with personnel returned to Canada by special sailing in October and made available for AG disposal.

3. At that time, while it was not thought likely that this battery would be required again this year, it was considered inadvisable to remove the armament while the war was still in progress. The armament has accordingly been kept in maintenance at Rigolet.

4. At this stage of the war, it is felt that the probability of enemy surface vessels or submarines proceeding through the Narrows and up Lake Melville for a distance of approximately 100 miles from the open sea to attack Goose Bay is so remote as not to justify Rigolet Battery being placed back in action next spring, with resultant increase in op troops of 4 officers and 99 ORs.

AA ARTY—GOOSE BAY (12-40mm AA guns)

5. Last Sep also, the risk of enemy high-level bombing attack on Goose Bay (possible but improbable) was accepted by the CSC and HAA defences were withdrawn accordingly. In view of the present greatly improved situa-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Projecteurs de la défense côtière.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Coastal Artillery Searchlights.

tion in Europe as compared with last fall, it is now considered that the risk of any form of enemy air attack on Goose Bay is so slight that it can be accepted in view of the advantages to be gained by non-replacement of the LAA bty (9 offrs and 205 ORs) when this unit is due for relief next June or early July. i.e. LAA defences to be withdrawn upon opening of navigation even if war with Germany is continuing then.

AREA HQ. INF. (Ground Defence Pl) AND SERVICES

6. When the war with Germany ends, there will be a continuing requirement for the RCAF operation of Goose Bay. It is considered however, that this operation will only require the retention of necessary Services with the Army HQ and the Ground Def Pl withdrawn.

7. In view of the foregoing and as plans have to be made now for relief of the Goose Bay Garrison next summer, it is recommended that:

- (a) Cst Arty (i) Rigolet Bty be not placed back in action this spring, and
- (ii) Armament, equipment and ammunition be returned to Canada, as convenient, during the coming navigation season, with the Army Station at Rigolet abandoned.

8. I have discussed this matter informally with External Affairs who see no objection to these proposals, from the International viewpoint, provided that Nfld. is informed in advance. Therefore if the recommendation in para 5 is approved it is further recommended that External Affairs be requested to so advise the Nfld. Govt.\*

J. H. JENKINS  
Colonel

392.

PRO AIR 38 21 842

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue au ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne  
pour discuter du programme de retrait du groupe 45 du  
Service des transports de la RAF*

*Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Air Ministry of Great Britain  
to Discuss the Contraction Programme of No. 45 Group,  
RAF Transport Command*

CONFIDENTIAL

[London,] January 30, 1946

...

THE CHAIRMAN opened the Meeting by stating that a previous meeting held on 18th December, 1945, in Air Ministry, was held to determine the

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

Secretary Chiefs of Staff Cttee. Please place this on Agenda of early meeting  
of the Cttee.

action required to implement the Contraction Programme for No. 45 Group. He went on to state that the purpose of this meeting was to review the progress made and to discuss any outstanding points. The meeting then turned to the Agenda.

. . .

#### ITEM No. 2. MONTREAL—GOOSE. MONTREAL—GANDER SERVICES

- (a) It was agreed that both of the above services should terminate on the 15th February, 1946. Transport Command representative pointed out that limited facilities in the form of air-lift would be required until personnel had been evacuated.
- (b) S.6<sup>1</sup> informed the meeting that the Ministry of Civil Aviation has asked the S. of S. for the R.A.F. to maintain personnel at Gander for a period of six months, and that a reply had been given in which it was stated that in view of the present circumstances it was not possible to retain R.A.F. personnel at Gander for such a period and that it was imperative to withdraw such personnel in the immediate future. The question of the Canadians being invited to take over the facilities was again raised, but it appeared that there was some doubt as to whether such an arrangement could be brought into effect.

S.O.A. No. 45 Group<sup>2</sup> pointed out that considerable numbers of civilians had already been engaged at Gander and the remaining number of R.A.F. personnel was comparatively small. In view of this latest disclosure S.6 was invited to press the Dominions Office to obtain agreement from the Newfoundland Government to take over facilities at Gander as quickly as possible. D.D.O.2<sup>3</sup> would thereafter notify all concerned of the target date for the hand over and for withdrawal of R.A.F. personnel.

S.O.A. No. 45 Group stated that he had received a signal from his Headquarters, stating that definite confirmation could not yet be given as to the target date of the 15th February being met for the handing over of Goose Bay to the R.C.A.F., but he indicated that the handing over would be achieved in the very near future. S.O.A. No. 45 Group was invited to report a firm date for effecting the handing over on his return to Canada.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> B. Humphreys Davies.

<sup>2</sup> Le capitaine de groupe D.W.F. Bonham-Carter.

<sup>3</sup> Le capitaine de groupe H. K. McIntyre.

<sup>2</sup> Group-Captain D. W. F. Bonham-Carter.

<sup>3</sup> Group-Captain H. K. McIntyre.



## SOUS-SECTION ii/SUB-SECTION ii

GANDER ET BOTWOOD

GANDER AND BOTWOOD

393.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 586

[St. John's,] September 10, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 470 Secret of 23rd June.<sup>1</sup> Defence of Air Bases. Power, Canadian Minister for Defence (Air), suggested in a telephone conversation with Emerson on 7th instant that Canada should take over control of Airports. This is first time Canadians have raised this question since Penson's conversation at Ottawa reported in our telegram No. 229 Secret of 30th April<sup>2</sup> and we do not know their reasons for raising it now.<sup>3</sup> May we assume that there is still no objection on your part to our expressing willingness to consider Power's suggestion favourably subject to stipulations in your telegram No. 374 of 5th June<sup>4</sup> and to adequate safeguards and assurances in relation to Trans-Atlantic flights including delivery flights. We should appreciate very early reply.

Skelton Papers 395

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au*  
*conseiller juridique*<sup>5</sup>

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to*  
*Legal Adviser*<sup>5</sup>

[Ottawa,] September 11, 1940

Attached is a copy of a letter<sup>6</sup> from Major Power regarding responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland. In view of the expenditure of Canadian funds there and the rights being obtained in other parts of Newfoundland by the United States, it was thought desirable by Council that Canadian rights position there should be made more definite.

Major Power's letter has been approved in general by Mr. King who has asked that a letter<sup>7</sup> be sent to the Government of Newfoundland. Perhaps some of the phrasing might be toned down.

<sup>1</sup> Document 119.<sup>2</sup> Document 72.<sup>3</sup> Voir le document 171.<sup>4</sup> Document 81.<sup>5</sup> J. E. Read.<sup>6</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>7</sup> La dépêche expédiée (document 395) était identique à la lettre de Power, sauf que cette dernière mentionnait que le gouvernement du Canada avait «assumé la responsabilité» de la défense de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 171.<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

<sup>7</sup> The despatch sent (Document 395) was identical with Power's letter except that the latter stated simply that the Government of Canada had "assumed responsibility" for the defence of Newfoundland.

395.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 7

Ottawa, September 13, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to invite your attention to the correspondence with regard to the defence of Newfoundland. The Government of Canada has assumed a very substantial degree of responsibility for that defence and units of the Canadian Active Service Force are now located in that country. A unit of the R.C.A.F. is located at Newfoundland Airport and the sum of \$1,370,000 is being expended by the Canadian Government to create additional air operating facilities at the Newfoundland Airport. When these facilities are ready, additional R.C.A.F. units will be located at the Airport. This Airport is owned and operated by the Newfoundland Government who have a Manager, a staff of meteorological, wireless, and other civilians on duty at the Airport.

During the period of hostilities it will be in the interest of all concerned for Canada to assume control of the Newfoundland Airport. It is desired, therefore, that the Government of Newfoundland be requested to discuss the following matters which affect the efficiency of the defence of Newfoundland:

- (a) The R.C.A.F. should take over complete control of the Newfoundland Airport including all buildings and equipment.
- (b) The R.C.A.F. should absorb the present staff of the Airport, either in a civilian or service capacity.
- (c) The Newfoundland and Canadian Governments should discuss their relative financial responsibilities in respect to the maintenance of the Airport during the period of the war.

Control of the Airport by the R.C.A.F. should in no way affect the use of local air facilities by British or Allied aircraft.

I should be very grateful if arrangements could be made to provide for discussion of the above matters at the earliest possible date.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON  
 for the Secretary of State  
 for External Affairs

396.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 606

[St. John's,] September 20, 1940

SECRET. We should appreciate immediate reply to our telegram No. 586 Secret of 10th September relative to suggestion that Canada should take over

control of Airports in Newfoundland. We have just received from Ottawa request that arrangements should be made to provide for discussion of the following matters at earliest possible date: . . .<sup>1</sup>

The communication adds that control of the Airport by the R.C.A.F. should in no way affect the use of local air facilities by British or allied aircraft. Proposed arrangements contemplated for period of hostilities. Important for many reasons we should reply to this proposal without delay.

397.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 768

[London,] September 24, 1940

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram No. 586, September 10th. Newfoundland Airports. We agree that question of control from Canada may be discussed with Canadian Government on basis proposed in my telegram No. 374, June 5th.<sup>2</sup> I will let you know if Air Ministry have any further observations on arrangements suggested in your telegram No. 606, September 20th.

398.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 47

St. John's, September 30, 1940

SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 47. Secret. Repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 628, and the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa, No. 45. Your despatch No. 7 of September 13th. Newfoundland airport, Glen-eagles seaplane anchorage and Botwood seaplane base are three separate air bases owned by the Newfoundland Government. United Kingdom Air Ministry has paid for whole cost of wireless equipment and five-sixths of other construction costs of these bases. The estimated net cost of maintenance and operation for the 12 months ending June 30th next, exclusive of wireless and meteorological services, is \$180,000 of which half met by the United Kingdom Air Ministry and half by the Newfoundland Government. This estimation ought to prove adequate to meet declining requirements of present situation. Cost of operation wireless services understood to be about \$100,000 per annum and is met entirely by the United Kingdom Air Ministry. Meteorological transport[?] provided and paid for by your Government. We have

<sup>1</sup> Ici suivait un résumé du document 395.

<sup>1</sup> Here followed a summary of Document 395.

<sup>2</sup> Document 81.

consulted His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regarding proposals contained in your despatch under reference. We shall be prepared to enter into discussion of details provided agreement can first be reached in regard to following fundamental points:

- (1) No part of any of latter's air bases to be handed over to control of a third party without prior consent.
- (2) No alterations to be made to existing lay-out of bases without prior consent of the Newfoundland Government.
- (3) Any damage to be repaired.
- (4) Control of bases to be handed back on termination of hostilities.
- (5) Control over area of Newfoundland airport now vested in Commissioner for Public Utilities by Act No. 19 of 1938 in regard to such municipal matters as permits for erection of new buildings and prevention of squatting to continue unimpaired.
- (6) Newfoundland personnel to be employed as far as practicable.
- (7) Preference to be given to materials manufactured or produced in Newfoundland sold at competitive prices.

As regards financial arrangements we assume that the Canadian Government would take over responsibility for the whole cost of maintenance and operation of the three bases including cost of wireless facilities as from date on which it takes over control. We consider it inexpedient and indeed impracticable to effect change-over before onset of winter when flying operations will be curtailed. At present time whole staff working under severe pressure and could not possibly divert their attention to problems arising in connection with change-over. Discussion of details might start in December with object of effecting change-over as soon as possible thereafter. It would probably be best for joint discussions to be conducted at St. John's.

399.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Boston, October 2, 1940

...

*Action by Canadian Air Force*

1 Flight B.R. aircraft now patrolling from Newfoundland; 48 Patrol planes reduced to 36, 12 to be accommodated by United States at leased Base. Site selected for 2 Squadrons. Site for third yet to be selected—depends upon site yet to be decided upon by R.C.N.

Flying off and parking space now available at Newfoundland airport and accommodation being erected for:

2 Squadrons of B.R. aircraft; 1 Squadron of Fighters; and 1 Flight of Target Towing aircraft.

...



400.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire au Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 838

[London,] October 17, 1940

SECRET. Your telegram No. 606 and your telegram No. 628<sup>1</sup> Secret of September 20th and September 30th respectively. Basis on which Newfoundland Airport and Seaplane Bases including all buildings and equipment may be transferred to complete control of Royal Canadian Air Force has been further considered in Air Ministry, and they wish to make it clear that their agreement to transfer is subject to following provisos:

- (a) Facilities at Airport and Seaplane Bases for British civil aircraft operating across North Atlantic or undertaking local flights to continue to be made available as required.
- (b) There will be no interference with plan for delivery by air of military aircraft across the Atlantic. This involves accommodation for aircraft and personnel at Newfoundland Airport, proposals for which will be submitted to Newfoundland and Canadian Governments as soon as possible. It involves also work by W.T. Station in connection with delivery flights.
- (c) Only such foreign undertakings as are at present authorized should be permitted to use Airport and seaplane bases and only to extent permitted by existing authorizations.
- (d) Royal Canadian Air Force should have regard to the fact that Air Port has been constructed at capital cost of over 900,000 pounds sterling, primarily for North Atlantic commercial air transport. Consequently no construction should be undertaken which will prejudice suitability of Airport for this purpose.
- (e) In view of its major financial interest in the Airport, H.M. Government in the United Kingdom will wish to be consulted as to basis on which division of financial responsibility will be determined. Financial discussions should take account of capital expenditure already incurred by H.M. Government in the United Kingdom on port installation.
- (f) Arrangement shall be limited to period of hostilities.

No objection to proposal to absorb present staff of Airport, either in civilian or service capacity, subject to consent of individuals concerned and consideration of position under existing contracts.

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<sup>1</sup> Document 398.

401.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Victoria, November 14, 1940

. . .

*Action by the Canadian Air Force*

After discussion with Captain Hill, U.S.N., and Captain Murray, R.C.N., it was decided to provide accommodation for 36 patrol planes at Botwood instead of 24 at Botwood and 12 at Canada Bay. The Department of Transport has been requested to survey this site and make an estimate of cost preparatory to proceeding with the necessary work when the respective Governments have ratified the Basic Plan.

. . .

402.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 774

[St. John's,] December 6, 1940

SECRET. Question of control of Airport arose in course of recent discussions here with Gibson, Canadian Minister for National Revenue.<sup>1</sup> No reply yet received to our telegram to Canadian Government repeated to you as No. 628 of 30th September but we gathered from Gibson that conditions as expressed in your telegrams 374 of 5th June<sup>2</sup> and 838 of 17th October likely to be generally acceptable to Canada subject to one important matter. Canadian Government apprehends criticism if it has to admit having spent some \$1,300,000 from Canadian funds on hutments for personnel and hangars for aircraft without security of tenure of sites after termination of hostilities. The infantry hutments are immediately south of railway at eastern end of flying field while the R.C.A.F. hutments and hangars are sited in the space between ends of runways 3 and 1. Hutments are of usual semi-permanent type while hangars have steel frames with timber walls. In view of expenditure from Canadian funds and extreme probability that these Airports will have to be defended even after hostilities cease we think we must give Canadian Government an assurance that we will leave them undisturbed in their occupation of these sites for a substantial period. Whether or not Canadian Government wishes to proceed with the idea of taking over control of these Airports for the duration of the war we propose to give them this assurance and we should be glad to be informed of your approval by telegram as early as possible.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 177.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 177.

<sup>2</sup> Document 81.

403.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 13, 1940

. . .

## DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

7. THE ASSOCIATE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that he had been somewhat concerned to learn from Brigadier Stuart, the Army member of the Canadian section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, that officers of the U.S. general staff were likely to propose that the United States be granted a long term lease, at or near the Newfoundland Airport. Unofficial intimations to this effect had been given during discussions regarding the provision of equipment, particularly anti-aircraft guns, for joint defence.

The Committee would recall that it had been agreed that the United States should establish bases on the Avalon Peninsula. It was now being suggested that this location would not be suitable and that the vicinity of the Airport would be preferable. The matter would be discussed at the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and Brigadier Stuart had been instructed not to give any grounds for believing that Canada would consent to such a proposal. It would be a mistake to permit the United States to take over a site in the vicinity of the Airport, which was occupied by Canadian forces. Such a site was not ours to grant, but we should not consent to any such proposal.

8. The Committee agreed with the view expressed by Mr. Power that Canada should not agree to the United States being granted sites for bases, at or in the vicinity of the Newfoundland Airport.

. . .

404.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 17, 1940

. . .

[4.] The members of the United States Section of the Board pointed out that in this two year interval before the new aerodrome facilities become available for use,<sup>1</sup> the Newfoundland airport is the only point at which United States Army air personnel can be trained for operations in New-

<sup>1</sup> Les installations devant être disponibles à Torbay où le CARC se proposait d'établir un aérodrome pour avions de chasse.

<sup>2</sup> The facilities to be made available at Torbay where RCAF was planning to establish a fighter aerodrome.

foundland. The climatic and operating conditions there are not duplicated elsewhere and therefore considerable unit training in the area is an essential prerequisite to any successful air operations.

The facilities which, it had been contemplated, Canada would provide for United States aircraft were at the Newfoundland airport, and were to consist only of hangar capacity for part of the total number of air planes, a camp site for emergency erection of tentage or portable housing, and portable machine shops and servicing equipment. This, however, it was pointed out, would not, as further reconnaissance makes clear, permit the continuous training in all seasons of sufficient United States air personnel to provide an adequate force in the event of an emergency situation of the type contemplated by the First Report.

Under these circumstances, two alternative courses were suggested. The first of these was that the character of the accommodation to be provided by Canada at the Newfoundland airport for United States use should be such as is considered essential by the force to be accommodated and should be of a more substantial character than was in contemplation in order that the composite group of 73 air planes could be operated for training purposes continuously throughout the year. The necessary expenditure for this purpose would be in excess of that originally contemplated.

The other alternative, and the one which the United States Service Members would prefer to see adopted, would be the leasing to the United States of an area adjacent to the Newfoundland airport, in which case the expense of erecting facilities for the training of the United States personnel might be borne by the United States.

The members of the Canadian Section of the Board fully appreciated the importance of the immediate training of United States Army air personnel under the conditions in which operations in Newfoundland would have to be carried on. They recognized, however, that a choice between the two alternatives was not one which concerned Canada alone, since if the second alternative were chosen, its adoption would depend upon negotiations between the United States and Great Britain.

It appeared to the Board that, since the proposed United States leased area would not include the landing field itself except for military purposes, the British-Canadian control of the use of the Newfoundland airport now and in the future would remain complete.

It was accordingly agreed that the Canadian Section should obtain from the Canadian Government and transmit to the United States Section, the decision of that Government as to whether it would prefer to assume the expense involved in the provision of adequate facilities or whether that the United States Government should initiate direct negotiations with the British Government with a view to the allocation of the suggested area on the understanding that if these negotiations were successful the Canadian Government would have no objection to any arrangements made being carried out.



405.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 18, 1940

. . .

## DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

1. THE ASSOCIATE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had informed him that the Board had now discussed the suggestion that the United States acquire bases in the vicinity of the Newfoundland Airport. Reference had been made to this at the last meeting of the Committee.

The Canadian representatives, in accordance with instructions, had indicated that the Canadian government would not favour such a proposal. The U.S. representatives had then suggested, as an alternative, that Canada agree to make accommodation and facilities at the Airport available to U.S. formations, for the purpose of operational training.

Approximately 78 aircraft and 1,000 men would be involved. It was contemplated that they would proceed to Newfoundland in February and remain there the year round. The construction of additional hutments and hangars would be required. Control of the Airport would continue to be vested in the R.C.A.F.

2. MR. POWER said that, in his opinion, the establishment of U.S. personnel and aircraft at the Airport would offer distinct advantages from the Canadian point of view, and should be permitted. Though such U.S. forces would not be committed to come to our assistance, their presence would inevitably constitute a much needed addition to the defensive strength of the Airport. At present Canada was not in a position to provide adequate air defence in this area.

3. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE expressed the view that if Canada were to agree to provide accommodation and facilities at the Airport, the United States should contribute to the cost, by way of rental or otherwise. Use by the United States of these facilities would be for their own defence purposes. It would be only reasonable, therefore, that they should assist in defraying the expenditure involved.

4. MR. POWER said that it might be preferable not to raise the question of contribution to the cost of additional accommodation. Canada did not wish to have any permanent U.S. establishment at or near the Airport and it would be unlikely that the United States would contribute to the expenditures involved without obtaining some share of jurisdiction and security of tenure. In any event Canada would eventually make use of the additional hangars and huts. The matter might, however, be discussed with the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Board.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER expressed agreement with Mr. Power. It now appeared that the enemy was preparing for a spring offensive. Activity in the Atlantic areas was not unlikely. The presence of U.S. aircraft and personnel in Newfoundland would give a sense of security in regard to our defence on the Atlantic. Canada had left her eastern coast exposed by sending all possible planes and ships to the assistance of the United Kingdom, in Europe.

6. After further discussion, the Committee approved in principle agreement on the part of Canada that the facilities of the Newfoundland Airport should be made available to U.S. air formations for operational training, and that the necessary additional accommodation, required for this purpose, should be provided. It was agreed that Mr. Power should discuss with Colonel Biggar the advisability of suggesting contribution by the United States to the cost involved.

...

406.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 72

Ottawa, December 19, 1940

Reference your telegram No. 47 of September 30th and our despatch No. 7 of September 13th, and memorandum of recent meeting at St. John's.<sup>1</sup>

1. Canadian Government has considered the seven fundamental points of your telegram No. 47 together with the one added at the recent meeting with reference to British civil aircraft and Trans-Atlantic delivery of military aircraft, and as regards Newfoundland Airport, the Canadian Government is prepared to agree on these points with the exception of Point 2. The wording of Point 2 as received here may be faulty, and we would ask you to clarify it so that it can also be considered and disposed of.

2. Still dealing with Newfoundland Airport exclusively, the Canadian Government is desirous of arriving at a final settlement at an early date under which control of this airport is assumed by Royal Canadian Air Force. As you have been informed, it would be desirable that title should be conveyed to Canada of the land occupied by hangars and hutments now being constructed. This would seem to be the most suitable way of dealing with this item, and the conveyance could be made subject to any suitable restrictions as to user, erection of buildings and repair of damage. Your serious attention is requested on this point before we revert to the alternative of a lease with restrictive covenants. Attention is again drawn to the very considerable financial commitments being assumed by Canada in the erection of hangars and other buildings.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 177.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 177.

3. The Canadian Government would welcome an expression of the views of the Newfoundland Government as to whether in the event of control being assumed as above, the Newfoundland Government would continue to make to Canada a contribution toward the maintenance and operation costs of the Airport, equivalent to the payment now being made by Newfoundland in this respect. The figures set out in your No. 47 of September 30th would seem to include Botwood and Gleneagles. May we be advised of the figures applicable to Newfoundland Airport only, if such can be stated.

4. If further reference is necessary to United Kingdom Government, may this be done as soon as possible so that agreement as to this Airport may be reached at an early date.

407.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 72

St. John's, December 28, 1940

SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, repeated to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 806. Your telegram No. 72, December 19th.

1. Point 2 of our telegram No. 47 of September 30th as follows. Begins. No alterations to be made to existing lay-out of bases without prior consent of Newfoundland Government. Ends.

We regard this condition as indispensable. Existing lay-out designed for trans-Atlantic services, and we must retain right to veto any proposal which would be prejudicial to those services. At the same time, our attitude will continue to be entirely co-operative in regard to defence of air port, in which Newfoundland and Canada are both interested.

2. In view of situation of hangars and hutments constructed, or now being constructed, at cost of Canadian funds, we could not agree to give Canada permanent title to land occupied by them. Subject to concurrence of United Kingdom, whose investment in air bases exceeds four and a half million dollars, we would agree to a lease for a substantial period (as to?) permanent buildings.

3. In the event of control being transferred as proposed, we would make some contribution towards operation and maintenance of cost, but we consider:

- (a) Our contribution, while Canada exercises control, should be substantially less than the cost we now bear, and
- (b) That the United Kingdom should be relieved of its contribution of cost of wireless services which it now bears in full.

As regards figures set out in our telegram No. 47, September 30th, sum of \$180,000 includes only \$8,000 for Botwood and nil for Gleneagles, in

respect of which no expenditure incurred in recent years. It is probable that operation and maintenance costs will have to be somewhat increased, and Control Officer reports cost of operation of wireless service, met entirely by Air Ministry, is \$104,000, not \$100,000 per annum. This last sum is of course additional to the \$180,000 cost of operation and maintenance.

4. Further reference to United Kingdom is necessary, but would serve no useful purpose until provisional understanding on main points has been reached as between Canada and Newfoundland. We await further communication from you.

408.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 1

[London,] January 1, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 807 of December 28th.<sup>1</sup> Secret. I agree that it is reasonable that Canadian Government should be given assurance of lease after termination of hostilities for period related to life of buildings.

We feel however that care should be taken to avoid any general commitment by Newfoundland Government in respect of post-war period in regard to defence arrangements concluded with Canada for duration of the war. You will appreciate importance of keeping open as far as possible position as regards arrangements to be made after the war as it will then be necessary to take into account not only general situation as left by the war but also possible constitutional developments in Newfoundland thereafter.

409.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, January 20, 1941

. . .

*Action by United States Army*

. . . Composition of 73 planes for Newfoundland Airport determined. Decision received that Canada would provide the facilities determined by the United States as necessary for operations of the 73 aeroplanes at Newfoundland Airport. . .

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



*Action by the Canadian Air Force*

Action has been taken to hasten construction of works and buildings at Newfoundland Airport, but bad weather, sickness and lack of shipping in the past has retarded construction. The contractor now has 800 men on the job. The contractor states he will have one double hangar ready for occupation and accommodation for 31 Officers and 200 men ready by 1st March, 1941.

. . .

Owing to weather conditions and conditions of the ground at Botwood, the engineers could not definitely locate a site, but the district inspector is arranging for more preliminary investigation, but final report cannot be made until conditions permit observations in the spring. Gander Lake should be considered as an alternative to Botwood as information received indicates that a suitable shore for slipways can be found on the north shore of Gander Lake reasonably close to the airport. Officers on the site have been requested to submit a report on a suitable site, including road connections to the Newfoundland Airport. Some facilities should be erected at Botwood to meet the emergency when boats might occasionally not get over the land to Gander. There is a good chain of lakes between Botwood and Gander.

. . .

410.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 5

Ottawa, January 20, 1941

Reference to your telegram of the 28th December, No. 72.

2. The Canadian Government now agrees with your Point 2 that no alterations be made of existing lay-out of bases without prior consent of Newfoundland Government. All your fundamental points have now been acceded to.

3. Canadian Government is prepared to accept a lease instead of a fee simple grant of lands on which R.C.A.F. buildings are being erected, provided the term of such lease corresponds reasonably to the life of the buildings being built thereon and subject to United Kingdom concurrence and subject to other details of the proposed transfer of control of airport being arranged to the satisfaction of the Governments concerned.

4. It is noted that your Government is prepared to make some contribution towards operation and maintenance costs, but that while Canada is exercising control this will be substantially less than formerly. In this connection the Canadian Government would like to make the following observations:

- (a) This Government has not in the past regarded the financial burden of the airport facilities as being necessarily inseparable from the:

operational control as witness our maintenance of the Meteorological Service in the past while operational control of the airport was in other hands.

- (b) The Newfoundland Government has stipulated and the Canadian Government has agreed that delivery of military aircraft across the Atlantic is a matter of paramount importance and that facilities are to be ensured for British Civil Aircraft undertaking Trans-Atlantic or local flights. The delivery of military aircraft overseas will quite possibly become an activity of some magnitude in the near future. It would seem to the Canadian Government to be equitable that the United Kingdom Government as well as Newfoundland should contribute in some measure to the cost of maintaining these facilities. The Canadian Government has in mind suggesting that a proportionate share of the cost of wireless services and maintenance be borne by the United Kingdom Government, even though operational control for defence purposes be in Canadian hands. The enterprise is a joint one and while the Canadian Government is prepared to assume the larger share of the burden, it is hoped that all the interested parties will co-operate.

5. In view of the fact that provisional understanding on the main points has been reached, we would hope that the matter may be referred to the United Kingdom at an early date so that final details can be disposed of and a definite date for take-over set.

411.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, January 21, 1941

. . .

2. The Board continued the discussion of the progress being made in providing facilities for United States aircraft in the Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland. Having reviewed the present status of the facilities which, in accordance with the approved Recommendation in the First Report of the Board are to be provided by Canada, the Board has agreed as its *Fourteenth Recommendation*:<sup>1</sup>

That most urgent priority should be given to the provision of facilities for at least one United States squadron of patrol planes at Halifax and one United States squadron in the Botwood area.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Approuvée par le gouvernement du Canada le 27 mars 1941.

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Government of Canada on March 27, 1941.

412.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 6

Ottawa, January 25, 1941

With reference to my telegram of January 20th. No. 5, and the agreement of the Canadian Government that no alterations be made of existing lay-out of Newfoundland Airport without prior consent of Newfoundland Government. In conformity with a recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and following urgent representations received from United States authorities as to the necessity for their forces having training and experience in the Newfoundland area, the Canadian Government has agreed to erect additional buildings at the Airport adequate for the accommodation and training of American composite group of approximately 300 officers, 1050 men and 73 aircraft. The cost will be borne by Canada. It is not intended that this will affect in any way the proposal that operational control of the Airport be assumed by R.C.A.F.

Detailed plans are not complete but are under consideration and will be discussed with Newfoundland authorities later. In the meantime, the Canadian Government would appreciate the Newfoundland Government signifying its general concurrence in the matter subject to details to be worked out.

413.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 62

[St. John's,] January 31, 1941

SECRET. Our telegram No. 50 Secret of 28th January, 1941<sup>1</sup>. We propose to reply to Ottawa telegram No. 5 on the following lines. We understand the position to be that Canadian Government (a) agrees with the seven fundamental points set out in our telegram to Ottawa repeated to you as No. 628 of 30th September, 1940, and elucidated in the case of point two by our telegram repeated to you as No. 806 of 28th December<sup>1</sup>; (b) agrees that there will be no interference with plan for delivery by air of military aircraft across the Atlantic or with facilities for British civil aircraft as stipulated in (a) and (b) of your telegram No. 838 of 17th October, 1940; (c) is prepared to accept a lease instead of a fee simple grant of lands on which Royal Canadian Air Force buildings are being erected subject to conditions specified in para. 3 of Ottawa telegram No. 5; (d) is prepared to assume the larger share of

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

the burden of the running cost of wireless services and maintenance and operation of the Air Bases at Gander, Botwood and Gleneagles. On the basis of this understanding we are prepared to proceed at once with negotiations with their officials with the object of disposing of final details and fixing a definite date for the handing over of the three bases subject to acceptance by the Canadian Government of a condition not explicitly mentioned by us in earlier telegrams, viz., the condition at (c) of your telegram No. 838. We propose to say also in our reply that we think that in all the circumstances a fair distribution of the financial burden would be for the United Kingdom to make a fixed contribution to Canada of \$25,000 per annum towards the cost of the wireless services and for the United Kingdom and Newfoundland jointly to make a further fixed contribution of \$50,000 per annum towards the maintenance and operation of the other services at the three bases, Canada being responsible for providing all further funds required and entitled to all rentals and other items of revenue while she is so responsible. We propose to add that the Newfoundland Government will hand over all equipment including surplus equipment for use at any of the above mentioned three bases or for safe custody at these bases, it being understood that no movable or immovable property is to be disposed of or removed from those bases without the consent of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments and that the proceeds of any agreed sales will be the property of those Governments. We would also tell Canada in advance of the negotiations as to details that Newfoundland Government expects to be allowed to retain such accounting personnel as may be mutually agreed on in order to provide for closing of accounts and completion of handing over proceedings, the cost of such personnel to be paid for by Canada. We should be grateful if you could see your way to authorise us to conclude this matter without further reference to you on the basis of this proposed reply and of any further conditions you may now direct us to lay down. The matter is urgent because we think it advisable to complete the handing over of these bases to Canada for the period of war before the Spring when we anticipate continuous demands for improved or additional facilities at the Airport which we shall be quite unable to supply from our own funds. As regards Ottawa telegram No. 6 we propose to agree that subject to consideration of details still to be worked out and on the understanding that no cost to Newfoundland exchequer will be involved we concur generally in proposals regarding accommodation for the training of United States air personnel. We will add that it is an indispensable condition of our concurrence that adoption of the proposals shall not involve any additional rights or privileges to the United States at Newfoundland air bases in regard to civil aviation over and above those which they already possess. We propose to remind Canada that consideration will have to be given to capacity of air bases to handle volume of additional air traffic likely to result before the proposals can be finally accepted by us. Please inform us as soon as possible whether you approve of this proposed reply and whether there are any special conditions which you would like us to lay down.



414.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, February 3, 1941

. . .

## NEWFOUNDLAND: ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATION FOR U.S. FORCES

15. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR stated that, following surveys which had been made, U.S. engineers had now reported that substantial additions would require to be made to accommodation which had been planned for U.S. aircraft and crews at the Newfoundland Airport. This additional accommodation involved estimated expenditure of \$4,000,000, beyond that which had already been authorized and undertaken by the Canadian government for this purpose.

16. MR. POWER said that despite the further substantial expense involved, he felt that it was justified by the importance, for the defence of Canada, of the presence of U.S. air forces in Newfoundland.

17. The Committee expressed general agreement with Mr. Power's recommendation in this respect, it being pointed out that the principle of providing for U.S. forces in Newfoundland, at Canadian expense, had already been approved.

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415.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 152

[London,] February 27, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram 31st January No. 62. Air Bases. It is hoped to send reply to first part very shortly. As regards last part Air Ministry are apprehensive that accommodation for training United States personnel may (in fact exclude?) R.A.F. requirements and would like to have views of Squadron-Leader Pattison on the subject before replying. Should be glad if you would communicate following message to him from Air Ministry. Begins.

Reference last part of telegram No. 62 of January 31st from Newfoundland Government about accommodation for United States Air personnel at Newfoundland Air Port we wish to know before agreeing to this proposal whether in your view Newfoundland Air Port would be able without hampering R.A.F. ferrying requirements to accommodate all the following:

- (a) R.A.F. and civilian personnel employed in connection with trans-Atlantic ferrying of American aircraft say 600 personnel and 40 aircraft at a time.

- (b) Such units of Royal Canadian Air Force as Canadian Government may wish to send, and
- (c) United States Military personnel which will number approximately 300 officers and 1,050 men together with 73 aircraft. Ends.

We should be grateful for early reply.

416.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des discussions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Buffalo, February 27, 1941

. . .

*Action by the Royal Canadian Air Force*

A senior officer of the United States Army Engineering Corps visited Ottawa and in consultation with the R.C.A.F. Engineers approved a building layout to meet United States requirements.

The contractor is arranging for the employment of an additional 1,500 men to speed up the construction programme.

A contract has been awarded for the new construction at Newfoundland Airport.

Detailed engineers report on progress available.

Engineers report available on Botwood and Gleneagles.

. . .

Botwood. A contract has been arranged for a construction company to commence work on this site as soon as surveys now being made are completed. There exists at this base one forty foot concrete slipway and refuelling facilities of 6,000 gallons. The Newfoundland Government have been requested to make these facilities available and to acquire the necessary lands. One squadron could operate from this base after the 1st of May if ship accommodation is available for personnel.

. . .

417.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 162

[London,] March 4, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram of 31st January No. 62. We agree that you should now proceed with negotiations for fixing definite date for handing over three bases<sup>1</sup> to the Canadian Government on conditions proposed by you, subject to following points.

<sup>1</sup> Gander, Botwood, Gleneagles.

On further consideration Air Ministry take the view that they must retain control of wireless station for duration of war in order to secure integration of Atlantic ferrying and civil signal organisations. They are prepared to bear cost of operation of station, subject to payment by Canadian Government for use latter may make of station for their own purposes but pending further enquiries are not yet in a position to suggest any figure.

Financial proposals proposed by you for services other than wireless are considered reasonable. Pension has suggested instead of annual contribution for United Kingdom and Newfoundland being fixed jointly at \$50,000 separate contributions of \$25,000 each should be proposed. We should have no objection to this.

418.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 126

[St. John's,] March 5, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 152 Secret of 27th February. Following is Pattison's reply to message from Air Ministry. Begins. Reference Air Ministry telegram re accommodation Airport. Only items being supplied R.C.A.F. and United States Air Corps are the use of the runway and building site thus as these organizations are supplying their own accommodation and service this does not affect ferry service accommodation. Original accommodation of Airport consists of one hangar and accommodation minimum permanent staff which is already inadequate. For ferry service additional accommodation for total of thirty has recently been provided thus accommodation under (a) in telegram referred to must be additional accommodation for which space is still available. The one hangar and the accommodation for thirty is all that is available for ferry service and additional requirements remain to be provided. The only doubt regarding hampering ferry service by the establishment of R.C.A.F. and United States is the possibility congestion aircraft on runway and in the air. This point was discussed by me with Canadian authorities and by the system of traffic control which it is proposed to establish it is considered that this objection will be satisfactorily overcome. Ferry service organizations have also been consulted regarding this traffic control and agree that situation can be satisfactorily overcome. For your information R.C.A.F. original plans for which camp is nearly completed have been modified. Camp will be enlarged on present site to accommodate forces under joint plan Ends. Woods proceeding to Airport tomorrow to discuss matter with Pattison and we will send our comments on Pattison's views after Woods returns. We suggest that you hold back your reply to first part of our telegram No. 62 Secret of 31st January until you receive our further telegram.

419.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Mémorandum du commissaire aux Services publics à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities to Commission  
of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 8 (a)-'41

[St. John's,] March 8, 1941

SECRET

With reference to my memo. P.U. 8-41,<sup>1</sup> our telegram to the Secretary of State No. 62, Secret, of 31st January, approved by minute 54-4 of 30th January,<sup>1</sup> and the following subsequent telegrams:

from S. of S. for D.A. No. 152, Secret, of 27th February

“ “ “ “ “ 162 “ “ 4th March

to “ “ “ “ “ 126 “ “ 5th March

relative to the proposed transfer of the Newfoundland Air Bases to Canada for the duration of the war, I annex two draft telegrams<sup>2</sup> to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

2. I advise that these telegrams should be despatched as soon as possible, as recent events have convinced me that the Canadian and United States Authorities are acting upon the assumption that the Air Bases at Gander, Gleneagles and Botwood are theirs to use and develop as they think fit without the Newfoundland and United Kingdom Governments having much say in the matter. The first draft telegram deals with the retention of Squadron-Leader Pattison's services by this Government and the second with proposals now afoot for Botwood and Gleneagles to be developed for the use of United States' flying boat squadrons. I consider it to be of vital importance for the Newfoundland Government to retain Squadron-Leader Pattison's services.

W. W. WOODS

420.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions  
Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 133

[St. John's,] March 10, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram of the 4th March No. 162 Secret. Before proceeding with negotiations we lay before you proposal to retain Pattison as representative of Newfoundland Government at the Airport and Botwood. He would (a) control wireless organisation which is to be operated on Air Ministry account as he does at present, (b) act as channel of communication on routine matters between Air Ministry and Newfoundland Airport, (c) act as liai-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Documents 420, 421.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



son officer between Air Ministry and the various Canadian and United States Authorities and (d) have a general watching brief on behalf of both the United Kingdom and the Newfoundland Governments in order to conserve their interests more particularly with reference to safety arrangements for trans-Atlantic flights and the civil rights of the Newfoundland Government at the Air Bases. Pattison informs us that he has been approached by the R.C.A.F. with an offer of a commission in that Force with the view to his becoming Officer Commanding R.C.A.F. at Newfoundland Airport. We wish to retain Pattison's services and consider that the value to us and the Air Ministry of his presence at the Airport would be seriously diminished if he became an officer of the R.C.A.F. We apprehend that many questions may arise affecting both the safety of trans-Atlantic flights and the interests of the Newfoundland Government in the Air Bases which we ought not to leave entirely in the hands of the R.C.A.F. and we consider that these interests can best be protected by retaining Pattison at the Airport in a position independent of the Canadian Government. Under our present proposal Pattison would have no powers of control over the Airport except in regard to the wireless organisation but he would be in a strong position for making representation to the R.C.A.F. Authorities in charge. We could not expect Pattison to accept such a position unless we offered him a permanent and pensionable appointment at a salary to be fixed in Canadian dollars, say, about \$5,000 per annum. The post should be included in the establishment of the Department of Public Works of Newfoundland and it would be fair that the United Kingdom Government should contribute say half the cost of such salary plus an addition to meet half the cost of Pattison's ultimate pension from Newfoundland. Without some such arrangement as this we apprehend that the interests of both the Newfoundland Government and the United Kingdom Government may suffer severely from the pressure arising from the special interests of the Canadian and United States Governments in Western Hemisphere defence and also from possible divergent interests in the matter of the trans-Atlantic Service. Please advise us most urgently whether you are prepared to approve this or some similar arrangement as R.C.A.F. are likely to press Pattison for an immediate answer to their offer of a Commission and we would like to inform Canadian Government of our intention to retain him before negotiations for fixing a definite date for handing over the three Bases to them are begun.

421.

NPA S-5-5-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 134

[St. John's,] March 10, 1941

SECRET. In continuation of our telegram No. 126 Secret of 5th March, 1941, we agree generally with Pattison's appreciation of the situation regarding

accommodation on the ground and in the air. We now understand that the United States personnel and aircraft are not being sent to the Airport solely for training purposes and that they will be there to implement defence schemes of the Joint Defence Board. We also understand from information obtained by Pattison in Ottawa that the Joint Defence Board have practically completed preparation of a scheme for establishing sea plane bases at Botwood and Gleneagles though no such proposal has yet reached this Government from either the Canadian Government or the United States Government. Our information is that these bases are intended for three United States flying boat squadrons. Generally we have the feeling that plans are being made as between the United States and Canadian Governments involving the use and development of our air bases without consultation with us during the formulation of such plans. These plans may be indicative of increased aid to Britain but we have no means of judging whether this is so or not. We pass on the information to you for your consideration before you inform us of your final wishes in regard to our reply to Ottawa telegram No. 6 of 25th January. This matter also should be treated as urgent.

422.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 11

Ottawa, March 13, 1941

1. A review of the present status of the more important items which have been the subject of discussion between the Newfoundland and Canadian Governments in connection with Canadian defence measures in Newfoundland and the responsibility of the Canadian Government therefor, reveals the fact that while there are a number of questions still unsettled and on which further negotiation will take place there is one matter of outstanding importance which awaits the decision of the Newfoundland Government. This refers to the request that the control of the Newfoundland Airport at Gander and the airports at Botwood and Gleneagles be turned over to the Royal Canadian Air Force for the period of hostilities. Similar control is now requested with reference to the additional airports and bases set out in paragraph 5 of this telegram.

2. Reference is made to the last paragraph of my telegram No. 5 of January 20th, and to my No. 6 of January 25th. These indicate the responsibility which the Canadian Government has assumed not only on its own account but also in connection with the recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in connection with Continental defence. Recent information is to the effect that the accommodation required by the United States Government

would need to be large enough to accommodate 3,420 officers and men instead of 1,350 as stated in my No. 6.

3. Every effort will be made by the Canadian Government to carry out its plans with the greatest expedition, including the decision to have the increased accommodation at Newfoundland Airport ready for occupation early in the coming summer. It will be appreciated however by the Newfoundland Government that the situation would be much clearer if the general principle of Royal Canadian Air Force control were settled at an early date.

4. It will be recalled that in your telegram No. 47 of September 30th, 1940, the Newfoundland Government laid down seven fundamental points on which agreement was to be reached following which the Newfoundland Government was prepared to enter into discussion of details. An eighth fundamental point in connection with the Trans-Atlantic ferrying of aircraft was added in the November-December discussions at St. John's. By my No. 72 of December 19th the Canadian Government expressed its agreement to all except point No. 2 the wording of which was at the time in doubt but agreement as to this latter point was expressed in my telegram No. 5 of January 20th. My No. 72 of December 19th referred to Newfoundland Airport exclusively but the Canadian Government now wishes to make it clear that the same eight fundamental points are agreed to with reference to Botwood, Gleneagles and Torbay insofar as they are applicable in these latter cases.

5. In order that you may be fully informed as to Royal Canadian Air Force plans the following is a consolidation of the requirements with respect to Newfoundland according to present plans.

- (a) Expansion of Newfoundland Airport to accommodate R.C.A.F. Station headquarters and one squadron and U.S. Army Air Corps composite group comprising headquarters and six squadrons.
- (b) Development of Botwood Seaplane base using present facilities to accommodate one U.S. Flying Boat Squadron as soon as possible and possibly an additional U.S. Flying Boat Squadron later.
- (c) Development of Seaplane base on Gander Lake at Gleneagles to accommodate one U.S. Flying Boat Squadron and possibly an additional Flying Boat Squadron.
- (d) Development of aerodrome at Torbay to accommodate R.C.A.F. headquarters and one squadron.
- (e) Establishment of refuelling bases in Northern Newfoundland and Labrador Coast at or near Canada Bay, Cartwright, Hopedale, North River, and Port Burwell.

6. The Canadian Government would greatly appreciate the Newfoundland Government giving this question preferred attention so that a decision may be received as to control of the airports at an early date. If general concurrence could also be expressed in the proposal made in my No. 6 of January 25th, as to additional buildings it would be of the greatest satisfaction to this Government.

423.

Skelton Papers 385

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 13

St. John's, March 15, 1941

We will reply to your telegram No. 11 of March 13th, re control of air bases, on receipt of replies to certain questions which we have put to the United Kingdom Government. We expect these replies very shortly.

424.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 209

[London,] March 18, 1941

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram 10th. March No. 134. We are prepared to accept proposal for accommodation of United States forces at Newfoundland Airport on the understanding that you are satisfied their presence will not in any way impede Air Ministry's programme for Ferry Service or Trans-Atlantic Civil Aviation Service.

Canadian Government are being asked by Canadian High Commissioner to let us know whether any recommendations affecting Newfoundland have been made by Joint Defence Board since meeting attended by Penson and Emerson and to repeat their reply to you.<sup>1</sup> We understand from Canadian representatives here that it is intended that United States forces should use Air Port and also seaplane bases at Botwood and Gleneagles in first place for training purposes and subsequently for implementation of defence schemes of Joint Defence Board. We are proposing to take up through High Commissioner at Ottawa method of enabling Newfoundland Government to be kept in touch with future deliberations of Board which may affect Newfoundland.

Reply will be sent as soon as possible to your telegram No. 133 regarding Pattison.

425.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 14

St. John's, March 25, 1941

SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 14, repeated to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, No. 163. In

<sup>1</sup> La seule recommandation à ce sujet était la quatorzième. Voir le document 411.

<sup>1</sup> The only such recommendation was the fourteenth. See Document 411.



continuation of my telegram No. 13 of March 15th, and with further reference to your telegram No. 11 of March 13th, we understand position to be that the Canadian Government:

- (a) Agree with 7 points set out in my telegram to you No. 47 of September 30th, 1940, and elucidated in the case of point 2 by my telegram to you No. 72 of December 28th;
- (b) Agree that facilities at airports and seaplane bases for British civil aircraft operating across the North Atlantic or undertaking local flights, will continue to be made available as required.
- (c) Agree that there will be no interference with plans for delivery by air of military aircraft across the Atlantic, such plans involving accommodation for aircraft and personnel at the expense of the United Kingdom Government;
- (d) Is prepared to accept a lease instead of a fee simple grant of lands on which R.C.A.F. buildings are being erected, subject to conditions specified in paragraph 3 in your telegram No. 5 of January 20th;
- (e) Is prepared to assume larger share of the burden of cost of maintenance and operation of air bases at Gander, Botwood and Gleneagles.

2. On the basis of above understanding, and subject to the two conditions set out in immediately succeeding sentences, we are prepared to proceed at once with negotiations with your officials with the object of disposing of details and fixing a definite date for handing over of three bases at Gander, Botwood and Gleneagles for period of hostilities. The Government of the United Kingdom now consider Air Ministry must retain control of existing wireless organisations for the duration of the war, in order to secure integration of Atlantic ferrying and civil signal organisations, and we must make this a condition of the proposed transfer. The United Kingdom Government have also asked us to stipulate that only such foreign undertakings as are at present authorized shall be permitted to use airport and seaplane bases, and only to extent permitted by existing authorizations, and we have agreed to make this stipulation a condition of the transfer.

3. The following are points which we wish to raise, but these may be reserved for further discussion at conference.

United Kingdom and Newfoundland to make fixed contribution of \$25,000 per annum each to Canada towards maintenance and operation of three bases, apart from cost of wireless organisation, which is to continue to be controlled and paid for by Air Ministry, Canada being responsible for providing all further funds required for maintenance and operation of three bases, and entitled to all rentals and other items of revenue while she is so responsible. If Canada makes use of Air Ministry wireless organisation, Canada should pay to Air Ministry a sum to be agreed on in respect of such use.

4. The Newfoundland Government propose to hand over to Canada its equipment at three bases, including surplus equipment (but excluding small power boat at Botwood and power boat at Gleneagles) for use at any three bases above mentioned or for safe custody at those bases provided that Canada will agree that no movable property is to be disposed of or removed from those bases, and no immovable property is to be disposed of without the consent of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments, and will also agree that proceeds of any agreed sales will be the property of those Governments.

5. The Government find it necessary to retain control over the two power boats mentioned, as they may be required for use exclusively in connection with trans-Atlantic flights.

6. The Newfoundland Government will raise at conference without prejudging question whether civil hangar should not be reserved exclusively for use of planes on trans-Atlantic flights.

7. We shall suggest at the conference that Newfoundland Government shall retain such accounting personnel as may be mutually agreed on as necessary to provide for closing accounts and completion of handing over proceedings, the cost of such personnel being deducted from first year's contribution of \$50,000 payable by United Kingdom and Newfoundland.

8. We concur generally in proposal regarding accommodation at Newfoundland Airport for Canadian and United States personnel and aircraft, outlined in your telegram No. 6 of January 25th, and in paragraph 5 (a) of your telegram No. 11, on the understanding that adoption of these proposals will not involve any additional rights or privileges to United States at Newfoundland air bases, in regard to civil aviation, over and above those which they already possess or may otherwise acquire.

9. As regards developments indicated in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 11, we have had no previous intimation that these proposals have been under consideration, and we should have liked to have received much more information before agreeing to them, even in principle. However, we are prepared to acquiesce in these developments on the understanding that we shall be given an opportunity to examine details of developments before land is acquired or work of any kind is commenced.

10. None of the foregoing is intended to apply to Canadian aerodrome developments at Torbay, or to proposed refuelling bases in northern Newfoundland and Labrador, referred to in paragraph 5 (d) and (e) your telegram No. 11, regarding which a separate communication will be addressed to you in due course. We do not anticipate any difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory agreement in regard to terms on which R.C.A.F. will control and operate these bases.

11. We assume negotiations settling details and fixing date of taking over had best be conducted at Newfoundland airport. The Newfoundland representatives will probably consist of the Commissioner of Public Utilities, Squadron-Leader Pattison, and a member of the legal staff, whose name will

be communicated later, together with such clerical and other staff as it may be found necessary to bring from St. John's. Accommodation for these personnel in already over-crowded civil quarters at airport will be difficult, but can be arranged as soon as R.C.A.F. officers can vacate rooms in civil administration buildings now occupied by them. Please advise us of names of your representatives and date on which it is proposed that they shall arrive at airport.

12. For your information we have decided, in agreement with the United Kingdom, that Pattison shall remain in the employment of the Newfoundland Government as Officer in Charge, Air Ministry wireless organisation in Newfoundland, and as liaison officer between Newfoundland Government, R.C.A.F. and Air Ministry, particularly with reference to trans-Atlantic flights. He will, of course, cease to have general charge of administration of airport.

13. We should be grateful if you would supply a copy of this telegram to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada.

426.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 27, 1941

. . .

3. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported that a reply had been received from the Governor of Newfoundland, to the telegram sent him following the Committee's meeting on March the 15th, regarding control of airports and other matters relating to joint defence.

(See Telegram No. 14, of March 25th, 1941, from the Governor of Newfoundland St. John's, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.)

While general agreement had been reached upon the principal matters involved, a number of subsidiary questions remained to be settled, and others would arise as plans developed. In the circumstances, it was important that Canada should be represented in Newfoundland by some one who could consider such questions, on the spot, with representatives of Newfoundland and the United States.

4. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE agreed, and suggested that, at the outset, Canada be represented by the Minister of National Revenue. Later on a more permanent agent could be appointed.

5. After some discussion, it was agreed that the Minister of National Revenue be requested to go to Newfoundland to represent the government in the settlement of outstanding questions, that Mr. Gibson be accompanied

by Mr. Dyde, the Secretary of the Defence Council, and that the matter of more permanent representation be deferred.

6. MR. POWER submitted, and the Committee approved, subject to concurrence of the Department of External Affairs, a draft telegram to the Governor of Newfoundland, with further reference to the conditions of Canadian control of Newfoundland airports.

(See draft telegram of March 27th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, to the Governor of Newfoundland, St. John's.)

. . .

427.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 17

Ottawa, April 1, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 14 of March 25th reference Newfoundland Airports.

1. (a) The Canadian Government has previously expressed concurrence in the 7 points alluded to in your sub-paragraph (a) and now confirms such concurrence. See my No. 72 of December 19th and my No. 11 of March 13th.
- (b) The Canadian Government has already expressed general concurrence in the eighth point which you have set out in two-sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) and now confirms these points as expressed in the said two sub-paragraphs.
- (c) Sub-paragraph (d) is concurred in.
- (e) The statement made in my No. 5 of January 20th that the Canadian Government was prepared to assume the larger share of the burden was qualified by the further remarks made in the same telegram, and was of course made before we were informed of the new stipulations and conditions which are now added by paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 14. The Canadian Government is still prepared to assume the larger share of the cost of maintenance and operation of the air bases at Gander, Botwood and Gleneagles, but wishes to point out that this cannot be taken to mean that we will

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



be responsible for the cost of facilities the control of which is not granted to the Canadian Government under the terms of the final transfer.

2. The Canadian Government notes the stipulations contained in paragraph 2 of your telegram, and which are now made conditions of the transfer of control. The Canadian Government concurs in the retention of control by the Air Ministry of the existing wireless organizations for the duration of the war. The stipulation regarding foreign undertakings is also concurred in. In this connection the Canadian Government has already agreed to your fundamental points and special reference is made to points (1) and (2) of your telegram No. 47 of September 30th which were agreed to previously and according to the terms of which our requests for increased accommodation for U.S. aircraft and personnel were made.

3. Your concurrence in the proposal of the Canadian Government regarding increased accommodation for Canadian and U.S. personnel and aircraft as expressed in paragraph 8 of your telegram is noted. The Canadian Government agrees that the adoption of the Canadian proposals in this connection will not involve additional rights or privileges to the United States at Newfoundland air bases in regard to civil aviation over and above those which they already possess or may otherwise acquire.

4. The Canadian Government regrets that you should have had no intimation previous to my telegram No. 11 of March 13th of the requirements at Botwood and Gleneagles as mentioned in paragraph 9 of your telegram. The arrangements contemplated by these additional requirements have been matters of recent development however and our request in this connection was made as promptly as possible after the Canadian Government was itself aware of the needs of the situation. Your concurrence in these developments is noted subject to your being given an opportunity to examine details of developments before land is acquired or work of any kind is commenced. The Canadian Government will be pleased to extend this opportunity fully to the Newfoundland Government.

5. The Canadian Government concurs in the suggestion that the negotiations to settle details and fix the date of taking over should be conducted at Newfoundland Airport, and feels it desirable to arrange such a meeting at the earliest possible date. A further telegram<sup>1</sup> will follow containing names of Canadian representatives and date on which it is proposed that they shall arrive at airport. In the meantime, it is hoped that the further communication with reference to Torbay which your paragraph 10 states is being sent in due course can be received.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

428.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Services publics à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities to Commission  
of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 8(c)-'41

[St. John's,] April 11, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

With reference to my memo P.U. 8(b)-'41 of 21st March, 1941,<sup>1</sup> our telegram No. 14 of 25th March, 1941, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, and telegram No. 17 of 1st April, 1941, from the latter to us, all relative to the proposed transfer of control of the air bases to Canada for the period of hostilities, I have to report to my colleagues that I went to the Newfoundland Airport on Sunday the 7th April with Mr. Bernard Summers, Secretary for Justice, to meet the Hon. C. W. G. Gibson, Canadian Minister of National Revenue. On our arrival we found that the Minister had already arrived with Mr. H. A. Dyde, Secretary of the Defence Council of Canada, Major Hugh Lunsden and Wing-Commander Bryan, R.C.A.F. Mr. Summers, Squadron-Leader Pattison and I had an informal conversation with the Minister on Sunday evening. Formal meetings began on Monday morning (8th) and continued almost without interruption throughout that and the two subsequent days. All of us, except Squadron-Leader Pattison, came to St. John's on Thursday (11th).

2. It will be noted that in para. 5 of telegram No. 17 Secret of 1st April the Canadian Government "concur in the suggestion that negotiations to settle details and fix date of taking over should be conducted at the Newfoundland Airport and feels it desirable to arrange such a meeting at the earliest possible date". In fact the subjects of discussion were mainly those which govern the broad lines of the transfer and the decisions provisionally reached (subject, of course, to the approval of our Governments) did not do much more than clarify, confirm, and in some cases, develop the decisions which had already been approved by the Dominions Office and ourselves in the course of our telegraphic correspondence, though some of these decisions had been left open to further discussion.

3. The decisions reached at the Conference are recorded in a draft memorandum of an Agreement of which a copy is hereto annexed.<sup>1</sup> I will offer some comments on this draft memorandum in later paragraphs.

4. It became evident in the course of our conversations with the Minister that the object of his visit to Newfoundland was something more than the disposal of the question of the transfer of the bases. It transpired that he was to go to St. John's and wait there until he received a communication from Ottawa which would inform him of the results of a discussion about to take place in the Joint Defence Board in regard to the command of the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

forces in Newfoundland in the event of circumstances making it necessary or desirable for a single command to include U.S. forces.<sup>1</sup> Although, as the draft memorandum shows, the decisions reached are all decisions arising out of the proposed transfer of the air bases the actual discussions were dominated by what became a veritable "King Charles' head", the possibility that the U.S.A. would try to obtain a dominating position (more especially in regard to problems involved in the use of land and air forces) in Newfoundland. It was impossible to find out definitely what was at the bottom of this preoccupation on the part of the Canadians—whether it was mainly a purely professional distaste of being "bossed" by Americans or whether it had a deeper origin in fear that the U.S. will adopt a policy deliberately aimed at drawing Newfoundland out of the British Commonwealth into the orbit of the United States. Whenever the Canadians thrust this preoccupation into our discussions, as they frequently did, we adopted the line of refusing to contemplate anything but the existence of a sovereign Government of Newfoundland forming part of the British Empire. The Commission of Government will no doubt hear more of all this while the Canadian Minister is in St. John's.

5. Para. 1 of the draft memorandum. This contains what is by far the most important point in the document, viz., transfer of the "control" of the air bases to Canada for the duration. Much may depend on the meaning and significance given to that word. No attempt has been made to define it as we thought a definition would be dangerous. The Canadian Minister wanted the para to provide for the transfer of control of "the airport area" and he seemed to think that this would secure to Canada a degree of control over the whole airport area (5 miles in all directions from the Railway Station) which, in our view, would subtract something from the complete sovereignty of the Government of Newfoundland. It was all somewhat nebulous and in the end they agreed to accept "control of the Newfoundland Airport" provided we inserted words indicating that the transfer is "for purposes of defence". We saw no harm in these words. It is a correct statement that the air bases are being transferred "for purposes of defence" but saying so does not give the Canadian forces any powers they would not have if we did not say it. No doubt the Canadian forces will have certain rights in the airport area of a military character, but these will derive, not from this document, or from the transfer of the air bases, but from the ordinary law of the land which gives certain rights in time of war to any of the forces of the Crown stationed in Newfoundland. These rights they already have.

6. Para. 2. As regards [sub-]para. 6(b), the Newfoundland Government employees at the air bases are all on a temporary non-pensionable basis and we have no obligation to provide them with continued employment which we

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<sup>1</sup> Voir la partie 5 C.

<sup>1</sup> See Part 5 C.

can ask the Canadians to take over. The agreement to continue existing personnel in employment "so far as practicable" is, I think, as much as we can expect. The rest of para. 2 is in harmony with the telegraphic correspondence.

7. Para. 3 deals with Squadron-Leader Pattison's position.

8. Para. 4. The Air Ministry decision to retain control of its wireless organization at the air bases introduced some complications into the problems arising out of the transfer, of which one is the necessity for covering the provision of services required by that organization, e.g., electric light and power and housing and feeding its staff on uneconomic terms. Acceptance by Canada of an obligation to provide these services on payment of cost up to a maximum sum of \$25,000 per annum is, I think, a good bargain for the Air Ministry. This item of the agreement will be separately reported to the Dominions Office.

9. Paras. 5 and 6 deal on lines already agreed with civil use of the bases, including use by the Atlantic Ferry Organization on behalf of the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

10. Para. 7 is important because it fixes at 50 years the tenure of the sites of the R.C.A.F. buildings. These are substantial buildings. No security of tenure is promised in the case of the Infantry buildings. In order to provide for the future requirements of Civil Aviation in the matter of space for buildings we insisted on the right being given to the Newfoundland Government to take back after the war the area on the west side of the flying field between the Railway and the runways on payment of compensation for Canadian buildings on this area.

11. Para. 8 deals with the maintenance of the Newfoundland Government buildings to be transferred and with their return at the end of hostilities.

12. Paras. 9 and 9A deal with sites for bombing ranges and bomb storage.

13. Paras. 10 and 11 deal with the transfer of Newfoundland Government equipment.

14. Paras. 12 and 13. The contribution of \$25,000 each from the United Kingdom and the Newfoundland Governments<sup>1</sup> was considered very small by the Minister and Mr. Dyde, but they expressed the opinion that the Canadian Government could only leave it to us to decide what we could pay. I explained the difficulty we found in carrying out our resolve to manage without a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom and the great importance from the point of view of the sterling-dollar exchange of our succeeding in doing so.

15. Paras. 14 and 15 record agreement in regard to the establishment of an aerodrome at Torbay and of refuelling bases in Newfoundland and Labrador. These paras. are a little out of place in this document, but the Canadian Minister pressed for their inclusion and there is no harm in them.

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<sup>1</sup> Il s'agissait de \$25 000 annuellement devant servir à l'entretien de la base.

<sup>1</sup> It was \$25,000 annually toward the cost of maintaining the base.



16. Para. 16 reproduces a stipulation about use of the air bases by foreign undertakings made by the Air Ministry.

17. Para. 17 records our acceptance of the arrangement by which Canada will carry out developments at the air bases for the accommodation of U.S. personnel and aircraft. We have already agreed to this.

18. Para. 18 commits us to giving the Canadians some sites for quite reasonable, indeed absolutely necessary, purposes.

19. Para. 19. These paras. really have nothing to do with the transfer of the air bases but here again we agreed to their inclusion as they contain only what is quite reasonable and proper.<sup>1</sup>

20. Para. 20 emphasizes our intention to take back the air bases at the end of the war and to use them to further Empire interests in Civil Aviation.

21. Para. 21 deals with the date of transfer. I understand that a new O.C. and staff will go to the Airport almost at once to discuss a *modus operandi* for the transfer with Squadron-Leader Pattison.

W. W. WOODS

429.

Privy Council 18 D-19-1

*Mémorandum du greffier du Conseil privé au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Clerk of the Privy Council to Prime Minister*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 12, 1941

CANADA-NEWFOUNDLAND AGREEMENT REGARDING AIR BASES

The Cabinet War Committee considered on Wednesday afternoon the partial text of a proposed agreement with Newfoundland, which had been received by telegram from Mr. Gibson. So far as it went, the partial text was regarded by the Committee as satisfactory, subject to clarification of certain of its provisions.

The remainder of the proposed text was subsequently received, and, after its examination by the Air Staff, I prepared yesterday, at Mr. Power's request and in consultation with Robertson and Keenleyside, a draft telegram from Mr. Power to Mr. Gibson, requesting clarification of a number of provisions and stating that the proposed agreement was receiving consideration from the viewpoint of general government policy and the financial commitments involved.

<sup>1</sup> Ces paragraphes se lisaient ainsi:

<sup>1</sup> These paragraphs read:

The Newfoundland Government agrees:

(a) that the present status of the area of and surrounding the Newfoundland Airport as a prohibited area under the defence regulations shall not be altered except by prior arrangement with the Canadian Government; and

(b) the Newfoundland Department of Customs will not issue permits to fly over any part of Newfoundland without prior consent of the Commanding Officer R.C.A.F. Newfoundland.

A copy of the proposed text has been sent to Mr. Ilsley for examination by officers of his department, of the financial aspects of the Agreement. The principal question of policy involved relates to the effect of the agreement upon Canada's post-war position *vis-à-vis* Newfoundland and the provisions of the agreement have been considered from this viewpoint by Robertson and Keenleyside.

Attached are:

1. A copy of the draft text<sup>1</sup>,
2. A copy of Mr. Power's telegram<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Gibson and,
3. A note prepared by Robertson and Keenleyside on the policy question.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

1156-D-39

*Mémorandum du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim  
aux Affaires extérieures au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum by Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] April 12, 1941

CANADA-NEWFOUNDLAND AIR BASE AGREEMENT

1. It would seem to be politically desirable that this Agreement should not appear to place Canada in a position in Newfoundland less favourable than that accorded to the United States by the Agreement of March 27, 1941. That Agreement granted the United States certain leaseholds for a period of ninety-nine years.\*

2. It would also be politically desirable that the Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland should not prejudice Canadian freedom of action *vis-à-vis* Newfoundland in the post war period.\*\*

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

\* Notes telles que dans l'original:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

\* Notes as in original:

Would the Prime Minister wish to express his views on the subject before leaving Ottawa, for the direction of the War Committee and Mr. Gibson, or will conclusion of the agreement have to be deferred for a full meeting of the War Committee, upon Mr. King's return?

A. D. P. H[EENEY]

I have carefully read all the terms of the proposed agreement, also the queries. If the latter are answered to the satisfaction of Mr. Power and Mr. Ilsley, I see no need to defer conclusion of the matter for full meeting of Committee. If on other hand there should be delay of more than present week in answering their queries satisfactorily, the agreement in final form might be held for approval till meeting of whole Committee possible. Everything would depend on whether point of difference were vital, or merely one of procedure or the like.

W. L. M. K[ING] 13.4.41

\*\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\*\* Note as in original:

I agree. K[ING]

3. On the first point critics may refer to the fact that whereas the United States Agreement provides for 99 year leases the Canadian Agreement stipulates that control of the air bases shall be handed back at the termination of hostilities and that leases shall be for a period of 50 years. The answer to this criticism is that the two Agreements are designed for different purposes. The Agreement with the United States specifies in exact detail the precise rights and obligations of the United States Government over certain minutely specified areas. The Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland has to do only with arrangements for control and operation of certain air defence facilities and does not touch the larger commitments that Canada has undertaken for the defence of Newfoundland as a whole. In other words, it is a specification of certain arrangements for the effective accomplishment of a common service operation to which Newfoundland and the United Kingdom will contribute, although Canada will have control. It does not attempt to spell out a solution for all the problems involved in Canadian-Newfoundland relations.

4. There does not appear to be anything in the Agreement which could prevent Canada from exercising complete freedom of decision in regard to political or other relationships with Newfoundland in the post-war period.

430.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires  
extérieures au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Acting Under-Secretary of State for External  
Affairs to Prime Minister*

[Ottawa,] April 12, 1941

With further reference to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's secret letter of April 8th<sup>1</sup> regarding the steps the United States Government are taking to strengthen Newfoundland defences immediately, I am enclosing copy of a memorandum on arrangements for the reception of additional United States forces which the Minister of National Defence for Air has received from the Chief of the Air Staff.

Shall I prepare a reply to Mr. MacDonald's letter, thanking him for the information it contained and advising him that the Canadian forces in Newfoundland will co-operate fully in making arrangements for the reception of the United States advance party?\*

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

<sup>1</sup> Document 153.

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

Please. K[ING] 13.IV.41

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

Privy Council, 18, D-19-1

*Mémorandum du chef de l'état-major de l'Air au ministre  
de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Memorandum from Chief of the Air Staff to Minister of  
National Defence for Air*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 10, 1941

Reference correspondence hereunder on U.S. forces proceeding to Newfoundland.

1. Our military Attaché at Washington has advised that 52 officers and 415 other ranks are proceeding to Newfoundland Airport about the 20th of April, to be followed by six twin-engine aircraft when the main party is settled in.

2. The Director of Works and Buildings has stated that accommodation will be available by April 20th, as follows:

R.C.A.F. Squadron, 50 officers, 300 other ranks,

U.S. Squadron, 57 officers, 575 other ranks.

and messing accommodation will be available for 110 officers and 450 other ranks and will serve both R.C.A.F. and U.S., in two sittings.

3. A.M.A.S. was in touch with the War Department and arranged as follows. That an advance party of five officers and 25 other ranks should proceed to Newfoundland well ahead of the main party, the officer in charge to call on the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, who has confirmed that the advance party can be accommodated with equipment now on the spot. The main party should not proceed until the advance party are ready to receive them and the main party will bring their own barrack equipment, ordnance stores and rations. The main party will not arrive at Newfoundland Airport until the 29th or 30th at the earliest. Any other U.S. forces arriving will have to bring their own kitchen equipment, ordnance stores, bedding, etc.

L. S. BREADNER

Air Vice-Marshal

431.

1156-D-39

*Le chef d'état-major général au ministre suppléant de la Défense  
nationale*

*Chief of the General Staff to Acting Minister of National  
Defence*

SECRET

Ottawa, April 15, 1941

Reference Telegram WFS. 554 attached.<sup>1</sup>

1. This telegram presumably was despatched by the Hon. Colin Gibson to the Minister of National Defence.

2. Brigadier Stuart received separate information from the U.S. Army member of the Joint Defence Board on Sunday, 13th April, that instructions

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



had been issued to Colonel Welty, Commanding U.S. Troops in Newfoundland, to carry out a reconnaissance of Airport from the point of view of additional U.S. troops which he might deem necessary to assist the defence thereof on the basis of co-operation with Canadian Forces.

3. I discussed with Brigadier Stuart and Brigadier Pope the undesirability of this form of unilateral "co-operation" on the part of the U.S. War Department prior to their departure for Montreal on Sunday evening. The provision of additional U.S. troops, for responsibilities in areas in Newfoundland which are presently definitely Canadian, has not been discussed previously either in Joint Defence Board or between Governments so far as I am aware. This decision on the part of the U.S. War Department to arrange "co-operation" without previous discussion tends to complicate an already involved situation. Brigadiers Stuart and Pope were instructed to stress these views at the meeting which they are now attending.

4. This matter was also raised by me at the conference this afternoon under the Chairmanship of Dr. Keenleyside at which Newfoundland representatives were present. Dr. Keenleyside has left this afternoon for Montreal where the complete Joint Defence Board is now assembling. This matter will undoubtedly be fully discussed before the termination of the meeting and we should be better in a position to decide on future policy and action when the Canadian members have returned to Ottawa and reported the proceedings.

5. I informed the G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command this morning by telephone of the situation which was developing and told him that I hoped for clarification of our position in the course of the next few days.

6. I suggest that an "Immediate" telegram along the following lines should be despatched by you to the Hon. Colin Gibson:

Hon. Colin Gibson,  
c/o Commanding Canadians,  
St. John's, Newfoundland.

Your WFS. 554 information concerning instructions to Commander U.S. Troops received here thirteenth and matter will be fully discussed at meeting Joint Defence Board being held this week Montreal. Significance of proposed fully appreciated.

H. D. G. CRERAR  
Major-General

*Décret du Conseil*  
*Order in Council*

432.

P.C. 2664<sup>1</sup>

April 16, 1941

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 16th April, 1941<sup>2</sup>, from the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs,

<sup>1</sup> Une copie du décret du Conseil fut envoyée au ministère des Affaires extérieures le 18 avril.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> A copy of the Order in Council was sent to the Department of External Affairs on April 18.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

representing, with the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence for Air that it is expedient that an Agreement should be concluded with the Government of Newfoundland with regard to the transfer of control of the air bases of the Government of Newfoundland at Gander, Glencables and Botwood to the Government of Canada upon terms which have been agreed to in principle by telegraphic and other correspondence terminating on the third day of April, 1941, and at meetings which were held at the Newfoundland Airport on Monday the 7th, Tuesday the 8th and Wednesday the 9th days of April, 1941, and which have been embodied in the draft Agreement, a copy of which is hereunto annexed<sup>1</sup>.

The Minister, therefore, with the concurrence as aforesaid, recommends that the Honourable Colin William George Gibson, Minister of National Revenue, be hereby authorized to sign and conclude on behalf of the Government of Canada an Agreement with the Government of Newfoundland based upon the hereunto annexed draft.

The Committee advise that the requisite authorization be granted accordingly.

A. D. P. HEENEY

433.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH

St. John's April 18, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 3 of 15th March, 1941,<sup>2</sup> and of the Blueprint showing the proposed lay-out of works and buildings at the Newfoundland Airport referred to in that despatch.

2. It is regretted that the Newfoundland Government is unable to express its unqualified consent to the execution of the plans indicated in the blue print, as it is considered that there are serious objections to the proposed camp opposite the existing married quarters. The grounds of these are indicated in the annexed copy of a letter addressed to the Hon. Colin Gibson, M.C., Minister of National Revenue, during his recent visit to St. John's. We also invite the attention of the Government of Canada to the necessity for seeking the approval of the Newfoundland Government for changes of the lay-out of any of the three air bases sufficiently in advance of the commencement of construction operations to afford the Newfoundland Government a reasonable time in which to examine the proposed changes in consultation with its own advisers and to reach a decision before work is started.

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice E.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix E.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

3. It is hoped that it may be possible to modify the proposals now under consideration so as to avoid prejudicially affecting the site which it was intended to reserve for further married quarters. This should be the subject of discussion in the first instance between representatives of the Government of Canada and Squadron-Leader Pattison, the Aerodrome Control Officer.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

[PIÈCE JOINTE / ENCLOSURE]

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au ministre du Revenu national*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to Minister of National Revenue*

[St. John's,] April 17, 1941

Dear Colonel Gibson,

You asked me to embody in a letter to you the representation which I made orally regarding the importance attached by the Newfoundland Government to strict observance of the condition of the Agreement which you and I have just signed that no alteration of the lay-out of the air bases which are being transferred to your Government for the period of hostilities shall be made by the Canadian Government without the prior consent of the Newfoundland Government. As I mentioned to you, we have had no advance information regarding the lay-out of the various camp buildings constructed by the Canadian Government at the Newfoundland Airport. In particular, the first intimation to the Newfoundland Government that it was proposed to construct a camp opposite the existing married quarters was conveyed by the blue print showing a proposed lay-out of works and buildings which was received at the same time as the despatch from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to His Excellency the Governor of Newfoundland, No. 3 of 15th March, 1941.<sup>1</sup> This proposed camp will, in our view, completely spoil the sites which it was intended to reserve as a residential area. Whether it is practicable to modify this plan or not we wish to emphasise the point that the Newfoundland Airport has been constructed for use as a civil airport and to assist in the promotion of a trans-Atlantic Air Service. Although the development of civil trans-Atlantic aviation has been interrupted by the war the importance of keeping in view the purpose which the air bases are to serve after the war remains. We feel that this purpose has not been kept clearly in view in the planning of camps and buildings to be constructed by the Canadian Government for the use of their and the United States forces and that the interests of the Government of Newfoundland may be seriously prejudiced in consequence. We feel that strict instructions in the sense of this letter should be given by the Canadian Government to its agents at the air bases and we should be very grateful if we could be given an assurance that this has been done.

Yours sincerely,

W. W. WOODS

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

434.

JWP Vol. 1 p. 196

*Extrait de The Mackenzie King Record**Excerpt from The Mackenzie King Record*

[Hyde Park, April 20, 1941]

Roosevelt referred to having sent troops and planes to Newfoundland and to the establishment of a United States naval establishment at Shelburne, Nova Scotia. Mackenzie King then “spoke to him about letting us have some P.B.Y.’s for Labrador. He said he doubted if it was possible adequately to patrol that Labrador coast, but was sending himself 12 P.B.Y.’s for the coast protection of Labrador and Newfoundland in that area. They would be on hand almost immediately.”

435.

JWP Vol. 1 p. 202

*Extrait de The Mackenzie King Record**Excerpt from the Mackenzie King Record*

[Hyde Park, April 20, 1941]

He<sup>1</sup> asked “that wherever Canada was concerned, we should be drawn into the conversations, and that, at all events, no commitments should be made before we were fully informed of them. This particularly in the case of Newfoundland. I<sup>1</sup> said Our Chiefs of Staff were much concerned about this. That there were conversations between the U.S. and Britain, and between Canada and the U.S. but that where commitments as, for example, re troops, etc. in Newfoundland were concerned, we had assumed large responsibilities there, and we should know fully in advance of any other arrangements proposed between Britain and the U.S. This was said in the presence of Hopkins, and the President replied that he agreed entirely and would emphasize that fact with his military authorities. . . . He said to me that he thought Canada ought to take over Newfoundland . . . that would have to come when the war was over. I told him I agreed; that Newfoundland had not been brought into Confederation because it was a liability but we would have to turn it into an asset.”

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<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie King.



436.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, April 25, 1941

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## DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

## I—Report upon Canada-Newfoundland negotiations

1. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE, who was present at the Committee's invitation, reported upon negotiations in Newfoundland leading up to the signature, on April the 17th, of the agreement for the transfer to Canada of the control of air bases at Gander, Botwood and Gleneagles.

Certain other matters remained to be settled, for example, conditions of tenure of property at St. John's, customs arrangements, road construction problems, and the like. Negotiations in these respects were being carried on.

2. MR. GIBSON said that he had been impressed by the fact that Canada was spending, and would spend, large sums in Newfoundland, in order to secure rights in connection with defence measures, and that the United States were spending, and would spend, much larger amounts. The eventual investment of the United States would be many times that of Canada. This could not fail to have an important practical effect upon our position in the island.

U.S. troops were moving in in considerable numbers, and larger forces were to follow. The U.S. Army appeared to be acting, as regards the local situation, on their own initiative, and without reference to the Newfoundland authorities, or to the arrangements made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. For example, on orders received from senior officers in the United States, the local U.S. Commander was proposing to make a reconnaissance of Newfoundland Airport, with a view to determining what forces were required for its protection, and subsequently moving troops in. Such unco-ordinated action raised difficulties in the matter of local Command.

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437.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 23

Ottawa, April 26, 1941

With reference to paragraph 2 (2) of the Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland.<sup>1</sup>

The Canadian Government wishes to expand the Botwood base to accommodate two United States flying boat squadrons. This will necessitate a large building programme involving the acquisition of considerable property.

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice E.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix E.

Representatives of the Department of National Defence will be prepared to proceed to Newfoundland at an early date, taking with them plans of the lay-out and full details of proposals.

As this matter is of great importance and highest priority the consent of the Newfoundland Government is requested at the earliest possible moment in order that the project may be put in hand if possible by May 5th. As soon as approval in principle is received we will forward the names of Canadian representatives and time of arrival.

438.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 22

St. John's, April 27, 1941

Your telegram No. 23 of April 26th. The Newfoundland Government accept in principle the proposal to expand Botwood Base. It is understood that no steps will be taken to carry out proposals until plans have been submitted to and approved by this Government.

439.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 6

Ottawa, May 2, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch of April 18th, 1941, with reference to the blueprint showing the proposed lay-out of works and buildings at the Newfoundland Airport. It is noted that you express the hope that certain modifications may be made in the plans as outlined in the blueprint under reference and that you invite our attention to the desirability of obtaining the approval of the Newfoundland Government for any changes in the lay-out of the Newfoundland air bases sufficiently far in advance of the commencement of construction operations to allow the Newfoundland Government reasonable time to examine the proposed changes and to reach a decision thereon.

With regard to the proposed lay-out of works and buildings at the Gander Airport I am informed that on February 14th the Newfoundland Government, at the request of the Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters, was good enough to allow Squadron-Leader Pattison, the Aerodrome Manager, to visit Ottawa to discuss a number of problems of mutual interest. At this meeting Squadron-Leader Pattison agreed to the lay-out of works and buildings at the Newfoundland Airport as these are depicted in the blueprint under

reference, with the exception of one minor alteration, namely the position of the gasoline storage facilities. At the same time, the United States Government sent a Senior Officer to Ottawa for the purpose of advising on this lay-out and he agreed that the proposals made offered the best solution of the problems raised by the necessity of providing for United States operational requirements.

With regard to the area opposite the married quarters, the engineers considered this aspect at the time but no other space lent itself so adequately to speedy construction and to the segregation of areas for the various forces and interests which must be accommodated at the Newfoundland Airport. It was also pointed out that this construction adjacent to the married quarters is of a temporary nature, and if ultimately found objectionable it can easily be removed or demolished at the end of the war.

It is greatly regretted that more time was not available for consultation, but in view of the tremendous pressure under which we are all operating and of the absolute necessity of completing construction at the first possible moment, it was hoped that Squadron-Leader Pattison's approval would be sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is hoped that the Government of Newfoundland can see its way clear to the acceptance of the lay-out as submitted on the blueprint under reference.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

440.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH  
CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, May 7, 1941

Sir,

With reference to my Confidential despatch of the 18th April, 1941, I have the honour to inform you that in view of the fact that the original layout of the Camp intended for the R.C.A.F. had to be adapted to take care of United States requirements, and that alternative accommodation for the R.C.A.F. detachment is urgently required, the Newfoundland Government will not press its objection to the use of the site indicated on the print which accompanied your despatch No. 3 of the 15th March, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

441.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 33

Ottawa, May 24, 1941

With reference to the taking over of the control of the Newfoundland Airport, the Canadian Government has had under review the best method for control of Atlantic flights and proposes that the control should continue to be operated on present civilian basis augmented by control officers, appointed by the Department of Transport, under Squadron-Leader H. A. L. Pattison.

To this end we have under consideration the appointment of four additional control officers making a total of five to be paid by the Canadian Government, the fifth being Mr. McGrath presently employed.

Squadron-Leader Pattison agrees that this is a satisfactory solution of the problem.

Your concurrence in this proposal is requested.

442.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 31

St. John's, May 26, 1941

Your telegram of May 24th, No. 33. Atlantic flights. We concur in proposals referred to.

443.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 21

Ottawa, July 9, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 9 of May 13th.<sup>1</sup> concerning Canadian Army personnel who are proceeding to Newfoundland during the summer of 1941, and to inform you that it has now been decided to send an additional infantry battalion from Canada to Newfoundland for duty in the Botwood area. As a result the infantry garrisons at Airport and Botwood will each consist of one battalion.

This additional battalion for Newfoundland will be the Prince Edward Island Highlanders—with an establishment of 34 officers and 749 other ranks. They

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



will be leaving Quebec for Botwood in two parties—on July 20th. and 27th. respectively. A small advance party of 2 officers and 12 other ranks is proceeding via Sydney to arrive in Botwood by 19th. July.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

444.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

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9. The Board has had reports that, in view of the increasingly high wing loading of the aircraft using the Newfoundland Airport and the adverse surface conditions which may result from snow during winter months, the existing runways are no longer considered long enough, particularly for heavy aircraft now on order. It was, therefore, agreed that the appropriate Canadian authorities would make at once the necessary surveys and investigations to determine the extent to which runways can be lengthened sufficiently for instrument landing and the operation of heavy aircraft. It was agreed that the Board would consider this matter and the related situation at Northwest River at its next meeting with the view of making a suitable recommendation.

10. Air Commodore Cuffe pointed out that the names of the Newfoundland Airport and the Northwest River Airport were continually causing confusion and misunderstanding and at a later date may cause pilots difficulty in low visibility in locating the landing fields by maps.

Shortly there will be four aerodromes in Newfoundland, three identified on maps by their proximity to places or bays marked on maps.<sup>1</sup> It is therefore suggested that the Newfoundland Government be requested to re-name the Newfoundland Airport, Gander Lake Airport and that this be brought to the attention of all concerned.

The so-called Northwest River Airport is about twenty miles away from the Northwest River Settlement but only a mile and a half from Goose Inlet, both of which are marked clearly on maps. It is therefore suggested that this airport be named the Goose Inlet Airport.

(The Secretary of the Canadian Section will send a suitable communication on this subject to the Newfoundland Government.)

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<sup>1</sup> Les autres étaient Torbay et Stephenville.

<sup>1</sup> The others were Torbay and Stephenville.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

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## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

*Newfoundland Airport*

Construction is progressing satisfactorily.

Four hangars have already been completed and are now occupied. The foundations for four others are completed and steel erection has commenced on three.

	Completed and occupied	Under Construction
Quarters		
Officers	4 (147)	3 (264)
N.C.O.	4 (176)	0
O.R.	7 (952)	6 (2128)
Messes		
Officers	1 ( 50)	1 (300)
N.C.O.	1 (120)	1 ( 40)
O.R.	1 (450)	2 (1440)
Other Buildings	13	41

The foundations of all the rest of the buildings are now being installed and it is anticipated that all buildings will be completed by the end of the year.

The foundations for the new power house are completed and erection of machinery has commenced.

The 10" pipeline to Gander Lake is all laid and foundations for the pumping station in hand.

Excavation has been completed on the sewage disposal plant and construction is progressing rapidly.

Spur lines to all power plants and gasoline and coal supplies are well in hand.

Roads are being brought up to grade and surfaced with shale.

Authority has been granted for a certain amount of aerodrome maintenance on some of the runways which were deteriorating slightly.

*Botwood Seaplane Base*

All work is now progressing satisfactorily since the acquisition of land has been completed.

Steel for the hangar has not as yet been shipped but it is hoped that one hangar will be completed before the end of the year.

The Breakwater running from the mainland to Killick Island has been completed other than the rip rap and stone surface.

Excavation for the hangar sites practically completed.

Buildings No. 1 and 9 are being roofed in. Buildings No. 5 and 8, interior finish is being completed. Foundations for the balance of the buildings are under construction.

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445.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

St. John's, October 28, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

We had what I regard as a satisfactory conference with Sir Wilfrid Woods yesterday. The Honourable Mr. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, was present, together with Mr. Pattison, who has been liaison officer for the Newfoundland Government at Gander, and two or three other officials of the Newfoundland Government. I had with me Mr. Dyde, Group-Captain McEwen and Group-Captain Guthrie, and Col. Clarke.

The conference was on a number of matters in connection with the three airports: Torbay, Gander and Goose Inlet.

We are to exchange letters on various matters. I will write you a formal despatch but I thought it might be important to send you a memorandum of the matters discussed and of the attitude of the Newfoundland Government as represented by Sir Wilfrid Woods and Mr. Emerson, and which will represent the views of the Commission.

The matters discussed were as follows:

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#### NEWFOUNDLAND AIRPORT AT GANDER

1. Additional land for a radio range station is also required at Gander, as mentioned in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 7 of October 9.<sup>1</sup> Colonel Clarke had not completed copy of the plan and description of the site required for this purpose, but is to furnish it to us today or tomorrow, when a formal application will be made. It was, however, agreed that this site should be supplied. I understand that the site is Crown land but the area is under lease to the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company and Colonel Clarke advised me that arrangements have been made with that Company for settlement for the cutting of timber and release of their rights in the area.

We did not discuss the tenure on which this site would be held but we assume it should be a fifty year lease, which is the tenure under which the other property required by the Canadian Government is held.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. Group-Captain Guthrie, who is the Officer Commanding at Gander airport, has had some difficulty in the matter of issuing passes. Apparently passes for admission to the area have been issued by the Department of Public Utilities or Department of Justice. Passes have also been issued by the Newfoundland Rangers.

The position taken by Group-Captain Guthrie and Group-Captain McEwen was that the only person who should have authority to issue passes was the Officer Commanding the airport. This raised some technical difficulty as Mr. Emerson stated that the airport was a prohibited area and, as such, came under his jurisdiction in certain matters as either Commissioner for Justice or Commissioner for Defence.

It was finally agreed, however, that the only and proper person who should have authority to issue passes to the area should be the Canadian officer who was in charge of the airport and it was arranged that Mr. Emerson should give the Officer Commanding the airport from time to time authority to issue passes and that no passes would be issued by Mr. Emerson's Department and no other person would be given authority to issue same.

3. The Newfoundland Government has supplied Rangers as policemen. They are at present paid for in part by the British Ferry Command and in part by the Canadian contractor. These Rangers are wholly inexperienced and are of little or no service. It was agreed that trained men belonging to the Newfoundland Constabulary should be appointed and should be paid for by the Newfoundland Government. The position of the Officer Commanding the airport in relation to the Constabulary was discussed and Mr. Emerson said he would further consider the matter. It is of some importance that the police officers should, to some extent at least, come under the control of the Commanding Officer of the airport.

4. Some difficulty has been experienced because of the fact that there is no police magistrate at the airport, the nearest magistrate being at Grand Falls. This is to be remedied, probably by the appointment of an assistant magistrate who will reside at the airport. This appointment is further necessary because at the present time there is nobody to hold an inquest when a man is killed. Group-Captain Guthrie tells me that when one of the contractor's men is injured, he has apparently found it impossible to collect hospital charges from the Insurance Company with which the contractor is insured in case of death, because the Insurance Company requires a certificate from a magistrate in respect of the claim.

5. The matter of the proposed alterations in the existing layout at Gander, as mentioned in your despatch No. 14 of October 15,<sup>1</sup> was considered and general approval was given. . .

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



446.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

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16. The Canadian Air Force Member reported that the clearing and grubbing of three runways at Gander Lake to a total length of 6,000 feet is to be undertaken during the present winter and it was agreed that a recommendation as to further action would be considered at the February meeting of the Board.

17. Developments in the international situation and the present policy of the United States make it very desirable that the United States station additional aircraft at Gander Lake Airport, at the earliest possible date. The United States is now prepared materially to augment its aviation forces at the Newfoundland Airport as rapidly as facilities become available. The situation requires that movements of personnel and material be carefully planned and coordinated. For the above reasons:

The Board considers that Canada should make available to the United States, without delay, all completed facilities constructed for use of the United States Forces; expedite by all practicable measures completion of remaining facilities for which Canada accepted a commitment; complete promptly and put in operation the laundry and bakery covered by a subsequent agreement; arrange for the extension as soon as possible of the railroad spurs required to serve bulk gasoline storage tanks and warehouse platforms and that the R.C.A.F. should inform the United States of dates on which all uncompleted facilities will be available for occupancy.

The foregoing is subject to the necessity for the temporary occupation of some of the facilities constructed for use of the United States Forces by Canadian station personnel which must be provided for during the coming winter.

It was noted that consideration is being given to the possible use of United States Engineer troops to assist in completing the construction of the buildings urgently required.

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[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

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## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

*Gander Airport*

	Completed and Occupied	Completed and Unoccupied	Under Construction
Hangars	4	1 (occupied by contractor)	7
Quarters			
Officers	4 (144)	3 (267)	—
N.C.O.'s	4 (176)	—	3 (288)
Other Ranks	8(1256)	2 (461)	4(1363)
Messes			
Officers	2 (350)		
N.C.O.'s	2 (160)		2(1440) <sup>1</sup>
Other Ranks	2 (800)		
Other Buildings	23		29

Note: One double J.A.T.P. Hangar (224' x 160') will be completed and ready for occupation in three weeks.

*Gasoline Storage*

- (a) 100,000 gallons R.C.A.F. Area—complete and in operation.
- (b) 500,000 gallons U.S. Area—installation is well advanced. Progress delayed due to difficulties encountered in excavation work.

*Botwood Seaplane Base*

Buildings are now on an average 70% completed with the exception of the hangars. Preparation of site for hangars is proceeding and excavation of foundations in progress. Structural steel for one hangar was diverted to Dartmouth and part of a hangar was diverted to Goose Inlet to meet urgent requirements at these points. Replacement orders have been placed and delivery will be made early in the spring. Breakwater has been made connecting the mainland with Killick Island and is now in use. It is, however, not completed as it will be necessary to raise the road further to meet required grades. Excavation in the aircraft parking area is complete with the exception of 10,000 yds. of material to be removed. Excavation for gasoline storage tanks (operational) has commenced. Laying of sewer and water lines 40% completed. Road diversion around the Station is practically completed.

It is expected that the Station will be ready for commencement of next year's operations.

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<sup>1</sup> Se rapporte probablement aux «autres grades».

<sup>1</sup> Probably refers to "other ranks".

*United States Army*

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## 2. DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

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On September 18, R.C.A.F. stated: "In view of the fact that Newfoundland Airport constitutes such a good bombing and incendiary target, it is now desired to station a fighter squadron there." In view of the decision not to send the pursuit squadron to Argentina, at this time, United States has a pursuit squadron available for use at Newfoundland Airport, and reported to the R.C.A.F. that this squadron would be sent to Newfoundland Airport as soon as information was received on the date housing would be available. A written request for this information was made October 8, 1941.

The Chief of Army Air Forces also stated on October 8 that he desired to send to Newfoundland, as soon as possible, the entire seventy-three airplanes for which the U.S. accepted a commitment. This will require the full facilities which Canada agreed to provide by the Fall of 1941. In view of the international situation and the present policy of the United States, these aircraft, as soon as stationed at Newfoundland Airport, could perform a most useful service. The views of the Chief of Army Air Forces were immediately communicated to the R.C.A.F. member of the Board. It is urgently requested that the housing situation at Newfoundland Airport be clarified at this meeting.

The War Department has asked the U.S. Army members of the Board to request the Canadian Government to complete, without delay, the laundry and dry cleaning building at Newfoundland Airport, and to install therein the laundry and dry cleaning equipment which is now available at Newfoundland Airport. As reported at a previous meeting, the R.C.A.F. agreed to provide the building and utilities if the U.S. would furnish the equipment.

The War Department also requested the U.S. Army members of the Board to take up at this meeting the question of extending the railroad siding at Newfoundland Airport approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile to serve the platforms of the warehouses used by United States troops in order to eliminate unnecessary hauling and handling of considerable quantities of supplies.

At the time the Board acted on the matter of providing facilities for United States Forces at Newfoundland Airport the question of maintenance of those facilities was not discussed. On August 15 the R.C.A.F. Airport Commander handed the Commander, 21st Reconnaissance Squadron stationed at Newfoundland Airport a document which stated that the R.C.A.F. would take over all buildings from the contractor as they were finished and give the contractor a receipt therefor. Buildings to be occupied by the Army Air Corps were to be handed over to the Air Corps Commander and a receipt taken for the buildings and fixed equipment. Station maintenance personnel would be responsible for all maintenance work required, regardless of who occupied the buildings. The document included a paragraph that "a statement of maintenance work done on behalf of the Air Corps, including costs, will be prepared by the R.C.A.F. and submitted monthly (or quarterly,

whichever is more convenient) to local Air Corps Commander." As local Air Force Squadron Commanders are not authorized to make decisions in fiscal matters of this nature, the paper was forwarded through channels with a recommendation that the matter be taken up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

The maintenance arrangements at Newfoundland Airport have been entirely unsatisfactory for many reasons, which are not the direct concern of the Board. The question of maintenance has been thoroughly studied by the United States War Department and the views of the Judge Advocate General secured. It is proposed that the Board adopt the following recommendation, which was previously forwarded to the R.C.A.F. member:

- (a) That the United States accept, on memorandum receipt, the buildings and facilities occupied by United States forces on the condition that the buildings and facilities will be returned to the Dominion of Canada at the termination of occupancy in the same condition as when delivered, ordinary wear and tear, acts of God, public enemies, fire, earthquake or action of elements considered; and that during its use and occupancy of said buildings and facilities the United States will repair or maintain the same with its own funds and its own forces.
- (b) That the maintenance of all outside facilities including roads, walks and all services, is a responsibility of the R.C.A.F. as a part of the basic agreement to furnish, without charge, the facilities necessary for the operation of a minimum of 73 airplanes. The draft of a Board action to implement the above will be submitted for consideration.

The commander, U.S. Army Air Unit, Newfoundland Airport, reports that the method of handling coal for United States Forces is unsatisfactory; that the amount of coal at the airport is frequently insufficient to meet all essential requirements; that on October 22 it was estimated only 600 tons of coal—approximately 10 days supply—was on hand for the entire Canadian and U.S. garrison, and that no information could be obtained as to expected date of arrival of additional shipments. It is recommended that, beginning at some date mutually agreed upon, the U.S. supply all coal and other heating fuel required by U.S. Forces at Newfoundland Airport.

On September 24 the question of a chapel for Newfoundland Airport was referred to the Senior Canadian Service member with a request that the matter be investigated so a decision might be taken at this meeting of the Board. Requests that a chapel be provided at Newfoundland Airport have reached the United States War Department from several sources. It is recommended that the matter be considered and acted upon at this time.

The War Department has issued necessary instructions to implement the action of the Board at its last meeting regarding furnishing of rations to enlisted personnel of visiting aircraft.

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447.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 65

St. John's, November 18, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 17th, 1941<sup>1</sup>, relative to the transfer of control of the air bases of the Government of Newfoundland at Newfoundland Airport, Gleneagles and Botwood, to the Government of Canada. This Agreement was signed by Sir Wilfrid Woods on behalf of the Government of Newfoundland "subject to the concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom".

2. I am now informed by Sir Wilfrid Woods that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs informed the Newfoundland Government by telegram dated June 3rd, 1941,<sup>2</sup> that the terms embodied in the Memorandum of Agreement of the 17th of April, 1941, above referred to had been finally approved by the Government of the United Kingdom.

3. I have been asked by Sir Wilfrid Woods to communicate this information to you and to express his regret that the information was not conveyed at an earlier date.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

448.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

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## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

*Gander Lake Airport*

As a result of Para. 17 of the Journal of the Twenty-Third Meeting,<sup>3</sup> the R.C.A.F. reviewed the entire project with a view to expediting construction. A series of meetings were held by senior officials of the Department of Munitions and Supply, and the contractor. The question of the possible use of U.S. Engineer Troops was carefully considered by experts on the labour situation, who strongly urged against it. An alternative solution was suggested to General Embick whereby U.S. Engineer Troops might be used at other

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice E.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>3</sup> Document 446.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix E.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

U.S. projects in Newfoundland, thereby releasing labour for Gander. This proposal was unacceptable as was the original, on account of the multiplicity of problems involved.

The situation was reviewed on the 17th December with the Chief Works Officer from Gander Lake Airport and, notwithstanding that he reports that the labour situation is deteriorating rapidly—i.e. at present 1800 and anticipated down to 700 or 800 over the Christmas-New Years period—we appear to have passed the crisis with respect to accommodation. In fact the Chief Works Officer depicted a very satisfactory state of affairs with respect to accommodation for U.S., R.C.A.F., R.A.F. Ferry Command and Canadian Army.

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#### *Botwood*

Recent progress on the Botwood development has been slow due to the diversion of labour to Gander. Most of the available labour is now being employed on outside work installing water and sewer mains and the contractor is presently concentrating on the water line from Peters River, which will be required to serve both the Navy and Army as well as the Air Force.

No attempt is being made to expedite this project as there is no doubt but that it will be completed in time for next year's operations.

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449.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 7-8, 1942

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

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#### GANDER LAKE AIRPORT

Work on this project has proceeded throughout the winter notwithstanding weather conditions and adverse labour situation. It is anticipated that the bulk of the present building programme will be completed within 40-60 days.

The radio range station is approximately 85% complete and the range site has been cleared 58% and partly stumped. The steel erection of three towers is complete and that of the fourth 30%. The counterpoise is 90% complete. Radio range equipment is installed. All power line poles are in place and 86% of the lines strung and the power cable ditch is excavated. It is anticipated that the radio range station will be ready for operation approximately April 10th.

The Canadian Government has approved the U.S. request for construction of roads for U.S. temporary blind landing installation.

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450.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte-rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, April 27, 1942

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

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## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

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*Botwood*

Excavation for the bomb stores on Killick Island is about 90% completed. The water supply system from Peter's River is complete except for minor deficiencies and is now in use.

A report as to the progress and availability for operations of Botwood was prepared and forwarded to the U.S. Naval Air Service representative.

As a matter of record, this report is as follows:

Botwood will be available for operations as soon as moorings are laid, dependent upon the break-up of ice.

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451.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 145

St. John's, June 26, 1942

Colonel F. F. Clarke has made a request to me on behalf of the Department of Transport to obtain approval from Newfoundland Government to extend runways Nos. one, two and three at Gander airport to give a hard surface of 6,000 feet in length by 400 feet in width; also to clear runways to full extent of their present width for total length; also to build 2.85 miles of hard gravel surface roadway. Understand cost may be upwards of one and one half million dollars. Please advise if it is in order for me to make this application.

As I understand position, our control of airport is only for duration of hostilities and any extension of runways would be wholly at Canadian expense, and would be of no benefit to Canada after the cessation of hostilities unless some other arrangement was made at present time.

I understand construction work on extension of the runways is now actually under way without formal submission of plans to Commission of

Government as required by sub clause (2) of clause 2 of Agreement.<sup>1</sup> However, on learning of this fact, I advised Woods informally and he will raise no objection provided plan which I now have in my possession is filed within a reasonable time.

452.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 133

Ottawa, June 29, 1942

Your telegram of June 26th, No. 145, runways at Gander.

The programme outlined by Colonel Clarke constitutes an essential part of the R.C.A.F. programme for the operational use of the Gander airport. The post-war considerations are important but cannot be allowed to interfere with what is considered essential for service operations.

Under the circumstances please make the necessary formal application to the Newfoundland Commission of Government for permission to carry out this work.

453.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte-rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires  
PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

St. John's, September 27, 1942

. . .

*Royal Canadian Air Force*

. . .

## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

. . .

*Botwood*

All domestic accommodation is completed except for minor items. Steel for both hangars has been erected—one is closed in and the other in process of being closed in. Installation of heating in one hangar has commenced. The slipway is completed. Botwood is at present being used by the R.C.A.F. as a Flying Boat base and by civilian companies as a Trans-Atlantic airline base.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice E.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix E.



454.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D20)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, June 5, 1943

. . .

## ITEM III. 1943—NAVY PLANS FOR BOTWOOD

The Flag Officer Newfoundland outlined the Naval plans for Botwood as follows:

- (i) Examination Service with one Examination Vessel to commence shortly. Examination Vessel will also carry out duties of P.W.S.S. until latter building is completed.
- (ii) P.W.S.S. to be sited at Bay Point is being proceeded with.
- (iii) H.D.A. building being proceeded with and Harbour Defence Asdics should be ready for laying when buildings completed.
- (iv) Sonic Buoys will be laid eventually but have not yet arrived.
- (v) Naval Service Headquarters states that Combined Administration Building, Fuel Tanks and accommodation will be commenced shortly.
- (vi) It is intended to establish a patrol of three Fairmile M/L's about 15th July.

. . .

455.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 8-9, 1943

. . .

*Canadian Army*

. . .

- 2a. The Canadian Army Progress Report for 25 June<sup>1</sup> contained details of a reduction in the Canadian infantry garrison in Newfoundland, made as a result of the improved strategic situation. Reductions have now been made in the Coast Artillery defences at Botwood by the placing in maintenance (not manned) of the 10-inch U.S.-type Counter-Bombardment battery.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

456.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, May 17, 1944

. . .

AIR; REPAIRS TO RUNWAYS, GANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND

39. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported that as a result of spring thaws and movement of heavy aircraft in large numbers, runways at Gander were in a condition which rendered them practically unusable.

In view of the fact that Canada's postwar interests in this airport had not been clarified, it was considered undesirable to effect permanent repairs which would cost in the neighbourhood of \$4,000,000 for three runways or \$1,500,000 for the main runway.

Since, however, the airport had to be made serviceable, it was recommended that, as a temporary measure, authority be given to resurface all runways. This could be undertaken without interruption of traffic and at an approximate cost of \$500,000.

Copies of a report by the Minister were circulated.

(Report, Minister of National Defence for Air, May 11, 1944—C.W.C. document 784<sup>1</sup>)

40. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved the Minister's recommendation and authorized the expenditure of \$500,000 for temporary repairs.

. . .

457.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

SECRET

New York, June 28-29, 1944

. . .

*Canadian Army*

. . .

SECOND RCMDN. DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

- 2a. The Canadian Army garrison in Newfoundland has been reduced by one infantry battalion from the Botwood-Lewisporte area. Its duties in this area have been taken over by detachment from the bn. at St. John's. The battalion released returned to Canada on 27 May prior to despatch overseas.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

- b. Concurrence of the U.S. War Dept. in this reduction was obtained through the Service members concerned. In this connection information regarding present composition and strengths of the U.S. and Cdn. Army garrisons in Newfoundland has been exchanged.
- . . .

458.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des discussions et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 7-8, 1944

. . .

4. Air Vice-Marshal Curtis informed the Board that the Royal Canadian Air Force has withdrawn its fighter squadron from Gander Airport. This action, he stated, was taken after a consideration of a recent study on the scale of attack. Colonel Jenkins stated that present plans are for the Canadian anti-aircraft defences at Gander to be retained.

. . .

SOUS-SECTION iii/SUB-SECTION iii

TORBAY<sup>1</sup>

459.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Victoria, November 14, 1940

. . .

*Royal Canadian Air Force*

. . .

A detailed survey is now under way of an aerodrome site at Torbay about four miles north of St. John's, Newfoundland.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Sur les origines de ce projet, voir les documents 63, 170, 221 (pièce jointe), 222; pour l'histoire des négociations, voir les documents 422, 425, 427 et 428.

<sup>1</sup> For the origins of this project, see Documents 63, 170, 221 (enclosure), 222; for its negotiating history, see Documents 422, 425, 427 and 428.

460.

1156-Z-39

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au ministre du Revenu national*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to Minister of National Revenue*

St. John's, April 17, 1941

Dear Colonel Gibson,

You reminded me during our recent negotiations here<sup>1</sup> that the Canadian Government has plans for establishing an aerodrome in the vicinity Torbay with accommodation for aircraft and personnel and you asked me to give you a written assurance that the Newfoundland Government agrees with the proposal. It is understood that the expenses of the proposed development will be borne exclusively by the Canadian Government and that the aerodrome will be used as a civil airport only with the consent of the Newfoundland Government. On this understanding and subject to the settlement of details with the appropriate Departments of the Government of Newfoundland, this Government agrees that the Canadian Government may acquire lands for this purpose and may establish radio, teletype, telephone and telegraphic communications between the aerodrome and the air bases. In so far as Crown lands are concerned, these will be placed at the disposal of the Government of Canada free of charge either as an outright grant or on a lease for a period commensurate with the capital investment of the Canadian Government, as may be agreed in due course. The Government of Newfoundland cannot undertake to meet any part of the cost of acquisition of private lands but in saying this I have no intention of deciding in advance the request which you have already made on behalf of the Government of Canada that the Government of Newfoundland should consider the possibility of bearing the cost of acquisition of private lands for use by the Canadian Forces. That request has not yet been considered by the Governor-in-Commission.

Yours sincerely,

W. W. WOODS

461.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, April 28, 1941

...

## II—ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR BASE AT TORBAY

3. MR. GIBSON referred to the large expenditures which were involved in the proposed establishment by Canada of an aerodrome at Torbay. In this

<sup>1</sup> Voir les documents 180 et 183.

<sup>1</sup> See Documents 180 and 183.



connection, he had obtained from the Commissioner for Public Utilities a letter agreeing to the project, and setting out conditions upon which the necessary property would be placed at the disposal of the Canadian government.

(See letter of April the 17th, 1941, from the Commissioner for Public Utilities, St. John's, Newfoundland, to the Minister of National Revenue.)

4. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that he had, this morning, signed a contract demand involving an expenditure of some \$1,900,000 for the development of the Torbay site, on the understanding that the project had been approved, in principle, by the Committee.

5. THE SECRETARY stated that the Torbay proposal, as such, had not been specifically considered by the Committee, though reference thereto had been made in a paragraph in a first draft of the air bases agreement. This paragraph had been subsequently deleted in favour of the letter which Mr. Gibson had mentioned.

The Minutes of the Committee's meeting of November the 29th, 1940, however, contained a reference to the recommendations of the First Report<sup>1</sup> of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, for Canadian co-operation in defence of the Atlantic Coast, which had already been approved by the Committee. These involved *inter alia* the establishment of "a fighter aerodrome near St. John's", which was presumably the one which was to be established at Torbay. On that occasion Mr. Power had submitted an estimate of \$8,725,000 to cover the costs of the several projects mentioned.

(See Minutes of November the 29th, 1940,<sup>2</sup> page 6.)

6. After some discussion, the Committee decided to give specific approval to the establishment of the aerodrome at Torbay, in accordance with the previously approved recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

...

462.

1156-Z-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 10

Ottawa, May 20, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Department of Transport intends to construct an airfield at Torbay near St. John's, Newfoundland in

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 221 (pièce jointe).

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 221 (Enclosure).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

connection with the operation of the British Commonwealth Air Training plan<sup>1</sup>. A plan<sup>2</sup> is enclosed outlining in red the approximate limits of the land required for the airfield and outlining in green the land for which clearing rights are required.

The Department of Transport is sending its Representatives to Newfoundland in order to negotiate for and acquire the necessary lands. The Representatives will, of course, get in touch with you as soon as they arrive in order that the correct procedure may be carried out in the negotiations.

The title to some of the land required would no doubt be in the Newfoundland Government but it is understood that there are certain privately owned lands to be acquired.

I enclose two copies of a letter of introduction<sup>3</sup> to you which I have given to the Representatives.

I have etc.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

463.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

. . .

*United States Army*

. . .

The Canadian Torbay Aerodrome at St. John's was visited. Remarkable progress has been made with runway construction and, barring most unfavourable weather, it appeared that runways will be substantially completed this fall.

. . .

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<sup>1</sup> Les recherches ne nous ont pas permis de découvrir la raison pour laquelle on reliait ce projet au Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth britannique.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Research has thrown no light on the reason for thus connecting the project with the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

464.

2059-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 9

St. John's, October 3, 1941

Your telegram No. 5 of October 1<sup>1</sup> states that Crown lands required for Torbay aerodrome were agreed to be granted by Newfoundland Government. Our understanding is that the only memorandum with regard to this matter is contained in letter from Sir Wilfrid Woods to Colonel Gibson dated 17 April, 1941, which states that Crown lands may be either granted or leased as may be agreed and that no final agreement has in fact been made. Please correct us if we are wrong. Understand that Department of Transport carried on negotiations subsequent to Gibson.

Preliminary report of yesterday's conference<sup>2</sup> should reach you Sunday afternoon but present attitude of Newfoundland Government is apparently only to issue lease which however may be for 99 years.

465.

2059-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 19

Ottawa, October 21, 1941

Sir,

With reference to my despatch of October 14th, No. 13,<sup>3</sup> regarding the discussion of property rights in Newfoundland, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter<sup>3</sup> from the Deputy Minister of Transport in which Commander Edwards points out that if the Government of Newfoundland insists on a leasehold agreement for Crown lands to be used in connection with the Canadian aerodrome at Torbay the situation will be that scattered portions of the aerodrome property which have been bought at the request of the Newfoundland Government directly from the owners will be owned outright by the Crown (for the Dominion of Canada) whereas other parts of the aerodrome property will be under lease. This is obviously an unsatisfactory arrangement, and I hope that it may be possible to persuade the Newfoundland Government to transfer these lands to the Crown in the right of the

<sup>1</sup> Document 481.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 482.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 482.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Canadian Government. If this proves impossible the proposal for a ninety-nine year lease would seem to be the most satisfactory alternative.

I have etc.

NORMAN ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

466.

1156-Z-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

[St. John's,] October 28, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

We had what I regard as a satisfactory conference with Sir Wilfrid Woods yesterday. The Honourable Mr. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, was present, together with Mr. Pattison, who has been liaison officer for the Newfoundland Government at Gander, and two or three other officials of the Newfoundland Government. I had with me Mr. Dyde, Group-Captain McEwen and Group-Captain Guthrie and Col. Clarke.

The conference was on a number of matters in connection with the three airports: Torbay, Gander and Goose Inlet.

We are to exchange letters on various matters. I will write you a formal despatch but I thought it might be important to send you a memorandum of the matters discussed and of the attitude of the Newfoundland Government as represented by Sir Wilfrid Woods and Mr. Emerson, and which will represent the views of the Commission.

The matters discussed were as follows:

#### TORBAY

1. We are to receive a grant in fee simple from the Newfoundland Government to Crown lands included in the area. As we have now a fee simple to the privately owned lands, we will have a complete free simple title to the whole property.<sup>1</sup>
2. It was agreed that additional land of about 25 acres required for a radio range station should also be granted in fee simple. This radio range station is referred to in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 7 of October 9.<sup>2</sup> Colonel Clarke is to furnish me with a plan and description of the lands required when a formal application will be made and will be granted.

...

<sup>1</sup> Voir la partie 5 B i.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> See Part 5 B i.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



I will cover all these points in a more formal despatch at a later date, after the exchange of formal letters between Sir Wilfrid Woods and myself. In the meantime, I thought it important that you should have information as to the result of our conference.

I understand Colonel Clarke is returning by the same train as carries this letter so that you can obtain further information from him as he was present at the interview and knows the attitude of the Government.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

467.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

...

*Royal Canadian Air Force*

...

#### TORBAY

Two of the three runways and the taxi-strip have been completed. The work on the aerodrome is now finished for the season.

The original building project which provided for a Headquarters and one Fighter Squadron has now been increased to provide additionally for one B.R. Squadron, one C.A.C. Detachment and civil air-line facilities. Work is continuing on buildings mutual to both projects and materials are being obtained for new work.

Owing to the submarine situation in the Western Atlantic it has been necessary for the R.C.A.F. to operate a detachment from Torbay, the personnel being accommodated in the contractor's camp.

...

468.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, April 27, 1942

...

*Royal Canadian Air Force*

...

#### TORBAY

...

A request was received from General Commanding U.S. Forces in Newfoundland for the following additional accommodation to be provided—1

hangar for necessary maintenance work; 7 dispersed single revetments or 4 duplex revetments for Pursuit Planes; Quarters and mess for 22 officers; Barracks for 160 enlisted men; Mess for 160 enlisted men; Bomb storage for 250,000 lbs. of bombs; Fusing shelter and ammunition loading room; storage for 25,000 gallons gasoline and 5,000 gallons oil; Storage for pyrotechnics; Storage for flying equipment; Motor transport sheds; also provision for joint weather intelligence and operations set-up similar to that approved for Gander. It was regretted, however, that R.C.A.F. plans for expansion of forces for this aerodrome will preclude any extensive use by the U.S.

...

469.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D9)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, June 25, 1942

...

#### ITEM 5. COORDINATION OF DEFENCES—TORBAY AIRPORT

As directed by the Joint Services Committee, Atlantic Coast in their letter A.C.S. 10-10 d/12 Jun,<sup>1</sup> the question of procedure at Torbay was discussed. This Sub-Committee feels that although Torbay is now of sufficient importance to be set up as a separate zone, its part in the Defences of the St. John's Area as a whole is such that it must form part of the larger Defence Scheme, and that the Fortress Commander, St. John's, must be the coordinating authority. It was agreed that the scheme for Local Defence is the responsibility of the Station Commander.

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470.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 19, 1943

...

#### U.S. PROPOSAL FOR EXPANSION OF TORBAY AIRFIELD

12. THE SECRETARY submitted a United States request for permission to carry out certain expansion at Torbay airport, Newfoundland. Augmentation of the U.S. Army Air Force in Newfoundland and expansion of anti-submarine operations in that area had made necessary additional facilities

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

including aprons, taxi strips and certain buildings at an estimated cost of \$400,000.

The departments concerned had been consulted.

(Letter, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air and Deputy Minister of Transport, May 15, 1943<sup>1</sup>).

13. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR expressed the view of the Air Staff that the government should offer no objection but that the land needed for U.S. purposes should be acquired by the Department of National Defence for Air in order to maintain the Torbay airport as a single unit. Moreover, the United States should give assurances that Canadian construction would not be jeopardized through competition for labour or materials. The Department of Transport had already contracted for construction on the site and it would be advisable for the taxi strips, aprons, etc. required by the United States to be placed under their contract.

(Memorandum, Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air to War Committee, May 18, 1943.<sup>2</sup>)

14. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, agreed that the U.S. request be approved, in principle, subject to the following conditions:

- (a) that the land required be acquired for the purpose by Canada;
- (b) that the construction required be undertaken by the United States but that U.S. contracts be subject to the approval of R.C.A.F. officials at Torbay in order to prevent competition for labour and materials or confusion in zoning.

. . .

471.

50216-A-40

*Le premier secrétaire, légation des États-Unis,  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures*

*First Secretary, Legation of United States,  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, June 18, 1943

Dear Mr. Keenleyside,

In your letter of May 21, 1943,<sup>1</sup> you informed me of the Canadian agreement to the proposal of the United States War Department to obtain additional facilities for United States aircraft at the Torbay Airport.

Due to the changing technical and strategic conditions, I have been directed to say that the War Department now feels (a) that the necessity

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

for the American construction at Torbay Airport has decreased in urgency, (b) that the facilities which the War Department had planned to construct there will not be required at this time.

Accordingly, I have been directed to request that the Canadian Government cancel any action which has already been inaugurated or planned with respect to the acquisition of additional land at Torbay Airport for the purpose of construction by the United States Army.

Sincerely yours,

LEWIS CLARK

472.

50216-A-40

*Le premier secrétaire, légation des États-Unis,  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures*

*First Secretary, Legation of United States,  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, July 10, 1943

Dear Mr. Keenleyside,

On June 18 last Mr. Clark wrote you to say that the War Department had reached the conclusion that the necessity for the American construction at Torbay Airport had decreased in urgency and that the facilities which the War Department had planned to construct there would not be required at this time. Accordingly, Mr. Clark requested that the Canadian Government cancel any action which had already been inaugurated or planned with respect to the acquisition of additional land at Torbay Airport for construction purposes by the United States Army.

In that regard the War Department now states that, although extensive installations at Torbay are not required, certain additional airport facilities are needed to handle the normal small volume of air traffic. These are:

- (a) Office space adjacent to the space now occupied by the Army Air Forces, amounting to about 1100 additional square feet to accommodate the weather office and allow for expansion of operations and technical supply.
- (b) One-half of the hangar adjacent to the present office space or similar accommodations in any other permanent hangar at Torbay.

It is understood that the local Royal Canadian Air Force commander in Newfoundland has indicated concurrence with the release of the above



facilities for United States use by the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command.

Yours sincerely,

EDWARD P. LAWTON

473.

50216-A-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures  
au premier secrétaire, légation des États-Unis*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to First Secretary, Legation of United States*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 30, 1943

Dear Mr. Lawton,

I wish to acknowledge your letter of July 10th concerning your request for additional office and hangar space at Torbay Airport, Newfoundland, for the use of the United States Army Air Forces.

I have discussed this matter with the Department of National Defence for Air, and I find that there has been some misunderstanding with respect to the assent given to this request by the Canadian Air Officer Commanding in Newfoundland. He agreed to relinquish the space in question before it was decided that the United States Army Air Force would not build additional facilities at Torbay. In the changed circumstances the original agreement to the request of the United States Army Air Force has had to be reconsidered.

I regret to say that the Royal Canadian Air Force cannot relinquish any office or hangar space. Office space is already overcrowded and, inasmuch as the Royal Canadian Air Force already provides full weather facilities, it is felt that it cannot relinquish 1100 square feet of floor space for the installation of a duplicate weather office.

The same condition of overcrowding obtains in the hangars and in fact the majority of operational aircraft have to be left out of doors. It will be impossible, therefore, to provide additional hangar space at this time.

The Royal Canadian Air Force will, however, continue to make hangar accommodation available for the Commanding General's personal landplane in visiting the aerodrome and to provide for routine inspection and minor repairs to other United States Army Air Force aircraft and visiting aircraft from Argentina.

Yours sincerely,

HUGH L. KEENLEYSIDE

474.

1156-Z-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, August 30, 1943

Dear Dr. Keenleyside,

I regret that I overlooked replying to your letter of June 8th,<sup>1</sup> with which you enclosed a copy of a short memorandum prepared in the American Division with the object of summarizing the present position of Canada with respect to air services between the North American continent and Newfoundland.

The memorandum seems to be correct, although, as you know, there has been some further correspondence about the Goose Bay area since this memorandum was prepared.

There is also a further delay in connection with the Torbay Airport because of the decision to install another runway which would involve the acquisition of additional land.

The position at the moment is that the Newfoundland Government agreed to give this land required for the runway to the American Government but the American Government have decided not to make use of it and it is mentioned in my despatch No. 687 of August 26, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

Some correspondence has been exchanged and General Brooks is to write a letter to the Commission of Government abandoning the application on behalf of the American Government.

I understand that the construction of the new runway by the Department of Transport is now well under way but I do not anticipate any difficulty about the matter. I understand that the runway will be the most used runway on the whole airport. Apparently, the local information furnished the Department of Transport when the construction of this airport was begun was found to be incorrect, with the result that none of the runways conform to the direction of the prevailing wind. The planes arriving at the airport frequently had to land in a cross wind which rendered the airport unsatisfactory and not safe. The construction of the new runway will remedy this defect.

It is unfortunate that the construction of the runway had to be commenced before I obtained the formal permission of the Commission of Government, but the delay was caused by the fact that the Americans apparently had acquired the right to part of the land which was required for the new runway.

There may be some kicks from the Commission of Government when they discover what has happened, but fortunately Dunn who would be the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

chief kicker is now in England and I think I can smooth matters over with the other Commissioners.

The position is that I have made application to them for additional land and they have raised no objection except to point out that one of the parcels required has been handed over to the American Government for the duration of the war and as this has now been cleared up, I do not think I will have very much difficulty in the matter. In this connection I refer to my despatch No. 687 of August 26, 1943.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

475.

1156-Z-39

*Le commandant en chef des forces américaines à Terre-Neuve  
au commissaire aux Ressources naturelles*

*Commander-in-Chief, United States Forces in Newfoundland,  
to Commissioner for Natural Resources*

St. John's, September 1, 1943

My dear Mr. Dunn,

Reference is made to the grant for temporary use of the United States Army of certain Crown Lands north of Portugal Cove Road, as outlined in letters of your office, dated August 25, 1942,<sup>1</sup> and January 4, 1943,<sup>1</sup> and letters, this Headquarters, dated August 24, 1942,<sup>1</sup> and January 23, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

It is understood that the Canadian Government desires to lease a portion of this tract, designated by them as parcel No. 25, and that the present agreement constitutes an impediment.

Agreement is hereby given to the withdrawal of the authority for the use of the area known as parcel No. 25. A more complete description of the parcel is requested in order that maps may be corrected and due notice given to lower echelons.

The hearty cooperation of your department in solving the problems incident to United States participation in the defense of Newfoundland is deeply appreciated.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

JOHN B. BROOKS  
Major-General, U.S. Army  
Commanding

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

476.

1156-Z-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 329

Ottawa, October 23, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

I enclose a copy of a departmental memorandum of October 1 in which it is submitted that the desirability of putting Canadian rights at the military aerodrome at Torbay on some clearer and more formal footing deserves consideration. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of the main document which now governs our position at Torbay—a letter of April 17, 1941, from the Commissioner of Public Utilities of Newfoundland to the Minister of National Revenue of Canada.

2. The enclosed memorandum is prepared from the information available on our files and may not be complete. I should, therefore, be grateful if you would let me know what revisions you think might be made in the memorandum.

3. I should also be glad to have an expression of your views on the nature of the agreement which you think we might propose to Newfoundland on the subject of the Torbay aerodrome.

4. I am making similar enquiries of the Department of Transport and the Department of National Defence for Air and Colonel H. A. Dyde.

I have etc.

ESCOTT REID  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

[PIÈCE JOINTE—ENCLOSURE]

7-CR(s)

*Mémoire concernant l'aérodrome de Torbay*

*Memorandum Concerning Torbay Aerodrome*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 1, 1943

1. The desirability of putting Canadian rights at the military aerodrome at Torbay on some clearer and more formal footing deserves consideration.

2. At the present time the main document governing our position at Torbay is a letter of April 17, 1941, from the commissioner of Public Utilities of Newfoundland to the Minister of National Revenue of Canada granting Canada the right to acquire land for the purpose of establishing an aerodrome at Torbay for use by the Canadian Forces on the understanding that the expenses would be borne exclusively by the Government of Canada



and that the aerodrome would be used as a civil airport only with the consent of the Newfoundland Government. (A copy of this letter is attached.)

3. Torbay is, of course, also referred to in the exchange of notes of February, 1942, with the Newfoundland Government which constitute an agreement between Canada and Newfoundland for a commercial air service to Newfoundland by Trans Canada Air Lines,<sup>1</sup> and under which Trans Canada Air Lines is authorized to operate a commercial air service for the transportation of goods mail/and passengers between airports in Canada and the airports of Gander and Torbay in Newfoundland. This authorization is only on a year to year basis. The permission of the Royal Canadian Air Force was, of course, necessary before T.C.A. could use the aerodrome at Torbay.

4. Canada thus, through the Royal Canadian Air Force, owns the aerodrome at Torbay. It has spent on this aerodrome ten million dollars (\$10,000,000) but, at any time, at the sole discretion of the Newfoundland Government, Canada might find itself unable to use the Torbay airport for either civil or military purposes. Since Canada owns the airport Canada could, of course, in such circumstances refuse to permit anyone else to use it.

5. It would seem, therefore, that Canada's status at Torbay should be put on some clearer and more formal footing by a formal exchange of notes between the two governments which could be published. The present governing document, the letter of April 17, 1941, is unsatisfactory both in form and content and it would appear to be in the interests of Newfoundland as well as Canada to make a more precise agreement since the present one does not even appear, for example, to give Newfoundland adequate protection against Canada selling its property at Torbay to a foreign air transport company such as Pan American Airways.

6. The following considerations, among others, might be kept in mind in drafting proposals on Torbay to be put before the Newfoundland Government:

- (1) The R.C.A.F. will require the use of Torbay aerodrome after the war and would like rights for as long a period as possible—say ninety-nine years.
- (2) The Canadian Government desires to have the undisputed right to grant to or withhold from the civil air transport companies of other countries the right to use Torbay as a civil airport. So long as Canada possesses this right it is possible for Canada, if it so desires, to retain for Trans Canada Air Lines a monopoly of air traffic to and from St. John's. It can do this even if, under an international air transport convention providing for freedom of air transit, it were to grant to the civil aircraft of all nations the right to land at Torbay for refuelling, since only T.C.A. would have the right to take on or discharge passengers, cargo and mails at Torbay.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le chapitre II, partie 2.

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter II, Part 2.

- (3) The Canadian Government would like to secure from Newfoundland the right for Trans Canada Air Lines to use Torbay as a civil airport. It would like to have this right, not on the present annual basis, but for as long a period as possible, and, in any event, for "a period commensurate with the capital investment of the Canadian Government" (a phrase used in Sir Wilfrid Woods' letter of April 17th, 1941.)

477.

1156-Z-39

*Le secrétaire du ministre de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary to Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, October 30, 1943

Your memorandum of October 12th<sup>1</sup> and enclosures<sup>2</sup> with reference to the aerodrome at Torbay, Newfoundland.

## MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 1ST

There are one or two points regarding the memorandum of October 1st. In paragraph 4 I am not sure of the accuracy of the phrase "through the Royal Canadian Air Force". My recollection is that Colonel F. F. Clarke of the Department of Transport carried out all the negotiations for the acquisition of privately owned lands and my impression is that when the privately owned lands were acquired they were taken in the name of the Minister of Transport.

Another point in connection with the memorandum arises out of paragraph 6(3) where Sir Wilfrid Woods' phrase as to the period is quoted. At a conference held in Sir Wilfrid Woods' office in Saint John's on 27th October, 1941, I think there was some discussion with reference to Torbay. I am not sure that I have an accurate minute of the proceedings of that conference, but my impression is that Sir Wilfrid Woods expressed the view that the Government of Canada should be given the same title for crown lands as they have acquired for private lands. The minutes of that conference are not I suppose binding on the governments concerned, but if Sir Wilfrid Woods made such a remark and it is recorded in minutes it would be a useful indication of his view of the tenure which the Canadian Government is to be given to the lands on which this aerodrome is situated. Mr. Burchell would have an accurate minute of this conference and would also be able to say whether it was an agreed minute as between himself and Sir Wilfrid Woods.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Partiellement reproduites au document 476  
(pièce jointe).

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Partly printed in Document 476  
(Enclosure).

## AGREEMENT WITH NEWFOUNDLAND

I am not convinced that the Canadian Government would be wise to open the subject of an agreement regarding this aerodrome at the present time. The Newfoundland Government and the United Kingdom Government as well have shown in their negotiations regarding Goose Bay a rather keen appreciation of the implications of post-war civil aviation and the acquiring of rights by the Canadian Government in air bases in Newfoundland. I doubt whether we would now be able to negotiate as favourable terms even as those which the Newfoundland Government are willing to grant at Goose Bay and we might easily wind up with a less favourable agreement. Under the circumstances I feel that we should consider the advisability of taking steps only to perfect the title of the Canadian Government to the crown lands as well as to the privately owned lands. It is true that we would then own an aerodrome which is subject to any legislation with regard to it that the Newfoundland Government might wish to pass. On the other hand the Canadian Government would be in possession and I feel that it would be difficult for either the United Kingdom Government or the Canadian\* Government to deny us reasonable use of the aerodrome both after the war as well as during it. As far as post-war commercial use of the aerodrome is concerned I am of the opinion it will be no more difficult to obtain concessions in this respect after the war than it would be now. It is quite conceivable that the Canadian Government would receive better terms after the war.

The foregoing is entirely an expression of my own views and should not be considered as the view of this Department. I will refer to the remarks of the officers of this Department hereinafter.

## TERMS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT

On the assumption that negotiations leading to an agreement are to be opened, I requested the officers of this Department to give me their advice as to any matter of concern to the Army. The Chief of the General Staff has said that it would appear advisable to include in any agreement re Torbay a clause on defence construction similar to that in the Goose Bay draft, namely:

The Government of Canada may from time to time erect within the Air base, such works, buildings and fortifications as it may deem to be necessary for the maintenance of the base as an operational air base and for its defence, and may station at the air base such military personnel as may be required for the defence thereof.

This is the only special provision from the Army viewpoint that the Chief of the General Staff has to suggest as it is assumed that matters affecting the use of the airfield including the construction and operation of necessary radio, telephone and telegraph facilities will be included in the Royal Canadian Air Force draft requirements.

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\*Note telle que dans l'original:

\*Note as in original:

Newfoundland

Apart from this special clause it would appear that any proposed draft would necessarily include clauses covering the following points:

- (a) Tenure; this presumably is now settled.
- (b) The right to construct; maintain and operate an airbase.
- (c) Special clauses; such as the Army clause above.
- (d) User; it is here that the difficulty will arise. The Canadian Government should have the right to use the aerodrome as a military aerodrome for the period of the war and for such time thereafter as the Canadian Government considers to be necessary in the interests of hemisphere defence. The Newfoundland Government will undoubtedly wish to qualify such a clause in the same way as they altered the Goose Bay draft. With regard to commercial use I have no doubt that no matter what the Canadian Government proposes at the present time, the Newfoundland Government will go no further than to agree that it should be a matter for future discussion, with definite limitations in the meantime.
- (e) Newfoundland Sovereignty; a clause preserving the sovereignty of Newfoundland will be an essential element.

H. A. DYDE, Colonel  
Military Secretary

478.

1156-Z-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au ministère des  
Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Department of  
External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, October 30, 1943

Dear Escott [Reid],

I have your despatch No. 329 of October 23rd, 1943.

You evidently got hold of an old file and not the current file on Torbay. If you can get hold of the right file you will find perhaps 30 or 40 despatches of mine on the subject of the Torbay Airport.

As soon as I get some additional stenographic help which I have asked for from Ottawa, and which I understand will soon arrive, I will prepare a memorandum for you on the whole subject and bring you up to date.

There has been extreme dilatoriness on the part of both officials at Ottawa, and officials of Newfoundland in getting the matters cleared up in connection with the Torbay Airport, as you will see when I send you a summary of my despatches. At the present time progress is held up because I have not received a reply to my despatch No. 764 of September 23rd, 1943,<sup>1</sup> nor

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



have I received a reply from Mr. Emerson on the subject matter of that despatch.

Everything is at a stand-still until I know how the matter referred to in that last mentioned despatch is to be proceeded with.

This is only one example of the hold-ups which have occurred during the past two years.

All the negotiations since I have been here, have been in connection with the acquisition of property, and there is no doubt that there is a settled agreement that we are to have title in fee simple to this airport.

If, however, you expect to get the present Commission of Government to now give you privileges for a term of years to use this airport, either for civil or military purposes after the war, you will find yourself up against a stone wall.

The position at the Torbay airport will be the same as at Goose Bay, except that the Canadian Government will own Torbay airport outright, while at Goose Bay, we will only have a lease for 99 years. The use of either airport for civil purposes by the Canadian Government after the war, is one which will have to stand over for future negotiation on the conclusion of the war. This was the arrangement originally made by Colin Gibson in 1941 with regard to Torbay, and a similar arrangement was made with regard to Goose Bay.

It would, in my opinion, be unwise to now open up the question of the use of Torbay after the war, and anything attempted now would only meet with refusal to re-open the question.

My main concern now is to obtain title to the Torbay Airport and if I can only get some assistance from Ottawa, and perhaps the authorization to obtain a local solicitor to help me prod the Newfoundland Government, I may be able to get the matter closed out before the end of the war.

The situation at the moment is as follows:

1. Title has been acquired from a number of private land owners and deeds obtained.
2. A number of land owners cannot be located and some arrangement will have to be made to acquire the title. This is a matter on which I want legal advice, which as yet I have not been able to obtain. It was the subject of several despatches from me, the latest being No. 764 of September 23rd, 1943.
3. A grant has to be obtained from the Government of Newfoundland and as a substantial part of the Airport is Crown lands. My negotiations with the Newfoundland Government have resulted in an agreement to give this grant, but this requires legislation.
4. A Confirming Act will also be required so as to absolutely clear up the title invested in the Canadian Government.
5. The attitude of the Department of Justice here is to postpone the passing of legislation in respect of Torbay until Goose Bay is

cleared up, at the same time. It is proposed to have one special Act with respect to Goose Bay and Torbay, and also with respect to other properties acquired by the Canadian Government to which the title is defective, and which will require legislation to validate it.

Legislation is necessary because the Regulations under which certain properties were expropriated is [sic] defective.

The Department of Justice want to combine all these things within one General Act to be passed at some indefinite time in the future. This is not good enough, as the situation may change and the personnel of the Commission of Government will also change. My view, therefore, is that we should press immediately for legislation with regard to Torbay, and at least get the title of that property cleared up.

One difficulty which I have had in connection with my office here, is that the Department of Justice of Newfoundland advises the Government of Canada in connection with legal matters, and acts as the legal agent for the Canadian Government. This arrangement was made before I came here, and it is somewhat difficult to change it now. It would have been much better if the Canadian Government had appointed a firm of solicitors here as their legal representatives, and they could do the prodding for me, which apparently is necessary to get any action by the Newfoundland Government.

As soon as I have my memorandum prepared, I will forward it to you. I expect to get to Ottawa on or about the 28th of November and we can then discuss the whole position.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

479.

1156-Z-39

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, November 9, 1943

Dear Sir,

I am in agreement with the suggestions made in your letter of October 12th<sup>1</sup> that it would be desirable to put Canadian rights at the Royal Canadian Air Force aerodrome at Torbay on some clearer and more formal footing.

With respect to the information contained in paragraphs 1-5 inclusive of your draft memorandum,<sup>2</sup> I would suggest the following revisions:

- (a) The approximate expenditure on Torbay as given in paragraph 4 should be \$11,200,000.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

- (b) An important consideration which might be included in paragraph 6 would be a reference to the fact that Torbay was constructed by Canada to provide a strategic air base for the defence of Canada and Newfoundland, within the general scheme of Hemisphere defence.

As regards the post-war use of Torbay airport, I may state that it is the intention of this Department that it should continue to be used as a base of operations for the defence of Canada and Newfoundland.

In acquiring property in Newfoundland required for defence facilities, the procedure followed by this Department has been to obtain a title wherever possible, the intention being that certain of these facilities, such as radio stations, for example, would be required for defence purposes in the post-war period. In the instance of Torbay airport, the same procedure was followed. The exact position of this Department and of the Canadian Government with respect to the right to exercise control over these properties to which title has been granted has not been made clear. Indeed, Canada's position in Newfoundland with respect to Torbay airport would appear to be analagous to the position which would arise if the United Kingdom were to purchase during wartime an important airport in Canada. In such an event, ownership would presumably not carry with it the right of post-war control nor the right to specify that the airport should be used only by aircraft of the United Kingdom. It was to avoid any such situation that the Canadian Government insisted that properties required by the U.S. Forces for defence purposes in Canada should be acquired in the name of the Canadian Government. In view of the considerations which I have just outlined, therefore, it is suggested that, as a preliminary to any negotiations about Torbay airport, it would be desirable to obtain a legal opinion with respect to the limitations of Canadian control over properties acquired for defence purposes in Newfoundland.

While it would be advisable to have the Canadian position at Torbay more clearly defined and, if possible, to obtain long term rights there, I am of the opinion that it would be unwise at the present time to place undue emphasis on post-war civil rights. The question of obtaining concessions to operate post-war civil air transport services from bases constructed for military purposes in another country during the war has recently been under active discussion, and it is conceivable that Canada's position with respect to the post-war military use of Torbay might be prejudiced if too much stress were placed on civil aspects. In expressing this view, I am not overlooking the fact that Canada has spent some \$11,200,000 on Torbay and that, in view of this expenditure, [it] might reasonably expect to obtain some special post-war rights there for civil as well as military aircraft. You will recall, however, that the Goose Bay lease which has been under negotiation for a long time provides that the question of post-war civil use of that air base is to be decided after the war by the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments. On the basis of our experience with the Goose Bay lease, therefore, I would suggest that Canada should endeavour to obtain from the Newfoundland Government military control of Torbay airport for a period of

99 years and that the question of post-war civil rights should be left for subsequent negotiation.<sup>1</sup> Such a proposal would be in accord with the announced policy of this country with respect to post-war civil air agreements and I feel that it would be more favourably received than one such as you have suggested, which would grant to Canadian aircraft the exclusive civil use of the airport. Moreover, an agreement along the lines of the Goose Bay lease would assure Canada of the continued use of the airport for the prime purpose for which it was constructed, namely, the defence of our Atlantic seaboard.

Yours very truly,

S. L. DE CARTERET

SOUS-SECTION iv/SUB-SECTION iv

GOOSE BAY<sup>2</sup>

480.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 8

St. John's, September 30, 1941

The Newfoundland Government have asked me to meet them in conference on Thursday, October 2nd, with reference to acquisition of property required for aerodrome at Northwest river and I have agreed to attend. I should appreciate your sending me any special information and instructions in this connection.

481.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 5

Ottawa, October 1, 1941

Your telegram of September 30, 1941, No. 8. Canadian Government desires grant of property rights for Goose Inlet Aerodrome, Northwest River, be similar to those given in case of land for Torbay, which was purchased outright from private owners by the Canadian Government or, in case of Crown land involved, granted by Newfoundland Government to Canadian Government.

...

<sup>1</sup> Voir la partie 6 E.

<sup>2</sup> Les origines de Goose Bay sont documentées à la sous-section i traitant du Service transocéanique. Cette sous-section traite principalement de la négociation de l'accord sur Goose Bay.

<sup>1</sup> See Part 6 E.

<sup>2</sup> The origins of Goose Bay are documented in Sub-Section i on the Atlantic Ferry Service. This sub-section deals mainly with negotiation of the Goose Bay Agreement.



482.

2059-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 12

St. John's, October 4, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 8 of September 30, 1941 and to your reply No. 5 of October 1, 1941.

2. Under the date of October 2, 1941 I wrote the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, giving him an informal report of our conference.<sup>1</sup>

3. I now enclose a copy of a letter dated October 4<sup>2</sup> from Sir Wilfrid Woods, the Commissioner for Public Utilities, addressed to me, together with a copy of the memorandum enclosed with his letter.

4. The first part of the memorandum mentions the points brought forward by the Newfoundland Government representatives at our conference, and the second part of the memorandum contains the views which I expressed on the various points. The views which I expressed are correctly stated in this memorandum.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Opinions émises lors d'une réunion tenue au bureau du commissaire  
aux Services publics*

*Opinions Presented at a Meeting in Office of Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

. . .

[St. John's,] October 2, 1941

VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON THE ABOVE POINTS<sup>3</sup>

1. Military use. His government would no doubt agree that use of the aerodrome should be open to R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. units and also, for the duration of the war, to the United States Air Forces but he thinks the words quote without restriction unquote would require qualification so as to permit Canadian Government to impose normal restrictions, e.g., for security and safety purposes, since that Government will be responsible for operating the aerodrome. For reasons given under No. 4 below his government would not be prepared to agree to limitation of the use of the aerodrome to the duration of the war so far as the R.C.A.F. is concerned.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>3</sup> Voir le document 358.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.<sup>3</sup> See Document 358.

2. Wireless control. His Government will no doubt agree to arrangements for co-ordinating the wireless and meteorological arrangements at the proposed aerodrome with those of the three stations operated by the United States Government in Canadian territory. He suggested that these arrangements should be left to be made by normal inter-service conferences.

3. Ground Organisation. The Canadian Government's proposal is that R.C.A.F. will provide the necessary ground organisation and will man and run the aerodrome.

4. General Control. His Government would really [readily] agree to a stipulation that transfer to a third party should not be allowed but would not be likely to agree now that the period of general control should be limited to duration of the war. He urged that at the end of the war there may be strong reasons why Canada should be allowed continued military use and control of the airport. He suggested that the whole question of post-war control should be left for consideration in the light of circumstances at the end of the war without any presumption against the possibility of continued control by Canada.

5. Commercial use. His Government would agree that facilities should be made available as required for any British Commonwealth civil aircraft engaged in ferrying or other operations directly concerned with war effort. He considers that an absolute prohibition at this stage against commercial use would be mistaken. He sees no objection to a stipulation parallel with that made in regard to the Torbay airport, viz., that the aerodrome should not be used as a civil airport without the consent of the Newfoundland Government either during or after the war.

6. Leases of land or buildings. In view of the large investment for works of construction which will be made by Canada the High Commissioner is of the opinion that it would be inequitable to stipulate that its tenure of land or buildings should be limited to the duration of the war. He considers that in the case of lands the Canadian Government should be given an outright grant of any Crown lands involved and should be permitted to acquire the fee simple of any privately owned lands.

483.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 490

[St. John's,] October 6, 1941

SECRET. The various points in your Secret and Personal telegram No. 856 of the 27th September, 1941<sup>1</sup>, relative to proposed aerodrome near North-west River, have been discussed by Woods and Emerson with Burchell,

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 358.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 358.

High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, who made the following provisional comments pending consultation with his Government. . .<sup>1</sup>

Our view is that it is not practicable to expect the Canadian Government to incur the large expenditure which will be required to create an aerodrome near Northwest River and at the same time to allow themselves to be put in a position in which all their rights in the aerodrome would automatically come to an end when hostilities ceased. The position in regard to this proposed aerodrome and the aerodrome now under construction at Torbay is not the same as the position in regard to the air bases at Gander and Botwood because in the case of the two first mentioned aerodromes the whole cost of construction is to be borne by Canada. We think that it will be necessary to leave entirely open until the end of the war the whole question of post-war control and operation for military purposes of the Labrador aerodrome and that we shall have to grant the Canadians at least a 99 year lease of any Crown lands which may be required for the proposed aerodrome. As regards commercial use we do not think we can expect much more than an undertaking that the aerodrome will not be used for commercial purposes without the consent of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments. We should be glad to have your approval of our continuing negotiations along these lines.

484.

2059-40

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 16, 1941

Dear Sir,

With reference to the letter dated 2nd October, 1941 from the High Commissioner for Canada, St. John's, Newfoundland<sup>2</sup>, this matter has been discussed with officials of the Department of Transport who expressed the opinion that they were willing to undertake certain matters of control and maintenance of the Northwest River aerodrome on behalf of the Department of National Defence for Air. On October 10th, the Deputy Minister, Department of Transport, wrote to you accordingly under reference 11-43-9.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ici suit l'exposé des opinions émises par le haut commissaire telles que rapportées au document 482.

<sup>1</sup> Here follows report of High Commissioner's views as recorded in document 482.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

This Department has since given further consideration to the matter and, while grateful to the Department of Transport for the suggestion contained in their letter, now think that negotiations with Newfoundland should be more in principle and less in detail than as suggested in the above quoted letter.

The Department of National Defence for Air is chiefly concerned with the strategic aspects of this situation, now and in the future. These are deemed to be:

- (a) Development of a strategic aerodrome for the defence of Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador, within the general scheme of Hemisphere Defence.
- (b) Development of an aerodrome to play an important part in the delivery of aircraft to Great Britain.
- (c) Development of an aerodrome strategically located as a base of operations in the Battle of the Atlantic and exigencies which may arise through major changes in the war situation.

In this respect it is deemed that a most open agreement as between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland should be negotiated such as will enable the facilities to be developed at this aerodrome being tied-in as an integral part of both the defensive and offensive situations as they evolve.

With regard to civil rights on the aerodrome, including commercial uses, it cannot be too strongly expressed that any civil or commercial uses to which this airport might be put during war would necessarily be part of the war effort. Such uses at the moment cannot be completely envisaged as we are dealing with a situation that can only be adjudged as one under process of development in which finality cannot be foreseen. It would therefore be unwise to place restrictions of any sort on the use or control of the airport at present.

With respect to Air Force use after the war, the Department of National Defence for Air deems it essential that strategic factors should not be lost sight of as it is quite possible that Hemisphere, Canadian, Newfoundland and Labrador defence requirements will still exist under circumstances in which Canadian control of this airport will be necessary.

With respect to civil and commercial use after the war, it is suggested that the matter should remain open for negotiations as doubtless there will be a complete reappraisal of Trans-Atlantic civil operations as between the United Kingdom, Canadian, Newfoundland and American Governments . . .



485.

2059-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire  
d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 17

St. John's, October 22, 1941

Your despatch No. 13 of October 14th<sup>1</sup> and your telegram No. 7 of October 9th.<sup>2</sup>

Colonel Clarke has arrived at St. John's, and investigations are being made of certain details such as actual boundary sites, availability of timber, firewood and sand, preparatory to meeting Newfoundland Government at an early date. Request you hasten expression of the views of Department of National Defence for Air and forward summary thereof by telegram or alternatively their confirmation of views of Transport especially as to ground organization as set out in paragraph (b) of despatch of October 14th. Ground organization during war might properly be considered matter for Canadian decision only, but Newfoundland Government's view as outlined in my despatch of October 4th, No. 12, is that R.C.A.F. assume this responsibility which, at the time, I considered satisfactory. In any case this question may have some effect on Newfoundland view regarding other matters under discussion such as the length of the Canadian tenure of aerodrome. It would therefore probably be advisable to leave me some latitude in my negotiations with Newfoundland Government in this connection.

486.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

St. John's, October 28, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

We had what I regard as a satisfactory conference with Sir Wilfrid Woods yesterday. The Honourable Mr. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, was present, together with Mr. Pattison, who has been liaison officer for the Newfoundland Government at Gander, and two or three other officials of the Newfoundland Government. I had with me Mr. Dyde, Group-Captain McEwen and Group-Captain Guthrie, and Col. Clarke.

The conference was on a number of matters in connection with the three airports: Torbay, Gander and Goose Inlet.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

We are to exchange letters on various matters. I will write you a formal despatch but I thought it might be important to send you a memorandum of the matters discussed and of the attitude of the Newfoundland Government as represented by Sir Wilfrid Woods and Mr. Emerson, and which will represent the views of the Commission.

The matters discussed were as follows:

#### GOOSE BAY AERODROME

1. The attitude of the Newfoundland Government, which has the approval of the Dominions Office, is that the site for the Goose Bay aerodrome should be leased for 99 years. I cannot explain why the Newfoundland Government would be willing to give a grant of the lands at Torbay, but only 99 years lease of the lands at Labrador. Sir Wilfrid Woods' only explanation was that as we had already secured title in fee simple to a large part of the Torbay site that it seemed only right that we should have title in fee simple to the remaining lands.

In conversation both with the Honourable Mr. Power and the Honourable Mr. Ralston, I understood that a ninety-nine year lease of the Goose Bay aerodrome would be satisfactory. I think, perhaps, involved in the decision to give only a ninety-nine year lease is the fact that Labrador has been to some extent a bone of contention between the Newfoundland Government and the Canadian Government in years gone by, and as we are asking for a large block of land containing 160 square miles I rather suspect that the Commission feels that a lease for ninety-nine years would be more acceptable to the people of Newfoundland than a title in fee simple. I take it that a lease for ninety-nine years will be acceptable but if not, you might cable me promptly.<sup>1</sup>

If the lease is acceptable, details should be arranged and a draft lease or agreement prepared by us in conjunction with the Department of Justice.

2. Sir Wilfrid Woods made no objection to the area being increased from 94 square miles, as it was in the original site, to 160 square miles.

3. He also made no objection to the Canadian Government having the right to obtain timber, firewood and sand from the area which may be required for construction purposes. The only reservation was that people living in the vicinity should have the right to cut firewood for their own use as is usual in all Newfoundland leases. I said there was no objection to this reservation.

4. Colonel Clarke informed us that the Canadian Government desires to have the permission of the Newfoundland Government to cut and grade a

<sup>1</sup> La partie pertinente du procès-verbal de cette conférence, tel que dressée par les Terrenoviens, se lisait ainsi:

<sup>1</sup> The relevant part of the Newfoundland minutes of this conference read:

Sir Wilfrid Woods said the Newfoundland Government would be satisfied to grant a lease of local Crown lands involved for a period of 99 years, and that they considered that the whole question of post-war control should be left entirely open until the end of the war.

roadway from the aerodrome to the settlement at Northwest River. I understand that this is a distance of approximately 24 miles. Sir Wilfrid Woods agreed to this proposal.

I will cover all these points in a more formal despatch at a later date, after the exchange of formal letters between Sir Wilfrid Woods and myself. In the meantime, I thought it important that you should have information as to the result of our conference.

I understand Colonel Clarke is returning by the same train as carries this letter so that you can obtain further information from him as he was present at the interview and knows the attitude of the Government.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

487.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, December 20, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I am somewhat disturbed about the situation with respect to negotiations for the Goose Bay Aerodrome. My disturbance is caused by the fact that I could not get a reply to my request for information as to whether or not the Canadian Government was willing to accept a ninety-nine year lease and I could not proceed with my negotiations with Sir Wilfrid Woods until this point was settled.

. . .

Sir Wilfrid Woods did leave December 14th and will be away for two months. The Honourable Mr. Emerson is Acting Commissioner in his absence and all negotiations with regard to Goose Bay must now be conducted through him.

On Monday morning, December 15th, I received from you a memorandum dated December 10th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> to which was attached a letter from Mr. Terence Sheard for S.L. De Carteret, Deputy Minister for Air Service, dated December 8th 1941,<sup>2</sup> their file being S.15-1-105 (D.P.O.). This letter states that a ninety-nine year lease would be quite acceptable for the Goose Bay Aerodrome property. Although there was no covering letter giving me instructions in the matter from yourself, I take it that a ninety-nine year lease is acceptable, but I would like to have this confirmed by you.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

The unfortunate situation in which I am now placed is that Sir Wilfrid Woods had gone away before I received any intimation that a ninety-nine year lease was acceptable and I was unable to negotiate with him on several important matters which are still unsettled in connection with Goose Bay Aerodrome.

My problem now is to decide whether or not I should take these matters up with Mr. Emerson or wait until Sir Wilfrid Woods' return about the middle of February.

I may say that for various reasons which I need not mention, I would very much prefer to continue negotiations with Sir Wilfrid Woods. Perhaps the most important reason is that he has full knowledge of the situation and is in a better position to give a more favourable decision than perhaps I could obtain from Mr. Emerson. The other difficulty with which I am faced is that Mr. Dyde who has given me such great assistance in this matter, will probably leave for Ottawa within the next two or three weeks, but I assume that, if necessary, it can be arranged that he return here in February to continue his assistance in negotiations.

My own feeling about the matter is that I should not continue negotiations until after Sir Wilfrid Woods' return unless for some reason you think it important that I should get the matter closed sooner. Subject to your approval, I propose not to follow the matter up until Sir Wilfrid Woods' return.

...

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

488.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 91

Ottawa, April 30, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your confidential letter of December 20th addressed to Mr. Robertson concerning the negotiations for the proposed lease for the Goose Bay air base. You will remember that these negotiations were postponed during the absence of Sir Wilfrid Woods and later in order to enable Mr. Dyde, who was then busy with the Hong Kong enquiry, to give the benefit of his advice.

2. A meeting was held on Monday, April 27th at which Mr. Dyde presented a rough draft of a possible lease<sup>1</sup> for discussion with representatives of the Departments of National Defence, Air, Transport and External Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> Il s'agissait en réalité d'un projet d'accord; le bail ne fut pas rédigé avant la signature de l'accord, soit plus de deux ans plus tard.

<sup>1</sup> This was actually a draft agreement; the lease was not drawn up until the agreement was signed more than two years later.



3. As a result of these discussions a draft lease<sup>1</sup> of which I enclose two copies has been prepared for use in negotiating with the Government of Newfoundland.

4. In its present form the draft contains the points with which it seemed necessary to deal but it is fully understood that in discussion with the Government of Newfoundland it may be expedient to make some modifications.<sup>2</sup>

5. A few comments on the contents of the draft may be of use to you.

- (a) The term "air base" has been used throughout instead of "aerodrome" because sea planes as well as land planes will be used.
- (b) The postwar control of the air base has been left vague except that provision is made not only for the duration of the war but for such time thereafter as may be deemed necessary in the interests of common defence.
- (c) Very little is said about commercial uses of the area as it is assumed that commercial flying will be dealt with by separate agreement and probably by broad international agreement. It seems quite suitable to leave this matter open and there would be strong objection to any express limitation of commercial use being inserted in the lease.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

489.

1156-X-39

*Le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements  
au sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of Munitions and Supply  
to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, September 19, 1942

Dear Mr. Wrong,

I have your letter of September 8th.<sup>3</sup> enclosing copy of your draft despatch<sup>4</sup> addressed to the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, regarding lease of air base at Goose Bay from the Government of Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Au cours de l'été, le projet fut à nouveau amendé à la lumière de discussions tenues entre divers ministères et avec les gouvernements terre-neuvien et britannique.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> During the summer the draft was further amended in the light of discussions held among various Departments in Ottawa and with the Newfoundland and British Governments.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

I agree entirely with the contents of your despatch.

I do not know what the adverse consequences would be if there is no lease, but it seems to me that now that the airport has been built with the consent of the Newfoundland Government, the pressure for a lease should be coming from Newfoundland rather than from Canada. I can hardly believe that Newfoundland would ever challenge possession of a base in Labrador built by Canada with Canadian money.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. HOWE

490.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 221

Ottawa, September 25, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 538 of September 18<sup>1</sup> and previous communications relative to the lease for the air base at Goose Bay.

2. A draft lease, prepared by Colonel Dyde, was submitted last week to the War Committee of the Cabinet and approved, subject to certain amendments designed to protect Canada's rights to the operation of civil aircraft in the post-war period.

3. I am enclosing herewith the amended draft upon the basis of which you may continue the long delayed negotiations with the Newfoundland authorities. If time permits, it would undoubtedly be useful for you to secure at least an informal expression of their comments before your visit to Ottawa in order that you may make a verbal report upon their reception of the draft lease.

4. It is regretted that the Minister of National Defence is unable to spare Colonel Dyde to assist you, but at the present time this is impossible. However, Mr. Power would be pleased if you would enlist the technical aid of the senior officer of the Canadian Air Force in Newfoundland. With your own experience and ability as a counsel, it is confidently felt that the interests of Canada will be in competent hands.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

*Projet d'accord sur Goose Bay*  
*Draft Agreement on Goose Bay*

## MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Commencing at the most northerly point of Terrington Basin, thence due north to latitude fifty-three degrees twenty-five minutes, thence due west to longitude sixty degrees forty minutes, thence due south to the northerly boundary of Block "A" (containing one hundred and ninety-seven (197) square miles located on Hamilton River), thence due east and south-east following the northerly and easterly boundary of the said Block "A" to the northerly bank of Hamilton River, thence north-easterly along the northerly bank of Hamilton River and westerly along the shore of Goose Bay and Terrington Basin to the point of commencement, containing one hundred and sixty (160) square miles, more or less, for a period of ninety-nine years from the first day of September, 1941, for the purpose of the construction,

operation and maintenance of an air base thereon for operations by land or water by the Government of Canada.

- (b) Such ninety-nine (99) year lease shall be effected by Special Act of the Newfoundland Commission of Government, or by such instrument as may be agreed upon by the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland as being effective to assure the grant.
2. During the period of the lease the Government of Canada shall have the right to construct, maintain, operate, manage and control an air base at the site described in paragraph 1 and without restricting the generality of the foregoing shall have as incidental thereto the following rights which may be exercised either within the site or in the vicinity thereof:
- (a) to build and maintain for its exclusive use, a roadway approximately 22 miles in length from the air base to Northwest River;
  - (b) to cut timber for construction purposes connected with the air base and fire wood within an area contained in a circle of thirty miles radius centering on the air base, saving and excepting therefrom such grants, timber limits, easements, and other rights and concessions as the Government of Newfoundland may have granted previous to the execution of this Agreement;
  - (c) to take rock, sand, and other materials for construction purposes connected with the air base from any point within a circle with radius of thirty miles centering on the air base;
  - (d) to take from the neighboring streams and rivers such water as may be necessary for the purposes of the air base;
  - (e) to develop, construct and operate power plants and for such purposes to use such water storage and power sites as may be designated by the Government of Newfoundland;
  - (f) to construct radio stations and transmission lines and operate communications by radio, telephone and telegraph;
  - (g) to construct wharves and anchorages for the purposes of the base.
3. The same concessions and exemptions in respect of Customs duties and taxes as are granted to the Government of Canada in Newfoundland shall be considered as extending to Labrador. Harbour and dockage dues shall not be collected from Canadian vessels conveying personnel, equipment and supplies to the air base where the dock and unloading facilities for ships have been provided by the Government of Canada.



4. For the duration of the war, and for such time thereafter as the Governments may deem necessary or advisable in the interests of common defence—
  - (a) The management and control of the air base shall be under the direction of the Royal Canadian Air Force, with certain wireless and meteorological services being supplied by the Canadian Department of Transport:
  - (b) The use of the aerodrome will be made available to the Royal Air Force and the United States Navy and Army Air Forces. The Government of Canada may permit the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to erect buildings at the air base for the accommodation of aircraft and military personnel, and may permit such Governments to station Naval and Air Force military personnel at the air base:
  - (c) The use of the air base by civil aircraft shall be permitted insofar as such use is a necessary part of the war effort; and it is further agreed that the air base shall be available for such other civilian use as may be mutually agreed upon:
  - (d) In addition to any arrangements for the co-ordination of the wireless and meteorological services with other operating air bases and stations, such services at the air base may be co-ordinated with those operated by the Government of the United States in Canadian territory adjacent to Labrador and with the Royal Air Force Ferry Command:
  - (e) The ground organization for the operation and maintenance of the air base will be supplied by Royal Canadian Air Force:
  - (f) The Government of Canada may erect such works, buildings and fortifications as it may deem to be necessary for the maintenance of the base as an operational air base and for its defence, and may station at the air base such military personnel as may be required for the defence thereof:
  - (g) The air base area within the boundaries as set out in paragraph 1 hereof, together with the roadway, as set out in paragraph 2 (a) hereof, shall be prohibited area within the meaning of the Newfoundland Defence Regulations, and the Government of Newfoundland will not issue permits to fly over any part of Labrador without the prior consent of the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, Royal Canadian Air Force, or such other authority as may be designated from time to time by the Government of Canada. The Commissioner of Justice will delegate to the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force Station at the air base, the exclusive authority to issue passes to persons desiring to enter the prohibited area.

5. The question of the continuance after the war of the rights referred to in paragraph 4 will form the subject of discussion between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and this discussion will take place not later than twelve months after the conclusion of the war.
6. The Government of Canada agrees that it will not without the consent of the Government of Newfoundland transfer to any third party in whole or in part the rights, powers and authority herein granted to the Government of Canada.

Signed at St. John's, Newfoundland, in duplicate

this ..... day of ..... 1942.

On behalf of the Government of Canada:

On behalf of the Government of Newfoundland:

491.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 590

St. John's, October 12, 1942

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 221 of September 25th relative to the lease for the air base at Goose Bay, I have the honour to report that the draft lease forwarded therewith was submitted to the Newfoundland Government through the Commissioner for Public Utilities, the Honourable Sir Wilfrid Woods, on September 28, who replies in a letter dated October 12,<sup>1</sup> copies of which are enclosed, stating that the lease has been considered by the Commission of Government and referred to a committee consisting of four of the Commissioners who will discuss its terms with the High Commissioner at a later date.

I have etc.

A. J. PICK  
for the High Commissioner for Canada

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

492.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET

St. John's, November 30, 1942

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Today I sent you an airmail despatch No. 708<sup>1</sup> regarding the Goose Bay air base.

In that despatch I quoted a letter<sup>1</sup> received from Sir Wilfrid Woods in which he requested plans of the complete layout at Goose Bay.

Subsequent to the receipt of this letter, Sir Wilfrid Woods spoke to me by telephone and informed me that certain objections had been raised to the granting of so large an area as 160 square miles to the Canadian Government and suggested that, for the purpose of the conference which the Commission of Government was to have with me, I should furnish him with information in respect of the following matters:

- (a) Why does the Canadian Government require so large an area as 160 square miles?
- (b) Are there any sites within the area of 160 square miles which might be used for air bases?
- (c) In the examination of Labrador, did the Canadian Government discover other suitable places for air bases?

Will you please arrange to have this information furnished to me.

I have had the feeling for some months that there was going to be trouble in closing out this lease because of the long delay and because the fact that this was a most valuable site for an air base was filtering through to the people of this country. I anticipated that when this fact became known objection would be raised by Newfoundlanders to the handing over of this base for a period of 99 years to the Canadian Government.

My conversation with Sir Wilfrid today was over the telephone but it was quite evident to me that pressure was being put on him locally to prevent this air base from being granted for so long a term of years to the Canadian Government.

Upon receipt of your despatch No. 280 of November 25<sup>1</sup> in reply to my despatch No. 632 of October 27,<sup>1</sup> I informed Sir Wilfrid that I was leaving on December 16 for Canada and would be away for three weeks and would like to have the conference with the Commission of Government before that date. In his telephone conversation with me today, he said that this would be arranged provided I obtained the information for him contained in my despatch No. 708 of today's date, namely the plans of the complete layout,

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

and was in a position to answer the questions (a), (b) and (c) above mentioned.

In view, however, of the new attitude expressed by Sir Wilfrid to me today, I think possibly it may be wise for me to go to Ottawa and get first-hand information about the whole situation before this conference takes place. Possibly also it may be advisable for me to have some reinforcements to assist me at the conference. Apparently, Sir Wilfrid has in view the reconsideration of the whole question of the policy of granting a lease for 99 years as, in his conversation with me today over the telephone, he mentioned the possibility of the Canadian Government having the best and perhaps the only available site in Labrador suitable for an air base and if this was in fact the case, he stated that there would be strong objection to it in certain quarters, by which I assumed he meant certain persons in Newfoundland. He told me that he had all along assumed that there were any number of bases in Newfoundland which were suitable for air bases and he would like to know if this is in fact not correct. He also mentioned the fact that if the Goose Bay air base was the only suitable air base in Labrador, the Canadian Government might have a monopoly on the trans-Atlantic commercial air traffic through the control of this air base for 99 years. He also mentioned the fact that apparently the Canadian Government was going into the trans-Atlantic air service as evidenced from recent communications addressed to him through me.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

493.

1156-X-39

*Procès-verbal<sup>1</sup> d'une réunion pour discuter du projet d'accord sur Goose Bay*

*Minutes<sup>1</sup> of a Meeting to Discuss the Draft Agreement on Goose Bay*

St. John's, January 26, 1943

PRESENT

Hon. Sir Wilfrid Woods, K.C.M.G.<sup>2</sup>

Hon. L. E. Emerson, K.C.

Hon. I. Wild

Hon. P. D. H. Dunn

Squadron-Leader Pattison

Major J. Haig-Smith

Mr. R. Manning

Mr. C. H. Conroy

Mr. C. J. Burchell, K.C.<sup>3</sup>

Air Commodore F. V. Heakes

Colonel H. A. Dyde

Mr. A. J. Pick

<sup>1</sup> Préparé par la délégation de Terre-Neuve et accepté comme texte officiel.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Wilfrid Woods et les personnes mentionnées après lui représentaient le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>3</sup> C. J. Burchell et les personnes mentionnées après lui représentaient le gouvernement du Canada.

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by Newfoundland delegation and accepted as the official record.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Wilfrid Woods and those listed under him represented the Government of Newfoundland.

<sup>3</sup> C. J. Burchell and those listed under him represented the Government of Canada.



Sir Wilfrid Woods welcomed those present and said that the object of the Conference was to discuss the terms of a draft agreement<sup>1</sup> between the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada respecting the lease of an area at Goose Bay, Labrador. He suggested that the draft agreement, copies of which had already been circulated, be read and discussed clause by clause and this procedure was adopted.

Preamble:

No objection was taken to this.

Clause 1(a) Area:

. . .

Mr. Burchell said that the question had been considered at Ottawa by the Department of National Defence (Army), the Department of National Defence for Air and the Department of Transport. He quoted as follows from the report of the joint conference:

After consideration of all the factors involved, the officers concerned are of the opinion that the area might be reduced to 120 square miles, but for reasons enumerated below, any further reduction in the size of the leased area would seriously prejudice and restrict development of the Goose Bay project.

This Department<sup>2</sup> is in full agreement with the views expressed. . .

In arriving at the extent of the area to be included in the lease, this Department has been guided by the following considerations:

- (a) Goose Bay is a very important R.C.A.F. base for the Air Defence of Newfoundland and Canada and the protection of Allied merchant shipping in the Western Atlantic. It is also important to the Allied Nations as a ferrying base for United States and British aircraft. Its isolated position demands that it should be developed as a self-sustaining defended community capable of expansion as the exigencies of the war situation may demand;
- (b) Owing to its isolation and short season of access of water navigation, large stocks of gasoline, bombs and ammunition must be stored at widely dispersed points at the air base to reduce the bombing hazard.
- (c) A considerable defence force is required to make the base secure against enemy attack either from the ground or from the air. This defence force must have room for the proper dispersal of its barracks, stores, ammunition dumps, oil supplies and motor vehicles. The organization of anti-aircraft guns and searchlights is constantly being

<sup>1</sup> Il s'agissait du projet envoyé par le gouvernement canadien le 25 septembre. Voir le document 490.

<sup>2</sup> Le ministère de la Défense nationale.

<sup>1</sup> This was the draft forwarded by the Canadian Government on September 25. See Document 490.

<sup>2</sup> Department of National Defence.

improved and a 'Defence Area' with sufficient depth to permit the guns and searchlights to come into action before an enemy bomber can arrive at the point of bomb release must be ensured.

- (d) It is essential that the airport should have an ample supply of water and electric power. Water and power installations should be situated within a controlled and defended area adequately guarded from enemy attack or sabotage;
- (e) The air base is being used by aircraft of the R.C.A.F., the R.A.F. Ferry Command and the United States Army Air corps, each requiring W/T communication channels. In addition, common radio aids to navigation must be provided at the airport, such as H/F D/F, M/F D/F and a radio range. Blind Landing Aids of up to date character must also be installed. All these W/T and R/T stations must be dispersed so that they can properly function without interfering with each other. The radio aids to navigation and Blind Landing must also be properly located in relation to the air base and particularly the runways so that aircraft landing under blind conditions will have a clear approach of 6 to 8 miles off the end of each runway. It is important that all these installations should be within a 'Defended Area' to prevent access by unauthorized persons;
- (f) In view of the importance of Goose Bay as an air base, ample space for expansion should be provided to meet any future eventualities;

...  
Mr. Burchell had been asked if there were any sites within the area of 160 square miles which might be used for additional Air Bases. He had been instructed to assure the Newfoundland Government that the Canadian Government is not aware of any other suitable site within the area for any other air base and that the sole consideration in specifying the area requested was to provide ample space for development, defence and possible future expansion of the air base.

He had also been asked to inquire whether the Canadian Government, in examination of Labrador, discovered other suitable places for air bases and had been advised that while the Canadian Government has not made a complete examination for other sites, investigations they have made show that other potential areas exist in the vicinity of the settlement of Northwest River and also in the vicinity of Cartwright and at the head of Hebron Fjord. Of these three sites, Cartwright is the only one considered to have potentialities for the development of a complete aerodrome. The other two sites are suitable for single emergency landing strips.

...

Squadron-Leader Pattison said that the explanation given by the Army seems to be quite reasonable but the Air authorities' argument is not so strong. The area appears to be greater than requirements would appear to justify.

. . .

Mr. Wild asked why it is necessary to have a greater area just because the place is isolated. One would have thought that difficulties of defence would be less.

Colonel Dyde said this would be correct in so far as fifth columnists are concerned but there are other menaces when you have a base without any other points of defence near.

Mr. Dunn said it would appear that the Army and Air authorities have planned the area on the assumption that the airport is in a hostile country. If such an area is necessary for the defence of a base the whole of England would be unable to defend its aerodromes. You do not need to control the area to arrange for its defences.

. . .

Colonel Dyde said that Army defence posts are more or less permanent. They require buildings for personnel and gun positions. These are sufficient reasons for having the posts on the leased area so that we are not going beyond our limits. There is the reason too that it may be necessary to change gun positions.

Mr. Emerson asked if the Canadian Government had an aerodrome of this size anywhere in the world.

Colonel Dyde thought they had. In isolated places they will have larger areas.

. . .

Air Commodore Heakes answering Mr. Dunn said that the Canadian authorities are not looking merely at the present situation. We are all in this mess because people did not look ahead years ago. The importance of Goose is that it fits in with a strategic plan. The coasts of Newfoundland and Labrador represent a first line of defence for Newfoundland, Canada and the United States of America. The problem of defence will not lessen in the future. It will increase because the performance of Aircraft is improving. We have today a certain sense of freedom but the future is going to hold no such guarantee. The Canadian and American Governments are looking ahead to the basic strategic defence of this continent and the Goose area is merely one of the factors. Newfoundland will not, for some time, be in a position to provide the means to deal with the defence of the Labrador coasts. The Canadian Government is endeavouring to look as far ahead as possible.

. . .

Sir Wilfrid Woods said there appeared to be two extreme views, viz:

- (1) That the lease should include not more than a few square miles [for] purposes incidental to the air field.

(2) That the area leased should contain 120 square miles.

The Newfoundland Commissioners will have to have a further conference before saying anything further as to the area.

#### Clause 1(b)

Mr. Dunn said that arguments put forward apply only to military necessity and the lease according to clause 4 is for the duration of the war. Clauses 1(b) and 2 give the right to maintain and control an air base for the period of 99 years. In paragraph 4 you limit the tenure to the duration of the war or for such time thereafter as the Governments deem necessary.

Air Commodore Heakes—After the preamble the other clauses are a logical development.

Mr. Dunn—We have to convince the people of Newfoundland that this is necessary. The draft which you have put up emphasizes the war time argument and says nothing about peace time. That is our difficulty.

Air Commodore Heakes—The basic reason why we are here, the tremendous outlay involved, and the not unnatural desire that there should be some recompense for what this outlay has meant to Canada. You have negotiated a 99 year lease with the Americans.

Mr. Emerson—All the areas they have do not equal one quarter of what you ask at Goose.

Sir Wilfrid Woods—There is something to be said for proposals to make the Goose Bay airport an instrument of defence permanently.

Mr. Burchell—The term of 99 years was agreed.

#### Clause 2 Construct, Maintain, Control, etc:

It was agreed in principle that the words "subject to the laws of Newfoundland" shall be inserted before the word "control".

This will be settled in the draughting. It was agreed that the words which follow the word "rights", viz: "which may be exercised either within the site or in the vicinity thereof" shall be omitted.

#### Clause 2(a) Road to Northwest River:

It was agreed that this road shall become a public highway.

#### Clause 2(b) Right to cut timber:

#### Clause 2(c) Right to take rock, sand and other materials:

Colonel Dyde observed that with regard to the cutting of timber it is important from the point of view of concealment that no further general cutting of timber should be permitted on the plateau surrounding the airfield. Timber for building and fuel needs can be obtained outside the plateau.

After discussion it was agreed that in place of these clauses a general undertaking will be given whereby the Canadian Authorities will be assured of an adequate supply of timber, rock and sand. This will be settled in draughting. There is no particular need for these clauses in the lease.



Clause 2(d) Water for purposes "other than power":

Agreed.

Clause 2(e) Water for Power:

It was agreed that after the word "designated" the words "and subject to such conditions as may be imposed" shall be inserted.

Clause 2(f) Radio, Telephone and Telegraph:

Operations must be subject to arrangements made with the Newfoundland Department of Posts and Telegraphs from time to time. Agreed generally to accept the terms of Sir Wilfrid Woods' note. Mr. Burchell will submit a draft clause.

Clause 2(g) Wharves and Anchorages:

Owing to uncertainty as to the precise area and to the requirements of the Canadian Government, it was agreed that the following words be added "at such places as may be agreed upon with the Government of Newfoundland."

Clause 3, Customs duties and taxes:

Mr. Burchell and Colonel Dyde agreed that this clause may be omitted.

Clause 4 Management for duration of war:

Agreed that instead of the words "as the Government [sic] may deem" the following shall be inserted, viz: "As the Governments agree to be necessary or advisable."

Clause 4(b) and 4(c)<sup>1</sup>

Not altered. Mr. Burchell said there could be no objection to the use of the air base by Newfoundland aeroplanes.

<sup>1</sup> L'extrait suivant du procès-verbal préparé par la délégation canadienne permet de mieux comprendre l'importance de cet article:

<sup>1</sup> The following extract from the minutes prepared by the Canadian delegation throws more light on consideration of this item:

It was suggested by Mr. Emerson that there should be a specific provision against the use of the base by civil aircraft, except with the consent of the Newfoundland Government, so that it would be quite clear that Canada could not continue to exercise the rights given under clause 4(c) after the end of the war. Mr. Burchell and Colonel Dyde argued that we were now limited by clause 4(c) so that we could not use the Air Base for civil aviation after the war, and that even during the war we must obtain permission to use the base for civil aircraft which was not connected with the war effort. There was some discussion on the meaning of the phrase, "not later than twelve months after the conclusion of the war". It was generally agreed that there might be difficulty in defining clearly when the war might be said to have terminated, but it seemed to be impossible to make a satisfactory definition to cover the several possibilities.

Sir Wilfrid Woods said that some clarification of this clause was required and that he would like it to show more definitely that Canada could not use the base for civil aviation after the war without making arrangements with the Newfoundland Government. Mr. Emerson will prepare a new wording for the clause.

## Clause 4(d)

Agreed.

## Clause 4(e)

Unnecessary. Omit.

## Clause 4(f)

Agreed that after "erect" the words "within the area" shall be added.

## Clause 4(g)

Unnecessary. Omit.

## Clause 5, Continuance after the war:

This clause was read in conjunction with Clause 4(c). It was considered that the position should be made clearer and it was suggested that Mr. Emerson should prepare a new clause. Mr. Burchell and Colonel Dyde said, the Canadian authorities would be prepared to consider the revised wording. Mr. Emerson and Colonel Dyde will meet and endeavour to reach agreement upon the wording.

## Clause 6, Consent before transfer to Third Party:

Agreed.

Sir Wilfrid Woods' proposal that a municipal area, similar to that at Gander, be created at Goose, was withdrawn.

Proposals for employment of Newfoundland labour were agreed in principle.

Agreed that the Newfoundland Government and its officers should have access at all reasonable times to the air base.

Agreed that the Canadian Government should give an undertaking to give free of cost land necessary for Government buildings for administration of its laws and affairs and for the accommodations of Government Staff or for any other Government purpose.

Sir Wilfrid Woods said that there are two points on which it is desirable that agreement be reached before Colonel Dyde returns to Canada, viz:

(1) The extent of the area

(2) Clauses 4(c) and 5.

The meeting then adjourned.

494.

1156-X-39

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, February 2, 1943

Dear Mr. Burchell,

With reference to our conversation on the telephone this afternoon, I send a copy of the draft lease for Goose Bay which the Committee of the

Commission decided to recommend to the whole Commission as suitable from the point of view of the Newfoundland Government. You will find that this draft is almost identical with that which Mr. Emerson gave to Colonel Dyde.<sup>1</sup> If there are any points in it about which you would like to ask questions I should be happy to answer them.

It is understood between us that at present neither side is committed to this draft and that I am sending you a copy of it for informal use in keeping your Government informed as to the progress of negotiations.

As I said on the phone, the Committee intend to recommend the grant of an area of about 120 square miles, approximately as shown in red in the plan marked No. 1 a-b 1-6<sup>1</sup> which Colonel Dyde gave me, but owing to the absence of fixed points the exact metes and bounds of such an area cannot be described until after a physical survey of the site. Substantially, however, the question of the size and situation of the area may be regarded as settled so far as the Committee of the Commission is concerned.

Yours sincerely,

W. WOODS

[PIÈCE JOINTE / ENCLOSURE]

*Projet d'accord sur Goose Bay*

*Draft Agreement on Goose Bay*

[St. John's, January ,] 1943

#### MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

Made this ..... day of ..... A.D. 1943

BETWEEN The Government of the Dominion of Canada, represented herein by

..... of the first part,

AND The Government of Newfoundland represented herein by

..... of the second part.

WHEREAS the development of a strategic air base for the defence of Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador, within the general scheme of hemisphere defence, and as a basis of operations in the Atlantic area, is considered by the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland to be of the utmost importance:

Therefore the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have agreed as follows:

1. (a) The Government of Newfoundland will lease to His Majesty in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence for Air, all that parcel of land in the vicinity of Goose Bay, Northwest River, Labrador, described as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

(Here follows description)

hereinafter referred to as the Air Base; Reserving nevertheless from the Air Base all mines and minerals TO HOLD the same unto the Government of Canada for a period of ninety-nine years from the 1st. day of September, A.D. 1941 for the purpose of the construction, operation and maintenance of an air base thereon for operations by land or water for the purposes set forth in the recital hereto.

- (b) Such lease shall be authorized or ratified by Statute, or by such other instrument as may be agreed upon by the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland.
2. During the period of the lease the Government of Canada shall have the right to construct, maintain, operate, manage and control an air base at the Air Base and without restricting the generality of the foregoing shall have as incidental thereto the following rights, namely:
- (a) to build and maintain a roadway approximately 22 miles in length from the Air Base to Northwest River, and such other roads outside the base as may be agreed with the Government of Newfoundland from time to time. All roads built hereunder outside the Air Base shall become public highways. Where the Air Base separates two roads or two parts of the same road, passage through the Air Base will be permitted, subject to such reasonable limitations as are necessary for the protection of the Air Base and its operations.
  - (b) to take from the neighbouring streams and rivers, such water as may be necessary for the purposes of the Air Base;
  - (c) to develop, construct and operate power plants for the use of the Air Base and for such purposes to use such water storage and power sites as may be agreed and upon such conditions as may be imposed by the Government of Newfoundland.
  - (d) to construct radio stations and transmission lines and operate communications by radio, telephone and telegraph for the purposes of the base, subject to agreement with the Secretary for Posts and Telegraphs as to frequencies and power output in the case of radio communications.
  - (e) to construct docks, wharves, slipways, piers and anchorages for ships and aircraft at such places as may from time to time be agreed with the Government of Newfoundland.
3. For the duration of the war, and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary or advisable in the interests of common defence—
- (a) The management and control of the Air Base shall be under the direction of the Royal Canadian Air Force, with certain



wireless and meteorological services being supplied by the Canadian Department of Transport;

- (b) The use of the Air Base will be made available to the Royal Air Force and the United States Navy and Army Air Forces. The Government of Canada may permit the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to erect buildings at the Air Base for the accommodation of aircraft and military personnel, and may permit such Governments to station Naval and Air Force military personnel at the Air Base;
  - (c) The use of the Air Base by civil aircraft shall be permitted insofar as such use is a necessary part of the war effort, and the Air Base shall be available for such other civilian use as may be mutually agreed upon;
  - (d) In addition to any arrangements for the coordination of the wireless and meteorological services with other operating air bases and stations, such services at the Air Base may be coordinated with those operated by the Government of the United States in Canadian territory adjacent to Labrador and with the Royal Air Force Ferry Command.
- 4. The Government of Canada may from time to time erect within the Air Base, such works, buildings and fortifications as it may deem to be necessary for the maintenance of the base as an operational air base and for its defence, and may station at the air base such military personnel as may be required for the defence thereof.
  - 5. Civil and military aircraft owned by the Newfoundland Government shall have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada.
  - 6. The Government of Canada will employ Newfoundland labour as far as practicable at the Air Base.
  - 7. Duly authorized officers of the Newfoundland Government shall have access at all reasonable times to the Air Base in the course of the carrying out of their duties.
  - 8. The Government of Canada shall transfer free of cost to the Government of Newfoundland, any land within the Air Base reasonably required by the Government of Newfoundland for the erection of buildings for the accommodation of its officials or for any other Government purpose.
  - 9. In order to avoid doubt it is hereby declared that the laws of Newfoundland shall be applicable throughout the Base, and to all persons therein or thereon.
  - 10. The development of the Air Base being primarily for defence the base and its facilities shall not be used for civil or for commercial operations, except as provided in paragraph (c) of clause 3 hereof.

The question of its use for civil or for commercial operations after the war and all matters incidental thereto will form the subject of discussion between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland and this discussion will take place not later than twelve months after the war.

11. The Government of Canada agrees that it will not, without the consent of the Government of Newfoundland, transfer to any third part[y] in whole or in part the rights, powers and authority herein granted to the Government of Canada.

Signed at St. John's Newfoundland, in duplicate this ..... day of ..... A.D. 1943.

On behalf of the Government of Canada:

On behalf of the Government of Newfoundland:

495.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

DESPATCH 47

[St. John's,] February 6, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to previous correspondence on the subject of the proposed lease of an area adjoining Goose Bay, Labrador, to the Canadian Government for use as an air base. At the time at which we received your latest communication on this subject (your telegram No. 545 of the 2nd October last)<sup>1</sup>, we had just received a draft lease<sup>2</sup> prepared by the Canadian Government and presented to us for consideration by the High Commissioner for Canada. We have since been in negotiation with the High Commissioner who has been assisted by Colonel Dyde, Military Secretary of the Department of National Defence of Canada, and Air Commodore F. V. Heakes, R.C.A.F., Commanding R.C.A.F. in Newfoundland. Matters have now reached a stage at which we are ready, subject to your approval, to propose to the Canadian Government the revised form of lease contained in the draft<sup>3</sup> which we have annexed to this despatch. A copy of the Canadian draft is also annexed for purposes of comparison.

2. In our draft we have recognized, as we must, that the Canadian Government has a strong case for requesting the right to exercise military control of the base throughout the agreed period of the lease. We had already, with your concurrence, accepted the view that the Canadian tenure of the site could not be limited to the period of the war, in view of the large expenditure involved, and had agreed that the period of the lease should be 99 years (your telegram 904 of 23rd October, 1941).<sup>1</sup> It was not possible to maintain in discussion a distinction between this period of the tenure of the site

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 490.

<sup>3</sup> Voir le document 494.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 490.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 494.

by the Canadians and the period during which they could control and operate the base for purely military purposes, since obviously security of tenure for 99 years would be of no value unless it carried with it the right to make some use of the base throughout that period. We accepted the view of the Canadian Government that the Goose Bay air base must be regarded as a factor in a permanent plan for the strategic defence of Newfoundland, Canada and the United States which cannot be limited to the period of the present hostilities and that since Newfoundland will not be able, within any predictable period of time, to take care of the defence of the Labrador coast herself, it is necessary to afford to Canada facilities for this purpose. It is in these circumstances that we have drawn the draft lease so that it gives Canada the right to "construct, maintain, operate and manage and control an air base" at Goose Bay "during the period of the lease", notwithstanding the previous decision that "the whole question of post war control should be left entirely open until after the war".

3. On the other hand, we have made it plain in our draft that the development of the air base is primarily for defence. This is expressed in the preamble to the lease (which is identical with the preamble in the Canadian draft) where reference is made to the "development of a strategic air base . . . within the general scheme of hemisphere defence, and as a basis of operations in the Atlantic area", and in the first clause which makes it plain that the rights given to Canada are for the purposes set forth in this preamble. The same point is made explicitly in Clause 10 where it is also provided that the air base and its facilities shall not be used for civil or for commercial operations, except for purposes of the war effort or by mutual agreement and that within 12 months after the war the whole question of post-war use for civil or commercial operations will be discussed between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland. The question of the use of the base for commercial or civil operations is thus definitely relegated to post-war settlement.

4. The situation and size of the area to be leased are matters to which we have given careful consideration. The draft prepared by the Government of Canada provided for the lease of an area of about 160 square miles for the aerodrome and, in addition, for rights to cut timber, take other construction materials (rock, sand, etc.) and water, to develop water power and to construct wharves, etc., in the larger area falling within a radius of 30 miles of the centre of the aerodrome. The Canadian representatives have accepted our view that the lease should not provide for any rights outside the aerodrome area and the Canadian Government has reduced its demand in respect of the latter to an area of 120 square miles. We agreed that we would give the Canadian authorities an assurance by letter of adequate facilities in the vicinity for obtaining timber, rock and sand.

5. We have no objection on general economic grounds to alienating for 99 years the particular area of 120 square miles in question, notwithstanding its size, as mineral rights are reserved and we have no reason to

suppose that the area possesses any particular economic value. It so happens that, according to information supplied by the Canadians themselves, the area contains a fairly extensive plateau which is the best site in Labrador for construction of runways and possibly the only really suitable site. Consequently there is a theoretical possibility that a situation might arise, after the war, in which Newfoundland could neither agree with Canada as to the terms on which civil or commercial operations should be permitted at Goose Bay nor find another site on which to build an air base for those purposes. On the other hand we are satisfied that the Canadian Government have sound military reasons for asking for an extensive area and we propose to agree to grant the area of 120 square miles which they now ask for.

6. The draft lease annexed to this despatch is incomplete in that it leaves blank the part of it in which a description of the metes and bounds should be given. Owing to the absence of fixed points it has not been possible to place the proposed area accurately on a map and for this reason final completion of the lease will have to await a survey which it will not be possible to make until the Summer. We annex for your information a blue print<sup>1</sup> which shows on a map the area placed as accurately as present information will permit. Attached to this blue print is a technical note explaining the difficulties above referred to. It seems probable that the area asked for will be found to include part of an area in which timber rights have been granted. If that is found to be the case it will be for the Government of Canada to acquire these rights from the Grand River Pulp and Lumber Company to whom they were granted.

7. Other points in the draft lease are, we hope, self-explanatory. Clause 2 contains the rights of the Government of Canada during the period of the lease, while Clause 3 contains rights which are secured and obligations which are imposed only for the duration of the war and for any period thereafter agreed to be necessary or advisable "*in the interests of common defence*". The obligations include availability of the air base for the R.A.F. and the U.S. Air Forces. Clause 4 gives the Government of Canada the right to erect works, buildings and fortifications "for the maintenance of the base as an operational air base and for its defence". This right will continue throughout the period of the lease but it is to be noted that it is a right to be exercised only for defence purposes. Clauses 7, 8 and 9 emphasize the intention to maintain Newfoundland sovereignty in the area. Clause 11 prohibits transfer of rights, powers, etc., to a third party.

8. While neither this Government nor the Canadian Government is committed to acceptance of our draft lease and the arrangements described in this despatch we have reason to believe that they will be acceptable to the Canadian Government. We should be grateful if you would telegraph as soon as possible your approval of our proposal to make a definite offer of these terms to the Canadian Government.

I have etc.

[Humphrey T. Walwyn]

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



496.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 44

Ottawa, February 23, 1943

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 60 of February 3rd<sup>1</sup>, relative to the Goose Bay air base, I have the honour to advise you that the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, under date of February 18th, provided me with an expression of the views of his department for transmission to you as follows:

I have examined the revised draft lease which was approved by the Newfoundland Government Committee and consider that, with certain minor reservations, it is now acceptable to this Department. . .

Colonel Dyde in a letter of February 20th, provided me with the viewpoint of the Department of National Defence (Army) in the following words:

The draft agreement has been examined by the Department of National Defence (Army). It is noted that in the minutes of the conference of January 26th, which have been forwarded subsequently in the High Commissioner's despatch No. 74 of 8th February, 1943,<sup>2</sup> note has been made of the fact that in the event of an expansion at some later date of the aerodrome towards the south-east edge of the plateau, the Army could obtain by making application, permission to use for anti-aircraft gun purposes a strip of land on the south bank of the Hamilton river.

With reference to paragraphs 25 and 26 of the High Commissioner's despatch No. 60, and the arrangements for timber and gravel supply, this Department recommends that the selection of a reasonable area for such purposes be handled by the Department of Transport in consultation with the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Quartermaster General.

On this understanding the draft agreement is satisfactory to this Department.

The Deputy Minister of Transport in a letter of February 19th, expressed the opinion of his Department as follows:

The terms of the draft lease have been carefully considered and the matter has been discussed with Colonel Dyde who was a party to these discussions. This Department is prepared to concur in the conclusion of a lease for this property on these terms.

I understand the Government of Newfoundland is prepared to meet the wishes of our Government in regard to the area required and that suitable natural boundaries will be adhered to as closely as possible.

. . .

I trust that no difficulty will be encountered in arranging for engineers of the Newfoundland Government to assist in drawing up a description of the area to be included in the lease in the manner described by Mr. De

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Carteret. It is trusted that in view of the concurrence of the competent Canadian authorities with respect to the lease as above set forth, it will be possible to secure its signature in the near future.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

497.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 225

[London,] May 14, 1943

SECRET. Your despatch No. 47 and connected correspondence.

1. GOOSE BAY. We have given careful consideration to draft agreement and comments on minor points are contained in my immediately following telegram.

2. Major issue of policy which arises on the draft is whether we are justified in granting Canadians Lease for 99 years for so large an area as 120 square miles even though use of such area is properly required by them for immediate defence purposes. Considerations which arise are:

- (a) It is stated in paragraph 5 of your despatch that the area asked for by the Canadians includes "the best and possibly the only suitable site" in Labrador for the construction of runways. In other words, if the Canadians get the whole of this area they may monopolise the only suitable landing ground in Labrador.
- (b) It is further stated in paragraph 5 of your despatch that the present Airport with its runways and buildings is entirely situated in one half of the area. This certainly suggests that the other half of the area is not so essential to the Canadians as they make out and that in demanding the whole area they may have in view the desirability from a long-term standpoint of preventing anyone else from establishing themselves next door to them. The Air Ministry are not themselves inclined to attach much importance to this point. At the same time, however, you should know for your very confidential information that their general view is that 120 square miles is probably more than is strictly justified on defence grounds and that most of the reasons given by the Canadians for asking for so large an area—as set out in your telegram No. 77<sup>1</sup> could be contested if this were necessary.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

- (c) We are committed to giving the Canadians security in the shape of a 99 year lease in return for the large expenditure they have undertaken at Goose Bay but having regard to the sensitiveness of Newfoundland public opinion on the score of Canadian and American 'encroachments' and to our position as trustees for future Newfoundland Governments we should lay ourselves open to serious criticism if area so leased were not restricted to absolute minimum. This would apply with all the greater force if area in question is only suitable landing ground in Labrador.
- (d) It is fully appreciated that the draft Agreement confers no right of user for civil or commercial purposes, the position as regards this being reserved for discussion between the two Governments after the war. On the other hand possession is nine-tenths of the law and if when such discussions open Canada is already established with a 99 year lease of the only suitable landing ground in Labrador even with rights of user limited to defence purposes only, Newfoundland's negotiating position may be so weak as to prejudice seriously prospects of securing satisfactory agreement with Canadians in regard to civil flying.

3. In the light of the above we feel that it would be unwise and inappropriate that Canada should as a result of war conditions be granted lease for whole area of 120 square miles and suggest that matter might best be dealt with as follows:

- (1) Canada to be granted lease for 99 years for that half only of the area which she is at present occupying, terms of grant to follow those of draft agreement.
- (2) Canada to be told that as regards remainder of area Newfoundland Government are of course very ready she should have full right of user for defence purposes during the war but that area must revert to Newfoundland possession immediately after the war.
- (3) It could be added that if experience during the war should be such as to make it desirable in the view of the Canadian Government that the area under (1) should be increased, the Newfoundland Government would be ready for their part to include discussion of this matter in the post-war conversations between the two Governments provided under clause 10 of the draft agreement. In the meantime the Newfoundland Government will hold the position open and will not dispose of rights over the unleased area to any third party.

4. While we agree that dominating practical consideration is that Canada is to be given 99 year lease at all for however limited an area we feel that above procedure would at least have the merit of strengthening Newfoundland's position in relation to postwar discussions and of giving better appearance to the arrangement from the standpoint of presentation to Newfoundland public. Moreover, line taken is not one to which it is thought

that Canada could reasonably object in view of attitude which she herself has adopted as regards air facilities granted to the United States in Canada.

5. If Commission agree that arrangement on above lines would be preferable from general Newfoundland standpoint, question arises whether matter should be pursued with Canadian Representatives in Newfoundland or whether in view of importance of issue negotiations should now be transferred to Ottawa where Newfoundland Representatives would be able to discuss direct with Canadian authorities with the assistance of United Kingdom High Commissioner. There seems much to be said for the latter course and we should be glad to have the views of the Commission as to this as well as on suggested basis of negotiation generally.

498.

NPA GN1/14 1/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 226

[London,] May 14, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL. Following are our suggestions as to certain drafting points<sup>1</sup>

...  
Clause 3 (B). It is desired that the opening sentence should be redrafted as follows—"The use of the Air Base will be made available to British military aircraft and to aircraft of the United States Navy and Army Air Forces". The term "British military aircraft" is used instead of "The Royal Air Force" to cover British naval aircraft.

Clause 5. We should like to see this clause extended to include other British as well as Newfoundland aircraft, i.e., we would propose that it should be amended to read—"All British Civil and Military aircraft shall have the right to use the air base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada". This would help to safeguard our right to use the airfield after the war.

...

499.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner in Great Britain*

DESPATCH 617

Ottawa, June 26, 1943

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. A-156 of May 27<sup>2</sup> and to previous correspondence concerning the proposed agreement between the

<sup>1</sup> Les articles du projet qui ne furent pas, à la fin, mis de l'avant ou contestés par le Canada sont omis.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Drafting points which were not, in the end, put forward or which were not contested by Canada are omitted.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



Canadian and Newfoundland Governments on the air base at Goose Bay, Labrador.

. . .

4. It is difficult for us to understand why the Dominions Office has not before now been able to inform the Newfoundland Government that it has no objection to the conclusion of this agreement between the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments. The postwar rights of the Government of Newfoundland are protected by the tenth clause of the agreement providing that the use of the base for civil or for commercial operations after the war "will form the subject of discussion between the Governments of Canada and of Newfoundland and this discussion will take place not later than twelve months after the war".

5. The negotiations for the lease of the Goose Bay air base have been very long drawn out and, particularly as a result of recent publicity given to the air base, it is possible that questions may be raised in Canada concerning Canada's title to the land on which it has made such heavy expenditures. It would be highly embarrassing for the Canadian Government to be required to admit that to date Canada possesses no title of any nature and it would be very serious if it were disclosed that opposition from the Dominions Office, in the face of agreement between the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments, was responsible for the delay during recent months.

6. For your confidential information I might point out that it is strongly desired that the lease be completed before Sir Wilfrid Woods returns to the United Kingdom. His term of office expired some months ago and he is remaining in Newfoundland only pending the arrival of his successor. Sir Wilfrid, who is the most competent of the United Kingdom members of the Commission of Government, has adopted a co-operative and fair minded attitude throughout the negotiations which have been primarily in his own hands so far as Newfoundland is concerned. Following his return to the United Kingdom it is possible that other officials, not fully responsible for his commitments, may raise obstacles to the signature of the lease.

7. I would be grateful, therefore, if you would take the matter up with the United Kingdom Government urging that, in the light of the considerations set forth in this despatch, action be taken by them at once to authorize Newfoundland to sign the agreement with Canada.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

500.

1156-X-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Ottawa, June 26, 1943

Dear Mr. Massey,

I wish to refer to our despatch No. 617 of today's date, asking you to take up with the United Kingdom government, as a matter of urgency and importance, the completion of the Goose Bay lease. To supplement the despatch, I am enclosing a copy of a secret and confidential letter of June 18th<sup>1</sup> from our High Commissioner in Newfoundland, from which you will see that the long delay in closing these negotiations is apparently due to the stalling position of the Dominions Office. A copy of Mr. Burchell's letter, the contents of which as you will see for yourself must be kept entirely confidential, was brought to the attention of the Minister of National Defence for Air. Mr. Power's comments on it are contained in the enclosed letter of June 19th<sup>1</sup> from his Deputy Minister.

I have an uneasy feeling that somebody in the Dominions Office or the Air Ministry may be toying with the idea that our defective title to the Goose Bay airport may be used for bargaining purposes in the discussion of post-war civil aviation. I am sure this would be a very dangerous card for the United Kingdom to think of playing, given the general relations between our two countries and the special complications introduced by the position in Newfoundland. The suggestion that the United Kingdom is using its control over Newfoundland and indirectly Newfoundland's control over Labrador (which is a fairly recent development) to put pressure on the Canadian Government in the general field of civil aviation, is full of thoroughly mischievous possibilities, which need no elaboration.

I had thought of speaking privately to Malcolm MacDonald here in the general sense of this letter, but you may have a better opportunity of putting forward these considerations in London.

I might add, for your own information, that though our position *vis-à-vis* the United Kingdom and Newfoundland in respect of the specific Goose Bay negotiations is, I think, very strong, it would be weakened if the argument were to become public and generalized by the fact that the airfields constructed for United States Service use in Canada automatically revert to the Canadian government at the close of hostilities. It might be argued rather loosely from this fact that, since Canada is in somewhat the same position *vis-à-vis* the United States in respect of airfields as Newfoundland is *vis-à-vis* Canada, the arrangements obtaining in the first situation might be equitable in the other. This is an analogy which we could not entertain for a moment

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and one, in fact, that breaks down on first inspection of the position of Newfoundland. There is, nevertheless, a risk that this sort of argument may be given a specious currency in Newfoundland if the negotiations for Goose Bay remain uncompleted. I hope, therefore, very much that you will be able to get the United Kingdom authorities to give their prompt consent to the confirmation by Newfoundland of the arrangements agreed with Canada six months ago.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

501.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1511

London, July 6, 1943

Your despatch No. 617 of June 26th. Proposed Canada-Newfoundland agreement on air base at Goose Bay.

1. I raised the matter vigorously in conversation with the Dominions Secretary and also handed him a note in which I asked that action should at once be taken to authorise Newfoundland to sign agreement.

2. Today I have the following note from the Secretary of State:

We fully appreciate the desire of the Canadian Government that their tenure of the Goose Bay airport should be placed on a formal basis as soon as possible, and I can assure you that there is no desire on our part to delay matters. A lease of Newfoundland territory for 99 years is, however, involved, and I am sure your Government will understand that this has made it necessary for us to look at the draft agreement with special care, more especially as both the United Kingdom Government and the Commission of Government are constitutionally in the position of trustees for future governments in Newfoundland.

After examination of the draft agreement here, we felt that there were certain aspects of it which might require reconsideration from this point of view, though it was difficult, in the absence of more detailed knowledge of the local position at Goose Bay, to come to any considered conclusion. It was accordingly necessary for us to put these points to the Newfoundland Government by telegram and to obtain their further comments before matters could be finalized. The reply of the Commission of Government should shortly be received, and I hope that, as a result it will be possible to arrive at a settlement satisfactory to your Government in the near future.

May I add that the Canadian Government will, I feel sure, be as strongly impressed as we are with the desirability that an agreement of this character should be fully acceptable to public opinion in Newfoundland. I know that they will understand the need to keep this aspect in mind, since they have had somewhat similar problems of their own in relation to facilities granted to the United States Government on Canadian territory.

MASSEY

502.

NPA S-5-5-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 249

[St. John's,] July 10, 1943

SECRET. Your secret telegrams Nos. 225 of 14th May and 348 of 6th July.<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay. Your proposal that Canada be granted lease for that half only of the area which she is at present occupying is evidently based on statement in para. 5 of our despatch No. 47 of 6th February that we believed runways and buildings are situated within the eastern half of the plateau. We sent Pattison to make an inspection of the area after receipt of your telegram and his report shows that the plateau is roughly in the centre of the whole area and that it would be impossible from the point of view of the control of air traffic to locate another set of runways adjacent to the present runways. It also shows that a considerable portion of the plateau remaining has been taken up with radio sites and roadways necessary for the present development. Thus in any case we should have to include the whole plateau in the leased area. A reduction of the balance of the area so that the total would be say 60 square miles instead of 120 would not in our view reconcile public opinion in Newfoundland to the lease or conserve to Newfoundland anything likely to be of value or alter the fact that Canada for 99 years would be in possession of the best known site for a landing ground in Labrador. On the other hand it would involve summary rejection of the Canadians' long range view of the requirements of Western Hemisphere defence as set out in our telegram to you No. 77 Secret of 8th March, 1943.<sup>1</sup> We have taken note of the statement of the general view taken by the Air Ministry of the reasons given by the Canadians for asking for so large an area but we are doubtful of the wisdom of entering into a controversy with the Canadians on this aspect of the matter especially as the surrender of the whole plateau is in any case unavoidable. Pattison has reported that in his opinion Goose Bay is not the only suitable site for an airport in Labrador although its location is ideal with regard to layout, nature of the terrain and access to the sea. He states that he was able to see from the air in the area of Northwest River alone that other sites could be found and he obtained confirmation of this opinion by discussions with R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. officers who have had experience in the area. In all the circumstances we do not advise reopening negotiations on a new basis and request authority to proceed on the lines indicated in our despatch No. 47. We are replying separately to your telegram No. 226 Confidential re drafting points.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



503.

NPA S-5-5-3

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 365

[London,] July 15, 1943

SECRET. Your telegram July 10th No. 249. Goose Bay. In the circumstances now explained I agree that there would be little practical advantage to be gained by seeking to reopen matter with Canadians on basis suggested in my telegram No. 225. I accordingly approve your proposal to proceed with negotiations with a view to completion of agreement on the lines of the draft enclosed in your despatch No. 47.

2. Above is subjected to consideration of drafting points contained in my telegram No. 226 on which I note you will be telegraphing separately.

3. I gather from your telegram that lease to Canadian Government of this area is likely to provoke criticism from Newfoundland Public opinion irrespectively altogether of the size of the area leased. It would clearly be unfortunate if such criticism were to be based as has happened on other occasions on a misapprehension as to the terms of the agreement and the steps taken to safeguard Newfoundland's interests and I assume that when announcing the grant of the lease the Commission will issue a full explanatory statement for public information. In view of importance of the matter I should be glad if text of any proposed statement could be telegraphed to me in advance.

504.

NPA GN 1/3 1/43

*Le vice-président de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Vice-Chairman, Commission of Government of Newfoundland,*  
*to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 260

[St. John's,] July 15, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL. Your telegram No. 226 confidential May 14th. Drafting points Goose Bay lease. . . .

Clause 3 (b). We agree and will propose to Canada.

Clause 5. We will put your proposal to Canada. They may wish to limit the aircraft to those owned or controlled by British Governments.

. . .

505.

Canada House AR 26/1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner in Great Britain*

London, July 26, 1943

My dear High Commissioner,

In continuation of my letter of the 6th July<sup>1</sup> regarding the Goose Bay airport in Labrador I am glad to be able to let you know that as a result of further correspondence with the Newfoundland Government it has now been agreed that the Commission of Government should proceed with the completion of the agreement on the general basis proposed at their discussions with the Canadian representatives last February. There are certain drafting points which the Newfoundland Government will be taking up, but these relate for the most part to matters of detail which should not I imagine give rise to any difficulty.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. ATTLEE

506.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 600

St. John's, August 2, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to my despatch No. 556 of July 20, 1943<sup>2</sup> and to previous despatches relative to the lease of the Goose Bay airport.

2. Under date of July 30th, I received a letter<sup>2</sup> from the Honourable Sir Wilfrid W. Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities, in regard to this matter, copy of which is enclosed herewith, together with a copy of the new draft of the lease, the draft being dated July 27, 1943.<sup>3</sup>

3. I have the following comments to make on the points raised in the letter from Sir Wilfrid W. Woods:

. . .

Clause 3 (b).

In the original draft, the first sentence of this clause read as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 501.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> See Document 501.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

The use of the Air Base will be made available to the Royal Air Force and the United States Navy and Army Air Forces.

It is now proposed that the following sentence should be substituted:

The use of the Air Base will be made available to the British Military Aircraft and to aircraft of the United States Navy and Army Air Forces.

This proposed change must be considered along with the proposed change in Clause 5.

Clause 5.

In the original draft, this clause read as follows:

5. Civil and military aircraft owned by the Newfoundland Government shall have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada.

It is proposed that the following clause should be substituted:

5. All British Civil and Military aircraft shall have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada.

It would appear that the intention of the clause proposed to be substituted is to give British civil and military aircraft the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada during the whole period of the lease, which is for 99 years.

This would seem to be clear from the fact that Clause 3(b) as originally drafted provided for the Air Base being made available to the Royal Air Force during the war and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary and advisable in the interests of common defence, and the change proposed in Clause 3 (b) is to extend this provision to all British military aircraft.

I am not quite clear as to whether or not it is intended that the word "British" should include Australian, New Zealand, South African and aircraft from all parts of the Empire or whether it is intended to limit its meaning to aircraft from the United Kingdom. I understand that in England it is quite usual in ordinary conversation to restrict the word "British" to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. However, such Acts as the Shipping Act, both in England and in Canada, make it clear that a British ship is one that is owned by a British subject, no matter in what part of the Empire he may reside. I would assume, by analogy, that a British airship is one which is owned by a British subject in any part of the Empire.

Under the original draft of the lease, it was agreed that aircraft owned by the Newfoundland Government should have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada. The matter of extension of this concession to include either aircraft from the United Kingdom or aircraft from any part of the British Empire is one of policy which must be decided by the Government of Canada.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

507.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Dominions Secretary*

[London,] August 25, 1943

My dear Secretary of State,

I would refer to your letter of July 26th and our previous correspondence regarding the Goose Bay (Labrador) Lease Agreement.

The Canadian authorities have now received from the Newfoundland Commissioner for Public Utilities a new draft<sup>1</sup> of the proposed Agreement, which they are prepared to accept, with the exception of a change proposed in Clause 5. This clause originally read: "Civil and military aircraft owned by the Newfoundland Government shall have the right to use the air base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada". The new draft would read: "All British civil and military aircraft shall have the right to use the air base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada". This change would affect the whole period of the lease.

Discussions regarding the terms of this lease began in October 1941, and my Government are very anxious to bring the matter to a conclusion. The War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet is not prepared to accept the re-draft of Clause 5, and I desire to urge strongly the retention of the previous text.

To assist you in appreciating the Canadian point of view I would point out that at an early stage in the negotiations the Newfoundland Commission of Government, presumably at the instance of the United Kingdom authorities, insisted that the question of post-war use should be reserved for consideration after the war. Clause 10 of the proposed Agreement accordingly provides for post-war discussion between the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada as to the use of the base for civil or commercial operations. At the same time Clause 3 provides for any necessary consideration of the continuing military or defence utilisation of the base.

In these circumstances it would seem inappropriate to provide in the lease for the specific and extensive post-war rights which would be granted by agreement to the new text of Clause 5, as agreement on this basis would mean that Canada and Newfoundland would be committed to making Goose Bay airport available on equal terms to United Kingdom and other British aircraft without any assurance of reciprocal rights in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the Commonwealth.

The Canadian Government has avoided the granting of any rights for post-war civil use of any air base in Canada or under Canadian control, until the end of the war or such time as suitable arrangements may be made as a result of the general international discussions. The United Kingdom proposal would

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



create a difficult situation with respect to rights to post-war use of the air bases constructed wholly or in part by the United States Government in Canadian territory and for that matter in other parts of the Commonwealth as well. If British aircraft were at this time granted the rights proposed in the new wording of Clause 5 there would undoubtedly be very great pressure from the United States for similar or equivalent rights for United States aircraft at Goose Bay and at other bases. Moreover, the fact that the members of the Commonwealth were making special arrangements among themselves at this time when the whole matter of post-war air transport is to be discussed shortly by the interested Governments would, we believe, prejudice the outcome of these discussions.

The Newfoundland Commissioner for Public Utilities, Sir Wilfrid Woods, and the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland have recently been in Ottawa, where the Canadian position was explained to them, and the latter has been instructed to inform the Commission of Government that the Canadian authorities accept all the modifications proposed in their redraft, with the exception of the change in Clause 5, to which objection has been taken for the reasons I have indicated.

Yours sincerely,

VINCENT MASSEY

508.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2226

London, September 15, 1943

MOST SECRET. Your telegram No. 1496, August 23.<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay Air Base. The following communication has now been addressed to me by the Dominions Secretary.

- (1) I have been considering the point raised in your letter of the 25th August regarding the proposed agreement relative to the air base at Goose Bay.
- (2) I note that in commenting on the revised form of Clause 5 which the Newfoundland Government have suggested, you say that it would mean that Canada and Newfoundland would be committed to making the airport available on equal terms to United Kingdom and other British aircraft "without any assurance of reciprocal rights in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the Commonwealth". So far, however, as the United Kingdom at least is concerned, I should not have thought that this argument was quite valid. I feel that, seeing that Newfoundland is under United Kingdom control, it is reasonable that any lease granted by the Newfoundland Government to Canada should provide for the equal treatment of United Kingdom with

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Canadian aircraft in the area to be leased. The question of reciprocity would seem only to arise if we were seeking equality of treatment with Canadian aircraft on Canadian territory, which of course is not the case. Similarly I would suggest as regards what you say as to the probability of pressure from the United States for similar rights, that there can hardly be any valid parallel between our seeking these rights in an airfield in territory for which we are responsible, and the United States Government pressing for similar rights at airfields in British territory.

- (3) I appreciate that the actual wording of Clause 5 which has been suggested covers other British as well as United Kingdom and Newfoundland aircraft, but we should have no objection to the wording being amended by the substitution of "United Kingdom and Newfoundland" for "British" before the words "civil aircraft". I should be grateful if you would ascertain whether, in the light of the above comments, this amendment would not adequately meet the views of the Canadian Government. I am glad to learn that in all other respects the Canadian authorities have found the revised draft acceptable.

2. In order that the matter may be finalised I should appreciate your further observations as soon as possible.

509.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 30, 1943

. . .

## GOOSE BAY LEASE

4. THE ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS reported that the U.K. government had now suggested that the proposed amendment to clause 5 of the Goose Bay Lease be limited to the granting to military aircraft owned by the Newfoundland and U.K. governments of the right to use the air base on terms not less favourable than those of the government of Canada.

(Cable from the Canadian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to External Affairs, No. 2321, September 29, 1943<sup>1</sup>).

5. MR. WRONG pointed out that this proposal was still open to objection, since it would provide the United Kingdom with post-war military rights at Goose Bay.

6. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR expressed the opinion that it would be undesirable, at this time, to make any agreement which

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

would permit the United Kingdom to establish an air station at Goose Bay. Negotiations regarding postwar military use of Canadian air bases should stand until after the war.

7. THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the amendment might lead to serious complications if Newfoundland should ultimately decide to enter Confederation, since, in that event, Canada would be faced with long term commitments to the United Kingdom.

8. The War Committee, after further discussion, agreed that the U.K. government be informed that the proposal was not satisfactory to the Canadian government.

. . .

510.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1733

Ottawa, [October 1, 1943]

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Your telegram 2321 of September 29.<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay Lease.

War Committee yesterday considered the United Kingdom suggestion contained in your telegram and decided that the proposal was not acceptable. Please convey this decision to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs at once.

Most of the arguments advanced in my telegram 1674 of September 22<sup>1</sup> against the granting of special rights in the lease to United Kingdom civil aircraft apply also to military aircraft. We feel strongly that negotiations regarding the postwar use of the base should stand until after the war and that the conclusion of the lease should not be made the occasion for obtaining longterm commitments of this nature. We do not anticipate difficulty in reaching a mutually satisfactory arrangement later on when the use of Goose Bay will be considered in conjunction with related matters.

Please use your best efforts to bring this matter to an early conclusion.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

511.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner in Great Britain*

N 665/5

London, October 7, 1943

SECRET

My dear High Commissioner,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th October<sup>1</sup> about the draft Goose Bay Agreement.

I am very sorry to hear that the Canadian Government have not felt able to accept the compromise suggestion which was discussed with you by Machtig. As you know, this was put forward to you in a tentative way subject to discussion with the authorities here, but we had very much hoped that a proposal on these lines would meet the difficulties felt by your Government and point the way to a mutually satisfactory settlement.

As a result of the telegram received from your Government we are now back where we were, and I can only suggest that the whole matter should now stand over for personal discussion with Mr. Howe when he arrives here for the general civil aviation talks.

Yours sincerely,

CRANBORNE

512.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*au ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements*  
*Dominions Secretary*  
*to Minister of Munitions and Supply*

[London,] October 20, 1943

My dear Howe,

In confirmation of our conversation with you and Mr. Massey this afternoon I enclose a note of the amendments which we for our part would like to see made in the draft Goose Bay Agreement.

I understood that you would seek the concurrence\* of your Government in these amendments on your return to Canada. As soon as I hear from them that they are acceptable, signature between the Newfoundland and Canadian Governments can take place.

Yours sincerely,

CRANBORNE

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

\* Note as in original:

Mr. Howe wrote Cranborne correcting this impression—said he would "transmit" but not recommend acceptance. R[OBERTSON]



## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Amendements suggérés au projet d'accord sur Goose Bay*  
*Suggested Amendments in Draft Goose Bay Agreement*

[London,] October 20, 1943

- (a) New article to be included providing that question of use of Goose Bay by U.K. civil aircraft will be reserved for the post-war discussions contemplated in Article 10 of draft Agreement.
- (b) Article 5 to be amended to read:  
 "Newfoundland and U.K. military aircraft shall have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada."
- (c) New article to be included providing that Newfoundland civil aircraft shall have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those to be agreed as applicable to Canadian civil aircraft.
- (d) Article 10 to be amended so as to omit the words between "subject of" and "will take place" and insert "discussions which".

513.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 867

St. John's, October 31, 1943

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 332<sup>1</sup> with which you transmitted a memorandum to Mr. Robertson, dated October 28th, 1943,<sup>2</sup> together with a note of suggested amendments sent to Mr. Howe on October 20th, by Lord Cranborne in connection with the Goose Bay Lease.

2. If the proposed amendments are accepted by the Commission of Government of Newfoundland, I have no objection to them.

3. I am assuming that the United Kingdom, Canada, and Newfoundland will continue as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and on this assumption I would accept the amendments.

4. If, as, and when Newfoundland becomes a member of the Canadian Federation, the privilege extended to the United Kingdom to use the Goose Bay Airport for military purposes might be considered objectionable, in the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

same way as the use of the Naval properties at Halifax under the agreement of 1895 was considered objectionable by some people in Canada as an interference with the sovereign rights of Canada in her own territory.

5. The fact, however, is that at the present time Newfoundland is not a part of Canada, and may never become a part of Canada. If negotiations are ever opened up to bring Newfoundland into the Canadian Federation, I think that would be the proper time to raise the issue as to whether or not the permission granted the United Kingdom for military use of the Goose Bay Airport should be withdrawn by mutual agreement.

6. The fact must also be kept in mind that the American Government has a lease of certain lands in Newfoundland for military and naval purposes for 99 years, including the military use of certain airports at Argentia and Harmon Field.

7. I would anticipate that before Canada would agree to take Newfoundland into the Canadian Federation, the privileges now proposed to be granted to the United Kingdom at Goose Bay and also the privileges to the American Government would have to be withdrawn.

8. I purpose leaving for Goose Bay to-morrow morning and am taking the Honourable Mr. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, with me.

9. Up to the present time, none of the Newfoundland members of the Commission of Government has ever inspected the Goose Bay Airport or the territories surrounding same. I think it of some importance, before the Agreement for the Lease is actually signed, that Mr. Emerson, as Commissioner for Justice and Defence, should visit this airport so that he can discuss intelligently with fellow Newfoundlanders, certain matters in connection with the lease, after he has had a personal examination of the area.

10. I am also taking with me the American Consul General, Mr. Hopper.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

514.

1156-X-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au premier secrétaire, légation des États-Unis*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to First Secretary, Legation of United States*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 2, 1943

Dear Mr. Clark,

It occurred to me that it might be useful if I were to supplement the remarks which I made to you on October 27 during our conversation on the Goose Bay lease.

One point I think I should make clear is that at an early stage in the negotiations it was agreed by the three governments, the United Kingdom, Newfoundland and Canada, that post-war civil air rights should be reserved for discussion after the war.

In view of the importance of Newfoundland in the Canadian scheme of defence, which was clearly recognized by your Government in the protocol annexed to the lease agreements covering United States bases in Newfoundland, this Government has asked for a lease conveying military rights and administrative control of Goose Air Base for a period of ninety-nine years, the same length of time as that provided in base agreements with the United States. It may be of interest to you to know that we have not asked for as extensive jurisdictional rights as those granted to the United States.

You will, no doubt, appreciate that the long-term leases in Newfoundland territory are perhaps less acceptable to opinion in Newfoundland now that the military situation has changed for the better. Further, in view of the possibility of a change in the form of government after the war, the Commission of Government has felt it necessary to go cautiously in the negotiations. Most of the details over which there have been differences of opinion are now settled to the satisfaction of all parties concerned so that we have reason to anticipate completion of the agreement before long. Your Government will, of course, be furnished with a copy of the agreement at the earliest possible date, but you will appreciate the difficulty of giving you a copy of the proposed lease at present while negotiations between the three governments concerned are in progress.

Yours sincerely,

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

515.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, November 3, 1943

...

#### LEASE OF GOOSE BAY AIR BASE

11. THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS referred to the discussion at the meeting of September 20th.

The U.K. government had made further suggestions to the Minister of Munitions and Supply during his recent visit to England. These suggestions in no way modified their earlier attitude regarding military and civil use of the base by British aircraft.

The situation had been further complicated by an enquiry received from the United States as to commitments regarding postwar use of the base.

(External Affairs memorandum, Oct. 28, 1943, and attached documents.<sup>1</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

12. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY suggested that the problem of postwar use would be solved when the countries concerned concluded general international air transport arrangements. It would seem, therefore, to be in Canada's interests to take no further action to press for agreement on the matter at this time.

13. THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the United Kingdom had not attempted to answer the arguments advanced by Canada with regard to proposed amendments to the draft lease. In the circumstances, it would be best to take no further initiative at the moment.

14. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after further discussion, agreed that the U.K. proposals, with regard to the terms of the lease, remained unsatisfactory to Canada, and that no further action be taken at present.

. . .

516.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures  
High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 891

St. John's, November 8, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to my despatch No. 852 of October 28th, 1943,<sup>1</sup> and previous despatches relative to the Goose Bay Airport.

2. I intimated in Paragraphs 14 - 17 of the despatch under reference, that arrangements were made through the Eastern Air Command to take Mr. Emerson and me to Goose Bay by air.

3. The original intention was that Mr. George D. Hopper, Consul General of the United States, should accompany us, but Mr. Hopper found it impossible to leave and it was therefore arranged that the Honourable Ira Wild, Commissioner for Finance, should accompany us.

4. We left Newfoundland by plane on Tuesday morning November 2nd and arrived at Goose Bay in the early afternoon. The intention was that we should return the following day, but owing to weather conditions in Newfoundland we were not able to return until Friday, November 5th.

5. It was the first visit that any of the three of us had made, and it was most interesting.

6. We had a number of discussions with Group-Captain Hansett-Taylor, Officer Commanding the Airport, concerning various matters, and also with the Newfoundland Rangers and others.

7. I think it especially important that the Honourable Mr. Emerson was given an opportunity to inspect the airport and surrounding country before the actual signing of the lease so that he could explain the position to his fellow citizens in Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



8. We inspected the site from which the native settlement had been removed as mentioned in your despatch No. 323 of October 16th, 1943.<sup>1</sup> It was quite obvious from an inspection of the site that it was essential to have the native settlement removed from that area, as it is in close proximity to a large above-ground storage area, and the fire hazard was a very serious one.

9. The O.C. of the Air Force informed us that some of the residents in this settlement had removed to another location on the Hamilton River within the leased area.

10. Unless this is checked, it will rapidly grow into a slum area and action should be taken immediately.

11. As you are aware, the lease of the Canadian Government of the 120-mile area has not yet been executed, and under the Statutes of Newfoundland, no person is allowed to enter a prohibited area, except with permission from the proper authority, and in the case of the Goose Bay Airport, the proper authority is the O.C. of the Airport to whom power has been delegated by Mr. Emerson, as Commissioner for Justice and Defence of Newfoundland.

12. The new settlement on the Hamilton River is just outside the 5-mile radius, and is therefore not within the Prohibited Area. It is therefore impossible for the O.C. of the Airport to remove this settlement at the present time and under present conditions.

13. Mr. Emerson is just as strongly convinced as are the Canadian authorities, that this settlement should be removed, and that no native settlement should be allowed within the boundaries of the leased area.

14. The obvious remedy seemed to be to have the whole area of 120 square miles declared a Prohibited Area, and Mr. Emerson agreed that this should be attended to immediately on his return to St. John's.

15. Mr. Emerson also gave instructions to the Newfoundland Ranger, in my presence, that he should warn any persons who commenced to build any new houses in the settlement that they do so at their own risk, and will not be entitled to receive compensation, and that they will be removed and the houses torn down as soon as the whole leased area is declared a Prohibited Area.

16. It is quite possible, however, that the O.C. of the Air Force will have to be authorized to pay some compensation to those who have already built houses in the new settlement, and Mr. Emerson informed us that he would expect a reasonable compensation to be paid, as under the laws of Newfoundland his view is that they are entitled to compensation.

17. I understand that some of the men who erected houses in the new settlement are employed by the American Forces, and that the others are employed by the Canadian Government contractors. These men were assisted in the building of the houses, by either the American Government or the contractors supplying them with lumber and other building material so that the services of the men could be retained to work on the base for

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

either the American Government or for the Canadian contractors. None of the men are employed by the R.C.A.F. or the Canadian Army.

. . .

19. Some provision should be made, and must be made, for men who are natives in the country, and whom it is desired should be employed to work on the Base as civilians. Indeed, one of the terms of the Lease is that Newfoundland labour should be employed to work on the Base wherever possible. These men should not be allowed to bring their families with them, as the bringing of women into these areas is a serious menace and is bound to cause trouble and difficulty.

20. I understand also that the contractors are employing about 18 girls in the laundry which is being operated by them, and this is a matter with which the O.C. of the Airport will have to deal. This difficulty, however, will disappear, because I understand that the work of the contractors will be finished within the next two or three months.

21. The removal of the families of some of the men now living in the new settlement may be impossible in the face of the winter season because some, at least, come from long distances and cannot get back to their former homes at this time of the year. Moreover, the fire hazard should not be a serious problem during the winter season, but will become a very serious problem in the spring and summer months.

22. I suggest that the whole matter should be left to the discretion of Group-Captain Hansett-Taylor, to settle and arrange, including the awarding of compensation where he thinks compensation should be given, and such other details as the proper time to evacuate. In this matter, he would work in co-operation with the Newfoundland Ranger, who appears to be a very good man, and who will be instructed to co-operate with him.

. . .

33. I would suggest that a monument should be erected to the man who discovered this Airport, who, I understand is Mr. Eric Fry. Certainly, I think he would be entitled to one of the new Canadian medals.

34. From the point of view of a layman, it appears to be an ideal site for an air base, and also ideal ground on which to construct runways. Moreover, the air base is suitable, not only for land planes, but also very suitable for sea-planes, as the air base borders on Terrington Basin which is a small basin off Goose Bay, in which sea-planes can land with comparative safety.

35. The runways are constructed on a high plateau of sand which had been formed through the ages as a delta between the Hamilton River and the Goose River.

36. During the four days we were there, the weather was clear and bright with the lowest temperature being not more than 11 or 12 degrees of frost, and there was no snow on the ground. This was in marked contrast to the weather in Newfoundland where there was rain and snow during the three days we were grounded at Goose Bay.

37. I was informed that there are about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times more flying days per year at Goose Bay than there are at Gander or Torbay, and from the information I obtained when I was there, I can quite understand that this estimate may be quite accurate.

38. Both Mr. Emerson and Mr. Wild were delighted with the opportunity of visiting the airport and returned with a much better knowledge of the situation there.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

517.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 177

St. John's, December 17, 1943

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

. . .

May I suggest that no further telegrams be sent to office of the High Commissioner for Canada in London at present as Sir Wilfrid is quite willing to send telegrams from here containing the views of the Canadian Government which may be sent to him through me. This will be accompanied by his own recommendations which I am sure will be quite favourable as he realizes the danger of a collision between Canadian and United Kingdom Governments on this issue and he is very anxious to avoid this.

I suggest that you send me instructions accordingly but please treat my conference with Sir Wilfrid Woods as strictly confidential.

518.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 161

Ottawa, December 22, 1943

Your telegram 177 of December 17, 1943, re Goose Bay Lease.

. . .

10. The Government of Canada is most anxious to see an early conclusion to these negotiations which have now been under way for over two years. The delay is prejudicial to our good relations with Newfoundland and

with the United Kingdom. In view of the suggestion in your telegram 177 of December 17, I should appreciate your continuing negotiations with Sir Wilfrid Woods along the lines of this telegram.<sup>1</sup>

519.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1062

St. John's, December 31, 1943

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

May I refer to your telegram No. 161 of December 22nd, 1943, with reference to Goose Bay.

2. In accordance with your instructions, I conferred with Sir Wilfrid Woods about this matter and sent him a despatch, copy of which is enclosed herewith.

3. Sir Wilfrid informed me that he would forward a copy of my despatch to the Dominions Office by Bomber Airmail in the early part of next week.

4. I assume that you will send a copy of the despatch to the High Commissioner for Canada in England for his information.

I have etc.

[C. J. BURCHELL]

[PIÈCE JOINTE / ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire aux Services publics  
High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

No. 118

St. John's, December 30, 1943

SECRET

Sir,

Under instructions from my Government, I desire to urge that the matter of the completion of the Goose Bay Agreement should be finalized at as early a date as possible.

2. The only point at issue now is the request of the United Kingdom Government, which was recently put forward, that the United Kingdom should be given the use of the Airport for military aircraft for the whole term of the Lease.

<sup>1</sup> Voir les paragraphes 30-40 et 45 de la  
pièce jointe au document 519.

<sup>1</sup> See paragraphs 30-40 and 45 of enclosure  
to document 519.



3. The Government of Canada object to this request for the reasons hereinafter mentioned.<sup>1</sup>

. . .

30. May I give you, under instructions, a *résumé* of the reasons for the refusal of the War Cabinet of the Canadian Government to accept the suggestion of the United Kingdom Government to insert a provision in the lease which would give British military aircraft the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada, for the full term of the lease, which is now the only point on which there is not complete agreement with respect to the final draft of the lease.

31. The United Kingdom has recognized by the Protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement of 1941 with the United States that the "defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government."

32. Goose Bay Air Base is vital to the Canadian scheme of defence as it has developed during the present war.

33. Clause 3 of the text of the agreement which the Canadian Government is prepared to accept assures the United Kingdom of the use of the Air Base "for the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary in the interests of common defence."

34. The text also assures the Newfoundland Government of equal rights with the Canadian Government in the use of the Base for civil and military purposes for the duration of the lease.

35. Under these circumstances, the Canadian Government feel that it is quite [as] unreasonable for the United Kingdom to insist on a long-term commitment for equal rights of military use for itself as it would be to insist on similar rights of use to bases developed by Canada in Canadian territory.

36. They feel that it is the more unreasonable since Canada has made large expenditures elsewhere in Newfoundland, notably at Gander, Botwood and St. John's without insisting upon advance commitments from Newfoundland and the United Kingdom guaranteeing to Canada the post-war use of these bases.

37. It may also be observed that the leases to the Bases in Newfoundland granted to the United States contain no provisions assuring either Newfoundland or the United Kingdom rights to use these bases either during or after the war.

38. The United Kingdom also fails to appreciate that any formal agreement guaranteeing to it the military use of the Goose Air Base, on the same terms as Canada, may put both Newfoundland and Canada under heavy pressure from the United States for similar concessions at this Air Base, especially so in view of the fact that about one third of the total expenditure at Goose Bay has been made for purposes of the United States Government, whereas

<sup>1</sup> Les paragraphes 4 à 29 contenaient un résumé des négociations antérieures.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraphs 4-29 contained a summary of the previous negotiations.

no expenditure has been made there by or on the account of the United Kingdom.

39. It should also be noted that the Goose Air Base is a very convenient intermediate landing field between United States Bases in Newfoundland and New England, and United States Bases in Greenland, the retention of which may be desired after the war by the United States Government for military purposes.

40. At the conclusion of the war, the use of the Goose Air Base and other related matters will, no doubt, be under discussion, and I am instructed to inform you that while the Canadian Government anticipate no difficulty in reaching mutually satisfactory arrangements, it is not prepared at the present time to enter into long-term commitments for the post-war use of Goose Air Base, which might raise both for the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments embarrassing problems in their relations with the United States.

41. The Government of Canada is most anxious to see an early conclusion to these negotiations which have now been under way for over two years, and all the essential terms of which were agreed upon at or about the time the work was commenced on the Air Base in October, 1941.

42. An announcement was recently made in the British House of Commons which was broadcast throughout Canada to the effect that the Goose Bay lease had not yet been finalized.

43. The Canadian Government has expended approximately \$20,500,-000.00 to date on the construction of this Air Base and has plans for an expenditure of an additional amount of approximately \$2,000,000.00. The people of Canada know that large expenditures have been made, but as yet have received no explanation as to why the agreement has not been signed.

44. I can assure you that it would come as a great shock to the Canadian public if they were informed that the only reason for the agreement not having been signed is the demand of the United Kingdom for the use of the airport for the full term of the lease.<sup>1</sup>

45. I am instructed to inform you that the delay in the execution of the Agreement is regarded by the Canadian Government as prejudicial to the maintenance of good relations with the United Kingdom, and to urge that the Agreement should now be signed as drafted in January last, and as approved by the Commission of Government, with the amendments suggested in your letter to me of July 30th with the exception of the amendment to Clause 5 which should be allowed to stand as in the original draft.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

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<sup>1</sup> Les paragraphes 41 à 44 furent insérés par le haut commissaire de son propre chef; ils n'étaient pas inclus dans les directives contenues dans le télégramme 161 du 22 décembre.

<sup>1</sup> Paragraphs 41-44 were inserted by the High Commissioner on his own responsibility; they were not included in the instructions forwarded in telegram 161 of December 22.

520.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 5

St. John's, January 6, 1944

Reference my despatch No. 1062 of December 31st, 1943, Goose Bay. Woods informs me he cabled the Dominions Office the substance of my letter to him of December 30th and has received a reply which states Cranborne had never received any reply to his communication to Howe of October 20th, and instructed Woods to inform me that delay in closing the agreement was, therefore, in no way attributable to Dominions Office. Also states that Massey has now been advised to the same effect and of my intervention. Woods says my letter of December 30th will be forwarded by bomber mail within the next two or three days, and presumably Dominions Office will not take any action until full text is received in London. Suggest you should keep Massey advised if you have not already done so.

It might be helpful in conducting negotiations with Woods if you could send reply to my despatch No. 1050 of December 29th, 1943,<sup>1</sup> regarding request of American Consul General to the Newfoundland Government for permission to construct taxi strip at Goose.

521.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 86

Ottawa, January 13, 1944

SECRET. Your telegram No. 104, January 11, 1944,<sup>2</sup> Goose Bay Lease.

2. The proposals made by Lord Cranborne in letter of October 20, 1943, to Mr. Howe were rejected by War Committee on November 3 since they were the same as those proposed in your telegram No. 2321 of September 29<sup>2</sup> and already rejected as stated in my telegram No. 1733 of October 1. The War Committee also decided to take no further action for the time being. I regret you were not informed of this decision.

3. About December 1 Burchell, on visit here, reported that he had gathered from conversation with Woods of the Commission of Government that the Dominions Office were now prepared to let whole matter of post-war use stand over provided they could sit in on post-war discussions. This was the occasion for my telegram No. 2182 of December 3,<sup>2</sup> to which you replied no change of views had occurred.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

4. When Burchell returned to Newfoundland he reported Woods was still of opinion views of Dominions Office had changed and offered to communicate with Dominions Office. Since the Commission of Government, and Woods especially, were in accord with our views it was decided to reopen negotiations through Newfoundland which was the original channel of communication on the matter. Burchell was sent instructions by telegram on December 22 and he wrote Woods December 31. Copies of both communications were sent you air mail. Our position with respect to Cranborne's proposals of October 20 is clearly set forth in these documents.

5. You will appreciate information about Woods' part in reopening negotiations confidential.

522.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 199

London, January 21, 1944

Your telegram No. 125 of January 18th,<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay lease.

As your telegram No. 161<sup>1</sup> to our High Commissioner in Newfoundland was the basis of the note (No. 118) addressed by Mr. Burchell to Sir Wilfrid Woods on December 30th, and a copy has reached the Dominions Office, my note to Lord Cranborne is confined to a reiteration of the unacceptability of the proposals contained in his letter to Mr. Howe of October 20th.

I shall also discuss the matter with Lord Cranborne and inform you of any change in the attitude of the United Kingdom authorities.

523.

NPA GN1/3 1/44

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au consul général des États-Unis  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities to Consul General of United States  
in Newfoundland*

[St. John's,] January 22, 1944

Dear Sir,

With further reference to your letter No. 824.5 dated 9th October, 1943,<sup>2</sup> relative to the construction of a concrete taxi strip at Goose Bay Airport, I now write to inform you that the Government of Newfoundland have no objection to the arrangements which have been made between the United

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



States Government and the Canadian Government for the construction of this strip (a work which, we understand, has already been completed in anticipation of the approval of this Government).

I have been requested to make it clear to the United States Government, in communicating the Newfoundland Government's approval, that the Newfoundland Government does not thereby give any assurance to the United States of a right to post-war use of the strip. I am to explain that Canada's rights under the proposed lease Agreement relative to the Goose Bay Airport will be limited, so far as the post-war period is concerned, to use of the Base for military purposes by Canada's own Forces, with no right of assignment of such rights to any other Nation.

Yours faithfully,

W. W. WOODS

524.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve  
au commissaire aux Services publics  
Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Commissioner for Public Utilities*

No. 16

St. John's, February 9, 1944

Dear Sir Wilfrid [Woods],

I wish to reply to the letter which you addressed to my predecessor on January 22nd, 1944,<sup>1</sup> in which you stated that the Commission of Government "assumes that it is clearly understood between Canada and the United States that no assurance can be given at the present time that the United States will have any right to use" the various buildings at Goose Bay Airport which are now occupied by United States Forces "beyond the period of the war".

It gives me pleasure to assure you that the Canadian Government has made no commitment, express or implied, to the United States which can be used to support any claim to the post-war use of Goose Airport or title to any structures there.

The present use of Goose Airport by the United States stems from arrangements for the ferrying of aircraft across the Atlantic and rests on the same basis as does the use by the United States of certain airports in North Eastern Canada. These arrangements rest on resolutions of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Article No. 11 of the memorandum of agreement for a lease for Goose Airport states:

The Government of Canada agrees that it will not, without the consent of the Government of Newfoundland, transfer to any third party in whole or in part, the rights, powers and authority herein granted to the Government of Canada.

This article would preclude Canada from granting to the United States, or any third party, any post-war rights to the use of Goose Airport, or title to any structures there, without the consent of the Government of Newfoundland. Although this agreement is not yet in force the Canadian Government intends to follow strictly the principles set forth in Article No. 11.

Yours sincerely,

[H. L. KEENLEYSIDE]

525.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 64

St. John's, February 28, 1944

Please refer to previous correspondence regarding Goose Bay lease.

(2) It is now over two months since Massey informed the Dominions Office that Canada would not accept the proposals made to the Honourable Mr. Howe when he was in London in October 1943. It was three months ago that Sir Wilfrid Woods was told—as he believes—that the United Kingdom Government was prepared to accept the Canadian formula on the understanding that the United Kingdom could sit in on the post-war discussions. Sir Wilfrid cannot understand why London has not given a final reply. He supports the Canadian position and is anxious that the matter be settled.

(3) In the meantime the situation here is deteriorating. In the press, but even more in private discussions, it is hinted and in some quarters even taken for granted that the Commission of Government has given way to Canadian pressure, has sold out Newfoundland rights, and is afraid to make the terms public because they are so detrimental to Newfoundland interests. This belief was strengthened by the indiscreet and inaccurate statements made by A. P. Herbert during and after his visit to Newfoundland as a member of the United Kingdom "Goodwill Mission". As a result there is a tendency here to think that the United Kingdom is attempting to defend Newfoundland rights against the complacency of the Commission of Government and the avarice of Canada.

(4) The only way in which this under-cover campaign can be stopped is by the publication of the facts. Therefore I urge most strongly that whatever

pressure is necessary be applied in London with a view to the completion of the lease negotiations and that Canada insist on the publication of the text of the Agreement. There will be some criticism, particularly of the size of the area leased, but this will be insignificant in comparison with the harm being done by the present campaign of insinuation and innuendo.

(5) This situation underlines the desirability of action along the lines proposed in my letter to the Under-Secretary dated February 16th, 1944.<sup>1</sup> But regardless of the decision in regard to that recommendation the Goose Bay negotiations should be completed as soon as possible.

526.

1156-X-39

*Mémorandum du haut commissaire désigné en Afrique du Sud<sup>2</sup>  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from High Commissioner designate in South Africa<sup>2</sup>  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

[London, March 1944]

Private and confidential views for N. A. R[OBERTSON].

You will remember that I told you in Ottawa, (and may have mentioned in a letter from Newfoundland) that I suspected that it was the Beaver<sup>3</sup> who was blocking the Goose Bay lease. After talking with the Beaver and with Cranborne I was quite convinced in my own mind that this is the correct position. What the reason is I cannot understand. I think, however, it may be because he believes we are playing too closely with the Americans. He apparently thought that the Americans had spent 6 or 7 millions of their own money at Goose and seemed quite surprised when I told him that this was not true.

What he told Sir Wilfrid was that his first interest was to protect Newfoundland and in talking to me about our acquisition of Goose and Torbay he was almost as bad as A. P. Herbert.<sup>4</sup>

C. J. B[URCHELL]

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> C. J. Burchell était alors en route vers l'Afrique du Sud.

<sup>2</sup> C. J. Burchell was then *en route* to South Africa.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Beaverbrook, alors lord du Sceau privé.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Beaverbrook, then Lord Privy Seal.

<sup>4</sup> Député à la Chambre des Communes britannique et membre de la *Goodwill Mission* à Terre-Neuve en 1943.

<sup>4</sup> Member of British Parliament and member of the *Goodwill Mission* to Newfoundland in 1943.

527.

1156-X-39

*Mémorandum du haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from High Commissioner of Great Britain  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa, March 10, 1944]

H.M. Government in the United Kingdom deeply regret the difficulties which have arisen in connection with the terms of the draft agreement relating to the Goose Bay Airport. They for their part, have been most anxious to reach a settlement of these difficulties, all the more so in that they are acutely sensible of the great work which Canada has done in constructing and operating this Airport which has played such an important part in the defence arrangement not only in the North Atlantic but of the U.K. itself. They fully recognize moreover that the position in relation to possible United States claims to post-war rights at Goose Bay may, in present circumstances, be a somewhat delicate one. They note also that the Canadian Government, as indicated in Mr. Burchell's letter to Sir Wilfrid Woods of the 30th December "anticipated no difficulty in reaching mutually satisfactory arrangements" with the United Kingdom when the time comes, and they assume that this would apply to the question of civil users as well as to that of user by military aircraft. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have carefully reviewed the position in the light of these considerations but, for reasons which they have already stated, they do not feel that they can do otherwise than maintain the attitude they have adopted in recent exchanges of view with the Canadian High Commissioner; on the other hand, they are of course most anxious not to cause avoidable embarrassment to the Canadian Government.

In these circumstances they would like to suggest that perhaps the best course might be for the completion of the draft Agreement to be left over for settlement between the three Governments (Canada, Newfoundland, and the United Kingdom) until after the war. In making this suggestion, the United Kingdom Government would wish to make it clear that there is of course no question of their wishing to go back in any way on the undertaking given to the Canadian Government in 1941 as to the grant of a 99 years lease of the site, and further that they remain ready to discuss matters with the Canadian Government at any time. Having regard however to the course which the recent exchanges of views have taken, they feel themselves that agreement would be likely to be facilitated if the completion of the formal instrument were allowed to rest until the end of the war, by which time the long term prospects both in relation to Civil Aviation and to the requirements of common defence should be much clearer.



528.

1156-X-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 192

Ottawa, July 3, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

With further reference to the negotiations about the lease of Goose Airbase, I enclose two copies of a memorandum given to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald in reply to his memorandum of March 10. You may give a copy to the Newfoundland Government for their confidential information with the explanation that we desire to keep them fully informed of the negotiations as we have done hitherto.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

[Ottawa,] June 27, 1944

1. The Canadian government have examined the memorandum which was left with Mr. Robertson by Mr. MacDonald on March 10, 1944, relating to the proposed lease of Goose Bay Airbase.

2. The Canadian government regrets that the United Kingdom is unwilling to accept the proposed draft of the Agreement on the ground that it does not provide for military use by the United Kingdom after the war. The Canadian Government had hoped that the United Kingdom Government would consider that its interests were adequately protected by Article 3 of the present draft, which assures the United Kingdom of military use "for the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary or desirable in the interests of common defence", and by the assurance given in Mr. Burchell's letter of December 30, 1943, to Sir Wilfrid Woods that the Canadian Government anticipated "no difficulty in reaching mutually satisfactory arrangements" about the use of Goose Airbase after the war.

3. The Canadian Government is pleased to note that no objection to the present draft of the Agreement has been advanced by the United Kingdom on the ground that the draft does not fully protect the rights and interests

of the people and government of Newfoundland. It is also noted with satisfaction that the Government of the United Kingdom is "most anxious not to cause unavoidable embarrassment to the Canadian Government", and that they do not wish "to go back on the understanding given the Canadian Government in 1941 as to the grant of a ninety-nine year lease of the site".

4. The Canadian Government is, however, unable to accept the suggestion of the United Kingdom Government that the completion of the Agreement be left until after the war. It is now almost a year and a half since the lease Agreement was worked out between representatives of the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland and provisionally agreed to. The long delay and the necessary secrecy about the Agreement have given rise to widespread and unfounded suspicion among the people of Newfoundland as to Canada's motives in the matter, and continued delay may be further prejudicial to good relations between the people of Canada and the people of Newfoundland.

5. Moreover, it will be difficult to justify to Parliament the heavy expenditures made at Goose Bay for permanent defence installations without title or agreement as to the post-war position. It will be recalled that the base was developed at the urgent request of the United Kingdom Government, and that Canada began construction at the earliest possible date and with all possible speed without waiting for the completion of a formal agreement as to the future status of the Base. Moreover the United Kingdom has expressly agreed in the Protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement of April 1941 with the United States that "the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence". As the United Kingdom Government will recognize, Goose Airbase is vital not only to the direct defence of Canada and Newfoundland, but as well to the maintenance of communications with the United Kingdom. Uncertainty as to Canada's post-war rights there affects seriously Canada's post-war defence situation. It is true that the United Kingdom has assured the Canadian Government that it does not wish to go back on the promise of a lease made in 1941. It is our understanding of the constitutional position that a lease would require legislation by the legislature of Newfoundland. The Newfoundland Commission of Government provisionally accepted the terms of the agreement almost a year and a half ago, and presumably are prepared to pass appropriate legislation. But the future status of Newfoundland is uncertain. It is at least possible that conditions might so change in Newfoundland that the local authorities there might later be disinclined to carry out the promise of the United Kingdom.

6. An immediate reason for completion of the lease Agreement at an early date is that it is understood that the Newfoundland Commission of Government is considering dealing with titles to Canadian defence properties in Newfoundland by a single Confirming Act, as was done in the case of the United States bases. With this step the Canadian Government fully agrees since it will facilitate the fulfilment of Canada's responsibilities for the defence of Newfoundland and North America, and since it should set at rest apprehension among the people of Newfoundland as to Canada's intentions. The

Newfoundland Government rightly feels that all such properties should be included in the Confirming Act. To leave Goose Airbase out of the Confirming Act might prejudice future negotiations, since any government in Newfoundland might be very reluctant to re-open a question which has already proved disturbing to Newfoundland opinion.

7. The Canadian Government, therefore, is of the opinion that negotiations over the lease should be brought forthwith to a definitive conclusion. At the same time the Canadian Government is most anxious to meet as far as possible the views of the United Kingdom. It suggests, therefore, that the question of post-war use, both civil and military, by the United Kingdom should be expressly reserved for discussion after the war, it being understood that the completion of the lease agreement should not prejudice any claims or rights which the United Kingdom may have in the matter. The Canadian Government has no doubt that, if the Agreement as to title can now be completed, mutually satisfactory arrangements as to use can be worked out after the war in the light of conditions then obtaining.

8. The Canadian Government, therefore, suggests the following amendments of the lease:

- (1) The insertion in the existing draft of the lease of the following new article immediately after 5:

The right of the United Kingdom to use the base for military aircraft shall be the subject of consultation and agreement between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland after the war, and in the meantime the rights of the United Kingdom under Article 3 of this Agreement shall continue unimpaired.

- (2) With a view to clarifying the question of civil use, the text of article 10, last sentence, to read as follows:

The question of its use for civil and commercial operations after the war, and all matters incidental thereto, will form the subject of discussion between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland, and this discussion will take place not later than twelve months after the war.\*

529.

NPA GN1/3 1/44

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 471

[London,] August 23, 1944

SECRET. My telegram No. 143.<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay. We have now received memorandum from Canadian Government through our High Commissioner at Ottawa in which they press further for early completion of formal agreement.

. . .

\*Note telle que dans l'original:

\*Note as in original:

Copies given Mr. MacDonald 28.6.44 R[OBERTSON].

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

4. We have carefully considered the new amendments suggested by the Canadian Government and recognise that these constitute a marked advance on their previous attitude. On the question of post-war civil use the suggested amendment at (2) above corresponds very closely with the suggestion which I made to Mr. Howe in October last and fully meets our position. On the question of post-war military use we have as you know been anxious to secure an amendment which would provide in terms for United Kingdom military aircraft to have the right to use the base throughout the period of the lease on as favourable a basis as Canadian military aircraft. The suggested amendment at (1) above does not in terms give us this but in practice goes a long way towards meeting our point of view since the general effect is that our rights of post-war military user are to be the subject of consultation and agreement between the three Governments after the war and that pending such consultation and agreement our wartime rights shall continue unimpaired. This provides us with a reasonable safeguard that there will be no modification after the war of our present wartime rights except with our consent.

5. In these circumstances we are prepared for our part to accept the new Canadian suggestions as meeting satisfactorily for the purposes of the draft agreement the United Kingdom requirements which we have been anxious to see covered. The question remains whether any further safeguards are required from the Newfoundland point of view. In this connection it will be recalled that I proposed to Mr. Howe in October last that a new article should be inserted providing that Newfoundland civil aircraft should have the right to use the air base "on terms not less favourable than those to be agreed as applicable to Canadian civil aircraft". Mr. Howe stated at the time that this was fully in accord with the intentions of the Canadian Government but pointed out that since the draft agreement does not purport to confer any rights of user on Canadian civil aircraft the insertion of such an article might not be wholly appropriate. The Canadian Government in their present memorandum have not referred to this suggestion and have indeed assumed the draft agreement as it stands is fully satisfactory to the Newfoundland Government.

6. Subject to the views of the Commission I am inclined myself to feel that it is hardly necessary to pursue this suggestion especially as there might be a certain awkwardness in pressing for such an article in advance of any grant of rights to Canadian civil aircraft. The rights of Newfoundland civil aircraft will in practice be fully safeguarded by the fact that (A) the lease is for defence purposes and confers no right of civil user and (B) the agreement of the Newfoundland Government will be required for any arrangement as to civil user which may emerge from the post-war discussions provided



for under article 10. It will thus be fully open to the Newfoundland Government in these discussions to make it a condition of their agreement to any arrangement for civil user that Newfoundland civil aircraft should be accorded the use of the base on as favourable terms as Canadian civil aircraft.

7. I should be grateful for very early indication of Commission's views on this point and also for any comments which they may wish to make from the Newfoundland standpoint on the new amendments suggested by the Canadian Government. If they agree for their part that draft agreement as thus amended can be regarded as satisfactory from Newfoundland point of view I would propose to inform the Canadian Government that their suggestions are accepted by the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments and way would then be clear for signature.

. . .

530.

NPA GN1/3 1/44

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 360

[St. John's], September 5, 1944

SECRET. Your telegrams No. 471 and 486<sup>1</sup> Secret. Goose Bay. We are satisfied from the Newfoundland standpoint to grant a lease embodying the terms which you have agreed with the Canadian Government. Please confirm by telegram that we are now free to arrange accordingly with the High Commissioner for Canada.

531.

NPA GN1/3 1/44

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 496

[London,] September 7, 1944

SECRET. Your telegram No. 360 of the 5th September. Goose Bay.

I am glad to learn that Canadian proposals are acceptable to Commission. As you will have seen from my telegram to High Commissioner, Ottawa, repeated to you as No. 495<sup>1</sup> I agree that you can arrange with Canadian High Commissioner for signature of agreement.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

532.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

516X/641

Ottawa, September 8, 1944

SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I have just received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs saying that the United Kingdom authorities have now carefully considered the memorandum on Goose Bay which you communicated to me on the 3rd July.

I am glad to be able to inform you that the suggestions contained in that memorandum are accepted by the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments and that the Newfoundland Government is accordingly now ready to arrange with the High Commissioner for Canada in St. John's for the signature of the Agreement.

I have been asked to point out that two small drafting amendments will be necessary viz:

- (1) The words "Royal Air Force" in article 3 (B) should be deleted and the words "United Kingdom military aircraft" substituted in order to cover aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm.
- (2) The words "Ferry Command" in article 3 (D) should be deleted.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

533.

1156-X-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

Ottawa, September 12, 1944

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

In the absence of Mr. Robertson, it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge receipt of your letter of September 8th in which you transmitted the agreement of the United Kingdom authorities to the recent proposals made by the Canadian Government in connection with the lease of Goose Bay. It is very satisfactory to know that this matter is now settled and we are sending a copy of the new text together with instructions to arrange for its signature to our High Commissioner in Newfoundland.

The drafting changes mentioned in your letter will be incorporated in the new text.

Yours sincerely,

[H. L. KEENLEYSIDE]

534.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 456

St. John's, October 10, 1944

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 349 of today's date<sup>1</sup>, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, certified copies of the Goose Bay Agreement,<sup>2</sup> which was signed this afternoon.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

535.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 482

St. John's, October 23, 1944

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the Goose Bay Air Base Bill,<sup>3</sup> with the statement of Objects and Reasons, was published in the press of Newfoundland this morning.

2. The notice provides that any comments should be sent to Sir George London, Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply, on or before November 23rd, 1944. Under the procedure here any comments that may be received will be referred to a Committee consisting of the Commissioners for Justice and Defence, Home Affairs and Education, and Public Utilities and

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Voir l'appendice F.

<sup>3</sup> Ce bill était nécessaire afin d'autoriser la signature du bail prévu par l'accord.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix F.

<sup>3</sup> This bill was necessary to authorize signature of the lease provided for in the agreement.

Supply. Bill will then be brought before the Commission for third reading and final enactment. I had rather hoped that they would adhere to their original intention of allowing three weeks instead of a month for comment, but the shorter period has been usual only for minor bills and for some of them—as, for example, the Bill confirming the Agreement between the Government and the Labrador Mining and Exploration Company, Limited, a period of six weeks was fixed. A period of five weeks is being allowed for the Child Welfare Bill which has just been read a first and second time. There isn't any likelihood of the Commissioners paying any attention to any comments that may be received since the objections to the Bill are already pretty well known.

3. Editorial comment in the St. John's papers has been rather less virulent than I had expected. I had rather thought it would take the form of an attack on the Commissioners, particularly Sir Wilfrid Woods, and might even extend to an attack on Canada. Fortunately, however, they do not go so far. Both local papers resent the secrecy with which negotiations have been conducted, strongly criticize the alienation of the territory for 99 years, which they think is unjustified, and hint darkly at repudiation when responsible Government is restored. All of these points, however, have been made many times before. I enclose two copies of these editorials<sup>1</sup> and will, of course, keep you posted of any further articles these papers may publish on the subject and, also, the opinions expressed by the outport press which will be available in the course of the next few days.

4. I should be glad to get, in return, a *résumé* of Canadian press comment. I trust it will be restrained and that Goose Bay will not be played up as a great Canadian airport advantageously placed for civil or commercial airlines after the war. For a good many local people read the *Financial Post* and other Canadian papers and I will have to defend our position at private gatherings where the subject will come up. Undoubtedly there is a fairly general feeling here that the acquisition of the Goose Bay area for 99 years is a piece of Imperialism on the part of Canada. Curiously enough there is a good deal less resentment felt towards the acquisition by the United States of more extensive bases and rights under them. This is partly because they feel that the United States, as a neutral, foreign country, has a natural right to bargain for advantages before lending its support, and that the United Kingdom was in such dire straits that the cession of substantial areas of land for bases was justified. Moreover, the American Army and Navy bases do not impinge in any way on the facilities which Newfoundlanders feel their country offers for the development of commercial aviation and for which they think they are entitled to secure considerable remuneration. The emphasis we have placed on the point that "it is undesirable that any other country should have a financial investment in improvements of permanent value, such as civil aviation facilities, for peacetime use in this country" (Canada) has, of course, not been lost on this country. The Commissioner for Natural Resources, Mr. Dunn, has referred to it pointedly on several

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



occasions, as has, of course, the press. The latest issue of the *Fisherman's-Worker's Tribune*, a weekly paper published in St. John's and edited by Mr. Michael Harrington, which has just come to hand, goes so far as to state that the Goose Bay airport should become the property of Newfoundland as other bases built in other countries become the property of the countries they are built in.

5. Real difficulty will arise when we try to reach agreement as to the terms on which the airport will be used for civil and commercial aviation after the war so that the less Goose Bay is played up in the press as a great acquisition the better it will be.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

536.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 345

Ottawa, October 26, 1944

Your despatch 475, October 19,<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay Air Base Bill.

Text of the bill has been examined and found acceptable. We have, therefore, no amendment to suggest.

537.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 501

St. John's, November 4, 1944

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 500 of November 3rd,<sup>1</sup> concerning comments in the outport press on the Goose Bay Agreement, I have the honour to transmit, herewith, for your information, copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the Newfoundland Board of Trade to Sir George London with respect to the Goose Bay Agreement. The letter was published this morning in the *Daily News*, together with an accompanying memorandum<sup>2</sup> setting forth the Board's reasons why the Lease should not be granted,—at least in its present form.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

2. The memorandum is the best expression of the Newfoundland case that has yet appeared. The drafting, I understand, was done by a Committee of legal men under the direction of Mr. Cook, the Deputy Mayor of St. John's, and undoubtedly it carries more weight than that of any newspaper editorial. It is moderate in tone, but gets in some rather telling arguments that will appeal to Newfoundlanders generally.

3. The memorandum begins by voicing a view, very prevalent in Newfoundland, that the Agreement even for military purposes is for too long a period. It accuses Canada of an attitude of unfriendliness in seeking to bind Newfoundland in such a way and draws the conclusion that

in seeking a ninety-nine year lease of this territory for military purposes, the Canadian Government seeks a measure of control over the Goose Bay Airport through which she will be enabled to exercise a prior authority over civil operations for the period of the Agreement. To expect that she would not do so is to ask Newfoundland for a measure of confidence in Canada's goodwill towards this country which her attitude in this matter seriously impairs, if not altogether destroys.

4. The memorandum goes on to point out that if the Agreement is ratified, Newfoundland would be, in future, placed in the position of having to negotiate with the Government of Canada for the use of this site on her own territory for military or civil aviation. To be placed in such a position is no less than national humiliation, damaging to the dignity and prestige of a British Dominion, whose constitutional status within the Empire, because of a lack of material advantage, is temporarily beneath that of other Dominions.

5. The memorandum touches on an argument, of which a good deal is heard locally, that Canada is not prepared to do with Newfoundland what she insists on doing with the United States in preventing the latter from retaining a control of bases developed during the war on Canadian territory, and goes on to make the following point:

Financial expenditure by an ally for strictly military purposes has never previously been put forward as a criteria for long term concessions, even in a military sense, much less when they may have such important practical bearing on questions of sovereignty, and commercial activities in time of peace.

This idea, indeed, lies at the core of their objections though it does not go so far as is sometimes expressed by individuals who point out that Canada does not take long term leases to air bases it constructs in North Africa, Italy or any other area except in Newfoundland, nor does any other country.

6. In assessing the weight that should be attached to this memorandum, I should point out that the Newfoundland Board of Trade is probably the most influential body in the country. It has a membership of 350 wholesale houses and small industrial firms, and has recently extended its membership to include outport merchants, especially along the East Coast, who previously had been more or less uncooperative.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

538.

1156-X-39

*Le ministre aux États-Unis  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Minister in United States  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Washington, November 15, 1944

Dear Sir,

I have read with much interest Despatches Nos. 496<sup>1</sup> and 501 from the High Commissioner in Newfoundland on the Goose Bay Agreement, forwarded to this Embassy with your Despatches No. 1595 of November 7th<sup>1</sup> and No. 1597 of November 8th,<sup>1</sup> respectively. I note that the suggestion is advanced by those in Newfoundland opposed to this Agreement that our attitude toward rights created on their territory by our expenditure of money during wartime is the same as that which we have rejected when advanced by the United States in respect of expenditures on installations in Canada.

I would be glad to have any information or argument which could be used to reject this comparison. I make this request because the point may be brought up here in our discussions with the United States authorities on similar matters.

Yours sincerely,  
L. B. PEARSON

539.

1156-X-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre aux États-Unis  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister in United States*

Ottawa, November 18, 1944

Dear Mr. Pearson,

I refer to your letter of November 15 regarding Newfoundland opinion about the Goose Bay Agreement.

As you state, the criticism has been advanced in Newfoundland that Canada is demanding post-war use of a base in Newfoundland territory constructed at Canadian expense whereas the United States has been denied post-war use of bases constructed in Canada at United States expense. This criticism is, however, misleading, and the analogy between Goose Air Base and bases constructed by the United States in Canada is quite unsound.

Canada has not asked for post-war use of Goose Air Base on the ground that it was constructed at Canadian expense. The ground for continued

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

possession of Goose Air Base by Canada is not the cost but the importance of the air base for the defence of Canada and Newfoundland as part of the western hemisphere. Were Newfoundland able to assume full responsibility for the defence of this region of the continent, there would be no occasion for continued occupation by Canada for reasons of hemisphere defence. The United States apparently had doubts about the capacity of Newfoundland to fulfil this responsibility when in 1940 it asked for three bases on 99-year leases in Newfoundland. I have not heard that the United States is contemplating the return of these bases to Newfoundland. The difference between the position of the United States in Newfoundland and that of Canada is that the United States insisted on a formal agreement in advance whereas Canada went immediately to the assistance of Newfoundland relying on the good faith of Newfoundland and the United Kingdom to implement agreements made then in principle.

With respect to defence properties in Canada constructed by the United States, it may be observed that the United States agreed unconditionally from the outset that these properties should be returned to Canada after the war. It may also be observed that Canada has long assumed responsibility for local defence and is indeed much more competent to fulfil this responsibility than ever before. Continued possession or continued use by the United States of defence facilities constructed in Canada is, therefore, quite unnecessary for defence purposes.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

540.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 386

St. John's, December 2, 1944

My despatch No. 532 of November 27th,<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay Agreement.

2. Board of Trade has submitted supplementary memorandum replying to Mr. Winter's statement of November 17<sup>2</sup> objecting to the principle of

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Winter prétendait que le bail de 99 ans était justifié à cause du gros investissement canadien fait dans la base et que l'accord impliquait le Canada dans la défense future de Terre-Neuve. De plus, il croyait que l'accord respectait les droits de Terre-Neuve, que la base pouvait être utilisée par l'aviation civile et que sous ce rapport, l'accord ne donnait pas plus de droits au Canada qu'à tout autre pays intéressé.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Winter had argued that a 99-year lease was justified by the very large Canadian investment in the base, that the agreement committed Canada to the future defence of Newfoundland, that Newfoundland rights were respected under the agreement, that the base could be used for civil aviation and that in this regard the agreement gave Canada no greater rights than those of any other interested country.



leasing for long periods any Newfoundland territories for any purposes and urging that the Agreement be amended to contain the following provisions:

- (a) Negotiations for long term rights regarding the use of Goose Bay for civil purposes shall take place not earlier than the end of the present war.
- (b) Newfoundland shall have the option of acquiring all fixtures of permanent value on a basis of arbitration.
- (c) That the freedom of Newfoundland to operate, control, dispose of or grant rights regarding Goose Bay Airport for civil purposes shall in no way be prejudiced or affected by its lease to Canada for military purposes.

541.

1156-X-39

*Mémoire du conseiller juridique<sup>1</sup> au conseiller spécial  
du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures<sup>2</sup>*

*Memorandum from Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup> to Special Counsellor  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>2</sup>*

[Ottawa,] December 18, 1944

RE: GOOSE BAY

1. I have been looking at J. S. M.[acdonald]'s despatches Nos. 547<sup>3</sup> and 577<sup>3</sup>, December 4 and 6 with enclosure<sup>3</sup> concerning Goose Bay.

2. Up to the present time all discussion here concerning Goose Bay has been based upon looking at one side and disregarding the other.

3. While I do not hold any brief for the Newfoundland Board of Trade, I cannot overlook the fact that their memorandum was a very strong argument, that the Newfoundland Commission of Government had done their best to meet it, and that the Board of Trade has knocked the argument into a cocked hat and left the Goose Bay situation in a position which is indefensible from the Newfoundland point of view.

4. The question of policy involved is whether it is wise from a Canadian point of view to leave a vitally important situation in Newfoundland in a position which is utterly indefensible from the point of view of any self-respecting Newfoundlander.

5. Personally, I am unable to see how any practical solution can be worked out for the Newfoundland problem without confederation. We have been going along for three-quarters of a century upon the assumption that only financial and economic matters are important. I should have thought that the last five and a half years would have taught us that finance and economics

<sup>1</sup> J. E. Read.

<sup>2</sup> R. A. MacKay.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>a</sup> Not printed.

are not the only important aspects of life. I should think that it would have taught us that it is impossible for a nation to live in modern times unless it has within it the basic elements of survival which must include adequate defensive forces and defensible frontiers. By defensive forces, I mean forces from within and from without. Back in 1928, Canadians were deluded by Hitler's argument that the self-determination of the intra-national [sic] racial group should prevail against the need for a strategic frontier. In those days, "strategic frontier" had a sinister sound. Now that it has been wrapped up by F. D. R. in high-sounding but innocent phrases such as "good neighbour policy" "strategic frontier" is, I think, becoming both innocent and respectable.

6. On this continent, no matter what happens, Labrador, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia are our strategic frontiers. This country cannot be defended against a combination of land, sea and air power without Labrador, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia. This continent cannot be defended against such an attack without the same strategic frontier. Further, as long as we are a part of the continent, we cannot afford to let down any part of the continental strategic frontier which is our responsibility. It should not be overlooked that we must assume that, in the next war, we shall be fighting for at least two years for the defence of North America before the United States steps in. The strategic frontier, therefore, needs to be strong enough so that it can be held with the skimpy forces which can be furnished by a nation of eleven million people.

7. In these circumstances, one wonders whether it is worthwhile for us to go on trying to suck and whistle at the same time. We know that we need Newfoundland and Labrador as much as we need Nova Scotia. We cannot any more afford to have Labrador and Newfoundland an easy advance base for an enemy to take without opposition than can the United States of America afford to have Canada a defenceless potential base for hostile action against the United States.

8. Looking at the problem without any regard for reality and thinking solely of political considerations, we are compelled to remember that the Newfoundland point of view on Goose Bay, Gander, and the like is not in any sense different from the Canadian point of view towards the United States army of occupation in the Northwest or towards the Northwest Staging or Crimson Routes. There is no likelihood of establishing any arrangement that will last which is based upon Canada as an outsider maintaining the sort of control in Goose Bay and elsewhere as is envisaged in the lease and other agreements.

9. In these circumstances, should not the Canadian Government give serious consideration to the problem of confederation? There have been three periods in which confederation has been an active problem. I am not old enough to have any genuine recollection of the first but I have a very vivid recollection of the last two.

(a) It will be remembered that, in the 90's, confederation was an

accomplished fact had not the Canadian Government quibbled over an item of \$100,000.

- (b) In the 30's, it was tossed overboard because it might have involved an expenditure of approximately \$15,000,000, far less than has been spent on Goose Bay alone.
- (c) In the various discussions which have taken place, it has been tossed aside because it might involve a purely theoretical expenditure of a few million pounds sterling out of useless London balances.

10. In these circumstances, should not the Newfoundland problem be given some serious consideration upon the assumption that it was desirable to put forward some solution which offered a slight prospect of working?

542.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 8

St. John's, January 15, 1945

Our despatch No. 574 of December 21st,<sup>1</sup> Goose Bay air base.

2. His Excellency the Governor signed and enacted on Friday, January 12th, Act No. 1 of 1945 to confirm the Agreement made between the Government of Newfoundland and the Government of Canada relating to the establishment of an air base in Labrador and to authorize the execution of a lease under the Agreement.

## SECTION B

## LES OPÉRATIONS NAVALES

## NAVAL OPERATIONS

543.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve  
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 24

[Ottawa,] April 30, 1941

The control of naval personnel in Newfoundland has been the subject of an interchange of signals with Admiralty and Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Station.

It has been proposed that administration of all Officers serving in [group omitted] should come under Naval Service Headquarters, and it has been

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

recommended that following officers should be lent in equivalent ranks to R.C.N. or Reserves:

Captain C. M. R. Schwerdt, R.N.<sup>1</sup>

Lieutenant-Commander J. T. Randell, D.S.C., R.N.R.

Lieutenant J. K. M. Ross, R.N.V.R.

Paymaster Lieutenant W. N. K. M. Crawford, R.N.V.R.

The Canadian Government would be glad to learn that Newfoundland Government would approve an arrangement whereby all Naval personnel at present serving in Newfoundland would be under the direction of the Royal Canadian Navy authorities.

544.

NPA S-4-2-3

*L'Amirauté au quartier général de la Marine*

*Admiralty to Naval Services Headquarters*

TELEGRAM 1726A/3

[London,] May 3, 1941

Your 1611/4th March<sup>2</sup> etc., (?). Admiralty approve loan of Captain Schwerdt R.N. (retired) and all Naval personnel serving in Newfoundland to R.C.N., with equivalent ranks and under R.C.N. direction.

545.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 24

[St. John's,] May 7, 1941

Your telegram No. 24 April 30th. Newfoundland Government approves the arrangement outlined.

546.

NPA S-4-2-3

*L'Amirauté au premier officier de marine, St. John's*

*Admiralty to Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's*

TELEGRAM 171B/20<sup>3</sup>

[London,] May 20, 1941

SECRET. Personal from First Sea Lord.

- (a) Owing to U-boats operating so far to westward we are now faced [sic] to use a base on western side of Atlantic for escorting destroyers and corvettes.
- (b) We should like to use St. John's, Newfoundland and request your views as to whether fog conditions will permit of this?
- (c) If St. John's, Newfoundland, is not practicable what is nearest base further west that could be used?

<sup>1</sup> Premier officier de marine à St. John's.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>3</sup> Ce télégramme fut répété au chef de l'état-major naval et portait le numéro 112.

<sup>1</sup> Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> This telegram was repeated as number 112 to the Chief of Naval Staff.



547.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le premier officier de marine, St. John's, à l'Amirauté*  
*Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's, to Admiralty*

TELEGRAM 2232Z/20<sup>1</sup>

St. John's, May 20, 1941

SECRET. Your 1717B/20th May. St. John's, Newfoundland is defended and has best facilities in Newfoundland. Average fog not more than 2 or 3 days per month. New tank holding 4 thousand tons of Admiralty fuel will be ready by June. Alternative would be Botwood, less fog but not yet defended and without Admiralty fuel oil as yet and ice bound from December to May. Harbours on south coast more fog undefended and without facilities.

548.

Skelton Papers 395

*L'Amirauté au quartier général de la Marine*  
*Admiralty to Naval Services Headquarters*

TELEGRAM 0016B/20

[London], May 20, 1941

We are considering disposition which would be required in event of anti-submarine convoy escort being needed in Newfoundland focal area. It would be of assistance to know how many of your corvettes are now available for duty on eastern seaboard and number likely to become available during the next 6 months.

549.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le quartier général de la Marine au commandant de la côte atlantique*  
*Naval Services Headquarters to Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast*

TELEGRAM 2024 Z/21

Ottawa, May 21, 1941

SECRET. H.M. Canadian Ships *Chambly*, *Orillia*, *Cobalt*, *Collingwood*, *Wetaskiwin*, *Agassiz*, and *Alberni* are to be sailed as convenient on the 23rd May at economical speed for St. John's, Newfoundland, where they are to be placed under the orders of the Naval Officer in Charge, St. John's, and based on St. John's, Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Ce télégramme fut répété au chef de l'état-major naval.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was repeated to the Chief of Naval Staff.

550.

Skelton Papers 395

*Le quartier général de la Marine à l'Amirauté*  
*Naval Services Headquarters to Admiralty*

TELEGRAM 2108Z/21

[Ottawa,] May 21, 1941

IMPORTANT. Your 0016B/20. Seven corvettes available now fifteen more within one month. Total of forty-eight within six months. Seven are being sailed for St. John's, Newfoundland, May twenty-third, being augmented by a group of five in a fortnight. The force being further strengthened as ships become available. We should be glad to undertake task of anti-submarine convoy escort in Newfoundland focal area which would involve utilization of all R.C.N. destroyers. With such a force we should feel confident of being able to carry out anti-submarine convoy escort from Newfoundland banks to rendezvous with Iceland escort basing this force on St. John's. Approximate operating strength by mid-June would be eight destroyers and twenty corvettes. Command of St. John's force would be given to an R.C.N. officer with experience of operations in western approaches probably Commander Mainguy with rank of captain. Suitable staff would be provided. It is hoped that Admiralty will assume direction of this force when necessary to coordinate its operations with those of the Iceland escort.

551.

NPA S-4-2-4

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 441

[London,] May 23, 1941

IMMEDIATE. Repeated to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Ottawa No. 844.

Admiralty desire as a matter of greatest urgency to use St. John's Newfoundland as advanced base for convoy escort forces operating in North Atlantic.

2. Force contemplated to be based on St. John's is approximately as follows, of which about a quarter may be expected to be in the harbour at a time: 15 destroyers, 15 corvettes, 3 sloops, 3 cutters.

3. Following is outline of main requirements. As far as Admiralty can judge these should not clash with requirements of Royal Canadian Navy or with areas and facilities accorded to the United States of America in the neighbourhood.

4. Control.

Will be signalled later.

5. Local Defences.

Admiralty hope that Canadian Government will continue to accept responsibility for provision and manning of local defences.

#### 6. Minesweeping.

It is hoped that a force of 2 L L and 4 Oropesa sweepers could be provided locally and manned by local Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Forces.

#### 7. Berthing Facilities.

Berthing will be required alongside and berths in the harbour for one depot ship, one store ship and one oiler.

#### 8. Repairs and Maintenance.

It is anticipated that refits and large repairs would be carried out at Halifax, in United States of America or in the United Kingdom and facilities for running repairs and maintenance only will be required at St. John's.

#### 9. Oil.

The use of the 4,000 ton tank is contemplated. Until this is available it is proposed that an Admiralty oiler should be utilized.

#### 10. Armament, Naval and Victualling Stores.

Buildings ashore would be required.

#### 11. Personnel.

Recreational facilities and canteen on shore would be required for about 65 officers and 1,000 men.

#### 12. Medical.

It is proposed that local hospitals be utilized.

#### 13. Shore Establishments.

Admiralty contemplate shore requirements arising should be met in existing buildings as far as practicable and that any additional buildings and local services required shall be arranged by Newfoundland Government on agency basis in accordance with plans and estimates to be approved by Admiralty for which arrangements would be made through officer to be appointed to take charge of base.

14. In view of great urgency and importance of these requirements Admiralty would be grateful to learn as early as possible that project is acceptable to Governments of Newfoundland and Canada respectively. If this is so they would propose that matters of detail be pursued forthwith with them by the Admiralty through the Naval Officer-in-Charge at St. John's and Chief of Naval Staff of Canada respectively with a view of bringing base into operation immediately.

15. Above has been repeated by Admiralty to Chief of Canadian Staff. High Commissioner in Canada is being asked to discuss with Canadian Authorities so far as they may be concerned.

552.

NPA S-4-2-4

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions**Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 265

[St John's], May 24, 1941

SECRET Your telegram No. 441 of May 23rd. Project is acceptable to Government of Newfoundland and we will make every endeavour to meet your requirements. We assume that numbers quoted in paragraph 2 include Canadian Corvettes (see message 2108-Z of May 21st from Naval Service Headquarters Ottawa) some of which are now on their way to this port. If on the other hand Canadian Corvettes are additional, port of St. John's would be so congested as to prevent its effective use as a Naval Base. See telegram 0203-Z of May 23rd<sup>1</sup> from Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's to Admiralty.

These conditions will also apply during the winter months when experience has shown that the harbour will be full of ships which have left convoys due to damage or breakdown and have come to the nearest port for repairs. Ministry of War Transport can confirm this.

Following are observations on certain other paragraphs:

Paragraph 6. Minesweeping. We presume these will be provided and manned by Canada.

Paragraph 8. Repairs and Maintenance. All facilities at Dock and Repair Shops at St. John's will so far as possible be made available.

Paragraph 10. Stores and other Buildings. Existing buildings seem likely to be insufficient and are generally speaking built of wood and in bad repair. Some additional accommodation will have to be erected.

Paragraph 11. Recreational Facilities. Existing limited facilities are already fully occupied by troops and additional buildings will have to be erected.

Paragraph 12. Medical. As you know local hospital facilities are extremely limited and additional accommodation and personnel will have to be provided by Admiralty.

Paragraph 13. Shore Establishments. Procedure proposed will be acceptable to us.

553.

Skelton Papers 395

*L'Amirauté au chef de l'état-major naval**Admiralty to Chief of the Naval Staff*

TELEGRAM 1520B/24

[London,] May 24, 1941

PERSONAL. From First Sea Lord reference 1939B/23<sup>2</sup> from Admiralty paragraphs 4 and 13.

In view of the importance of this appointment it would appear desirable that a Flag Officer should fill it. As Commodore Murray's duties on this side

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Le contenu du télégramme 1939B/23 est identique à celui du document 551.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> The content of telegram 1939B/23 is identical to Document 551.



would be so greatly reduced and as he has a very good knowledge of conditions in Western Approaches he would be most suitable and it would give us great confidence if you saw your way to selecting him for appointment.

554.

DND NSS 1078-3-4

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Conseil naval<sup>1</sup>**Minutes of a Meeting of Naval Council<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] May 26, 1941

. . .

## 1. Newfoundland.

- (a) Signal 1520B/24 from the First Sea Lord was brought to the Minister's attention. The Minister approved a reply to the effect that we concurred in the appointment of Commodore L. M. Murray, R.C.N., in command of the St. John's Escort Force. The Minister further instructed that the Admiralty should be informed we propose to provide all shore facilities at St. John's for the Escort Force.
- (b) The Minister authorised approval of signal 1935Z/25<sup>2</sup> from Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's, in regard to the hiring of extra office space, additional civil assistants, etc., and instructed that steps were being taken at Headquarters to provide the remaining requirements, including a Barracks to accommodate about 500 men. He also instructed that communication arrangements were to be expedited and that arrangements should be made for the Department of Munitions and Supply to have a representative in St. John's in order to avoid as far as possible all unnecessary delays.
- (c) The Minister approved immediate action being taken to provide a second 30,000 bbl. oil tank at St. John's. It was estimated that this could be ready within three months.
- (d) The Engineer-in-Chief was instructed to investigate the question of carrying out running repairs to ships in St. John's.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Le Conseil naval se composait du ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals et de son sous-ministre, du chef de l'état-major et de son chef-adjoint, du directeur du service de renseignements navals et du directeur du personnel naval. Le directeur du service des plans agissait en tant que secrétaire du conseil. Le Conseil naval exista du 19 décembre 1940 au 2 février 1942.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> The Naval Council consisted of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, his Deputy Minister, the Chief of the Naval Staff and his deputy, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Personnel. The Director of Plans Division was the secretary of the Council. It was in existence from December 19, 1940 to February 2, 1942.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

555.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 27, 1941

. . .

## ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL BASE AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

12. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES reported that the British Admiralty now wished, as a matter of the greatest urgency, to make use of St. John's as an advance base for convoys operating in the North Atlantic. The force contemplated would consist of destroyers, corvettes, sloops and cutters. Details of the proposal had been communicated to the government through the U. K. High Commissioner in Ottawa.

Consideration had been given to this problem by the Naval Staff, and it was suggested that it would be appropriate to make use of Canadian destroyers for this purpose. Canada could provide immediately for the forces necessary, with the possible exception of a few corvettes and certain auxiliary units which could be supplied by the Royal Navy.

While additional expense would be involved, to provide necessary buildings and facilities, it was recommended that Canada assume responsibility for the new base, the forces thereat to be commanded by Commodore Murray.

13. THE PRIME MINISTER expressed a favourable view of Mr. Macdonald's recommendation and observed that the action proposed would be in accordance with established principles of Empire defence.

14. MR. KING read two communications, on this subject, from the U. K. government, setting out the main requirements for establishment and operation of the base, and requesting word as to whether the project was acceptable to the government. The Newfoundland government had already indicated their acceptance.

(See letters of May 24th<sup>1</sup> and May 26th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from Mr. W. C.

Hankinson, to the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.)

15. After further discussion, it was agreed that Canada should undertake responsibility for the establishment and operation of convoy escort forces at St. John's, Newfoundland, and that a communication should be sent to the U. K. High Commissioner, informing him of the government's decision to employ Canadian destroyers for this purpose.

. . .

556.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le quartier général de la Marine à l'Amirauté**Naval Services Headquarters to Admiralty*

TELEGRAM 1626Z/29

Ottawa, May 29, 1941

SECRET. Your 1940B/23rd May<sup>2</sup> and my 1502Z/26<sup>2</sup> not to all addressees. All requirements at St. John's, Newfoundland, outlined in Admiralty's

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1940B/23<sup>1</sup> will be provided from Canadian sources and full details of action being taken will be signalled later. In the meantime, we would appreciate assistance of tanker and store ship and also if possible depot ship until facilities are established. Increased oil fuel already in hand. Permanent moorings for one store ship or oiler and trots for Destroyers and Corvettes will be laid early in June. Personnel for base staff will be provided from Halifax so far as is practicable.

557.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion de la commission pour Terre-Neuve**Minutes of a Meeting of the Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

324-41

St. John's, June 2, 1941

The question of providing in St. John's the additional facilities required for an Advance Naval Base, as disclosed by the visiting Naval Officers, was discussed. Having regard to the comprehensive nature of the requirements involved in these additional proposals the possibility of using other ports as alternative or ancillary Bases, was considered. As certain difficulties were presented by conditions in these ports it was agreed that the position in St. John's should first be fully explored with a view to ascertaining if the necessary space and facilities could be provided here.

The visiting Naval Officers, in consultation with the Naval Officer in Charge, will prepare a full statement of the commitments involved.

The following persons<sup>1</sup> will be invited to confer with the Commission of Government for a discussion of the question as to whether it would be possible to meet the requirements of the Admiralty and the Royal Canadian Navy without serious dislocation of the economic life of the Port:

Mr. J. W. Allan, O.B.E.

Mr. Eric A. Bowring

Mr. Raymond Gushue

Mr. H. V. Hutchings, M.B.E.

Mr. W. F. Hutchinson

Lt-Col. L. C. Outerbridge, D.S.O., O.B.E.

Mr. C. C. Pratt.

W. J. CAREW

Secretary

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Ces personnes invitées étaient des experts en commerce, en pêcheries ou en opérations portuaires.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Those invited were experts in commerce, fishing or port operations.

558.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 3, 1941

. . .

DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND—MOUNTING OF U.S. GUNS

34. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that it had been agreed to mount, at St. John's, Newfoundland, certain 8" guns recently obtained from the United States.

. . .

559.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 489

[London,] June 3, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Addressed to Governor of Newfoundland No. 489, United Kingdom High Commissioner, Ottawa. My telegram of 23rd May No. 441, Ottawa No. 929 [844].

After further consideration Admiralty consider escort force working from St. John's should be increased to following strength:

- 30 destroyers,
- 24 corvettes,
- 9 sloops.

2. Admiralty estimate that up to 16 ships initially will be in harbour of St. John's at one time that is an average of:

- 7 destroyers,
- 7 corvettes,
- 2 sloops.

3. The local requirements of escort force and in particular the detail of shore requirements communicated separately to the Naval Authorities in Admiralty message 1940B/May 23rd<sup>1</sup>, would be increased correspondingly.

4. Admiralty would be grateful to learn as early as possible that these increased requirements are acceptable to Governments of Newfoundland and Canada. They are repeating this message to Naval Authorities concerned including instructions to N.S. Ottawa and N.O.I.C. St. John's, Newfoundland.

5. If increase is acceptable Admiralty would appreciate early details of requirements that can be provided from Canadian sources as foreshadowed in N.S.H., Ottawa No. 30, 1626Z/May 29th, to the Admiralty.

6. Depot ship, store ship and oiler are being sent as requested.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



560.

2011-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 36

Ottawa, June 3, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Reference your exchange of telegrams with Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs regarding the use of St. John's as an advance base for convoy escort forces operating in the North Atlantic. We have advised United Kingdom that in our view Canada should undertake responsibility for establishment and operation of convoy escort forces at St. John's and that it has been decided to employ Canadian destroyers for this purpose. Canada would provide the ships required for this purpose with the possible exception of a few corvettes and certain auxiliary units which it is hoped could be supplied by the Royal Navy. Matters of detail in connection with the establishment of the base will be taken up immediately by the Chief of Naval Staff of Canada with the Naval Officer at St. John's and with the Admiralty.

561.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 287

[St. John's] June 6, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 489 of 3rd June. Commission of Government have discussed the local requirements of enlarged escort force based on St. John's with Admiral Sheridan, R.N., Captain Schwerdt, R.N., and Engineer Captain Stephens, R.C.N., and have considered a written appreciation of the situation by Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter who has visited St. John's. We are of the opinion that it will be just possible to provide the bare requirements of the force contemplated in your telegram 489 but this will involve extensive requisitioning of commercial premises on the waterfront, considerable dredging, building or rebuilding of approximately 3200 lineal feet of wharfage and a building programme covering about 50,000 square feet of floor space on the waterfront apart altogether from magazines, recreational and hospital facilities and housing. According to Rear-Admiral Bonham-Carter immediate wharf accommodation can be found for one depot ship, one destroyer, two corvettes and two sloops. Three more destroyers and five more corvettes could be accommodated immediately but without security of tenure. These eight vessels are part of those referred to in the immediately succeeding sentences. After dredging further wharf accommodation can be found for two destroyers, eight corvettes and two sloops. When trots have been laid moorings can be found for four additional destroyers and also one anchoring billet for oiler and one for store ship. With additional dredging and construction of new jetties the number of ships that can be berthed over and above those already mentioned will be further increased resulting finally

in provision for the following total number of naval vessels which can be accommodated in the harbour. One depot ship, seven destroyers, twelve corvettes (five for the local defence), four sloops, six mine sweepers, one store ship, one large oiler, one small oiler, two tugs, one water boat, three harbour patrol craft, four fairmiles, four lighters, six harbour duty boats and two examination vessels. . . The Admiralty have advised Naval Officer-in-Charge, St. John's, by message 1940B/May 23rd<sup>1</sup> that it is essential to enable maximum possible facilities to remain available for merchant ship repairs during winter months. If the number of vessels contemplated in Admiral Bonham-Carter's appreciation are to be accommodated the result will be to reduce drastically the number of merchant vessels which can be sheltered in St. John's harbour and will probably reduce the number which can be repaired. You will have realized, of course, the great cost which will be involved in compensating owners of waterfront properties for damages which will be caused to them by requisitioning of their premises. In my next succeeding telegram I will inform you of the views of the Commission of Government on the question whether the Admiralty or the Canadian Government should be responsible for the establishment and operation of the proposed advanced naval base at St. John's.

562.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 288

[St. John's,] June 6, 1941

SECRET. Reference concluding sentence of my immediately preceding telegram, it is not clear to us whether Admiralty still wish to establish their own advance base at St. John's or have accepted the view expressed in the following telegram No. 36 Secret dated 3rd June, 1941, which we have received from the Government of Canada: . . .

This message was presumably sent before Canadian Government had been acquainted with contents of your telegram 489. The Commission of Government believe that it would be much preferable from the point of view of the future of Newfoundland and the sentiments of the people that the base should be an Admiralty base established and operated by the United Kingdom Government on the lines indicated in your original telegram No. 441 of 23rd May, and we hope that it will be possible for action to be taken accordingly unless adoption of the Canadian proposal is in the judgement of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom definitely preferable from the point of view of immediate military necessities. We should be glad to be informed of your views as early as possible.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

563.

2011-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
of Great Britain*

No. 27

Ottawa, June 9, 1941

SECRET.

Sir,

With reference to Mr. Hankinson's letter of June 3rd<sup>1</sup> regarding the additional proposals for the use of the Port of St. John's, Newfoundland, as an advanced base for convoy escort forces, I have the honour to inform you that the Canadian Government approves of the proposals outlined in the letter under reference. The Royal Canadian Navy accepts the proposal for the increased requirements outlined in paragraph 4, and the technical officers of the Naval Service are concentrating their attention on this undertaking in the hope that they may be able to comply with the request outlined in paragraph 5 within the next few days.

While the Canadian Government is in correspondence with the Newfoundland authorities in regard to this matter, it is hoped that the Government of the United Kingdom will on their part inform the Newfoundland Government that the new arrangement is being made at their request and with their approval.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON

for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

564.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 10, 1941

...

## ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL BASE AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

19. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES reported that a preliminary investigation of probable requirements for the development of St. John's as a convoy escort base, on the increased scale now proposed by the British Admiralty, indicated that an expenditure of not less

<sup>1</sup> Le contenu de cette lettre était semblable à celui du document 559.

<sup>1</sup> The substance of this letter was similar to Document 559.

than \$10,000,000 would be involved. Necessary developments included the provision of adequate wharfage, various buildings, including accommodation for personnel, store-houses, the expropriation of property, and the organization of running repair facilities.

The force now contemplated for the St. John's base would, at first, consist of 30 destroyers, 24 corvettes and 9 sloops, besides depot ships, store ships and oilers. Of these, 10 destroyers and 19 corvettes would be Canadian.

The result of setting up the new base would be that, in future, half of the convoying would be done from this side of the Atlantic. The government had already signified their willingness to undertake responsibility for the establishment and operation of forces from this base, on the smaller scale previously contemplated, and it was thought that, in the circumstances, Canada should undertake financial responsibility for the constitution of the necessary base facilities. The project had been carefully considered by the Naval Council and was recommended to the Committee.

(See formal submission of June the 10th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> by the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.)

20. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE enquired why it was suggested that Canada should accept financial responsibility for the large expenditures involved in the establishment of a base in territory which was under the control of the U.K. government. While it might well be that Canada would have to provide the necessary Canadian dollars, it would be a mistake not to keep the final responsibility where it properly belonged, namely upon the United Kingdom. If Canada were to accept the duty of operating a naval base from Newfoundland, the U.K. government should accept the financial obligation involved in establishing the required facilities on their own territory.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER said that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake for Canada to undertake the large financial responsibility involved in the construction of a base in territory over which the Canadian government had no control. The position of the United States was quite different in that they had leased the areas upon which their facilities were being developed. It would not be possible to justify the expenditure of Canadian funds upon the construction of costly establishments outside Canada in areas where the Canadian government had no control. This would be a wrong principle.

Furthermore, the estimated cost of the present project would increase the total of Canadian war expenditures beyond the total agreed upon as the maximum capacity of the country. It was, as well, quite out of proportion to consider that Canada could undertake "the responsibility for fighting half the battle of the Atlantic". While it was appropriate that Canadian men and vessels should be engaged in operations of the kind suggested in the Western Atlantic, the undertaking of large financial responsibility for the establishment of a naval base in Newfoundland was quite another matter.

22. MR. MACDONALD said that the U.K. government had made no suggestion that Canada undertake financial responsibility for the establishment of

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



the base. We had, however, offered to operate the base as a Canadian undertaking, and, since it would be in an area of primary Canadian interest, it would be appropriate for Canada to assume the financial burden, as well. Expenditures had been authorized for other construction outside of Canada, for example, at the Newfoundland Airport, and the project recommended would also be within what was recognized as the Canadian orbit.

23. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE observed that the government had already undertaken financial responsibility for construction outside of Canada on areas under Canadian control, for example, for gun mountings in Newfoundland. Irrespective of the merits of the present proposal it was not possible to establish, on a territorial basis, any general principle against such expenditures.

24. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES expressed the view that the protection of the North Atlantic route, by which Canadian products were transported to the British Isles, was a primary Canadian interest. The additional strength which the establishment of a naval base at St. John's would give to Canadian defence was an additional reason why Canada should assist in this undertaking. There was no objection in principle to accepting the recommendation under consideration.

25. After further discussion, it was agreed that a communication be sent to the U.K. government indicating the nature of the facilities at St. John's which the Naval Service considered appropriate to the establishment of the proposed base, and enquiring the views of the U.K. government as to financial arrangements for the expenditures involved.

. . .

565.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 20, 1941

. . .

CONVOY ESCORT FORCE AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

1. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that the Admiralty had now decided that a substantial portion of the Newfoundland convoy escort force would operate from Halifax. This would reduce somewhat the necessary shore establishment in Newfoundland.

In the Prime Minister's absence, the question of the St. John's base had been considered by the Cabinet on June the 17th, in consultation with the Naval Staff. It was now important that an early decision should be taken

and that steps be taken, with the least possible delay, to acquire the necessary property and begin construction. Speed was essential, regardless of what arrangements might eventually be made with regard to the division of financial responsibility.

2. MR. RALSTON pointed out that Canada had agreed to undertake responsibility for the establishment and operation of the Newfoundland escort force on the smaller scale first contemplated. Since then the intended scale of operations had been increased. The undertaking, however, was of vital concern to Canada and provided an opportunity for the Canadian Navy to play an important and responsible role in the Western Atlantic.

Expenditures for land and buildings had to be made, whether by the U.K. or Canadian government, by Canada, or by both governments jointly. In the circumstances, it would save time if the Minister of National Revenue proceeded immediately to St. John's, in order to explore with the Newfoundland government means of acquiring the necessary property. It was not necessary to await a reply from the U.K. government.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he was fully conscious of the importance of the early establishment of the Newfoundland base and appreciated the natural desire of the Naval Staff to have the Canadian Navy undertake a major role in the operations of the Newfoundland force. Nevertheless, the suggestion that Canada accept sole financial responsibility for the acquisition of property in Newfoundland and the construction there of large shore establishments, should be carefully considered in relation to present commitments in other departments of the war effort. It was natural that the Defence Departments should each seek to emphasize the importance of the Canadian contribution in their own sphere. It was the duty of the civil authority, however, to take a general view of the situation and to prevent over-reaching in any particular department which would endanger the war effort as a whole and prevent the country from making its most effective maximum contribution. Earlier commitments in respect of the Army and Air Force had been increased far beyond what had been contemplated. Increasingly heavy commitments had been accepted in respect of munitions and supplies. These considerations should constantly be kept in mind by the government lest the cumulative effect of rapidly expanding programmes be to impose a financial burden beyond the country's capacity and to cause a breakdown of the national war effort.

4. MR. KING reviewed the course of events leading up to the latest proposals with regard to the Newfoundland base. When the first suggestion had been put forward, the Committee had agreed that, in the circumstances, Canadian naval vessels should be concentrated on this side of the Atlantic as a most appropriate sphere of service. Subsequently, when the original plans had been largely increased, the Naval Staff had submitted a recommendation that Canada undertake the construction of a large naval base in Newfoundland, and accept responsibility for fighting half the battle of the Atlantic.

This proposal had been lacking in a sense of proportion and the recommendation had not been accepted by the Committee.

There had been no commitment on Canada's part to accept responsibility for the acquisition of property in Newfoundland and for the construction of the shore facilities now contemplated.

5. MR. RALSTON drew attention to the drastic changes which had taken place in the general war situation since earlier programmes had been settled for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Canada must now do her utmost to hold her first line of defence which was overseas. So far as the Army was concerned there had been no overreaching in the drawing up or development of their plans. Resources in manpower and finance were available in Canada to meet the requirements of Service programmes. The Defence Departments had sought to take a general rather than a separate Service view of military requirements and this had been constantly emphasized by the Minister. There had been no criticism of the programmes of the Defence Departments on other than financial grounds. The Newfoundland base was to be established in a sphere of primary Canadian interest and it would be most appropriate for Canada to accept responsibility therefor.

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7. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE expressed the view that the U.K. government should themselves acquire the property, take title thereto and bear the cost. This course would be preferable even though Canada had to provide the necessary Canadian funds, and in spite of the argument that, in such event, the Canadian government should acquire ownership.

8. MR. KING remarked that he had consistently supported Canada's maximum contribution in the naval sphere and the importance of Canadian contributions to hemisphere defence. Nevertheless, in considering Canadian commitments in Newfoundland the possibility of a post-war U.S. government wishing to strengthen the American position on the island, without full regard to Canadian interests, should be borne in mind. It was conceivable that after the war the United States might make demands in regard to Newfoundland in return for materials lease-lent to the United Kingdom. In these circumstances, it might be preferable to have the St. John's base acquired and built by the U.K. government, rather than by Canada.

9. THE MINISTER OF MINES AND RESOURCES expressed the view that, if Canada were to undertake the expenditures involved, there should be well established conditions providing for Canadian control after the war. If Canada bore the cost, she should be in a position to derive the post-war benefit.

10. MR. RALSTON stated that irrespective of what financial arrangements would ultimately be made, the important consideration was to initiate, at once, proceedings for acquiring the necessary land and preparing for the construction of the shore establishment. Mr. Gibson, who was familiar with the Newfoundland situation, should go to Newfoundland, at once, to confer

with the Newfoundland government regarding the immediate acquisition of property. The question of financial responsibility could be settled later.

The meeting adjourned at 1 p.m.

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12. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES explained to the Committee the Admiralty's latest proposals for dividing the convoy escort force between St. John's and Halifax. The Naval Staff, at his request, had prepared estimates of the reduced minimum requirements for Newfoundland.

13. The Committee discussed the questions of title and financial responsibility at some length, it being finally agreed that a communication be immediately directed to the U.K. government, to the following effect:

- (1) that no reply had as yet been received to the Canadian government's enquiry as to the U.K. government's views regarding financial arrangements for the enlarged shore establishment for the convoy escort force to be based on Newfoundland;
- (2) that, because of the urgent importance attached to the provision, at the earliest possible moment, of the necessary shore facilities, the Canadian government had thought it advisable to have the Minister of National Revenue, who was familiar with the Newfoundland situation, proceed at once to St. John's for the purpose of exploring there, with the Commission of Government the method by which the necessary property could best be acquired;
- (3) that it was assumed that expropriation proceedings on the part of the Newfoundland government would be required, irrespective of what arrangements were made as to the eventual title and financial responsibility; in this connection it would be helpful if the U.K. government were to communicate immediately with the Commission of Government, with a view to their initiating the appropriate proceedings;
- (4) that, with regard to ownership and financial arrangements, it was felt that, because of the special relationship of the U.K. government to Newfoundland, title would most appropriately vest in the United Kingdom and that responsibility for the cost of the property and the necessary construction would be borne by the U.K. government, under such terms and conditions as might be agreed between the governments;
- (5) that, if the U.K. government desired Canada to undertake the financial responsibility involved, it was felt that title should vest in the Canadian government.

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566.

2011-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

IMMEDIATE and SECRET

Ottawa, June 22, 1941

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister to refer to my letter to Mr. Hankinson of June 11th<sup>1</sup> enquiring as to the United Kingdom Government's views regarding financial arrangements for the enlarged shore establishment for the convoy escort force to be based on Newfoundland. He had hoped that a reply would have been received to that enquiry which would have enabled the necessary arrangements to be proceeded with immediately.

Because of the urgent importance attached to the provision, at the earliest possible moment, of the necessary shore facilities and on the assumption that expropriation proceedings on the part of the Newfoundland Government would be required irrespective of what arrangements are made as to the eventual title and financial responsibility, the Canadian Government have thought it advisable to have the Minister of National Revenue, who is familiar with the Newfoundland situation, proceed at once to St. John's for the purpose of exploring there, with the Commission of Government, the method by which the necessary property can best be acquired. The Canadian Government is of the opinion that it would be helpful if the United Kingdom Government would communicate immediately with the Commission of Government, with a view to their initiating the appropriate proceedings.

With regard to ownership and financial arrangements, it is felt that, because of the special relationship of the United Kingdom Government to Newfoundland, title would most appropriately vest in the United Kingdom and that responsibility for the cost of the property and the necessary construction would be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom under such terms and conditions as might be agreed to between the Governments. If the United Kingdom Government desires Canada to undertake the financial responsibility involved, it is felt that title should vest in the Canadian Government.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 24, 1941

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## CONVOY ESCORT BASE AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

27. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES stated that no reply had as yet been received to the communications sent to the U.K. government regarding the immediate undertaking of steps to acquire property and build shore establishments at St. John's. The urgency was such that it would be advisable to proceed, nevertheless, to the acquisition of property, leaving financial arrangements for subsequent discussion. Repair and fuel facilities in Newfoundland would be an important saving for escort vessels, making it unnecessary for them to proceed the further distance to Halifax, for these purposes. There were thirty-five enemy submarines now reported in the Atlantic.

28. THE PRIME MINISTER mentioned that so far as the United State's interest was concerned, Mr. A. A. Berle, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, had remarked to him in conversation recently, that the United States would welcome Canada taking a more direct responsibility for Newfoundland. This was an important consideration.

29. After further discussion, it was agreed that, if the Minister of National Defence came to the conclusion that, from the strategic point of view, the urgency was such that action to acquire the necessary property and begin construction of required shore facilities for the establishment of the convoy escort base at St. John's could no longer be delayed, the Committee authorize the immediate undertaking of such steps, on the understanding that the questions of eventual title to the property and responsibility for its cost and that of the necessary construction would remain open for decision by the governments concerned, in accordance with the letter of June the 22nd from the Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom.

It was also agreed that the Minister of National Revenue, now in Newfoundland, be advised accordingly.

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568.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 572

[London,] June 26, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Addressed to Governor of Newfoundland No. 572. Repeated to High Commissioner, Ottawa No. 1123 Secret. Your telegram 6th June No. 288. Base at St. John's.

We appreciate desire of Commission of Government that base should be established and operated by Admiralty and have given fullest weight to their views. But it will be understood that in existing circumstances it would be of very great advantage to us from naval point of view if Canadian Authorities administered base and Admiralty have felt they could not do otherwise than accept their offer. But Admiralty are of course closely concerned and our hope is that by joint discussion between three Governments mutually satisfactory arrangements can be worked out which should minimize difficulties which Commission of Government might apprehend.

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569.

2011-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1140<sup>1</sup>

[London,] June 28, 1941

SECRET. Your tel. 27th June No. 966<sup>2</sup> St. John's Base.

First Lord of the Admiralty has received a direct personal message from the Canadian Minister of Naval Services pressing for a decision as to the title and financial responsibility (?). First Lord has sent the following reply. Begins.

I am most grateful for your Department's prompt co-operation and offer to provide all naval requirements from Canadian sources.

2. Having given consideration to

- (a) The problems that have since appeared particularly over the acquisition and tenure of the sites and
- (b) The requirements of the Ministry of War Transport at St. John's mentioned below, I have come to the conclusion that best course is to proceed on the basis set out in paragraph 13 of the original Admiralty message 1939B of May 23rd, which has been accepted by the Newfoundland Government. The effect will be as follows.

<sup>1</sup> Une copie de ce télégramme fut envoyée au ministère des Affaires extérieures.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Copy of this telegram was sent to the Department of External Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

3. Admiralty will be responsible for the provision of additional naval requirements at St. John's for escort forces based there. Additional shore facilities and services as necessary will be arranged by the Admiralty with the Newfoundland Government on the agency basis in accordance with the requirements planned and estimates approved by the Admiralty.

4. Terms of occupation of existing properties acquisition and tenure of sites, ownership of new buildings and the like will similarly be arranged between the Admiralty and the Newfoundland Government, and the title will be vested in the Admiralty or Newfoundland according to the circumstances of each case.

5. Admiralty will be responsible for capital costs of the new works and services but subject to the foregoing paragraphs we should very much welcome your Government's assistance generally and particularly in the shape of transferable material and equipment.

6. The Minister of War Transport and I are also anxious that facilities for shelter and repair of Merchant ships at St. John's should be improved and that a co-ordinated scheme should be prepared to meet the requirements of naval and merchant vessels as? [and] advanced as far as possible before the winter. The Ministry contemplates arrangements with the additional facilities for merchant vessels such as those in paragraphs 3 and 4.

7. We are sending to St. John's forthwith a joint mission representing our two departments and comprising administrative and technical officers. In consultation with the authorities concerned, including Commodore Commanding, Newfoundland Force (See Para. 9) the Mission will prepare a co-ordinated scheme calculated to meet the total requirements with maximum economy of time and effort, submit it for our approval with estimates of cost and arrange for the scheme to be put in hand forthwith. The scheme might comprise (a) short term projects which could be completed and brought into service by the Winter and (b) longer (? term) projects.

8. Further details of Mission will be sent in early separate message.

9. As regards administration and maintenance of naval base including additional naval facilities to be provided, I feel in the existing circumstances it will be an advantage that the R.C. Navy should undertake these services and cordially accept their offer to do so. To this end a Canadian officer has already been appointed as Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Force.

10. I am well aware that in a project of this kind devised under urgent stress of war there are many problems to be solved. But I am confident that all concerned will realise the great importance of the scheme in the battle of the Atlantic and do their utmost to make it a success.

11. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs is telegraphing a copy of this message to the Governor of Newfoundland. Ends.

Similar telegram sent to the Governor of Newfoundland No. 583.

570.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 331

[St. John's] June 28, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 572 Secret. We have no misgivings because of decision to accept Canada's offer to administer naval base and Gibson, Canadian Minister for National Revenue, who is returning to Ottawa on



Sunday, fully realises this. Our relations with him and other Canadian representatives most cordial. For your information no progress being made with acquisition of water front property owing delay in reaching final conclusions regarding naval requirements. Question of financial liability also likely to delay action. Gibson has informed us his Government contemplates suggesting acquisition of property temporarily until question of ultimate ownership and responsibility for cost has been settled. With your concurrence we should be quite willing to co-operate in this or any other way consistent with absence of liability of Newfoundland funds. [sic]

571.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 51

Ottawa, July 1, 1941

Department of National Defence (Naval Service) have reported it is desirable that a new survey of the harbour of St. John's should be made and they would like to undertake this work starting sometime within the current month.

The Canadian Government will be grateful if the Government of Newfoundland will grant permission for this survey to be undertaken.

572.

2011-40

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue*  
*pour discuter de la base navale à St. John's*  
*Minutes of a Meeting Held*  
*to discuss the St. John's Naval Base Question*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 1, 1941

A meeting was held at 1500 hours first July, 1941, in the office of the Deputy Minister for Naval Service, at which the following were present:

The Honourable Colin Gibson, Minister of National Revenue,  
Mr. Norman Robertson, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Admiral Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff,  
Commodore H. E. Reid, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff,  
Lt. Col. K. S. MacLachlan, Deputy Minister for Naval Services,  
Mr. L. B. Pearson, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Captain F. L. Houghton, Director of Plans Division,  
Mr. W. B. Mills, Assistant Deputy Minister, Naval Services.

## MINUTES

1. The meeting gave consideration to Admiralty Signal 0123B/29 June<sup>1</sup> addressed to the Minister of Naval Service from First Lord of the Admiralty.

<sup>1</sup> Document 569.

This Admiralty message proposes an arrangement that conforms to the first recommendation of the War Committee of the Cabinet set forth in the letter of June 22nd addressed to the High Commissioner for Great Britain in Canada by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and it is assumed that the Canadian Government concur in the proposed arrangements under which the United Kingdom will take title and assume responsibility for capital costs.

2. We would recommend that all the information concerning shore facilities, and estimates of required new construction made by Canadian technical officers who have been in Newfoundland for some weeks, should be made available to the Joint Mission which the Admiralty is sending to St. John's and that consideration should be given to making the service of these experts available to the Joint Mission.

3. We further recommend that Canada should assume responsibilities for administration, maintenance and command of the Naval Base at St. John's, Newfoundland, and of the anti-submarine forces based on Newfoundland.

4. The report prepared by the Honourable Colin Gibson, Minister of National Revenue, is available for the Admiralty if desired.

K. S. MACLACHLAN  
Deputy Minister  
(Naval Services)

573.

2011-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 2, 1941

Dear Sir Patrick [Duff],

The Canadian Government have now had an opportunity of considering the message which the First Lord of the Admiralty sent to the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services<sup>1</sup> regarding the establishment of a convoy escort force to be based on St. John's.

The arrangements described in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, of Mr. Alexander's message with regard to the acquisition of the necessary property and the construction of the shore facilities required, are satisfactory to the Canadian Government and in accordance with the views expressed in the third paragraph of my letter of June the 22nd to Mr. Malcolm MacDonald.

With regard to paragraph 9, it is assumed that the expression "administration and maintenance of the naval base including additional naval facilities" has reference to operational responsibility, and that physical maintenance

<sup>1</sup> Document 569.

of the shore facilities belonging to the United Kingdom or Newfoundland Governments is not involved.

As you are aware, the Canadian Government regard the defence of Newfoundland as most important from the point of view of Canada. They therefore hope that it would be understood that if the United Kingdom should, at any time, consider relinquishing title and control of the naval base and shore facilities, no action to that end would be taken without prior consultation with Canada. Furthermore, it is felt that Canada's participation in and intimate concern with this undertaking warrants her receiving first consideration in the event that any transfer of the United Kingdom interest should be contemplated.

It is realised that additional questions concerning the base will arise from time to time as the scheme develops which will require consultation and cooperation between the Governments. You may rest assured that the Canadian Government appreciate the vital importance of the early coming into operation of the plans contemplated, and will do their utmost to secure their success.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

574.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 42

St. John's, July 5, 1941

Your telegram No. 51 of July 1st. Permission is granted for survey to be made [of] St. John's Harbour.

575.

DND NSS 1078-3-4

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Conseil naval*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Naval Council*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 7, 1941

. . .

2. ST. JOHN'S, NFLD.

It was pointed out to the Minister that certain statements contained in Secret Letter, dated July 2nd, from [the] Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Deputy High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, were not in conformity with Naval recommendations, in particular paragraph 3 of that letter, which stated that physical maintenance of the facilities at St. John's is not a responsibility of the Canadian Government. The Naval Staff stated that in their opinion maintenance of this Base should be the responsibility of the R.C.N.

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576.

DND HQS 19-6-10

*Le commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est,  
au chef de l'état-major de l'Air du CARC, Londres*

*Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command,  
to Chief of the Air Staff of RCAF, London*

[ ,] July 9, 1941

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN COASTAL COMMAND R.A.F.  
AND EASTERN AIR COMMAND R.C.A.F.

The winning of the Battle of the Atlantic is just as important to the survival of Great Britain and the continuation of the Empire War effort as the winning of the Battle of Britain.

2. Ships loaded with food, raw materials, and war supplies badly needed for the survival of Great Britain and the continuation of the Empire War effort are being sunk in the North Atlantic in numbers which cannot be replaced.

3. The Battle of the Atlantic is a more intimate and immediate responsibility of Canada than the Battle of Britain because the Western end of the Battle Zone rests on Canadian shores.

4. Great Britain's part in the Battle of the Atlantic has been so well achieved that enemy submarines and surface ships are operating further and further westward on the convoy routes often out of reach to aircraft in the British Isles but within reach of aircraft in the Canadian Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland.

5. The whole immediate object and effort of Eastern Air Command's air operations must be to assist the Navy and Coastal Command to sweep all enemy submarines and surface ships out of the North Atlantic Ocean. The object can best be achieved by concentrating all available personnel and long range aircraft on Convoy, General Reconnaissance and anti-submarine patrols along the complete Northern Atlantic Convoy routes to the point when they connect with similar patrols sent out by Coastal Command from the United Kingdom.

6. At least four Catalina Squadrons operating from Newfoundland in the Summer and from Nova Scotia in the Winter are required for long range patrols. A Liberator Squadron operating from Newfoundland airport all the year round could cover that part of the North Atlantic out of reach of Catalinas from either shore, particularly during the winter months.

7. Coastal Command and the Royal Navy are most anxious to assist Eastern Air Command with aircraft and aircraft equipment wherever possible.

8. It is more important *now* that personnel be posted to fill the Eastern Air Command G.R. Squadrons than to fill Bomber and Fighter Squadrons of the R.A.F.

9. Attached is a copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> sent by the writer to the A.O.C. in C Coastal Command giving details of methods suggested for ensuring the re-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



quired close co-operation between the two Air Commands concerned with the important air operation in the North Atlantic.

10. Heretofore training problems have received priority in consideration at your Headquarters. It is recommended that the opportunity now afforded for the R.C.A.F. operating in Canada to render valuable and necessary assistance in the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic should receive prior consideration.

N. R. ANDERSON  
Air Commodore  
R.C.A.F.

577.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Services publics  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities  
to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 61-'41

[St. John's,] July 10, 1941

The annexed document is a copy of a report<sup>1</sup> by Mr. R. Thompson of the Ministry of War Transport which he is taking home to England for consideration by his Ministry. Mr. Thompson is the Ministry of War Transport representative on a Joint Mission to which reference is made in para. 7 of the telegram from the First Lord of the Admiralty to the Canadian Minister of Naval Defence which was repeated to us in Dominions Office telegram No. 583 Secret of the 28th June, 1941.<sup>2</sup> The personnel of that Mission consisted of Engineer Rear-Admiral Sheridan, R.N., Mr. Seal of the Admiralty and Mr. Thompson. On their arrival, Mr. Emerson and I had a preliminary talk with them and they have been in continuous contact with the officials of the dockyard, the General Manager and myself during their stay.

2. Mr. Thompson's report deals entirely with the dockyard and other requirement[s] of merchant ships in St. John's harbour. Mr. Russell and I consider that the recommendations are sound, but, of course, they involve expenditure which our normal peace time requirements would not justify. They are, however, considered absolutely essential for purposes of the battle of the Atlantic and, therefore, we will want to do everything in our power to facilitate their adoption. It will be premature to make suggestions at present regarding the financing of these proposals, but possibly the Commission may decide to suggest using part of the money earmarked as an interest free loan to Great Britain for use on this particular war service, leaving it to be decided after the war what part of the expenditure, if any, should be

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Document 569.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

treated as a final charge on Newfoundland as part of its capital expenditure on the dockyard. It is quite probable that part of the expenditure may be found to be a justifiable capital commitment of the Newfoundland Railway and Steamship service.

3. I do not think we can take any immediate action on this report pending the receipt of information as to the view taken by the Ministry of War Transport, the British Treasury and the Dominions Office on the proposals which it contains. At an interview with Mr. Thompson just before he left St. John's for the Airport I impressed on him very strongly how important it is that we should start on this work as soon as possible if the facilities contemplated are to be available before winter sets in. I gathered that the proposals are not in any way dependent on the final decision regarding the advance naval base though, no doubt, the two are connected. It is possible that we shall hear something definite about the proposals by the end of the month if the authorities in England move quickly.

W. W. WOODS

578.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 15, 1941

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#### CONVOY ESCORT BASE AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

14. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES reported that the U.K. Joint Mission had arrived in Canada. They had indicated to him that, while the U.K. government were willing to bear the whole capital cost involved in the establishment of the base, including the installation of the necessary machinery, they now wished to have Canada supervise the acquisition of the land required and the necessary construction in addition to maintenance and operation.

The U.K. Mission estimated the capital cost involved at \$5,000,000. They proposed to lease the necessary property from Newfoundland for the duration of the war. Land would be acquired from proprietors probably in part by purchase and in part by lease.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the opinion that Canada should obtain some interest in the new base in return for her outlay, and the provision of the necessary funds. The base would have important advantages for Canada and would constitute an important element in the defence of our Atlantic Coast.

16. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE reminded the meeting that it had previously been agreed that the U.K. government or Newfoundland should accept responsibility for the cost, and acquire title. The U.K. government had agreed to this. No doubt Canada would have to provide the dollar exchange necessary; nevertheless, the base should be a British base. If Canada lent the

money required, we might be in a position to require security. As it was, the U. K. government would purchase the necessary dollars with sterling. We might ask for the right to purchase in sterling after the war, or leave the matter for the general post-war adjustment.

17. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY and MR. MACDONALD observed that they had always favoured acquisition of the base itself by the Canadian government and remained of this view.

18. MR. MACDONALD said that the Admiralty had now added to their requests by asking that Canada accept responsibility for establishment and maintenance. No doubt they would be prepared to give Canada rights in the base after the war.

19. The subject was discussed by the Committee at some length, it being generally agreed that the question of eventual title to the base be deferred until after the war, but that Canada's vital interest in the base should entitle her to special consideration when the matter was dealt with in the general postwar settlement.

It was also agreed that, in the circumstances, it would be preferable, where possible, in dealing with proprietors to obtain title rather than to lease the property required.

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579.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 367

[St. John's,] July 16, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 623 Secret of 8th July.<sup>1</sup> Admiralty Mission through Seal communicated to us general lines of the proposals they intended to recommend to the Admiralty for the development of the harbour of St. John's for naval purposes. Cyril Thompson also communicated proposals which he is placing before Ministry of War Transport to improve facilities for merchant ship repairs and shelter at St. John's. In both cases the proposals are generally acceptable to the Newfoundland Government. We cannot urge too strongly the importance of commencing construction operations and ordering equipment at very earliest possible moment. We are already far into the summer and unless work is pushed hard it will be found that little progress has been made when handicap of winter weather overtakes us. You may assume that this Government would be entirely agreeable to employment, for the purpose of financing these operations, of surplus funds contemplated by our budget arrangements as an interest free loan to the United Kingdom on the understanding, of course, that the sums issued to this purpose would be regarded as interest free loans.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

580.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 666

[London,] July 19, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Addressed to Governor of Newfoundland No. 666. Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada No. 1293. Secret. Your telegram 16th July No. 367.

Seal has been authorized to place contracts at Admiralty's expense for large naval developments proposed in his scheme for new dockyard site in North West corner of St. John's Harbour. As regards other naval works included in Seal's proposals it is necessary to consider position in the light of other recent developments, and Seal has been asked for further recommendations in the light of these developments.

Question of finance is tied up with question of policy. Development of site involves large expenditure by Admiralty and acquisition of freehold is therefore considered most desirable so that benefit of permanent improvements should enure to Government. We feel that most satisfactory and expeditious method of acquisition would be by Newfoundland Government under Emergency Powers if necessary. We should be grateful if necessary action could be taken forthwith.

As regards permanent ownership there would seem to be considerable advantage if ownership vested in Newfoundland Government. In conjunction with developments now contemplated in existing dockyard at St. John's [we] should assume that greater importance in future is [as] shipping and repair port, and it is most desirable that dockyard facilities should continue under control of local Government.

If this proposal commends itself to the Commission of Government, we agree that it would be best to utilize for purpose of financing purchase of new naval dockyard site part of Newfoundland surplus funds contemplated as interest free loan to the United Kingdom. Since ownership of site as improved by large Admiralty expenditure would be for permanent benefit of Newfoundland, Commission of Government might wish to consider accepting as immediate charge on Newfoundland funds, cost of acquisition, placing site at disposal of Admiralty for as long as is required. Question of final allocation of charge whether in whole or in part would be for settlement at the end of the war or earlier if circumstances in Newfoundland necessitated this in the light of conditions then prevailing. If Commission of Government saw their way to take this course we feel that there could be no better contribution to the success of the Battle of the Atlantic. Commission of Government should know that H.M. Government in the United Kingdom propose to bear finally the cost of almost all the items in short term scheme of improvements proposed that a rise in respect of existing dockyard. Some of these items are no doubt such that railway or dockyard Administration would be undertaking them for themselves, and would be willing to bear cost on their own funds.



We should be grateful if we could have by telegram as early as possible views of Newfoundland Government on financial question above. Admiralty are instructing Seal to get in touch with you.

581.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 377

[St. John's,] July 21, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 666 of 19th July. We agree to accept as an immediate charge on Newfoundland funds cost of the acquisition of the site required for Admiralty works in North West corner of St. John's Harbour as set forth in Seal's letter to us dated 9th July.<sup>1</sup> We accept this immediate charge on the understanding that Newfoundland Government will be at liberty to reopen at the end of the war question whether the cost of acquisition should remain as a final charge against Newfoundland funds or should be regarded as part of the interest free loan to the United Kingdom.

With reference to the concluding sentence of your telegram under reply we have received no further information from Seal since he left St. John's but we are ready to take possession of the properties as soon as we hear from him that arrangements have been made to start work.

We do not propose to make it known immediately that the Newfoundland Government will be the purchaser of these properties as we think it will be advantageous to the purchaser for the Canadian officers who have already started negotiations with owners to follow these negotiations up with a view to settlement by agreement, if possible. You may rest assured, however, that we shall see that the properties are available as soon as work can be commenced.

582.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le haut commissariat de Grande-Bretagne au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*High Commission of Great Britain to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 32

Ottawa, July 22, 1941

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following for Woods from Seal. Please do not initiate any action on Dominions Office telegram No. 666 until you hear from me.

Essential that no word should leak out especially to Canadian Naval Authorities. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

583.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 682

[London,] July 25, 1941

SECRET. Addressed to Newfoundland No. 682. Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner at Ottawa No. 1326. My telegram 19th July No. 666.

After further consideration we have come to conclusion that balance of advantage rests with acquisition of the base by the United Kingdom. This would enable present arrangements for negotiations to proceed undisturbed and it would of course be subject to understanding that ultimate disposal of the site would be left for discussion when it is no longer required by Admiralty. We understand from Seal that this solution would also be most expeditious in view of course of his discussions with Canadian authorities. Question of allocating part of proposed interest in [sic] free loan from Newfoundland for this purpose would not in these circumstances arise.

In view of urgency of the matter we should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether Commission of Government agree that arrangements may proceed accordingly.

584.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 35

Ottawa, July 29, 1941

From Admiral Sheridan, British Admiralty Technical Mission, for Commissioner Public Utilities. Begins. Reference our telephone conversation and Dominions Office No. 681 of July 24th.<sup>1</sup>

1. Seal has returned to Washington, but I have approached Canadian Navy and Department of Munitions and Supply on the subject of meeting your requirements.

2. Regarding paragraph 3b. There is every possibility of meeting your requirements for tug and Harbour launches from Canada.

Canadian Navy have ordered a number of new launches for delivery shortly which will render some of those now in service available. The tug is not so easy but they suggest possibility of chartering a Saint Lawrence tug for use at St. John's during time ice compels lay-up here. As your urgent need is for winter months this might prove economical arrangement.

3. Reference general paragraph of message quoted. Department of Munitions and Supply are very willing to act on your behalf in placing contract of constructional work as soon as your requirements are specified. Suggest you send me as soon as possible full particulars of work required to be done.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

They inform me that the Naval work is to be done by E. G. M. Cape Company of Montreal who already have works under way in Newfoundland and whose local representative is Mr. Burton. Am informed that supply of structural steel is difficult and very early statement of requirements is urgent so that supply may be earmarked. Ends.

585.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D3)

*L'officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve,  
au commissaire aux Services publics*

*Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, to Commissioner for  
Public Utilities*

St. John's, August 25, 1941

Dear Sir Wilfrid Woods,

As requested by you this morning at the special meeting arranged for you to see the plans of proposed construction to be undertaken for the Naval Base at St. John's, I now send you a copy of the proposed plan<sup>1</sup> showing the work to be done in the Harbour of St. John's.

This plan includes the projected Naval Dockyard and Wharves; the projected wharves along the South Shore; the projected Naval Oil Fuel Tank on the South Shore and the projected underground magazine on the South Shore.

In addition to the above mentioned construction, plans were also shown to you of:

The projected Naval Barracks to be erected on the grounds to the immediate North of Prince of Wales College.

The projected Naval Hospital to be erected on the grounds adjacent to the existing Fever Hospital, and

The combined Officers accommodation and Administration Buildings to be erected on the property immediately South East of the Newfoundland Hotel.

As you will be aware if any of this construction is to be completed before the winter it is essential that work should be commenced with the least possible delay.

It will be greatly appreciated, therefore, if the Commission of Government will see their way to granting permission for this construction to be undertaken in general, and if the Newfoundland Harbour Board under your Chairmanship, would grant permission for the work in St. John's Harbour, as outlined in the enclosed plans, to be carried out.

I shall be very grateful if one of the two copies of the Harbour construction enclosed herewith might be returned to me with your reply, duly initialled by you, as authorising the work to be done on behalf of the St. John's Harbour Board.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

With the exception of the dredging, all contracts for all proposed work have been placed with the E. G. M. Cape Company, who are ready to start as soon as I am able to authorise them to do so. The dredging will be undertaken by Messrs. J. P. Porter and Sons. Both these contractors will be reminded of the need to obtain the requisite permission of the Municipal Authorities.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Commissioner for Defence.

L. W. MURRAY  
Commodore

586.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to the Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 72

Ottawa, August 28, 1941

With reference to previous correspondence regarding movement of Canadian Army personnel to Newfoundland.

It has now been decided to send Royal Canadian Artillery personnel from Halifax to Newfoundland to man four 3-inch Anti-aircraft guns that are being made available for Canadian use by the United States Army at St. John's. After a preliminary training period at St. John's it is expected the guns and personnel will be moved to Airport for duty.

This personnel comprise the 7th A.A. Battery, R.C.A., and its authorized interim strength is 6 Officers 107 Other Ranks. It is possible that later its establishment may be increased to about 146 All Ranks.

The nucleus of this Battery will be proceeding from Halifax to St. John's in late August—with additional personnel proceeding as drafts until interim strength of 6 Officers 107 Other Ranks is reached.

587.

2011-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

516 K/43

Ottawa, September 6, 1941

SECRET

Dear Mr. Pearson,

I am afraid that Mr. Robertson's letter of the 2nd July to Sir Patrick Duff on the subject of the St. John's base has remained unanswered for a long



time. But as you know thanks very largely to the willing help and active co-operation of the Canadian Government and, in particular, the Department of National Defence (Naval Service), matters have by no means stagnated in the meanwhile and I understand that part of the land required at St. John's has already been purchased, and that work on the site may be expected to start very shortly.

I agree that the point as regards financial arrangements in Mr. Robertson's letter of the 22nd June has been cleared by the First Lord's message<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Angus Macdonald, paragraph 5 of which stated that the Admiralty would be responsible for capital costs of works required for the escort force to be based on St. John's. I note that this paragraph, as also paragraphs 3 and 4 of the First Lord's message, have been accepted by the Canadian Government.

We understand that expenditure for the purpose of acquiring the sites and developing the base will be financed in the same manner as other expenditure involving Canadian dollars.

I do not know whether you have yet had an opportunity to consider the request in the second part of paragraph 5 of the First Lord's message with reference to the possible transfer of material and equipment for the base to the Admiralty.

It has been arranged now that the ownership of any freehold sites which may be acquired in connection with the base shall be vested in the United Kingdom. This does not of course apply to any Crown Lands which are used, which are already the property of the Newfoundland Government.

With reference to paragraph 3 of Mr. Robertson's letter of 2nd July, I think there can be no doubt that the intention of the First Lord in paragraph 9 of his message was that the physical maintenance of the shore facilities should be undertaken by the Canadian authorities who would in fact have the necessary staff on the spot. If however this arrangement is not acceptable to the Canadian Government, you will no doubt make an alternative suggestion.

Finally I come to the important point raised in paragraph 4 of Mr. Robertson's letter of the 2nd July. I am authorised to give a definite undertaking that if the Admiralty should at any time consider relinquishing title and control of the Naval Base and shore facilities at St. John's they will consult with the Royal Canadian Navy. In this connection however it is only right to point out that although the interest of the Canadian Government in the defence of Newfoundland is fully recognised it is equally necessary that account should be taken of the direct interests of Newfoundland concerned.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

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<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 569.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 569.

588.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 2, 1941

. . .

## NAVAL BASE AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

55. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES recommended that the Canadian government agree to pay the cost of maintenance of the Naval establishment at St. John's, Newfoundland, the headquarters of the convoy escort base established there by the U.K. and Canadian governments. The Admiralty were paying the capital cost. The Naval forces were Canadian.

56. The Committee approved in principle Mr. Macdonald's recommendation in this respect.

. . .

589.

2011-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne**Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

Ottawa, October 20, 1941

Dear Mr. MacDonald,

With reference to your letter of September 6th to Mr. Pearson, on the subject of the St. John's base, the Government has now had an opportunity of considering the questions raised therein and wishes to make the following observations concerning them. First, in regard to the request in paragraph five of the First Lord's message of June 28th, 1941<sup>1</sup> to the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, on the subject of the possible transfer of material and equipment for the Base from the Canadian Government to the Admiralty, this is understood to mean a transfer of material and equipment already in the possession of the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government regrets that owing to the expansion of its own activities, it has no spare material or equipment for this purpose. It is understood that the first fitting-out of the Base with material and equipment will be a charge against Admiralty account, and in order to avoid delay, arrangements have been made for its procurement.

The Canadian Government agrees that the intention of the First Lord in paragraph 9 of his message of the 28th June, 1941, was that the maintenance of the shore facilities should be undertaken by the Canadian Government.

<sup>1</sup> Document 569.

The Canadian Government is glad to affirm that it accepts responsibility for the administration and maintenance of the Naval Base at St. John's, Newfoundland.

To summarise the above, the Canadian Government's understanding of the division of financial responsibility is:

(a) Admiralty Account

- (1) Acquisition of property and payment of compensation.
- (2) Construction of the Base, including buildings and first fitting-out of material and equipment.

(b) Canadian Account

- (1) Administration and physical maintenance of the Base.

The Canadian Government appreciates your assurance that if the United Kingdom Government should at any time consider relinquishing title and control of the Naval Base and shore facilities of St. John's, they will consult with the Canadian Government before any action is taken. It is understood, however, that, in any such consultation, account should be taken of the direct interests of the Newfoundland Government.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

590.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

...

*United States Navy*

...

## 2. DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND ITS SEA APPROACHES

The naval defence of Newfoundland has been strengthened to an extent considered adequate in the present strategic situation, by the current dispositions of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet augmented by the Canadian forces based at St. John's. In order to increase the air strength available to cooperate with and support naval forces engaged in the protection of shipping and sea communications, the Chief of Naval Operations on November 7 requested the Chief of Staff to augment the Army Bombardment units at Gander Lake to the extent permitted by available facilities. On November 8 the Chief of Staff ordered the movement of eighteen medium bombers from Sacramento to Newfoundland. Arrangements have been made to provide these aircraft locally with naval type aircraft depth charges for use against submarines.

The construction of the Naval Operating Base, Argentia, is proceeding satisfactorily. Difficulty is being experienced in completing the evacuation of civilians.

...

591.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

. . .

*Royal Canadian Navy*

. . .

## ST. JOHN'S NEWFOUNDLAND—HARBOUR DEFENCES

The A/T Baffles completed on August 26th, will be weighed about the end of December, 1941, as ice conditions do not permit the obstructions to remain for winter.

Improvised underwater defences comprising a small controlled minefield and additional A/T Net were recently laid at St. John's for the purpose of meeting a particular threat which did not materialize. These temporary defences are being continued and the question of their permanency is under consideration.

Construction of the Base facilities at St. John's as outlined in Progress Report submitted to the Meeting of September 9th is proceeding satisfactorily.

. . .

592.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D3)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] January 27, 1942

. . .

## 7. DEFENCES FOR BAY BULLS, NEWFOUNDLAND

The Secretary reported that the J.S.C.S-C., Newfoundland, had received a request from the Commissioner of Defence in Newfoundland for some form of defence for vessels compelled to lie in Bay Bulls. The Sub-Committee reported that fixed defences were impracticable, and that the only defence against submarine attack was by patrol craft. They recommended patrol by Fairmile M.L.'s and in this the J.S.C. Atlantic Coast concurred. The Committee agreed, and directed that the requisite number of craft should be allocated for that purpose when they became available.

. . .



593.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D4)

*Le secrétaire du Comité des chefs d'état-major au secrétaire  
du Comité mixte de la côte Atlantique*

*Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Secretary of  
Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] February 12, 1942

With reference to Item 2 of the 11th Meeting of the J.S. S/C. Newfoundland<sup>1</sup>, and memorandum from J.S.C. Atlantic Coast A.C.S. 10-10-1 of 22nd January 1942<sup>1</sup>, the Chiefs of Staff Committee desire that the following points be brought to your attention.

2. Regarding the vulnerability of Conception Bay, referred to in Item 2 of the 11th Meeting of the J.S. S/C. Newfoundland, in May 1941<sup>1</sup>, the U.S. Army had under consideration the move of their 8-inch battery from Signal Hill (St. John's) to Cape St. Francis to cover the entrance of Conception Bay. However, by January, 1942, the U.S. had apparently decided on Red Cliff Head as the ultimate site for this battery instead of Cape St. Francis where it would continue to act as a second counter bombardment battery for St. John's (the other being the Canadian 10" battery at Cape Spear).

3. The U.S. Army further intends, once the 8-inch battery is moved, to use the mobile 155mm. battery, now at Signal Hill, in a mobile coast defence role with selected alternative positions fully prepared for occupation; such positions to be in the Torbay area and in an area covering Conception Bay.

F. HOUGHTON  
Captain, R.C.N.

594.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D4)

*Mémoire du secrétaire du Comité des chefs d'état-major  
au Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Memorandum from Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee  
to Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, February 25, 1942

I beg to forward herewith copy of a submission<sup>2</sup> from the J.S.C., Atlantic Coast, referring to Item 8 of the Minutes of the 16th Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, which reads as follows:

Item 8. Seaward Reconnaissance, R.C.N.—R.C.A.F.

The Committee again desires to go on record as stating that the facilities provided for naval and air reconnaissance seawards are not sufficient for present needs, and that it is not considered that an adequate warning can be given in the event of an attack.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

The following two Items from the Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the J.S. S/C., Newfoundland, are also relevant:

Item 2. Naval and Air Reconnaissance

With the present Naval and Air Forces available it is not possible to carry out any regular seaward patrols or searches of the coastline. The best that can be done at present is to provide air protection for convoys in vicinity, and to send out patrols, both Naval and Air, when any definite intelligence warrants this action . . .

595.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D5)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] March 3, 1942

. . .

4.

INADEQUACY OF SEAWARD RECCE.-NEWFOUNDLAND

The Committee took note of Item 8 of the Minutes of the 16th Meeting<sup>1</sup> of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, regarding the inadequacy of seaward reconnaissance owing to the small number of ships and aircraft available to the R.C.N. and R.C.A.F.. The Committee is fully aware of the situation, and action has already been taken in an endeavour to improve matters as soon as additional ships and aircraft can be made available.

. . .

596.

1156-AC-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 151

St. John's, March 16, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 71 of March 14, 1942,<sup>1</sup> and to my despatch No. 146 of March 13, 1942,<sup>2</sup> regarding the matter of the proposed floating drydock and marine railway in Newfoundland.

2. In my despatch under reference I sent you a copy of the report<sup>1</sup> of Mr. J. Stuart Crandall and I am enclosing two additional copies herewith, but without the copies of the plan<sup>1</sup> which was sent with the original which I enclosed with my despatch No. 146.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

3. The matter of providing either a railway drydock or floating drydock would seem to be one which should have immediate attention.

4. The present situation is that there is a graving dock at St. John's, the length of which on the blocks is 575 feet, the width at the bottom 70 feet and the draft over sill 27 feet.

5. The situation, however, which has existed since St. John's became a convoy port is as outlined in Mr. Crandall's report, namely that frequently as many as six or more vessels are waiting to go into drydock for more or less extensive repairs, requiring from a few days to several weeks, but that the drydock has been kept available for repairs to Naval vessels, principally destroyers, corvettes and minesweepers, which of necessity take preference over merchant craft.

6. If a 3,000 ton floating dock or railway drydock was in operation, the Naval destroyers, corvettes and minesweepers in use in this country could, as I understand it, all be repaired in a dock of this size. The graving dock could then be used exclusively for repairs to merchant vessels or for Naval vessels of a larger size.

7. When they were in Montreal attending the conference, the Honourable Sir Wilfrid Woods and the Honourable Mr. Emerson discussed the position with Mr. Arthur Cross, the President of the Halifax Shipyards Limited, Halifax, which company operates a graving dock and several railway drydocks.

8. Mr. Cross strongly advised that Mr. J. Stuart Crandall or his father, J. L. Crandall of Boston, should be asked to come to Newfoundland to report on the situation. The Crandall Drydock Engineers had designed the railway drydocks owned by the Halifax Shipyards and indeed, were the designers of all marine railway docks in Nova Scotia, including those now under construction by the Dominion Government.

9. Following the advice of Mr. Cross, Sir Wilfrid asked me to get in touch with the Manager of the Halifax Shipyards in Halifax, who was able to locate Mr. Crandall for me and put me in touch with him by telephone, when it was arranged that Mr. Crandall should go to Montreal and come to Newfoundland with us by plane.

10. I notified the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs of the arrangement in conversation over the telephone.

11. I also conferred with the Honourable Angus Macdonald, Minister for Naval Services, who approved of Mr. Crandall coming to Newfoundland for the purpose of making a report on the whole matter.

. . .

15. When the matter was first brought to my attention, I thought that the cost of construction might be a matter which the Commission of Government of Newfoundland would undertake and that it might be operated in conjunction with the graving dock. I understand, however, from Mr. Crandall and Admiral Murray that it is not thought to be practical for the Commission

of Government to operate the proposed new drydock, in addition to the graving dock. However, this is a subject which will bear further study and examination. I have not discussed the matter with Sir Wilfrid Woods. I understand, however, from Rear-Admiral Murray that his views are that it would be preferable to have the new dock operated by the Naval authorities, although the matter of employment of sufficient skilled workmen is one which might perhaps be as difficult for the Naval authorities to arrange as for the Commission of Government.

16. If the decision is that the proposed new dock should be operated by the Canadian Naval authorities, I take it that the cost of construction would have to be borne by the Canadian Government.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

597.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D6)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, March 31, 1942

. . .

#### ITEM 1. A.A. LAYOUT ST. JOHN'S-TORBAY

The G.O.C. detailed to the meeting an ultimate plan of Canadian anti-aircraft defences for the St. John's-Torby area. He asked for an opinion as to what were considered to be vulnerable points from the Naval and Airforce view-points. The F.O.N.F. detailed as follows:

- (a) Oil storage on South Side Hills.
- (b) New Naval Dock Yard.
- (c) Repair Shops and Stores in the new Naval Dock Yard area.
- (d) Ship Repair Establishment at Bay Bulls  
 (to be installed at a later date.)

The A/A. O.C. stated that the general building area at Torbay Airport should be considered as a vulnerable point.

The G.O.C. advised of the probable locations of Light and Heavy anti-aircraft sites as selected. These appeared to cover the points mentioned above.

. . .



598.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 14, 1942

. . .

NEWFOUNDLAND—NAVAL BASE; GENERAL AGREEMENT  
REGARDING DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

11. THE SECRETARY pointed out that the proposal of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services for assumption by Canada of the capital cost of the Naval base at St. John's had been deferred for consideration with the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland.

12. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR expressed the view that opportunity should be taken to negotiate a general agreement with Newfoundland covering not only the question raised by Mr. Macdonald, but the many other questions involved in the various defence arrangements which Canada had made in Newfoundland. At present the situation was unsatisfactory and complex; different arrangements had been made in various places with regard to title.

13. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES felt that, in any case, Canada should take title to and responsibility for the Naval base at St. John's. The present position was unsatisfactory in many ways, and led to serious delays.

There was the further important and urgent matter of completing repair facilities for both Naval and merchant vessels, involving the construction of a marine railway.

14. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE stated that he would be prepared to agree, in regard to the Naval base. At present, Admiralty expenditures for this purpose came from the billion dollar gift. If Canada were to undertake this responsibility and take title to the base, its cost would be added to the amount of the gift.

15. THE PRIME MINISTER was of the opinion that, if feasible, all these kindred problems should be settled at the one time in terms of general policy. A comprehensive report and recommendation might be made by the Ministers concerned, after consultation with Mr. Burchell. It would be remembered that the President had expressed the view that Canada should control Newfoundland, which was naturally part of the Dominion; the United States had no intentions in this direction.

16. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after further discussion, agreed that, after conference with the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services and the Minister of Finance report and make recommendations generally regarding Canada-Newfoundland defence arrangements, and specifically with regard to the Naval base.

. . .

599.

NPA S-4-2-4

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire aux Finances*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner for Finance*

No. 33

St. John's, May 18, 1942

SECRET

Dear Mr. Wild,

When I was in Ottawa last week, I sat in at a meeting of the War Cabinet and explained the proposal for the establishment of a marine railway to relieve the congestion at the drydock. I also informed the War Cabinet of the offer of the Newfoundland Commission of Government to contribute the sum of \$300,000 towards this project.

I was subsequently directed by the Minister for the Navy to convey to the Newfoundland Commission of Government the thanks of the Canadian Government for their generous offer. The project is regarded as one which will be of great value in the "Battle of the Atlantic" and the offer of assistance by the Commission of Government is one which is gratefully accepted by the Canadian Government.

. . .

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

600.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 284

St. John's, May 26, 1942

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your secret despatch No. 103 of May 23, 1942<sup>1</sup>, in which you inform me that at the Cabinet War Committee meeting on May 14th, it was agreed that, after conference with the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services and the Minister of Finance should report and make recommendations generally regarding Canada-Newfoundland defence arrangements and specifically with regard to the Naval base.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

8. In the letter which I sent by airmail to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, dated May 23rd,<sup>1</sup> I reported to him the result of a preliminary conference I had with Sir Wilfrid Woods with respect to acquisition of the Naval property by the Canadian Government and I enclosed a draft of a letter<sup>1</sup> which I proposed to send to Sir Wilfrid Woods, subject to the approval of the Honourable Mr. Macdonald and the Honourable Mr. Ilsley. At the time of writing, I have not received a reply to my letter.

9. Mr. Robertson also mentioned to me that the matter of obtaining a more definite agreement respecting defence arrangements with the Newfoundland Commission of Government, along the lines of the agreement negotiated with the United States Government, had been under consideration by the War Cabinet. I think Mr. Robertson mentioned that the making of such an arrangement had been suggested by the Minister for the Army, Mr. Ralston. I told Mr. Roberston that I would have to think this matter over carefully and would require to have more information about what we desired, other than what we have at present, before I was prepared to make any recommendation. In any event, I said that I thought we should clear up the matter of the Naval base if this were possible, before bringing up any proposal for discussion with the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

...

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

601.

NPA S-4-2-4

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Minutes of a meeting of the Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

St. John's, June 18, 1942

...

P.U. 64-242.

Memorandum<sup>2</sup> regarding an enquiry from the War Cabinet of Canada as to how the Government of Newfoundland would view a proposal that the Canadian Government should take over the title to all Admiralty properties recently acquired or leased by them in Newfoundland. The Commissioner for Public Utilities will draft and arrange for the transmission of a Telegram to the Secretary of State informing him of this enquiry, stating that there would be grave objection locally to Canadian ownership of water-side property in St. John's, and asking for his views on the proposal.

...

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

602.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, June 19, 1942

Dear Norman [Robertson],

After talking over with Sir Wilfrid Woods the matter of taking over the Naval Bases and on his recommendation, I sent him several copies of a memorandum,<sup>1</sup> copies of which are enclosed herewith.

It is the same as the letter with the amendments suggested by the Minister of the Navy, except that I changed Clause 11 so that it read as follows:

11. When I was in Ottawa, I was instructed by the War Cabinet to take the matter up informally with the Commission of Government of Newfoundland and obtain their opinion before the matter was submitted to the United Kingdom Government.

In my original draft, I asked for the "approval" of the Newfoundland Government. Upon consideration, however, I realized that the Newfoundland Commission of Government could not give me their approval without first consulting with the Dominions Office.

As Sir John Puddester was ill in the hospital and the Hon. Mr. Winter was in Canada, a full meeting of the Commission could not be held until this week.

I had a conference with Sir Wilfrid Woods after the second meeting which was held yesterday afternoon. He told me that the decision of the Commission was to send a cable to the Dominions Office inquiring as to their attitude and advice, with the recommendation from the Commission that the title be held in the name of the British Admiralty.

I asked him not to send this telegram and he agreed to wait until I had a reply by telegram to this letter.

Although Sir Wilfrid Woods did not tell me what occurred at the meeting of the Commission, I would gather that while he himself would be willing to recommend the approval, the other two members of the Commission from the United Kingdom did not want to do anything without first obtaining the views of the Dominions Office. I also think that the three Newfoundland members of the Commission were afraid of arousing public opinion if they agreed to the proposal, and especially so at the present time after *The*

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



*Financial Post's* intrusion into the political situation and the awaking of the strong anti-Confederate feeling which has always existed here.<sup>1</sup>

So far as I can gather, there would not be any objection by the Newfoundland Commission of Government to the removal of the dual control so as to allow the Royal Canadian Navy to make prompt decisions without having to consult with the United Kingdom officials.

There would also be no objection to taking over the leased property. As Sir Wilfrid Woods put it to me in confidence, the only real objection is to the Canadian Government taking over the title to the Dockyard property and the wharves on the dockyard site. The fear on the part of the Newfoundland Commissioners is that, with Canada holding such an extensive frontage in the small harbour of St. John's, the property might be turned to commercial purposes after the war.

I asked Sir Wilfrid if it would assist the obtaining of a favorable decision if we offered to let the Newfoundland Government take over the Dockyard property any time after the war at cost, less depreciation. I suggested that we might even agree that the property would not be used for commercial purposes without the consent of the Newfoundland authorities. He thought that either or both of these suggestions might help to obtain the approval of the Newfoundland members of the Commission but he doubted it.

If, however, the decision is made for Canada to take the matter up with the United Kingdom, I suggest that it might be advisable to include one or both of these restrictions.

The present position is that Sir Wilfrid Woods has been instructed by the Commission to take the matter up with the Dominions Office and ask their advice, but with the recommendation that the Commission of Government is opposed to the suggestion. Sir Wilfrid, however, said that he would not send this cable, but would wait for two or three days so that I could receive a reply from Ottawa.

. . .

You will understand that officially I have not received any reply to my memorandum. The information given to me by Sir Wilfrid Woods was entirely unofficial and confidential, and the information he gave me should not be disclosed to the U.K. High Commissioner in Canada or to the Dominions Office.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

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<sup>1</sup> *The Financial Post* avait distribué un questionnaire demandant aux Terre-Neuviens s'ils étaient pour ou contre la Confédération avec le Canada. Les réponses furent presque toutes négatives.

<sup>1</sup> *The Financial Post* had circulated a questionnaire asking Newfoundlanders to express an opinion for or against Confederation with Canada; the results were almost entirely negative.

603.

1156-Y-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 132

Ottawa, June 27, 1942

Reference your telegram No. 144 of June 26th.<sup>1</sup> In view of attitude of Commission of Government towards proposed transfer of title of naval base reported in your letter of June 19th, we do not think it advisable to press proposal further at present. Please advise the Commission accordingly.

604.

1156-AC-39

*Le commissaire aux Services publics à l'officier supérieur, détachement  
de la MRC à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities to Flag Officer,  
Newfoundland Force*

St. John's, July 4, 1942

Dear Admiral Murray,

With reference to your letter to me (7918/652) of the 12th May, 1942,<sup>2</sup> relative to the proposed Railway Dry Dock, and to your interview with me on the 2nd July, 1942, when you told me that you were recommending to Ottawa that the Dry Dock should be installed at Bay Bulls on a site which you pointed out to me on a plan, I write to inform you that the Commission of Government would be prepared to approve the proposed site and would be agreeable to acquiring the necessary land as part of its contribution to the Railway Dry Dock. No action will be taken by this Government, of course, until we hear that your Government definitely intends to carry out the Bay Bulls proposal. You will no doubt be good enough to keep me informed of the progress made in the settlement of this matter.

Yours sincerely,

W. W. WOODS

605.

1156-AC-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire aux Services publics  
High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner for Public Utilities*

No. 68

[St. John's,] August 18, 1942

Dear Sir Wilfrid [Woods],

I have now been instructed that the War Committee of the Cabinet, after discussion, has approved the recommendation of the Minister of National

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Defence for Naval Services for authority to construct a marine railway at Bay Bulls to supplement the drydocking facilities at St. John's.

It is estimated that the initial cost of the whole project will be \$2,000,000 and that \$1,000,000 additional will be required to provide a netted anchorage which will also be used to relieve the congestion of ships in the Harbour of St. John's.

As already arranged, the Newfoundland Commission of Government will contribute the sum of \$300,000 towards this project.

I understand that the Commission of Government has approved of the site at Bay Bulls which has been selected by the Admiralty for the purpose.

When the marine railway is installed, it is proposed that it should be operated by and under the direction of the Canadian Navy.

I discussed with you yesterday the matter of the acquisition of the title to the necessary land required for the project and today I had a telephone call from the Honourable Angus L. Macdonald, Minister for the Navy, who told me that the Canadian Admiralty were all set now to proceed with the project and desired to go ahead as quickly as possible. He had in mind that in view of the large investment by the Canadian Government title to the property would be placed in fee simple in the name of the Canadian Government. I have recommended to him, however, that a 99 year lease might be more acceptable to the Commission of Government and he has authorized me to request that the title should accordingly be in the name of the Canadian Government for that term of years, at a nominal rental.

There has been a long delay in getting this much needed project to finality since the time it was first suggested at the meeting of the Honourable Mr. Emerson, you and myself in Montreal last March. This, as you know, was due in a large measure to the difficulty in deciding on the proper site. Now that the project has been finally approved and the money authorized by the Canadian Government, I sincerely hope that the matter can be closed out and work started immediately. Personally I regard it as one of the most important steps which can be taken in the Battle of the Atlantic and defence of Newfoundland. The project will not only relieve the congestion in the Harbour of St. John's but will permit of the drydock being used in making prompt repairs to merchant shipping. The marine railway should be able to take care, in a large measure at least, of the repairs to Destroyers, Bangors, Fairmiles and other small war vessels which are engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Yours faithfully,

[C. J. BURCHELL]

606.

1156-AC-39

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

11/01/56

St. John's, August 24, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

I write to inform you that I placed your letters No. 68 and 69<sup>1</sup> of the 18th and 21st August, 1942, respectively, relative to the construction of a Marine Railway at Bay Bulls, before the Commission of Government this morning.

I am to inform you that the Commission of Government has formally approved of the project outlined in your letter on the understanding that the Canadian Government will hold the property on a lease from the Newfoundland Government for a period of 99 years, subject to the following conditions:

- (1) During the War the property to be used for any purpose connected with the war effort.
- (2) After the War the property to be used for Naval purposes only.

It will be necessary for the Government of Newfoundland to acquire the private property required for the Dry Dock so that it may be leased to the Government of Canada. It would be agreeable to the Newfoundland Government that it should proceed to acquire the property forthwith, treating the cost of acquisition as part payment of the contribution of \$300,000 which this Government undertook to make towards the project.

It is understood that the lease of the property will be on a nominal rental.

Yours faithfully,

W. W. WOODS

607.

NPA GN1/3 1/42

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 47

[St. John's,] October 24, 1942

SECRET. Your Telegram No. 579 Secret, of the 15th October. . .<sup>2</sup>

Commission proposes to acquire property for lease to Canadian Government, treating cost of acquisition as part payment of contribution of \$300,000 previously offered. The marine railway will be operated by and under the direction of the Canadian Navy.

We are now informed that installation of marine railway is to be put in hand and that contract has been placed by Canadian Government. In these

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



circumstances, your approval is requested of the payment from Newfoundland funds of the contribution of \$300,000 referred to above.

At the request of the Ministry of War Transport the Commission of Government has also decided, subject to your approval and to a favourable report on completion of survey of the harbour bottom, to install at Bay Bulls a system of mooring trots for the use of merchant vessels, at an estimated cost of \$100,000. Approval of the installation of a similar system at St. John's was given in Lord Cranborne's Despatch No. 27, of 28th January, 1942.<sup>1</sup> Bay Bulls is used during the winter as a reserve anchorage for St. John's, but the present mooring facilities are inadequate and last winter several ships were endangered. Your approval of this additional expenditure is requested, subject to the satisfactory completion of the survey now being undertaken.

608.

DND HQS 19-6-10

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au quartier général du CARC, Londres*  
*Chief of the Air Staff to RCAF Headquarters, London*

TELEGRAM X793

[Ottawa,] November 6, 1942

IMPORTANT. MOST SECRET. Necessity for anti-submarine sweeps and convoy patrols E.A.C. connecting with similar Air Operations Coastal Command to ensure continuity offensive action against enemy submarines in protecting our shipping North Atlantic fully realized in 1941 and suggestions for necessary cooperation made in A. V. M. Anderson's memorandum to A.O.C.-in-C. Coastal Command dated 4 July, 1941. Advise you procure copy. Suggestion made at time that Liberator aircraft based at Gander would be necessary to undertake patrols to mid-Atlantic meeting point between 2 commands during winter months when long range Catalinas could not operate from Botwood. This requirement still holds and applies to summer months as well since actual operations this past summer have proven practical operational radius of action figure for Catalinas is not beyond 600 nautical miles from base. For instance on Catalina flight from Botwood to 38° W. distance 762 nautical miles out of total 21 hours 22 minutes airborne only 4 hours could be spent with convoy. Remainder flying time consumed flying to and from convoy. Liberator on same flight duration could have spent 12 hours with convoy. For flights distance 600 to 800 nautical miles from Newfoundland essential aircraft have higher cruising speed than Catalina owing strong prevailing west winds. Mid-ocean meeting point between Coastal Command Base North Ireland and Eastern Air Command Base Gander is 850 nautical miles[.] To make aircraft coverage at this distance worth while essential that aircraft remain in patrol area at least 8 hours. Aircraft with cruising speed 150 to 155 knots at least required and Liberator LB 30 only known aircraft in America

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

fills this requirement. Owing bad weather, difficulty developing air base facilities and problem sea transportation no intention locating aircraft in south Greenland for convoy patrols. Much more satisfactory use bases in Newfoundland which are close to western end convoy route and all flying between bases and convoys are [sic] over waters infested by U-boats. We have no means securing Liberator aircraft as senior U.S. Army Air Corps officers are not impressed with our bids for aircraft to operate in Canada. Consider Admiralty and Air Ministry should show their zeal to help by asking U.S.A. to supply R.C.A.F. with one squadron LB 30's plus attrition and pipe line for these urgent operations. Alternatively U.K. provision to R.C.A.F. would similarly meet situation.

609.

DND HQS 19-6-10

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au commandant de l'aviation,  
région aérienne de l'Est*

*Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding,  
Eastern Air Command*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] January 4, 1943

CONVOY PATROLS BY R.A.F. AIRCRAFT  
EASTERN AIR COMMAND

1. For your information, under date of November 23rd the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom signalled our Prime Minister expressing concern over the recent heavy losses from convoys in the centre of the Trans-Atlantic route and asking permission to use Goose Bay and Gander for long-range Liberator aircraft of Coastal Command on A/S patrols. Intimation was made that later they may wish to send a Coastal Command squadron to operate from these bases.

2. Our Prime Minister's reply dated December 3rd<sup>1</sup> gave assurance of all possible assistance to combat enemy U-boat activities and drew attention to the fact that our B.R. squadrons based at Botwood, Gander and Torbay had provided A/S sweeps and convoy patrols over the Western Atlantic area since 1940-41, and although we could do sweeps up to 700 nautical miles and give convoy protection up to 550 nautical miles, the strong prevailing westerly winds did not permit extension to the mid-ocean area. The suggestion was made that it would be more economical if the United Kingdom would let us have the long-range Liberator aircraft and we would supply fully trained crews already experienced on Western Atlantic operations, and base facilities and do the patrols.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

3. The reply from the United Kingdom dated December 14th<sup>1</sup> expressed appreciation of our assurance of assistance and requested that R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. Staffs make arrangements for servicing and refuelling Liberators at Goose Bay and Gander as soon as possible. Regret was expressed that the United Kingdom was unable to meet our request for long-range aircraft as the number of Liberators available was too small to allow any to be permanently based in the Western Atlantic.

4. Our Prime Minister's reply dated December 16th<sup>1</sup> expressed regret at the United Kingdom being unable to supply aircraft and allow us to supply the crews, base facilities and do the patrols. Information was given that base facilities at Gander and Goose Bay were limited, but if the United Kingdom operations envisage occasional aircraft arriving at Gander and Goose Bay for rearming and refuelling, such facilities could be arranged. The suggestion was made that as full information on local conditions for Western Atlantic flying was only available in Canada, the conference with the United Kingdom Staffs should be held here.

5. The reply<sup>1</sup> received from the United Kingdom concurs that detailed arrangements for the operation of the Liberator aircraft at Goose Bay and Gander should be made in Canada, and 2 R.A.F. officers will be sent over at once to discuss arrangements with the R.C.A.F.

6. In the meantime, the Air Force Member of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington, is making every endeavour to secure Liberator (LB-30) aircraft for R.C.A.F. long-range operations in the Western Atlantic area.

7. May the above information please be passed to A.O.C., No. 1 Group, St. John's, Newfoundland, with instructions that he or a representative of his staff be prepared to supply the forthcoming conference between R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. Staffs with information concerning the facilities which can be provided at Gander and Goose Bay for the crews and Liberators from Coastal Command which are to operate from this side of the Atlantic.

8. Your own staff should also review the implications involved in the operation of Coastal Command aircraft within your Command and be prepared to discuss such points as command, control, briefing of Coastal Command crews and furnishing up-to-date intelligence on U-boat activities and meteorological information, co-ordination of long-range patrols with Coastal Command patrols from Iceland and Northern Ireland and the communication channels and information required to ensure such co-ordination, escort and reconnaissance frequencies and passing of operational information air-to-ground and ground-to-air, radio aids to navigation and flying control assistance and facilities, Aircraft Call Signs and Movement Serial Indicators, aircraft maintenance, aircraft spares, bombs, depth charges, ammunition and fuel, aircrew and ground crew accommodation, messing, R.C.A.F. issues and accounts.

L. S. BREADNER  
Air Marshal

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

610.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 6, 1943

. . .

NAVAL BASE, ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND—EXPENDITURES ON  
ADMIRALTY ACCOUNT.

1. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES submitted a report concerning expenditures on the naval base at St. John's.

Authority had been given for expenditure up to \$5,000,000 for United Kingdom account but as this limit had already been exceeded as a result of further necessary work still in progress, additional authority was required in order to enable payment to be made to contractors.

In order that there should be no delay in the work of construction, it was recommended that, subject to the British Admiralty's approval, Canada provide funds to meet progress payments to contractors for U.K. account up to an additional amount of \$1,000,000. An explanatory note had been circulated.

(Letter, Director of Contracts, Department of Munitions and Supply, to Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, December 30, 1942—C.W.C. document 379<sup>1</sup>).

2. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved the Minister's recommendation.

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611.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 21, 1943

. . .

REPORT BY THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF  
R.A.F. USE OF CANADIAN BASES FOR CONVOY PATROLS

15. THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF reported that officers of the R.A.F. Coastal Command had arrived in Canada to discuss the use of bases in Labrador and Newfoundland by R.A.F. long range aircraft.

It now appeared that the United Kingdom did, in fact, propose to base aircraft on the western side of the Atlantic, rather than use these bases merely for refuelling and servicing. Discussions were now in progress with the R.C.A.F.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



612.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, February 10, 1943.

. . .

USE OF LABRADOR AND NEWFOUNDLAND BASES BY THE R.A.F.

9. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR submitted a report on arrangements made between the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. for the use of Newfoundland and Labrador bases by the R.A.F. Coastal Command for anti-submarine patrols

Permission had been granted to base a detachment of three R.A.F. Liberators at Gander and to divert other Liberator aircraft on patrols to Gander or other bases in Labrador and Newfoundland as weather conditions might require.

Control of the Coastal Command aircraft, operating from the bases in the Eastern Air Command, would be exercised through headquarters at St. John's, Newfoundland, R.A.F. personnel being supplied for this purpose.

(Memorandum, D.C.A.S. to the Minister, Feb. 4, 1943<sup>1</sup>)

10. THE WAR COMMITTEE noted the Minister's report.

. . .

613.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 146

St. John's, March 3, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 47 of February 23, 1943<sup>2</sup> relative to informing the Newfoundland Commission of Government prior to the commencement of negotiations for the acquisition of property in Newfoundland for defence purposes.

2. I note from this despatch and from the accompanying letter from the Deputy Minister that it has apparently been decided to construct a marine railway at H.M.C. Dockyard in the harbour of St. John's.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

3. This is the first information I have had from you of this proposal.

4. I conferred with Sir Wilfrid Woods who, as Commissioner for Public Utilities, has general jurisdiction over the harbour, and the proposal comes as a complete surprise to him.

5. It must, of course, be appreciated that the proposal must meet with the approval of Sir Wilfrid Woods, the Commission of Government and the Board of Harbour Commissioners.

6. Sir Wilfrid Woods asked me to obtain full information as to the proposed project and he particularly asked for information as to how far the cradle and the marine railway would extend into the harbour and how far it would constitute a further blocking of the narrow entrance to the wharf and drydock of the Newfoundland Railway.

7. I am writing the Honourable L. E. Emerson, K.C., Commissioner for Justice and Defence, giving him the substance of the information contained in your despatch under reference but in my letter I state that the matter of the marine railway is one which is merely under consideration and that I am informing Sir Wilfrid Woods of the proposal. I also state that an application will be made for the approval of the Board of Harbour Commissioners and of the Commission of Government before it is proceeded with.

8. May I add that when the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services was in St. John's, he mentioned to me that this matter was being considered, but I did not know that the project had proceeded so far that directions had been sent by the Department of National Defence for Naval Services to purchase the Hickman property for the purpose of the proposed marine railway.

9. Your despatch under reference states that "it is proposed to open negotiations for additional properties on behalf of the British Admiralty Delegation". The accompanying letter however states that the hospital is to be a Royal Canadian Naval Hospital.

10. Please advise if the marine railway is being constructed by the Canadian Naval authorities and if the title to same is to be in the Canadian Government or the United Kingdom Government. Please also advise if the United Kingdom Government has approved of the construction of the marine railway. Sir Wilfrid Woods asked me this question this morning and asked me also if the original proposal came from the United Kingdom Government or the Canadian Government. I told him that I had no information on this point but would obtain this information for him.

11. Please also advise if the site for the new hospital is to be acquired in the name of the Canadian Government or in the name of the United Kingdom Government.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

614.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET.

Ottawa, April 7, 1943

. . .

## EXPANSION OF NAVAL BASE, ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

7. THE SECRETARY reported that the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services recommended approval of British Admiralty proposals for expansion of the naval base at St. John's, Newfoundland, at a cost estimated between \$5,000,000 and \$6,000,000.

The cost would be borne by the Admiralty who, in this connection, had approved an immediate order for Canadian lumber at a cost of \$1,000,000.

An explanatory note had been circulated.

(Extract from Naval Board Minute, Mar. 29, 1943—C.W.C. document 462<sup>1</sup>).

8. THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF submitted a memorandum explaining that the proposed expansion of facilities was rendered necessary by the substantially increased numbers of escort and merchant ships to be employed on the North Atlantic run for which maintenance would have to be provided. St. John's would have to be developed to the utmost for this purpose.

It was essential that materials be ordered at once, in order to ensure that the additional facilities required would be available by the winter of 1943-44.

(Memorandum, Director of Organization, R.C.N. to Chief of Naval Staff, Apr. 6, 1943<sup>1</sup>).

9. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved proceeding with the proposed extension of facilities at St. John's; it being agreed that the Canadian War Supplies Allocation Board (when established) would give consideration to the conditions which should govern the undertaking as between the British and Canadian Governments.

. . .

615.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures**High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 38

St. John's, April 11, 1943

IMMEDIATE PRIORITY. Reference your despatch No. 82 of March 26,<sup>2</sup> acquisition of additional property for Naval development.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

I have not yet met Seal but Mills<sup>2</sup> has kept me informed and has asked me to send this telegram to you and obtain instructions from you. Mills advises that Seal proposes in place of acquiring further expensive freehold properties here that land be secured on lease with option to British Admiralty to remove buildings and fixtures after war or in case of certain particularly expensive lands and where new building is not too valuable to agree to turn building itself over after the war as compensation in lieu of rental. In case of new 250 bed Naval hospital the most suitable site happens to be alongside tuberculosis hospital and mental hospital which institutions are both owned by Newfoundland Government. It is tentatively proposed by Seal that Newfoundland Government acquire site and put in necessary water and sewerage services at expense of Newfoundland Government on condition that hospital be turned over to Newfoundland Government after the war to be used as an addition to present tuberculosis hospital.

Mills agrees that foregoing proposals are the most satisfactory to deal with the matter provided Canadian Government concurs.

As suggested by Newfoundland Government, it is also proposed that Newfoundland Government should carry on all negotiations for acquisition of additional property required to be purchased or leased and without any Canadian representative taking any part in negotiations. Newfoundland Government thinks they can arrange more favourable terms.

You will understand that Seal is conducting all negotiations with Newfoundland Government in the matter but Mills and I assume that as Canadian Government is supplying the money proposals should have the approval of the Canadian Government. Mills is leaving by plane tonight weather permitting and Seal proposes leaving tomorrow afternoon. Understand from Mills that Seal proposes to confer with me on the matter tomorrow morning. His proposals are of course subject to approval by British Admiralty but I assume he will want to know Canadian attitude towards them before sending cable to England regarding same.

There has been no further discussion about Canadian Government acquiring title to Naval property here since receipt of your telegram No. 132 of June 27 except that no objection was raised to title of marine railway property at Bay Bulls being vested in Canadian Government on 99 year lease.

Understand from Mills that Seal is disposed to favor all Naval property being handed over to Canadian Government but as I have not yet met Seal he has not discussed the matter with me. Presume, however, you do not want me to reopen this question at this stage and, in any event, do not think it would meet any more favourable response at present time than it previously did.

Understand that proposed new developments will cost some six to eight million dollars.

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<sup>1</sup> W. G. Mills, sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals.

<sup>2</sup> W. G. Mills, Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.



616.

5206-40

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1003A/4

Ottawa, April 12, 1943

SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

In a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs I am informed that the Admiralty and the United Kingdom Ministry of War Transport are concerned at the increasing evidence that by winter the shortage of repair facilities for warships and merchant vessels on the East Coast of Canada and in Newfoundland will have become acute unless urgent steps are taken now to remedy the deficiencies. The Canadian Government will be aware of the difficulties which have been encountered during the past year in meeting adequately the needs of these ships. Moreover a large increase is envisaged in the number of merchant vessels and escorts employed on the North Atlantic route by the end of 1943.

To meet this situation it has been suggested that a combined Canadian-United Kingdom and United States Committee should be set up immediately, under Canadian chairmanship, to examine repair problems for warships and merchant vessels as a whole on the basis that the number of vessels involved will increase considerably. It is suggested that this Committee might be constituted by using the Ship Repair and Salvage Advisory Committee as a nucleus and adding (i) further United Kingdom representatives to advise on requirements of British merchant ships and warships; (ii) representatives from Newfoundland so far as facilities in Newfoundland are concerned; and (iii) United States representatives to advise on the requirements of United States ships and in respect of facilities at Argentina.

The United Kingdom Government hope that these proposals will commend themselves to the Canadian Government and I should be grateful if you would let me know the views of the Canadian Government for transmission to Mr. Attlee.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

617.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 116

[St. John's,] April 13, 1943

SECRET. Following for Admiralty from Seal. Begins. I want to point out the complete change which has occurred in the Canadian attitude. When I originally came here, they were vacillating about undertaking the construction. We were able to arrange, on the lines suggested by the Admiralty,

that they would provide the contractor and the dollars, and we should own the freehold. Whilst these arrangements were being made, and the first instalment of the work under construction, N.S.H.Q. were perfectly happy that we should call the tune so far as the works were concerned, provided we came to an amicable agreement with the Commodore about his requirements. We accordingly went in detail into every requirement, and were prepared from our knowledge to vouch for its necessity.

We now find that N.S.H.Q. are taking a direct and effective interest. During our visit, the Deputy Minister, the Board Member for Supply, the Director of Organization, and a representative of the Board Member for Engineering, have all been present. They have gone into the Commodore's requirements most thoroughly and carefully, and have presented us with an agreed Canadian Naval Service plan, which they will present to the Minister and the Canadian Cabinet.

I have throughout been on excellent terms with the Deputy Minister. He and I have seen eye to eye, and I respect his judgment. Any suggestions or criticisms I have made he has represented in his own consultations with the Commodore. We both agree that the scheme which has emerged though regrettably expensive, is forced on us by Military necessity, if the port is to be fully developed. But Hunter and I have not taken part as hitherto in the preparation of the scheme, and we are therefore not so fully informed about the case which exists for each of the items.

In my judgment it is essential that the Admiralty and the Treasury should accept without question the scheme as and when it finally emerges with the approval of the Canadian Cabinet. There is a strong and growing feeling that the Canadians are providing the money and are responsible for operating the base. If we refuse sanction, they will feel humiliated at having to ask sanction from us to spend their own money, and will also blame us if in future anything goes wrong. I cannot put this point too strongly.

The above is not to say that we should abandon the arrangement under which we nominally own the base, which is still acceptable to all concerned. I admit the financial anomaly, but it is worth while to preserve the goodwill of all concerned. The arguments I have previously put forward in this connection (see B.A.D. 1531/5/2, para. 5)<sup>1</sup> are still valid. Ends.

618.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, April 16, 1943

. . .

NAVAL BASE, ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

17. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES reported further upon this matter which had been discussed at the meeting of April 7th.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

It now appeared that further expenditures of some \$3,000,000 would be required to complete the present programme. In addition, the new programme of expansion made necessary by the increased use of the base would require some \$7,000,000 more which would bring the total costs to approximately \$16,000,000.

The Deputy Minister had gone over plans on the spot with the Admiralty representative and recommended approval. Since this development was considered necessary for reasons already explained to the War Committee, it was recommended that the additional expenditure be authorized. Copies of communications exchanged between the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland and the Secretary of State for External Affairs had been circulated.

(Airmail despatch No. 82, from External Affairs to Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland, March 26;<sup>1</sup> airmail despatch No. 205, from Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland to External Affairs, March 29;<sup>1</sup> telegram No. 38, from Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland to External Affairs, April 11—C.W.C. document 487).

18. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved in principle the Minister's recommendation, subject to concurrence of the Minister of Finance.

. . .

619.

1156-Y-39

*Le commissaire aux Services publics à l'officier supérieur,  
détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve  
Commissioner for Public Utilities to Flag Officer,  
Newfoundland Force*

[St. John's], April 29, 1943

Dear Sir,

I have received from Mr. R. Hunter, Superintending Civil Engineer, British Admiralty Delegation, a memo<sup>2</sup> forwarding a copy of a message<sup>2</sup> to the Admiralty from Mr. Seal of the British Admiralty Delegation outlining proposals by the Admiralty St. John's Mission for expansion of Naval repair facilities at St. John's and a second memo<sup>2</sup> containing a schedule of sites which the Admiralty desire to acquire in connection with the provision of these facilities. The last mentioned memo contains a request for recommendations by me as to the terms on which the properties should be acquired.

You will appreciate that it is absolutely necessary that I should be informed officially and formally that these projects have been definitely approved and their financial implications formally accepted by the British Admiralty and

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

by the Canadian Government before I can undertake any effective negotiations for the acquisition of the sites. Will you please take the necessary steps to obtain these necessary communications to me.

Yours faithfully,

W. W. WOODS

620.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 209

[London,] May 11, 1943

SECRET. Your telegram of the 22nd April No. 129.<sup>1</sup> At the Atlantic Convoy Conference in Washington it was agreed that Canada would assume responsibility for the naval and air protection and routing of North Atlantic trade convoys between the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom west of the western ocean meeting point.

2. The Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast has now assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief Canadian North Atlantic Approaches (short title C.-in-C. C.N.A.). Flag Officer Newfoundland is responsible to C.-in-C. C.N.A., for the co-ordination of air and naval protection of convoys in the Labrador Newfoundland area.

3. The above arrangement for the transfer of responsibility for trade convoys from the United States to Canada does not in any way affect the strategic responsibility of the United States for the whole Western Atlantic area and United States forces will continue to be based on Argentia for the execution of their allotted strategic tasks.

4. These changes took effect on 30th April.

5. It is probable that with the increase in the total number of escort vessels coming into service there will be a proportional increase in the number based on Newfoundland. No accurate estimate of increase can be made as it will depend on operational considerations.

621.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 396

St. John's, June 9, 1943

SECRET

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 391 of June 29, 1942,<sup>2</sup> and to previous despatches regarding the matter of the title to the Naval property in St. John's, Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



2. As mentioned in your despatch No. 103 of May 23, 1942,<sup>1</sup> the Cabinet War Committee at a meeting held on May 14, 1942, had agreed that after conference with the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services and the Minister of Finance should report and make recommendations generally regarding Canada-Newfoundland defence arrangements and specifically with regard to the Naval base.

3. During my visit to Ottawa last month, I had discussions on the subject with the Minister of Finance and also with the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services and prepared a memorandum<sup>2</sup> for the Honourable Mr. Ilsley and the Honourable Mr. Macdonald, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

4. A final conference on this subject was held in Ottawa on May 28, 1943 at which there were present the Minister of Finance and his Deputy, Dr. Clark, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services and his Deputy, Mr. Mills, and I was also present as High Commissioner for Canada.

5. I reported to Mr. Robertson verbally on the decisions arrived at at this conference and stated that I would send a formal report as a matter of record.

6. The following matters were agreed upon at the conference—

- (a) The Canadian Government would continue to pay for the expenditures on Naval properties in the City of St. John's including the additions which have been recently approved by the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom. It was estimated that, with the expenditures to date and the additions now proposed, the total amount paid out by the Dominion Government on behalf of the United Kingdom Government will be \$16,000,000.
- (b) The amount of these expenditures will stand as a charge against the United Kingdom Government for settlement after the war. If the present credit balance of the Canadian Government in London is now \$700,000,000 the amount will be increased by \$16,000,000, making a total of \$716,000,000.
- (c) The title to all the Naval property in the City of St. John's, both leasehold and freehold, will remain in the Government of the United Kingdom and all additional property required, either leasehold or freehold, will be in the name of the Government of the United Kingdom.

7. The difficulties mentioned in my memorandum, with which the Canadian Naval Services have had to contend during recent months, will still continue but Mr. Mills explained that there had been agreement between himself and Mr. Seal with respect to the new additions now proposed and that he did not anticipate any serious difficulties which could not be adjusted between them.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

622.

DND HQS 19-6-10

*Mémorandum du directeur du personnel militaire du Conseil de l'Air  
au directeur de l'organisation du Conseil de l'Air*

*Memorandum from Air Member for Air Staff to Air Member  
for Organization, Air Staff*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] June 10, 1943

1. It has been decided that the control of Liberator aircraft operating from R.C.A.F. bases is to be exercised by No. 1 Group Headquarters.<sup>1</sup>

2. The meteorological staff at No. 1 Group is required to act in the same capacity as the meteorological staff at E.A.C. Headquarters, except that they restrict themselves to the activities within No. 1 Group. They are required to provide forecast information with respect to all the aerodromes in Newfoundland, and alternates in Labrador, Iceland and the U.K. They are further required to provide forecasts for patrol activity over the north Atlantic for a distance of half way to the U.K. Forecasts for landing on the other side of the Atlantic are necessary since it may occasionally be found necessary to divert aircraft to Iceland or the U.K.

3. Meteorological office is also required to provide information as to the probability that air coverage will be able to be provided the following day at the daily joint conference between the Naval and R.C.A.F. Operations Staffs.

4. It is requested, therefore, that the following establishment changes to No. 1 Group Headquarters be made . . .

W. I. CLEMENS, G.C.

623.

5206-40

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à Ottawa pour discuter du problème de la  
réparation des navires de guerre et des navires marchands sur la côte  
est du Canada et de Terre-Neuve*

*Minutes of a Meeting held in Ottawa to Discuss Repair Problem for  
Warships and Merchant Vessels on the East Coast of Canada and  
Newfoundland*

M.S. 1078-13-11

Ottawa, August 12, 1943

SECRET

. . .

The committee were advised that, in connection with St. John's Newfoundland, original developments on the north shore and the north side of the harbour were now in operation, and that extensive further developments on the south shore had been approved and would be proceeded with

<sup>1</sup> Basé à St. John's.

<sup>1</sup> Based at St. John's.

with as little delay as possible. The plans with regard to these developments made provision for the maximum repair facilities which it was considered the Port of St. John's could accommodate. In addition, the United States Government were providing an 1800 ton floating dry-dock for use at St. John's which, it was anticipated, would be in operation this winter. A 3000 ton marine railway with ancillary shops was being constructed at Bay Bulls, but this would not be ready for use this winter. Corner Brook, Newfoundland, had also been developed as a ship repair base, but was only open part of the year, due to ice conditions.

The United States Naval Observer advised that a 7000 ton floating dock was now in operation at Argentia, and that very shortly wharves and repair facilities would be completed ashore for ship repairs. It was also planned to eventually place a 3000 ton floating dock, and a 1000 ton floating dock at Argentia with commensurate ancillary facilities ashore for the operation of these docks. The committee were advised that while all of these facilities were primarily planned for the use of U.S. ships, when facilities were available they could be used for escort ships of other allied nations, and possibly, in an emergency, for merchant ships. At the present time, pending completion of the shore facilities, the U.S.N. repair ship *Prairie* is at Argentia.

. . .

The committee then proceeded to summarize the morning's discussion as follows:

- (a) The assumption must be made that strong enemy attacks on our trade in the North Atlantic would continue, and on this basis it would be reasonable to say that Naval escorts would probably increase approximately 40% between mid 1943 and mid 1944, and 40% between 1944 and 1945, this allowing for a number of the older ships being taken off escort duties, and a reasonable percentage of losses, the latter approximately 8%.
- (b) In connection with Royal Naval ships and other allied ships, with the exception of Royal Canadian Naval ships, it would be expected that running repairs only would be effected in Canadian and Newfoundland ports.
- (c) There will be some increase in the number of merchant ships, but the actual numbers could not be foreseen. It was, however, assumed that the load will not exceed 20% increase over the present figure by mid 1944.
- (d) There will be no increase in demand for repairs to United States naval ships in Eastern Canada.

In connection with the above conclusions, the committee was under great difficulty in forecasting the load which may be required to be undertaken. These conclusions were reached, as far as information was available, on the basis of the worst reasonable hypothesis, that is, submarine activities would be renewed in force, and that, in addition, merchant ships would be augmented to meet European invasion requirements.

The committee then made the following recommendations:

- (1) That the Canadian Naval facilities now planned at St. John's, Newfoundland, and the Maritime Provinces should be completed and fully manned as quickly as possible.
  - (2) That additional manpower of four to five thousand men should be provided to Eastern Canadian yards without delay.
- ...
- (3) That at St. John's, Newfoundland, in order to make provision for the largest escort vessels and so free the Government drydock for merchant vessels, a floating dock, not less than 3000 tons and capable of taking the largest escort vessels and fleet destroyers, should replace the 1800 ton floating dock as soon as available. It was emphasized that due to its geographical position, St. John's, Newfoundland is an important port of refuge for damaged convoy ships.
  - (4) That the proposal already approved to augment the skilled forces of the Newfoundland Government dry dock at St. John's by bringing certain skilled labour from Great Britain, be proceeded with without delay.
- ...

B. I. RANKIN

Ty.Pay.Lt.-Cdr., R.C.N.V.R.  
Secretary

624.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, August 24-25, 1943

*Royal Canadian Navy*

3. The problem of ship repairs continues to increase, and is receiving the attention of the various authorities. A wooden floating dock has been obtained from United States sources and is being towed to St. John's, Nfld., leaving New York August 20th. It is hoped that this will assist at St. John's, Nfld., where the problem of the lack of docking facilities is most acute.



625.

NPA S-4-2-4

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions au commissaire  
aux Services publics*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions to  
Commissioner for Public Utilities*

N.517/13

[London,] September 14, 1943

SECRET.

My dear Sir Wilfrid [Woods],

Thank you for your letter of the 17th June<sup>1</sup> about the new Naval developments in St. John's. This has been very helpful to us here in considering the final arrangements.

Discussion with the Canadians on the financial side has shown that they not only fully accept the position that the Base is entirely a United Kingdom responsibility—they themselves being in the position of temporary users—but that they want us to pay for the new developments from our own earnings of Canadian dollars. In other words it is now clear that there is no question of their wishing to contribute towards the cost under the provisions of their new Mutual Aid Act; and it appears too that they are prepared to turn a blind eye to the implications of this, viz., that owing to our shortage of Canadian dollars the effect of our footing the whole bill as proposed will probably be to increase *pro tante* our drawings on their Mutual Aid Fund for other purposes.

This is generally satisfactory and it is accordingly now proposed to go ahead with the scheme on the basis that the cost will be borne wholly by United Kingdom funds. Furthermore, as the Canadians have had their opportunity of putting forward suggestions from the financial standpoint and are apparently quite content not to make any in relation either to the present or the post-war position, there is no longer any need to pursue the post-war aspect with them at the present time.

Yours sincerely,  
P. A. CLUTTERBUCK

626.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve  
Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 318

London, October 27, 1943

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to my predecessor's telegram No. 222 of the 14th May<sup>2</sup>, I have the honour to state that the question of financial responsibility for

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

the further development of naval facilities at St. John's now in progress has been discussed with the Canadian authorities. It is agreed that the Base is entirely the responsibility of the United Kingdom and that the cost of the present scheme will be borne wholly by United Kingdom funds from this country's earnings of Canadian dollars.

2. The question has been raised whether, in view of these considerable developments, it would be desirable to arrive at any understanding as to the future of the Base after the war. It is of course not possible to foresee in present circumstances whether and for how long it will be necessary to maintain the Base for defence reasons after the war, and this is a matter on which the views of the Canadian Government will have to be ascertained when the time comes. Having regard, however, to the position as regards financial responsibility as described above and the uncertainty of the post-war strategic situation, it is considered unnecessary to raise with the Canadian Government at the present time any question of this nature. It is appreciated that in the meantime the Commission of Government would wish to be assured that any arrangements which may eventually be arrived at for the post-war user of the Base will take full account of Newfoundland's interests, and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are ready to give an assurance to the Commission that the Admiralty will not sell or lease any of the properties in question to any third party otherwise than in consultation with the Newfoundland Government and after full consideration of any special economic interests of Newfoundland which may be involved.

I have etc.

CRANBORNE

627.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, January 13-14, 1944

. . .

*Royal Canadian Navy*

1. Clearance of the enemy minefield in the approaches to St. John's, Newfoundland, was continued. To date, 34 mines have been swept, and no further ships have been lost.

. . .

628.

NPA S-4-2-4

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Services publics  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities to  
Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 36-'44

[St. John's,] March 7, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

I circulate for consideration by my colleagues a copy of the Report of a Committee<sup>1</sup> appointed by me last October with the following terms of reference:

To examine the circumstances of the two recent groundings of merchant ships at the entrance to the port of St. John's with a view to recommending practicable measures for reducing the hazards of navigation through the Narrows.

2. The Report sets out the situation and I think it is clear that the only serious hazard of navigation through the Narrows is the existence of the shallow over the Merlin Rock.

3. My own view is that expressed in the Committee's Report, viz., that we should take steps to have this obstruction reduced so that there will be a clear channel 200 feet wide with 40 feet of water.

4. I put forward the matter for oral discussion.

W. W. WOODS

629.

NPA S-5-2-1

*Arrêté de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*Decision of Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

198-'44

[St. John's,] March 10, 1944

P.U. 36-'44. The Commissioner for Public Utilities was authorized, subject to possible modification in expenditure by the use of local facilities or otherwise, to arrange for the removal of an obstruction in the entrance of the harbour of St. John's at an estimated cost of \$142,500.00.

W. J. CAREW  
Secretary

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

630.

1156-AC-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire suppléant<sup>1</sup> à Terre-Neuve  
Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to  
Acting High Commissioner<sup>1</sup> in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 133

Ottawa, May 3, 1944

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 174 of April 12, 1944<sup>2</sup> and other correspondence concerning the Marine Railway at Bay Bulls.

2. The Department of National Defence (Naval Service) have now built a repair base which includes a Marine Railway at Bay Bulls, Newfoundland as well as a Boom Defence Depot.

3. In accordance with the arrangement made with the Commission of Government as outlined in the copies of the two letters attached from Sir Wilfrid Woods to the High Commissioner for Canada at St. John's, dated August 24, 1942<sup>2</sup> and October 19, 1942,<sup>2</sup> it is requested that early action be taken whereby the Newfoundland Government will issue a lease on the lands required by the Royal Canadian Navy for a term of ninety-nine years. It is recommended that this lease be in the favour of His Majesty the King in the right of Canada as represented by the Minister of National Defence, and it is assumed that such lease will call for the payment of the nominal sum of One Dollar per year by the Canadian Government.

4. It is requested that the lease cover three parcels of land together with the easements or right-of-ways, and a site for a dam which were required to bring in a new water supply from the Bay Bulls River. These properties may be roughly described as:

- (a) that land and the water rights on which the repair base and Marine Railway has been erected.
- (b) the plot of land and water lot beside St. John's road which was formerly the site of the Fisheries Laboratory on which the Boom Defence Depot has been erected. Permission was given verbally by the Department of Public Works for the Royal Canadian Navy to occupy this land and erect the necessary buildings, et cetera, on a rent free basis pending finalization of the lease between the two Governments.
- (c) two plots of land in Bay Bulls Village on which the contractors, Cape and Company, have built their staff houses and other accommodation. These buildings belong to the Canadian Naval Service as they were included in a cost plus contract for the construction of the Marine Railway, and it is considered desirable to hold the land on which they have been erected on the same basis as in the case of the sites for the repair base (Marine Railway) and the Boom Defence Depot.

<sup>1</sup> J. C. Britton.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



5. Exact plans of the areas required, together with agreements regarding water rights, both fresh and ocean, are available in F.O.N.F.'s Office and in the Office of the Commissioner of Public Works for the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

6. It will be noted from the letter of the 24 of August, 1942 from the Commissioner for Public Utilities, that a contribution of \$300,000 is to be made by the Commission of Government towards the Marine Railway project, and that the acquisition of the property is to be treated as part payment of this contribution. It is suggested that you enquire of the Newfoundland Government as to the amount available beyond the cost of acquisition of the property and suggest that the Canadian Government would appreciate payment when convenient.

7. Negotiations have been concluded with the British Admiralty Delegation in Washington with reference to the erection of a Naval Magazine in the vicinity of Bay Bulls, but it has been decided that this magazine is to be an Admiralty commitment, and therefore the acquisition of the site for the magazine should not be treated as part of the lease required for the activities of the Canadian Naval Service. The matter of this site for the erection of the magazine will be treated as a separate subject, and the necessary request in connection with it will be made through the customary channels which have been set up to handle the sites required for Admiralty purposes in Newfoundland.

8. It is requested that you confer with the Newfoundland Commission of Government in order to expedite completion of the lease as soon as possible.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

631.

1156-AC-39

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland and to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 220  
CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, May 8, 1944

Sir,

With reference to your despatch of May 3rd, 1944, No. 133 concerning the Marine Railway at Bay Bulls, I have the honour to advise that in accordance with your instructions, I conferred with Sir Wilfrid Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply of the Newfoundland Government to discuss the completion of the lease.

2. Sir Wilfrid Woods, who consulted with Sir Edward Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence by telephone during our interview stated that the Newfoundland Government desired that the Bay Bulls lease should form part of the confirming act covering all Canadian properties in Newfoundland and should not be dealt with separately as is proposed in your despatch under review. It was suggested by the Commissioner for Justice and Defence that the Canadian Government might draft a lease covering the Marine Railway at Bay Bulls, for consideration by the two Governments and with the object of having the lease ready for inclusion in the Confirming Act.<sup>1</sup>

3. Sir Edward Emerson and Sir Wilfrid Woods agreed that it was undesirable from the standpoint of good relationship between Canada and Newfoundland to publish at frequent intervals the required notices of special legislation confirming Canada's title in respect of properties. It is anticipated by these two members of the Commission of Government that the publication of an Act confirming title in the Canadian Government for all of their properties in Newfoundland would be greeted with unfavourable publicity. It is not desired, moreover, to have this publicity repeated on numerous occasions by dealing with projects separately, such as the Bay Bulls lease. Sir Edward Emerson stated in confidence that he was averse to the suggestion gaining ground that the Commission of Government had granted the whole of Newfoundland to Canada and the United States. Sir Edward informed me at the same time that there are at present several leases outstanding in which the United States Government is involved.<sup>2</sup>

4. In accordance with the agreement by which the Newfoundland Government is to contribute \$300,000 towards the Marine Railway project, the Commissioner for Public Utilities has stated that the acquisition of property had been largely completed although payment has not as yet been made in all cases. It is indicated that the amount available beyond the cost of the acquisition of property will approximate \$170,000. and that the Newfoundland Government is now prepared to make part payment when desired.

...

I have etc.

J. C. BRITTON

<sup>1</sup> Voir la partie 5 B i.

<sup>2</sup> Les États-Unis tentaient d'obtenir des baux additionnels pour des terrains situés sur deux de leurs bases, terrains destinés à devenir des emplacements de pièces d'artillerie.

<sup>1</sup> See Part 5 B i.

<sup>2</sup> The United States was seeking supplementary leases for extra lands at two of its bases for gun sites.

PARTIE 5/PART 5  
LES MESURES COMPLÉMENTAIRES DE DÉFENSE  
COMPLEMENTARY DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

SECTION A  
LES SERVICES DE SOUTIEN<sup>1</sup>  
SUPPORT SERVICES<sup>1</sup>

SOUS-SECTION i/SUB-SECTION i  
LES DÉFENSES FIXES<sup>2</sup>  
FIXED DEFENCES<sup>2</sup>

632.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Mémorandum du secrétaire aux Finances au commissaire  
à la Santé et au Bien-être social*

*Memorandum from Secretary for Finance to Commissioner  
for Public Health and Welfare*

St. John's, January 28, 1941

Sir John [Puddester],

Please see annexed correspondence<sup>3</sup> which is self-explanatory; I should be grateful if you would indicate a convenient time so that I may arrange a meeting with Sir Wilfrid.

I do not see how this proposal can be fitted within the revised budget figure. The cost of the Militia is already a very severe drain upon the Exchequer and an addition of a further \$100,000 per annum would make it unbearable.

If the Militia is regarded in its true light it becomes apparent that it is merely an auxiliary of the Canadian Forces; on its own, in the event of an invasion, it obviously could do nothing. The proposed expansion, while it may be necessary, is very obviously beyond our bearing capacity, and there is a hint of still further expansion in Brigadier Earnshaw's memorandum.

It seems to me that the time has now come to face facts squarely, and the solution, to my mind, appears to be that if the Militia is an integral and vital part of the defence machinery it had better be absorbed in the

<sup>1</sup> Cette section documente les principaux services de soutien des bases canadiennes à Terre-Neuve. Cependant elle passe sous silence les centres d'approvisionnement en huile et en essence, les radio-alignements et les installations semblables situées à proximité des principaux aéroports.

<sup>2</sup> Les défenses fixes à St. John's, Torbay, Gander, Botwood et Goose Bay sont également traitées aux sections pertinentes.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> This section documents the main support services for Canadian bases in Newfoundland. Services not documented are oil and gasoline supplies and radio ranges and similar installations set up in the close vicinity of main airports.

<sup>2</sup> Fixed defences at St. John's, Torbay, Gander, Botwood and Goose Bay are also covered in sections dealing with these places.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Canadian Army, Canada having accepted the responsibility for our defence, and let us pay over to Canada the \$250/300,000 per annum which the Militia (not expanded as suggested by Brigadier Earnshaw) is now costing us.

W. M. MARSHALL

633.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 9

Ottawa, May 13, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the completion of the new fixed defences that the Canadian Army plans to install in Newfoundland during the summer of 1941, and the provision of certain anti-aircraft defences at St. John's and the Airport, necessitate the following personnel, (additional to those on duty in Newfoundland during 1940) proceeding from Canada to Newfoundland during the summer of 1941:

(a) For duty in St. John's area.

Manning 4.7" and 10" Btys., defence lights, anti-aircraft lights and machine guns, port staff and services.

26 officers	581 other ranks
-------------	-----------------

(b) For duty in Botwood area.

Manning 4.7" and 10" Btys. and defence lights, port staff and services

29 officers	441 other ranks
-------------	-----------------

(c) For duty in Airport area.

Manning anti-aircraft machine guns

5 officers	131 other ranks
------------	-----------------

Total to Newfoundland

60 officers	1153 other ranks
-------------	------------------

Of this personnel a party of 4 officers, 118 other ranks proceeded to Newfoundland on 25th April.

It is expected that a further 8 officers, 172 other ranks will proceed from Canada to St. John's by 15th May, with the remainder proceeding at intervals during the period 1st June to 31st August, as the equipment becomes ready for manning.

I have etc.

NORMAN ROBERTSON  
 for the Secretary of State  
 for External Affairs



634.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire du Comité de guerre du Cabinet au secrétaire,  
section canadienne de la CPCAD*

*Secretary of Cabinet War Committee to Secretary, Canadian Section of PJBD*

Ottawa, June 9, 1941

Dear Mr. Keenleyside,

At a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee held on June the 5th:

(1) authority was given for the increase of the Canadian garrison in Newfoundland by an additional infantry battalion, . . .

Yours very truly,

A.D.P. HEENEY

635.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

. . .

*Royal Canadian Army [sic]*

. . .

#### SECOND RECOMMENDATION

. . .

### 3. Defence Requirements Generally

As instructed in April, 1941, the Officer Commanding Canadian Army Force in Newfoundland duly submitted an Appreciation on the defence requirements of the Island. His recommendations have been carefully examined and the position with respect to those of special interest is as given in paragraphs 4 to 7 hereunder.

### 4. Airport

#### (a) Lines of Communication

That no action be taken to guard the railway approaches to Airport except in the St. John's and the Botwood-Lewisporte areas.

APPROVED

#### (b) Infantry Garrison

That an infantry garrison of two infantry battalions be provided.

NOT APPROVED

Considered that the forms and scales of attack to which it is estimated Airport is exposed are such as can adequately be met by

one battalion which has been provided. This constitutes an increase of one-half battalion and the construction of the additional necessary accommodation is in hand.

(c) Field Artillery

That a field battery be provided.

NOT APPROVED

Considered infantry mortars, 3-inch and 2-inch, will be adequate.

(d) A.A. Defence

Certain general recommendations were submitted under the head of A.A. Defence.

ACTION

Final consideration has been deferred pending submission of detailed recommendations as to layout. This note also applies to the A.A. defence of all Canadian bases in Newfoundland.

## 5. Botwood-Lewisporte Area

(a) Botwood

(i) Coast Defence

That coast defences be installed comprising:

1—Counter bombardment battery

1—Close defence and examination battery

5—C.D. lights.

APPROVED

Work of installation progressing favourably.

(ii) A.A. Defence

See 4 (d) above.

(iii) Infantry

That an infantry garrison of one infantry battalion be provided.

APPROVED

Additional half battalion dispatched and provision of additional accommodation in hand.

(b) Lewisporte

Appreciation did not make any specific recommendation for defence of Lewisporte. This question has since been examined and recommendations have been made, with a view to approval, that the following be provided:

1—2-gun, close defence and examination battery

4—3.7" A.A. guns (see in this connection 4(d) above.)

4—40mm. A.A. guns

6—A.A. searchlights

An infantry garrison (to be found from Botwood Bn.)

## 6. St. John's

## (a) Coast Defence

- (i) That the following coast defences were considered necessary:

2—Counter bombardment batteries

1—Close defence and examination battery

1—Boom defence battery

5—C.D. lights

## APPROVED

Close defence and boom defence batteries in action.

Installation of C.B. battery and C.D. lights progressing favourably.

- (ii) Information has since been received from O.C. Canadian Army Force, Newfoundland, that he has been advised that United States authorities are giving serious consideration to turning over the 8-inch battery now in action at Signal Hill to the Canadian Army for continued employment at St. John's.

Should the United States authorities decide in this sense, the Department of National Defence would be prepared to assume the commitment involved.

## (b) A.A. Defence

See 4 (d) above.

## (c) Infantry Garrison

That an infantry garrison of one battalion plus two companies for protective detachment be provided.

## NOT APPROVED

Considered one battalion adequate.

## 8. Torbay Aerodrome

Subsequent to the submission of the Appreciation under reference, O.C. Canadian Army Force in Newfoundland has submitted a further recommendation regarding the defences which will ultimately be required at Torbay.

These comprise:

H.Q. details and two companies of infantry

8—3.7 inch A.A. guns

8—15 inch A.A., M. G.,

or similar equipment

} to be co-ordinated with A.A. layout at  
 } St. John's.

This recommendation is under active consideration to the end that construction of the required accommodation may be put in hand before the winter.

636.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

...  
*Canadian Army*  
 ...

## SECOND RECOMMENDATION

## (a) Coast Defence

Installation of coast defences in Newfoundland is progressing. The 10-inch battery at St. John's (Cape Spear) is expected to be in action by 10 Nov. At Botwood the 4.7-inch battery is in action and it is estimated that the 10-inch battery will also be in action by 15 Dec.

...

## (c) A.A. Defences

A review of the A.A. defence requirements of bases in Newfoundland and Labrador has been concluded. Provision is being made for scales of defence ranging from 16-3.7" and 8-40 mm. at Airport to 4-3.7" and 4-40 mm. at Lewisporte. A table showing approved scales of provision at defended points both in Newfoundland and Canada will be handed to United States Service Members.

...

637.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

...

*Canadian Army*  
 ...

## 2. SECOND RECOMMENDATION

...

## (d) Forms and Scales of Attack

It is suggested that the taking of decisions respecting measures of defence and the calculation of strengths of garrisons required in Newfoundland, would be facilitated if the forms and scales of



attack to which it is estimated points of Military importance in the Island are exposed, could be agreed upon. It is suggested that the forms and scales of attack laid down for the Canadian Atlantic Coast (including Newfoundland and Labrador) by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff may commend themselves to United States Service Members as being appropriate to the end in view. Copies of a memorandum defining the forms and scales of attack in question are available for the consideration of United States Service Members.

. . .

#### 5. SEVENTH RECOMMENDATION

So far as the Canadian Army is concerned, Annex I of ABC-22<sup>1</sup> is now somewhat out of date. A revised statement of the forces available for the operations required by the Plan, as of 17th December, is attached hereto.

. . .

#### [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

CANADIAN ARMY PORTION — ANNEX I, ABC-22

As of 17th Dec., 1941

. . .

*Newfoundland* 3,975

Force Headquarters  
 Headquarters — St. John's Defences  
 " — Botwood Defences  
 Three Infantry Battalions  
 Two Heavy Batteries — Coast Artillery  
 One A.A. Battery  
 One A.A.M.G. Battery  
 (incl. A.A.S.L. Tp.)  
 Service Troops

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 894.

<sup>1</sup> See document 894.

639.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 6, 1942

. . .

## DEFENCE OF OIL STORAGE FACILITIES

## LEWISPORTE, NEWFOUNDLAND

10. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE reported that a plan for the defence of oil storage facilities at Lewisporte, approved by the Chiefs of Staff, required the provision of certain units and services and the construction of suitable heated buildings. Personnel involved totalled 13 officers and 255 other ranks, and consisted of coast artillery, infantry garrison and administrative services.

For the remainder of the fiscal year, the estimated cost was \$229,689. The annual recurring costs would be \$293,449. In this connection a memorandum had been circulated and approval was recommended.

(Departmental memorandum December 29, 1941<sup>1</sup> — C.W.C. document 49; also C.G.S. memorandum to Minister, December 18, 1941<sup>1</sup>).

11. THE WAR COMMITTEE approved the Minister's recommendation.

. . .

639.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense à la*  
*commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence to*  
*Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J. and D. 28-1942

[St. John's,] March 21, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

On the 27th February I received from Major-General Page, a memorandum<sup>1</sup> in which he informed me that it was intended to protect the cable landing stations at Harbour Grace and at Bay Roberts with military guards. In each case a platoon of 35 men of all ranks would be required. He further stated that the only troops available for this duty were the Newfoundland Militia, and it was proposed to place these guards from that Force. I referred this memorandum to the Secretary for Defence for comment, and in his reply, in which he analysed the duties now being performed by the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Militia<sup>1</sup> and the proposed additional duties, he informed me that it would be impossible to carry on unless the Force was increased by about 150 of all ranks. I thereupon wrote General Page pointing out that the Secretary for Defence did not see that the Militia could perform these duties in addition to their existing ones. To this I received a reply<sup>2</sup> which is annexed hereto in full.

...

A situation which I do not like, has arisen from the method in which this subject has been approached. General Page has not asked whether the Government would consider an increase of the Militia so as to assume further duties in the defence of Newfoundland, he has assumed to provide duties for which there are not a sufficient number of troops, and when questioned about its insufficiency, to propose an increase which in this case is very substantial. An admission of this principle would place him practically in control of the Newfoundland Treasury.

...

It may be advisable therefore to inform the Canadian Government that as part of our actual war expenditure we are prepared to assume this further obligation, but on the basis that we are not asked for further financial sacrifices of this nature, and make it perfectly clear that any further duties of a military nature which are to be assumed in Newfoundland, must be assumed by Canadian or United States Forces.

L. E. EMERSON

640.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 91

[St. John's,] March 24, 1942

SECRET. The Officer Commanding Combined Canadian and Newfoundland Troops has requested us to increase Militia by 158 of all ranks so as to take over certain additional guarding and other duties. The annual recurring cost will be about \$175,000. and in first year for buildings and equipment a further sum of about \$50,000. We have agreed to this proposal subject your approval. Shall be grateful for this approval at your early convenience.

<sup>1</sup> La copie manuscrite de *The History of the Participation by Newfoundland in World War II* par A. M. Fraser (DND (DH) HQC 1453-1 (D3)), rapporte que la milice terre-neuvienne était responsable de la garde des installations suivantes à St. John's: la station de câbles, le bassin de radoub, les réservoirs de l'*Imperial Oil Company*, le service des eaux et la station de radio du gouvernement.

<sup>1</sup> In the manuscript copy of *The History of the Participation by Newfoundland in World War II*, by A. M. Fraser (DND (DH) HQC 1453-1 (D3)) it is stated that the Newfoundland Militia was responsible for guarding the following installations at St. John's: the cable station, the dry-dock, the Imperial Oil Company oil storage tanks, the water supply and the government radio station.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

641.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire,  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 80  
MOST SECRET

Ottawa, April 9, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to state that from time to time I have furnished the Newfoundland authorities with information regarding Canadian Army personnel who were proceeding to Newfoundland.

I am now informed by the Department of National Defence that during the coming summer it is expected that the following personnel will be proceeding either to Newfoundland or Labrador, as shown hereunder. These represent increases in garrisons in the places shown and are not routine reliefs.

- (a) For the A.A. Defences of the St. John's-Torbay area—approximately 16 officers; 395 other ranks.
- (b) For the A.A. Defences of the Gander Airport—approximately 13 officers; 319 other ranks.
- (c) For the new defended Port of Lewisporte—approximately 8 officers; 186 other ranks.
- (d) For the defence of Goose Bay Aerodrome, Labrador:  
Coast and A.A. Artillery—approximately 17 officers; 419 other ranks.  
Infantry Garrison—approximately 34 officers; 773 other ranks.  
Miscellaneous services—approximately 8 officers; 121 other ranks.

From the foregoing it will be seen, therefore, that it is planned to send approximately 37 officers and 900 other ranks to Newfoundland, and approximately 59 officers and 1313 other ranks to Labrador during the next three or four months. This personnel will be moved from Canada as equipment and shipping space become available.

I should be obliged if you will bring this information to the attention of the Newfoundland authorities.

I have etc.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs



642.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, July 6, 1942

. . .

4. General Embick presented a statement based on information obtained from an Inspector General of the United States Army reading as follows:

1. Bay Roberts, on Conception Bay, is the western terminus for four underwater cables from England and one from the Azores. These cables terminate in a prominent building in the town adjacent to the shoreline, the sea being deep enough for the operation of enemy submarines. This cable station is guarded by a platoon of a Newfoundland regiment, but is within the Canadian sector of defence.
2. If this building were damaged and equipment destroyed, six months would ensue before equipment could be replaced and operations again normal.
3. It is suggested that this matter be placed on the agenda for the next Permanent Joint Board meeting in New York on July 6.

After discussion of this matter it was agreed that it should be referred to the Commander of the Canadian Army in Newfoundland for inquiry and report, together with the request that he ascertain whether there is reserve relay equipment available in Newfoundland which could be utilised to provide additional security at this cable terminus.

. . .

643.

DND HQS 7410-8

*Le directeur des opérations et des plans militaires  
au chef d'état-major général**Director of Military Operations and Planning to  
Chief of the General Staff*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] July 31, 1942

1. On 5th May, 1942, the G.O.C.-in-C., Atlantic Command, was requested (at folio 68, on H.Q.S. 7018, Vol. 9) to forward his views regarding using personnel of the Newfoundland Militia to man the two 40 mm. A.A. Bofors allotted to Bell Island.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ceux-ci étaient des canons supplémentaires à ceux de la défense côtière déjà manœuvrés par des soldats terre-neuviens.

<sup>1</sup> These were in addition to the coast defence guns already manned by Newfoundland soldiers.

2. On the 11th May (at folio 108, H.Q.S. 7018, Vol. 9) he replied stating that he considered it unwise in the initial stages of manning to have the proposed Section in Bell Island a separate entity.<sup>2</sup> As a result, authority was sought and obtained for the two guns at Bell Island to be manned by a Section of the 25th A.A. Regiment, R.C.A. which is allotted to the St. John's-Torbay-Bell Island area.

3. Immediately hereunder is A. 3047<sup>1</sup> from Atlantic Command recommending that the two A.A. Bofors at Bell Island should be manned by the Newfoundland Militia as he now considers it inadvisable to mix the R.C.A. personnel with the Newfoundland Militia who are manning the Coast Artillery on the Island. He states that the Commissioner for Justice and Defence approves the proposal. The G.O.C.-in-C. proposes, if concurrence of these Headquarters is obtained, to approach the local Commission of Government to complete arrangements.

4. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that:

- (a) The proposals contained in A. 3047 be concurred in.
- (b) In the event of the Newfoundland Militia taking over the manning of the A.A. Defences on Bell Island the W.E. for the 25th A.A. Regiment, R.C.A., should be amended by the deletion of the Section now allotted to Bell Island.

J. H. JENKINS  
Colonel

644.

DND HQS 7410-8

*Le directeur des opérations et des plans militaires au chef  
d'état-major général*

*Director of Military Operations and Planning to Chief of the General Staff*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 5, 1942

With reference to your minute on folio 2,<sup>2</sup> advice has been received (in A 3186<sup>2</sup> immediately hereunder) from G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command that the Newfoundland Government now advises that they cannot supply the personnel for manning the A.A. Bofors on Bell Island. The present procedure whereby these guns are manned by a Section of the 25th A.A. Regt., R.C.A. therefore will remain unchanged.

J. H. JENKINS  
Colonel

<sup>1</sup> i.e. séparée des autres défenses anti-aériennes déjà manœuvrées par des soldats canadiens ailleurs sur la côte atlantique.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> i.e. separate from the other anti-aircraft defences already manned by Canadian soldiers elsewhere on the Atlantic Coast.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

645.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D11)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, August 11, 1942

. . .

## ITEM I. DEFENCES — CORNER BROOK

With further reference to Item No. 5 of the 29th meeting<sup>1</sup> regarding the recommendation from the Bowater Company, Corner Brook concerning harbour defences, the F.O.N.F. stated that he had studied the correspondence and was of the opinion that the protection was requested by a commercial company and that their situation was similar to many of the "paper" ports on the Atlantic Coast. Great difficulty would be experienced in placing nets due to the depth of water, and for this reason it was considered the only protection that might be afforded would be the placing of a baffle around the dock area. The scale of attack would not warrant the expense of installing anti-submarine nets and shore defences and the present importance of the port was not such that defences should be installed. Provision of the necessary equipment and material was more urgently required for other areas. The Sub-Committee concurred in this opinion and the Commissioner of Defence will be advised accordingly.

. . .

646.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des discussions et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, September 1, 1942

. . .

3. Colonel Jenkins reported on the situation at Bay Roberts, Newfoundland. He stated that the General Officer Commanding, Canadian, Newfoundland, had reported:

- (a) Sufficient spare equipment to operate a few cables at reduced speed are held in a secret place; and that:
- (b) The recently improved Army defences at the Cable Station are considered adequate against raids.

. . .

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

647.

DND NSS 8871-325

*L'officier d'état-major du service de renseignements, HMCS Avalon,  
au directeur du service de renseignements navals*

*Staff Officer (Intelligence), HMCS Avalon, to Director  
of Naval Intelligence*

St. John's, September 9, 1942

On a.m. 5/9/42, four ships, *Lord Strathcona*, *Saganaga*, *Evelyn B.* and *P.L.M. 27* were anchored in diamond formation between Bell Island and Little Bell Island in Conception Bay, with *Saganaga* at Westerly angle and *Lord Strathcona* opposite, *P.L.M. 27* at the North and *Evelyn B.* opposite with *Lord Strathcona* about 3 cables from *Saganaga*.

2. At approximately 1130/5/9/42, there was a terrific explosion in *Saganaga*. Two men, ventilator, decking, ore, etc. blown into air. Immediately after first, there was a second explosion and the ship sank immediately—30 sec. The boilers did not blow. Shortly afterwards, 2-3 minutes, two explosions in close succession occurred in the *Lord Strathcona* and the boilers blew up and the ship sank—90 seconds.

3. The *Evelyn B.* started weighing anchor within a few minutes of the sinking of the *Saganaga* and headed into shallow water, bow on to the land—Kelly Island. About 2 feet of sub's periscope sighted 1500 yards away moving by the southwest corner of the Island heading out to sea on the Westerly side of Bell Island. *Evelyn B.* gunner opened fire, range 1500 yards. First shell hit very near periscope and same disappeared immediately. Second shot hit spot where it had been. No wake, oil, etc. sighted afterwards.

4. *Evelyn B.* gunner then laid down barrage from 1500 to 3000 yards attempting to divert submarine from getting into position to fire further torpedoes. 27 rounds S.H.P. 3" used in barrage. *Evelyn B.* manœuvred into position whereby if submarine surfaced, it would be spotted immediately and fired upon. None sighted.

5. Captain Guy of the *Evelyn B.* is of the opinion that a new type of High Explosive Torpedo is being used, owing to the tremendous damage done by the first torpedo.

6. It would appear that the submarine came in on the West side of the Island and left by the same route outside of the fire range of the batteries protecting the ore wharves. The approach, attack and departure all being made while the submarine was submerged.

W. A. JOHNSON

Paymaster Lieutenant, RCNVR



648.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D12)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve**Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, September 28, 1942

. . .

## ITEM I. ACTION BELL ISLAND—5 SEP. 42

The recent submarine attack on shipping at anchorage, Bell Island was discussed, and the action taken was carefully reviewed to determine if further protective measures could be made to prevent a recurrence. It was agreed that the anchorage could not be moved to a point which could be more adequately covered by the Bell Island Battery.

Commodore Mainguy outlined the plan now in operation for the conveying of ore boats. With this plan in effect no ship should be at anchorage longer than twelve hours after loading, and during that time a patrol vessel will be provided. The route between Bell Island and Sydney will be protected and if through any reason it becomes necessary for these ships to delay their sailing they will be transferred to Bay Bulls where a protected anchorage is provided.

. . .

649.

DND (DH) 321.009 (D143)

*Rapport sur la seconde attaque contre le poste d'amarrage à Bell Island**Report on Second Attack against Anchorage at Bell Island*

SECRET

[St. John's,] November [ ] 1942

Herewith a report based on an investigation into the events occurring at Bell Island on 2nd November, 1942, and on the reports received from Units concerned.

2. From the evidence obtained, the following seems to be the most plausible account and was worked out after studying all reports sent to this Headquarters and after a visit to the area by G.S.O. III (Intelligence) with Staff Officer (Intelligence) of Canadian Naval Headquarters.

3. The submarine probably entered by the western passage and surfaced about 1,000 yards south of the *Rosecastle* which was anchored about 1,400 yards from shore, east of Lance Cove.

4. A torpedo was fired when about 600 yards from the *Rosecastle*. This torpedo missed and continued on, eventually striking the Scotia Pier. The submarine, swinging in a left circle, fired a second torpedo which struck the *Rosecastle* near the stern. The third torpedo struck her near the bow. By this time the first torpedo had reached Scotia Pier and exploded. Continuing her swing left, the submarine was sighted by a member of the out-post at Lance

Cove in the light of flare sent up by the *PLM 27*. The submarine was head-on to shore and fired a fourth torpedo which cut the *PLM 27* in two. The *PLM 27* sank almost immediately. The *Rosecastle* was slowly sinking with bow up. The submarine continued her left swing, gathered speed, and proceeded towards the western passage where it was seen on the surface in the waning light of a "snowflake" by a Corporal of the out-post and several of his men. The submarine submerged after six or seven minutes travel in the west passage.

5. The submarine was stated to be quite large and from the evidence it appears to have been of the 500 to 750 ton type with four tubes forward.

6. During the visit to the area, three pieces of torpedo that struck the Scotia Pier were recovered and these reveal the torpedo to be of a more recent electrical type. Information obtained in this investigation resulted in some ten more pieces being taken from the *Fylingdale* at St. John's and twelve more pieces, including portions of electrical cable and battery parts, were obtained from a search by the Militia on the 5th November. All of these were turned over to the Naval authorities.

7. The locations and actions of Naval vessels during the action is [sic] not known. One vessel was informed by the Coast Defence Battery that the submarine was proceeding on the surface to the west passage. This vessel acknowledged receipt of the message and proceeded east at high speed. It was about fifteen minutes after the submarine submerged that the first Naval vessel appeared off Lance Cove.

8. Some survivors had already been picked up and several had swum ashore from the *Rosecastle*, one with broken legs. Casualties were reported as follows:

<i>Rosecastle</i> had a crew of 43 on board:	15 survivors
	24 missing
	4 dead
<i>PLM 27</i> had a crew of 50 on board:	38 survivors
	3 missing
	9 dead

9. Damage to the Scotia Pier is estimated at about thirty thousand (\$30,000) dollars but in no way impairs the loading facilities (see attached sketch map and illustration<sup>1</sup>). The damaged portion of the pier consisted of piles, heavy timbering and rock fill.

10. The battery was not able to fire though the submarine was in the extreme right arc of fire of one gun for a short while, since the area of the anchorage is prohibited to the searchlight. It is doubted if the submarine could have been engaged from the present battery's position.

...

G.S.O. III (Intelligence),  
Canadian Troops in Newfoundland

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduites.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

650.

DND (DH) 321.009 (D143)

*L'officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve,  
au secrétaire du Conseil de la Marine<sup>1</sup>*

*Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, to Secretary, Naval Board<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

[St. John's,] November 12, 1942

## DEFENCES OF WABANA, BELL ISLAND.

The following proposals with regard to Defences for the anchorage at Wabana, Bell Island, Newfoundland, are submitted for the consideration of the Department.

2. Following a survey of the anchorage, it is proposed to lay a double line A/T Baffle 600 feet off and parallel to the Dominion and Scotia piers. The Baffle would be sufficient length to give complete protection to both piers, with a single net gate at each end.

It is understood that the Superintendent of Boom Defence has made arrangements for the supply of the necessary materials.

3. A convenient slab site has been located and permission received from the Dominion Iron and Steel Company [sic] for the use of same. Storage facilities are available in buildings at present on the site, though some additional expenditure will be necessary to make these suitable for Boom Defence purposes. In view of the urgency of this matter, it is proposed to take the necessary alterations in hand forthwith, in anticipation of Headquarters approval. Photographs of the proposed site are enclosed herewith.<sup>2</sup>

4. Under this scheme it will be essential that a tug of sufficient power should be available to assist in berthing vessels and in opening and closing the end gates of the baffle. It is possible that the tug *Frank Dixon* now en route to St. John's may be suitable, and, if so, it is recommended that the vessel be earmarked for this duty. A small tug of the "Active" type will also be required to act as tender to B.D. 1.

5. To expedite the laying of the baffle, and to assist in maintenance work, it is strongly recommended that a crane and tractor be shipped with the Boom Defence material, direct from Sydney to Bell Island. No equipment of this kind is available in St. John's.

6. Boom Defence commitments in St. John's area have increased directly within the past few months, and if maintenance work at St. John's, Bay Bulls and Wabana is to be efficiently undertaken, it is considered essential that B.D. 1 should be retained here. No derrick scow is available here, and B.D. 1 would be particularly useful in view of the ice conditions on this coast.

H. E. REID

Commodore First Class, R.C.N.

<sup>1</sup>Formé en janvier 1942, il remplaça le Conseil naval en tant que source d'avis collectif pour le ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals.

<sup>2</sup>Non reproduites.

<sup>1</sup>Formed in January 1942, it replaced the Naval Council as a source of collective advice for the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed.

651.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D14)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, November 23, 1942

ITEM I. REQUEST FOR NAVAL, AIR AND LAND PROTECTION —  
 PORT-AUX-BASQUES<sup>1</sup>

A letter<sup>2</sup> was tabled from the A/Commissioner for Defence to which was attached a resolution<sup>2</sup> from the citizens of Port-aux-Basques and Channel and representatives of adjacent settlements, asking that:

- (i) The area comprising Port-aux-Basques and vicinity be declared a "blackout area."
- (ii) That adequate protection for this area in the form of naval, air-force and militia be based at Port-aux-Basques.

With reference to (i) it was pointed out that the question of blackout is a matter for decision by the communities concerned in conjunction with the Commissioner for Defence and Director of Civil Defence.

It is noted that the ferry boat under the existing schedule is required to carry out loading and unloading during the hours of darkness. The A.O.C. No. 1 Group R.C.A.F. is to make tests at Torbay and the U.S. Docks with blue lights and if found satisfactory, a recommendation for their use at Port-aux-Basques will be made.

Regarding (ii), it was not considered possible, with the equipment available, by any of the Services to provide protection for this port at the present time. The area is under air control of A.C. and a naval patrol outside the port is now in operation at all times when the ferry is in port. The F.O.N.F. stated that the question of additional naval protection will be recommended if additional vessels are available. The Sub-Committee do not recommend that Port-aux-Basques be made a Defended Port or that additional defensive measures can be taken at this time, with the equipment available. The A/Commissioner for Defence will be so advised. If further equipment is made available the Sub-Committee recommend that consideration be given to the provision of armament for the port, similar to the installation at Lewisporte. In view of the approach of winter conditions provision is not considered urgent before spring.

...

<sup>1</sup> Cette demande suivait le torpillage du S.S. *Caribou* dans le détroit de Cabot.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> This request followed the sinking of S.S. *Caribou* in the Cabot Strait.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



652.

DND (DH) NSS 1037-4-106

*Rapport de l'interrogatoire des survivants du U-513<sup>1</sup>**Report on the Interrogation of Survivors from U-513<sup>1</sup>*

MOST SECRET

[ ,] September 9, 1943

. . .

## CHAPTER V. FIRST PATROL OF U-513

## Departure

U-513 left Kiel on the afternoon of 7 August 1942, in company with U-165, commanded by Korvettenkapitän Hoffmann; both boats were escorted by a mine destructor vessel as far as Kristiansand, which was reached in the early hours of 9 August 1942. Two enlisted men suffering from light cases of blood poisoning were taken to a hospital where they were treated. They were able to rejoin their boat in time for the sailing, the morning of 11 August 1942. U-513 and U-165 had both topped up with oil, water, and provisions and left the port together. They separated soon thereafter.

## Crossing of North Atlantic

After passing through the "Rosengarten" on the surface, now and then seeing floating mines, U-513 shaped a course for her operational area off the coast of Newfoundland. To most of the crew this was a complete and unpleasant surprise, as they had been issued tropical gear; the boat itself was equipped with a second refrigerator, located in the control room—these are believed installed only in boats operating in the South Atlantic.

## Patrolling off Strait of Belle Isle

Not much time was lost in crossing the Atlantic; U-513 arrived off the Strait of Belle Isle after about 14 days. She did not enter the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but patrolled only the entrance to the strait. After about ten days of unsuccessful waiting, the commander decided to try his luck farther south.

## Sinkings in Conception Bay

Observing ships entering Conception Bay and anchoring off Bell Island, U-513 followed a 3,000 ton freighter into the harbor of Wabana the night of 4 September 1942. She then dived and, resting on the bottom in about 80 feet, spent the night in relative comfort. Next morning a target was selected, and two torpedoes were fired at an ore steamer estimated at 9,000 tons. Apparently the torpedo ratings, in the excitement of firing their first live torpedoes, had forgotten to set the battery switch from "Charge" to "Fire", because, as soon as they left the tubes, they sank quickly to the bottom. Before the next attack could be launched, U-513 broke surface briefly, but none of the look-outs on the anchored steamers saw her. After this incident the boat again maneuvered into firing positions and shot two

<sup>1</sup> Ce sous-marin fut coulé en août 1943 le long de la côte brésilienne.

<sup>2</sup> This U-boat was sunk in August 1943 along the coast of Brazil.

torpedoes at the freighter she had selected as her first victim. This time the torpedoes hit, and the steamer was observed to sink. Immediately after the explosion all other ships made frantic efforts to either shift their position or to get out of the harbor. Due to the shallow water *U-513* could not move with her accustomed ease, and when another of the steamers, estimated at 7,000 tons, swung around suddenly on her way out, *U-513* was dealt a glancing blow on the conning tower, forcing her into the mud of the shallow harbor. This action, however, was no intentional ramming, and it is doubted whether the steamer was aware that she had scraped against the hull of a U-boat. Recovering swiftly from the blow, *U-513* fired two torpedoes from her stern tubes, sinking the steamer. She then followed, submerged, in the wake of the same 3,000 ton steamer which she had followed in; but, due to the disorder caused by the collision and the general excitement, tubes were not reloaded in time to attack the steamer acting as pilot for them and she therefore escaped. (O.N.I. Note: The ships sunk were probably S.S. *Lord Strathcona*, British freighter, 7,335 tons, and S.S. *Saganaga*, also a British freighter, 5,454 tons, loaded with 7,900 tons of iron ore. Both were sunk 5 September 1942, at 47.35N., 52.59W.)

*U-513* then stood out to sea to repair her damaged conning tower; about two days later she made several trial dives, transferred four torpedoes from her upper deck containers, and was again ready to continue the patrol.

. . .

653.

DND (DH) HQS 193.009 (D30)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 21, 1944

. . .

IV. REDUCTION IN CANADIAN GARRISON — NEWFOUNDLAND (CSC 401)

The Committee considered and approved the proposal in HQS 20-1-15 FD 13 (Ops) of 17 April 44<sup>1</sup> to reduce by one Infantry Battalion the Canadian Garrison in Newfoundland.

This reduction, it was noted, was concurred in by the U.S. War Department (through its member on the P.J.B.D.) and the G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command and effected a change in Infantry and Airfield Defence personnel from 2030 all Ranks to 1273 all Ranks.

C.G.S. to note.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

654.

DND (DH) 355.009 (D2)

*Le secrétaire, Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve, au commissaire  
à la Justice et à la Défense*

*Secretary, Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland,  
to Commissioner for Justice and Defence*

WFS 2-1-0

SECRET

[St. John's,] September 19, 1944

## REDUCTION IN STRENGTH OF NFLD REGT

The proposal for reduction in strength of Nfld Regt to a HQ Coy only, was examined carefully at a meeting of the Joint Services Sub-Committee held 18 Sep 44. The views of the sub-committee were as follows:

Responsibility — Bell Island — The decision to provide protection at Bell Island was arrived at by consultation between governments and the scale of defence was laid down by Chiefs of Staff in 1941. Attached is a copy from our files of a memo<sup>1</sup> on the subject received through Atlantic Comd in Jan 1941.

2. In view of the above decision, it is felt that no change may be made here without approval of higher authority. Chiefs of Staff are therefore being requested to re-assess the sit [sic] in view of present conditions.

Arty — Pending decision from higher authority, it is felt that the Cst Arty at Bell Island should remain. Consideration was given, however, as to whether these guns could be manned by Cdn Tps in view of your present proposal. There is at present a Cst Def Bty at Bot containing similar eqpt frm which the personnel would be available from freeze-up of Bot harbour until the break-up in the spring. Whether or not the war sit will preclude the necessity of re-opening the Bot site at that time can not at present be predicted, and the availability of personnel if required at that time is at present being studied. If assurance can be received from NDHQ that such personnel would be available if required, then Nfld Regt personnel might be released as proposed.

Infantry — At present in Nfld, Cst Arty personnel may be made responsible for their own protection, and therefore there is no objection to the withdrawal of the Infantry at present stationed at Bell Island. Infantry personnel at present stationed at Shamrock Fd are not considered essential to the defence. The elimination of Infantry from the Nfld Regt would simplify the construction of the Regt and achieve a reduction of about 100 ranks, all ranks.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Home Guard — The functions of the Home Guard<sup>1</sup> were examined. In the case of the Bay of Islands Coy, their role at present consists of the defence of Cornerbrook and Main Dam, Deer Lake. The Grand Falls Coy is looked upon as a potential reserve to our garrison at Bot-Lspte, which is already considerably reduced in strength. It is understood that the cost of maintaining these two Coys is not very great, but if a reduction is made, it is suggested that the Grand Falls Coy be retained until the end of hostilities.

3. It is regretted that an immediate decision cannot be rendered regarding the Cst Arty personnel, but steps as outlined above are being taken and the results will be notified to you as soon as possible. May GOC be advised of your decisions regarding Inf and Home Guard.

J. B. T. LEWIS  
Lt.-Col.

655.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, October 5, 1944

. . .

DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND;  
REDUCTION OF CANADIAN ARMY GARRISON

33. THE SECRETARY submitted a report of the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommending reduction of the present Army garrison from 4,313 to approximately 3,700 by the end of 1944, the remaining force to be distributed between St. John's and Gander.

The Chiefs of Staff also recommended that, until such time as postwar defence arrangements were agreed upon, withdrawals be co-ordinated with those of the United States, so that the strength of the Canadian Army garrison did not fall below that of the United States.

The U.S. Army were now planning reductions to approximately 3,400 by the end of the current year. Thereafter, further reductions would likely

<sup>1</sup> Des unités de la *Home Guard* furent formées à Grand Falls en mai 1941, à Corner Brook en janvier 1942 et par la suite à Bishop's Falls. La copie manuscrite de *History of the Participation by Newfoundland in World War II* de A. M. Fraser (DND (DH) HQC 1453-1 (D3) indique que:

The Home Guard units have been formed under authority of the Auxiliary Militia Act, 22nd June 1940. They are voluntary unpaid, part-time forces. . . The Officer Commanding Newfoundland Militia is in command of all Home Guard Forces.

<sup>1</sup> Home Guard units were formed in Grand Falls in May, 1941, in Corner Brook in January, 1942, and subsequently in Bishop's Falls. The manuscript copy of the *History of the Participation by Newfoundland in World War II* by A. M. Fraser (DND (DH) HQC 1453-1 (D3) states:



be made. Details of the effect of Canadian reductions were set out in the Chiefs of Staff report, copies of which had been circulated.

(Memorandum, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to War Committee, Sept. 29, 1944<sup>1</sup>—C.W.C. document 874).

34. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved the recommendations contained in the report submitted.

. . .

656. DND (DH) 355.009 (D2)

*L'officier général commandant les troupes canadiennes à Terre-Neuve  
au commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense*

*General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland  
to Commissioner for Justice and Defence*

SECRET

St. John's, October 18, 1944

Dear Mr. Winter,

Further to communication from Joint Services Sub-Committee, WFS 2-1-0 dated 19 Sep 44, advice has now been received from NDHQ which clarifies the situation.

2. Chiefs of Staff Committee have advised that in view of present submarine activities they are not yet prepared to decide on subject of permanent removal of the Coast Artillery from Bell Island. In view of your request there was no objection made to withdrawal of Nfld Regt personnel from January 1945. The situation will be re-examined later in the year to decide on whether they should be replaced by Cdn personnel.

3. As our 4.7" battery at Botwood might be used during the winter for such replacement it is requested that withdrawal of Nfld Regt personnel take place on 1 Jan 45 or 4 days after freeze-up in Botwood, whichever is the later date.

4. Advice has also been received that the garrisons at Botwood and Lewisporte, except a care and maintenance party, will be withdrawn after freeze-up. The infantry company will rejoin the battalion at St. John's and the Coast Artillery Batteries will be withdrawn to Canada, unless the 4.7" battery personnel is used as in para 3 above. Although the above withdrawal is considered permanent it is subject to re-assessment early in 1945.

5. In view of the reduction at Botwood-Lewisporte I feel that our previous views regarding the Home Guard Company at Bishop's Falls are modified and no longer are applicable.

Yours sincerely,

P. E. LECLERC  
Major-General

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

657.

DND (DH) 355.009 (D2)

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense à l'officier général  
commandant les troupes canadiennes à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence to General Officer  
Commanding, Canadian Troops in Newfoundland*

St. John's, October 21, 1944

Dear General Leclerc,

Please forgive this tardy ack [sic] of your letter of Oct 18th handed to me by Col. Lewis.

I am glad to have this clear statement of the views and intentions of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and I am sure we can co-operate with you in carrying them out so far as the disposition of the Nfld forces is concerned.

As I see the situation generally, there is no need for action on our part before January at the earliest, and if any change in the movements proposed by you should become desirable, there will be ample time for us to consult about it.

Yours sincerely,

H. A. WINTER

658.

DND (DH) 955.003 (D1)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, October 25, 1944

. . .

## ITEM IV REDUCTION OF ARMED SERVICES IN NFLD

FONF wished to have recorded the warning received from higher authority that intensified submarine activities are expected toward the end of 1944.

Reductions are still being made in Nfld and higher authority has made such decisions without asking the views of JSSC.

. . .

659.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires  
PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 7-8, 1944

. . .

Canadian Army

. . .

## SECOND RCMDN—DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

2.

(a) Canadian Army Garrison, Newfoundland

Approval has been given for a reduction in the Canadian

Army Garrison in Newfoundland. Coast defences at Botwood and at Lewisporte will be permanently withdrawn from their operational roles when freeze-up occurs this winter. LAA defences at these ports have already been withdrawn, and inf detachments will be called in when the ports are closed by ice. These inf detachments will rejoin their Battalion at St. John's.

- (b) At the end of the year the strength of the Canadian Army Garrison at Newfoundland, as a result of these and other reductions previously reported, will be reduced to about 3,700 all ranks.

. . .

SEVENTEENTH RCMDN—DEFENCE OF GOOSE BAY, LABRADOR

4. (a) The HAA defences at Goose Bay have been withdrawn. The coast arty at Rigolet has been taken out for the winter, decision as to removal of guns being deferred for consideration in the spring. This leaves LAA and one airfield defence company for the defence of this airport.

. . .

660.

DND 7410-8

*Le secrétaire, Comité des chefs d'état-major, au secrétaire,  
Comité mixte de la côte de l'Atlantique*

*Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Secretary,  
Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 19, 1944

DEFENCE OF BELL ISLAND

1. With reference to your S400-10<sup>1</sup> and S400-11 of 12 Dec,<sup>1</sup> I am directed to inform you that the Chiefs of Staff agree with the recommendation of the Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast, that the coast defence battery at Bell Island continue in operation. In their opinion, a reassessment of the situation should be made in the spring of 1945.

2. They have noted also the decision of the Newfoundland Commission of Government not to withdraw the detachment of the Newfoundland Regiment employed in manning this battery and as a consequence of this change of policy, it will not now be necessary to assign troops of Canadian Army to this role.

E. W. T. GILL  
Lieutenant-Colonel

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## SOUS-SECTION ii/SUB-SECTION ii

LES BASES DE RAVITAILLEMENT EN ESSENCE ET LES  
STATIONS MÉTÉOROLOGIQUES  
REFUELLING BASES AND WEATHER STATIONS

661.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Victoria, November 14, 1940

. . .

*Action by the Canadian Air Force*

. . .

Investigations are being made by Eastern Air Command regarding the laying down of moorings and providing limited sub-base facilities at Canada Bay, three points along the Labrador Coast and one on Resolution Island, Baffin Land.

. . .

662.

DND HQC 15-11-17

*Mémorandum du directeur du personnel militaire au Conseil de l'Air  
au sous-chef de l'état-major de l'Air*

*Memorandum from Air Member for Air Staff to Deputy Chief of Air Staff*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] February 20, 1941

ESTABLISHMENT OF REFUELLING BASES  
NORTH COAST OF EASTERN CANADA

1. The necessity of carrying out reconnaissance and patrol flights off the Labrador coast, requires the establishment of refuelling bases at:

Canada Bay (Newfoundland)

Cartwright (Labrador)

Hopedale (Labrador)

Vicinity of North River (Labrador)

Port Burwell on the Labrador Coast or Resolution Is.

Leaf Lake (Ungava Bay)

Moosonee (James Bay)

Richmond Gulf (East side of Hudson Bay)

2. These sub-bases are to provide:

(a) Refuelling points

(b) W/T facilities for aircraft on reconnaissance or patrol, point-to-point communication for the transmission of brief meteorological reports and Aircraft Detection Corps reports.



3. The Director of Air Signals has advised that the establishment of W/T personnel should be as follows:

- 1 Corporal, Wireless Operator (Ground)
- 1 Aircraftsman, Wireless Operator (Ground)
- 1 Aircraftsman, Wireless Electrical Mechanic (Reference D.A.S. Minute (2) hereunder)

From previous reconnaissance flights, it is known that local living conditions are such that it is deemed advisable to supply these detachments with rations for the period they will occupy these refuelling bases. It will, therefore, be necessary to include one cook (civilian, seasonal) in the establishment.

4. The Director of Air Signals has been asked to anticipate the requirements for the wireless equipment and he will arrange with A.M.S. for the supply. A.M.S. has been asked to anticipate gasoline requirement and the provisioning of moorings; and D.W.B. has been asked to design suitable type of building, should it be necessary to erect accommodation.

5. Since the whole of this coast is frozen over during the winter months, personnel and W/T equipment will be evacuated in late fall and re-established as early as possible in the spring. Before these refuelling bases are established, a reconnaissance flight will be made as soon as possible to determine the actual sites and whether or not it will be necessary to build or rent living accommodation and to appraise refuelling and servicing facilities. When the result of this reconnaissance is known, those concerned will be advised when and exactly where, these refuelling bases are to be established.

6. Will you please draw up the necessary organization orders.

A. A. L. CUFFE  
Air Commodore

663.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 29

Ottawa, May 13, 1941

SECRET. With reference to paragraph 14 of the Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland referring to the refuelling bases in Newfoundland and Labrador.<sup>1</sup> It is essential to have the bases as soon as possible after navigation opens. It is proposed, therefore, to proceed with the establishment of five bases, each composed of W/T station, gasoline cache and a four man detachment at Roddickton in Canada Bay, Cartwright, Hopedale, Hebron, and at a location in the vicinity of 60 degrees north latitude. The detachments at Cartwright and Hebron will be quartered in rented buildings but

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice E.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix E.

quarters will be taken in and erected at the other bases. The exact sites at the three latter bases will have to be chosen by the officer proceeding with the shipment of personnel and supplies.

The Canadian Government would be grateful if the Newfoundland Government would agree to the establishment of these bases as detailed above. It is assumed that crown land is available at these points for establishment of this sized detachment and that the Newfoundland Government will make necessary provision for the duration of the war. If it is considered necessary, a representative of the Newfoundland Government would be welcome to proceed to the bases with the R.C.A.F. party.

An early reply would be appreciated.

664.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for  
External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 29

[St. John's,] May 17, 1941

SECRET. Your telegram No. 29 Secret of 13th May. We agree to establishment of refuelling bases in Newfoundland and Labrador as proposed. You may assume that there will be no difficulty in making land available at points mentioned for duration of the war though it is not certain that Crown land will be available in all cases. For your information Railway coastal steamer Kyle will be leaving St. John's for Cartwright and Hopedale on 6th July with fishermen's supplies. Not considered necessary send representative of Newfoundland Government. Local rangers have been instructed to give all possible assistance. Please advise dates of movements of your party as far as possible in advance in order that rangers may be on the spot.

665.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 74

St. John's, November 25, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to send you a copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> which I received from Sir Wilfrid Woods today, asking if the Newfoundland Government could be

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

supplied with an authoritative and complete statement of the places in Newfoundland (including Newfoundland Labrador) territory in which bases have been established by the Canadian Government in accordance with the general consent to such establishment conveyed to the Canadian Government by telegraphic despatch No. 29 Secret of the 17th May, 1941; together with details of any permanent or semi-permanent works or buildings constructed at each place.

2. I am also enclosing copy of the exchange of letters<sup>1</sup> with Group-Captain McEwen, Royal Canadian Air Force, in regard to the matter.

3. Will you please send me the necessary information to reply to Sir Wilfrid Woods' letter.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

666.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 7

Ottawa, January 15, 1942

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch of November 25, 1941, No. 74, in connection with a request from Sir Wilfrid Woods that the Newfoundland Government be supplied with an authoritative and complete statement of the places in Newfoundland territory in which bases have been established by the Canadian Government.

From a letter of January 10, 1942, from the Minister of National Defence for Air, I quote the following paragraphs which contain the information required:

In order to provide facilities for the operation of seaplanes, to provide meteorological information and to supply means of communication to permit transmission of Air Detection Corps messages or information of enemy activity in attempting to establish submarine or air bases along the coast of Labrador, the Canadian Government considered it expedient to establish several refuelling bases with wireless equipment along the coast of Labrador. The Commission of Government for Newfoundland consented to this proposal in their despatch No. 29 dated May 17th.

As a result of reconnaissance, it was decided that these bases should be established at Canada Bay, Cartwright, Hopedale, Hebron and, if possible, another base north of Hebron in the proximity of Cape Chidley. It was discovered

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduites.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

later that it was impracticable to establish this last base and the equipment and supplies were diverted to Goose Bay, where an aerodrome has been developed.

. . .

I have etc.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

667.

50218-40

*Memorandum annexé au rapport des militaires de la CPCAD*  
*Memorandum Annexed to Report of Service Members of the PJBD*

TOP SECRET

Quebec City, May 26-27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR ARMY MEMBER, PERMANENT JOINT  
BOARD ON DEFENSE, CANADA - UNITED STATES

Subject: Additional Radio-weather Reporting Stations,  
Northeast Air Route

1. In accordance with the request in your memorandum for A.C. of S., OPD, dated April 29, 1942,<sup>1</sup> a new study of the requirements for additional radio-weather reporting stations on the Northeast Air Route, has been completed. Consideration was given to the existing Canadian facilities, and, in view of this, it is requested that the following listed stations with indicated services, be discussed at the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence:

Station	Service Desired
. . .	
Goose Bay, Labrador	hourly observations; four
Remarks: Hourly observations and two pilot balloon runs daily being received but only occasionally.	pilot balloon runs daily
Grand Bank, Newfoundland	hourly observations
Remarks: Now being received eight- hourly	
. . .	
Hebron, Labrador	six-hourly observations
Remarks: Very infrequent reception, possibly due to question of proper decoding of station name.	
. . .	

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Hopedale, Labrador

six-hourly observations

Remarks: Canadian Government reports on  
May 11 that 8-hourly observations  
are being received; these observations  
were coming through about once daily.

. . .

Millertown Junction, Newfoundland

hourly observations

. . .

2. If the services outlined in Paragraph 1 above cannot be accomplished by the Canadian Government, it is requested that authority be granted for the United States Government to establish, man, and operate such stations as are deemed necessary for proper security of the Northeast Route.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Force:

H. A. CRAIG, Colonel, G.S.C.  
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff Plans

668.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 14, 1945

. . .

CANADA-U.S. DEFENCE PROJECTS; NORTHEAST STAGING  
ROUTE; ASSUMPTION OF METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES

17. THE SECRETARY reported that the Inter-departmental Meteorological Committee had recommended that Canada take over the weather stations on the Northeast Staging Route, upon their abandonment by the United States, and that subsequent examination of the needs of the route be made to eliminate unnecessary services.

Estimated cost of operation of the service at the present scale would be \$125,000 annually, which could probably be reduced substantially. The Air Transport Board had concurred in these recommendations.

An explanatory note had been circulated (Secretary's memorandum, Feb. 12, 1945<sup>1</sup>—C.W.C. document 942).

18. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Meteorological Committee.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## SOUS-SECTION iii/SUB-SECTION iii

LES STATIONS DE RADAR<sup>1</sup>RADAR STATIONS<sup>2</sup>

669.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

. . .

*United States Army*

. . .

Representatives of the R.C.A.F. Eastern Air Command and the U.S. First Interceptor Command conferred at Mitchell Field regarding selection of A.W.S. sites in Newfoundland. United States personnel made a ground reconnaissance for A.W.S. sites during August. Serious difficulties are presented due to lack of communications of all kinds. Action has not yet been taken on the survey.

. . .

670.

NPA GN1/8 4

*Mémorandum du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense*  
*à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence to*  
*Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J. and D. 11-1942

[St. John's,] January 30, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

I annex hereto copy of letter<sup>2</sup> from the United States Engineers, in which they request six areas, each of about 500' × 1000' at:

Cape Spear<sup>3</sup>Cape St. Mary<sup>4</sup>Allan's Island<sup>4</sup>Elliston, Cape Bonavista<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> La liste des stations de radar canadiennes, en plus de celles mentionnées dans cette section, se trouve au document 990.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> À St. John's, adjacent à la base américaine à Fort Pepperrell et à la base du CARC à Torbay.

<sup>4</sup> Sur la côte sud, à proximité de la base américaine d'Argentia.

<sup>5</sup> Au nord-est de Gander et de Botwood.

<sup>1</sup> For list of Canadian radar stations in addition to those mentioned in this section, see Document 990.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> At St. John's, adjacent to U.S. base at Fort Pepperrell and RCAF base at Torbay.

<sup>4</sup> On south coast in vicinity of the U.S. base at Argentia.

<sup>5</sup> North-east of Gander and Botwood.

Fogo Island<sup>1</sup>

Cape Race.<sup>2</sup>

These areas are required for the installation of aircraft detection machinery and equipment, and the erection of quarters for about thirty men in each case.

It is to be noted:

- (1) that these areas are not required under the 99 year Bases Act; and
- (2) that in only one case is private property involved.

I shall bring with me the map, to which reference is made in the letter.

I recommend the granting of the request.

L. E. EMERSON

671.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D9)

*Le secrétaire du Comité mixte de la côte de l'Atlantique au secrétaire du  
Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Secretary, Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast, to Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

Halifax, July 2, 1942

#### MINUTES—26TH MEETING

#### JOINT SERVICE SUB-COMMITTEE, NFLD.

I am directed to forward herewith four (4) copies of Minutes of the 26th Meeting, Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland.

...

3. (a) As regards Item 2, Radar Stations, Nfld., the A.O.C., E.A.C. informed the Committee that the matter of manning equipment raised therein had already been clarified to A.O.C., No. 1 Group, Nfld., when in Ottawa recently.

(b) I am to say however, that the Committee while noting this fact, recommends that such clarification should be made through the ordinary channels to both Canadian and U.S. Force Commanders in Newfoundland and so that there may be no grounds for further misunderstanding.

...

L. C. GOODEVE  
Colonel, G. S.

<sup>1</sup> Au nord-est de Gander et de Botwood.

<sup>2</sup> Il semble que la station de Cape Race, si elle fût établie, ne demeura pas longtemps en opération.

<sup>1</sup> North-east of Gander and Botwood.

<sup>2</sup> It would appear that the station at Cape Race, if established, did not remain long in operation.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve**Minutes of a Meeting of the Joint Service Sub-Committee Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, June 18, 1942

. . .

## ITEM 2. RADAR STATIONS—NEWFOUNDLAND

Correspondence was tabled as follows:

Letter from E.A.C. S-34-1 d/23 May 42<sup>1</sup> addressed to A.O.C. No. 1 Group H.Q., R.C.A.F.

Letter from A.F.H.Q. S-34-2-6 (d plans) d/15 May 42<sup>1</sup> addressed to A.O.C. E.A.C. signed for Chief of the Air Staff.

Memorandum<sup>2</sup> to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (U.S.-Can.) submitted by Air Commodore F. V. Heakes and Col. Douglas, U.S.A. A.C.

The Sub-Committee noted from the memorandum that U.S. equipment was to be installed, manned and operated as a temporary measure by the Americans until such time as 271's can be replaced by Canadian C.H.L. E/W. Sets. It is noted from Para. 3 of the letter from the Chief of the Air Staff, that the intention behind the Agreement is that the system is to be ultimately unified under the R.C.A.F. This Sub-Committee can find nothing in the memorandum which would definitely bear out the statement, as a careful reading of para. 1 (a) would indicate that while the equipment was to be replaced by Canadian equipment, there is nothing to show that this Canadian equipment would come under Canadian control when replaced. This Sub-Committee feels that there is definite ambiguity in the wording of the memorandum to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which should be clarified forthwith, as this means of intelligence is considered vital, not only to the Air Defences of Newfoundland but also to those of Atlantic Command, and should be controlled by the R.C.A.F. That such ambiguity exists is evident from the fact that the Commanding General, U.S. Base has stated that Radar equipment was being installed by himself, that he would control such equipment, and that information would be relayed into his own Operations Room. This Sub-Committee requests that this matter be given priority of consideration in order that the O.C. No. 1 Group H.Q., R.C.A.F., may be placed on firm ground before opening negotiations with the U.S. Army, with which he has been instructed to proceed.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



672.

NPA GN1/8 4

*Mémorandum du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J. and D. 102-1942

[St. John's,] December 1, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

I annex hereto copy of letter dated and delivered to me on November 30th, by Mr. Burchell (No. 50 Secret)<sup>1</sup> in which permission is sought to establish a secret radio location station in the vicinity of Port-aux-Basques. Mr. Burchell made it a point of calling on me with the letter, to urge that I should grant permission at once, so that the work may proceed immediately.

I assured him that in my opinion the Commission of Government would have no objection to this proposal and that he could so inform his Government. There are three conditions—

- (1) Private lands must be compensated for.
- (2) Crown Lands will be granted without cost.
- (3) The Canadian Government must make arrangements regarding frequencies, with the Newfoundland Department of Posts and Telegraphs.

I would appreciate the passage of a Minute of Commission approving of my action in this respect.<sup>2</sup>

L. E. EMERSON

673.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, May 6-7, 1943

...

*United States Army*

...

PROGRESS OF U.S. PROJECTS<sup>3</sup>

...

All five SCR-271 (radar) stations are in training operation. The station at Cape Spear is being calibrated. Calibration of the other four should be completed in April. Radar beacons, to operate with ASV equipped aircraft have been installed at Allan's Island, St. Bride's<sup>4</sup> and Harmon Field.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> L'approbation fut donnée le 9 décembre.

<sup>3</sup> Ce rapport fut préparé en avril.

<sup>4</sup> Cape St. Mary.

<sup>5</sup> Base américaine à Stephenville.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Approval was granted on December 9.

<sup>3</sup> This report was prepared in April.

<sup>5</sup> United States base at Stephenville.

674.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Le représentant de l'aviation canadienne, CPCAD,  
au représentant principal de l'armée américaine, CPCAD*

*Canadian Air Member, PJBD, to  
Senior United States Army Member, PJBD*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] March 25, 1944

Dear General Henry,

Advice has been received that the U.S.A.A.F. is to discontinue the operation of four ASV beacons located at Stephenville, Elliston, St. Bride's and Allan's Island, Newfoundland, the last three places being radar detachments operated by the U.S. Forces.<sup>1</sup> It is understood that the U.S.A.A.F. have urgent need for the personnel operating the beacons but that the beacons themselves will be made available for R.C.A.F. use if it is so desired.

As it is essential that beacons be continued in operation at these points to meet R.C.A.F. service requirements, the question of taking over the equipment and supplying personnel to operate it has been under consideration.

...

It would be appreciated if this proposal could be discussed with the appropriate U.S. officials, and if the suggestion is approved, that the command be advised so that arrangements may be made for the installation of the new beacons and for the posting of the necessary personnel to the station.

Yours sincerely,

W. A. CURTIS  
Air Vice-Marshal

675.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires  
PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 7-8, 1944

...

*United States Army*

...

## 2. DEFENSE OF NEWFOUNDLAND:

## a. Operation of U.S. Radar Stations in Newfoundland

The matter of Canada assuming responsibility for the operation of the five

<sup>1</sup> Fogo fut ultérieurement ajouté à la liste des stations devant être abandonnées par l'armée de l'air des États-Unis.

<sup>1</sup> Fogo was later added to the list of stations to be abandoned by the United States Army Air Force.

U.S. radar stations in Newfoundland has been under consideration by Eastern Air Command Headquarters and the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command. The War Department has been notified that Eastern Air Command are now in a position to start placing RCAF personnel on these stations, thus gradually relieving the U.S. personnel concerned. It is expected that all U.S. personnel will be relieved by 31 December 1944. Details incident to disposing of equipment involved are being jointly worked out locally. It is understood that the Canadian Government will not, in assuming responsibility for the operation of these stations, be committed for the purchase of same.

...

676. 50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET New York, June 14-15, 1945  
 ...

3. Air Vice-Marshal Curtis referred to five aircraft warning (radar) stations in Newfoundland which the United States authorities had advised the Canadian authorities were of no further use to the United States forces. Two of these in particular, at Fogo Island and Elliston (Bonavista) in Newfoundland, are of no value to Canada but before proceeding to abandon them, Air Vice-Marshal Curtis wished to advise the United States members that their operation had been instrumental in saving at least five United States aircraft during recent months. He therefore believed that the United States authorities might wish to reconsider the matter. General Henry reported that there seemed to be a difference of opinion as to the continued need for various of these stations and recommended that a survey and determination on the spot by Canadian and United States authorities should be made as to what stations should be continued in operation by Canada. It was agreed that General Henry should take this matter up and advise Air Vice-Marshal Curtis of the results. Brigadier-General Connell, Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, was present and agreed to continue the leases on the two stations in question in order that the Royal Canadian Air Force might continue their operation.

...

677.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, September 4-5, 1945

. . .

*United States Army*

. . .

## 2. DEFENSE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

## Radar Stations in Newfoundland

With respect to the Aircraft Warning Stations in Newfoundland, by mutual agreement between the RCAF and the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, five aircraft warning stations will continue in operation, ie:

RCAF owned and operated	— Flat Rock <sup>1</sup>
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— Bonavista
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— Fogo Island
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— St. Bride's
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— Allan's Island

The Aircraft Warning Station at Cape Spear<sup>2</sup> was ordered disbanded effective 20 June 1945. Arrangements have also been effected for removal of the equipment at that place.

. . .

678.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et décisions, rapport des militaires**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 7-8, 1945

. . .

*Royal Canadian Air Force*

## MISCELLANEOUS

- (a) The United States Government has advised that no objection is made to the closing and withdrawal of R.C.A.F. personnel from the following Radar Establishments in Newfoundland after 31st October, 1945:

R.C.A.F. owned and operated	— Flat Rock
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— Bonavista
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— Fogo Island
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— St. Bride's
U.S. owned, R.C.A.F. operated	— Allan's Island.

. . .

<sup>1</sup>Près de Torbay.<sup>1</sup> Near Torbay.<sup>2</sup> On estima que cette station remplissait la même fonction que celle de Flat Rock.<sup>2</sup> It was considered that it duplicated the coverage at Flat Rock.



SOUS-SECTION iv/SUB-SECTION iv  
 LES POSTES DE NAVIGATION À LONGUE DISTANCE  
 LORAN STATIONS

679.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Quebec City, May 26-27, 1942

. . .

10. The United States Navy Member described recent developments in connection with provision of new and extended radio navigation aids along the Atlantic Coast of the United States, Canada and Newfoundland. It was stated that the Canadian stations would be installed, manned and operated by the Canadian Navy. Captain Thomas stated that the United States Naval authorities would prefer to have the new stations in Newfoundland and Labrador installed, manned and operated by Canadian Service personnel. He added, however, that if the Canadian authorities decide that they cannot undertake this obligation, the United States Navy is prepared to accept the responsibility. In the latter case the United States will discuss the problem directly with the Government of Newfoundland. The Canadian Naval Member stated that he would endeavour to obtain a decision from the Canadian authorities not later than June 5.

. . .

680.

NPA GN1/8 4

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
 à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
 to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J. &amp; D. 64-'42

[St. John's,] June 20, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

I circulate a copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Emerson by the High Commissioner for Canada in which he requests on behalf of the Government of Canada the concurrence of the Government of Newfoundland in a proposal to establish a new radio installation at Sandgirt Lake, Labrador.

2. I have ascertained from the Secretary for Posts & Telegraphs that his Department has already made the necessary arrangements as regards license, frequencies, etc., and unless any of my colleagues has any point which he desires to raise I propose to inform Mr. Burchell that this Government is agreeable to his Government's proposal.

W. W. WOODS  
 for the Commissioner for Defence

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire  
à la Justice et à la Défense*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Justice and Defence*

No. 24

[St. John's,] June 18, 1942

SECRET

Dear Sir,

I am informed by the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada that at a recent meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, consideration was given to the provision of new and extended radio navigation aids along the Atlantic Coast of the United States, Canada and Newfoundland.

In that connection, it is proposed that a new installation will be made by Canada at Sandgirt Lake, Labrador.

The Right Honourable the Secretary of State for External Affairs has asked me to obtain the necessary concurrence of the Newfoundland Government for this project.

I would therefore appreciate hearing from you if the Newfoundland Government is agreeable to this installation being made by the Canadian Government.

Yours faithfully

C. J. BURCHELL

681.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 449

St. John's, August 11, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I have received a letter from the Honourable Sir Wilfrid W. Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities, in which he states that when he was recently at Cape Bonavista he learned that a combined American and Canadian party had paid a visit there and taken certain bearings which seemed to suggest that the installation of a radio range was contemplated.

2. He also informs me that the Ranger stationed at Battle Harbour has reported that a party consisting of members of the Royal Canadian Navy, the United States Navy and the United States National Defence Research Bureau had been there and had conducted a survey for the location of a site for a radio station.

3. Sir Wilfrid states that the Newfoundland Government expects and

desires that its permission will be sought before any such surveys are conducted and informs me that there is no record of any approach having been made to the Newfoundland Government in either of the cases referred to. He has asked me if I have any information concerning the nature, extent and location of the proposals for which the surveys have been conducted.

4. I have informed Sir Wilfrid that I have no information but that I would take the matter up with you and obtain this information for him.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

682.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 190

Ottawa, August 22, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 449 of August 11, 1942, regarding surveys being conducted in Newfoundland by combined Canadian and American parties, with a view to installing new radio stations.

2. At a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence held in Quebec on May 26-27, 1942, it was agreed that the provision of new and extended radio navigation aids along the Atlantic Coast of the United States, Canada and Newfoundland was desirable. Canada and the United States undertook to provide the necessary stations in their own territories, while the stations in Newfoundland and Labrador were to be installed and manned by Canada if she felt able to undertake this new obligation. If not, the United States Navy was prepared to accept the responsibility and the United States would discuss the problem directly with the Government of Newfoundland. After investigation of the undertaking, the Canadian authorities decided that Canada could only provide stations on her own territory and at Sandgirt Lake, Labrador. Permission for the latter installation has already been sought and obtained from the Newfoundland Government.<sup>1</sup> The United States naval authorities were informed of Canada's decision and it was assumed that they would approach the Newfoundland Government as agreed upon at the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Apparently, however, they have neglected to do so.

3. On July 20th and 31st, Canadian naval authorities were requested by the National Defence Research Committee of the United States to obtain geographical information of extremely exact nature as to the sites of these stations. On August 4th Mr. Fink of the Radiation Laboratory was informed

<sup>1</sup> Apparemment cette station ne fut jamais construite.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently this station was never built.

that the Canadian Naval Service was not in a position to assume any responsibility for stations outside Canada, but it was considered that such assistance as might be afforded should be given. Accordingly, on August 8th, the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources was requested to carry out a survey of sites in Newfoundland and Labrador, making use of the Canadian Geodetic Survey party at present working in Newfoundland. Herein, apparently, lies the explanation of the surveys mentioned in your despatch under reference. The request for permission to make such surveys should, however, come from the United States naval authorities.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

683.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, June 28-29, 1944

...

2. Vice-Admiral Johnson informed the Board of the proposal of the United States Navy to install another Loran station in Newfoundland. He stated that he had been in communication with the Canadian Naval Member of the Board in regard to this matter and that a Canadian officer will accompany the survey party which is to proceed to Newfoundland in the early days of July to inspect sites for the proposed station. Admiral Johnson added that the Navy Department had requested the Department of State to invite the Newfoundland Government to be represented on this survey party.

...

684.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, September 6-7, 1944

...

*United States Navy Section Report Progress*

...

#### NEWFOUNDLAND

The survey party which went to Newfoundland on 5 July 1944 to select a suitable site for an additional Loran transmitting station has located one that is satisfactory in the vicinity of Port-aux-Basques. The Newfoundland Government has been requested to grant the U.S. Navy permission to install and operate a Loran station at the site selected.

...



685.

PRO DO 35 1155 X/J 8146

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

DESPATCH 167

St. John's, August 14, 1945

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to the establishment by the United States authorities of long range aid to navigation (LORAN) installations in Newfoundland . . .

2. These telegrams<sup>1</sup> refer specifically to the two installations erected at Bonavista, and at Battle Harbour (Great Caribou Island) Labrador. In 1944 a similar station was installed with this Government's consent, on the same general terms, at Port-aux-Basques (Mouse Island). In the event, it was not found possible for the Newfoundland Government to provide the operating staff for these stations as adumbrated in my telegram No. 355.<sup>2</sup> Their operation has, therefore, been carried on by United States Naval personnel.

3. In November, 1944, the American Consul General informed this Government that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was considering the question of the future operation of these Loran Stations for the benefit of shipping and aviation and requested views as to whether the Newfoundland Government would wish to take over and operate the stations or, if not, would approve the transfer of title and subsequent operation of the stations by the Canadian authorities should they be prepared to undertake it. It was indicated that should the stations be turned over to another Country the United States Navy Department would expect to be reimbursed the cost of the equipment.

4. After consideration by the Commission of Government, the Consul General was informed that Newfoundland was unable to take over and operate the stations but that, if it was desired to keep them in operation, the Commission would have no objection to the Canadian Government undertaking that responsibility, if they were prepared to do so, under the conditions applicable to the United States, viz., that the sites were made available for the period of the war and six months thereafter.

5. Further representations from the Consul General were then received emphasising the point that although these stations had been erected during the war, and had served a useful military purpose, they would be of great value to shipping and aviation in general after the war, and that the Canadian Government could not reach a decision on the acquisition and operation of the stations until the consent of the Newfoundland Government for their post-war operation had been given. The Commission of Government decided

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

that it would be prepared to permit the Canadian authorities to operate these stations after the war on the understanding that their continued future operation would be the subject of discussion in due course between the Governments concerned. This decision was conveyed to the American Consul General and also to the Canadian High Commissioner who, in the meantime, had made similar inquiries.

6. On the 14th July, 1945, the Canadian High Commissioner addressed this Government on the question of security of tenure of the sites of the installations. He wrote:

The continuance of these stations would undoubtedly be of value for aerial and marine navigation and air-rescue work and Canada, the United States and doubtless all countries interested in marine and air navigation would wish to see the services continued. I understand that the Newfoundland Government does not wish to go to the expense of purchasing the equipment and training the personnel to operate the stations. It would be necessary, if the Canadian Government undertakes the responsibility of operating them, to provide considerable funds and equipment as well as to provide for the training and maintenance of personnel, and in the circumstances the Canadian Government would not feel justified in undertaking the maintenance of the services unless they were accorded an assurance of title in fee simple or at least an assurance of a long term tenure.

The Commission of Government considered this matter further and, being of opinion that the continuance of this service is desirable, and in view of the fact that it is not possible at present either to supply the necessary trained personnel or to contemplate the acquisition of the installations and equipment, decided, subject to your approval, to give the Canadian Government a lease for fifty years over the sites of the three stations concerned at Bonavista and Port-aux-Basques in Newfoundland, and Battle Harbour in Labrador. The understanding relating to intergovernmental discussions on the future operation of the stations will remain, and it will also be laid down that should the Newfoundland Government find itself in a position, at a later date, to take over the stations and provide the necessary operating personnel, if their continued operation in these specific localities is necessary or advisable, it would be at liberty to do so and to re-enter upon the lands and terminate the leases.

7. The areas of the sites concerned are comparatively small being of the order of twenty-five to thirty acres in each case, though the necessity for providing access to the only available open beach may increase the area somewhat in respect of the Battle Harbour site. It may be stated that these stations have already been in operation, those at Battle Harbour and Bonavista for some considerable time, and there is no evidence before the Commission that they cause any interference with existing trans-Atlantic aeronautical radio stations.

8. I now request your consideration and approval of the course of action proposed above.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

686.

7-CR (s)

*Memorandum du conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>*

*Memorandum by Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 21, 1945

DISCUSSION WITH CAPTAIN WORTH AND COMMANDER FOSTER OF NAVAL  
HEADQUARTERS ABOUT THE LORAN STATIONS IN NEWFOUNDLAND

At the request of Commander Foster, Mr. J. S. Macdonald and I visited Naval Headquarters this afternoon to discuss the next step to be taken with respect to taking over United States Loran Stations in Newfoundland.

Mr. Macdonald suggested that National Defence, Naval Services, forward to us a precise statement of what they needed with respect to tenure and operation of the stations, and that these should be presented to the Newfoundland Government with a fuller explanation of the purpose of the stations. He also expressed the view that there was extremely little likelihood that the Newfoundland Government, although putting forward qualifications about tenure, would ever wish to take over the stations in view of the cost of installations and operation. It was agreed that Naval Services should follow this course.

It was explained that the Loran Stations were essential for complete coverage of the North Atlantic for precision navigation by air or sea and that they would have to be maintained by someone. The United States had originally constructed them and were anxious that we should take them over, since they fall more within the zone already being covered in part by Canadian stations.

This matter will be discussed with Mr. Clutterbuck since the Newfoundland Government have intimated they will ask the guidance of the Dominions Office.

687.

PRO DO 35 1155 X/J 8146

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions  
Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 388

[St. John's,] November 8, 1945

SECRET. My despatch No. 167 of 14th August. Loran stations.

Canadian Government is reluctant to assume responsibility of operation unless it has more definite assurance of long term tenure or compensation in event of Newfoundland Government taking over. Canadian Government suggests:

<sup>1</sup> R. A. MacKay.

- (1) Taking over control now, this Government undertaking to give five years notice if it later decides to take over control.
- (2) If this government assumes control, Canada to be reimbursed for such portion of total monies expended as might be decided by arbitration.

2. This government prepared grant 50 year lease and agree to conditions set out in paragraph 1.

3. We propose, subject to your concurrence, to discuss with United States authorities and, if they agree, action will be taken to effect transfer of control to Canada.

4. If general agreement on transfer question effected we would propose to request Canada to employ Newfoundland personnel so far as possible. We have Newfoundland operators with experience with the R.A.F.

5. Grateful for early reply.

688.

PRO DO 35 1155 X/J 8146

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 541

[London,] November 17, 1945

SECRET. Your telegram No. 388 of 8th November. Loran Stations.

Proposals contained in your telegram and in your despatch No. 167 of 14th August together with technical memorandum<sup>1</sup> prepared by Squadron-Leader Pattison when he was last in this country, were communicated to Admiralty and Air Ministry for their comments.

2. Admiralty have informed us that they do not, repeat not, intend to maintain any shore based radio navigational aids in peace-time solely for use of shipping, for which purpose they are not considered to be essential. In view however of their importance to aircraft, administrative control of United Kingdom Loran chain has now been transferred from Admiralty to Air Ministry.

3. Admiralty have further suggested that before entering into any long-term commitments Canadian Government may wish to know confidentially that very considerable potentialities have been shown by new British system of long range navigation which is now under development for commercial use by Decca Company. This system as at present evolved uses frequency of approximately 100 kilocycles, and does not, repeat not, therefore conflict with other radio requirements of small commercial craft in 1,700-2,000 kilocycles band, as is case with Loran system. Admiralty suggest therefore that Decca system when fully developed may well have number of advantages over American manufactured Loran equipment. They would in any event

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



be very ready to place at your and Canadian Government's disposal any information on this subject which would be likely to be of assistance in connection with disposal of present Loran stations in Newfoundland.

4. Air Ministry, to whom views of Admiralty were communicated have expressed the view that there is no, repeat no, strong operational need for Loran in North Atlantic unless this system should be adopted internationally for civil aviation in preference to other long range devices. They themselves doubt therefore whether the Canadian Government would find it worth while to take over the stations.

5. In light of above, Commission will no doubt wish to reconsider position with Canadian authorities before reaching any conclusions as to disposal of stations in question.

Delay in replying is regretted.

689.

PRO DO 35 1155 X/J 8146

*Le commissaire aux Services publics  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office*

G/468

St. John's, August 3, 1946

SECRET

Dear Syers,

Would you please refer to the Secretary of State's Secret telegram No. 541 of the 17th November—Loran Stations.

2. The Canadian High Commissioner addressed me as follows on the 26th July:

It is pointed out that in view of the conclusions reached at the recent Dublin Conference on Civil Aviation and the First International Conference on Radio Aids to Marine Navigation, which has just ended, it would appear doubtful whether Loran would become a standard navigational aid to civil aviation and merchant marine. No concrete recommendations were however reached by the delegates at the Conference on the Radio Aids to Marine Navigation concerning position-fixing-systems. It was felt that a year of operational research on the peace-time uses of present systems would be necessary before a conclusion could be reached. In view of the uncertainty about the future of Loran it is considered that it would at present be unwise for the Government of Canada to take over the United States stations in Newfoundland. It is thought it would be preferable that these stations should remain under United States control during the coming year when operational research on radio aids to marine navigation will be under way.

In view of the commanding position of Newfoundland Loran Stations in the North Atlantic chain and their relation to the eastern air and sea approaches to Canada, it is felt however that Canada should, if possible, obtain a priority option for taking over the Newfoundland stations should it develop that Loran becomes a standard aid to aviation and marine navigation, or should it develop that these

stations become essential to Canadian defence. Accordingly I have been instructed to request your approval of an option in favour of Canada to the United States stations should Loran become the standard navigational aid to civil aviation and merchant marine, or essential for defence purposes. I may add that it is proposed to notify the United States authorities of our approach to you in the matter.

3. Pattison has minuted:

We would not desire to operate the system ourselves on account of the expense and the difficulty of administration—the stations are located at Bonavista, Battle Harbour, Port-aux-Basques and Twillingate. The cost will exceed \$100,000 per annum.

2. A policy regarding the future operation of Loran as an International system has not been decided. This may be settled at the forthcoming meeting of P.I.C.A.O. on "Airway Standards" (Oct. 1946). I myself believe that Loran or a modified Loran will be adopted. One of the difficulties will be the initial cost to Empire countries who are not equipped at present, the equipment being American.

3. Therefore we should agree to the U.S. operating the system for the present—if they are willing to do so—and inform Canada that we would be willing for them to operate the system under conditions set out in telegram to Secretary of State, No. 388 of the 8th November.

4. I am informing the High Commissioner for Canada as in paragraph 3 of Pattison's minute.<sup>1</sup>

Yours sincerely,

J. S. NEILL

SOUS-SECTION V/SUB-SECTION V  
LES COMMUNICATIONS<sup>2</sup>  
COMMUNICATIONS<sup>2</sup>

690.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 6

St. John's, January 29, 1941

Your telegram No. 4 of January 20th, paragraph 3.<sup>3</sup> At the request of Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, we have supplied to Flight-Lieutenant Goodspeed, who was here on January 18th, detailed information of changes in communication system which would be necessary to supply a 24 hour telegraph service and an estimate of expenses involved. We presume that his report will shortly be available to you, and you will then be able to formulate specific requests which we shall have to consider with relation to expenditure which will be entailed.

<sup>1</sup> Le Canada assumait la responsabilité des postes de navigation à longue distance en 1953.

<sup>1</sup> Canada assumed responsibility for the Loran stations in 1953.

<sup>2</sup> Voir également les documents 176-180.

<sup>2</sup> See also Documents 176-180.

<sup>3</sup> Document 179.

691.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 15

Ottawa, June 7, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Canadian Air Force have under consideration a proposal to erect voice and teletype circuits from St. John's, Newfoundland, to the Airport at Gander Lake.

In order to carry out a system of physical and phantom circuits, with side transpositions, it will be necessary to erect crossarms, move and replace a number of poles, in order to obtain proper balance, as well as provide for extra guying, etc., on the existing pole line owned by the Newfoundland Government Postal Telegraph Company.

The Department of National Defence for Air would be grateful if you would reserve sufficient space on your existing pole line to enable the Department to erect a four pin crossarm, as well as two pin space on the existing crossarms, in order that the above and/or other contemplated work may be carried out, the total cost of which will be borne by the Department of National Defence (Air).

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
 for the Secretary of State  
 for External Affairs

692.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, July 30, 1941

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5. Reference was again made to the subject of wire communications in Newfoundland. Lt.-Col. Bissell pointed out that the railway telegraph system between St. John's and the Newfoundland Airport would probably have to be rebuilt in connection with the improvement of the road as contemplated.<sup>1</sup> He commented that in many cases the telegraph poles were reported to be in bad condition and that the poles would probably have to be replaced. He added that it would seem to be desirable that high priority be given by the

<sup>1</sup> Les planificateurs canadiens et américains conçurent un certain nombre de projets routiers visant à relier Gander à St. John's et à d'autres centres, mais ces projets ne furent jamais réalisés.

<sup>1</sup> Canadian and U.S. planners developed a number of projects for linking Gander by road with St. John's and other centres but these projects were never implemented.

Newfoundland Railroad authorities to the providing during this construction work of wire facilities for (a) the railroad itself, (b) United States military requirements, (c) Canadian military requirements, and (d) local telegraph requirements; all of these requirements to be met with suitable reserves for future expansion. It was agreed that the Service members concerned would, through their respective Departments, have instructions issued to the appropriate representatives in Newfoundland to confer with one another with the view to ascertaining whether arrangements could not be made for all of these wire communication requirements to be met with a single installation in connection with the improvements of the railroad soon to be brought about. It was agreed that should such an arrangement be brought about, the costs of the wire installation should be paid by the railroad from funds expected to be provided by the United States Government if the negotiations which are about to commence are successfully concluded; that recommendations should be formulated by the interested Services representatives in Newfoundland and the railway authorities to apportion these charges on a fair and equitable basis; and that these recommendations should be submitted to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence for its approval.

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693.

10793-40

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à St. John's pour discuter  
des problèmes de communications*

*Minutes of a Meeting held in St. John's to Discuss  
Communication Problems*

SECRET

St. John's, September 6, 1941

A meeting of Communication Officers of the U.S. and Canadian Services in Newfoundland was held in the Newfoundland Hotel on Friday, 5th September. The following Officers were present:

Lieutenant-Commander Cairns, R.N.

Lieutenant Lucas, R.C.N.V.R.

Lieutenant McCloud, R.C.C.S.

Flying-Officer Bonell, R.C.A.F.

Major Cooper, U.S. Army

Lieutenant-Commander Cleaves, U.S. Navy

Lieutenant Plagge, U.S. Navy

Lieutenant Wells, U.S. Navy

Group-Captain C. M. McEwen, R.C.A.F. also attended and gave the meeting the benefit of his advice.

2. Terms of Reference

The meeting was called in accordance with instructions from the Joint Services Sub-Committee<sup>1</sup> with the following terms of reference:

<sup>1</sup> Le Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland.



- (1) To explain to those present the L/T Communication at present approved to be installed by the Canadian Services.
- (2) To decide whether the above arrangements are adequate for the present and future needs of the services concerned.
- (3) To ascertain what L/T communication arrangements are being installed by the American Services.
- (4) To ensure that the maximum measure of co-operation between all services is achieved both for reasons of efficiency and economy.

### 3. Canadian Services Approved Communication Arrangements.

The arrangements already approved were explained and are shown in diagrammatic form in Appendix I.<sup>1</sup> Flying-Officer Bonell RCAF stated that these lines will be completed by the end of October 1941.

### 4. Canadian Services Additional Arrangements Required.

It was agreed that the arrangements shown in paragraph 3 above do not meet the full requirements of the Canadian Services in the following respects:

- (1) The Army and Navy require separate T/T lines between St. John's and Halifax; an additional T/T circuit must be added to the Varioplex system. Flying-Officer Bonell agreed, after discussion, that this is most desirable and stated that, subject to approval from higher authority, an additional circuit can be provided. The meeting recommended that both the Army and the Navy apply to their Headquarters, by signal, for this additional facility.
- (2) The existing approved arrangement for speech and T/T circuits between St. John's, Gander and Botwood are [sic] insufficient to meet the requirements of all three services. It will be necessary to install B and H carrier systems on the St. John's to Gander circuit. All the additional lines so provided will not be required by the Canadian Services; 7 T/T circuits can be loaned to the American Services *vide* paragraph 6 below.
- (3) Similarly it will be necessary to increase the facilities between Gander and Botwood by the addition of H Carrier and the erection of one additional physical circuit.
- (4) It was agreed that the voice circuits between St. John's, Gander and Botwood should be pooled among the Services concerned in order to make the maximum use of the facilities provided. This will necessitate the provision of trunking equipment at St. John's.

5. It is strongly recommended that all the additional facilities outlined in paragraph 4 above be provided. The arrangements which were approved in June 1941, and which then allowed for some expansion, are already inadequate for the needs of the Canadian Services alone. By installing the additional equipment mentioned, the needs of the Canadian Services will be met and facilities which are most urgently required by the American Services can be made available to them.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

#### 6. Communication arrangements being installed by the American Services.

Major Cooper stated that he had proposed, but had not yet received approval, to install an underground cable of 26 pairs between St. John's and Gander with an extension of a smaller cable from Gander to Stephenville. He stated that it was unlikely that work would commence before April 1942 and that the line would not be complete before July 1942.

In the meantime the American Services would welcome the use of any spare circuits which can be allotted to them and it was agreed that 7 T/T circuits between St. John's and Gander can be spared for this purpose, provided the B carrier system quoted in paragraph 4 (2) above is installed.

It was also agreed that voice circuits between St. John's and Gander can be made available for limited use by the American Services provided the H carrier system quoted in paragraph 4 above is installed.

Major Cooper stated the ultimate requirements for the American Services between St. John's and Gander include 26 voice circuits.

#### 7. Referring to the communications at Argentia the U.S. Naval Representative stated that it was intended to provide a direct T/T circuit to New York over a commercial line and an additional T/T circuit to the American Base Headquarters, St. John's.

The requirements for meteorological exchange of information are dealt with in paragraph 8 below.

It was agreed that it is essential to arrange for some rapid form of communication between Canadian Combined Headquarters at St. John's and Argentia and that the only practicable method is for Naval Headquarters to relay their traffic to the U.S. Base Headquarters on a separate local T/T circuit.

#### 8. Meteorological Service

The approved Meteorological T/T circuit between Halifax and Gander, with loops at St. John's and Botwood were explained to the U.S. Representatives, who stated that they wish to make use of this service.

9. It was agreed that the U.S. Representative raised the question of local weather information reports, and it was agreed that a period of say 10 minutes in every hour should be allocated to local reports and should be transmitted in a sequence of stations to be determined later and that a reperforator should be installed at St. John's to enable the meteorological information coming from Halifax to be stored up at St. John's during periods when local weather reports were being exchanged.

#### 11. Final L/T Communications.

The final L/T Communication arrangements which are envisaged, if the proposals put forward at this meeting are approved, are shown in diagrammatic form in Appendix II.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

694.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

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*Royal Canadian Navy*

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## FIFTH RECOMMENDATION

The Final Report of the Joint Canadian—United States Communications Committee received the approval of the Canadian Government on the 2nd September, 1941.

## Landline Communication—Newfoundland

The present situation is as follows:

- (a) A temporary teletype circuit from St. John's to Gander was completed on August 23rd, 1941.
- (b) The simplexing of the present Gander-Botwood line, so that telephone and teletype traffic may be passed simultaneously should be completed by September 15, 1941.
- (c) It is expected that construction of one phantom and two physical circuits from St. John's to Gander will be completed by November 30th, 1941.
- (d) Definite information regarding the date when three varioplex channels between St. John's and Halifax will be available, has not yet been received from the Canadian National Telegraphs.

Following is a summary of Long Distance Telephone and Teletype Lines, either under construction, or contemplated:

- (i) Arrangements are being made for trunking facilities between Torbay and St. John's in the cable to be erected by the Avalon Telephone Company.
- (ii) The R.C.A.F. are constructing a 2 physical and 1 phantom circuit between St. John's and Gander to provide, at present, three voice circuits and four teletype channels. The line is being constructed in such a manner as to allow for H. and B. carriers, which will provide, in addition to the above, ten more teletype channels and one more voice circuit. Provision at present is being made for two teletype lines to go directly from Halifax to the Newfoundland Airport. The other two will be between St. John's and Gander.

- (iii) The voice circuits will be connected to the switchboard at St. John's and to the switchboard in the Canadian section at Newfoundland Airport, Gander.
- (iv) The existing teletype and telephone line between Gander and Botwood will be simplexed to allow talking and teletype simultaneously.
- (v) An estimate is now being prepared for an additional telephone and teletype circuit to be erected between these two points (Gander and Botwood), if necessary.
- (vi) The telephone circuit is to be installed on the switchboard in the Canadian section at Gander and in the R.C.A.F. switchboard at Botwood.
- (vii) Consideration is being given to the erection of a circuit from Botwood to Grand Falls in order to connect with the radio telephone link between Grand Falls and St. John's, as an alternate means of communicating with No. 1 Group Headquarters from Gander or Botwood, in event of interruption by sabotage, or otherwise, to our direct circuits between St. John's and Gander.
- (viii) When the complete installations have been made, sufficient trunking facilities will have been provided to allow telephone communications between the following:

No. 1 Group Headquarters, St. John's  
 Newfoundland Airport (Gander).  
 Torbay.  
 Botwood.

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*Canadian Army*

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#### SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

As a result of the question of signal communications in Newfoundland, raised by the United States Army member in his Progress Report dated 29th July,<sup>1</sup> the matter has been referred to O.C. Canadian Army Force for his early inquiry and report. Actually, the Canadian Services have had in hand a project for the provision of additional telephone and teletype circuits and their local representatives have been instructed to inquire into and report on the most appropriate ways and means of ensuring adequate line signal communications in Newfoundland to meet the needs of both United States and Canadian Services.

This report is not yet to hand.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



695.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

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11. The Board discussed the question of landline communications between Gander Lake Airport, St. John's, and Argentia and the circuits to be available this winter and those to be available next spring. It was agreed that circuits to be available this winter should be allocated, by agreement between local commanders in Newfoundland, in such a manner as best to serve the needs of joint operations, as well as those in connection with ferrying aircraft overseas.

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## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

## FIFTH RECOMMENDATION

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## Halifax—St. John's (Permanent Teletype Service)

Varioplex equipment is being installed on the temporary teletype circuit to provide three separate channels for meteorological, R.C.A.F. operational, and a joint channel for the Navy and Army. Western Union promise this will be completed by November 20th.

## St. John's—Gander (Permanent Voice and Teletype Service)

Approximately 65% of the 213-mile Newfoundland Postal and Telegraph pole line has been strengthened and guyed. Approximately 40 miles of wire have been strung. When completed (by end of December) this permanent line will provide four teletype and three voice circuits.

Installation of the "B" telegraph carrier equipment, which will provide ten additional teletype channels, should be completed by the end of March, 1942.

## Gander—Botwood (Voice and Teletype Circuit)

At present one teletype and one voice circuit is in operation. Because of climatic conditions, it is not expected work can commence on the erection of the two proposed physical and phantom circuits before the spring of 1942.

### Temporary Teletype Service

A temporary teletype line has been constructed between St. John's and Gander Airport, thus completing the link to provide temporary service from Halifax, N.S., to Gander Airport.

Note: We are proceeding with U.S. request to link up our wireless systems with them on the East and West coasts. Arrangements are being made to link up with the Army Airways Communication system and the Air Force Wireless Communications network.

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696.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

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*Royal Canadian Navy*

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### Communications

C.O.A.C., C.C.N.F., and Naval Service Headquarters, are now linked by teletype circuits. A circuit has also been established from N.S.H.Q. to B.A.D. Washington.

B.A.D. is similarly linked by teletype to Navy Department.

C.O.P.C. and U.S. Naval Headquarters, Seattle, Wash., are linked by teletype.

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*Royal Canadian Air Force*

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The Meteorological communication system at March 31st, 1942 will provide direct teletype communication from Montreal to Halifax, through St. John's, to the forecasting centre, Gander Lake Airport. From Gander Lake Airport, local weather and special reports will be sent by teletype to Botwood; local weather plus Atlantic weather will be sent to St. John's for distribution by teletype as necessary to Torbay and Argentia. Weather reports will also be sent by W/T from Gander to Goose Airport and from Gander to England. If necessary, the U.S. can establish forecasting station at St. John's or elsewhere on the circuit.

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697.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 7-8, 1942

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*United States Army*

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## 5. Communications in Newfoundland

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b. The general plan for the aerial cable from St. John's to Stephenville has been approved. Appropriation of \$3,500,000 has been granted. The Signal Corps is ordering the cable and first delivery is expected approximately May 1. Poles will be procured locally (in Newfoundland) and erection of poles, stringing of cable and most of the splicing will be done by the Bell Telephone Company of Canada.

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698.

DND HQS 19-6-10

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air au chef de l'état-major militaire*  
*des États-Unis*

*Chief of the Air Staff to Chief of Staff, United States Army*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 1, 1943

ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES IN THE ATLANTIC  
 RECOMMENDATIONS OF ATLANTIC CONVOY CONFERENCE—  
 MARCH 1st - 12th, 1943

1. It is noted that recommendation D (1) of Paper A.C.C.-5, Appendix "A"<sup>1</sup> (Communications and Operational Intelligence) has been referred to the Chief of Staff U.S. Army and the Chief of the Canadian Air Staff for consideration of the advisability of carrying out this recommendation as a Combined Canada-United States Project.

2. Recommendation D (1) deals with the following points of air communications:

- (a) Reliable communications from St. John's Newfoundland, to Goose Bay, are urgently needed.
- (b) Voice circuits from Halifax to St. John's, Newfoundland, are urgently needed.

3. Prior to the Washington Conference, I had given approval for improving the W/T Point to Point Stations at St. John's, Newfoundland and Goose Bay for ASW air operations and action has been taken to acquire suitable

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

property in the vicinity of St. John's for the erection of remote control transmitters and receivers. Plans for the buildings at St. John's and Goose Bay are going forward and the wireless equipment is on order for this circuit but delivery will not be made until next winter.

4. In view of the late date of delivery of the wireless equipment we have on order for improving this circuit, I would like to ascertain if two 5KW, or alternatively, two 2 KW HF communication transmitters and two 2KW LF communication transmitters can be secured from U.S. sources immediately. These transmitters would be returned on receipt of the transmitters the R.C.A.F. now has on order.

5. I have also taken action to secure voice circuits between Halifax and St. John's, Newfoundland. This circuit will run from Halifax to Sydney over telephone lines, then by VHF frequency modulated radio telephone to Cape North to Red Rock, Newfoundland. From there a landline would have to be provided to Stephenville, Gander and St. John's.

6. I understand your Forces in Newfoundland have already installed a cable connecting Stephenville to Gander and St. John's and a landline from Stephenville to Port-aux-Basques is now under construction. If we can secure the use of two pairs of wires in this circuit from Port-aux-Basques to St. John's we will complete the remainder of the circuit to Halifax. This is the only arrangement which can give us secure voice channels from Halifax to St. John's. It would also provide standby teletype channels for the present teletype circuits between these points or alternatively supply additional teletype channels between Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.

7. Any assistance you can give in the above proposals will be greatly appreciated.

L. S. BREADNER  
Air Marshal

699.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, April 1-2, 1943

...  
5. Admiral Jones brought up the question of the desire of the Royal Canadian Navy to rent a cable circuit between St. John's, Newfoundland, and Canso, Nova Scotia. This circuit, he stated, is badly needed by the Royal Canadian Navy in connection with its operations, particularly in the light of the added responsibilities which it has undertaken in anti-submarine work. The United States Air Forces also desire equally strongly to use this same circuit. The Board was of the opinion that the disposition of this circuit should be referred to the Combined Communications Board in Washington.  
...



700.

10793-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 74

Ottawa, July 2, 1943

Defence Communications Limited, a wholly owned Crown Company responsible for installing defence communications around the shores of the Gulf of St. Lawrence for the use of all three Services, is anxious to establish a radio station at Port-aux-Basques as a link in the system of communications from Halifax through Sydney to St. John's, Newfoundland. Mr. Michie, Supervising Engineer of the Department of Munitions and Supply, is the local representative of Defence Communications Limited in Newfoundland. I would be grateful for any assistance you can give him in necessary dealings with Newfoundland Government in connection with acquisition of land at Port-aux-Basques and in reconditioning of telegraph pole line in Newfoundland, which will be necessary part of Defence Communications system. All Defence Services attach highest priority to these projects and would be grateful for your aid in expediting them.

701.

10793-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 81

St. John's, July 16, 1943

Reference your despatch No. 206 of July 10th, 1943,<sup>1</sup> and previous despatches and telegrams, east coast defence communications.

Sir Wilfrid Woods understands United States military authorities intend to establish similar communications project as that contemplated by Defence Communications Limited. Sir Wilfrid not prepared to recommend approval to Commission of Government of these duplicating systems because he feels that Canadian and United States Governments should cooperate in this undertaking. Until Canada and the United States cooperate, Sir Wilfrid states approval of Newfoundland Government on both Canadian and United States projects will be withheld. I await your instructions in the matter.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

702.

10793-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au commissaire  
aux Services publics*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

No. 74

[St. John's,] July 22, 1943

SECRET

Dear Sir Wilfrid [Woods],

May I refer to my secret letter No. 69 of July 10th, 1943,<sup>1</sup> and previous correspondence relative to defence communications in Newfoundland.

I have now been notified by my Government that consultations between the United States Signal Corps and the Canadian Joint Staff Mission at Washington have been conducted with a view to achieving a maximum of co-operation in the construction of the radio installations at Port-aux-Basques and the land communication lines from Port-aux-Basques to Stephenville.

Subject to the approval of the Newfoundland Government, the radio installations at Port-aux-Basques will be built by Defence Communications Limited for the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government have requested the United States Signal Corps to construct two physical circuits from Stephenville to Port-aux-Basques when permission for same is accorded by the Newfoundland Government.

I now request the approval of the Newfoundland Government on behalf of the Government of Canada for the erection of a radio station which it is proposed to build on Crown land at Port-aux-Basques. This is described in Paragraph 2 of my secret letter No. 69 of July 10th, 1943. Details of this site will not be available until completion of the survey of the land. I can advise you that it is proposed to use special radio equipment of a highly secret nature in the radio station and this station will be required to transmit and receive secret information which for reasons of security cannot be carried on the underground cable.

The United States Consul General informs me that he is requesting the approval of the Newfoundland Government in respect of the communication system from Port-aux-Basques to Stephenville. This was covered by Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 in my secret letter No. 69 of July 10th, 1943, and request for permission to construct which by the Canadian Government is therefore rescinded.

Yours faithfully,

J. C. BRITTON

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

703.

1156-AU-39

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

G/480/14

St. John's, August 7, 1943

SECRET

Dear Sir,

In continuation of my letter of the 24th July, 1943,<sup>1</sup> (reference No. G/480/14) relative to your letter No. 74 of 22nd July, 1943, on the subject of Defence Communications in Newfoundland, I send you copy of a letter of today's date<sup>1</sup> on this subject which I have sent to the American Consul General. The position in regard to the Radio Station at Port-aux-Basques which is to be used in combination with the Defence communications is that the Commission of Government have approved in principle of the erection of the Radio Station as described in para. 2 of your secret letter No. 69 of 10th July, 1943,<sup>1</sup> but this approval is subject to arrangements being made by you with the Department of Natural Resources in regard to the availability of whatever Crown Land may be required for the purpose and to the usual arrangements with the Department of Posts and Telegraphs in regard to frequencies and other matters in which that Department is interested. It is also understood, of course, that the Defence Regulations of Newfoundland will be complied with in so far as the proposed Radio Station is concerned.

Yours faithfully,

W. WOODS

704.

DND HQS 151-1-204

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air à l'officier commandant l'aviation,*  
*région aérienne de l'Est*

*Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding,*  
*Eastern Air Command*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 28, 1945

ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES  
EASTERN AIR COMMAND

1. A request has been received from the United States authorities through the United States Military Attaché, Ottawa for permission to construct additional communications facilities at stations in Eastern Air Command. The stations in question are Mingan, P.Q.; Goose Bay, Labrador; Cape Harrison, Labrador; St. John's, Newfoundland and Gander, Newfoundland. The facilities requested by the United States are urgently needed in connection with the movement of their Forces by air from the European Theatre to North America. Particulars of the United States request are given in a report

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

of a telephone conversation between Major-General Guy V. Henry, Senior United States Army Member, Permanent Joint Board on Defence and Colonel Graling, the United States Military Attaché, Ottawa, a copy of which is attached.<sup>1</sup>

2. The United States request has been approved on the understanding that the construction is not of continuing value to Canada, that the equipment is to be provided and paid for by the United States and that any construction involved is to be undertaken and paid for by the United States. The United States authorities have been requested to advise their local commanders at Goose Bay, St. John's and Gander to get in touch with the R.C.A.F. station commanders concerned with respect to questions of siting so as to ensure that there is no conflict with any projected R.C.A.F. construction. The United States authorities have also been requested to clear the question of frequencies with your Command.

3. As soon as further information about these facilities is received it will be communicated to you.

W. A. CURTIS A/V/M  
for the C.A.S.

705.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, September 4-5, 1945

10. Air Vice-Marshal Curtis raised the question of the continued maintenance of the Stephenville-St. John's land line cable operated by the United States forces. After discussion, the Board agreed that the continued maintenance of this cable was necessary for transatlantic air operations civil and military, as well as to the defence of Newfoundland. General Henry stated that the War Department was considering the possibility of having post-war maintenance expenses shared by Canada and the United States and undertook to communicate a proposal to the Canadian Section at a later date.

706.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 7-8, 1945

12. General Henry distributed copies of a memorandum which he had written to the Secretary of the Canadian Section announcing the decision of

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



the United States to continue the maintenance of the Stephenville-St. John's landline. The memorandum is attached to the Journal as an appendix and the Secretary of the Canadian Section will inquire as to any Canadian requirements for rental or lease of circuits.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum du représentant principal de l'armée des États-Unis,  
CPCAD, au secrétaire, section canadienne de la CPCAD*

*Memorandum from Senior United States Army Member, PJBD,  
to Secretary, Canadian Section of PJBD*

TOP SECRET

Washington, November 5, 1945

SUBJECT: STEPHENVILLE-ST. JOHN'S LAND LINE, NEWFOUNDLAND

1. The matter of continued maintenance and ownership of the Stephenville-St. John's Land-Line has been brought on one or more occasions before the Permanent Joint Board. The United States has now decided to continue the maintenance of this system, and would be pleased to arrange with the proper agencies of the Canadian Government for the continued rental or lease of the circuits these agencies require, rates to be arrived at by joint agreement based on comparable commercial rates. . .

2. It is therefore recommended that Canadian agencies desiring the use of facilities on the Stephenville-St. John's Land-Line, communicate with the Chief Signal Officer, War Department, Washington, D.C., with a view of arriving at a joint financial agreement for the use of the facilities in question.

GUY V. HENRY  
Major-General, U.S. Army

SOUS-SECTION vi/SUB-SECTION vi

*LES TRANSPORTS  
TRANSPORTATION*

707.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, August 27, 1940

7. In relation to supplies generally it was agreed as the Fifth Recommendation of the Board:

That the subject of communications between Newfoundland, the Maritime Provinces, Eastern Canada and the United States, is of high importance, the following subjects requiring to be examined:

- (a) Railway facilities.
- (b) Water transport.
- (c) Roads
- (d) Air transport and communications.

That the establishment of additional commercial airways, complete with landing facilities and aids to air navigation, between these important areas, would be essential to the defence plan.

...

708.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 661

[St. John's,] October 11, 1940

SECRET. Both Canadian and United States naval and military experts who have visited us have expressed anxiety in regard to the capacity of our single line of railway to continue to meet requirements of defence and maintenance of economic life under present and possibly more difficult future conditions. We are ourselves concerned over this and in particular with regard to engines which will be available to the railway next Spring. We have to expect heavy demands for rail freight from both Canadians and Americans in addition to other traffic stimulated by war conditions. Present position is that all engines are being used to their utmost capacity and efficient maintenance has to be sacrificed to immediate requirements. This cannot continue indefinitely and we feel that if railway, which is a life line, is not to be imperilled next Spring and Summer we must ensure delivery of two additional engines by 1st May next. We have an offer from Canadian Locomotive Company Montreal of two Mikado type engines to be delivered at Montreal works 24 weeks after receipt of order. . .

709.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 16, 1941

...

*Action by the United States Army*

...

(i) The supply of aviation gasoline and other essential supplies to Newfoundland Airport and Stephenville to maintain military operations is estimated to require approximately five additional locomotives, fifty (5,000 gallon

capacity) tank cars for 100 octane gasoline, and fifty freight cars above present Newfoundland railway equipment. The United States Army plans to provide any additional rolling stock required for its exclusive use. However, a definite decision has not yet been made. The United States War Department requests the Board to make an appropriate recommendation as to which Government will furnish this rail equipment, improve rail facilities by additional sidings between Botwood and Newfoundland Airport, particularly, and throughout the length of the Newfoundland railway generally, and insure continuous operation of the railroad between Botwood and Newfoundland Airport and between Cerner Brook and Stephenville. The United States will build the spur for its use into the Stephenville field.

. . .

710.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 17, 1941

. . .

3. At the request of the Chairman, Colonel Bissell outlined in some detail the problem created by the inadequacy of existing railway equipment in Newfoundland.

4. After prolonged consideration with the Newfoundland Commissioners; after determination that the present condition and rolling stock (on hand and on order) of the Newfoundland railroad are barely adequate for civilian requirements; and after full consideration of the great urgency of adequate supply prior to the winter of 1941 of United States bases in Newfoundland, the Board agreed as its Sixteenth Recommendation:

that the United States procure and retain title to such railroad rolling stock as is necessary for its military requirements in Newfoundland, including possible operations from the Newfoundland Airport;

that the Newfoundland Government continue to operate the Newfoundland railroad and undertake at once the construction of additional facilities and necessary rehabilitation of the railroad outside of areas leased to the United States;

that necessary arrangements for essential financial assistance be immediately worked out between the United States and Newfoundland Governments; and

that both Canada and the United States assist in the procurement of the necessary priorities required to permit this recommendation to be carried out in the time specified.

. . .

711.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 21

[St. John's,] April 24, 1941

Reference recent discussion here with Colonel Gibson<sup>1</sup> regarding equipment for Newfoundland Railway we should be most grateful if Canadian Government would assist us by securing such priority for two thousand class locomotives recently ordered from Montreal Locomotive Works as will ensure delivery by December next.

712.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 6, 1941

. . .

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE  
 FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH RECOMMENDATIONS

6. THE PRIME MINISTER submitted the Journal of Discussions and Decisions of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, covering the Board's meetings at Montreal, on April the 16th and 17th, and including the Board's Fifteenth and Sixteenth Recommendations. Copies of the Board's Journal, for these meetings, had already been sent to the Defence Ministers and to the Minister of Munitions and Supply, for consideration and report.

7. THE SECRETARY reported that he had received word from the Chairman of the Canadian Section that the President had already approved the Board's recommendation regarding rolling stock and the improvement of the Newfoundland railroad facilities (Sixteenth Recommendation), but that the United States could not proceed to implement this Recommendation unless the gasoline storage in the Newfoundland Airport and Lewisporte-Botwood areas were provided by the Canadian government, as recommended by the Board (Fifteenth Recommendation). In the circumstances, it was requested that action by the Canadian government, upon the Fifteenth Recommendation, be treated as a matter of urgency.<sup>2</sup>

The Air Staff had not yet had an opportunity of completing their estimate of the cost of providing the additional storage facilities involved.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 180.

<sup>2</sup> Les mesures du gouvernement canadien relatives à la quinzième recommandation ne semblent pas avoir été prises avant janvier 1942. Voir le document 638.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 180.

<sup>2</sup> Action by the Canadian Government on the Fifteenth Recommendation does not appear to have been taken until January 1942. See Document 638.



(See letter of May 3rd, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Chairman of the U.S. Section, to the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.)

8. MR. KING suggested that, in the circumstances, the Committee might depart from the usual practice of withholding approval of these recommendations until the Ministers concerned, after consultation with their staffs, were in a position to report. In this case approval might be given, subject to concurrence of the Minister of Finance and the Defence Ministers.

9. The Committee, thereupon, approved, in so far as Canada was concerned, the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Recommendations of the Board, subject to the concurrence of the Minister of Finance and the Defence Ministers.

...

713.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 50

Ottawa, June 30, 1941

Minister of Munitions and Supply states that his Department is having greatest difficulty in arranging transportation of material and supplies to various points in Newfoundland where Canadian contracts are being executed. The Newfoundland Railway is being taxed beyond their capacity, and apparently no system of priorities exists. Three separate authorities are competing for priority as follows:

1. The United States Army and Navy, who are erecting bases and apparently sending ships and cargoes in without previous advice;
2. The British Ministry of Aircraft Production (ATFERO) for project at Gander;
3. Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply for projects at Gander, Botwood and St. John's.

As you are aware, at the moment all their agencies are in difficulty. Ships are going to small outlying harbours and docks and are being held up for lack of labour and also for lack of railway equipment.

To remedy this situation so far as Canada is concerned, Department of Munitions and Supply propose to ask all Canadian agencies to apply to Canadian Transport Controller for shipping instructions. It would however be a great advantage if someone in Newfoundland could be clothed with authority to determine priorities on transportation within Newfoundland.

The Canadian Government would therefore be grateful if you could find it possible to appoint someone to perform in Newfoundland duties similar to those performed in Canada by Transport Controller, namely to have general supervision over port and rail facilities, to determine priorities of movement and unloading and to see that cars are supplied only to move materials on instructions issued by himself or his office.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

714.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, July 30, 1941

1. . . . The Honourable L. E. Emerson, Commissioner of Defence and Justice [sic] of Newfoundland, was present.

. . . .

3. After a detailed discussion of various phases of the problem of road maintenance and construction in Newfoundland, in which Mr. Emerson participated, it was agreed that the Newfoundland Government will to the limits of its capacity with available equipment maintain existing roads and keep them open during the coming winter. The Newfoundland Government has no objection to and would welcome any action taken by the United States and Canada to assist in keeping roads open during the coming winter.

The United States members pointed out that the road in which they are most urgently interested is the St. John's-Argentia highway (about 80 miles long and, according to Mr. Emerson, 58 miles paved with tarvia, the remainder gravel surfaced). The United States authorities may carry out a survey of a new highway between St. John's and Argentia: authority to conduct surveys outside the leased areas is granted in Article X of the Base-Lease Agreement, signed at London March 27, 1941.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Emerson said that, of course, there would be no objection on the part of the Newfoundland authorities to such a survey.

As regards the road from Stephenville to the airfield near that town, Mr. Emerson said that because of the lack of equipment the Newfoundland authorities could do practically nothing to keep that road open this winter. There will be no difficulty, however, in keeping open the roads from St. John's to Quidi Vidi and to the United States ammunition dump.

Mr. Emerson stated that there should be no great difficulty in keeping open the road from St. John's to the Canadian Camp at Torbay. There was a discussion of the need of a highway from Botwood to the Newfoundland Airport. The Canadian Service members will consult with their Departments on the question of whether this road is necessary and, if so, whether it will be surveyed this year.

It was agreed that in due course arrangements in respect to right of way and maintenance questions should be dealt with by exchanges of notes between the interested Governments.

The Board approved the following as its Twentieth Recommendation:

(a) That improvement and maintenance of road communications is recognized as essential for effective military operations in the defence of Newfoundland.

(b) That the Newfoundland Government should, without cost to the United States or the Canadian Governments, make available the

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B.

rights of way necessary for such roads as the United States or the Canadian Government consider must be constructed for military purposes.

- (c) That the United States and Canada should be given the right to construct and maintain such roads as each individually requires in Newfoundland for military purposes without obligation either to construct or maintain any roads.
- (d) That Newfoundland, Canadian and United States vehicles would have use without tolls of any roads constructed by the United States or Canada in Newfoundland outside of Base areas.
- (e) That all necessary road maintenance in Newfoundland other than as provided for above should be a responsibility of the appropriate Newfoundland authorities.

Subject to the approval of the Newfoundland Government, Mr. Emerson expressed general concurrence in these views.

4. There was a discussion of The Newfoundland Railroad and the improvements dealt with in the Board's Sixteenth Recommendation. Lt.-Col. Bissell reviewed for Mr. Emerson's benefit the provisions of his Progress Report on this subject. It was pointed out that representatives of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the United States expected to leave the United States on Wednesday, July 30, to conclude an agreement with the appropriate Newfoundland authorities in regard to the terms on which the proposed assistance by the United States Government to the railroad could be extended. Mr. Emerson stated that the proposed visit of these officials had already been taken up with the Newfoundland authorities by the American Consul General at St. John's; that the Newfoundland authorities were prepared to conclude an agreement on this subject at an early date; and that he anticipated no difficulty in the reaching of such an agreement.

. . .

715.

DND HQS 7410-11

*Le chef adjoint d'état-major général au chef d'état-major général*  
*Assistant Chief of the General Staff to Chief of the General Staff*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 11, 1941

1. With reference to the attached letter from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup> re rehabilitation of Newfoundland railroad, . . .

2. . . . I find it difficult to see how the employment of U.S. troops can adversely affect us. Actually, the damage, if any, was done at the April meeting of the Board when the Sixteenth Recommendation was passed. This reads as follows:<sup>2</sup>

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 710.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 710.

3. As I see this matter, who actually carries out this work, either Canadian civil or military workmen, Newfoundland workmen or U.S. civil or military workmen has little bearing on the subject. The fact is that the Board has agreed that the Newfoundland Government rehabilitate the railroad with U.S. financial assistance. The fact that U.S. military or civil workmen may be added in order to expedite the work to my mind is of little significance.

MAURICE POPE  
Brigadier

716.

1156-D-39

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>*

*Memorandum by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa,] August 16, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

As a result of the decision of the Prime Minister, Mr. Ralston and Mr. Power that the attached telegram<sup>2</sup> should not be sent, Brigadier Pope communicated with Colonel Bissell and informed him that, as the Canadian military authorities are unable to undertake the work of rehabilitating the Newfoundland Railway, the Canadian Government has no objection to such work being carried out by the American Army.

In my opinion this decision is likely to cause difficulties.

717.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

...

12. There was a discussion of the steps which are being taken in pursuance of the Board's Sixteenth Recommendation to rehabilitate the Newfoundland Railway as an essential part of the defence plans of the United States and Canada.

It was brought to the attention of the Board that the rehabilitation program does not include rerailing the Argientia Branch with the heavy rails which are necessary to carry the new rolling stock being provided. It was the sense of the Board that military requirements necessitate rerailing the Argientia Branch with 70-pound rail and that in view of the unwillingness of the Newfoundland Government to bear the cost of rerailing the branch, the United States should provide the necessary 70-pound rail.

...

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

...

*United States Army*

...

REHABILITATION OF NEWFOUNDLAND RAILROAD AND  
 PURCHASE BY UNITED STATES OF ROLLING STOCK

The RFC negotiators arrived at a tentative agreement which was approved by the Newfoundland Government on August 22 as to the railroad rehabilitation which that Government is willing to undertake. The rehabilitation which Newfoundland is willing to finance is considerably less than was recommended by the Freeman-Dorsey Report and the Chief of Army Engineers. Careful investigation on the ground with Newfoundland authorities, the Railroad manager, Newfoundland Base Commander and Army Engineers indicates that the rehabilitation, when accomplished will in general suffice for military requirements. It will be necessary in addition for the United States to provide at its own expense certain railroad equipment considered essential should military operations be required. A United States Army member will amplify the above information on the railroad at this meeting of the Board. The RFC must consummate a final agreement with the Newfoundland Government. Col. Bissell suggested to Mr. Emerson that the latter proceed to Washington with power to act for the Newfoundland Government in order to consummate the agreement at the earliest practicable date.

All practicable measures to expedite completion of the delivery of the rolling stock ordered by the United States have been taken. The first 10 tank cars arrived in Newfoundland on August 26 and the last of the 50 flat cars on September 4. All tank cars have been shipped. The contractor will not deliver the 5 locomotives in Brooklyn on September 28 as scheduled, but expects to be able to deliver the first locomotive by the latter part of October and the remaining 4 between November 3rd and 8th. Under the terms of the proposed rehabilitation agreement, the Newfoundland Government rather than the United States Army will own and operate the locomotives and flat cars. The tank cars will remain the property of the United States Government as originally contemplated.

The most critical factor in the operation of the railroad is lack of locomotives. This will be alleviated by the delivery of the locomotives on order. Canada can assist by expediting delivery of locomotives being fabricated in Canada. The second most critical factor is the lack of and poor condition of rolling stock. This will be relieved, materially, by the 50 flat cars and 50 tank cars, plus the other equipment which the railroad has on order. Additional rolling stock is an essential and its procurement is contemplated under the proposed rehabilitation agreement.

The Newfoundland Government is not willing to finance rerailing the Argentia Branch with 70-pound rails. Unless this is done, the new locomotives cannot operate between United States bases at St. John's and Argentia. The Newfoundland Government proposes to rerail and retie the Argentia Branch if the United States Government will provide the rails and furnish them to the Newfoundland railroad at a nominal rental. Although certain legal questions are involved, it is suggested that the Board recommend that the United States Government provide the 70-pound rails.

...

[20. Newfoundland Roads] . . .

No formal notification has been received from the Newfoundland Government that it would provide, without cost to Canadian or United States Governments, the right-of-way necessary for such roads as the United States or Canadian Governments consider must be constructed for military purposes in Newfoundland. Mr. Emerson advised Colonel Bissell informally that Newfoundland could make the right-of-way available over Crown lands but did not believe it could undertake to make available a right-of-way through private property. When it was pointed out that such a decision would probably result in roads avoiding small settlements in Newfoundland where private property was involved, Mr. Emerson left the impression that the Newfoundland Government might wish to consider further the matter.

...

718.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 96

St. John's, December 4, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 85 of December 2, 1941<sup>1</sup> and to previous despatches in respect of the problem of transportation of supplies by rail and steamer to Newfoundland. I have also the honour to refer to my despatch No. 46 of November 10, 1941<sup>1</sup> in which I enclosed a copy of the official notice appointing a local Priorities Committee.<sup>1</sup>

2. Certain facts have come to my attention officially and otherwise as follows:

...

- (g) I am informed by the R.C.A.F. equipment officer in St. John's that he went through several dock warehouses the other day and found that much congestion and confusion existed. Earlier shipments are not always cleared before the next ship docks, with the result that successive shipments continue to pile up and the owners of the earlier shipments have trouble unearthing their goods. The

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

St. John's *Evening Telegram* of December 3rd states that the port of St. John's is experiencing the greatest freight congestion in its history. I gave you information about this in my despatch referred to, No. 85 of December 2.

. . .

- (j) The Secretary of the Priorities Board, mentioned in paragraph 2 (a), is Mr. W. E. Curtis who is also head of the Supplies Division of the Department of Public Utilities, Newfoundland Government, and who, in addition, has recently become Purchasing Agent for the St. John's local Purchasing Office, Department of Munitions and Supply. He informs me that his work in connection with priorities has consisted largely of arranging priorities in the supply of goods coming from Canada and from the United States.
- (k) As I understand it, the Priorities Committee was established primarily for the assistance of firms in Newfoundland who desire to obtain permits for importation of goods which cannot be exported from Canada or from the United States without a priority permit from Ottawa and Washington.
- (l) Up to the present time at least, the Priorities Committee has apparently regarded itself as an assisting committee to the Newfoundland importers. I am not sure that it has taken upon itself the burden of deciding whether or not from a Newfoundland point of view the importation of the commodity in question is essential, although I would expect that as Mr. Curtis is also representing the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply, he would naturally endeavour to secure priority of transportation for war supplies. It appears to me that the Priorities Committee should take upon itself the burden of deciding from a Newfoundland point of view whether a permit should be granted for importation into Newfoundland, not only of goods which may be on the Canadian and American priorities list, but of luxury goods which may not be on the list. Although I have no exact information in the matter, I believe that an examination of the situation would reveal the fact that a large quantity of luxury goods are coming into Newfoundland which the Newfoundlanders could easily do without, and the importation of these goods must be a considerable factor in cluttering up the transportation facilities and also the wharfage facilities in Newfoundland.

. . .

- (n) The extension of naval activities in St. John's has deprived the port of a portion of its shipping and warehousing space and there appears to be no room for expansion of the facilities in a harbour which was small and already congested even before the Navy came in. This situation naturally has not lightened the problem.

. . .

3. From what information I have it would appear that service requirements, both Canadian and American, are going to increase rather than decrease. It is true that much of the construction work has been done but every little while some expansion of service plans comes to my attention which indicates that for some time to come there will be urgent service requirements of some magnitude. The general situation will probably get worse before it gets better. This is quite apart from any possible war emergency which would of course throw an even greater burden on all available transportation facilities.

4. I hesitate to forecast the future, but I am apprehensive that even when the railway has improved its service we may find something like the following occurring. Urgent demands will be presented to the railway by the American forces. They will be given priority for the very reason that it was with American aid that the railway is able to carry on. Other urgent claims will be put forward by local importers who cater to the civilian trade, and who will use the very effective argument that trade must be maintained in order that full advantage may be taken of the present wave of prosperity. The Newfoundland Government will not be inclined to turn a deaf ear to these arguments because more trade means more customs revenue and in any event a budget surplus is to them a new and pleasant experience and one to be encouraged. Urgent Canadian Service claims may thus be relegated to a junior position, or become dependent on our coming in under the wing of the Americans. If such a result occurs it will not be by reason of any conscious design on the part of a particular group but rather as the outgrowth of circumstances which now seem to be developing.

5. It would appear to me that the whole question of transportation to Newfoundland and the priorities connected therewith is one which deserves early study and consideration in the interests of all concerned. The Commissioner for Public Utilities here is fully alive to the problem, but I doubt if he has an available staff in his Department with sufficient experience to deal with it. In any case it affects the Canadian and United States Governments as well. While I have not discussed the matter formally with Sir Wilfrid Woods, I feel satisfied that he and other members of the Commission of Government would at least consider any representations that might be made or any suggestions that the Canadian Government might offer.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

719.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, January 20, 1942

5. The Board devoted particular attention to the problem of railway facilities in Newfoundland. It was reported that traction power and rolling stock



will be adequate for winter movements but that the Railway will be badly overloaded in the spring and summer unless additional cars can be obtained. The required cars are on order from the Canada Car and Foundry Company but will not be ready in time unless material priorities are granted. It was agreed that this matter would be followed up by General Pope and Colonel Bissell and that if it should prove impossible to obtain the necessary priorities in Canada, consideration should immediately be given to the advisability of transferring the order to some United States company which can obtain the required materials through priorities obtained by the War Department.

6. In connection with traffic movements to Newfoundland, Colonel Bissell referred to delays resulting from freight bottlenecks at various points in the Maritime Provinces. A detailed statement on this subject is included in paragraph 5 of the United States Army Progress Report<sup>1</sup> and it was agreed that this would be brought to the attention of the appropriate Canadian authorities.

. . .

720.

2892-40

*Mémorandum du régisseur des transports, ministère des Transports*<sup>2</sup>

*Memorandum by Transport Controller, Department of Transport*<sup>2</sup>

Montreal, January 26, 1942

MEMORANDUM REGARDING SHIPPING CONDITIONS OF DEFENCE MATERIALS,  
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES TO NEWFOUNDLAND PORTS.

The essential Newfoundland trade from Canada has been carried by a number of private Steamship Lines operating from Montreal seven months in the year and from Halifax during the entire season. . . .

For the last year and [a] half, these private services have been totally inadequate to carry the ordinary commercial trade, and defence materials, even though they have all augmented their fleets by charters.

When defence materials started to move in volume, it was necessary for me to charter vessels to carry these materials, and we have succeeded in lifting all defence materials to date by combining our chartered ships with the privately owned fleets, and in doing this we have utilized the Ports of Corner Brook, Lewisporte, Clarenville, Botwood and St. John's, but as these outports are closed from about the end of January, it becomes necessary to concentrate on St. John's, Newfoundland, with the result that we meet with slow discharge and bad congestion at that Port. . .

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> T. C. Lockwood.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

It now develops that the greatest difficulty is in finding storage space near the Harbour in the open as our man reports that practically every available space is taken up with lumber, cement, building materials of all description. Another great disadvantage is due to the fact that the Railway only serves the Newfoundland Railway Dock, and we understand it is impossible, owing to the nature of the Harbour front, to extend the switching facilities to any other docks, which results in a great deal of cartage having to be performed in order to move the materials to rail cars.

When the new Naval Dock now under construction is completed, there will, of course, be a smaller movement of timber, piles and building materials now being used in this work, and the new Docks will also enable the other piers to be released for general cargo but I anticipate that on account of new Airfields being erected near St. John's, that the movement of construction materials will continue throughout next summer season, and that very little relief can be expected in St. John's Harbour.

. . .

Last year we requested the Commissioner of Public Utilities, Sir Wilfrid Woods, to establish a Priority Officer in Newfoundland, whose duty it would be to arrange the docking of ships at St. John's and the various outports, so that the ships will be unloaded according to the priority of the cargo, which they contain, but Sir Wilfrid, at that time, felt that the Manager of the Newfoundland Railways was very competent, and that the matter could safely be left in his hands, but we still consider that it is very difficult for anyone exercising the duties of managing a Railroad, running night and day to full capacity, to also keep an eye on incoming ships, so that they will be properly spaced and economically used.

. . .

NORTH SYDNEY. Owing to the small amount of car freight which can be handled on the ferry service from North Sydney to Port-aux-Basques, very great congestion resulted at North Sydney and recently there was on hand at that port and at adjacent Railway Terminals back to Moncton over 250 carloads of freight, much of which contained defence materials and food-stuffs. Eventually the Newfoundland Railroad decided to charter three steamers and move this traffic to St. John's for distribution by rail from that port. Under my instructions the Canadian National Railways placed an embargo against North Sydney, but this action was much too late. We are now trying to regulate this movement so that cars will only be taken to North Sydney loaded with LCL freight, which can be handled on the ferry service, thus avoiding congestion for the balance of the winter months. The balance of cargo freight will have to be handled through Halifax.

. . .

721.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D5)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] March 3, 1942

. . .

### 3. Transportation to Newfoundland

The Committee considered a Memorandum (ACS. 10-10 of 20th February 1942<sup>1</sup>) from the J.S.C. Atlantic Coast containing a suggestion that, in order to improve transportation facilities between Canada and Newfoundland, the T.C.A. should be pressed to augment their proposed service to Newfoundland for the specific purpose of carrying Service personnel. In this connection the Secretary referred to a letter to the D.M. (Army) from D.M. Transport<sup>2</sup> stating that all necessary negotiations in connection with the new service from Moncton to Gander and Torbay Airports (via Sydney) had now been successfully completed; that the Department of Transport proposes to ask for an appropriation of \$500,000 from the War Vote to meet necessary expenditure; and requesting the endorsement of the Department of National Defence for the project. The Committee recommended endorsement on the grounds that the proposed air Service will assist in providing improved transport facilities for passengers and mail between Canada and Newfoundland.

. . .

722.

2892-40

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion pour discuter des questions de transport*  
*Minutes of a Meeting to Discuss Transportation Questions*

Montreal, March 4, 1942

1. A meeting of Representatives of the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments was held in Montreal at the Windsor Hotel on Wednesday, 4th March 1942, under the Chairmanship of Colonel The Honourable Colin Gibson, Canadian Minister of National Revenue, for the purpose of discovering means of facilitating transportation between Canada and Newfoundland.

2. The following were present:

(A) For Newfoundland:

Sir Wilfrid W. Woods  
 Hon. L. E. Emerson, K.C.  
 Hon. P. D. H. Dunn  
 Claude Fraser

Commissioner for Public Utilities.  
 Commissioner for Justice and Defence.  
 Commissioner for Natural Resources.  
 Secretary for Natural Resources.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

## (B) For Canada

Col. The Hon. Colin Gibson  
Hon. C. J. Burchell

H. F. Angus  
T. C. Lockwood  
F. E. Bawden  
B. A. Macdonald

Minister of National Revenue.  
High Commissioner for Canada in New  
foundland.  
Department of External Affairs.  
Transport Controller.  
Department of Trade and Commerce.  
Secretary, Canadian Shipping Board.

3. After a preliminary general discussion of the problem under reference at which the officials and officers named in the attached Annex "A"<sup>1</sup> assisted, the meeting, recognizing that the present merchant shipping tonnage situation is such that all possible means must be taken to ensure the most effective use of available merchant vessels, agreed upon the following recommendations:

- (a) That the Newfoundland Government accept the principle of central control of shipping to Newfoundland and of port facilities and railway transportation in Newfoundland.
- (b) That the Newfoundland Government take all possible steps to secure the continuous discharging and loading of vessels at all Newfoundland ports.
- (c) That the Newfoundland Government provide the Canadian Shipping Board and the Canadian Transport Controller, from time to time, with a list of essential civilian supplies required in Newfoundland in their order of priority.
- (d) That the Canadian Transport Controller provide the Newfoundland Government, from time to time, with information as to the probable tonnage of defence materials to be moved from Canada to Newfoundland during stated periods.
- (e) That the Newfoundland Government study the possibility of having the importation of domestic coal controlled by a central agency and that if a central agency is established the Canadian Coal Administrator be requested to arrange the supply of Canadian coal to such agency.
- (f) That the Canadian Shipping Board continue to use its best efforts to secure the merchant tonnage necessary to take care of the essential trade between Canada and Newfoundland.

4. The Newfoundland representatives reported that the anticipated traffic through North Sydney for Newfoundland will be limited by present dock facilities and sheds. The meeting recommended that an investigation be made to ascertain if increased facilities could be provided.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



723.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 166

St. John's, March 21, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 136 of March 9, 1942<sup>1</sup> concerning the recent conference held in Montreal to discuss the problems of transportation between Canada and Newfoundland and wish to advise you that certain developments in this connection have been announced here. I enclose relevant clippings<sup>2</sup> from *The Daily News* of yesterday and today.

2. You will note that the Newfoundland Railway has acquired an area of land near the present terminus in St. John's where three freight sheds and the necessary sidings will be constructed.

3. At the meeting of the Council of the Newfoundland Board of Trade yesterday Mr. H. J. Russell, the General Manager of the Railway, announced that the Railway proposed to build a wharf and shed for the landing of goods at Argentia from whence they will be shipped to St. John's in box cars.

4. Mr. Russell also announced yesterday that the summer schedule of three passenger services a week from St. John's to Port-aux-Basques and North Sydney will be resumed at the end of April. It is also stated that it is proposed to inaugurate a daily cross country service beginning towards the latter part of June if the necessary rolling stock is available at that time.

5. The purchase of the Steamer *Moyra* to be used for the carrying of freight between Halifax or North Sydney direct to St. John's has been publicly announced by Mr. Russell. He has also informed the press of the recent contract given to the Canadian Car and Foundry Company for railway equipment consisting of five sleeping cars, eight day coaches, ten baggage, mail and express cars and three diners, all of which is expected to be delivered before the end of June.

6. I was also advised by Mr. Russell that satisfactory arrangements had been made for the Newfoundland Government to obtain additional berth and warehouse facilities at North Sydney. This was one of the matters brought up for discussion at the Montreal conference and in respect of which Mr. Appleton brought in a report which recommended that the matter should be further investigated. After the conference Mr. Appleton accompanied Mr. Russell to North Sydney and arranged on the ground for the additional accommodation which Mr. Russell so urgently needed. With this accommodation it will be possible to run a daily service during the summer months.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduites.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

724.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 182

St. John's, March 27, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 166 of March 21, 1942 and to previous despatches and telegrams concerning the recent conference held at Montreal on March 4th to discuss the problems of transportation between Canada and Newfoundland.

2. No action has yet been taken by the Commission of Government to implement the recommendations of the conference, such as the appointment of a controller of shipping and port facilities, the improvement of discharging and loading of vessels, or the control of imports. I take it, however, that these matters have been under consideration by the Commission of Government and that some action may be expected in the near future.

3. I think possibly the delay may be in part explained by the fact that the Government desired to have the report of Sir Lionel Warner's Board receive a wide circulation. A synopsis of the report was published in the daily papers but the report itself is quite a lengthy document and goes fully into some at least of the matters which were under consideration at the Montreal conference, such as the control of traffic and of loading and discharging of ships. . . .

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

725.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, April 2, 1942

Dear Norman [Robertson],

. . .

I think you are quite unduly disturbed about the articles which have appeared in the press. I have tried to give you the setting in my letters but evidently I have failed to do so and the matter will have to wait until I get to Ottawa and talk it over with you.

I did not give any interview to the press, either in Newfoundland or in Canada, about this conference. If I had given an interview to the press here and explained the work of the conference, the conference would have received the whole-hearted approval and blessing, not only of the papers, but of the citizens. My policy, however, which I think is the right one, has been not to give an interview to the press on any subject whatever.

Where the Commission of Government fell down is in not explaining the conference to the public here and, up to the present time, they know nothing of what transpired.

The criticisms in the press were aimed primarily at the Commission of Government for not taking the public into its confidence. What amazed me was that the criticisms were so mild.

...

[C. J. BURCHELL]

726.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 225

St. John's, April 20, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 199 of April 9, 1942<sup>1</sup> and to previous despatches and telegrams concerning the conference held at Montreal on March 4th to discuss the problems of transportation between Canada and Newfoundland.

2. The Commission of Government have now set up a Transportation Control Board under the Chairmanship of the General Manager of the Newfoundland Railway, with a separate office at Railway Headquarters and a whole-time Secretary and staff.

3. I am enclosing herewith eight copies of a communiqué<sup>2</sup> issued by the Commission of Government, in which the duties of the new organization are outlined.

4. My comment about the Board is that it may be too large. It, however, includes four men who may probably be stated to be four of the best civil servants in Newfoundland, namely, Mr. Russell, Mr. Price, Dr. Mosdell and Mr. Claude Fraser.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

5. My information from Sir Wilfrid Woods is that the Secretary, Mr. R. Mosdell, is a very good man who is familiar with the problem. He will devote his whole time to the work and much of the success of the operation of the Board may depend upon him.

6. I have not yet been furnished with copies of the Order in Council under which the Board was established, but apparently extensive powers have not been conferred upon the Board itself. The power, for example, to control berths, docks and warehouses is in the Harbour Master, but it is intended that the Harbour Master shall act under the direction of the Board.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

727.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 237

St. John's, April 27, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 225 of April 20, 1942 and to previous despatches and telegrams concerning the conference held in Montreal on March 4th to discuss the problems of transportation between Canada and Newfoundland.

2. One of the recommendations of that conference was as follows:

4. The Newfoundland representatives reported that the anticipated traffic through North Sydney for Newfoundland will be limited by present dock facilities and sheds. The meeting recommended that an investigation be made to ascertain if increased facilities could be provided.

3. Immediately after the conference, Mr. Appleton, the General Manager of the Canadian National Railways, Eastern Division, proceeded to North Sydney with Mr. H. J. Russell, the General Manager of the Newfoundland Railway, and examined the situation on the ground.

4. On his return to Newfoundland, Mr. Russell reported to the Newfoundland Government that the investigation made by Mr. Appleton who was accompanied by Mr. Tompkins, showed that it was possible to increase the facilities at North Sydney so as to provide additional dock and shed space for the Newfoundland Government to take care of the increased traffic through the port of North Sydney. Apparently Mr. Russell was of the opinion that the matter would be proceeded with without any further application being made, and expected the facilities would be put in use during the coming season.

5. In this, however, he evidently was mistaken. Today I received the following letter from Sir Wilfrid Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities:



St. John's, 27 April, 1942

Dear Sir,

I enclose copies of telegrams exchanged between Mr. Russell, General Manager of the Newfoundland Railway, and Mr. Appleton of the Canadian National Railways, regarding the necessity for additional berthing and storage accommodation at North Sydney. You will remember that this was the subject of discussion at the Montreal Conference. I believe that the representatives of both Governments present at the Conference were satisfied as to the necessity for this development, though, of course, your Government's representatives could not commit their Government in any way. Perhaps you would be good enough to communicate to your Government, as a suggestion from this Government, that your Government should make inquiry from the Canadian National Railways as to the results of the examination of the situation at North Sydney which, according to Mr. Appleton's telegram, has already been made, and should inform this Government whether the additional accommodation can be provided.

Yours very truly,

W. W. Woods

6. The copies of the telegrams which were enclosed in his letter were as follows:

April 17, 1942

W. U. Appleton,  
Canadian National Railways  
Moncton, N.B.

Kindly advise if any progress made in securing approval for extension wharf and shed at North Sydney

H. J. RUSSELL

Moncton,  
April 20, 1942

H. J. Russell,  
General Manager Newfoundland Railway,  
St. John's, Nfld.

Your wire 18th. In accordance with understanding at meeting in Montreal we made examination of the possibility of extending the facilities and that is as far as we have gone in the matter and no steps have been taken in respect of securing authority for additional accommodation.

W. U. APPLETON

7. As requested by Sir Wilfrid Woods, will you please ascertain whether the additional accommodation can be provided and how quickly it can be provided.

8. Apparently from Mr. Appleton's telegram, it would seem that an application on behalf of the Government of Newfoundland for this accommodation is necessary and Sir Wilfrid Woods' letter is intended as an application for same.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

728.

2892-40

*Le président, Commission canadienne de la marine marchande,  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chairman, Canadian Shipping Board,  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, May 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Robertson,

May I refer to Mr. C. J. Burchell's despatch No. 234, dated St. John's, Newfoundland, April 24, 1942,<sup>1</sup> and relating to the creation of the Newfoundland Transportation Control Board.

We would be much interested in receiving any further information sent by Mr. Burchell relating to this Board and its activities and to two other matters dealt with in his despatch, viz., the Newfoundland proposals regarding the construction of small vessels and the establishment of an import priorities control.

As you are aware, whether it likes it or not, Canada is now closely involved in Newfoundland's shipping requirements. Newfoundland is dependent upon us in this field in the same sense that we are dependent upon the United States, although perhaps to a greater degree because it is an island.

The Transportation Control Board is the result of the representations put forward by the Canadian delegates at the Canada/Newfoundland Conference in Montreal on March 4. The Canadian representatives likewise suggested at the same conference that Newfoundland establish an official priority agency similar to our Canadian Shipping Priorities Committee. This suggestion has, so far, not been acted upon. We should appreciate anything the High Commissioner might be able to do to press this necessity upon the Newfoundland authorities.

As matters stand at present, we require to give the United States authorities, i.e., the War Production Board and the War Shipping Administration, the most detailed information regarding Canada's shipping requirements and regarding the employment of ships under Canada's control. If this Board is to assist Newfoundland effectively, it should receive similar information from the Newfoundland authorities.

Contact has been established between the new Transportation Control Board and ours. For your information and record I enclose herewith copy of a telegram dated April 27<sup>1</sup> from the Secretary of the Transportation Control Board to the Secretary of this Board together with a copy of the latter's letter in reply dated May 5.<sup>2</sup>

I enclose also for your information and record a copy of a letter dated April 27, 1942,<sup>2</sup> from this Board's representative in Washington to the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Director of Shipping, with a copy of the memorandum<sup>1</sup> referred to therein and a copy of Mr. MacCallum's reply dated May 6.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,

L. D. WILGRESS

729.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfosndland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 377

St. John's, June 23, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 373 of today's date<sup>2</sup> with respect to additional dock facilities and sheds at North Sydney.

2. Although it will be quite obvious to the Department of Transport and to Mr. Lockwood, I should have pointed out in that despatch that Port-aux-Basques has really become the front entrance to Newfoundland. With the improvement in the carrying capacity of the Newfoundland Railway and with the improvement of the dock facilities at North Sydney, and if additional steamers are put on this route, a very substantial amount of freight could be transported via the North Sydney—Port-aux-Basques route. This is a very short water trip—which is an all important matter in view of the scarcity of ships and the congestion in the harbour of the port of St. John's.

3. I should also mention the fact that one of the chief causes of complaint against the Canadian Government in Newfoundland is the withdrawal some years ago of the subsidy paid by the Canadian Government for this service. It would ease the situation here and be some answer to this complaint if additional facilities were provided at North Sydney as requested by the Newfoundland Government.

4. On the other hand, if the fact were made public that these improvements had been refused, the public of Newfoundland would consider it as a continuation of the refusal by the Dominion Government to support this route which, in their regard at least, has become an all important route for them.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

730.

2892-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 428

St. John's, July 31, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that Mr. T. C. Lockwood, Transport Controller of Canada, and Mr. A. L. W. MacCallum, Director of Shipping, arrived in St. John's by airplane on Wednesday evening, July 29th and remained here until Friday afternoon, July 31st. Mr. Lockwood came here on the invitation of Sir Wilfrid Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities.

...

4. On Thursday morning, July 30th, a meeting was arranged with the Transportation Control Board, of which Mr. Herbert J. Russell is Chairman. Mr. Bower and I were also invited to attend this meeting. There was a full and frank discussion of the general Newfoundland shipping situation with respect to both imports and exports.

5. I am enclosing herewith a statement<sup>1</sup> presented by Mr. Russell to the meeting, which shows the total tonnage of imports to be moved to Newfoundland during the present calendar year. The statement shows the tonnage actually moved, the balance required to be moved, the available tonnage and the estimated additional tonnage required.

6. It will be noted that, except in the case of coal, the picture is fairly good, especially so in view of the announcement which Mr. Lockwood was able to make, namely that the *Lady Rodney* was to be placed on the route between Halifax and St. John's and, in addition to military cargo, would probably be able to carry 1500 or 2000 tons of civilian cargo from Halifax to St. John's at intervals of three to four weeks.

...

13. Apart from the difficulty of securing shipping, which was of course well known to everybody, the points which are causing difficulty in relation to shipments to Newfoundland and which were discussed freely at all meetings were as follows:

- (1) The fact that St. John's Harbour is so small and is practically always so overcrowded with ships.
- (2) The fact that most of the wharves are small and that even the larger wharves have no mechanical equipment, either to unload the cargo or to move it quickly when it is landed on the wharves. There are no cranes at any of the wharves and only two wharves are equipped with shear-legs for handling heavy pieces of cargo.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



(An effort is to be made to get at least one of the wharves equipped with a moderate amount of mechanical equipment, such as self-propelled trucks, etc.) Possibly the worst feature in respect of the discharging of ships is in connection with the unloading of coal. This is still being done by bucket and there is no mechanical equipment of any kind at any of the coal wharves.

- (3) What was generally agreed to be the worst problem in St. John's was the stevedoring problem. The rate of discharge of steamers is actually somewhat lower in wartime than it was in peacetime. This appears to be largely because of the fact that the men are paid by the hour and the work is performed at a very slow speed. There has apparently been very little effort made to have a cooperative movement among the Government, the merchants, the steamship agents and the stevedores to improve this situation, which admittedly is a tremendous handicap to the port of St. John's as it is causing great delay in the turning around of ships.

14. It was agreed by Mr. Lockwood, Mr. MacCallum and Mr. Lawes that Newfoundland has at the present time sufficient ships allotted to its service to permit the importation of all her requirements if even a modest improvement were made in the way of mechanical equipment on the wharves and if the stevedores would perform their work at a reasonable speed.

...

17. Both Mr. Lockwood and Mr. MacCallum agreed that, as a result of the conference held in Montreal last March and of the recommendations of that conference, conditions here have been greatly improved from what they were at that time. They noted, among others, the following improvements:

- (1) A Transportation Control Board has been set up and is commencing to do efficient work although much remains to be done.
- (2) The Transportation Control Board has now full authority through the Harbourmaster to direct at what berths ships should be discharged and to move ships from one berth to another, and to give one ship priority over another, as the occasion may require.
- (3) The sheds on the wharves which had been cluttered up with goods, some goods being allowed to remain there for months at a time, have now been cleared and cargo is being removed from the sheds almost immediately after its discharge from the ships. This is a very marked improvement and permits a cargo to be discharged and handled in the sheds with much greater expedition.
- (4) A coal pool has been formed. All coal is being imported by that pool and allocated as directed by the Board.
- (5) Something has been done by the Transportation Control Board in the matter of priorities and the prevention of the importation of non-essential goods. It is quite apparent, however, from the discussions that very much remains yet to be done in this direction. Indeed, it is quite obvious that some scheme will have to be

worked out which will compel ships coming to Newfoundland to carry only such cargo as is essential. Control must also be exercised to ensure that the goods imported are given precedence on ships according to the priorities list as fixed from time to time by the Transportation Control Board.

...

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

731.

2892-40

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, August 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

We are apparently not making any progress in regard to additional dock facilities and sheds at North Sydney. You will remember that on 22nd June, 1942, I sent you a copy<sup>1</sup> of Mr. Russell's comments on the quotations from a letter<sup>1</sup> sent to you by Mr. Lockwood, Transport Controller, which you had included in your letter to me No. 49 of 12th June, 1942.<sup>1</sup> I also sent you five copies of a relevant plan.<sup>2</sup> Can you say whether there are likely to be any developments of this matter or must we regard the proposal as dead?

Yours faithfully,

W. W. WOODS

732.

DND (DH) NSC 1440-1

*Le commandant du HMCS Grandmère au premier officier de marine, Sydney*  
*Commanding Officer, HMCS Grandmère, to Naval Officer-in-Charge, Sydney*

HMCS Grandmère, October 15, 1942

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS, SYDNEY—PORT-AUX-BASQUES CONVOY  
 Submitted:

...

4. At 0640Z/14, Officer of Watch observed *Caribou* being struck by torpedo on starboard side. *Caribou* was then bearing Red 30°, distant 1500 yards. Action stations rang and revolutions increased to make speed 15 knots. Commanding Officer reached bridge a few seconds after explosion, rang full speed. U-Boat sighted on surface steering about 120° true at high speed possibly 15 knots and clearly visible being about 350 yards Green 10. Course then altered to ram. When 150 yards ahead, U-Boat crash-dived leaving

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

very distinct white wake. As wake passed port beam of *Grandmère* six charge pattern depth charges dropped, 150 foot setting. It is Commanding Officer's opinion that this pattern must have exploded very close to target by calculation within 60 feet of U-Boat. No Asdic Contact obtained at any time during attack. Course was altered to starboard and a further pattern of 3 charges setting 500 feet dropped to port of disturbance in water. Ship swung again over the area and another 3 charges setting 500 feet dropped close to disturbance of 2nd pattern. As still no contact obtained a search of area made until 0820Z/14 when hunt was abandoned to rescue survivors.

5. Due to darkness area was searched until 0930Z/14 when first survivors were picked up, nearly all in very exhausted state as all lifeboats with the exception of one had been destroyed in explosion, survivors clinging to wreckage and lifesaving rafts, the intact lifeboat with 20 survivors on board. This work very ably assisted by two aircraft. A total of 103 survivors picked up, 2 dying on board *Grandmère* as result of exposure. After further search of area, assisted by aircraft, no other survivors could be seen.

...

I have etc.

J. O. B. CUTHBURT  
Lieut., R.C.N.R.

733.

2892-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 268

Ottawa, November 10, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch number 613 of October 21,<sup>1</sup> concerning additional dock facilities and sheds at North Sydney. The report from Mr. Cousins has now been received and a copy is being forwarded to you by slow mail.

2. In summary Mr. Cousins reports that the Canadian National Railways are faced with an expenditure to the order of \$115,000 if they are to put their existing dock into full use; that additional facilities are badly needed; that these are purely for the benefit of the Newfoundland Railway and should, therefore, be paid for by that Railway which might spread the cost over a period of twenty years. Mr. Cousins recommends that the Canadian National Railways and the Newfoundland Railway should consult together and decide on the work to be done, on the understanding that the Canadian National Railways would contribute \$115,000 towards the cost and the Newfoundland Railway the balance.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

3. When you have had time to examine Mr. Cousins' report, I should appreciate it if you will discuss the whole question with the Newfoundland authorities and advise me if they are sympathetically inclined towards Mr. Cousins' recommendations. In the meantime a copy of the report is under consideration by the Canadian National Railways. The report is being mimeographed and a second copy will be sent to you in a few days time.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

734.

2892-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 298

Ottawa, December 10, 1942

Sir,

In my despatch No. 268 of November 10, concerning the question of dock facilities at North Sydney, I advised you that Mr. E. L. Cousins' report had been sent to the Canadian National Railways for consideration, and I now have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a letter,<sup>1</sup> received from the Deputy Minister of Transport, in which Mr. R. C. Vaughan, President of the Canadian National Railways, sets out the views of his Company with regard to the report.

2. It will be seen that while the Canadian National Railways feel unable to adopt Mr. Cousins' recommendations for their participation in the enlargement of the existing dock facilities, they are willing to carry out certain repairs on the latter next spring. They also suggest two alternative solutions for obtaining enlarged dock facilities. One is that the Canadian Government might make the necessary improvements. In this case the Canadian National Railways would turn over their dock to the Government on the understanding that it would assume the responsibility for the dock's maintenance. The second suggestion is that, if the Newfoundland Railway or Government would provide the capital required and assume the maintenance costs, the Canadian National Railways would undertake the construction of new facilities.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



3. Commander Edwards informs me that he would still be interested to receive a report on the Newfoundland Government's reactions to Mr. Cousins' proposals despite the unfavourable reaction of the Canadian National Railways, and that he would be grateful if you would treat Mr. Vaughan's letter as confidential.

I have etc.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

735.

2892-40

*L'administrateur en temps de guerre des ports canadiens de l'Atlantique  
au sous-ministre des Transports*

*Wartime Administrator, Canadian Atlantic Ports,  
to Deputy Minister of Transport*

Halifax, February 1, 1943

Dear Commander Edwards,

Re: North Sydney Terminal Facilities

I wrote to Mr. Russell on January 14th to ascertain the results of conference I had arranged for December 29th between officials of the Canadian National Railways and Newfoundland Railway at Moncton.

Herewith attached copy of memorandum<sup>1</sup> covering meeting which Mr. Russell was good enough to send me.

You will note that Canadian National Railway expenditure is estimated at \$130,000 for rectification and Newfoundland Railway estimated cost \$50,000. This latter amount is in keeping with figures discussed when I was in St. John's, Newfoundland, for conference and as to the former figure it also is in line with approximate estimated Canadian National Railway expenditure.

Presume I can now write *finis* to this matter. Do you want me to return all papers, plans, etc., to you for your records?

With kind regards.

Yours very truly,

E. L. COUSINS

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

736.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D17)

*L'officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve,  
au secrétaire du Conseil de la Marine*

*Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force,  
to Secretary, Naval Board*

St. John's, February 11, 1943

It is submitted for the consideration of the Department that the transportation facilities available for Naval Personnel travelling between Canada and Newfoundland on duty and leave are inadequate.

2. On the basis of the proposed shore based complement for this Command of 3371, and each man being granted one leave per year, 6742 single trips between Canada and Newfoundland are required. In addition, on the assumption that half the complement will be drafted each year and replaced by other personnel, a further 3371 single passages will be required. It is reasonable to assume however, that of men drafted approximately 500 will have had their leave prior to departure for Newfoundland or after draft to Canada, thus reducing the one way leave trips by 1000.

3. On the above assumptions and using round figures shore based personnel in this Command will require:

5000 single leave trips

3000 single duty trips

8000 single trips annually.

4. The personnel of sea-going ships primarily are granted leave while the ship is in a Canadian port for refit or other purposes; similarly the majority of drafting changes are made while the ships are in Canadian ports. There are however, instances of leave and drafting changes in Newfoundland, to the estimated number of 1000 per year, thus requiring 2000 single trips to Canada and return. The Newfoundland Railway have undertaken to make available 20 passages per week each way, a total of 2080 passages per year. This figure however, during the past few months, has been considerably reduced due to weather conditions and the consequent erratic operation of trains. It is nevertheless considered that transportation for sea-going personnel by the Newfoundland Railway, augmented by Service passages of approximately 2 per ship between St. John's and Halifax or Sydney, total numbers being dependent on the numbers of convoys, will be sufficient.

5. Newfoundland R.N. ratings taking leave in Newfoundland have been averaging 140 per month coming in by various methods and returning for the most part by S.S. *Fort Amherst* and S.S. *Fort Townsend*. The Agents have been providing about 50 passages per trip, an average of 140 per month, each ship making a round trip every three weeks. It is considered that additional outbound passages to the total accommodation of 100 per ship can be obtained if necessary. Passages to Newfoundland from Halifax cannot be estimated due to these ships coming up from New York.

6. In addition some personnel are willing to bear the additional expense of air transportation. These numbers are estimated at 30 outbound and 25 inbound trips per month, or 660 annually.

7. It will thus be seen that 8000 trips less 660 air trips, a net total of 7340 trips per year are required other than available by Newfoundland Railway, Service passage, or the *Fort* boats.

8. The Canadian Army Transport *Lady Rodney* normally makes 25 round trips per year between St. John's and Halifax, giving an annual single trip capacity of 25,000. Of this accommodation the R.C.A.F. and the Canadian Army estimate their requirements, other than by Newfoundland Railway, T.C.A. and Service Aircraft, at 34,742 single trips, which together with 7340 Navy trips, a total of 42,082, leaves an annual deficiency of 17,082 single trips.

9. The *Lady Rodney* is presently classified as a Canadian Army Transport, which gives priority to Army Personnel, which creates an undesirable distinction between the Services.

10. It is therefore submitted for favourable consideration:

- (1) That an additional vessel be chartered large enough to make good the deficiency in accommodation presently available, namely 17,000 single trips;
- (2) that the *Lady Rodney* and subsequently acquired transports be classified as a Joint Services transport giving equal transportation privileges to the three Services.

H. E. REID  
Commodore First Class, R.C.N.

737.

NPA S-5-9-1

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Services publics  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities  
to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 38-'43

[St. John's,] March 5, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

I annex copy of a memo<sup>1</sup> and annexure<sup>2</sup> addressed to me by the General Manager dealing with the locomotive situation.

2. It will be seen that out of 39 locomotives, 13 are from 27 to 40 years old and are either due to be scrapped or have been relegated to shunting. Some of the balance of 26 are due for heavy repairs.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

3. In view of the time which it will take to obtain new locomotives, and uncertainty as to what the traffic position will be, say, a year hence, I think we should adopt Mr. Russell's recommendation and order 4 new locomotives. Estimated cost \$290,000.

4. I do not think there is any likelihood of our being able to obtain locomotives from the United Kingdom, but we would try there as well as in Canada and U.S.A. and decide when we have received quotations.

5. It is quite possible that the Railway Reserve will be able to meet an expenditure of \$290,000 on this service in a year's time, but it is a long time ahead and we cannot be sure. Our present expectations are that the balance of the Reserve on 31st March, 1943, will be somewhere about \$970,000, after meeting (or providing for) all commitments on account of extra-ordinary expenditure to that date (bridge programme, improvement works, 1000 tons of track rails, share of Dockyard extension, share of Argentia railway depot and repayments to the U.S. Defence Supplies Corporation). Our commitments on extra-ordinary works to be met in 1943-44 will be as follows:

Bridge and other improvements programme

(P.U. 39-'43 of 6th March, 1943) .....	\$290,000
U.S. Defence Supplies Corporation .....	80,000
S.S. <i>Northton</i> .....	325,000
	<hr/>
	\$695,000

If there is even a small surplus on the operating account for 1943-44 the Reserve will just about meet these extra-ordinary expenditures and the cost of the 4 new engines. If 1943-44 pans out as well as we hope (i.e. with a surplus on operating account of \$368,000) we shall still have a balance in the Reserve on 31st March, 1944, after paying for the engines.

W. W. WOODS

738.

2892-40

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, September 23, 1943

Dear Mr. Burchell,

In reply to your letter of 16th September, 1943,<sup>1</sup> with reference to the construction of a freight shed at North Sydney, I confirm that the memorandum dated 8th September, 1943,<sup>2</sup> signed by Mr. J. M. Somerville, Secre-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



tary, Department of Public Works, Ottawa, a copy of which was annexed to your letter under reply, sets out correctly the arrangements therein referred to and that the Government of Newfoundland agrees to reimburse the Dominion Government for the cost of the shed which will amount to \$50,000.

Yours faithfully,  
W. W. Woods

739.

NPA S-5-9-1

*Le commissaire suppléant aux Services publics  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Commissioner for Public Utilities  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

G/373

[St. John's,] October 13, 1943

Dear Mr. Burchell,

The Government has had under consideration for some time the replacement of the *S.S. Caribou* lost, as you remember, by enemy action, by another ship to run between Port-aux-Basques and North Sydney. Inquiries both from the United Kingdom and Canada have disclosed the impossibility of obtaining a merchant ship for this purpose.

It has been suggested that there has been an excess of building of frigates in Canada and that it might be possible to purchase one now in the course of building at such a stage that the plans could be altered to convert her into a suitable conveyance.

I would be grateful if you would inquire whether this statement that there is an excess of frigates now building is correct and if so whether the Canadian Government would consider a proposal to sell us one now on the stocks and permit us to have it altered to suit our requirements.

Yours faithfully,  
L. E. EMERSON

740.

NPA S-5-9-1

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire suppléant  
aux Services publics*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

St. John's, November 6, 1943

Dear Mr. Emerson,

May I refer to your letter of October 13th, 1943, (your file G/373) in regard to the possibility of obtaining a frigate in Canada to replace the *S.S. Caribou*.

In reply, I am instructed to inform you that the Naval authorities of Canada state there is no excess production of frigates in Canada, and that in any case a frigate would be totally unsuited to the work in question. The opinion was expressed that the type of vessel required would be one of 4,000 tons, whereas the gross tonnage of frigates is 1250 tons. It was further stated that a ship to negotiate the waters mentioned would require construction somewhat similar to an icebreaker, and that frigates could not live very long if they were required to navigate the waters between Port-aux-Basques and North Sydney, during the winter and spring season.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

741.

NPA S-5-9-1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions à l'Administrateur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Administrator of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 58

[London,] February 14, 1946

Your telegram No. 454 of 28th December last.<sup>1</sup>

Following consultations with Shipbuilding Conference and with Crown Agents Captain Dalton made arrangements for five United Kingdom firms to tender for new vessels to replace *Caribou*, *Home* and *Clyde*.

Detailed quotations are expected early in March, but in the meantime Dalton has informed us that his investigations show that Fleming and Ferguson can offer best delivery dates viz: Large vessel in 14 months, and two smaller vessels in 16 and 18 months from dates of placing of orders. Next best delivery would be two years for large vessels and August and October 1947 for smaller ships.

Dalton points out that prices are high, and that Fleming and Ferguson estimate that cost of large vessel will approach but not exceed £280,000. Indications are, however, that other firms will not repeat not improve on this figure, and that general level of shipbuilding prices is unlikely to recede in near future.

In the circumstances we should be glad to learn whether Commission would be prepared in principle to agree to placing of orders in the United Kingdom subject to consideration of final tenders. Early indication of your views would be appreciated since Fleming and Ferguson are only Firm with berths available and they are likely to be kept open for short period only.

742.

NPA S-5-9-1

*L'Administrateur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Administrator of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 58

[St. John's,] February 20, 1946

Your telegram No. 58 ships for Newfoundland Railway. We agree.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

743.

NPA S-5-9-1

*Extrait du procès-verbal d'une réunion de la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Extract of Minutes of a Meeting of Commission of Government  
of Newfoundland*

643-'46

St. John's, July 19, 1946

The General Manager of the Railway was invited to the Meeting for the purpose of informing the Commission of the details of the proposal for the conversion of locomotives from coal to oil burning engines. He explained that the total cost of the conversion would be \$400,000; that he anticipated an annual saving of \$498,250 as a result of the change; and that it was possible to have oil burning locomotives in operation from St. John's to Bishop's Falls by May, 1947. It was agreed to authorize him to proceed to put his plans into effect.

W. J. CAREW  
Secretary

SOUS-SECTION vii/SUB-SECTION vii  
*LES RELEVÉS TOPOGRAPHIQUES*  
*SURVEYS*

744.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Mémoire du ministère des Affaires intérieures et de l'Éducation  
de Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum by Newfoundland Department of Home Affairs  
and Education*

[St. John's, ]

PREPARATION OF MAPS, ETC.

The war has necessitated the preparation of many types of maps of the Island. During the summer of 1940 the Surveys Branch of this Department compiled a special series of maps of the Island, comprising five sheets, at a scale of eight miles. These maps were subsequently sent to Ottawa where they were published by the Department of Mines and Resources with an acknowledgment of our co-operation. Based on the same compilations five aeronautical sheets have been issued confidentially for the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Two map sheets of southern Labrador extending to the sixtieth parallel of latitude were also prepared and forwarded to Ottawa for publication. These maps will be used as base maps on which aeronautical data will be represented.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> En juin 1939, le ministère de la Défense nationale voulait obtenir de l'information sur les criques de la côte du Labrador pouvant être utilisées par les sous-marins et les avions ennemis. Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures demanda la permission d'effectuer un vol de reconnaissance photographique. La permission fut accordée.

<sup>1</sup> In June, 1939 the Department of National Defence wished to obtain information about inlets on the Labrador coast that could be used by enemy submarines or aircraft. The Secretary of State for External Affairs sought permission for an aerial photographic reconnaissance. This was granted.

With the advent of the American Military Forces a demand was created for a general map of the Island. Such map has now been prepared and has been sent to the publishers. It has been projected on a scale of ten miles to the inch and the most recent surveys made have been utilized.

Surveys are now being undertaken for the purpose of preparing mile maps of the eastern seaboard to show the exact representations of the topographic features.

Planimetric sheets of sections of St. John's and environs have already been prepared at a large scale based on data already collected by the survey and have been distributed to the Canadian Military Forces who have found them of great service.

745.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

No. 14  
SECRET

Ottawa, June 5, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Department of National Defence desires to produce a 1/63,360 contoured map of the area around St. John's, Newfoundland, at the earliest possible date. Preliminary plans had been made for carrying out the necessary field work this summer, when it was discovered that the Newfoundland Government had already completed a large proportion of the work required.

Further inquiry in this matter has revealed that a considerable portion of the trained survey staff of the Newfoundland Government is now employed with the Canadian Army and the United States Engineers. It has been intimated, as a result of suggestions made by our Commander in Newfoundland, that any assistance which the Department of National Defence can lend in the survey and mapping work would be particularly welcome.

The Department of National Defence has asked me to communicate to you their offer of assistance, and to inform you that Lt.-Colonel J. E. Lyon will be despatched to St. John's during the latter half of June, with authority to discuss and arrange for the completion of this important mapping work.

I have etc.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs



746.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

No. 17

Ottawa, June 20, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that at the request of the Minister of National Defence for Air, I have today instructed the Canadian Minister at Washington to request the State Department to ascertain if the United States air forces now in Newfoundland would be prepared, if the Newfoundland Government agrees, to undertake a photographic survey of the Labrador coast.

My despatch to the Canadian Minister at Washington reads in part as follows:

Existing maps and surveys of the Labrador coast are not accurate and are not adequate for operations along this coast. It was intended that the Royal Canadian Air Force should undertake a photographic survey of the Labrador coast this year but in view of the new commitments being undertaken by the Royal Canadian Navy, i.e., the Newfoundland escort force, all available Royal Canadian Air Force flying boats will be required to co-operate with this force and other naval forces.

I am informed that the United States Navy has several flying boats at Argentia and that the United States Army Air Corps have aircraft at Newfoundland Airport. If these aircraft could be used it would relieve Canadian flying boats for escort duty.

The Minister of National Defence for Air states that if the Royal Canadian Air Force can assist in any way in supplying photographic equipment and camera operators, details can be arranged between the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command and the appropriate United States Officer Commanding in Newfoundland.

I am informing the Newfoundland Government of this proposal and am asking them for their co-operation and for permission from them for the United States forces to carry out this very necessary survey.

I should be most grateful if the Newfoundland Government would give their co-operation to this survey and would grant permission for the United States forces to carry it out.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

747.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le vice-président de la commission pour Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Vice-Chairman of Commission of Government of Newfoundland to  
Secretary of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, June 21, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of June 6th<sup>1</sup> respecting the visit of Lt.-Colonel J. E. Lyon of the Department of National Defence to discuss and arrange for the completion of the contoured map on the scale of 1/63,360 of an area around St. John's. The Department of Natural Resources will be glad to co-operate with Lt.-Colonel J. E. Lyon in survey and mapping work and to discuss with him plans for the completion of this important work.

I have etc.

J. C. PUDDSTER

748.

9475-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 257

Washington, June 24, 1941

Your despatch No. 841 of June 19th.<sup>1</sup> We asked the State Department today whether the United States would make a photographic survey of the Labrador coast. On their own initiative, and without reference to our request, State Department are telegraphing their Consul General at St. John's instructing him to notify the Newfoundland Government under Article No. 10 Bases Agreement<sup>2</sup> that the United States, in cooperation with Canadian forces, would make a survey of the east coast of Labrador, limited to selecting landing fields.

Our request for a complete survey, which is considerably broader in scope, is receiving immediate sympathetic consideration.

749.

9475-40

*Le chargé d'affaires aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chargé d'Affaires in United States to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 2389

Washington, August 12, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 986 of July 22nd, 1941,<sup>1</sup> and previous correspondence concerning the proposal that the United States authorities should undertake a photographic survey of the Labrador coast.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix B.

We have now been advised unofficially by the State Department that this question is now before the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and that it has been the subject of discussion between the Canadian and United States members of the Board.

In the circumstances, the State Department intend to leave the matter to be settled by the Board and will not send an official reply to our Aide Mémoire of June 23, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY  
for the Chargé d'Affaires

750.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

...

*United States Army*

...

Contact between Canadian and U.S. mapping personnel indicated there was an area in southern Labrador for which no maps suitable for military air operations were available. Arrangements were made for the U.S. Army to make the necessary aerial photographs for mapping this area to facilitate defence operations from Newfoundland. A U.S. Army photographic party is in Newfoundland and will use B-17 aircraft for the purpose. Low clouds and adverse weather may delay procurement of the necessary photographs.

...

751.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 10-11, 1941

...

*United States Army*

...

United States Army Air Forces photographed, for mapping purposes, a very large area of Labrador between the Strait of Belle Isle and latitude of 57° N. A map of the area photographed is available for the information of the Board and will be furnished the R.C.A.F. members at this meeting. The numbering and printing of the photographs has just started. About 57 rolls of film were exposed on the job. United States and Canadian mapping agencies have been in correspondence regarding details.

...

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

*Mémorandum pour la CPCAD<sup>1</sup>**Memorandum for PJBD<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa,] May 16, 1942

PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF AREAS IN  
CANADA AND LABRADOR

The R.C.A.F. Member reports that, in connection with the air photographic survey of certain areas in Canada and Labrador commenced in 1941 and to be extended into 1942,<sup>2</sup> provision has been made by Canada for funds to cover the ground control to be undertaken by Canada, and the U.S. Army Air Corps and R.C.A.F. have co-ordinated the work to be undertaken by the U.S.A.A.C. under conditions mutually agreeable to both countries and deemed to be a part of the war effort.

The conditions under which such photography is to be done, include the following,

1. All information regarding ground control in Canada established for the purpose of these surveys by the Canadian Government will be made available to the United States Government.
2. Prints of all photographs made on the surveys will be supplied to the Canadian Government for the Air Photographic Library of the Department of Mines and Resources. Also one complete set of prints of areas photographed in Labrador will be supplied to the Newfoundland Government.
3. Copies of all maps and plans prepared by plotting the information obtained from the photographs will be supplied to the Department of National Defence (Air) in Canada. Copies of maps and plans of areas in Labrador will be supplied to the Newfoundland Government.
4. Such photographs will not be used for commercial purposes without prior agreement of the Governments concerned.\*

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<sup>1</sup> L'auteur de ce document est inconnu.

<sup>1</sup> Authorship of this document is unknown.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 682.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 682.

\* Notes telles que dans l'original:

\* Notes as in original:

Dr. Keenleyside: Could I have your comments on the above plan? F. V. HEAKES 16.5.42

Suggested to Heakes that this be discussed with Camsell.\*\* If he agrees, we approve. HLK

\*\* Charles Camsell, sous-ministre des Mines et des Ressources.

\*\* Charles Camsell, Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources.



753.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, May 6-7, 1943

. . .

*United States Navy*

. . .

- (b) Labrador—A joint U.S. Navy and Army survey party is being sent to Labrador on or about July 1, 1943 to chart the waters and rivers of that sector.

. . .

## SOUS-SECTION viii/SUB-SECTION viii

*LA CENSURE**CENSORSHIP*

754.

724-D-39

*Le sous-ministre associé suppléant de la Défense nationale*  
*au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Associate Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence to*  
*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

HQS 8118-18 (c)

Ottawa, February 28, 1940

Dear Sir,

I attach hereto copy of a communication received by this Department from Mr. S. Finlayson, Deputy General Manager, Canadian Marconi Co., Montreal. Mr. Finlayson asks that the radiotelephone circuit between Canada and Newfoundland be re-opened.

It will be recalled that earlier correspondence on this subject passed between this Department and the Department of External Affairs, which led to the decision not to re-open the circuit.

In view of the fact, however, that the Hon. L. E. Emerson, Commissioner of Justice and Attorney General of Newfoundland, is at present in Ottawa, it is felt that Mr. Finlayson's communication might appropriately be taken up with him.

Yours sincerely,

H. DESROSIER

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le gérant général adjoint de Canadian Marconi Company  
au chef de la censure télégraphique<sup>1</sup>*

*Deputy General Manager, Canadian Marconi Company,  
to Chief Telegraph Censor<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

Montreal, February 12, 1940

Sir,

We would like to confirm the substance of our discussions on February 1st, relative to the possibility of re-establishing the radiotelephone service between Montreal and St. John's, Newfoundland, on a basis that would be acceptable to your Administration.

This service was inaugurated on January 11th, 1939, and suspended at the request of the Newfoundland Government on August 31st, 1939. Simultaneously, the Newfoundland Government ordered suspension of the inland radiotelephone services between St. John's and the Grand Falls area, and between St. John's and the Burin area in Newfoundland. These telephone services function in the same way as the main circuit from St. John's to Montreal, and, in part, as feeders thereto.

On December 13th, the Newfoundland Government permitted the re-establishment of these latter services on the basis that the national service was properly safeguarded under a code of control, a copy of which is shown in Appendix "A"<sup>2</sup> to this letter.

Upon re-establishment of the inland services, our Associates, the Avalon Telephone Company, who operate those services as well as the Newfoundland terminal of the main circuit, made application to the Newfoundland Government for permission to re-establish the main service. We are now informed that the Newfoundland Government is willing to permit the resumption of operations on the clear understanding that no conversations on subjects liable to be of interest to the enemy will be permitted. We are further informed that the Government Officials and the Chief Censor, Major Haig-Smith, are desirous of having the service re-opened for the purpose of restoring to Newfoundland, to the greatest extent possible, the advantages that this service provides the people of that country, who presently are completely cut off from the telephonic communication with the North American continent. We therefore beg formally to request that permission be granted by the Government of Canada for the re-establishment of this service on the understanding that:

1. The secrecy equipment is employed at all times.
2. People desiring to use the service be informed that their conversations must not deal with certain subjects.
3. If desired, special arrangements may be made to permit officers of the Censorship Staff in Montreal to monitor conversations directly.

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<sup>1</sup> Le Lieutenant-colonel W. W. Murray.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit. /

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. Murray.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Our experience during the period that the circuit was in operation indicates that the majority of the normal calls are concerned with social and ordinary business subjects, and it is therefore probable that the public as a whole would not be materially restricted in its use of the circuit; on the contrary, it would appear that the re-establishment of the service would be of considerable value to the peoples of Newfoundland and Canada in the promotion of their mutual interest.

I have etc.

S. FINLAYSON

755.

724-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre associé suppléant de la Défense nationale  
Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to  
Associate Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence*

Ottawa, March 7, 1940

Dear Sir,

I am writing with reference to your letter of February 28th, HQS 8118-18(c), concerning the question of re-opening the radiotelephone circuit between Canada and Newfoundland.

As you suggested, this question was discussed with Mr. L. E. Emerson, Commissioner of Justice and Attorney General of Newfoundland, while he was in Ottawa recently. Mr. Emerson was not in a position to say just how important this question was and it was proposed to him that on his return to Newfoundland he might look into the matter and have a report prepared. This report will, in due course, be sent to us and I shall communicate with you again immediately on its receipt.

I should also add that it was further suggested to Mr. Emerson that the question of transit calls through Canada destined to the United Kingdom or Europe over the channel from New York now available was one which might appropriately be taken up with the United Kingdom authorities.

Yours very sincerely,

LAURENT BEAUDRY

756.

724-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve  
Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, May 30, 1940

The Chief Telegraph Censor here has been informed by the Chief Censor of Newfoundland that the radio-telephone service between Newfoundland

and Canada is to be resumed. This question has been under consideration and it is felt that the re-opening of this channel would perhaps be dangerous.

During his recent visit Mr. Emerson undertook to investigate the matter in St. John's and to send me a report. I should be grateful if this report could be forwarded as soon as possible in order to guide us in reaching a final decision.

757.

724-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's, June 3, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL Your telegram 30th May, radio telephony service between Canada Newfoundland. Mr. Emerson undertook to report conversation in St. John's and did so. As result Major Haig-Smith, Secretary Posts and Telegraphs, who visited Ottawa in April, discussed the matter with the Chief Telegraph Censor at Ottawa who at that time saw no serious objection to re-establishment of service under proper control. This control would take form of monitorial service in Canada and there will be similar supervision here. It is understood that incoming and outgoing calls would be subjected to censorship in Canada for which facilities already exist but it would not be practicable to exercise same censorship here. In view of these precautions we felt that any element of danger would be removed and Major Haig-Smith's discussion in Ottawa left the matter on this basis. Unless you consider circumstances have so far altered since the middle of April as to necessitate change of attitude, we should regard resumption of service under above conditions with favour and be prepared to express formal approval. General advantages of resuming services are obvious.

758.

724-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 17

Ottawa, June 18, 1940

Reference my telegram May 30th, radio-telephone service.

Upon further consideration here it has been decided that this channel of communication had better be opened. The Marconi Company in Montreal inform me that they can be ready to give service on June 22nd.

All calls will be routed through the Bell Telephone terminal station in Montreal and censored there.

Some time ago the Chief Censor, St. John's, gave to the Chief Telegraph Censor here the regulations regarding the use of the local radio-telephone



service in Newfoundland. The Chief Telegraph Censor here is putting into force regulations essentially similar to these to control the new Newfoundland-Canada service and it is suggested that the Newfoundland Censor might take similar action at your end.

759.

724-D-39

*Mémorandum du chef de la censure télégraphique*

*Memorandum by Chief Telegraph Censor*

Ottawa, June 18, 1940

NOTE: Telephone operators will read the following instructions to persons making a radiotelephone call between Canada and Newfoundland.

- (1) Your call will be accepted, subject to censorship.
- (2) You are cautioned that you must not discuss anything likely to convey information to the enemy.
- (3) You must *Not* mention names of ships or of any seaports.
- (4) You must not say anything that would reveal the movements of ships.
- (5) You must not discuss the movement of troops, or mention troop formations or equipment.
- (6) You must not discuss the movements of aircraft.
- (7) You must not discuss the weather, or meteorological conditions in either Canada or Newfoundland.
- (8) You must not refer to the operation of navigation aids.
- (9) You must not discuss the despatch or arrival of direct mails to or from Europe, Canada or the United States.
- (10) If you violate any of these instructions the telephone connection will be severed.
- (11) All conversations will be in English or French.

W. W. MURRAY  
Lieut.-Colonel

760.

724-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chef de la censure télégraphique*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chief Telegraph Censor*

Ottawa, July 10, 1940

Dear Sir,

This will confirm your telephone conversation with Mr. Stone this afternoon concerning the use of the Canada-Newfoundland radiotelephone service as follows:

1. It is understood that calls between the United States Consul General or Consul in St. John's, Newfoundland, and the State Department in Washington will be passed subject to censorship.
2. It is understood that, in accordance with the wishes of the Newfoundland Censorship, no business calls from the United States will be accepted over this channel.

Yours very sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

761.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Ressources naturelles à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Natural Resources to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, August 12, 1940

VISIT OF INSPECTOR FRASER, RANGER FORCE, TO NORTHERN NFLD.

In accordance with decision taken at the meeting of the Commission of Government on July 6th, 1940, Inspector Fraser was instructed to proceed to Northern Newfoundland. In company with a representative of the Chief Censor, Inspector Fraser left Whitbourne by train on the 7th. and arrived at Corner Brook on the 8th. On the following day the party left by Customs Cutter *Shulamite* for St. Anthony via Port Saunders and Flowers Cove.

Calls were made en route at various points to arrange for censorship regulations to insure secrecy. On July 11th. the party reached St. Lunaire Bay where an inspection was made in accordance with instructions. Nothing of interest to the officers concerned was noted. The Southwest and Northwest arms of this Bay provide excellent anchorage for fair sized ships. Later in the day the party reached St. Anthony. While at St. Anthony arrangements were made, after consultation with authorities in St. John's, for adequate censorship of the Marconi stations at Battle Harbour, Forteau and Pointe Amour.

On the 12th. the party left for Battle Harbour, and arrived there some five hours later. Forteau and Henley Harbour were visited. On the return trip and whilst rounding Cape St. Anthony a naval craft was sighted proceeding into Crémillière Bay. On arriving at St. Anthony on the 13th. the Inspector learned that a naval party had landed there during his absence. It was learned also that detachments of men had been posted on the North shore from Cook's Hr. east. The Inspector proceeded to Crémillière Bay and met the Commander of the Canadian naval craft, who expressed his appreciation of the action of the Commission of Government. He outlined the action he had taken, and introduced the Inspector to the officers in charge of the other forces. In all, six small parties had been landed at the

following places: Cooks Hr., Pistolet Bay, Ha-Ha Bay, Quirpon, Griquet and St. Lunaire Bay. These were to make reconnaissances. A destroyer had also made a thorough search of the *area involved*. On the 14th. the Canadian naval craft left to pick up the detachments which had been landed, the information received having been regarded as unreliable.

In the course of his investigations, the Inspector made arrangements for his detachments to report in special code any unusual events.

On the 17th. July the Inspector made a special patrol of the *involved area* by the m.v. *St. Barbe*. Nothing of interest was noted, and he returned to St. John's, where he reported in detail to me, the Commissioner for Justice, and to Captain Schwerdt.

Some suggestions respecting mail and instructions to friendly aliens made by the Inspector in his reports have been passed to the Departments concerned.

J. H. GORVIN

762.

724-D-39

*Le chef de la censure télégraphique au premier secrétaire, ministère  
des Affaires extérieures*

*Chief Telegraph Censor to First Secretary, Department  
of External Affairs*

Ottawa, October 12, 1940

Dear Mr. Stone,

May I recall to you our telephone conversation of two days ago when we discussed the desirability of opening the Newfoundland-Canada radio telephone for general traffic, to and from the United States. Instances had arisen of United States officers seeking to telephone their homes in New York. Our regulations were not sufficiently elastic to permit this.

At the same time a St. John's business man had to be prevented from telephoning to Boston on what has since been notified to me as "semi-official" business.

Since the whole picture has been changed recently in the triangular set-up with regard to Canada, Newfoundland and the United States, it is, of course, desirable that I take cognizance of the change. It would appear to be insufficient to restrict the use of the radiotelephone to United States government business, for the term can not always be strictly defined. I can see where vast amounts of stores will have to be purchased in the United States for not only official but civilian personnel working on United States projects in Newfoundland and the question of whether negotiations relating to these would be held government business or not is too academic to bother with.

In general, I think the position is this: the people who want to telephone from Newfoundland to the United States are exactly the same people who would be telephoning from Newfoundland to Canada. I do not think there

would be any more danger in permitting calls to the United States than to Canada. Consequently, armed with your expressed concurrence in this opinion, I advised the Newfoundland Censor accordingly. I have today had his agreement by telegram; and he proposes that the extension of the facilities to United States general traffic be embarked upon immediately.

I feel sure this further concession would be welcomed by the United States administration.

Yours very truly

W. W. MURRAY, Lt.-Col.

763.

724-D-39

*Le chef de la censure télégraphique au premier secrétaire, ministère  
des Affaires extérieures*

*Chief Telegraph Censor to First Secretary, Department  
of External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 14, 1940

Dear Mr. Stone,

The extension of the privilege of using the Newfoundland-Canada radiotelephone to callers to and from the United States raises another point, which I have endeavoured to decide temporarily. It is the matter of censoring such calls.

For the time being I have instructed the telephone company to require his operators in the Montreal office, through which these calls are channelled, to read to callers and recipients of calls the instructions which govern the radiotelephone users in Newfoundland and Canada.

Under the strict interpretation of our Censorship Regulations, such calls would merely be in transit through Canada; and such being the case, we would have no business with them beyond noting their content. I do not feel disposed, however, to confine myself strictly to that interpretation, for I believe it would not be in the national interest so to do. The Newfoundland people rely on us more for the censoring of these calls than they do on themselves, consequently I propose to treat them in the same way as calls terminal to Canada are treated.

The point then arises—perhaps a purely technical point—of the extent to which we can instruct the citizen of a foreign country (the United States) to adhere to our Regulations in radiotelephone calls that are not terminal to Canada. I would suggest that a brief instruction along the lines of the one I enclose be drafted, and that the telephone operators be required to read the instructions to United States callers.

The instruction makes it clear that the callers are being given the privilege of using the radiotelephone as a matter of courtesy on the part of the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland, that these countries are at war with



a foreign power, and that the facilities offered are available only if the callers abide by the precautions which these Governments deem necessary in their own interest.

There follow then the few simple regulations which are a digest of those governing the use of the radiotelephone in Canada and Newfoundland.

I would be glad to have your views on the matter which, as I say, may be purely technical, but which, with the dangers to which the use of the circuit exposes our own operations, strikes me nevertheless as quite important.

Yours very truly,

W. W. MURRAY  
Lieut.-Colonel

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum du chef de la censure télégraphique*  
*Memorandum by Chief Telegraph Censor*

HQS 8118-18(c)

Ottawa, October 14, 1940

NEWFOUNDLAND-CANADA TELEPHONE INSTRUCTION NO. 2.

NOTE: Telephone operators are requested to read the following instructions to persons making radiotelephone calls between Newfoundland-Canada-United States:

- (a) You are asked to bear in mind that your call is permitted through the courtesy of the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland.
- (b) You are reminded that these Governments are at war with certain foreign powers, and they have therefore found it advisable to impose restrictions on conversations by radiotelephone. It is requested that you abide by these restrictions, otherwise the telephone connection will be severed. These restrictions are as follows:
  1. You must speak in English or French.
  2. You must *Not* mention the names of British or Allied ships or of British or Allied seaports.<sup>1</sup>
  3. You must not say anything that would reveal the movements of British or Allied ships, troops or aircraft.
  4. You must not discuss the weather or meteorological conditions in Canada or Newfoundland.
  5. You must not refer to the operation of navigation aids.
  6. You must not discuss the despatch or arrival of mails to or from Europe, Canada, Newfoundland or the United States.

<sup>1</sup> Ultérieurement amendé pour:

<sup>1</sup> Subsequently amended to read:

You must *Not* mention the names of ships or seaports.

764.

724-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

No. 19

Ottawa, June 25, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I have received a request from the Press Censors for Canada to take up with you the possibility of a closer co-ordination between press censorship policy in Newfoundland and in this country regarding the announcement of the arrival of survivors or passengers at Newfoundland ports.

The Press Censors informed me that three weeks ago the Press of Canada was requested to eliminate port datelines and certain precise phrases regarding arrivals, the objective being to remove from press items of this nature all direct or indirect indications that might assist an enemy agent in compiling precise information about the movement of shipping. This arrangement appears to be working out quite well.

The Canadian Press Censor in Halifax, however, has been recently somewhat embarrassed in his relations with the newspapers by reason of the fact that despatches sent from St. John's, Newfoundland, contain information which the above arrangement is designed to keep out of our own press. Similar information is published on occasion in Newfoundland papers, copies of which circulate in Canada. In consequence, our newspapers make the point that if such news can be printed in Newfoundland and circulated here, why should they not enjoy the privilege of publishing similar information about activities in Halifax, Saint John and other Canadian ports.

The Press Censors, therefore, desire me to point out that they would be materially assisted in their work if the Newfoundland authorities could see their way clear to arrange:

- (a) That the Press of Newfoundland treat survivor or arrival news in the same manner as it is treated in Canada; and
- (b) That the Newfoundland Cable Censor eliminate from cables addressed to Halifax or other Canadian points all details of the arrival of shipping in Newfoundland ports.

I should be most grateful if you would be good enough to discuss this matter with the Newfoundland Press and Cable Censorship authorities and let me have their views. For your further information, I attach herewith two copies of a memorandum of May 31st<sup>1</sup> from the Press Censors for Canada, concerning the treatment of the news of ship arrivals at Canadian ports, and two copies of the Press Censors Directive No. 84<sup>2</sup> on the general subject of shipping.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
 for the Secretary of State  
 for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

765.

724-X-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, July 14, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your letter No. 19, of the 25th June, 1941, in connection with the question of closer co-ordination between the press censorship policy in Newfoundland and in Canada. We here would entirely welcome this as it has been felt and advocated that closer co-ordination is desirable in all phases of censorship.

The press here have repeatedly pointed out, with apparent justification, that much of the information published in Canada has not been permitted in Newfoundland, and I append copies of telegrams<sup>1</sup> received here which have been suppressed, the information contained in which was published in the Canadian press. Copies of correspondence in connection with the publication of the loss of the *Nerissa*, which passed between the Chief Censor here and the Censorship Authorities in Canada, are also attached.<sup>2</sup> The embarrassment occasioned in that instance was somewhat disconcerting in view of the definite instructions received from the Admiralty.

So far as has been possible no reports have emanated from Newfoundland which have mentioned the names of ships damaged or sunk by enemy action. The fact that survivors have been landed here has, in fact, been published but dates, names of ships sunk or rescuing, or of personnel, have not been passed. On several occasions telegrams have been received from Canada asking for stories of so many words length and furnishing the names of both lost and rescuing ships, and a careful watch was kept on all replies.

The press in Newfoundland does not publish information of the arrival or departure of shipping in Newfoundland and telegrams containing such information are not passed. We would be very grateful here if any instances, such as those referred to in the third paragraph of your letter, could be brought under notice in order that suitable steps can be taken to avert recurrences of what appear to have been isolated failures on the part of the censoring staff here.

From the foregoing it will be seen that as regards (a) the Newfoundland censorship exercises an even more stringent censorship than is done in Canada, and (b) that this is already being done.

I thank you for the copies of the "Memorandum on handling of ship arrivals at Canadian Ports", of 31st May 1941,<sup>3</sup> and directive No. 84 of the 19th April 1941,<sup>2</sup> and would suggest that closer co-ordination would be

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

achieved if the Canadian Censorship authorities could find it convenient to furnish the Chief Censor here with two copies of such directives and instructions as are issued, for his information.

I need hardly assure you of our earnest desire to co-operate in every possible direction in this matter.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

766.

724-X-39

*Le censeur de la presse du Canada au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Press Censor for Canada to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, August 13, 1941

Dear Mr. Robertson,

With reference to the co-ordination of Canadian and Newfoundland censorship referred to in yours of July 21st, 1941,<sup>1</sup> I am glad to be able to report that as a result of discussions which took place at Halifax between Messrs. Charpentier and Jefferson of our branch, and Messrs. Bellamy and Clarke of the Newfoundland Censorship, we have come to a satisfactory understanding with the Newfoundland authorities.

This is confirmed in a letter from Mr. Haig-Smith to Major Rayner dated July 29th,<sup>1</sup> a copy of a portion of which Major Rayner has been good enough to send us for our records.

Sincerely yours,

W. EGGLESTON

767.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions  
Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 188

[St. John's,] June 1, 1943

Following a visit of Canadian newspapermen to Goose Bay, Labrador, a series of articles giving undesirably detailed information about the Goose Bay Airport and the use which is being made of it has recently been published in the Canadian Press. An article on the Airport, stating that it was in Labrador but without mentioning its name, had previously been published in the American *Saturday Evening Post* of April 17th. No prior reference was made to the Newfoundland Government or the Newfoundland Censorship regarding these publications.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



The Newfoundland Press had hitherto on advice of censorship here maintained silence regarding this Airport, although they have now copied the Canadian articles.

The Commission of Government views with concern the publication without any reference to it of such information regarding defence installations and activities in Newfoundland territory. The references made in the Canadian Press to probable post-war use of the Goose Airport are also unfortunate in the absence of any prior statement by the Commission of Government and may cause us serious embarrassment.

That the present is not an isolated instance will be seen by reference to examples quoted in my Confidential Despatch and enclosures, No. 97, of 20th April.<sup>1</sup>

We should be glad if representations could be made in Ottawa and Washington to ensure so far as is possible that prior reference is made to the Commission of Government or the Newfoundland Censorship before the release of information regarding defence installations or hostile action in Newfoundland territory.

768.

724-D-39

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité consultatif sur les services  
de renseignements et de la sécurité*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Advisory Committee on Intelligence and Security*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 14, 1944

. . .

2. RADIO-TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION WITH NEWFOUNDLAND

The Chairman<sup>2</sup> recalled to the Committee the fact that because concern had been expressed by the Services over the circuit between Montreal and Newfoundland being used for social calls, and the necessity for cutting a very large percentage of calls because of objectionable matter being passed by the parties talking, Canada had agreed in principle with the United Kingdom that the circuit should be restricted to official calls sponsored by the Government, if the other parties concerned were agreeable. The restriction was now in process of being effected, but this involved the working out of appropriate official lists. Newfoundland was prepared to co-operate with the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom in restricting the use of the circuit there to sponsored calls, and it was believed that this should substantially reduce the security hazard. It might be possible at the next meeting of the Committee to indicate exactly what was being put into effect.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> W. Eggleston, directeur de la censure.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> W. Eggleston, Director of Censorship.

Mr. Glazebrook<sup>1</sup> said the list which was being prepared was the same type of list which was being used for communication with London, and would, he felt sure, be quite satisfactory.

The Committee expressed its approval of the steps being taken.

...

769.

724-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 442

St. John's, October 4, 1944

Sir,

The Newfoundland authorities have requested me to convey an invitation to the Canadian Censorship to send a representative to Newfoundland in the near future to discuss the regulations governing the use of the radio telephone service between Newfoundland and Canada, and the most practical method of giving effect to Canadian security requirements. They have indicated that they would be prepared to send a representative to continue the discussions at Ottawa later on if it is thought desirable.

2. I have no detailed information as to the exact points at issue. I understand, however, that there has been considerable discussion between the Chief Censor and the United Kingdom Censorship authorities as to the efficiency of the telephone censorship in Newfoundland. The Newfoundland Chief Censor, who is at present in the United Kingdom, is expected to return in the next few days.

3. I would be glad if the invitation could be forwarded to the censorship authorities, and, if they can arrange to accept the invitation, to let me know who will be coming and the date that would be most convenient.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

770.

724-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 350

Ottawa, November 16, 1944

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 442 of October 4th, concerning the invitation from the Newfoundland authorities to Canadian

<sup>1</sup> Représentant le ministère des Affaires extérieures.

<sup>1</sup> Representing the Department of External Affairs.

Censorship to send a representative to Newfoundland to discuss the question of censorship of the radio-telephone circuit between Newfoundland and Canada.

Since the receipt of your despatch under reference we have had a despatch from the Office of the High Commissioner in London stating that the Dominions Office "have been advised that the Newfoundland Government would like to have a representative of the Canadian Censorship go to Newfoundland to talk with the Newfoundland Censorship authority on the interpretation of the regulations governing the use of the radio-telephone service and the best method of giving effect to Canadian security requirements". The despatch also says that the Newfoundland authorities hope that this visit of a Canadian representative will be followed by a return visit by the Newfoundland Chief Censor in the near future.

This matter has been discussed with the Director of Censorship and we are advised that, if desired by the Newfoundland authorities, the Chief Telegraph Censor, Mr. E. A. Martin, will be glad to make a visit to St. John's in the near future.

The circuit in question is, in part, the radio-telephone service between St. John's and Canada and is carried through Montreal to the United States. For your own information, there has been considerable dissatisfaction on the part of those concerned with security here on the large number of calls on this circuit, which have had to be interrupted by Canadian censors in Montreal because of breaches of security. This monitoring in Montreal, however, does not prevent the calls from being a possible source of information to the enemy, especially by interception from submarines.

The principal measure of improvement which has been suggested is an effective monitoring arrangement at St. John's. At present we understand that the monitors are ordinary operators in the employment of the Telephone Company.

There has been correspondence over a period of some months between the Canadian Director of Censorship and Major Haig-Smith, and no satisfactory agreement has been reached. The matter was considered so serious here that it was taken up with the United Kingdom authorities.

If Mr. Martin's visit is to serve any useful purpose, we should first like to be assured that it is still desired by the Newfoundland authorities. It would be of help if you could ascertain their attitude and report to us.

If Mr. Martin goes to St. John's, he will be instructed to call upon you first and we should be glad of any assistance which you may be able to give him. He would also be able to furnish you with any further information you may desire.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

771.

724-D-39

*Mémoire du chef de la censure télégraphique  
au directeur de la censure*

*Memorandum from Chief Telegraph Censor  
to Director of Censorship*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 17, 1945

SUBJECT: REPORT ON VISIT TO NEWFOUNDLAND

As agreed I proceeded to St. John's, Newfoundland, on February 20th to discuss with Major Haig-Smith, the Chief Censor in Newfoundland, certain aspects of Telecommunications censorship, particularly the censorship of conversations passing over the Canada-Newfoundland Radio-Telephone circuit.

After discussing the subject briefly with Mr. J. S. Macdonald, the Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland, and Commander Thomson, Canadian Naval Intelligence and Security Officer stationed at St. John's, I had several meetings with Major Haig-Smith with whom I discussed the following subjects:

1. *Radio Telephone Censorship*

Major Haig-Smith felt that to restrict the use of the circuit to government or government-sponsored calls, as proposed by Mr. Eggleston, was too drastic a step to take at this late stage of the war. I agreed that this step should, if possible, be avoided, and pointed out that this proposal had only been made after it was learned that other less drastic proposals had not been acceptable to the Newfoundland authorities. I stated that if proper control and one hundred percent censorship were applied at both ends of the circuit further restrictions would not be necessary.

Major Haig-Smith then suggested that one hundred percent censorship at one end of the circuit should suffice and, because of a shortage of staff at his end, felt that this might well be applied at the Canadian end. I explained to him that when an indiscretion occurs at the Newfoundland end it serves little purpose to cut at the Canadian end since by so doing we only deprive the Canadian party of the objectionable part of the conversation while it is still going out over the air and capable of being monitored. For this reason the conversation should be interrupted at the point where the breach occurs. Haig-Smith, who had been under the impression that by cutting the circuit at Montreal the call was severed at both ends, now agreed that his suggestion would be impracticable.

In order to help overcome his staff difficulties, I offered to lend him one of our experienced telephone censors. Haig-Smith appreciated this offer, but said that he could not accept it and this for political reasons. The Newfoundland people, he believed, might



resent being censored by a Canadian rather than by a Newfoundlander, and felt that this might result in an increase in the number of complaints on the part of the callers.

Haig-Smith added that he had many complaints from persons who have occasion to use the telephone between Newfoundland and Canada stating that the censors are too strict. On being told, however, that they had been speaking over a *radio-telephone* circuit the complaints were in most cases withdrawn. I stated that we in Canada have had very very few complaints, and suggested that before the connection is established the Newfoundland party be reminded (as we do in Canada before the "warning" is read) that his conversation is going over the air and that it might be intercepted by the enemy. Both Haig-Smith and Mr. Morris, Superintendent of the Avalon Telephone Company whom we visited together, agreed to institute this procedure immediately and feel that it will eliminate many complaints.

I showed Haig-Smith many examples of violations of regulations which had occurred during the months of January and February of this year, and pointed out that these were verbatim transcriptions of records of conversations taken by our telephone censors at Montreal. He was grateful for this information which will enable him to take the matter up with those responsible. Conversations are not recorded in Newfoundland, and Haig-Smith was not aware that copies of intercepts sent him in the past were actually transcriptions of recorded conversations.

As a result of our discussion Haig-Smith has agreed to tighten the control at his end. The calls will be censored by the radio technicians who control the circuit, and not by telephone operators. In addition to the usual warning that is read to the caller before the connection is established, the Newfoundland party will be reminded that his conversation is going over the air and capable of being monitored. The radio technicians will be fully instructed on the necessity of applying the regulations on the spot. Haig-Smith has asked me to send him an extra copy of our telephone censorship regulations and the interpretation to be given these instructions by those whose duty it is to censor Radio-Telephone calls. This I promised to do. Should these steps fail to bring the necessary results Haig-Smith will place one of his censors in the telephone exchange to supervise Radio-Telephone censorship.

On my arrival at Montreal on March 6th, after visiting our stations in the Maritime Provinces, I was informed by our Principal Censor that there has already been a decided improvement on the Canada-Newfoundland circuit, and that over a period of a week it had not been necessary at any time to cut conversations at this end because of infractions at the Newfoundland end.

These subjects were discussed in an atmosphere of goodwill and co-operation. We now understand our mutual problems, and I think I am safe in saying that we shall not encounter any further difficulties.

E. A. MARTIN

SECTION B  
LES AUTRES RELATIONS DE DÉFENSE  
OTHER DEFENCE RELATIONS

SOUS-SECTION i/SUB-SECTION i  
*LES PROPRIÉTÉS*  
*PROPERTY*

772.

1156-Y-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland*  
*to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, October 2, 1940

Sir,

As progress with the establishment of the Canadian defences in Newfoundland has now reached that stage where the expropriation of private lands on behalf of the Government of Canada must take place, the Commission of Government is of opinion that some method of procedure should be adopted which will be satisfactory to your Government.

2. It would appear that such expropriation should be carried out as a war measure under powers conferred upon the Government by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1940, copy of which I annex hereto.<sup>1</sup> This Act as you will note endows the Executive Government with those extensive powers which are now common form throughout the Empire.

3. The Government of Newfoundland considers that it would be appropriate to appoint an advisory board consisting of say three members, to deal with all questions in which the expropriation of private lands for war purposes are [sic] involved. This Board would, it is suggested, be presided over by a Judge of our Supreme Court and would make full examination into all questions of values, whether the property is to be taken for long or short terms, and would advise the Government as to the amounts to be paid. The Government would then be in a position to submit these to your Government before your becoming bound by any Agreement. You would thus have the advantage of an independent survey of the situation in each case, to which would be added such advice as we could tender you before final decision is made.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

4. Two points will be appreciated as of importance (1) that the taxpayer of Canada must be protected to the fullest extent in the negotiations for the acquisition of these properties, and (2) that the public of Newfoundland must be satisfied that the board which considers matters involving possibly valuable property, is a strong and independent one.

I should appreciate very much your early consideration of this suggestion so that we may take the necessary steps. We will submit to you the names and qualifications of the nominees before appointing them.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

773.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, November 19, 1940

...

#### DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

24. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported that, following the Committee's meeting on November the 5th, a message<sup>1</sup> had been sent to the Governor of Newfoundland agreeing to discussions taking place in St. John's, regarding problems of defence, and naming as Canadian representatives, Mr. Gibson and Mr. Dyde. The subjects to be discussed at the meeting had been agreed upon.

It was not intended that the question of long-term holdings of property in Newfoundland, by the Canadian government, should be included. This was a much larger question of policy and would require further careful consideration.

25. THE PRIME MINISTER expressed the view that in negotiations with the government of Newfoundland, the long view should be taken of the permanent Canadian interest in the defence of the island. The United States had acquired long-term leases, and had taken into account not only the immediate problem of the war, but the situation after the war. Canada should also take thought for the future: temporary occupancy was insufficient, and the present was the time to settle this question.

26. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES agreed with Mr. King that unless the government took steps to obtain permanent holdings in Newfoundland, for defence purposes, they would properly be subject to criticism for having neglected essential Canadian interests. Mr. Power and Mr. Ilsley, on the other hand, were inclined to the view that we should regard present defence activities in Newfoundland as merely temporary operations on the soil of an ally.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 175.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 175.

27. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY expressed doubt as to whether it would be possible for Canada to obtain title to the Airport,<sup>1</sup> where the principal Canadian investment was being made. The U.K. government had expended large sums of money there and had subsequently transferred the Airport to Newfoundland.

28. THE SECRETARY pointed out that at the meeting of November the 5th, when the visit of Mr. Gibson and Mr. Dyde had been decided upon, it had been agreed that their discussions at St. John's should be exploratory only, without committing the Canadian government to definite decisions.

29. After further discussion, it was agreed that, in addition to the other subjects which they would take up with the Newfoundland government, Mr. Gibson and Mr. Dyde should explore the possibility of obtaining from Newfoundland, permanent holdings or long-term leases. They should seek to discover what Newfoundland would be prepared to offer, and whether the Newfoundland government would be prepared to put Canada, in this respect, in the same position as the United States.

...

774.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions<sup>2</sup>*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary<sup>2</sup>*

TELEGRAM 776

[St. John's,] December 9, 1940

SECRET. Reference our telegram No. 760 Nov. 23<sup>3</sup> and your reply No. 990 Nov. 30th.<sup>3</sup> We have discussed with Colonel Gibson Canadian Minister National Revenue a proposal to settle compensation for expropriation for Canadian Bases<sup>4</sup> by the same procedure as that outlined in our telegram No. 760. This and other methods were examined in some detail. We have agreed to a joint recommendation to the Canadian Government under which we will appoint a Board consisting of three persons—the Chairman will be a judge of our Supreme Court and the other two chosen for qualifications to assess values. The decision of this Board will bind the owner, and this Government and the Canadian Government will agree to carry out the Board's decision. If the Canadian Government accepts this recommendation we consider it desirable that the same procedure should apply to the United States Government and indeed that the same Board should handle all cases. It is suggested that our Ambassador at Washington might inform the United States Government of this proposal and state we will let them know as soon as we hear views of Canadian Government.

<sup>1</sup> L'aéroport de Gander.

<sup>2</sup> Ce télégramme fut répété à l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne aux États-Unis et portait le numéro 22.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>4</sup> Voir le document 177.

<sup>1</sup> Gander Airport.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram was repeated to Ambassador of Great Britain in the United States as number 22.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 177.



775.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Ressources naturelles  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Natural Resources  
to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

N.R. 123-'40

[St. John's,] December 12, 1940

CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES BASES POLICY

With reference to the Memorandum of Meetings between a Committee of the Commission and [the] Hon. Colonel Colin Gibson, M.C., Canadian Minister of National Revenue,<sup>1</sup> circulated with Memorandum J. 76-'40 of 9th December<sup>2</sup> by the Commissioner for Justice and Defence, I should wish to comment on one or two points in the memorandum and the matters of principle raised in it.

2. My Department is concerned in paragraph 1 of the Memorandum—Acquisition of property in Newfoundland for use of the Government of Canada. The line taken in regard to the acquisition of property for defence by the Canadian Government will have a later bearing on detailed negotiations with the United States Government on the same subject.

- (a) As regards the decision . . . that the titles in Crown lands would be leased or granted to the Canadian Government without charge, I have always thought that the public in Newfoundland have some common rights on many of the Crown lands especially on the coastal fringe. These areas are, for instance, used in many cases as grazing ground for livestock, as fuel supply and as blueberry picking areas. This might well be the case in the Torbay area, for example, and would not the public be entitled to some safeguard of its traditional rights? Will the protection of these rights be one of the matters for arbitration, if necessary, and, if so, who will be responsible for the costs of arbitration? Legislation will, presumably, be necessary to give the Arbitration Board appropriate powers and in doing so the terms of reference of the Board might be so drawn as to include matters of this kind.
- (b) A more important question which arises, however, is in relation to the procedure to be adopted in settling claims by private owners, especially by a number of people in a single community. . . . If the Government is to recognise that the people who are evacuated are entitled to be given an opportunity of finding a reasonably assured subsistence after their removal there, two questions arise:
  - (i) Who is to be responsible for the costs of moving the families, and

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 177.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 177.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

- (ii) who will be responsible for the expenses of setting up the families in new areas?

...  
3. There are other questions on which I should wish to comment. For example what kind of business or other activities will be allowed to continue within the areas leased to the Canadians or the Americans? This has some bearing on the evacuation problem. I assume that in this regard the Americans would be asked to give the same terms and conditions as the Canadians. For example, what will be the position in regard to existing fishing premises, saw mills, etc. in the areas? Will these activities be allowed to continue if they do not interfere directly with the purpose for which the bases are taken? Will facilities such as roads, wharves, telegraphs, etc. constructed for reasons of defence or war strategy, in the area or from the area to Service headquarters be reciprocal and available to Newfoundland nationals who are conducting business or are employed in the bases area? Are the Canadians or Americans in the bases—some of whom may be civilians—to be treated in a different category so far as customs and other facilities are concerned from Newfoundlanders whose national status must be respected? . . .

4. So far as the principle of equal treatment to Canada and the United States is concerned, the idea of a block contribution by Newfoundland to the Canadian defence of Newfoundland, which is accepted in the memorandum, seems to be based on the assumption that Canada, as part of the British Commonwealth, is primarily concerned in Newfoundland's defence. Although the United States have been granted bases in Newfoundland to defend their own country, is it not equally true that, under the Monroe Doctrine, President Roosevelt's statements and the Havana Act, America is as equally committed to the defence of Newfoundland as is Canada? In that case, is there any justification for treating Canada and the United States differently from the standpoint of concessions made to them or the amount of the contribution which Newfoundland makes to their expenses? I suggest not.

5. In the despatch of 23rd November<sup>1</sup> to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, which I discussed with Colonel Colin Gibson (who thought that Canada should seize this moment to take a helpful attitude to Newfoundland), we asked that Canada should associate Newfoundland with it in any trade treaties which it has in contemplation with other countries. In the Memorandum J. 74-'40 of 28th November,<sup>2</sup> page 4, the Commissioner for Justice and Defence says that, from the equitable point of view, Newfoundland should, in relation to the American bases, not make monetary sacrifices but rather receive monetary considerations from the United States and that, in Washington, Newfoundland should press this point of view and ask for special customs and immigration arrangements and facilities as a *quid pro quo* for the granting of the bases. I support this and would like to see some extensive road building (e.g. from Port-aux-Basques to Stephenville and, if it can be defended on grounds of military strategy, through some

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

of the agricultural areas in the Humber and Green Bay districts) undertaken at American cost. But have we in talking to Canada had the same considerations in mind that we suggest applying to the United States as compensation in respect of her use of Newfoundland for her own protection, e.g. why do we offer a contribution to Canada equal to customs and transport facilities enjoyed by her forces? Why do we give her what appears to be strategic control of the Airport and suggest long term leases in such a manner as to risk putting Canada in virtual control of civil aviation in Newfoundland after the war? When the United States undertook increased aeroplane production to assist Great Britain, the British Government was, I understand, asked to pay the cost of enlarging the aeroplane plants. Would it not be equally fair to ask Canada to bear the cost of any additional capital investment involved in the additional traffic in Newfoundland on rail or road? The point I am urging is that we should adopt the same principle of compensation so far as Canada is concerned as Mr. Emerson's paper suggests we should adopt to the United States. Can we ask the United States to grant a more favourable *quid pro quo* than Canada? I should like to see these matters discussed by the whole Commission.<sup>1</sup>

J. H. GORVIN

776.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 470

St. John's, August 24, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 179 of August 10, 1942<sup>2</sup> concerning the matter of compensation of persons whose property is taken under the provisions of the Newfoundland Defence Regulations.

2. In that despatch you asked me to discuss with the Newfoundland Commission of Government the questions referred to in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 397 of June 30, 1942.<sup>2</sup>

3. According to your instructions, I took this matter up with the Honourable Mr. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, and enclose herewith copy of reply received from him.

4. I am sending you under separate cover a copy of the Regulations made under the Defence Act, 1939.<sup>3</sup> The regulations respecting the acquisition of land will be found on page XCIII.

<sup>1</sup> Le gouvernement canadien conserva sur une base *ad hoc* le terrain dont il avait besoin pour l'expansion continuelle de ses opérations de défense à Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> The Canadian Government continued to obtain *ad hoc* the land it needed for its expanding defence operations in Newfoundland.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

5. The information which I referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of my despatch No. 397 of June 30th was obtained from Mr. J. G. Higgins, K.C.

6. You will note that the information now given to me by the Honourable Mr. Emerson is somewhat different from my understanding of the matter as obtained from Mr. J. G. Higgins, KC.

7. As the Honourable Mr. Emerson understands it, the position taken by Mr. Justice Higgins, Chairman of the Compensation Board, is that the Board has no authority to give compensation in cases in which properties are expropriated for a term of years.

8. Mr. James G. Higgins, K.C. happened to call at my office today and referred to this matter. He tells me that he is uncertain whether the Judge would rule that he had no jurisdiction to award compensation on properties taken for a term of years or whether he would rule that in such cases he would award compensation on the basis of the value as if the fee simple was acquired.

9. You will note from the Honourable Mr. Emerson's letter that he considers that the Act is quite clear and does not need any amendment.

10. I think probably your Legal Department will concur in the Honourable Mr. Emerson's opinion.

11. Up to the present time, no case has been placed before the Compensation Board in which the Board was asked to consider the placing of a value on property which had been expropriated only for a term of years and it is quite possible that no such case will ever arise. Up to the present time all properties which have been taken over by the Canadian Government for a term of years have been by private agreement and there has been no necessity to resort to the provisions of the Act.

12. I shall be pleased to have your further instructions in the matter.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, August 22, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 18th instant<sup>1</sup> in which you refer to the question of the Compensation Board presided over by Mr. Justice Higgins holding that if land is taken for a period of years instead of in fee simple it is the duty of the Board to give the owner compensation as if the fee simple had been taken.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



I have discussed this matter with Mr. J. G. Higgins, K.C., our counsel in these cases, and he informs me that you must have misunderstood Mr. Justice Higgins' informal statement. As I understand the position Mr. Higgins at a board meeting stated that he expected to have before the Board in the near future cases in which the Canadian Government wishes to take leases for years. The Judge expressed the view that under the regulations the Board did not have power to deal with compensation cases involving anything but the taking of the fee simple and that it had no authority to consider cases involving leaseholds.

I am of the opinion, and in this opinion Mr. Higgins concurs, that if this is the actual view of the Board it is wrong and that both the regulations as to taking of land and the order appointing the Board clearly indicate that the Board can give compensation even for the most minor infringement of personal rights, e.g. the knocking down of a fence, the occupation for a few hours as well as in the case of leases and fee simples. In our opinion the regulations on this point leave no doubt and because of that I do not think it wise to suggest an amendment thereto.

I propose therefore that a case should be chosen in which the Canadian Government has taken a lease for years or wishes to take a lease for years and application be made to the Board to settle the claim thereof. These terms I suggest would consist of (a) settling the rent, (b) settling the damage to the land, if any, and (c) in appropriate cases, compensation for loss of business. If the Board holds that it has no power to deal with cases of this kind I would ask them to state a case for the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Yours faithfully,

L. E. EMERSON

777.

1156-Y-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 202

Ottawa, September 10, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 470 dated August 24, 1942, and to Mr. Emerson's letter which was enclosed therein, also to the Regulations made under the Defence Act, 1939,<sup>1</sup> which were sent under separate cover.

The Regulations respecting the requisitioning of land which are set forth at pages XCII to XCV inclusive, enable the Commissioner for Public Utilities to take possession of land and to give such directions as appear to him to be necessary or expedient in connection with the taking of possession of land.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

While the land is in his possession, it may be used by, or under, his authority in such manner as he thinks expedient. Compensation is payable for any damage or loss sustained by the owner or occupier to be determined by agreement or considered by the tribunal, or a board of arbitration.

The Defence (Board of Compensation) Regulations 1941, constitute the Board and enable it to consider and make awards in respect of claims submitted by owners or occupiers for damage or loss sustained by reason of the taking of possession of land, or of anything done in relation thereto, under the Defence (Requisitioning of Land) Regulations.

I observe that you are apprehensive that the Judge might rule that he has no jurisdiction to award compensation for property taken for a term of years, and that he would award compensation on the basis of the value of the fee simple.

Without questioning in any way the views of the learned Judge, or the opinions expressed by the Commissioner of Justice, I must say that I have difficulty in understanding the basis for their opinions.

I should have thought that there was no power vested in the Commissioner for Public Utilities to take either a fee simple, or a term of years in land. I should have thought that his power was limited to taking possession and providing for the use of the lands, for such purpose and in such manner as he might think expedient, in the interests of the public safety or the Defence of Newfoundland or for the efficient prosecution of the War or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The terms of clause (a) seem to assume that the Commissioner would not be taking the fee simple, but merely the possession, use and enjoyment of the lands, so long as they might be necessary for the purpose set forth in the Regulations. I should have thought, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the Board of Compensation would be limited to the determination of compensation damage or loss sustained by reason of the taking of possession of the land, or of anything done in relation thereto, in pursuance of the Defence (Requisitioning of Land) Regulations.

I have no available information with regard to other legislation, or decisions of the Court, that might be relevant to the question, and it is not improbable that I may have overlooked essential aspects of the legal problem involved. I have, however, given some consideration to Regulation 51 of the United Kingdom Defence (General) Regulations 1939, which is almost identical with the Newfoundland (Requisitioning of Land) Regulations, and to the United Kingdom Compensation Defence Act 1939, which makes provision for compensation payable, when land is taken over under Regulation 51. This clearly deals only with compensation for the temporary use of land during the war, the implication being that there is no right to take over land for a term of years, or to expropriate a fee simple under the Regulations.

I should think that, under the circumstances, it would be unwise to rely on the powers set forth in the Regulations, which you have cited, either for the requisitioning of the fee simple or of leaseholds in Newfoundland. If you

require estates in land, it would be preferable to acquire them by purchase from the owner, or else to have them expropriated by the Newfoundland Government and retransferred to the appropriate Canadian authorities.

I have etc.

J. E. READ  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

778.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au conseiller juridique*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Legal Adviser*

St. John's, September 18, 1942

Dear John [Read],

I have read with great interest despatch No. 202 of September 10, 1942, which deals with the matter of the taking over of lands for defence purposes by the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

I am, what is for me, in rather the unique position of being the advised and not the adviser in legal matters. I am not therefore venturing any opinion of my own but am passing a copy of your letter on to the Department of Justice for their consideration.

It is quite evident, however, that the Newfoundland authorities intended that the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1940 and the Regulations made thereunder were intended to be authority for expropriation of the title.

This would appear from the despatch from the Governor of Newfoundland to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for External Affairs dated October 2, 1940, with which was enclosed a copy of the Act.

The Act itself seems to be fairly clear as by subsection (2) of Section 1, it provides *inter alia* that the Governor in Commission may

(b) authorise

- (i) the taking of possession or control, on behalf of his Majesty, of any property or undertaking;
- (ii) the acquisition, on behalf of His Majesty, of any property;

The trouble however may be with the Regulations made under the Act and I understand your criticism is related to them.

If you are right in your contention that the Regulations only authorize the taking possession of the property for the period of the war and do not authorize the acquisition in fee simple or for a term of years, serious complications will arise and it may be necessary to obtain special legislation to regularize proceedings which have already been taken under the Defence Regulations.

Although I have not complete records, my understanding is that neither the Army nor the Air Force have taken title to any property under the Defence Regulations. I think that in the case of both the Army and Air Force, all title, whether it was leasehold or freehold, was arranged by private negotiation.

In the case of the Navy, however, property was taken on the waterfront under the Newfoundland Defence Regulations and quite a substantial amount of money was paid on the understanding that the fee simple was expropriated and valuable buildings and other structures have been erected on the property.

As I understand your contention, the fee simple was not legally acquired, although compensation was paid on that basis. If you are right, the only way to fix the matter up now is by special legislation because certainly it was understood that the fee simple was acquired and compensation was awarded on that basis.

However, I have never examined the papers in connection with the acquisition of the Naval property but I do know that the Arbitration Board was set up under the Defence Regulations to determine the amount of the compensation. The total amount of the awards as given by the Board was upwards of \$200,000 and I do not think there can be any doubt of the fact that the Board assumed that the freehold title was being expropriated and made their awards accordingly.

I should perhaps add, although you probably already know it, that the property on the waterfront, of which the fee simple title was supposed to be taken, was not to be transferred to the Canadian Government but to the United Kingdom Government.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

779.

1156-Y-39

*Le conseiller juridique au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Legal Adviser to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

[Ottawa,] October 1, 1942

Dear Charlie [Burchell],

I have noted the points raised in your letter of September 18, 1942, with regard to the question of taking over land for defence purposes by the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

I note that you have sent a copy of my letter to the Department of Justice. It is obviously a point which would need to be settled by a Newfoundland lawyer. I raised the issues set forth in my letter of September 10 in case there might be some substantial doubt as to the powers of the Government under the Regulations. If there is any doubt, it should be cleared up before heavy expenditures are made.



Apart from the legal aspect of the problem, there is a policy question involved with regard to taking over leasehold interests. It is obvious that the Government needs to take possession of land for defence purposes and that it needs to be able to take over the title in some cases, e.g. where buildings are being erected on the land. I should think that there might be very strong objections in policy to any power to take over leasehold interests. It is almost inconceivable that a situation could exist in which it was necessary or even important that the Government should take a leasehold interest, as distinct from possession or fee, for a term of years. The taking of a term of years imposes a very great hardship upon the owner of the property and the payment of the rent does not begin to compensate him for what he suffers. However, these are matters for the Newfoundland Government and not for me.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN E. READ

780.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D14)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

TOP SECRET

[Ottawa,] November 17, 1942

...

v. Defence Installations, Newfoundland. Reference to Newfoundland Government.

A despatch from the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, and referred to the Deputy Minister of National Defence, raises the question as to whether certain views expressed by Sir Wilfrid Woods, Acting Commissioner for Defence in Newfoundland, with regard to procedure for the acquisition of property for Defence purposes, were acceptable to Canada.

These views were expressed as follows:

In future when the Military Authorities wish to acquire property for the establishment of defence works it would be desirable to keep the Newfoundland Government advised before any negotiations are commenced in order that the Commissioner for Defence may be aware of what is being done and a record kept of the property thus acquired. It is also important that this Government should be asked to give prior consent before any new Military Establishment is set up in Newfoundland territory.

The C.G.S. reported that this matter had been discussed at Defence Council and that the Secretary had drafted a letter to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the effect that it is impossible in many cases, to give advance notice, owing to practical difficulties and the need

for speed and secrecy, but that we would be glad to give such notice where it was reasonably possible.

The Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that an attempt should be made to meet the wishes of the Newfoundland Government in this matter, and directed the Secretary to inform the Secretary, Defence Council that they wished to discuss the draft letter at the next Meeting of Defence Council.

...

781.

1156-Y-39

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, November 26, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

As you are aware, we have up to quite recently been carrying in this Department the full burden of passing upon the titles to various properties taken over by the Canadian Government for its various war efforts in this country. Recently, after the arrival of Mr. Keenleyside of the Navy Department, arrangements were made under which the firm of Fox, Knight, Phelan & Hawkins would in future act in these matters for the Royal Canadian Navy.

The amount of work in this Department has very substantially increased since the war began. In spite of increase in the staff which has taken place the amount of arrears has approached alarming proportions. This is particularly so in the realm of legislation and other work of a drafting kind, which entails so much care and attention.

I have before me now a list of properties at Botwood, Torbay, Whitbourne, Bay Bulls, Port Blanford, Flatrock, Portugal Cove Road, Thorburn Road, Holyrood, Torbay Sewer [sic], etc., amounting in all to eighty. A great many of the properties are very small in value but the amount of labour involved in the searching of titles is just as great as if the amounts were large. In most cases the occupants of the properties will have to be interviewed and detailed stories taken which may also necessitate the interviewing of other people who would appear on the surface to have claims.

I very much regret therefore that I must ask you whether it would not be possible for you to engage outside assistance for this work. I make this request with great reluctance because we have always been willing, and indeed anxious to help out so far as possible in this work. In view however of the present state of the work in this Department I have really no alternative. Not only is the work of this Department suffering but I feel that a great deal of your work will similarly suffer and may have to be performed in haste and without proper supervision.

Yours sincerely,

L. E. EMERSON

782.

1156-Y-39

*Le secrétaire du Conseil de la défense au sous-secrétaire d'État  
adjoint aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary, Defence Council, to Assistant Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, December 4, 1942

Dear Dr. Keenleyside,

The despatch of the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland No. 659 of November 2nd<sup>1</sup>, a copy of which was enclosed in your letter of November 5th<sup>1</sup> has been considered by the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Council.

The Defence Council on the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff agree that it would be desirable to inform the Newfoundland Commission of Government in confidence before negotiations for the acquisition of property in Newfoundland for defence measures are begun. Instructions will be issued at once to the senior officers of the three services to inform the High Commissioner for Canada in St. John's of any proposed acquisition prior to the opening of negotiations so that he may pass it on for the confidential information of the Newfoundland Commission of Government.

The request of the Newfoundland Government that they should be asked to give prior consent before any new military establishment is set up in Newfoundland territory has also been considered. The Defence Council, again on the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, regard it as most desirable that the Newfoundland Government be kept as fully informed as possible of the development of Canadian defence measures in Newfoundland. The active co-operation and assistance which the Newfoundland Government has extended in the past has been of incalculable value in working out the defence plan of Newfoundland. The Newfoundland Government will probably realize however that in carrying out the responsibilities which Canada has assumed in connection with the defence of Newfoundland plans must be integrated with the general plan for the defence of the Atlantic coast. While it may not always be possible due to the necessity of speed and security to request the Newfoundland Government to give prior consent before any new military establishments are set up in Newfoundland territory it is recognized as desirable that the Newfoundland Government should not only be confidentially informed prior to our negotiation for property but also of the intended use of the property.

Yours very truly,

H. A. DYDE  
Colonel

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

783.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, April 14, 1943

Dear Norman [Robertson],

I am writing you in a formal despatch today, No. 246,<sup>1</sup> regarding the title to the Naval Hospital.

You will note from that despatch that the lease of the Naval Hospital site was never in fact prepared or executed. The same statement is true of the Administration Building and possibly of other Naval properties.

While the title to all these properties is in the British Admiralty, I assume that, as the Canadian Government took charge of the negotiations for the lease of the properties, the matter should be carried through to finalization by the obtaining of the leases. It is, to say the least, unbusinesslike merely to have an exchange of letters agreeing to give a lease and not have the actual lease prepared and executed.

I think perhaps it would have been advisable, in the first instance, if the Canadian Government had appointed a solicitor in St. John's who would follow up all these matters and get them finalized.

I understand that the Department of Justice of Newfoundland has been attending to the matter of searching the title and also arranging with a local solicitor, Mr. James D. Higgins, to attend to hearings before the Board of Arbitration in cases where the property is expropriated.

I have never been informed as to the particular arrangements made with the Department of Justice as these were made before my arrival in this country as High Commissioner. I presume, however, that the Canadian Government pays for the services of Mr. Higgins, but I am not sure of this. I also do not know whether or not the Department of Justice renders any bill to the Canadian Government for their services in searching titles or if these services are supplied gratis. I would like to get information on these matters.

Another matter in respect of title which is giving me some concern is that the titles to a number of valuable properties on the waterfront were obtained pursuant to regulations made under the Defence Act, 1939.

The legal adviser for the Department of External Affairs, Mr. J. E. Read, K.C., advised me in his despatch No. 202 of September 10, 1942 that, in his opinion, these regulations do not authorize the acquisition of the title in fee

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



simple of lands but merely authorize payment of compensation for the use of the lands for the duration of the war.

There can be no doubt of the fact, however, that the arbitrators in fixing their award under the regulations did so on the basis that the freehold title was being acquired and made their awards accordingly.

While I have not given the matter very careful study, I think that Mr. Read's opinion is sound and if that is the case, it would be clear that after the conclusion of the war, the owners to whom compensation is awarded can demand possession of the land on which hundreds of thousands of dollars have been expended in the erection of wharves and buildings.

I submitted Mr. Read's opinion to the Honourable L. E. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice for Newfoundland, shortly after I received it but never received a reply from him.

In informal conversation with the Secretary of the Department of Justice, however, I understood that that Department would probably agree with Mr. Read's opinion.

If that is the position, it is a most unsatisfactory one and should be cleared up immediately.

I suggested to the Secretary of the Department of Justice that the only way to clear the matter up was by a special act of the Commission of Government and if this could be done, the matter should be attended to without any further delay.

It is quite possible that, in some cases at least, deeds have been obtained from the parties to whom compensation was made before payment of the money. If that was done in all cases, I presume Mr. Read would agree that this would be satisfactory. It does seem to me, however, a matter in which complete investigation should be made, as I assume that the British Admiralty, in whose name title was acquired, is relying upon the Canadian Government to attend to matters of title.

I have exchanged some correspondence with Mr. Read about the matter and I have expressed the opinion that the Emergency Powers Defence Act of Newfoundland gave full authority to the Commission of Government to acquire the title in fee simple of property but the defect is in the regulations which are made under the Act.

I suggest that the whole matter of all the titles should be investigated and where there are any irregularities, such as above mentioned, action should be taken to cure them by special legislation or by some other method. Possibly it may be necessary to send some legal man here from your own Department or from the Department of Justice in order to check up the title to all the properties and prepare the necessary legislation in cooperation with the Department of Justice of Newfoundland.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

784.

1156-Y-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre de la Justice*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Deputy Minister of Justice*

Ottawa, October 26, 1943

I am enclosing a copy of telegram No. 153 of October 21, 1943,<sup>1</sup> in which Mr. Burchell discussed the arrangements made by Mr. Keenleyside (of the Department of National Defence, Naval Services) during his recent visit to St. John's.

The state of the Newfoundland property is confused, and we have not full information as to the facts.

There are various types of properties involved, including the following:

- (a) Properties held under lease from private landowners in Newfoundland, the leases being taken in the name of the Crown (Dominion).
- (b) Properties held under lease from private individuals, the leases being taken in the name of the British Admiralty.
- (c) Leases from the Crown (Newfoundland) to the British Admiralty.
- (d) Leases from the Crown (Newfoundland) to the Crown (Dominion).
- (e) Property acquired under compulsory powers by Newfoundland Government, leasehold.
- (f) Property acquired under compulsory powers by the Newfoundland Government, freehold.
- (g) Properties held under agreement, either with Crown or with private individuals.

There may well be other classes of properties, but you will observe that a substantial number of the properties are being acquired through the agency of the Newfoundland Government, and I understand that it has been necessary to have the Newfoundland Department of Justice act in the matter of acquisition. I have no doubt that some or all of the properties with which Mr. Keenleyside was involved were properties in respect of which the Newfoundland Government was acting as an agency for the purpose of acquiring a property and vesting it either in the Admiralty or in the Crown (Dominion).

This whole problem is confused, and the difficulties have arisen for the most part as a result of the need for naval, military and air force officers to act with the utmost speed and get the essential military installations into operation, leaving the legal aspects of the problem to be untangled later.

I should think that, in the circumstances, it would be desirable that the whole question of the properties in Newfoundland should be brought under a single authority. It would be entirely satisfactory if you could send a

<sup>1</sup>Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

representative down to St. John's to consult with the Commissioner of Justice and with Mr. Burchell and the various interested people there and make arrangements for having all of the properties brought under the general supervision and control of a single representative of the Department of Justice. In that case your representative would of course be acting in an advisory capacity only in respect of properties which are being acquired by the Newfoundland Government under their compulsory powers. It would be necessary to leave the Department of Justice in St. John's to make their own appointments where they have accepted responsibility for giving title to our Canadian departments, but even in those cases your representative would be able to help in an advisory capacity and insure that all the titles were ultimately straightened out.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

785.

1156-X-39

*Mémorandum de discussions au sujet de Terre-Neuve*<sup>1</sup>  
*Memorandum of Discussions on Newfoundland Questions*<sup>1</sup>

Ottawa, December 2, 1943

Present: Mr. N. A. Robertson  
Mr. C. J. Burchell  
Dr. H. L. Keenleyside  
Mr. A. D. P. Heeney  
Mr. R. A. MacKay.

. . .

3. TITLE TO TORBAY AIRPORT—Mr. Burchell reviewed the situation with respect to the acquisition of title to parcels of property, the owners of which were unknown, and said that the Honourable Mr. Emerson had informed him before leaving that the Government of Newfoundland was prepared to pass a special Act to clear up all questions of title. Mr. Emerson expressed the preference, however, for a general Act covering all outstanding questions of title to Torbay, properties at Gander and Botwood, and to Goose. It was generally agreed that this would be undesirable since it would lead to considerable delay and that to secure our postwar position in Newfoundland title to Torbay and Goose should be secured at the earliest possible moment. Mr. Burchell agreed to discuss the question of Torbay with the Deputy Minister of Justice.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Ces discussions eurent lieu le 29 novembre au bureau de N. A. Robertson.

<sup>1</sup> These discussions took place on November 29, in N. A. Robertson's office.

786.

1156-Y-39

*Mémorandum du haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Memorandum from High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] December 3, 1943

1. As I explained in various despatches, the position with regard to legal matters, such as acquisition of titles, etc. in Newfoundland is very unsatisfactory.

2. Before my arrival in Newfoundland an arrangement was made with the Newfoundland Department of Justice to act as agent for the Government of Canada in all legal matters without charge. This arrangement has proved to be very unsatisfactory, and just before I came to Ottawa on my present visit the Commissioner of Justice, Mr. Emerson, asked the Department to be relieved of the work. In his letter to me he mentioned there were eighty or ninety different titles in respect to which his Department had not been able to finalize arrangements because of pressure of other work.

3. On my arrival in Ottawa I talked the matter over with Mr. J. E. Read, and we agreed on a procedure which should be adopted, and it was arranged I should confer with Mr. Varcoe.

4. I conferred with Mr. Varcoe and found him entirely agreeable to the proposals which I made to him, which were as follows: The Canadian Department of Justice is sending a lawyer to Newfoundland for as long as may be necessary, whether it be for weeks or months. He will act as Canadian agent for the Canadian Department of Justice and will do the work which heretofore was performed by the Newfoundland Department of Justice. He will also work as closely as possible with the Newfoundland Department of Justice.

5. Mr. Varcoe said he had no man in his own Department who could be spared for this work, and he required a man of some considerable tact and ability. He asked me if I had any man whom I could recommend for the work and I suggested that it might be possible to obtain the services of Mr. Ben Rogers, who is a graduate of Dalhousie University, and was a student in my office for a period, and a man who I thought would be sufficiently well qualified to perform the work in Newfoundland. Rogers is now Chief Legal Counsel of the Mutual Life Assurance Company at Waterloo, in which company he has been employed for the past six or seven years, and I know is held in very high regard by that company.

6. Mr. Varcoe informed me by telephone that he spoke to the General Manager of the Mutual Life, who had agreed to release Mr. Rogers temporarily for this work on the understanding that it might be possible for him to pay visits at intervals to Waterloo.

7. Mr. Varcoe also arranged that Mr. Rogers come to Ottawa and meet me here on Monday the 13th of December in company with Mr. Varcoe, when details can be worked out, after which I shall give you a further report.



8. It is not intended Rogers would do much of the legal work himself, but would have authority to employ such lawyers in Newfoundland as he may decide upon for each particular piece of work after consultation with me and with the Newfoundland Department of Justice.

9. I conferred with the Judge Advocate General about this matter and he gives it his full approval. He told me that if Rogers required an additional man to help him he would send a man down from his Department. I also arranged for Mr. Rogers to meet the Judge Advocate General during the course of his visit to Ottawa.

787.

1156-Y-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 401

Ottawa, December 17, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to your despatches Nos. 943 of November 25<sup>1</sup> and 948 of November 27<sup>1</sup> with reference to the acquisition by Canada of properties in Newfoundland.

2. You will recall that this subject was discussed at length during your recent visit to Ottawa with officials of this Department. This despatch will serve as a record of the discussions.

3. With reference to the proposed amendment of defence regulations in Newfoundland, it would be desirable that provision should be made as suggested by you for the following:

- (a) Outright expropriation in fee simple;
- (b) Compensation to the owners of properties expropriated confined to the value of the land originally requisitioned, regardless of buildings or installations which may have been erected by the Canadian authorities in the meantime.

It is presumed that it will be possible for you to secure a draft of the proposed amendments before they are passed by the Commission of Government, so that they may be examined by the Legal Adviser of this Department and by the Department of Justice in accordance with your suggestion.

4. It is noted that even after the Regulations are amended and the expropriation proceedings with respect to all these properties are completed, it will still be necessary to have the properties conveyed by the Newfoundland Commission of Government to the Crown in right of Canada.

5. It would appear to be desirable to have the legal work with respect to the titles of these properties which is now so badly in arrears done by the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Newfoundland solicitors instructed by the Canadian Government for that purpose instead of relying on the Department of Justice in Newfoundland as was the former practice. I believe it is your view that the work should be divided among several Newfoundland solicitors who would receive instructions with respect to a number of specific properties, partly in view of the fact that there are, I understand, a great number of properties which have received no attention whatsoever. I further understand that arrangements have been made with the Department of Justice for that department to employ a qualified person for the supervision of all these matters in co-operation with you and that the gentleman they have selected has already left for Newfoundland where he will endeavour to get all these matters completed as quickly as possible.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

788.

1156-AD-39

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve<sup>1</sup>  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland<sup>1</sup>  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 36

St. John's, February 2, 1944

IMPORTANT. CONFIDENTIAL. Reference to my predecessor's despatch of January 26 1944, No. 34.<sup>2</sup> Regarding the status of properties purchased by the Canadian Government.

(2) You will recall that Mr. B. A. Rogers was sent to Newfoundland as Special Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Justice for the purpose of clarifying and regularizing the whole position relating to properties obtained or being obtained by the Canadian Government either for Canadian defence purposes or for transfer to the British Admiralty.

(3) One of the major problems faced by Rogers was that arising from a defect in the Defence Regulations made under the Emergency Powers Defence Act (1940) under which some properties were expropriated. The defect was that although the lands were intended to be expropriated in fee simple and compensation was paid on that understanding the regulations have been interpreted as giving possession for the duration of the war only.

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

(4) Most of the properties affected by this defect were taken on Admiralty account but as the Canadian Government was instrumental in their acquisition [it] is a Canadian responsibility to remedy the situation.

(5) The number of separate properties affected by this situation is very large and it would be a long, tedious and difficult process to obtain exact surveys and to arrange for a remedial act to cover all properties expropriated. Under the circumstances Mr. Rogers has endeavoured to obtain agreement from the Commissioner for Justice to the passage of a confirming Act which in one single piece of legislation would clarify the title of all properties expropriated or otherwise obtained for Admiralty account by Canada in Newfoundland. Agreement on this proposal would also mean the reduction in the number of surveys required from approximately 30 to not more than 6.

(6) After a prolonged discussion the Commission of Government yesterday agreed to pass an Act for the purpose indicated. Before this can be done, however, it will be necessary to have the essential surveys carried out. The Royal Canadian Navy authorities here state that they have not received definite instructions from Ottawa to initiate such surveys although they have had a letter from the Director of Works and Buildings, Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa, informing them that the British Admiralty delegation in Washington desires such a survey to be made and instructing them to discuss the matter with the High Commissioner, particularly with reference to the question of payment for the said surveys.

(7) As it has taken a good deal of argument to bring the Commission of Government to agree to the proposal of a single act, and as there is always a danger that they may again change their minds, it is, in my opinion, and in this Rogers concurs, important that the naval authorities should receive immediate instructions from Ottawa to carry out the necessary surveys covering the properties taken for Admiralty account.

(8) The question of who should do the surveys should depend, I assume, on the availability of competent naval surveyors. If the R.C.N. is not in a position to supply suitable personnel for this purpose, surveyors can be obtained locally. The cost of the surveys should, in my opinion, be chargeable to National Defence for Naval Services, as all other expenditures relating to the acquisition of these properties have been covered by that Department.

(9) The first purpose of this telegram, however, is to ask that the matter be explained in detail to the Department of National Defence for Naval Services with a view to ensuring that appropriate instructions are forwarded immediately to the naval authorities in St. John's. The greater the period of delay in completing the necessary surveys, the more likely we are to run into further difficulties with the Commission of Government. If advantage is to be taken of the agreement reached yesterday, action on the surveys should be initiated at once.

789.

1156-Y-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 160

Ottawa, May 16, 1944

SECRET. 1. Following for Rogers from MacKay. Begins.

2. See Britton's despatch No. 220<sup>1</sup> re Bay Bulls. Keenleyside suggests it would be useful to have from you details about proposed confirming act mentioned in despatch.

3. We are not very clear here as to what the Commission of Government proposes to include in the general confirming Act. My understanding was that it was to clear up powers of the Commission of Government to expropriate property beyond duration of war so as to cover property expropriated on behalf of Canada and the Admiralty. But it appears from despatch No. 220 that the Act is to cover "all Canadian properties in Newfoundland". Does this mean that the general confirming Act will actually confirm title in the Crown in right of Canada?

4. If it means the above, will it cover the following?

(a) Torbay

(b) Bay Bulls

(c) Properties at Gander and Botwood

(d) Goose

(e) Minor properties acquired for duration of the war

(f) With regard to (e), will it include right to remove equipment and buildings?

5. Is proposal to grant Canada proprietary rights only or will it include right of military user?

6. We should appreciate any comment you may have about the proposed Act, and especially your opinion as to prospects of getting Act passed within near future.

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<sup>1</sup> Document 631.



790.

1156-Y-39

*Le conseiller spécial du sous-ministre de la Justice au conseiller spécial  
du sous-secrétaire d'État aux affaires extérieures*

*Special Assistant to Deputy Minister of Justice to Special Assistant  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

St. John's, May 29, 1944

Dear Mr. MacKay,

Referring to your secret telegram of May 16th, 1944, No. 160, concerning the proposed confirming Act of Canadian properties.

2. In view of the chaotic condition of titles in Newfoundland it soon became apparent after my arrival here that the only satisfactory method of acquiring titles in Newfoundland was by a confirming Act, and this was the first point discussed by Mr. Burchell and the writer with Sir Edward Emerson, Commissioner for Justice. Sir Edward informed us that he had in mind a confirming Act eventually which would confirm title to all Canadian properties. He stated that the Commission of Government did not want to pass a number of separate Acts but would wait until all properties could be gathered together in a single Act.

3. There are also a number of Crown grants which have been requested by the Canadian Government but no formal grants have been made and it is proposed to include these grants in the so-called confirming Act. Grants of Crown lands in Newfoundland exceeding fifty acres must be made by special Act. I believe that by lumping the two types of properties together, that is property which is being granted and property the title to which is being confirmed, the Commission of Government feel that it will ameliorate their rather delicate position before public opinion here.

4. In addition, as reported in the Acting High Commissioner's despatch of May 8th, 1944, No. 220,<sup>1</sup> it is proposed to include the Bay Bulls lease. During the interview mentioned in that despatch, in reply to my question Sir Wilfrid Woods informed us that all long-term leases would be included. Having in mind our property at Gander and Botwood I asked him if he considered fifty year leases as long-term leases and he replied in the affirmative, but he did not give us any definition of what he considered to be a long-term lease.

. . .

7. With respect to properties which have been expropriated in fee simple under the Defence Regulations pursuant to the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, these properties are all British Admiralty properties, with the exception of a small parcel at Chain Rock in St. John's Harbour which was expropriated for the Army. These British Admiralty properties are being dealt with by a separate confirming Act and the Department of External Affairs has been kept fully informed of this development by copies of

<sup>1</sup> Document 631.

correspondence which has been forwarded from time to time by the High Commissioner, and I refer you particularly to my letter to the Deputy Minister of Justice dated January 20th, 1944,<sup>1</sup> a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience.

8. More specifically in reply to paragraph three of your telegram of May 16th, the proposed Act will include all Canadian properties in Newfoundland and Labrador acquired by purchase, or expropriation by the Newfoundland Government, or by grant from the Newfoundland Government. It will vest title in fee simple in His Majesty the King in right of Canada. In addition it will cover properties acquired under long-term leases. In this connection we should consider the position of the lease at Buchans to be made with the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company, and other interested Companies, which is for a term of thirty years, with right of renewal for an additional thirty years.

9. With respect to paragraph four of your telegram:

- (a) The Act would cover Torbay in that it will confirm title to the properties which have been purchased from private parties and grant the Crown lands within the airport area. With respect to the five parcels of land where Crown grants have been made but the owners cannot be found, the Department of Justice here have approved of the suggestion that these parcels be included in the Act for confirmation of title provided that some arrangement can be worked out for payment to any owner who should come forward at a later date. I presume that such an arrangement would take the form of an agreement between the two Governments.
- (b) The Act will contain the lease at Bay Bulls.
- (c) The Act should cover our properties at Gander and Botwood under the provisions of our agreement with respect to Gander, Botwood, and Gleneagles.
- (d) In reply to my inquiry during our interview above mentioned, Sir Wilfrid Woods stated that unless the agreement concerning Goose Bay Air Base had been completed at the date of the Act it would not be included in the Act. You might wish to give this further consideration. My personal opinion was that it might be possible to include this lease in the Act subject to the terms of the agreement to be executed, but I am afraid that the Commission of Government would not permit the lease to be brought before the people of Newfoundland in this way before the terms of the agreement have been made public. In this connection you might also consider the R.C.A.F. property (usually referred to as Defence Communications Limited) on Table Mountain at Cape Ray.
- (e) and (f) No suggestion has been made for including short-term leases or properties expropriated for the duration of the war only in the proposed Act. The question of the right to remove buildings and

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

improvements from such properties is a matter which, in my opinion, should be dealt with separately and requires special consideration.

10. With respect to paragraph five of your telegram, at no time has the question of user been discussed in connection with the proposed Act. Representations have been confined entirely to the object of validating the acquisition of property.

11. As you know we have been waiting for many months for legislation which would permit expropriations in fee simple and for leases against known and unknown owners and which would provide, in the case of leases, for the right to remove improvements. In my opinion this legislation will not be passed in time to be of any benefit to us. The procedure which has been followed throughout, particularly in respect to the lands expropriated, has been an attempt to solve the various problems without the necessity of such legislation. Apparently the reason for the delay in obtaining the legislation has been and is the fact that the Department of Justice here are overburdened with work which became acute with the departure of Mr. G. B. Summers, Secretary of Justice, to AMGOT a short time ago. He had been working for some time on the draft of an amendment to the Public Works Act, 1935, which was to remedy the defect in the regulations under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940, but I think that this amendment has been more or less permanently pigeonholed.

12. It seems to me to be advisable that the principle of this Act should be passed upon by the Commission of Government as soon as possible and not later than August of this year. Sir Wilfrid Woods will be leaving in August and I am informed that Sir Edward Emerson will become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in October. As the Act would in all probability be drafted by Sir Edward personally, and as he is familiar with the objects of the Act it seems imperative that the Act be drafted before his retirement. I understand that he is to be one of the delegation going to England in connection with constitutional matters, which will take up some of the time of his remaining period of Office. You are already aware of the desirability of having the principle of the Act brought before the Government before Sir Wilfrid Woods' departure. In my opinion the Act will be passed by the Commission of Government without doubt if Sir Wilfrid Woods and Sir Edward Emerson form part of the Commission of Government at the date of decision. Even if one or both of them retire beforehand, I think it would still pass as I have been informed confidentially by Mr. Dunn, Commissioner for Natural Resources, who is probably the most popular (or least disliked) member of the Commission, that in his opinion such an Act must be passed. Mr. Dunn has agreed to remain in Office for an additional year after the expiration of his term this Fall.

13. I would therefore, suggest that you consider the various problems which will have to be decided as soon as possible. In the meantime I am preparing for consideration a list of all Canadian properties for inclusion in

the Act which can be presented to the Commission of Government with the application for such an Act within the period above stated. This list will simply form the basis of the schedule to the Act and will be informative only. I think it would be advisable, when the list has been prepared, for me to make a trip to Ottawa in order that the various aspects can be discussed and the list checked with the records of the interested Departments. Once the principle of the Act has been accepted by the Commission of Government the drafting of the provisions of the Act can be commenced by Sir Edward Emerson and the schedules be compiled in proper form.

...

Yours sincerely,

B. A. ROGERS

791.

1156-Y-39

*Mémorandum du ministère des Affaires extérieures  
au Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Memorandum from Department of External Affairs  
to Cabinet War Committee*

[Ottawa,] September 19, 1944

RE: THE PROPOSED CONFIRMING ACT  
FOR DEFENCE PROPERTIES IN  
NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR

1. The legal work with respect to defence properties in Newfoundland is now virtually completed, but under Newfoundland law Crown grants free of charge or over ten acres and leases exceeding fifty acres in Newfoundland or one hundred square miles in Labrador require statutory approval. Moreover, in view of the uncertainty with respect to title and boundaries of many properties in Newfoundland it is thought essential that title should be confirmed by Statute to various properties purchased from private owners by the Canadian Government. In certain cases also the owners to properties have not been located and statutory confirmation of title would be desirable.

2. The Newfoundland Commission of Government appears to be prepared to pass a general Confirming Act applying to all properties acquired by the Canadian Government, as was done in the case of the base areas leased to the United States. Officials of the Departments of Government concerned (Army, Air, Naval Service, Transport, Justice, External Affairs) are agreed that a Confirming Act is necessary. It is understood that the Admiralty also propose to request a Confirming Act for Admiralty properties in St. John's.

3. The properties involved would include:

- (a) Crown lands promised the Canadian Government in fee simple. (Part of Torbay Air Base and certain small properties ancillary to base areas);



- (b) leases to Crown lands promised the Canadian Government. (Goose Bay Air Base, to which Canada has been promised a lease for ninety-nine years; areas at Gander and Botwood on which hangars and other structures have been erected and to which Canada has been promised security of tenure up to fifty years; Bay Bulls Marine Railway, to which Canada has been promised a lease for ninety-nine years.);
- (c) properties acquired from private owners at Botwood and Torbay and various small ancillary properties;
- (d) certain properties in the Torbay Air Base the owners of which cannot be located.

4. The only matter of policy involved would appear to be whether the Newfoundland Government should be requested to assure to Canada the right to post-war military use to these properties. It is clear that title in fee simple or lease would not *ipso facto* confer the right to military use, and it is possible that if no right to military use is expressly conferred by the Act the Canadian Government might find itself seriously restricted in, if not entirely precluded from, the use of such properties for defence purposes unless the Newfoundland Government should subsequently consent to military use. (Military use to Goose Bay Air Base is probably not dependent on statutory confirmation in view of the special Agreement for a Lease which Newfoundland and the United Kingdom have agreed to.)

5. It is recommended that an effort should be made to have the Newfoundland Government include in the Confirming Act express provision for military use, as was done in the case of the United States leases by The American Bases Act, 1941. In view of the probable early retirement from the Commission of Government of Sir Edward Emerson and Sir Wilfrid Woods, both of whom have been actively concerned with property questions and both of whom appreciate the desirability of a Confirming Act, it is desirable that decision on the question be made as soon as possible.

792.

1156-AN-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 282

Ottawa, September 20, 1944

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 389 of August 31, 1944<sup>1</sup> concerning oil storage properties on South Side Hill, St. John's Harbour.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. The objections raised in your despatch to asking a grant from the Newfoundland Government for land which it is intended should be handed over to a private company have been carefully considered by this Department and the Department of Munitions and Supply, and it is agreed that your point is well taken. I may say, however, that the Department of Munitions and Supply when making a request for the grant overlooked the agreement that had been made with Imperial Oil Limited.

3. The facts are that the Director of Protection of Petroleum Reserves of the Department of Munitions and Supply arranged for the removal of the gasoline tanks of Imperial Oil Limited which were located on the Harbour front at St. John's to their present site on South Side Hill merely as a defence measure, and the cost of approximately \$275,000 of so removing the tanks was borne entirely by the Department of Munitions and Supply. The Director also obtained from the Company its agreement to accept the new location as a permanent site for the tanks. If an arrangement cannot be made for the present location as a permanent site the Department will be put to the additional cost of reinstalling them to their former location on the Harbour front. It is estimated that this would cost at least as much as their removal to the present site. It is not thought, however, that the Newfoundland authorities would be favourable to the removal to the old site on the Harbour since that would, undoubtedly, constitute a fire hazard there.

4. In view of the fact that the Canadian Government has made a substantial outlay in removing the tanks from their present site, and in view of the fact that their removal has undoubtedly contributed to the safety of the Harbour, it may be that the Newfoundland authorities, as their contribution to the safety of the Harbour, will be willing to grant to Imperial Oil Limited the necessary land for the tanks and an easement for the pipeline. If, however, the Newfoundland authorities wish compensation at a fair valuation of the land negotiations might be carried on on that basis.

5. Would you please discuss the whole matter with the Commission of Government and advise it of the arrangements by the Department of Munitions and Supply and with Imperial Oil Limited. Would you also advise as to whether Imperial Oil Limited should open direct negotiations with the Commission for the acquisition of the land, or whether the Commission of Government would be prepared to grant the land to the Canadian Government on the understanding that it would be turned over subsequently to Imperial Oil Limited.

6. This property should be dealt with separately from those to be included in the proposed Confirming Act.

7. I enclose two copies of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the Deputy Minister of Munitions and Supply, under date of September 16, referring to the property, one copy of which may be transmitted to Mr. Rogers for his information.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

793.

1156-Y-39

*Le conseiller spécial du sous-ministre de la Justice au conseiller spécial  
du sous-secrétaire d'État aux affaires extérieures*

*Special Assistant to Deputy Minister of Justice to Special Assistant to  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, September 23, 1944

Dear Mr. MacKay,

We attempted this week to maintain the schedule which we discussed in Ottawa but unfortunately it will not be possible now to bring the question of the confirming Act before the Commission of Government until Friday of next week.

However, Sir Edward Emerson has assured us that there is no question but that the principle of the legislation will be accepted by the Commission with provisions for military user, and commercial use and disposal with the consent of the Newfoundland Government. Such provisions will not in any way affect the good marketable title as the use will be confined to use *by the Canadian Government*. I believe that the other provisions which we discussed can be satisfactorily negotiated with the Newfoundland Government and on the whole the position appears to be very favourable. I am not sure as to the reason for separating Torbay with its subsidiary installations from the remaining properties but it may be that in this way the Commission of Government could grant us more concessions than by the single Act. It was necessary to confine Goose to a separate Act as there are provisions which we hope to have in the Act which might be taken to widen the agreement which has already been made with respect to Goose. In addition I believe that Sir Edward feels that unfavourable public comment would be less if the legislation were divided in this manner. Sir Edward stated that these Acts were necessary from the Canadian Government point of view in its responsibility to the people of Canada for the large amounts which have been expended, and he is indifferent to the storm of criticism that will undoubtedly be forthcoming when the Acts are published.

After discussing the question of the Act with Sir Edward and Mr. Puddester on Tuesday, Sir Edward discussed the matter with his successor, Mr. Winter, in order that there would be no difference of opinion between them, as the Acts would be completed after his resignation.

...

Last night I had a long discussion with S/L Pattison, who is Director of Civil Aviation for Newfoundland and acts as a liaison between the Newfoundland Government, the British Air Ministry, and the R.C.A.F. He apparently has been discussing the whole question with Sir Wilfrid Woods, with whom he is in close touch at all times on these matters. When I saw him in July at Gander after our discussions in Ottawa about Goose, and later at Botwood, before his departure for England, I gathered that he was very

much against any Crown grants of radio installations and any concessions respecting title which would put us in a stronger position in respect of the air bases. From our conversation last night he appears to have been somewhat impressed by the difficulties which will be met in maintaining these air bases and subsidiary installations and he could see no objection to our acquiring, by Crown grant, our radio ranges and other installations which are on Crown lands. The cost of maintenance seemed also to be uppermost in Sir Edward's mind during our discussions and he pointed out that the cost of snow removal at Gander for one year was one million dollars. I reminded S/L Pattison that Botwood, which is a thriving semi-commercial base, only averages between six and eight planes a day whereas Gander clears for overseas about seven hundred planes a month, and that use and operations of the air bases after the war have been greatly exaggerated. In fact I concluded that he thought it a rather good idea to have someone other than the Newfoundland Government responsible for the large maintenance costs.

Yours sincerely,

B. A. ROGERS

794.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, September 27, 1944

...

DEFENCE PROPERTIES IN NEWFOUNDLAND;  
 CONFIRMATION OF TITLE

1. THE SECRETARY submitted a memorandum, copies of which had been circulated, regarding passage by the Newfoundland Commission of Government of appropriate legislation on this subject.

A number of grants and leases required statutory approval and, in view of uncertainty with respect to other properties, it was considered desirable to obtain a general Confirming Act which would cover all land however acquired from the Crown, or from private owners.

Since it was not clear that title in fee simple or lease conferred the right to military use, it was felt desirable to propose that an express provision to this effect be included in the Confirming Act.

(External Affairs memorandum, Sept. 19, 1944—C.W.C. document 862).

2. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, noted this report with approval, on the understanding that the proposal to include provision for postwar military use would not be pressed if it proved likely to delay immediate conclusion of arrangements for the Confirming Act.

...



795.

1156-Y-39

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, October 5, 1944

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

Further to our conversation on the subject of the various properties in Newfoundland in which your Government is interested, and which it has acquired by grant, lease or otherwise, I have to inform you that at the meeting of the Commission of Government held on September 29th last it was agreed in principle that the title of the Canadian Government to these properties should be confirmed by Act of Parliament.

I have given instructions for the preparation of the necessary legislation, and shall be glad to consult with you about it as may be necessary, so that we may agree upon a final draft satisfactory to both Governments.

I feel sure that your Government will be glad to know that this rather difficult matter is being settled in this way.

Yours sincerely,

H. A. WINTER

796.

1156-X-39

*Le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of Munitions and Supply  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

Chicago, November 17, 1944

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Thanks for your confidential letter of November 14<sup>1</sup> with reference to the Goose Bay Lease and public opinion in Newfoundland.

There is no doubt that all criticism in Newfoundland results from the delay in reducing preliminary understandings to formal leases. Something might be gained through stressing the huge expenditures made by Canada in developing the leased areas. I am inclined to think that a still better procedure would be to let criticism die down through lack of controversy.

I note the suggestion from Mr. Rogers that perhaps the most contentious of all will be the lease of the runway extensions at Gander. Should controversy arise on that point it might be well for Canada to turn over these leases to whomever may be permanent custodian of the aerodrome.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

I am in accord with Mr. Rogers' suggestion that the seaplane base at Botwood might be turned over to the Government of Newfoundland subject to an undertaking that Newfoundland will maintain the base. The seaplane base will be of little if any value to Canadian postwar aviation.

Thanks for bringing these matters to my attention.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. HOWE

797.

1156-Y-39

*Mémoire du conseiller spécial  
du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures<sup>2</sup>*

*Memorandum from Special Assistant  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>2</sup>*

Ottawa, November 28, 1944

Despatch No. 528 of November 28<sup>3</sup> points out that the Commission of Government is somewhat worried over the persistent criticism of the Goose Bay Agreement. The High Commissioner suggests that we should offer to assist the Commission in drafting the statement of objects and reasons which will accompany the publication of the proposed Confirming Act. He suggests that to allay criticism something of the expenditures outside defence properties, the titles to or possession of which will be confirmed in Canada, should be emphasized.

2. Now that the Newfoundland Government has agreed to the Confirming Acts in principle, I wonder if it would be wise to press for completion of the Acts at the present time in view of the probability that the Acts will stir up more suspicion and more criticism of Canadian policy. There is a further consideration that, if a comprehensive defence plan is proposed by the Committee on Post Hostilities and approved by the Government, we shall have to ask Newfoundland for rights beyond those granted by the Confirming Acts. It is thus possible that, by pressing for the Confirming Acts at the present time, we might prejudice further negotiations.

3. I suggest, therefore, that we might consider suggesting to the Newfoundland Government that, provided we have their formal assurance of the approval of the Confirming Acts in principle, we should have no objection to a few months delay in the formal completion of the Acts, pending discussion between the two Governments as to postwar defence arrangements. Mr. Rogers could complete all matters of title, and the Acts might be drafted before he leaves Newfoundland. We should, of course, need to consult the High Commissioner before giving instructions on the matter.

<sup>1</sup> R. A. MacKay.

<sup>2</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

798.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, December 7, 1944

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I have read with much interest your confidential letter of November 29th<sup>1</sup> enclosing copy of a memorandum<sup>2</sup> from Mr. MacKay raising the question as to whether it is good tactics to press for the completion of the Confirming Acts at the present time in view of the prolonged and unfavourable criticism of the Goose Bay Agreement.

I had been pondering this very question for the last week or two myself but had come to the conclusion that our course is pretty clear.

We have already an assurance from the Commission of Government that they agree, in principle, to the passage of the Confirming Acts and I do not see how we could very well go back to them on this point and try to nail them down to anything more specific.

It is unfortunate, of course, that the properties could not have been in-defeasibly secured while there was a menace of attack. But, though that menace has long since receded and is no longer a factor of any importance whatever, I think we should continue to press now while the memory of Newfoundland's promises can still be recalled with some plausibility, and while we have still strong bargaining power with the United Kingdom. In the last resort they set the policy that is followed here.

A further reason for keeping to this course is that both the United States and the United Kingdom have Confirming Acts in course of preparation and it will, I think, be easier for us to get our titles secure at the time they are also doing it than if we leave the matter to be dealt with at some later period. Mr. Hopper, the United States Consul-General, tells me that he is proceeding very slowly in the matter. He has not spoken to any of the Commissioners on the subject for the past six weeks and, in fact, the State Department has still before it the draft of the United States Supplementary Agreement which has to be confirmed. They, too, have a few small properties, the deeds and descriptions of which they have not yet completed. It may be, therefore, a month or more before any action is taken by the Commission of Government on the matter. As for the United Kingdom, we understood from Mr. R. Hunter, Superintending Civil Engineer, British Admiralty Delegation at Washington, who was in St. John's some weeks ago, that a Confirming Act for the Admiralty properties here had been discussed with the Newfoundland Government and that the Act would be put through shortly. We have recently been rather surprised to learn that the permanent officials here have had no formal

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 797.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 797.

instructions on the matter. I would suggest, therefore, that this point be brought to the attention of the British Admiralty Delegation at Washington.

There is an additional point, developed in my letter of December 1st,<sup>1</sup> which, I think, is relevant in this connection. It is that I do not think it is desirable to approach the Newfoundland authorities for a post-war defence Agreement until we know what the defence picture really amounts to. It would be senseless for the military authorities to enter into commitments which may involve the Canadian tax-payer in heavy outlays when more reflection may prove that they are not really needed at all.

To propose that the Confirming Act be not proceeded with, or to acquiesce in any Newfoundland proposal to drop them, would, it seems to me, not be the best policy. For in negotiating a post-war agreement they would be negotiating on more than even terms and we might not get an agreement at all, whereas with respect to the Confirming Acts, they can only get out of them by going back on undertakings, not as definite as they should have been, but nevertheless fairly definite, that they have already given us.

It goes without saying that, so long as the United States maintains forces here, we should do likewise. It seems to me however, that the size of our respective Forces should be revised now and from time to time later. Recently we have taken over the operation of five radar stations and in consequence 350 United States soldiers have returned to the United States. The general position appears to be, however, that the more troops we have here the more they think they should have also. For example, I understand that General Brooks, before leaving, protested against a proposal to reduce United States strength at Fort Pepperrell Base from 3900 to 1000 men on the ground that they were needed for prestige purposes since Canada has some 3700 troops in the neighbourhood. As a result, I understand, it has been decided not to reduce United States forces under 3000. By arrangement between the two Governments or Service Departments the forces could, and clearly should, be greatly reduced, for they serve no military purpose whatever and it will make the post-war situation easier to solve if the numbers involved are smaller.

Once we have the Confirming Acts we will have something definite to show for our work down here and will be in a much stronger position for bargaining if it should prove necessary to seek a new post-war defence agreement. If, later on, it comes to bargaining about a post-war agreement or bargaining about the use for commercial purposes of the facilities we have constructed during the war, some thought should, I think, be given to turning them back to Newfoundland for something of more use to us. The rights we have, or expect to get confirmed in Gander and Botwood, for example, are not of much real value to us from an operational point of view and it would, in fact, be better to have one real base here with full operational rights than a series of holdings that cannot really be used at all except in conjunction with Newfoundland.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



If it should happen that the Bills can be got ready for publication by January 15th, I may, unless you see any objection, find some plausible means to postpone their publication until after the 25th of January. As you know, I have agreed to deliver the address on the "Immortal Memory" at the Burns Night celebration on that date, and I would not wish to risk the possibility of a hostile demonstration on such an occasion. It is true that the bulk of the audience would be Scotch and Scotch-Canadian but, as you know, it is customary for a considerable number of Newfoundlanders to be present and, indeed, to speak on general topics affecting the welfare of the Island. There would be, in fact, a ready-made opportunity to criticise the Acts over the radio and destroy what should otherwise be an evening of good fellowship. The probability seems to be that the Acts will not be ready, in any case, before the 25th of January, but I think, in closing, I should bring this aspect of the matter to your attention.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

799.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, January 26, 1945

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I was rather disappointed, though hardly surprised, on returning from my vacation in Canada on January 20th, to find that during my absence Mr. Winter had shown a disposition to waver on the Confirming Acts and had suggested a trip to Ottawa to have a further discussion on the subject.

...

The whole position is almost too complicated to summarise in a despatch, more particularly when Mr. Rogers himself will be going to Ottawa and can do it more effectively in conversation. I have already set it forth in detail in my letter of December 7th, and the views set forth therein represent what I think on the subject. I am particularly concerned that the discussions be kept to the legal questions involved and not allowed to set aside the principle accepted by the Commission on September 29th, of passing the Confirming Acts. It is well to keep in mind, however, that our position is weak in that if we try to insist that the Confirming Acts be passed they could make a very good case on technical grounds that they have so many prior questions, including the Supplementary American Bases Act and the British Admiralty Act and other highly important questions the United Kingdom Government wishes them to take action on, that they could delay almost endlessly. Moreover, our original agreements are so drawn that they could give us exactly what they are committed to give us, but the result would not

be satisfactory to us at all. I have already referred in this connection to the anomalous position at Gander. A similar point is that no binding commitments were secured respecting the grant of Crown lands on which the radio stations at Brig Harbour Island, Port-aux-Basques, and St. Andrew<sup>1</sup> were erected,—a point that our decision to be content with getting nothing more than a duration and two years thereafter tenure at Cape Ray further weakens. I suggest that Mr. Rogers should have a general discussion with the members of the proposed Committee before they meet Mr. Winter so that they will be familiar with the situation and our point of view.

. . .

Mr. Winter is certainly the best disposed towards Canada of any member of the Commission and has for years past, made no secret of his view that the ultimate solution of Newfoundland's constitutional problem is federation with Canada. He feels that if good terms were offered Newfoundland might be persuaded to come in. He may possibly wish to sound out our ministers very informally on the matter of favourable terms. I am sure, however, that he has no specific proposal to put forward and certainly nothing of an official character since his whole trip is more of a personal than of an official nature. If he should raise the matter at all it might present a good opportunity to secure information on the proposals for constitutional changes which the Dominions Office made last Autumn and which thus far have been kept extremely secret. He could hardly mention the subject unless he is prepared to tell us what the Dominions Office is proposing to do. In any case I hardly think, for the reasons set forth in my communication No. 431 of September 25th, 1944,<sup>2</sup> which are still operative, that the present or immediate future is a propitious time to bring up the question of federation with Canada.

Sincerely yours,

J. S. MACDONALD

800.

1156-Y-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, February 14, 1945

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Since writing you on January 26th with reference to Mr. Winter's visit to Ottawa to discuss the Confirming Acts, I have had several informal talks with him, and with the other Commissioners chiefly interested, in an endeavour to ascertain whether I could elicit any facts or points of view that would be helpful to you in the discussions.

<sup>1</sup> Subordonné à Torbay.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Ancillary to Torbay.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

. . . The passage of the Goose Bay Act has impressed upon the Commissioners the extent of the public outcry that is likely to be made at the publication of each new Act or Agreement tying up Newfoundland's resources for long periods, the need for which still does not seem to be understood by the public. And in recent weeks the deep penetration of the allied armies into Germany itself has shown the war to be approaching its termination, and made clear to them that not only the question of property titles but also the question of military rights in the post-war years and the regulation of civil aviation will soon have to be discussed.

Mr. Winter who, as Commissioner for Justice, is responsible for drafting the Confirming Acts has, by a process of gradual development of ideas, come to the conclusion that it would be better not to proceed with them now. This is the view he will put before you at Ottawa. He bases it partly on legal niceties about conveyancing and property rights, which I do not completely follow and, partly, on the necessity for a broader arrangement and the desire to avoid unnecessarily agitating public opinion by a series of enactments when one more comprehensive Agreement will suffice. I do not think he is actuated by any desire to escape from or water down the commitments Newfoundland has made to us but genuinely feels a better and more acceptable conclusion can be reached by dropping the idea of Confirming Acts and proceeding, as soon as the post-war situation is sufficiently clarified for us to see what conditions will have to be met, to the negotiation of a new Agreement, or series of Agreements published simultaneously, covering post-war military rights and commercial use, and regulating property rights at the same time.

I would say that Mr. Winter's opinion, though not so strongly or so clearly held by the other Commissioners, is, in a general way, shared by them. I know that Sir George London, Mr. Dunn and Mr. Walsh consider it would be to the advantage of Canada as well as Newfoundland to adopt Mr. Winter's general view. Of the other two Commissioners, Mr. Wild, Commissioner for Finance, is not keenly interested one way or the other, and Sir John Puddester, Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare, while not directly interested as a Commissioner, is generally adverse, as a Newfoundlander, to giving anything away.

Last evening I had dinner with Mr. Winter. Sir Edward Emerson the Chief Justice was also present. In the course of the evening we had an opportunity for half an hour's discussion on the subject. It was particularly interesting and important because, as you will recall, Sir Edward Emerson was the Commissioner for Justice at the time when the decision was taken to proceed with the preparation of the Confirming Acts. I could see, however, that he was much impressed by the case Mr. Winter put forward feeling that the experience with the Goose Bay Act showed how wide-spread and deep-seated was the public feeling against the granting of leases and that the approaching termination of the war was now making topical both the question of post-war military rights and the question of commercial use.

I do not think that the Commissioners or the Chief Justice over-estimate the strength of public opinion on this question. Agitated as they are over the granting of long term rights to undeveloped land in far-off Labrador there is every reason to expect more intense feeling when rights are granted at the old Newfoundland airports of Gander and Botwood and at Torbay on the outskirts of St. John's itself. Moreover, the language of the legal documents itself tends to accentuate the difficulty faced as it is with such phrases as "vested indefeasibly in Canada", "freed absolutely of all public rights", etc., etc. While the suggested procedure would not, of course, avoid public discussion it would avoid stirring up such discussion three separate times—first, on the Confirming Acts, then on the grant of post-war military rights, and, finally, on the Commercial use of the bases. Moreover, the suggested procedure might make it practicable to present the situation more acceptably by being able to explain it comprehensively.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

801.

10298-D-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

TELEGRAM D-58

Ottawa, April 28, 1945

SECRET. Following from Read for Robertson. Begins.

1. Meeting April 27 of officials of Departments concerned and Mr. Winter, Commissioner of Justice and Defence for Newfoundland, to discuss Confirming Acts for defence properties in Newfoundland.

2. Winter freely admits that the Commission of Government is committed to passing the legislation, and says it will be passed if we insist but he thinks such a course would be prejudicial to good relations with Newfoundland, in view of public concern over post-war civil use of air bases, especially Gander and Botwood.

3. He proposes that questions of title to defence properties should be left in abeyance, pending overall agreement which would cover post-war use of properties for defence and civil aviation. Goose Bay Agreement provides for discussion, within twelve months after the war, between the United Kingdom, Newfoundland and Canadian Governments about civil use of Goose Bay. Winter suggests that these discussions might be broadened to include use of other bases and defence properties and overall defence arrangements. He

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie King assistait alors avec N. A. Robertson à la conférence de San Francisco.

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie King was then attending the San Francisco Conference with N. A. Robertson.



thinks an overall agreement which would safeguard rights and interests of both parties should not be difficult to achieve and would be more acceptable to Newfoundland people than legislation which would merely assert Canadian rights to property.

4. Winter would agree to Exchange of Notes which would preserve rights of both parties, pending an overall settlement. Exchange of Notes would include lists of properties involved, together with statement of rights and intentions of parties as expressed in agreements already reached. The Newfoundland Government would agree to protect the Canadian Government in occupation of existing defence areas should occupation be challenged by any private party.

5. Winter hints privately that Dominions Office is averse to passage of Confirming Acts unless United Kingdom is assured of military and possibly civil use of Torbay. He thinks Dominions Office would approve of Exchange of Notes, pending overall settlement as suggested.

6. Winter's suggestion seemed to meet with favour of officials representing the Departments concerned. The main objection appears to be that the Exchange [of] Notes could not (repeat not) at present be made public since publication would likely arouse criticism in Newfoundland as would passage of Confirming Acts. We think, however, that Canadian interests would be adequately safeguarded by such Exchange of Notes.

7. In view of strong feelings of Newfoundland Government on the matter, and in view of fact no decision has yet been reached on policy with respect to post-war defence responsibilities in Newfoundland it is suggested: (1) that External Affairs express its approval of Winter's proposal to other Departments concerned; and (2) that a Note to Newfoundland Government be drafted in consultation with Winter and other Departments concerned, DRAFT to be subject to approval later by both Governments.

802.

10298-D-40

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense au sous-secrétaire d'État  
suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence to Acting Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, May 2, 1945

Dear Mr. Read,

Following the conversations which my associates and I had during the past few days with officials of your department, as well as officials representing the other departments of your Government which are concerned, on the subject of the Canadian defence properties in Newfoundland, I am now addressing you for the purpose of setting forth in writing, as clearly and succinctly as I may, the proposal which I made to you in those conversations and which it was the object of my visit to Ottawa to make.

. . .

The task with which we are faced is to settle, satisfactorily to both parties, the title or titles which Canada is to have to the properties involved in these large projects. These projects in turn are three in number and are perhaps sufficiently denoted by their familiar names of (1) Goose Bay; (2) Gander and Botwood; and (3) Torbay. They comprise both 'real estate' in which I include land, buildings and other fixtures, and incorporeal rights or easements, such as rights of way, usufructs, *et cetera*.

It is important, I think, to emphasise that the agreement, or understanding, reached at this stage by the two Governments and contained in the letters, notes, memoranda and other documents exchanged between them, is confined to the military nature of the Bases and the use to which they have been, and may be in the future, put for defence purposes. Two of them, Goose Bay and Torbay, were in fact built as a result and for the purposes of the war; while the others, Gander and Botwood, come into the picture because, although they were in existence and use before the war, Canada has, at her own expense, so largely added to the pre-existing works and facilities, in addition to exercising control of their use during hostilities.

It was natural and logical, and appreciated by the Newfoundland Government from the beginning, that Canada should look for a clarification of her legal position and a definition, as final and precise as possible, of her tenure of these Newfoundland properties. The correspondence which I have mentioned had that object in view and is regarded by both Governments as constituting, either in express terms or by necessary implication, a binding agreement, or series of agreements. Consonantly with this view, the Newfoundland Government in September 1944 accepted in principle the idea that these agreements should be implemented by legislation, which should confirm the titles, of the nature and in the form agreed, of Canada to the respective properties. An undertaking to that effect was given by my letter to Mr. Macdonald, the Canadian High Commissioner, of October 5, 1944.

Shortly afterwards, in the case of Goose Bay, this undertaking was carried out and the Goose Bay Act enacted. It granted Canada a ninety-nine year lease of the site for military purposes; it expressly provided that its use for other purposes should be settled by agreement within the year following the end of the war in Europe.

It was not possible to prepare and put into final shape similar draft Acts for Gander-Botwood and for Torbay until last February, when the two Bills, copies of which you possess, were approved by the Solicitors of both Governments so far as their purely legal effect was concerned. I may add that these drafts have been circulated among the members of the Newfoundland Commission of Government, but, for reasons which I now explain, have not yet been submitted to the Commission as a legislature for consideration and enactment.

If these Bases, built or adapted for defence purposes, were capable of no other use, as is, say, a gun battery or ammunition depot, there would have

been no difficulty in the way of giving Canada such title to the purely military installations she had created as might best suit her. But an airport is not in that category, and the provision in the Goose Bay Act which I have mentioned shows that both Governments have in mind the question of the post-war commercial use, or at least potentialities, of that Base. And I need hardly add that, in actual fact and for the past three years or more, Torbay, Gander and Botwood have all been availed of for purely civil, if not strictly commercial, purposes.

Having regard to this consideration, and, I think I may frankly say, impressed by the importance which the Newfoundland public, rightly or wrongly, attached to the civil and commercial side of the subject, as shown by the comments made upon the Goose Bay Act, the Newfoundland Government asked itself the question whether it was the wisest course, or in the best interest of either party, to proceed with a programme perhaps too simply conceived; whether it was not premature to do so; and whether more might not be lost than gained by such action. It was obvious that the large question of the civil and commercial use of these airports would have to be answered some time, and that many factors would exert pressure on both countries to answer it sooner rather than later. Would it not, therefore, be better in every way to let matters stand until the contemplated discussions should have settled the exact practical use that should be made of each airport, and then, both countries knowing just where they stood, assure to Canada, either by statute or by some inter-governmental agreement, just such titles and legal rights as the situation required or showed to be most desirable?

As the Newfoundland Government saw it, and as I have endeavoured to put it to you, the alternatives might be simply expressed in this way. The titles which the present draft legislation would create or confirm would either fit into the final scheme of things or conflict with it. If the latter, both Governments might well be criticised for acting precipitately and perhaps erecting unnecessary obstacles in the way of a permanent arrangement. If the former, the Bills could still be enacted and it is hard to see how any time would have been lost.

There are of course, many other aspects of the situation, but I do not feel that it is necessary to add to the length of this letter by discussing them. I think I need only state that the Newfoundland Government came to the decision that action upon the Bills should, if possible, be deferred, and that I was authorised to proceed to Ottawa and submit the proposal to your Government, as I have done.

In its simplest terms that proposal is that the position be left unchanged, and no action at all be taken, pending the discussions indicated, unless some new development should dictate otherwise. This broad, and perhaps somewhat bare, proposition is of course based upon the assumption, which I think can safely be made, that both Governments have already reached sufficiently complete agreement upon the 'military' side of the question and that that agreement is expressed in the two Bills as drafted.

I realise, from some of the views expressed during our recent discussion, that this general suggestion of a postponement, although it may be acceptable in principle to your Government, may appear to it not altogether satisfactory because of the uncertainty which will still surround certain features of the Bases and which it is desirable to remove during the period which has to elapse before a final settlement. If that should be the case, I should be grateful if you could intimate to me any department of the subject, or any specific points, upon which you would like some further express agreement or understanding or some more exact definition of the understanding already reached. If you care to do this, I shall be happy to submit your suggestions to the Newfoundland Government for its consideration and approval.

Yours sincerely,

H. A. WINTER

803.

10298-D-40

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense au sous-secrétaire d'État  
suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence to Acting Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, June 29, 1945

Dear Mr. Read,

Upon my return early this month from Canada I made a written report to my colleagues in the Commission of Government upon my visit to Ottawa and the discussions which were had there on the subject of the Canadian Air Bases in Newfoundland. I appended to my report copies of my letters to you of May 2nd. and of your draft reply of May 18th.<sup>1</sup>

... While my colleagues in the Commission are gratified to know that the broad proposal for the postponement, for the time being, of the passage of the draft Acts is acceptable to the Canadian Government, they are, I regret to have to inform you, somewhat concerned and perturbed over a certain passage in my letter which, in their opinion, incorrectly reflects their views of the matter and might for that reason mislead (or possibly have already misled) your Government and produce an unfortunate misunderstanding upon some important points.

The passage I refer to is contained in the penultimate paragraph of my letter and consists in the words which you quote in your draft reply, viz., "This broad, and perhaps somewhat bare, proposition is of course based

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



upon the assumption, which I think can safely be made, that both Governments have already reached sufficiently complete agreement upon the 'military' side of the question and that that agreement is contained in the two Bills as drafted."

The view which the other members of the Commission of Government take of these words, and which they have instructed me to convey to you, is that in their natural and ordinary meaning they suggest that the Newfoundland Government so far accept and approve the provisions of the Bills as they stand, that their enactment as Statutes would follow almost as a matter of course if it were proceeded with. They fear that this is how they will appeal to the Canadian cabinet, or to the proper Ministers, and that, should the Commission at any time hereafter express disagreement with, or opposition to, any of the terms of the Bills except upon trifling or immaterial points, your Government might reasonably complain that it had been induced to act in a certain way upon the strength of an understanding which did not in fact exist.

I do not myself share this view; in fact, I dissent from it strongly. I have my colleagues' permission to say this and to state what I consider the passage must be taken to mean, having regard to the whole tenor and purpose of my letter.

If I had intended to give the impression which my words are said to convey, I should simply have stated that both Governments had already agreed upon the military side of the question, as shown by the Bills, or words to that effect. The words 'sufficiently complete' would have been unnecessary and indeed meaningless. In my view they plainly imply the very opposite of what my colleagues infer from them. They can only mean that the parties have not yet reached agreement but have gone far enough on the road to it to permit further discussion safely to await the larger conference in view.

If, as I considered quite possible, the Newfoundland Government saw any substantial objection to the Bills as they stand, the argument of my letter was that such objection could much more reasonably stand aside and be urged at the projected conference, when it could be considered along with questions of civil and commercial rights and user, than be raised now or in the interval that must elapse. The latter course would in any case involve further discussion between both Governments, which could be far better carried on around a conference table; if they resulted in a final settlement of the 'military' question alone, that settlement might well be considered modified, by common consent, in the light of civil and commercial considerations, in which case the same ground would have been gone over twice.

...

Yours sincerely,

H. A. WINTER

804.

NPA GN1/8 1/45

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Commissioner for Justice and Defence*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 12, 1945

Dear Mr. Winter,

I refer to your letter of June 29th, concerning your letter to Mr. Read of May 2, about the postponement of the passage of the proposed Confirming Acts for Canadian defence properties in Newfoundland.

I thank you and your colleagues on the Commission of Government for the courtesy of explaining the statement in your letter of May 2 "that both Governments had already reached sufficiently complete agreement upon the 'military' side of the question and that that agreement is contained in the two Bills as drafted". I assure you that your letter will be given careful consideration.

I may say that we have assumed that the statement to which you refer should be read in accordance with the whole tenor and purpose of your letter. We do not understand from it that the Newfoundland Government is committed to the passage of the draft legislation as it stands. Nor would we ourselves wish to be committed to the present draft. It is recognised that the Bills as presently drafted may be quite inadequate to provide for the mutual interests of Canada and Newfoundland in the matter of defence, as well as in the matter of civil use of the properties concerned, and that in the proposed general discussions both Governments will be free to introduce for consideration matters not covered or inadequately covered by the draft Bills.

It was thought, however, that the draft Bills, as well as the Exchange of Notes following your proposal in your letter of May 2 to postpone passage of the confirming legislation pending a general discussion between the two Governments, would form a convenient basis for the proposed general discussions between our two Governments.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

805.

10298-D-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au commissaire suppléant  
aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Commissioner  
for Public Utilities and Supply*

No. 51

St. John's, July 20, 1945

Dear Mr. Winter,

I wish to refer to your letter of May 2nd, 1945, to J. E. Read, Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, regarding the proposed Confirming Acts for Canadian defence properties in Newfoundland. . .

It will be appreciated that the Canadian Government has been somewhat concerned since, although very large expenditures have been made on defence construction in Newfoundland, some of which should be regarded as of continuing importance for the defence of Newfoundland and Canada, the legal status of a number of defence properties has not been clearly defined. The Canadian Government has felt, therefore, that it would be desirable that all questions of title to defence properties should be cleared up.

In view of the considerations advanced in your letter of May 2nd, 1945, the Canadian Government would not wish to press for the passage at the present time of the proposed Confirming Acts and is, therefore, prepared to accept the suggestion of postponement pending discussion and agreement between the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada as to post-war civil use of the properties concerned, subject to the following understanding:

- (a) Canada shall have rights of use for defence purposes to properties acquired or to be acquired by Canada in fee simple, or under long-term lease from the Newfoundland Government.
- (b) With respect to Torbay Airport and to ancillary properties essential to the operation of the Airport, the Newfoundland Government will be prepared later on the request of the Canadian Government to pass legislation necessary to assure to Canada title in fee simple to the lands comprising the Airport and to lands ancillary thereto as described and referred to in Schedule A<sup>1</sup> annexed to this letter. It is also understood that, pending passage of such legislation, the Newfoundland Government will protect the Canadian Government in its present use and control of the airfield and ancillary properties.
- (c) With respect to the Naval property at Bay Bulls, to which Canada has been promised a lease for ninety-nine years for defence purposes, the leased premises contemplated are described and referred to in Schedule B,<sup>1</sup> item 5, annexed to this letter.
- (d) With respect to the areas at Gander and Botwood to which Canada, under the Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941,<sup>2</sup> was to be granted leases for a period of fifty years, it is understood that the leased premises contemplated under paragraph 7 of the Air Bases Agreement are as of September 1, 1944 those described in Schedule B, items 6 and 7, annexed to this letter. It is recognized however, that adjustments may be necessary in the interest of the future operation of these bases.
- (e) With respect to properties purchased from private owners, as described and referred to in Schedule B, items 1, 2, 3, 4, 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 11(a), 11(b), annexed to this letter, it is understood that the Newfoundland Government will take such measures as may be necessary to assure to the Canadian Government proper title in fee simple.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir l'appendice E.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix E.

- (f) With respect to the defence properties at St. Andrews, Port-aux-Basques and Brig Harbour Island, as described in Schedule B, items 8, 9, and 10, annexed to this letter, the Canadian Government desires title in fee simple, but it is prepared to leave the question of title to these properties in abeyance pending the discussions referred to above and subject to the understanding that the Canadian Government will be protected in its present use and control.

In addition to the properties mentioned above, defence installations have been erected by the Canadian Army on certain Crown lands, notably for the defence of St. John's and Botwood. No request has been made by the Canadian Government for title in fee simple or long-term lease to these areas. It is suggested that the disposition of these areas should be reserved for the discussions referred to above, subject to any arrangements that may in the meantime be mutually agreed upon between the two Governments.

It is understood that the Canadian Government may remove its improvements from any Crown lands occupied by the Canadian Government for defence purposes, and from the leased premises herein referred to during the currency of the lease.

Installations to which the Canadian Government attaches importance for purposes of defence are the radio stations at Cape Ray. The Newfoundland Government has agreed that Canada should have undisturbed occupation for the duration of the war and for two years thereafter with the assurance that appropriate arrangements for continued use could be made between the two Governments without difficulty. It is suggested that the use of these stations and tenure to the property on which they are located would form an appropriate subject of the discussions referred to above. This property is described in Schedule C,<sup>1</sup> attached to this letter.

It would also be desirable in this exchange of correspondence to arrive at a clear understanding with respect to the status of the Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941, providing for Canadian control and operation of Gander, Gleneagles and Botwood Air Bases for the duration of the war. The Canadian Government recognizes its obligation to hand back to Newfoundland the control and operation of these Bases as provided in the Air Bases Agreement, but in view of the present uncertainties as to military requirements the Canadian Government is prepared to continue control and operation of these Bases in accordance with the terms of the Air Bases Agreement pending the discussions referred to above unless prior to these discussions our Governments should modify or terminate the agreement by mutual consent.

It is suggested that discussions between the Newfoundland and Canadian Governments referred to above should be held not later than twelve months hence, the date to be fixed by mutual agreement.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



If the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of Newfoundland, this letter together with your reply shall be regarded as placing on record the understanding arrived at between the two Governments.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. BRITTON

806.

10298-D-40

*Le commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements au  
haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

St. John's, August 28, 1945

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

I should like to refer to the letter of July 20th, 1945, which Mr. Britton, as Acting High Commissioner, wrote to Mr. Winter, Acting Commissioner for Public Utilities, on the subject of the Canadian Defence Properties in Newfoundland. In acknowledging that letter Mr. Winter stated that it would receive the early consideration of the Commission of Government, who would endeavour to give a reply as soon as possible on the subject of the understandings specified in it.

The Commission of Government have now carefully examined and discussed Mr. Britton's letter, both in its general tenor and with regard to these specific points, and I have been directed to communicate to you the view which they take of the matter in its various aspects.

In considering Mr. Britton's letter as a whole, and the request of the Canadian Government that the understanding set forth in it be reached pending the discussion which it has been agreed shall take place on the whole subject of user, both military and civil, of the airports and other facilities in question, the Commission of Government take the view that consideration cannot at this stage be fairly given to the proposal for reasons which I shall endeavour to explain.

The letter indicates the willingness of the Canadian Government to agree to the postponement of legislation confirming its title "subject to" the understanding referred to. Ordinarily this would suggest that, failing such agreement or understanding, the Canadian Government would press for such legislation. I can hardly think that this is what it had in mind, particularly since recent correspondence shows that the Canadian Government itself appreciates that neither party is in any way committed to the Bills as drafted. Further, it can, I think, be taken as settled that the conference alluded to must sooner or later take place—it is expressly provided for in the case of Goose Bay—and that the whole position, in all its aspects, will almost certainly be reviewed.

The Commission of Government therefore are somewhat at a loss to understand just what purpose your Government considers will be served by the proposed understanding, though the Commission are most anxious to prepare the ground in advance of the larger discussion. You will recall that the reason for Mr. Winter's visit to Ottawa was to stress the fact that legislation at that time could, of necessity, not deal with all the important questions of future user, so that, even if both Governments were in accord and complete agreement upon the wording of the Bills, it might well happen that in the light of full and free discussion of all sides and features of the matter either Government would desire some modification of the formal understanding and might even find it in its own interest not to insist upon what, in the narrow view, it might fairly call its rights. In that event the interposition of anything so rigid as an Act of Parliament might prove an embarrassment even to the party whom it purported to benefit.

If nothing remained to be done but to enact the draft Bills in final and agreed form, the Commission of Government would not regard it as unreasonable to be asked to give a clear-cut yes or no on all the points enumerated in Mr. Britton's letter. In fact, it would do so in effect during the passage and consideration of the Bills themselves. But, for the large reason which I have endeavoured to make clear, the Commission feel it impossible to give so direct and simple an answer at this stage and in place of a categorical acceptance or rejection of each of these points, I can only state briefly the view they take of them respectively at present.

Although Mr. Britton's letter specified a number of matters, enumerated (a) to (f), and mentions others in addition, I find that the first two alone present any real difficulty. The rest are either by way of identification only or are, including (f) expressly mentioned as proper subjects for discussion at the proposed conference, so that, subject only to the possible application to any of them of the general observations made below upon points (a) and (b), I think you may safely consider all these proposals as agreed by the Newfoundland Government.

The great difficulty which the Commission of Government sees in either assenting to points (a) and (b) or rejecting them has in effect already been explained by Mr. Winter to Mr. Read, after the latter's draft letter had been received and discussed in Commission. I do not think this will occasion you any surprise, since Mr. Britton's letter in this respect exactly produces Mr. Read's draft. Mr. Winter's letters made it clear that the Newfoundland Government had accepted in principle the idea that agreements already reached should be implemented by legislation confirming titles of the nature and in the form agreed, but that the Commission had not considered the terms of the proposed Confirming Acts. In reply to Mr. Winter's letter of June 29th, Mr. Robertson wrote, "We do not understand from it (i.e. Mr. Winter's letter of May 2nd.) that the Newfoundland Government is committed to the passage of the draft legislation, nor would we ourselves wish to be committed to the present draft". The Commission of Government were glad to have this

reply and assurance that the position was not misunderstood, but unfortunately, in their view, the propositions (a) and (b) in Mr. Britton's letter for all essential purposes reproduce, and are tantamount to, the legislation itself. If that view is correct, it would follow that the Newfoundland Government, if it assented to those propositions, would in effect be assenting to the very legislation which had been postponed, or at least to the principle of it which it had been at pains to question. It would not be committed to the legislation itself, but it would be committed to an understanding going to the root of the legislation. Its passage into law would alone be postponed; discussion of its main principle, unless Canada agreed to reopen it, would already have been obviated and precluded.

The principle to which I allude is involved in the words "rights of use for defence purposes to the properties, etc." used in (a). This is, I think you will agree, a very general and sweeping phrase, and doubts might arise as to its exact meaning. In its broadest interpretation it would seem to assure to Canada the right, for a long term or in perpetuity, to undertake the defence of Newfoundland, or even the defence of Canada in Newfoundland, so far as these installations are concerned, and certain other military rights in Newfoundland territory would probably arise by necessary implication. The opposite view of all that has passed between the two countries is that the "use for defence purposes" contemplated only the emergency now passed, and that the purpose of either a long term lease or a grant in fee simple was merely to protect Canada's right or title to the respective properties.

I do not, of course, at this stage propose dealing with these interpretations, but I think that you will agree that both give rise to impracticable situations. To indicate one difficulty by way of example, it hardly seems practicable to apply the first interpretation to the Gander Airport or to conceive of Canada using for defence purposes, under a fifty year lease, the miscellaneous properties listed in the Schedule, placed as they are in the midst of a large aerodrome which is certain to be a focal point for civil aviation. On the other hand, the second interpretation, applied to the Torbay Airport, would leave Canada with a fee simple title to the land but a title, since the war is now ended, divested for the time being of any rights of user. Such a situation may of course be theoretically possible, but the Governments concerned would hardly wish to allow it to remain in practice.

As I know you will appreciate, many other debatable points could be indicated, but I do not wish to make this letter unduly long and trust that the large and general considerations which I have submitted will incline the Canadian Government to share the view which the Newfoundland Commission of Government strongly hold, that the understandings sought cover matters which should be included amongst the subjects for discussion between the parties and that they involve such fundamental principles and serious considerations that a general understanding at this stage is difficult to reach without full agreement as to the scope of all rights conferred and the terms and conditions upon which they may be held.

The Commission of Government are considering ways and means with a view to instituting the general discussion, and are in communication with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

GEO. E. LONDON

807.

NPA GN1/8 1/45

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

DESPATCH 174

St. John's, August 31, 1945

SECRET

My Lord,

With reference to correspondence H.516/17, relating to Torbay Airport, ending with a letter dated 14th May, 1945,<sup>1</sup> from the Commissioner for Public Utilities to Mr. Clutterbuck, I have the honour to inform you that Mr. H. A. Winter, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, accompanied by Squadron-Leader Pattison, Director of Civil Aviation, and Mr. Puddester, Secretary for Justice, paid a visit to Ottawa in May, in the course of which he discussed with officers of the Canadian Departments of External Affairs, Justice, and Transport, and of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the subject of legislation for the purpose of confirming the titles of Canada to lands concerned in various Canadian defence installations in Newfoundland, including those at Torbay, Gander and Botwood. . .

3. In his report to the Commission on his return from Canada, Mr. Winter wrote:

When Mr. Puddester, Squadron-Leader Pattison and I reached Ottawa we had preliminary talks with Mr. R. A. MacKay and Mr. John Read, both of External Affairs, at which I outlined the proposal of the Commission of Government that action on the legislation be deferred. They received it sympathetically and in a general way concurred in the reasons which I gave in support of it. They then arranged a conference attended by representatives of the Justice and Transport Departments, in addition to their own, and of the Army, Navy and Air Forces.

A full discussion took place at this meeting, in which pretty well every aspect of the subject was treated. The only objections—and these were not strongly urged—which our proposal met arose from the slightly different points of view with which the Canadians and ourselves seemed to regard the subject. Most of them looked upon the airports as essentially war projects and as capable of retaining that character after the close of hostilities. I felt at liberty to assure them that few people in Newfoundland questioned what had been done as a contribution to the war effort or would oppose the future use

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.



of the bases for a similar purpose, if that desperate necessity arose; but that very many people were concerned over their civil and commercial possibilities and the share which Newfoundland might fairly claim in them.

In the end we succeeded in securing the assent of all present to the proposal itself and their agreement that it would be to the advantage of both Governments to hold up further legislation until the whole situation should be clarified by the larger conference upon civil and commercial user. In fact, the military gentlemen at the table, who did not at first fully appreciate some of the purely legal points involved, in the end supported my contentions rather more strongly than the rest.

If it had merely been a matter of agreeing to the postponement of further action, a simple exchange of letters to that effect might have been sufficient; but a point arose which I had not fully appreciated at first. The draft Bills which had been prepared had merely been agreed between Mr. Rogers and Mr. Macdonald on the one side and the Justice Department on the other as correctly interpreting and effectuating the agreements made in 1941 and onwards and contained in the letters, telegrams, and other documents that had passed between the parties. They had not been circulated to Commissioners still less submitted to Commission and approved in principle and as a policy.

Mr. MacKay pointed out to me, very reasonably as I thought, that the Bills were therefore not 'on the record' and that, as we had agreed last October to implement our undertaking to give Canada these titles, something should for the time being take the place of the Bills if they should be thus dropped.

After some discussion it was agreed that I should put to Mr. Read in writing the main arguments which I had used at the meeting and my general proposal, and that he should in reply, while agreeing to the course proposed, ask for an assurance or understanding of the same general effect as the Bills. The result was the exchange of letters<sup>1</sup> which I append hereto.

. . .

6. Whatever may be the outcome of this particular correspondence, it is clear that the time is fast approaching when the problem of the future use of Canada's defence properties in Newfoundland, and of the airports in particular, must be discussed and settled. The Goose Bay Agreement specifically provides that discussion on the future use of that Airport shall be held not later than one year after the war and, as reported in another despatch in this mail, the United States Government have now raised the question of the civil use of the Stephenville and Argentia Air Bases, and have also indicated their desire to participate in discussions relating to the use of airports established by Canada in Newfoundland territory. It would, therefore, seem to be of advantage, and, indeed, may be essential, to deal with all these matters comprehensively at the same time. I suggest, therefore, that steps should soon be taken to prepare for a conference of representatives of the Governments concerned, and I request your directions in this matter.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

<sup>1</sup> Voir les documents 802-806.

<sup>1</sup> See Documents 802-806.

808.

10298-D-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 197

Ottawa, September 7, 1945

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 285 of August 29<sup>1</sup> concerning the reply of the Newfoundland Government to Mr. Britton's letter of July 20 agreeing to certain conditions of the postponement of the passage of the Confirming Acts for defence properties.

2. It is noted that the Newfoundland Government does not accept our understanding of the situation already reached with respect to post-war military use of the properties in question and with respect to the obligation of the Newfoundland Government to pass the Confirming Act for Torbay Air Base if we insist. On the other hand, it is a matter of satisfaction that the Commission of Government does not reject these points out of hand, but urges that they be left in abeyance pending the general discussion envisaged in our reply.

3. It is, however, worth noting that Sir George London's letter is somewhat misleading in its reference to Mr. Robertson's letter of July 12 to Mr. Winter. Referring to our reply to the Newfoundland Government's request for postponing the Confirming Acts, Mr. Robertson said

We do not understand from it that the Newfoundland Government is committed to the passage of the draft legislation as it stands. Nor would we ourselves wish to be committed to the present draft.

Sir George London's alleged quotation reads as follows:

We do not understand from it that the Newfoundland Government is committed to the passage of the draft legislation, nor would we ourselves wish to be committed to the present draft.

The omission of the qualifying phrase "as it stands" obviously changes the sense.

4. I do not, however, think that anything but a debating point would be gained by pointing this out to the Newfoundland Government at the present time. But if we should decide subsequently to press for the Confirming Act for Torbay, we should be careful to see that Mr. Robertson's letter, if quoted at all, is quoted correctly.

5. As you observe, questions relating to civil aviation are likely to arise at an early date, and we cannot very well await settlement until after the constitutional future of Newfoundland is decided. As you also observe, the United Kingdom Government will be concerned with civil aviation matters and will probably have to be called into conference. As you suggest, it might be an

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

advantage to deal with the United Kingdom as a principal in these negotiations. In any event, discussions of civil air matters will give an opportunity for reviewing the whole question of defence.

6. I may say that serious consideration is being given at the present time to post-war requirements in Newfoundland for defence and civil aviation. A departmental memorandum has been prepared for the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction on the basis of discussions by an inter-departmental committee. A copy of this memorandum will be sent you in the course of a few days. From it you will observe that the possibility of relinquishing control of present defence properties in Newfoundland (as distinct from Labrador) in return for assurance of facilities for civil aviation and assurance of availability of airfields for military use in the event of emergency is being seriously considered. If this course is followed, passage of the Confirming Acts might be unnecessary.

7. Under these circumstances, I think it undesirable in your reply to Sir George London's letter to comment on the contents. I suggest instead that you merely acknowledge receipt of the letter, informing him that it has been referred to the Canadian Government and noting with satisfaction that the Newfoundland Government is considering ways and means of instituting general discussions on the whole matter.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

809.

50204-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au secrétaire du Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 12, 1945

Dear Colonel Gill,

As you know, the Newfoundland Government has not enacted legislation to confirm title in the Canadian Government to various defence properties in Newfoundland as had been hoped. On representation from the Newfoundland Government it was agreed some months ago that questions of title and rights of post-war military use for such properties should be postponed pending consideration of civil use of airfields and other defence facilities now under Canadian control.

It is anticipated that conversations with the Newfoundland and United Kingdom Governments on the civil use of Newfoundland airfields and other civil air matters will be held before long. It has been suggested that since the future political status of Newfoundland is uncertain, and since civil

aviation across the Atlantic is still in the experimental stage of development, a short-term arrangement of, say, three years' duration might be more feasible than long-term arrangements.

It is felt, however, that Canada's defence interests should not be lost sight of in these negotiations, especially in view of the attitude taken by the Newfoundland Government with respect to legislation for confirming title. Although it may be difficult to define Canada's requirements in the Newfoundland-Labrador region pending achievement of a peace settlement in Europe and pending clarification of Canada's military obligation under the United Nations Organization, it is suggested that it would in the meantime be desirable to safeguard Canada's freedom of action in the region.

. . .

Assuming that it is decided to endeavour to secure a short-term arrangement with the Newfoundland Government, the views of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as to the provisions which should be included in order to safeguard Canada's defence interests in the Newfoundland-Labrador region would be appreciated.<sup>1</sup>

. . .

Yours sincerely,

[H. H. WRONG]

SOUS-SECTION ii/SUB-SECTION ii

LES FINANCES<sup>2</sup>

FINANCE<sup>2</sup>

810.

1156-D-39

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 33

St. John's, August 2, 1940

SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, No. 33. Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner at Ottawa, No. 27. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 511, from Governor of Newfoundland.

Our secret telegram of June 16th,<sup>3</sup> accepted principle that Newfoundland should share the cost of special expenditure involved in measures adopted by Canada for the defence of Newfoundland air bases, but pointed out that total sum we could pay must necessarily be small. Meanwhile, at the request of Officer Commanding, Black Watch, we have undertaken certain fencing and clearing at airport, estimated to cost about \$4,000. We have also had a request from Squadron-Leader Carscallen that we should carry out certain work designed to make areas off runways unusable as landing grounds, and he has

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 950.

<sup>2</sup> Voir également l'appendice G.

<sup>3</sup> Document 108.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 950.

<sup>2</sup> See also Document G.



in mind other more expensive measures which would make it possible to render the runways themselves unusable at short notice. We are anxious to co-operate in every way and have actually authorized the work off runways, estimated to cost \$1,700, and pending more precise settlement of amount of our general contribution to Canada's expenses incurred on defence of Newfoundland, to be agreed as between our two Governments, we propose to accept these and similar miscellaneous items carried out at the formal request of Senior Canadian Military or Air Force Officer in Newfoundland as expenditure on account of our contribution. We should be grateful to hear that your Government agree. If requests of your officers here have to be covered by higher Canadian authority before we are entitled to recognize them, you will no doubt deal with this point in your reply.

811.

NPA S-4-1-2

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Finances  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Finance  
to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

F. 68-'40

[St. John's,] August 22, 1940

The Commission may wish me to summarise at this stage the position as regards our financial contribution towards Canada's expenditure on the defence of Newfoundland. During the last two or three months this Government has had in mind the possibility that a substantial financial contribution would probably have to be made to the Canadian Government on account of the large expenditure which Canada was likely to incur on the defence of Newfoundland. It has been recognized all along that Canadian expenditure here primarily had regard to the necessities of the defence of Canada itself. Nevertheless, this Government has all along held the view that, since the Canadian Government in defending its own territory was also providing defence to Newfoundland to an extent far beyond what we could provide ourselves, it was reasonable that some financial contribution should be made by this Government towards Canada's expenditure under this Head. This point was referred to during Mr. Emerson's visit to Canada in June last (see J.24(a)-'40)<sup>1</sup> and it is mentioned also in our Telegram to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa No. 33 (Repeated to United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada No. 27 and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 511) of August 2nd. At the time of the final fixing of the budget figures we had in mind that the contribution might amount to \$200,000 in a full year. Later as the scale of Canadian expenditure in this country grew the possibility of our having to make a larger contribution came into the minds of some of us. Alongside of the idea of an annual financial contribution in the form of a definite sum there has also been the suggestion that Newfoundland might provide certain services as representing partly or wholly

<sup>1</sup> Document 162.

the contribution from this country. It has recently been suggested in a letter from Colonel Ralston to the Commissioner for Justice and Defence that we should take over the question of transportation of Canadian recruits in Newfoundland, and the Commissioner for Public Utilities has recently prepared a draft of a letter, which he showed to me and I agreed, which might be used in reply to Colonel Ralston.

The matter took a somewhat different turn at the meeting at Government House yesterday with Mr. C. G. Power, Canadian Minister for [sic] National Defence for Air. The question of Newfoundland's financial contribution was raised in a question from our side of the table and Mr. Power in reply said that he thought it would be undesirable that Newfoundland should pay any kind of financial "tribute" to Canada on this account. He stressed that Canada was doing her part in the defence of Newfoundland for the sake of her own security and that Newfoundland was playing its own part in providing the sites, facilities, etc. which Newfoundland possessed and Canada would have to use. He seemed to think that Newfoundland might feel that any direct financial contribution would necessarily be inconsistent with our independence. We pressed him on the question whether from his own political point of view it would not be better for him to be able to reply, in answer, for instance, to a Parliamentary question, that Newfoundland was making a contribution of a not inconsiderable amount towards the large expenditure which Canada would be incurring; but he made it quite clear that for his own part he foresaw no difficulty of that kind, and he afterwards told me that he would insist when he returned to Ottawa that Newfoundland should not be asked for any specific contribution.

This is, of course, all to the good. But as Commissioner for Finance I want to make it clear that this arrangement, if finally confirmed by the Canadian Government, must not mean that we should, in lieu of a direct contribution, accept the charge for services up to an indefinite sum on behalf of the Canadian Government. I do not really think that it is a good principle that one Government should incur expenditure at its own discretion and another Government pay for it. We might find ourselves in that way with a larger bill to pay than a definite financial contribution would have involved. Moreover, the responsibility for the expenditure and the meeting of the charge involved should, broadly speaking, fall upon the same authority. However, Sir Wilfrid Woods' proposed reply to Colonel Ralston on the question of transportation meets all that one could ask in practice under present circumstances, and it will probably mean a very heavy expenditure on transportation before we get anywhere near a figure corresponding to what we would have to pay by way of a direct financial contribution. Further, of course, what is paid to the Newfoundland Railway helps to reduce the deficit or provide additional revenue, thus assisting our financial position generally in the long run. Whilst accepting, however, that we should meet the cost of the Canadian Government's transportation for defence purposes in Newfoundland, we should, I think, be doubtful about assuming responsibility for any other large block of charges of this kind.

After the meeting yesterday I spoke to Air Vice-Marshal Breadner and Major-General Elkins about the question of financial responsibility. Both said that they were not really competent to speak of this matter, but both appeared to accept quite definitely what Mr. Power had said at the meeting. Air Vice-Marshal Breadner said he thought that Newfoundland's contribution to the defence of this country should primarily be expressed in the provision of such local forces as might be agreed upon without any other contribution of any kind. Major-General Elkins seemed to think that we might take one or two definite services such as transportation and provision of temporary accommodation, e.g., in St. John's, pending the building of hutments, leaving everything else to the Canadian Exchequer. If our expenditure on the Newfoundland Militia is to be substantially increased, as the Commissioner for Justice and Defence has in mind, a total of five hundred men being provided irrespective of any recovery (now, of course, out of the question) from the United Kingdom, we shall be pretty severely strained, and the relief from any direct financial contribution to Canada of the order, say, \$200-400,000 will be very acceptable. Even with this relief, however, I have little doubt that we must bear in mind the possibility of having to increase the defence provision as set forth in the budget estimates and, as I have already told the Commission, savings must be made elsewhere.

Since, however, the question of our financial contribution towards Canada's defence was felt by us all to have a political as well as a purely financial implication, I am bringing this paper now before the Commission with the request that approval be given to proceeding on the basis indicated above, accepting Mr. Power's principle on the assumption that that will be confirmed by the Canadian Government and confining our measure of financial assistance to the provision of one or two specific services of moderate amount such as Railway transportation and possibly also the provision of temporary accommodation for troops in St. John's.

J. H. PENSON

812.

2227-40

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
au ministre de la Défense nationale*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to Minister of National Defence*

St. John's, August 27, 1940

Dear Colonel Ralston,

I am now in a position to write you more fully in reply to your note to me of 1st. August, 1940<sup>1</sup> in which you refer to a report made by Major-General Anderson, Inspector General, regarding his visit to Newfoundland and inform me that one point which he mentions is with regard to transportation of

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

troops, either singly or in bodies moving over the Newfoundland Railway. You add that you would hope that it would be my wish that the Newfoundland Railway would take care of this item.

2. We propose that any member of the Canadian Forces serving in Newfoundland should be entitled when travelling on leave, to return ticket on payment of the price of a single ticket, provided he produces a properly authenticated leave pass. This concession will be granted to all persons serving in Newfoundland with any branch of the Newfoundland, Canadian or United Kingdom Forces.

3. The question of payment for transportation over the Newfoundland Railway of members of the Canadian Forces when on duty is not without difficulty. The Newfoundland Railway has not sufficient revenue from other sources to enable it to give this service free. Consequently the service must be paid for, either by the Canadian Government or by the Newfoundland Government. We should very much like to be able to offer transportation of the Canadian Forces over our Railway free of cost to the people of Canada, but I am afraid we cannot make such an offer without reference to our total commitments in the matter of sharing the cost of measures taken by Canada for the defence of Newfoundland. Eventually we shall have to come to some agreement with your Government, which will keep our liability on this account to a sum which we can afford from our strictly limited resources. It will perhaps take some time to reach such an Agreement, but if your Government would in the meanwhile agree in principle that provision of free transportation over the Newfoundland Railway for the Canadian Forces when travelling on duty should be treated as a contribution to the cost of Canadian defence measures in Newfoundland we should be prepared ourselves to meet the bills rendered by the Newfoundland Railway from our general revenue. We intend to pay our Railway three-fourths of its ordinary charge for the services rendered, which would amount to requiring the Railway to carry the traffic at less than bare cost.

4. I must add that bills which we have in mind as payable by ourselves on the conditions above indicated are bills for actual transportation of members of the Canadian Forces and their ordinary baggage. Bills for meals or sleeping berths supplied at the request of Canadian Authorities and not paid for at the time, and bills for rail freight on stores and supplies carried independently of troop movements would be for the account of the Canadian Government. Similarly the reduced fares referred to in paragraph 2 above include transportation charges only. Meals and sleeping berths would have to be paid for by the individual concerned at the ordinary rates chargeable to the public.

5. Special arrangements would have to be made in the case of transportation of troops by Newfoundland Government steamer involving the supply of food on the voyage.

6. I should be glad to hear that these proposals would be acceptable to your Government.

Yours very truly,

L. E. EMERSON



813.

1156-D-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre des Finances*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister of Finance*

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, October 16, 1940

Dear Mr. Ilsley,

In reply to your letter of the 7th October<sup>1</sup> regarding Newfoundland's contribution to the problem of joint defence, the following information indicates how this matter stands at the moment.

When the Honourable Mr. Power visited Newfoundland some time ago<sup>2</sup> the Commissioner for Finance stated that the Newfoundland Government appreciated the generosity of the Canadian undertakings in the Island, and continued as follows:

The Newfoundland Government could not offer to pay any sum commensurate with the expense involved. It was felt, however, that a financial contribution was due. What he had in mind was a fixed sum which would not be inconsiderable, so far as the means of Newfoundland permitted. He explained that prior to the war the annual deficit had been met by grants-in-aid from the British Treasury. The Newfoundland Government considers that its most important war effort constitutes in so managing its finances that there will, if possible, be absolutely no call on the British Treasury for sterling. None the less Newfoundland was willing and anxious to bear its share of the common financial burden.

In reply Mr. Power stated that while he could not speak with authority his personal view was that the whole financial burden should be shouldered by Canada. He appreciated the desire of Newfoundland to do its share, but he thought it would be repugnant to the ideas of both countries that Newfoundland should, as it were, pay tribute to Canada and thus appear in a somewhat serviant [sic] role. He suggested that Newfoundland would probably wish to contribute by providing certain services and concessions in its own Island, e.g. transportation of troops, etc.

Newfoundland's financial contribution by way of "services and concessions" may be summarized as follows:

- (1) On June 30, 1939, the Governor agreed to admit free of duty, supplies for the disposal of the R.C.A.F. operating on the Labrador Coast, including gasoline, oils, spare equipment for air craft, photographic equipment and personal effects. All the gasoline supplied to the R.C.A.F. in Newfoundland is duty free as well as materials for building of airports.
- (2) The Government agreed to give free transportation over Newfoundland railroads for Canadian forces while travelling on duty.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 171.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 171.

- (3) Newfoundland authorities have undertaken certain fencing and clearing work at airports at the cost of \$5000 or \$6000, and agreed to give free use of airport facilities and provide quarters and messing for the R.C.A.F. personnel (Newfoundland airport and Botwood).
- (4) Re defence of Bell Island in Conception Bay. Arrangements were made for the training of 8 or 10 men of Newfoundland Militia *at Halifax*. In this matter, Newfoundland was asked to meet only the actual expenditures, that is the pay of the men, transportation charges and the cost of their maintenance. No charge is made for tuition fees, etc.

The foregoing, I believe, summarizes the situation as it stands today.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

814.

DND HQS 7410-3

*Le conseiller spécial du ministre de la Défense au  
sous-ministre associé suppléant de la Défense nationale*

*Special Assistant to Minister of National Defence  
to Associate Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence*

Ottawa, February 10, 1941

Dear Colonel DesRosiers,

Dr. Keenleyside advises me that he has received an enquiry from you as to the present financial arrangements that have been arrived at by the Canadian government and the Newfoundland Commission of government, with reference to the defence measures in Newfoundland.

The following is an outline of all the matters having financial implications which have been the subject of discussion, although in some cases you will notice these relate to departments other than National Defence.

1. Acquisition of property required for Canadian defence measures.

- (a) Where land in Newfoundland that is required for Canadian defence measures now belongs to the Crown, the Newfoundland government will convey or lease it to the Canadian government free of cost.
- (b) When private property is required the Canadian government will acquire it by negotiation, or failing a mutually satisfactory settlement, by a method in the nature of expropriation. Whether such property is rented or purchased, the cost will be borne by the Canadian government.

- (c) It has been agreed that where private property is to be acquired the Canadian government will appoint an agent to conduct negotiations with the owners thereof and arrangements are at present being made to find a suitable man in Newfoundland for this purpose.

## 2. Defence Forces.

- (a) As far as Canadian service personnel is concerned, all cost incidental thereto including pay and allowances, rations and quarters is borne by the Canadian government. As a contribution, however, to the cost of Canadian defence measures the Newfoundland Commission of government has agreed to pay for the transportation on the railway system in Newfoundland of all Canadian soldiers travelling on duty whether individually or in groups.
- (b) The cost of the Newfoundland Militia including the cost of relocating them and providing new quarters will be borne by the Newfoundland government.

## 3. Newfoundland Airport.

Negotiations are now proceeding with a view to having the operational control of Newfoundland Airport transferred to R.C.A.F.. Terms have not been arranged as to the responsibility for the cost of maintenance of the Airport and its facilities, but the Newfoundland government has agreed to make some contribution toward this item. Other Air Force activities are planned for Newfoundland but need not be itemized here.

## 4. Navy Activities.

The R.C.N. is considering a programme of defence measures. No conclusion has yet been reached as to whether Newfoundland will be able to bear any share of the cost involved.

## 5. Munitions, Guns, etc.

The Newfoundland government has not agreed to pay for guns, mountings, implacements, ammunition, etc., set up or used in Newfoundland. However, an account should be kept by National Defence of the cost of these items in case negotiations result in the Newfoundland government deciding to make some contribution toward such costs.

## 6. Financial Arrangements Generally.

- (a) Customs Duties. It is not settled as to what arrangements will finally be made as to customs duties on goods imported by the Canadian government into Newfoundland. In the meantime, it has been agreed that all equipment and supplies are to enter Newfoundland duty free with the exception of canteen supplies and goods for resale, special arrangements being made for certain articles.
- (b) Members of Canadian Forces are exempt from Newfoundland income tax during the period of hostilities.
- (c) Cheques are subject to Newfoundland stamp tax.

- (d) No charge is to be made by Newfoundland for motor licences in the case of Canadian vehicles, but payment is to be made to Newfoundland for the cost of the license plates.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Dr. Keenleyside so that, should there need to be further reference to the matter, he will also be in possession of the particulars.

Yours very truly,

H. A. DYDE

815.

2227-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 45

St. John's, July 9, 1941

During the visit of Colonel Gibson, Canadian Minister of National Revenue, opportunity was taken for discussion of outstanding customs and financial matters relating to Canadian defence scheme in Newfoundland. The arrangements tentatively proposed between Colonel Gibson and Newfoundland Commissioner of Finance have now been approved by Commission of Government, subject to one point which this Government would like to raise. They wish to know whether your Government desire to press for concession of duty free liquor being sold to officers by officers' messes for consumption outside of officers' mess[es] themselves, naval and military establishments and camps e.g. in private homes of such officers. Newfoundland Government find it difficult to believe such a concession is really necessary or can be regarded as advantageous from the point of view of war effort.

During Colonel Gibson visit question has been raised as to whether continuance, in view of liberal customs arrangement proposed, of present arrangement for payment by Newfoundland of railway fare of Canadian troops in Newfoundland when proceeding on official business. [sic] Newfoundland Government does not ask that this arrangement should be rescinded altogether, but that it should be agreed that contribution of Newfoundland Government in any year should not be more than \$30,000.

816.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*

TELEGRAM 480

Ottawa, November 20, 1941

Deputy Minister De Carteret and Air Commodore Nairn, National Defence for Air, arriving Washington Saturday to discuss informally with United States authorities financial arrangements regarding maintenance and operation of airfields in Newfoundland.



817.

2227-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur  
de Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor  
of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 84

Ottawa, December 13, 1941

Reference last paragraph your telegram No. 45 of July 9 concerning payment by Newfoundland of railway fare of Canadian troops in Newfoundland when proceeding on official business. We recognize desirability from Newfoundland's point of view of having an upper limit placed on Newfoundland's contribution. It seems to us, however, that \$30,000 is too low having regard to Newfoundland's present financial position and the fact that free transportation is only contribution Newfoundland has been able to make towards defraying expenses incurred by Canada in defending the island. Canadian Government thinks \$50,000 would be a fair limit.

818.

2227-40

*Le commissaire aux Finances au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Finance to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, January 10, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to a telegram (a copy of which is attached) addressed to His Excellency the Governor by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on 13th December 1941 in reply to a telegram of the 9th July last in which the Newfoundland Government asked that the contribution which it made to defence by way of free transportation of Canadian troops should be limited to \$30,000 a year in view of other concessions granted. The Secretary of State for External Affairs now suggests that the limit should be increased to \$50,000 a year.

I am to inform you that the Commission of Government is prepared to agree to this increase provided that the Canadian Government will for its part agree to forego certain claims which have been put forward or which might be raised for remission or refund of miscellaneous dues or revenue which accrue to the Newfoundland Exchequer by reason of work done or services performed in Newfoundland at the cost of the Canadian Government. The types of revenue referred to are stamp duties on bills of lading, cheques, etc., tolls paid to the Government by Telegraph Companies on messages sent, and Income Tax on insurance premiums, regarding which a separate communication has already been addressed to you. To analyse the whole of Newfoundland miscellaneous revenue in order to eliminate any possible gain accruing from transactions on behalf of the Government of Canada would be a most difficult, if not impossible task, and it is with the

object of avoiding lengthy research and possible controversy that the Commission of Government is prepared to offer the additional lump sum contribution which has been suggested. I should make it clear that the duties referred to in this connection are exclusive of Customs and Excise duties, and that any other arrangements already made would not be affected.

I should be glad to know if this proposal meets with the approval of the Canadian Government.

I have etc.

I. WILD

819.

2227-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 152

St. John's, March 16, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 26 of February 11th<sup>1</sup> in respect of the matter of the possibility of Newfoundland accepting financial responsibility for certain defence projects.

2. In the despatch under reference, you asked me to look over the field and let you have any useful suggestion that might occur to me as a proper project for the Newfoundland authorities to undertake.

3. In the hope that this matter might be placed on the agenda for the conference recently held in Montreal,<sup>2</sup> I wrote the Honourable Mr. Wild, Commissioner for Finance, under date of February 23rd, a letter,<sup>1</sup> copies of which are enclosed herewith.

4. Under date of February 25th, Mr. Wild informed me that he would be glad to discuss the matter with me at any time, but at his request, and at the request of Sir Wilfrid Woods, it was agreed that the matter should not be placed on the agenda for the Montreal conference.

5. On my return to St. John's after the Montreal conference, Mr. Wild called me by telephone and said that he was prepared to discuss the matter with me. I accordingly met Mr. Wild on March 12th, at which time he and I were the only persons present, as I had stated that I only wanted an informal conference with him.

6. The conference opened with the statement by me that at the time the earlier conferences on this subject took place, Newfoundland was not financially able to undertake any defence project of its own or to make any substantial contribution because of its poor financial position. At that time,

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 722.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 722.

the revenues of Newfoundland were not sufficient to meet the expenditures and there was an annual deficit. I pointed out, however, that the situation had now been radically changed as it was understood there would be a surplus this year of from \$5,000,000 to \$8,000,000.

7. I also pointed out that at the early conferences, the Commission of Government had intimated that they were willing to assist in the matter of the defence of Newfoundland if the financial position improved, and that at one of the earlier conferences, Mr. Penson had suggested that the arrangements should be in the form of a money contribution.

8. I then went on to explain, as stated in my letter to Mr. Wild, that it was felt that the better way for Newfoundland to make a contribution was to undertake some substantial defence project of its own in cooperation with or under the direction of the Canadian authorities. I further informed Mr. Wild that I had been requested by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to suggest some defence project which Newfoundland might undertake, but that I felt this was a matter which should come from the Newfoundland Commission of Government itself. However, I added that there were two matters now under consideration, either one or both of which might be considered as a defence project which Newfoundland might undertake, namely:

- (1) the establishment of a floating dock or marine railway which would permit of corvettes and destroyers being repaired and thus release the graving dock for the repairs of merchant ships;
- (2) the matter of Newfoundland adding to its own Militia Forces, which would operate under the direction of the Canadian authorities.

9. I told Mr. Wild that I understood that Major-General Page was to ask that Newfoundland should provide an additional 200 members of the Newfoundland Militia. Mr. Wild said that a request had already come from General Page for an additional 150 men and that this was now under consideration. (In subsequent conferences with General Page, I understand that he will require at the present time from 150 to 200 additional men in the Newfoundland Militia and that he estimates the annual cost for each man, based on the Canadian experience, to be \$1500 per year.)

10. I explained that the form of the defence project which Newfoundland should undertake at the present time was for the Newfoundland Government to decide and I said that the matter would be left in this position for further consideration as all I desired to do at this conference was to open up the position of the Canadian Government in the matter.

11. In the course of the conversation, Mr. Wild told me that while there would be a substantial surplus this year, it would only be a temporary one and was owing to the influx of the Canadians and Americans and also to the merchant ships which were using St. John's harbor as a convoy port and buying supplies here.

12. Mr. Wild also pointed out that Canada was contributing a substantial sum of money, amounting to \$1,000,000,000 in the way of foodstuffs, etc., to England, and said that he thought that the best contribution which New-

foundland could make would be to lend its surplus to England and, by helping out in the supply of dollars to England, [it] was indirectly helping Canada, as with this supply of Canadian dollars England would be able to buy more foodstuffs, etc., in Canada.

13. I stated that I thought that possibly the people of Newfoundland would be better satisfied if they realized that they were actively participating in the war by providing some defence project of their own.

14. Mr. Wild asked me if the Canadian Government was now willing to accept his proposal to increase the expenditures for carriage of troops from \$30,000 to \$50,000 on condition that certain small nuisance taxes were [not] to be cancelled. By nuisance taxes, I understand he means the revenue stamps on cheques, the tax on telegraph messages and the 8% on fire insurance premiums, stamp tax on bills of lading, and possibly one or two other similar nuisance taxes. I informed Mr. Wild that I would let him have an answer in a few days.

15. In my despatch No. 31 of January 14, 1942,<sup>1</sup> I sent you a copy of the letter received from Mr. Wild<sup>1</sup> and you replied in your despatch No. 12 of January 24,<sup>1</sup> 1942.

16. I have gone as far as I think I can possibly do in the matter of arrangement of taxes and other matters referred to in your despatch No. 12. The position may be summarized as follows:

- (1) *Price of liquor for Canadian Forces.*

Settled

- (2) *Free importation of coal for Canadian contractors.*

Settled.

- (3) *Customs concessions for hostels.*

I am writing you on this subject by a separate despatch (No. 148 of March 13th)<sup>1</sup> and am pointing out that nothing further can be done about this matter, for the present at least, because of the fact that duty has been collected from the United States Forces on foodstuffs for their Recreation Hut, and there will be no remission of duties for the Canadian hostels, although possibly there may be some assistance given to the hostels in some other way to help compensate for duties which may be paid on foodstuffs.

- (4) *Customs duties on contractors' foodstuffs.*

This is practically settled. We have reached the point where Mr. Wild is prepared to allow a concession on food supplies used by Canadian employees but not by Newfoundland employees.

- (5) *Tax on telegraph messages.*

This is one of the nuisance taxes which Mr. Wild wants the Canadian Government to continue to pay and which is to be offset by increasing the contribution from \$30,000 to \$50,000 for the carriage of Canadian troops. The total amount paid by the contractors up to December 31, 1941, according to information furnished by Mr. Waterhouse, was \$1,082.15.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



(6) *8% tax on fire insurance premiums.*

The same remarks apply to this as to item No. (5).

Mr. Wild appears to be particularly anxious to hold on to this tax as he regards it as equivalent to income tax. The total amount paid by the contractors up to December 31, 1941, according to information furnished by Mr. Waterhouse, was \$2,935,83.

(7) *Stamps on cheques.*

The same remarks apply to this as to item No. (5).

I mentioned in my despatch No. 43 of January 20, 1942<sup>1</sup> that this tax is not now being collected from the United States contractors. It is, however, a tax which the Canadian Government agreed to pay at the conference held in December 1940. This is mentioned in your despatch No. 17 of January 29, 1942.<sup>1</sup> I discussed remission of this tax with Mr. Wild and suggested that it might be remitted to Canadian contractors because it had been remitted to United States contractors. I also had to admit to Mr. Wild that it was one of the taxes which the Canadian Government had agreed to pay at the December 1940 Conference.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Wild stated that not only the stamps on cheques but several of the other so called "nuisance" taxes had been remitted to the United States contractors. He said that it would cause a great deal of confusion however if this "nuisance" tax were remitted to Canadians and urged me not to press in the remission. Apparently he mentioned that he would have to make a public announcement sometime and that he felt the Newfoundland people would be better satisfied if some taxes were collected from Canadians. He added that his intention in increasing his offer of \$30,000 to \$50,000 for the carriage of Canadian troops was based on the assumption that we would not attempt remission of any of these "nuisance" tax[es].

(8) *Stamps on Bills of Lading.*

The same remarks apply to this as to item No. (5).

I have no information as to the amount actually paid during the past eighteen months.

17. I would like now to receive specific directions as to whether I will accept the offer to increase the amount to be paid by the Newfoundland Government from \$30,000 to \$50,000 on the conditions named in Mr. Wild's letter of January 10, 1942<sup>1</sup> above referred to.

18. I may say that I left with Mr. Wild a copy of Mr. Waterhouse's statement<sup>1</sup> showing the approximate amount of duties paid by the Canadian Government to the Newfoundland Government up to December 31, 1941.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 177.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 177.

820.

1156-AC-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 83

St. John's, March 24, 1942

Reference my despatch No. 152 of March 16 and my telegram No. 75 of March 18.<sup>1</sup>

Commission of Government has agreed to pay for one hundred and fifty additional members of Newfoundland Militia which they estimate will cost \$200,000 annually. Commission also agrees to contribute the sum of \$300,000 towards establishment of Marine Railway at place mentioned in my telegram under reference. It is quite understood that the Marine Railway will probably be operated by Naval Authorities.

Increase of expenditure for the carriage of troops from \$30,000 to \$50,000 also remains open for acceptance, subject to conditions outlined in my despatch under reference. Wild wants an answer by telegram as to whether conditions acceptable as the amount already expended in the present fiscal year is in the vicinity of \$30,000. I recommend acceptance of his conditions.

821.

2227-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 85

Ottawa, April 10, 1942

Your telegram No. 85 of March 26th<sup>1</sup> Newfoundland's contribution to expenditures. Please inform the Newfoundland Government that it has been decided to accept the offer of an increase of \$20,000.00 for the carriage of troops in return for Canada's acquiescence in continuing to pay nuisance taxes.

822.

NPA S-1-1-3

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

St. John's, August 8, 1942

. . .

600-'42 J. & D. 69-'42. Request from the Canadian Authorities that the charge for fares to Canadian Troops travelling on annual and final leave over the Newfoundland Railway System should be reduced

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

to the corresponding amount charged in Canada i.e., from single fare to one third of a single fare for the double journey at an estimated cost of \$60,000, per annum to be met from Newfoundland funds. Approved by the Commissioner for Finance.

. . .

823. 2227-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve  
au secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 350

St. John's, November 14, 1945

Sir,

Under an arrangement made during the war the Government of Newfoundland voted \$50,000 annually toward defraying the travelling expenses of Canadian troops on duty in Newfoundland. In view of the cessation of hostilities the Commissioner of Finance has now raised the question as to whether it would not be proper to terminate the arrangement as of January 1st next. This is one of the matters arising out of post-war military arrangements which might be discussed at the forthcoming Conference at Bermuda if the subject is placed on the Agenda. If the subject is not placed on the Agenda of that Conference it would be desirable to give it consideration at an early date and let me have an indication of your views for communication to the Commissioner of Finance.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

824. 2227-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve  
Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 256

Ottawa, December 8, 1945

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 350 of November 14 regarding contributions by the Newfoundland Government towards the travelling expenses of Canadian troops on duty in Newfoundland.

2. In view of the cessation of hostilities and in view of the removal from Newfoundland of all Canadian troops, except about five hundred required for the maintenance of property and equipment, the Canadian Government

concur with the suggestion of the Newfoundland Commissioner of Finance that the arrangement whereby Newfoundland has been contributing \$50,000 annually to the expenses of transportation of Canadian troops on duty in Newfoundland should come to an end as of December 31, 1945.

3. In advising the Commissioner of Finance will you kindly convey in appropriate terms the appreciation of the Canadian Government for this contribution of Newfoundland towards joint defence.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

SOUS-SECTION iii/SUB-SECTION iii

LES DOUANES  
CUSTOMS

825.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

Ottawa, July 6, 1940

Sir,

With reference to my telegram of the 5th July, No. 23,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to request that sympathetic consideration may be given to the suggestion which was made to Mr. Emerson, the Minister of Justice and Defence, who recently visited Canada, to the effect that all articles sent to Newfoundland for the use of the Canadian Military Forces now established in that country should be exempt from the provisions of the Newfoundland Customs regulations.

In the course of the discussions with Mr. Emerson it was suggested that exemption might be restricted to those articles which will eventually come back to Canada. However, as much of the material that will be forwarded will consist of expendable articles such as clothing, ammunition and bulk shipments of cigarettes and tobacco for free distribution, it is earnestly hoped that the exemption will not be restricted to such articles as may ultimately be returned to this Dominion.

An early indication of your views in regard to this request will be very greatly appreciated.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, July 24, 1940

I have the honour to refer to Mr. Skelton's letter of July 6th, and to inform you that stores and equipment of every description sent to units of the Canadian Army or the Canadian Air Force will be admitted into Newfoundland free of Customs duty. This covers gasoline consigned directly to the Air Force, etc.

2. In my telegram no. 25 of July 15th<sup>1</sup> I explained that it has been found necessary to make special arrangements in connection with the supply of gasoline and lubricants from the duty paid stocks of Imperial Oil Limited, and a refund of duty is being made on the certificate of the appropriate indenting officer.

3. You are now aware from my telegram of July 6th<sup>1</sup> that my Government has agreed to waive duty upon parcels containing goods of every description (except alcohol) consigned to units, or to members of units, of the Canadian Forces serving in this Country, but it is not possible to extend this concession to goods sent for re-sale in canteens.

4. It will not be possible to refund duty upon goods purchased from stocks in Newfoundland except in the special case mentioned in paragraph 2 above.

[ for the Governor ]

Skelton Papers 395

*Memorandum from Department of External Affairs  
to Cabinet War Committee*

[Ottawa,] October 31, 1940

## SUMMARY OF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

#### VI. *Provision of supplies for Canadian forces in Newfoundland.*

In a telegram dated the 27th of September, the Governor of Newfoundland confirmed the understanding that materials for the buildings at the Newfoundland Airport would be admitted free. He stated, however, that it had also been agreed in conversation with the Canadian representatives that so far as

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

possible materials which are manufactured or produced in Newfoundland would be given preference in purchase. He protested that this agreement was not being carried out by the Canadian authorities.

In reply, the Secretary of State for External Affairs telegraphed to Newfoundland on the 25th of October, in part, as follows:

The Canadian Government, taking cognizance of the assistance that has been rendered in connection with utilization of Newfoundland facilities, and in connection with the granting of permission to import, duty free, certain materials required for defence purposes, is willing to purchase the commodities mentioned in your telegram and other materials manufactured in Newfoundland on condition that the price quoted compares favourably with that of similar materials when imported and subjected to the laid down Customs duties. Canadian officers in Newfoundland have been instructed accordingly.

...

828.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 5

St. John's, January 20, 1941

Your telegram October 25th No. 57.<sup>1</sup> We are proceeding on basis of your assurance that materials manufactured in Newfoundland will be purchased locally for use of your Forces when qualities are satisfactory and prices plus import duty compare favourably with Canadian goods similarly imported and subject to Customs duties. Accordingly wherever the required qualities and quantities are available here we propose to charge normal duties on following items imported even if imported for the use of Canadian Forces: Paints, nails, manufactured windows and doors, sawn lumber, jams and potatoes.

829.

NPA S-4-2-1

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Finances à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Finance to Commission of  
Government of Newfoundland*

F. 62-41

[St. John's,] June 28, 1941

PROPOSED ARRANGEMENTS AS TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS  
BY CANADIAN PERSONNEL IN NEWFOUNDLAND

Advantage has been taken of the presence of Colonel Gibson, Canadian Minister of National Revenue, to arrive at a settlement of outstanding financial matters with the Canadian Government arising from the Canadian Defence arrangements in Newfoundland. We previously conferred with Colonel

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 827.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 827.

Gibson and Brigadier-General Earnshaw on this subject in November and December last<sup>1</sup> and the Commissioner for Justice and Defence, the Chairman, Board of Customs, and myself had further discussions during our visit to Ottawa in April.<sup>2</sup> As a result of these earlier discussions the broad lines of our treatment of Canadian Government importations were agreed, but it was understood that the provisional arrangements which had been made as regards Canadian Army and Air Force personnel should stand until it could be seen more clearly how the provisions of the United States Bases Agreement would work out in this respect. Although unfortunately we have not yet reached agreement on all points with the United States Mr. Price and myself raised the matter again with Brigadier-General Earnshaw on June 15th. Meanwhile, the Canadian Navy also has increased its establishment in Newfoundland and on this further ground a final settlement of outstanding questions has become very desirable.

It may be remembered that in the conversations with Colonel Gibson and Brigadier-General Earnshaw at the end of November, the Canadians requested, and we agreed, that when the terms on which the United States establishment in this country were settled we should grant the Canadian troops terms no less favourable than those granted to United States troops. When we were in Ottawa in April this principle was confirmed, and a note to this effect is in the notes which I circulated to the Commission under cover of F.36-41 on April 24th.<sup>3</sup> We made it clear in Ottawa that there were many advantages in maintaining the arrangements for Canadian troops which then existed (and still do), and that the sole advantage of bringing canteen goods into the same position for Customs purposes as those imported into United States Post Exchanges and commissary stores would go to the troops themselves at the expense of the Exchequer. This would result in such anomalies as that the Canadian soldier in Newfoundland would get his cigarettes and other goods at a price materially less than he could get them if serving in Canada. We went on to point out that there would be a considerable loss of revenue to the Newfoundland Exchequer, and that this might on our part necessitate the withdrawal of other concessions in order to make up such loss of revenue. Nevertheless, Colonel Gibson told us in Ottawa that the political importance of securing that Canadian troops were not placed in a worse position than United States troops when serving side by side was so great that he felt bound to press for the change.

...

Mr. Price and I accordingly went through the various problems involved and made offers which were accepted by the Canadian representatives as satisfactory to them on all points.<sup>4</sup> Briefly, they are as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 177.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 182.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>4</sup> Le 9 juillet le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures écrivait au gouverneur disant que le gouvernement canadien était

<sup>1</sup> See Document 177.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 182.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> On July 9, the Secretary of State for External Affairs wrote to the Governor saying the Canadian Government was

very grateful to the Government of Newfoundland for these concessions.

- (1) Goods for sale in Canteens and Officer's Messes  
These will all be imported duty free.
- (2) Beer for Canteens, and Wines and Spirits for Officers' Messes  
These will also be duty free, but will as a matter of convenience be obtained from the Board of Liquor Control.
- (3) Tobacco and Cigarettes  
These will also be imported duty free or supplied duty free ex bond, St. John's.
- (4) Parcels  
The present arrangement by which Canadian troops are importing parcels without restriction with freedom from duty will now be altered and assimilated to the United States arrangements under which all parcels to be imported either by Canadian Officers and other ranks and their families must be imported through the Canteens or Officers' Messes. . .
- (5) Cigarettes and Tobacco  
It follows from the preceding sub-paragraph that Cigarettes and Tobacco may be received by the troops in parcels under the same arrangements as are operating for them at the present time and were established in November last.
- (6) Coal  
Coal imported by the Canadian Armed Forces will also be free of Customs duty but must be imported in bulk either centrally or on behalf of Canteens or Messes. . .
- (7) Canadian Navy  
Concessions made to the Army will be extended to the Canadian Navy, including shore establishments having a Canteen or Officers' Mess, and harbour vessels as well as sea-going vessels.
- (8) Prevention of Abuses  
The Canadian Authorities will give a similar undertaking to prevent abuse as has been given in the Bases Agreement by the United States Authorities.
- (9) Private Motor Cars  
These, if owned by members of the Forces, may be imported duty free provided that the importation is merely temporary. . .
- (10) Rebates  
All the above concessions would apply only to goods directly imported or imported ex bond, and Colonel Gibson at once agreed that no question of rebate of refund of duty could be considered.
- (11) Wireless Licences  
The arrangement provisionally made in our discussions at Ottawa was confirmed, that no fee would be charged for wireless receiving sets in barracks or camps, but that such sets possessed by Canadian service personnel living in private houses would pay the normal licence fee.



Following upon the discussions which took place in Ottawa, the Department of Posts & Telegraphs has made arrangements mutually satisfactory to both Administrations for the establishment of Canadian Post Offices at those stations where there are substantial numbers of Canadian troops. The arrangement will be on the same lines as the corresponding arrangement with the United States, but Canadian stamps will not be used.

. . .

At the close of our meeting on June 27th, I reminded Colonel Gibson that in view of the very substantial concessions on Customs points which we were now prepared to recommend, I thought we should ask for the withdrawal of the arrangements under which the Newfoundland Government pays for the transportation of Canadian service personnel including bodies of troops when on duty. The matter was taken up during our discussions in Ottawa in April<sup>1</sup> and it is recorded in the notes prepared by Colonel Gibson himself that:

The Newfoundland representatives stated that, should any change in the existing customs charges be considered desirable, readjustment of the financial arrangements between the two countries would be sought to offset the loss of revenue, e.g., by modifying or cancelling the payment now being made by the Newfoundland Government to the Railway for transportation of Canadian Forces.

It has been recognized for a long time by the Canadian Authorities that waiver of Customs duty would be regarded by them as a form of contribution by the Newfoundland Government to the cost of Canadian Defence measures. The telegram from the Secretary of State for External Affairs No. 55, of October 20th, 1940<sup>2</sup>, refers to the extent and form of our contribution "whether in cash, services or property, or by waiver of Customs duty". The additional Customs concessions which we now recommend to the Commission over and above those already accorded Canadian Government importations will involve a very considerable reduction in our revenue. The Chairman of the Board of Customs estimates that as things are today these concessions would be worth \$40,000 a year. Following our discussions in Ottawa I had assumed that the application of these concessions was almost inevitable and we have made provision for it in the Estimates. On the other hand, the cost of transportation of Canadian troops is likely to be between \$25,000 and \$30,000 in 1940-41. It is presumably likely to increase in future years if the Canadian Forces increase in number. . .

In a conversation with Colonel Gibson on June 26th I told him that any form of direct contribution would be unpopular in Newfoundland and should be regarded as politically unwise. On the other hand, I gave him to understand in confidence something of our proposals for disposing of the budget surplus likely to be available in this country in the coming year. He appreciated at once that the substantial sums we had in mind to lend to the United

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 182.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 182.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Kingdom for the war period would be in direct relief of what Canada would otherwise be compelled to provide in order to make up Great Britain's dollar deficiency. I think this is an additional reason why the Canadian Government should now accept our view that payment for transportation of troops should no longer be made. I accordingly ask that in confirming the arrangement tentatively made as to Customs concessions we should state that the transportation arrangements should be withdrawn, both to operate from July 1st.

J. E. PENSON

830.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, September 23, 1942

Dear Norman [Robertson],

I wrote you a confidential airmail letter on September 22nd<sup>1</sup> on the subject of the improvement of the road leading from St. John's to the air base at Torbay.

In that letter I brought up the question of whether or not we should consider Canada to be in a preferred position over the United States in respect of certain matters.

In any of my negotiations, with the Newfoundland Commission of Government, I have never permitted myself to be put in the position of trading with them on the basis of the American privileges. On several occasions, however, it has been brought home to me that at least some of the Commissioners, and particularly the Commissioner for Finance, always consider themselves to be in the position of not giving anything to Canada which has not been given to the United States.

In considering the problem which I put up to you in my letter, it must be kept in mind the fact that the United States Government has been given more extended privileges than have been given to Canadians. For example, the United States civilian citizens employed on work in connection with the leased areas and their families can obtain duty free goods from the Government stores operated at the Bases. I think they can obtain practically everything they require at the Bases without payment of Newfoundland Customs duties. This privilege of course includes tobacco, cigarettes and liquor. The civilian personnel can also make use of the United States postal facilities in the leased areas. Furthermore, all American civilians employed in connection with the Bases are immune from Newfoundland income tax and generally any form of Newfoundland taxation.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

None of these privileges are extended to civilian employees of Canadian defence contractors. This puts our Canadian employees at a distinct disadvantage as compared with the Americans as it increases by a very substantial percentage the cost of living to Canadian civilians as compared to American civilians.

While I do not wish to get in the position of trading with the Commission of Government on the basis of what is given to the Americans, as compared with the Canadians, my own opinion in which I think you will agree is that we should not only have all the privileges which are given to Americans under the Bases Agreement, but should be put in a preferred position in many matters.

This is a subject which I want to discuss with you on my forthcoming visit to Canada. I do not want to set up our claim in cold type in the way that I have expressed it to you but I do think that something should be done to remedy the present position in which we are not even on an equality with the Americans.<sup>1</sup>

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

831.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D15)

*Le commissaire aux Finances au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Finance to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, December 30, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

May I trouble you to refer to Despatch No. 22 dated 9th July, 1941,<sup>2</sup> from the Secretary of State for External Affairs for Canada to the Governor of Newfoundland, regarding certain concessions granted to the Canadian Military Forces stationed in Newfoundland, and especially concessions (1) and (3) of the Despatch, i.e.

- (1) Canteen supplies, including cigarettes for the Canadian Forces will be admitted without duty.
- (3) Private parcels to members of the Canadian Forces will be admitted free of duty if consigned to the addressee in care of the Unit Commander who will be responsible that the contents are for personal use and not for resale.

Following this despatch, Rear-Admiral (then Commodore) L. W. Murray forwarded a circular to the Chairman, Board officers and ratings of the

<sup>1</sup> Il n'existe aucune évidence que des mesures aient été prises à la suite de cette recommandation.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> No evidence of action on this recommendation has been found.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Canadian Navy stationed in Newfoundland. The points raised in this Circular were based on the Despatch mentioned above, and I quote hereunder paragraphs 3, 15 and 16 corresponding with paragraphs (1) and (3) above:

3. Supplies of such articles or goods as may be sold legitimately through a canteen will be admitted duty free if required for Officers' Messes or Canteens for sale to Naval personnel.
15. Parcels: All parcels for Naval personnel addressed c/o Fleet Mail Officer, St. John's, will be admitted duty free. The Fleet Mail Officer will send such parcels to the Commanding Officers of various units for distribution to addressees. Commanding Officers should keep a record of parcels received and their contents, and the attention of the Maintenance Captain is to be called to anyone receiving an abnormal quantity.
16. Commanding Officers will make it a personal matter to see that the concessions are not abused and that Naval personnel purchase only what is reasonably required for themselves *and their immediate families* in Newfoundland. In any case of doubt whatsoever, application is to be made to me, through the Maintenance Captain, for a ruling.

CANTEEN SUPPLIES: When we agreed to the duty-free importation of articles for sale in military canteens, we definitely had in mind the kind of goods at that time sold in regimental canteens, such as cigarettes, tooth brushes and paste, chocolate bars, razor blades and the like, for the personal use of the soldier or sailor living in barracks. Admiral Murray's circular confirms this. It was never our intention that the concession should apply to goods for the use of families living outside barracks, or even to groceries to be consumed by the men outside, nor should we have agreed to this had it been suggested.

We now find, however, that the canteens run by the Salvation Army at Lester's Field and by the Y.M.C.A. at Buckmaster's Field have developed to such an extent that they might almost be described as grocery stores, where not only Service men but their wives and families can purchase duty-free provisions, etc. for consumption outside the barrack areas. We understand that these privileges are also enjoyed by members of the Canadian Armed Forces recruited in Newfoundland and their families.

There is great risk of leakage, so far as Customs Revenue is concerned, whenever duty-free goods are taken out of barrack areas. You will, I am sure, readily appreciate the special difficulties arising in the case of Newfoundlanders, and of Canadians who have married Newfoundland girls. We cannot see any good reason why families should be entitled to Customs privileges of this nature. In our view the sale of any duty-free goods for consumption outside barrack areas, except articles for the personal use of the member of the Forces himself, should be strictly forbidden.

We should, of course, raise no objection to Newfoundland members of the Forces, including Newfoundland women who have joined units of the Canadian Forces, buying at Army or Navy canteens, provided that the articles so purchased are for their sole use, and are of the kinds such as I have indicated above, which we understand to be usually sold in canteens. These are, in fact, the privileges we have agreed for other members of the Canadian Forces.



**PARCELS:** In paragraph 3 of the Despatch of the 9th July quoted above it was made clear that the contents of parcels would be admitted free if they were for the personal use of members of the Canadian Forces and not for resale. The Naval Circular, however, also mentioned the duty-free admission of parcels for the immediate families of military personnel, which was agreed to at the time by the Chairman of the Board of Customs, although the concession for the immediate families was not included in the Despatch. The Chairman agreed to this because at the time the concession to families appeared to be trivial. The position today is, however, very different and difficulties have arisen with regard not only to the wide variety of goods being imported but also to the class of recipient. We have reason to believe that members of the Forces are obtaining duty-free importations of articles which we cannot agree are for personal use, e.g. household goods, furniture and furnishings, articles to be used as gifts, etc.

If a satisfactory system of control is maintained we are quite ready to allow duty-free entry in respect of parcels addressed c/o the Unit or c/o a designated officer, to members of the Forces for themselves or for their wives and children who have been allowed to come from Canada to join them in Newfoundland, provided that the goods were strictly for their personal use; these would include articles of apparel but would exclude household furnishings and similar articles not worn on the person, and would of course exclude articles to be used as gifts. We should be prepared, however, to treat radios exceptionally and to allow them to be imported duty-free by members of the Forces on the definite understanding that duty is paid if there is any transfer to non-entitled persons.

In addition we request that all parcels received either by post or express should in future bear a declaration of contents for the information of our officials. The Unit Commander or designated officer, through whose care the parcel was addressed, would of course remain responsible for ensuring that the contents were actually of the kind which we have agreed may be imported free of duty and that they were for the sole use of a person who, in accordance with our agreement, was entitled to this privilege. A parcel arriving without a declaration of contents would be fully examined by Customs.

These arrangements would, of course, be without prejudice to the rights already enjoyed by persons entering Newfoundland to bring with them as settlers' effects goods which have been in their possession for six months.

We have also to consider the position of

- (a) Newfoundland members of the Canadian forces who were resident in this country prior to recruitment;
- (b) Newfoundland wives of Canadian soldiers;
- (c) Members of Women's Forces recruited in Newfoundland.

We are firmly of opinion that no parcels should be allowed in duty-free for Newfoundland members of the Forces, e.g. those resident in Newfoundland prior to joining, nor for the Newfoundland wives or families of Canadian

members of the Forces, e.g. wives married in Newfoundland who were not resident outside the country prior to the men's enlistment. I should mention that the only duty-free privileges enjoyed by the Newfoundland Militia relate to cigarettes and tobacco, which are strictly rationed.

We should be glad to discuss with you at your early convenience the points raised herein, so that we can arrive at an agreed procedure in order to overcome the difficulties which we are at present experiencing.

Your very truly,

[IRA] WILD

832.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D19)

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 315

St. John's, May 11, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to my despatch No. 202 of March 29, 1943<sup>1</sup> and to previous correspondence relating to the matter of Customs privileges for the members of the Canadian Armed Forces in Newfoundland.

2. On April 24, I had a conference with the Honourable Mr. Wild, Commissioner for Finance, who was attended by Mr. H. V. Hutchings, Chairman of the Board of Customs and Mr. J. G. Howell, Secretary for Customs. Accompanying me were Colonel J. B. Dunbar, A. A. and Q.M.G. Canadian Troops in Newfoundland; Captain M. D. Peters, Auxiliary Services Officer, Canadian Troops in Newfoundland; and Captain Balfour, representing the Naval Forces in Newfoundland.

3. At this conference, I think we ironed out satisfactorily practically all the questions which were at issue between the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments in relation to this subject matter.

4. I had assumed that I would receive a confirming letter from the Honourable Mr. Wild but as this has not come to hand, I thought that I should report to you and if the arrangements are satisfactory, I can send a confirming letter to Mr. Wild at a later date.

5. In the meantime, I may receive a letter from Mr. Wild after he has reported to the Commission of Government in the matter.

6. The chief points on which Mr. Wild and I agreed were as follows:

- (a) The list of articles to be sold in canteens and to which Customs privileges will apply is the one referred to in paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 175 of March 15, 1943<sup>1</sup> and a copy of which was enclosed with that despatch. Mr. Wild had no objection to the addition of the articles mentioned in your despatch No. 94 of April 3, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

(This has heretofore been the chief point of difficulty between us as Mr. Wild had previously expressed the desire to greatly restrict the list of articles to be sold in canteens.)

- (b) Articles may be sold from canteens to Newfoundlanders who are attached to the Canadian Forces but care will be taken by those in charge of the canteens to prevent food being supplied to Newfoundland families.
- (c) I agreed that Mr. J. G. Howell, Secretary for Customs, would be given the privilege of making an inspection of the canteens at any time and also that the officers of the canteens would furnish him with reports from time to time as to the operation of the canteens.

(I regard Mr. Howell as a very efficient and understanding type of Newfoundland Civil servant and believe that the authority vested in him to exercise general supervision over the work of the canteens will reduce to a minimum the friction which has previously existed with regard to the operation of these canteens.)

- (d) The arrangement with regard to parcels is to be that agreed upon at the conference with Mr. Gibson on June 27, 1941 which was as follows:

Private parcels to members of the Canadian Forces will be admitted free of duty if consigned to addressee care of the Unit Commander who would be responsible that contents were for personal use and not re-sale.

The question arose as to the contents of private parcels which would be admitted free of duty. Mr. Wild took the position that only articles for the personal use of the members of the Armed Forces or of their wives or families should be admitted free of duty.

He informed me that claims were being made for the admission free of duty of house furnishings and even of building material to erect houses.

He, however, was prepared to agree on the first arrival of any member of the Armed Forces that he (or she) could bring with him the household effects which he had in use in Canada or in the country from which he transferred to Newfoundland. These would be brought in under the heading of settler's effects but that new articles for household use would not be admitted.

He explained to me that one of the reasons for insisting on this limitation was that it was not the desire of the Newfoundland Government to encourage the families of members of the Armed Forces to come in large numbers to St. John's because of the present over-crowding of the city.

. . .

7. I understand that the foregoing arrangement went into operation immediately but that it is subject to the approval of both Governments.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

833.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D20)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major**Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] May 25, 1943

. . .

X. Customs Dues and Privileges for Service personnel, Newfoundland.

The Committee considered a communication<sup>1</sup> from the Department of External Affairs enclosing a despatch from the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland (No. 315 dated 11th May 1943) outlining the arrangements made with the Newfoundland authorities.

The Committee approved the arrangements made and instructed the Secretary to notify the Department of External Affairs accordingly.

C.N.S., C.A.S. and C.G.S. to notify personnel concerned of the arrangements made with the Newfoundland authorities through the medium of appropriate orders.

. . .

834.

DND HQ 035-11-1

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1031

St. John's, December 18, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to my despatch No. 1022 of December 16th, 1943<sup>1</sup> and to previous despatches regarding the matter of duty-free cigarettes imported for the use of the Canadian Armed Forces.

2. In this connection I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I am sending today to the Commanding Officers of the three Canadian Services in Newfoundland.

3. I may add that the General Officer Commanding of the Canadian Troops in Newfoundland is very cooperative in this matter as will appear from a letter from him to me dated the 16th day of December, 1943,<sup>1</sup> copy of which is enclosed herewith. You will note from his letter that he has issued very stringent instructions to his officers and men.

4. I am also enclosing a copy of a letter from Air Vice-Marshal Heakes, of December 6th,<sup>1</sup> but I am not complying with his suggestion to forward copy of his letter to the Honourable Mr. Wild.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



5. I also understand that the Flag Officer Commanding, Naval Services, is also taking steps to prevent abuses but apparently he does not consider it necessary to reduce the supply of cigarettes from 1,000 per man per month to 750, which has been accepted by the Honourable Mr. Wild as a partial step towards correction of the abuses.

6. My view is that there should be general agreement of all the Services to this reduction.<sup>1</sup>

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve à l'officier général commandant  
les troupes canadiennes à Terre-Neuve*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to General Officer Commanding,  
Canadian Troops in Newfoundland*

No. 38

St. John's, December 18, 1943

Dear General Leclerc,

May I refer to letter No. 37 from this Office to you dated December 15th, 1943<sup>2</sup> with relation to the matter of duty-free cigarettes.

This matter came up for discussion between the Honourable Mr. Wild and myself before my departure for Ottawa on November 28th. I explained the position to Mr. Britton and gave him instructions as to how I thought the matter should be dealt with during my absence and he has followed my instructions accordingly.

I would strongly recommend the adoption by all the Services of the agreement now proposed and can assure you that unless this is done there will be further trouble which may result in duty-free privileges being withdrawn, not only on cigarettes but on other commodities.

The duty-free privilege granted to Canadian Forces in Newfoundland by the Newfoundland Government is a special one and one which is not enjoyed by Canadian Forces in other countries.

In the early days, after the arrival of the Canadian Forces in Newfoundland duty-free privileges were subject to abuse as not sufficient control had been exercised. Upon complaints being made to me I assured the Newfoundland Government that the Canadian Forces would undertake to use every effort to prevent the abuse of the privileges by their officers and men. At that time there was a very severe tightening up on the part of all the Services.

I was sorry, however, to be advised by the Newfoundland Government, on what was undoubtedly correct information, that abuses have now crept in and that apparently sufficient control is not being exercised to prevent these abuses.

<sup>1</sup> Il y en eut un.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> There was.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

I have repeated my assurance to the Commission of Government that every effort should and would be made by the officers in command of the various Canadian Services to prevent these abuses and I told them that I knew I could count on the support of the C.O.'s of all the Services to that end.

May I add that the Commissioner of Customs is now objecting to the importation of cigarettes direct from the United States through the American Post Exchange. You will recall that the Canadian Trade Commissioner made an arrangement with the American Post Exchange to permit Canadian Forces to import not only cigarettes but various other commodities direct from the United States through the American Post Exchange. This was a highly satisfactory arrangement and we are indebted to the Officer Commanding and other officers of the American Forces for putting this arrangement through. We are also indebted to the Newfoundland Government who agreed to the arrangement notwithstanding the fact that under the American Bases Agreement such an arrangement was prohibited.

The whole arrangement with the American Forces is now in jeopardy because of the abuses which have apparently crept in with regard to the illegal sale of cigarettes by the Canadian Forces, and unless we can establish to the satisfaction of the Newfoundland Government that the Canadian Forces can control the abuses, I can foresee that we are going to have trouble, not only with respect to cigarettes imported direct from the United States through the courtesy of the American Post Exchange, but with respect to all other commodities.

I would strongly recommend that the three Services agree to the proposed reduction of 1,000 cigarettes per man per month to 750. This has been agreed to by Mr. Wild as a partial step in the correction of the abuses.

Yours sincerely,

C. J. BURCHELL

835.

DND HQ 035-11-1

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au conseiller spécial du  
sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Special Assistant to  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, May 20, 1946

Dear Mr. MacKay,

You will recall that at the Conference here in February it was agreed that the special exemptions from customs duties granted to members of the Armed Forces and contractors working for the Canadian Government, which were to terminate on March 31, 1946, were extended until June 30.

Good progress has been made in the repatriation of Canadian servicemen from Newfoundland and there will be only a bare handful left in Newfoundland by the end of June. It might be desirable, however, in order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, to draw the attention of the Service Departments, if it has not been done already by their own representatives at the Conference, to the fact that free entry of the undermentioned goods will terminate on June 30 next:

Item No. 653

- (c) Goods for use in the construction, maintenance or operation of bases, installations or works, for naval, military or air forces of His Majesty consigned to or destined for any Department of the Government of Canada, or a contractor therefor, not to include articles of food or clothing or articles for the personal and private use of individuals.
- (d) Goods when imported for the use of the naval forces of the Allies of His Majesty in the present war for use or consumption aboard their vessels.
- (e) Goods imported for the purpose of sale to members of the naval, military or air forces of His Majesty at institutions under the control of such forces approved by the Commissioner for Finance, subject to any regulations to be made by the Commissioner for Finance.
- (f) Personal belongings or household effects of members of the naval, military or air forces of His Majesty or of their wives and families, provided that such goods have been in use by them prior to their first entry into Newfoundland.
- (g) Goods imported for the personal use of a member of the naval, military or air forces of His Majesty other than a person who was domiciled in Newfoundland when he became a member of such force and who is stationed in Newfoundland, or of his wife or child when addressed to the individual in care of the Fleet Mail Office in the case of the Navy and in care of the Commanding Officer of the unit in the cases of the Army and Air Force, not to include household equipment and furnishings, and provided that such wife or child was not domiciled in Newfoundland prior to September 1, 1939.

Item No. E1410

Goods enumerated in any of the items in this Schedule C when delivered from a bonded warehouse—

- (c) to the naval forces of His Majesty's allies in the present war for use or consumption on board their vessels; or
- (d) to naval, military or air forces of His Majesty or to bodies supplying such forces for sale to members of such forces at institutions under the control of such forces and approved by the Commissioner

for Finance, subject to any regulations to be made by the Commissioner for Finance.

The undermentioned goods will continue to be duty free after that date:  
Item No. 653

- (a) Goods, when imported for the use of, the Naval, military or air forces of His Majesty.
- (b) Goods consigned directly to officers and men on board vessels of His Majesty's Navy for their personal use and consumption.

Item No. E1410

Goods enumerated in any of the items in this Schedule C when delivered from a bonded warehouse—

- (a) to the naval, military or air forces of His Majesty for the use of such forces; or
- (b) to officers and men on board vessels of His Majesty's Navy for their personal use and consumption.

In commenting on the situation the Secretary for Customs, Mr. J. G. Howell, states that

On and after July 1st, 1946, only goods which are imported and paid for by the Canadian Government will be entered duty-free and any goods brought in by contractors on behalf of the Canadian Army will be admitted duty-free provided that a certificate that the goods belong to the Canadian Government accompanies each shipment. Similarly, goods brought in for use on Naval ships will be duty-free provided that they are not for resale. However, goods imported for institutions under the control of the Canadian Armed Forces such as canteens, etc. will be required to pay duty and personal belongings of members of the Armed Forces will be subject to the law pertaining to civilians. That is to say, Tariff Item 663 will apply to such people. It will be seen, therefore, that only goods imported and paid for by the Canadian Government will be granted duty free entry and any goods which are for resale or are not paid by the Canadian Government will be subject to the revenue laws of Newfoundland. This policy applies to Canadian Armed Forces at Goose Bay Airport, Labrador, and automatically to the American Armed Forces at Goose Bay who are at that port by arrangement with the Canadian Government.

It should be pointed out, also, that a further concession was granted during the war to the Canadian Armed Forces at Goose Bay whereby the importation of alcoholic liquors was permitted. The Newfoundland Customs authorities desire to make clear that after June 30th all supplies of spirits and beer must be ordered through the Board of Liquor Control in St. John's. The Board will no doubt make arrangements to have beer shipped direct from Canada, if desired, but spirits must be purchased through the Board and any direct importations by the Armed Forces at Goose Bay would be subject to forfeiture.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD



SOUS-SECTION iv/SUB-SECTION iv  
 LES RELATIONS BILATÉRALES  
 BILATERAL RELATIONS  
 L'ENTRAÎNEMENT DES MILITAIRES TERRE-NEUVIENS  
 TRAINING OF NEWFOUNDLAND SERVICEMEN

836. Skelton Papers 395

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 22 Ottawa, July 4, 1940

SECRET. Following from Defensor for Officer Commanding Black Watch. Begins. Hon. Mr. Emerson Minister of Justice Newfoundland will shortly discuss with you possibility of having a company of Newfoundland Militia attached to Black Watch for training. It is desired to assist as far as possible in this respect. Report result of discussion.

Report also upon practicability of your establishing a local recruiting station in St. John's for Canadian Forces generally. Have your medical officer review the situation in St. John's as to the suitability of setting up a local medical board for the examination of recruits. Ends.

837. DND 5199-7

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue à St. John's pour discuter  
 des questions bilatérales de défense*

*Minutes of a Meeting Held in St. John's to Discuss  
 Bilateral Defence Questions*

SECRET St. John's, July 29, 1940

Present:

Hon. L. E. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
 Hon. Sir Wilfrid Woods, Commissioner for Public Works  
 Capt. Schwerdt, R.N. Naval representative in Newfoundland  
 Lt.-Col. Rendell, O.C. Newfoundland Militia  
 Major-General T. V. Anderson, Inspector-General (C.C.)<sup>1</sup>  
 Major A. B. Garrow, C.A.S.F., S.O., I.G. (C.C.)<sup>1</sup>

The Conference was arranged to discuss matters concerning the defence of Newfoundland, which are of mutual interest to both Canada and Newfoundland. The points discussed and the action taken, if any, are as follows:

...

#### 5. TRAINING NEWFOUNDLAND MILITIA

The Inspector-General explained why the Black Watch had been unable to undertake to train more than 50 Newfoundland Militia at a time. Mr.

<sup>1</sup> Représentant le Canada.

<sup>1</sup> Representing Canada.

Emerson asked that O.C. of the relieving unit should be requested to assist to as great an extent as possible in such training. It was agreed that the O.C. troops, Airport, and the Newfoundland authorities should make their arrangements direct with one another in this respect.

...

#### 7. TRAINING OF NEWFOUNDLAND SPECIALISTS

Mr. Emerson stated that Newfoundland would like to send a further party of twelve officers and other ranks to Canada for training in Artillery duties. The I.G. stated that he could see no objection provided M.D. 6 was in a position to take them. (Note: The D.O.C., M.D. 6, states that this additional personnel from Newfoundland can be attached for training in Halifax at any time. N.D.H.Q. approval is recommended.)

838.

10298-D-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 307

St. John's, October 2, 1945

Sir,

On my return from Ottawa the Governor, Sir Humphrey Walwyn, invited me to Government House for an informal talk. In the course of our conversation he touched on the problem of the rehabilitation of returned men in Newfoundland which appeared to exercise him considerably. He brought up, among other things, the question of vocational training and whether any steps could be taken to expedite a reply on the Newfoundland Government's inquiry respecting the Canadian Army workshop on Blackmarsh Road. Reports had reached him that the military authorities were moving back to Canada the machines and tools that would be most useful in vocational training, giving rise to the fear, locally [that only] the building might eventually become available. I explained to him that the machines and tools which were being moved out were special equipment for the servicing and repair of heavy guns and would be of no use whatever for vocational training purposes and that, while I had been [in] Ottawa, I had made some further efforts to get a speedy decision on the question knowing the importance the Newfoundland Government attached to it.

2. I was glad to learn that His Excellency agreed with the view I had already urged that arrangements be made under which Newfoundland ex-servicemen could receive vocational training in Canada and I trust that every effort will be made to forward an early and satisfactory reply.

...

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

839.

CTS 1946 No. 11

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve  
au commissaire aux Affaires intérieures et à l'Éducation*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education*

No. 2

St. John's, February 14, 1946

Dear Mr. Walsh,

With reference to the request of your Government respecting provision of vocational training in Canada for a limited number of ex-service personnel of Newfoundland (other than those who served in the Canadian Armed Forces) and the discussions carried on recently in Ottawa by the Director of Civil Re-establishment with officers of the Department of Veterans Affairs on the detailed arrangements that would be required I wish to inform you that the Canadian Government is prepared to agree to the arrangements set forth hereunder:

1. The Newfoundland Government will nominate personnel for vocational training courses to the D.V.A. which, after acceptance, will arrange with the Department of Labour for allocation to vocational training schools operated by the Department of Labour, or to private institutions. Each application will be considered individually by D.V.A. upon its merits. The fees for instruction at private institutions will be paid directly to the institution by the Government of Newfoundland. The costs of instruction at Canadian Vocational Training Schools will be paid by the Department of Veterans Affairs, which will recover the amount from the Government of Newfoundland. The rate of fees at C.V.T. schools is set at \$25 per month per trainee.
2. The Newfoundland Government shall certify to the D.V.A. that candidates for training in Canada are physically fit to undertake such training, certification to include results of chest X-ray.
3. Maintenance allowances will be paid directly to the trainee by the Newfoundland Government according to the Newfoundland Civil Re-establishment Scheme.
4. Transportation from Newfoundland to the training centre will be provided by the Newfoundland Government. The cost of transportation from one training centre to another within Canada when authorized by the D.V.A., and the cost of transportation from a training centre to the trainee's home in Newfoundland will be paid by the D.V.A. and recovered from the Newfoundland Government.
5. Each candidate for training will be despatched from Newfoundland with funds for living expenses sufficient to maintain him for thirty days after arrival in Canada, and any necessary advance of money by D.V.A. on account of indigence shall be recoverable from the Newfoundland Government.

6. The D.V.A. undertakes to provide necessary medical treatment, including hospitalization, for the trainees during the training period, the cost of which shall be recoverable from the Newfoundland Government. The Government of Canada shall not be liable for injuries to Newfoundland veterans while undergoing training. In the case of the death of a trainee the D.V.A. will forward the remains to the trainee's home, unless otherwise instructed, and expenses incurred will be paid by the D.V.A., recoverable from the Newfoundland Government.
7. It is understood that all trainees will return to Newfoundland on completion of training, as set forth in Order-in-Council 7032 of November, 1945.<sup>1</sup> Any expenses incurred in enforcing the trainee's return shall be recoverable from the Newfoundland Government.
8. It is understood that Newfoundland trainees accepted under the agreement will conform, where applicable, to all rules and regulations laid down by the Department of Labour and D.V.A. for the administration of vocational training.
9. The Newfoundland Government understands that accommodation in most Canadian training centres is taxed to the limit and that there are many on the waiting list for admission. D.V.A. however, in making arrangements for Newfoundland candidates will give every possible consideration to their training needs consistent with these limiting conditions.

It is understood that, if your Government concurs in the arrangements outlined above, this letter and your reply will be regarded as constituting agreement between the two Governments on the subject.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

840.

CTS 1946 No. 11

*Le commissaire aux Affaires intérieures et à l'Éducation  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, February 27, 1946

Dear Sir,

Your letter No. 2 of the 14th February, containing the terms of an arrangement under which a limited number of ex-Service personnel from Newfoundland would be accepted for vocational training in Canadian Schools, has been considered by the Commission of Government, and I am directed to inform you that the Newfoundland Government agrees to the arrangement which your Government has proposed.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



With respect to paragraph 5 we should be glad if the Department of Veterans Affairs would notify our Department of Civil Re-establishment fairly promptly of any advances on account of indigence recoverable from the Newfoundland Government. It is assumed that the Department of Veterans Affairs will make these advances only in such circumstances as that Department would make advances to Canadian personnel.

It is agreed that your letter and this reply will be regarded as constituting an arrangement between the two Governments on the subject, and on behalf of the Commission of Government I should be glad if you would convey to your Government our appreciation of the interest which they have taken and the courtesy which they have shown in the matter.

Yours sincerely,

A. J. WALSH

*LE RECRUTEMENT DES TERRE-NEUVIENS POUR LES  
FORCES CANADIENNES*

*RECRUITING OF NEWFOUNDLANDERS FOR CANADIAN FORCES*

841.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le chef d'état-major de l'Air au commandant de l'aviation,  
région d'entraînement de Montréal*

*Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding, Montreal  
Training Command*

Ottawa, May 18, 1942

RECRUITING IN NEWFOUNDLAND. R.C.A.F. (WOMEN'S DIVISION)

1. Permission to recruit women in Newfoundland for service in the R.C.A.F. (Women's Division) has been received from the Commissioner of Defence for Newfoundland.

2. Attached for your information is a copy of letter<sup>1</sup> addressed to the Commanding Officer, No. 16 Recruiting Centre, Halifax, in which he has been instructed to send a fully equipped Mobile Unit on a recruiting mission to Newfoundland as soon as possible. Quotas assigned for this purpose are as follows:

TRADE	QUOTA	REPORTING DATE	MANNING DEPOT
General Duties	40	20 June 20th	# 7
		20 June 27th	# 7
Laundrywomen	40	June 27th	# 7
Messwomen	20	July 11th	# 7

3. Additional quotas may be authorized if it is found that suitable candidates are available for the trades of Clerk (Steno), Clerks (General) and Clerks (Operations Room)—reference para. 6 letter attached.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

4. Upon the Unit's return to Halifax on or about 6th June, particulars of enlistments and assembling points will be forwarded to you. It will then be necessary for you to detail W.D. Officers to escort each party from Newfoundland to arrive at Manning Depot on dates designated above.

5. If you anticipate any difficulty in securing personnel for this purpose within your Command, please advise these Headquarters at the earliest possible date.

E. MIDDLETON  
Air Commodore  
for Chief of the Air Staff

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le commandant, centre de recrutement du CARC à Halifax,  
au secrétaire, ministère de la Défense nationale pour l'Air  
Officer Commanding, RCAF Recruiting Centre in Halifax,  
to Secretary, Department of National Defence for Air*

SECRET

Halifax, May 7, 1942

ENLISTMENT OF R.C.A.F. (W.D.) APPLICANTS IN NEWFOUNDLAND

7. From observations at both Gander and St. John's it is believed that it would be advantageous for the RCAF to fill the Women's Division establishments as far as possible with Newfoundland personnel. It is therefore recommended that arrangements be made to invite applications for enlistment in the R.C.A.F. (W.D.) and to effect the enlistment of suitable candidates in the St. John's area, and possibly at other points along the Newfoundland railway between St. John's and Port-Aux-Basques, subject to the advice of Newfoundland officials who are familiar with the territory adjacent to such points as Grand Falls and Corner Brook.

Flight-Lieutenant  
L. T. CHAPMAN

842.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le commandant, unité mobile de recrutement du CARC,  
au secrétaire, ministère de la Défense nationale pour l'Air  
Officer Commanding, RCAF Mobile Recruiting Centre, to Secretary,  
Department of National Defence for Air*

SECRET

St. John's, May 28, 1942

RECRUITING IN NEWFOUNDLAND, R.C.A.F. (WOMEN'S DIVISION)

1. Findings on this Mobile tour are becoming clearer. A large number of applicants must be dealt with in order to obtain a few enlistments. This is

occasioned (1) By the lack of education. Many below the minimum standard present themselves in spite of advertisement of the requirements and these are sorted out and rejected courteously. Grade eight here would appear to be as common for the maximum as Grade eleven in Canada, (2) By the very low scores on the Classification tests, (3) By the number who are not found qualified, for telephone operator, driver transport, etc, but are unwilling to accept General Duties, (4) By the large number of medical rejections.

...

F. K. STEWART  
Flying-Officer

843.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 314

St. John's, June 1, 1942

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 279 of May 23<sup>1</sup> concerning recruiting in Newfoundland for the Royal Canadian Air Force (Women's Division), I reproduce herewith the following report of an interview on the subject with the Hon. L. E. Emerson, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, which appeared in the *Evening Telegram* of May 30:

There seems to be some considerable anxiety, said the Commissioner for Defence when interviewed by our representative this morning, as to the extent to which recruiting for the R.C.A.F. Women's Division is to be carried out in Newfoundland. Various statements have been made on the subject, one to the effect that an unlimited number of women would be sought, another that two hundred were required, and so on.

The true position is that the numbers sought at the present time will not exceed one hundred. Recruiting will finish in St. John's on Tuesday and the recruiting party will proceed by train to Grand Falls for a couple of days and then, to Corner Brook for a couple more.

I have been informed that the number of applications has been quite substantial. The tests, however, both educational and physical are severe, particularly on the physical side, and the number so far accepted has not been great, the Commissioner said.

The Commissioner also said that he was glad to be able to make this statement as there seemed to be an idea abroad that there would be a very large exodus of our female population at an early date to this Force.

2. Apparently the purpose of Mr. Emerson's statement was to reassure the people of Newfoundland that only a very limited number of women were going to leave the country to join the Royal Canadian Air Force.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

844.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 542

St. John's, September 22, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter received from Major-General L. F. Page, General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland, in which he informs me of the proposal to start a recruiting campaign in Newfoundland for the purpose of recruiting women for the C.W.A.C.

2. I had an informal conference with the Honourable Mr. Emerson, Commissioner for Defence, yesterday on the subject. In the course of conversation with him, I intimated that Major-General Page had informed me that he might request me to make an application to him for permission to send a recruiting officer here for the purpose mentioned.

3. Mr. Emerson appeared to be quite lukewarm about the proposal to send a recruiting officer here to open up the campaign for the C.W.A.C. but I do not think he would actually refuse permission if a formal request was made to him.

4. I have not made any formal request as I have intimated to Major-General Page that the starting of recruiting campaigns in Newfoundland for any of the Canadian Forces is a matter of policy which should be settled by the Department of External Affairs and that I felt I should obtain some definite instructions from you before taking any action in the matter.

...

8. May I suggest that if it is decided to proceed with the campaign for the C.W.A.C. and if the Newfoundland Commission of Government give their approval, that it should be agreed upon in advance as to the number of women it is proposed to recruit. Indeed, I think Mr. Emerson will probably insist upon such an arrangement.

9. In considering the matter of policy of obtaining recruits in Newfoundland for the Canadian Services, may I suggest that the matter of recruits for the Naval Services should also be considered.

10. In that connection I refer to your confidential despatch No. 136 of June 29, 1942<sup>1</sup> which states that the broad policy being followed is to refuse acceptance of Newfoundlanders for the Navy except where they are particularly qualified for service in the Navy on the ground that the waiting list of resident Canadians is still of large proportions, both for officers and men. Further, it is considered undesirable that non-residents of Canada should receive prior consideration.

11. I understand that there are at the present time several young boys belonging to the leading families of Newfoundland who have applied for

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



admission to the Navy, but whose applications have been refused because they are Newfoundlanders and not Canadians.

12. I would respectfully suggest that if permission is to be asked of the Newfoundland Commission of Government to commence recruiting for the C.W.A.C. or for any other branch of the Services, it should be accompanied by notification to the Newfoundland Government that Newfoundlanders would be permitted to join any branch of the Canadian Services on the same terms as Canadians but where it is a matter of competition, as in the case of applicants for admission to the Naval Training Schools, it would have to be understood that Newfoundland boys would be in competition with Canadian boys and would only be selected if they have qualifications equal to successful Canadian applicants.

13. It is, of course, quite clear that no recruiting for any of the Canadian Services could be carried on in Newfoundland without the approval of the Newfoundland Commission of Government, e.g. permission to recruit in Newfoundland would certainly not be given in the case of men for the Canadian Army as this would put the Newfoundland Commission of Government in competition with the Canadian Government, as it is necessary to carry on recruiting campaigns from time to time to secure recruits for certain British Artillery Units composed of Newfoundlanders now in the United Kingdom. In my despatch No. 479 of August 28, 1942 I mentioned the fact that a recruiting campaign was then being carried on to ensure 1,000 men to be enlisted within the next several months in order to bring up to strength the two artillery regiments of the United Kingdom Forces which are being manned by Newfoundlanders. In the recruiting broadcast which the Honourable L. E. Emerson, Commissioner for Defence, made on August 24th, he said the Government of Newfoundland definitely stated that priority must be given to the provision of these men over all other claims, referring particularly to work on defence projects in Newfoundland.<sup>1</sup>

14. The same objection, however, would not arise in the case of recruiting for women for either the Canadian Army, Navy or Air Force, but in such case the formal permission of the Newfoundland Commission of Government should first be obtained.

15. It does not, however, appear to me to be quite reasonable to expect the Newfoundland Commission of Government to permit recruiting of their women and to refuse the application of men for other Services, such as the Navy, when such applications met with the approval of the Commission of Government in Newfoundland.

16. I will await further instructions from you before taking any action on the letter from Major-General Page.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

<sup>1</sup> A partir de 1940 des Terre-Neuviens furent admis à l'entraînement au Canada en vertu du Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth britannique; règle générale, après l'entraînement, ils combattaient dans la RAF.

<sup>1</sup> Beginning in 1940, Newfoundland men were accepted in Canada for training under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan; as a rule, they subsequently served in the RAF.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*L'officier général commandant les troupes canadiennes à Terre-Neuve  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, September 21, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

Further to my conversation of today's date, this is to advise you that I am in receipt of a telegram from the Adjutant-General which reads as follows:

District Officer Commanding No. 6 suggests that there are a large number desirable recruits Newfoundland anxious join C.W.A.C. and requests permission send Recruiting Officer C.W.A.C. to Newfoundland to obtain recruits. Would like to know whether you consider this worthwhile before taking official action.

2. I am of the opinion that no such action should be taken without prior consent of the Newfoundland Government, and I would be grateful if you would approach them and get their reactions to this proposal.

Yours very truly,

L. F. PAGE  
Major-General

845.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 618

St. John's, October 22, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 542 of September 22, 1942 regarding the matter of recruiting in Newfoundland for women for the Canadian Services . . .

8. I understand from a conversation I had recently with the Honourable Mr. Emerson that he has now received a formal request from the Air Force for permission to continue the campaign for the recruiting of Air Force women in Newfoundland. Mr. Emerson also informed me that in a recent conversation with the Naval authorities he understood that the Naval authorities were also planning to conduct a campaign for recruits in Newfoundland.

9. I would strongly urge that the whole matter of policy be considered and some workable arrangement be made, as it will raise difficult problems here if the Air Force, the Army and the Navy invade this country with three separate recruiting campaigns for women, and especially if each of the Forces

carry on such extensive advertising campaigns as was carried on in the case of the Air Force campaign.

10. May I suggest that it might be possible for the three Forces to co-operate in the matter of obtaining women recruits for the three Services in Newfoundland. May I also suggest that instead of having a widely advertised special campaign that the three Services might be authorized, with the consent of the Newfoundland Commission of Government, to carry on a continuous campaign for recruits in Newfoundland which would not have the disturbing effect of a special campaign with special advertising and other accompaniments of a special campaign and especially avoiding the appearance of the three Canadian branches of the Services being in competition with each other for recruits.

11. The situation at the present time, as I understand it, is that if a woman wants to enlist in any of the Canadian Women's Forces, she has to go to Canada and pay her own way there unless she is recruited in a special campaign. May I suggest that the recruiting authorities in each of the three Services should be authorized to receive applications at all times for enlistment in their respective Services and have their medical and other qualifications passed upon by competent authorities in Newfoundland and if they are accepted, the authorization should be given to pay the passage of these girls to whatever place in Canada they may be required.

12. I am quite sure that if some such arrangement as this is made and a special campaign is avoided, there will be no objection raised by the people of Newfoundland.

13. May I also suggest that the same procedure should be followed in respect of recruits for the Navy and for the Air Force and, in some cases at least, for the Army. I know that at the present time there is strong objection in Newfoundland to the refusal of the Canadian Navy to accept Newfoundland boys for Naval training. Objection is also raised to men who desire to get into the Air Force having to pay their own way to Canada. So far as recruits in the Army are concerned, these should only be accepted with the approval of the Commissioner for Defence in view of the recruiting which is now being carried on in Newfoundland to supplement Newfoundland's Forces now overseas. I understand, however, that from time to time certain men who have the qualifications for officers would prefer to enter the Canadian Army and the Commissioner for Justice would not, I think, raise any objection in such cases.

14. As I understand that the R.C.A.F. intend to commence recruiting in Newfoundland on the 1st of November, the matters of policy above outlined should be settled at an early date and before the departure of the mobile unit for Newfoundland.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

846.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 654

St. John's, November 2, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 641 of October 29, 1942<sup>1</sup> and to previous despatches regarding recruiting in Newfoundland for the Canadian Services.

2. Since the despatch under reference was mailed, I have received your airmail despatch No. 256 of October 26, 1942<sup>1</sup> on the same subject.

3. I am now in receipt of a letter from Sir Wilfrid W. Woods, Acting Commissioner for Defence, in which he informs me that at a meeting of the Commission of Government held on the 30th of October approval was given to recruiting in Newfoundland for the Women's Division of the Canadian Army.

4. I have advised Major-General Page that this permission has been granted.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

847.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion d'un comité spécial pour envisager une  
politique commune de recrutement à Terre-Neuve*

*Minutes of a Meeting of a Special Committee to Consider  
a Common Recruiting Policy in Newfoundland*

[Ottawa,] November 17, 1942

Pursuant to Defence Council Meeting of November 13th, 1942, instructing that the Personnel Heads of the three Services convene and consider a common recruiting policy for the three Services in Newfoundland, a meeting was held on Tuesday, November 17th, at 1500 hours.

Air Commodore E. E. Middleton was in the chair. Those present were:

Captain E. R. Mainguy (R.C.N.)

Colonel J. Ness (Canadian Army)

The Committee reviewed the representation that had been made by Mr. C. J. Burchell, the High Commissioner for Canada in St. John's, Newfoundland, pointing out the disturbance that had been caused by intensive and

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



short recruiting campaigns, and the subsequent inability for personnel of Newfoundland to enlist unless they come to the mainland at their own expense.

After duly considering all the points concerning recruiting in Newfoundland, the following recommendations are jointly made:

- (a) That due to an understanding with the United Kingdom Authorities, the three Services are not prepared to enlist men in Newfoundland.
- (b) That the enlistment of women by either of the three Services in Newfoundland would be with a view to their employment in Newfoundland, but that this cannot be guaranteed absolutely, as the exigencies of the Services might dictate their posting elsewhere.
- (c) The three Services agreed that they would make arrangements to accept recruits women [sic] continuously in Newfoundland and to have their medical and other qualifications passed upon by competent authorities in that country, and that such recruits, if accepted, would have their passage paid to Canada to whatever place therein they may be required for training or employment. Recruiting would be open continuously by each of the Services as long as women were required, and no special campaign would be put on.

E. R. MAINGUY  
Captain (R.C.N.)

J. NESS  
Colonel (Canadian Army)

E. E. MIDDLETON  
Air Commodore (R.C.A.F.)

848.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 91

St. John's, February 16, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 32 of February 5, 1943<sup>1</sup> with respect to the matter of male citizens of Newfoundland being recruited in the Royal Canadian Air Force.

2. I conferred with Air Commodore Heakes in regard to this matter.

3. Under date of February 11, I sent a letter to the Honourable L. E. Emerson, K.C., Commissioner for Justice and Defence, as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

February 11, 1943

Dear Mr. Emerson,

The Royal Canadian Air Force, from time to time in past months, has received applications for enlistment from young men in Newfoundland, but no provision has been made for their examination and acceptance in this country. The result has been that some intending applicants have gone to Canada to seek admission there but have had to do so at their own expenses and have had to run the risk of rejection, after their arrival there, because of physical defects.

I understand that Air Commodore Heakes has been discussing the matter with Colonel Rendell and it is now proposed, subject to the approval of the Commission of Government, to accept recruits in Newfoundland and have them examined in this country. It would, however, be understood that if so desired each recruit, before being finally accepted, would receive the approval of yourself or Colonel Rendell or some other person authorized by you.

Will you kindly advise me if this proposed arrangement is satisfactory to the Commission of Government.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

4. I am today in receipt of the following reply from Mr. Emerson:

February 13, 1943

Dear Mr. Burchell,

I brought your letter of February 11th No. 13 to the attention of Commission of Government at its meeting yesterday and I am to say that the Government accepts in principle the proposal that the R.C.A.F. should accept recruits in Newfoundland and have them examined in this country.

In my discussion of the subject with Colonel Rendell and others I found that a number of workmen from the Dockyard, the Railway and the Foundry and young apprentices mechanics have been applying for enlistment and that a number of others have indicated their intention of so doing. This is a very serious matter. The work which these young men are doing is of vital importance to the war effort. The repairing of ships, in which both the Dockyard and Foundry are primarily engaged, the running of our trains are all of just as grave importance as enlistment in the Forces.

We do not wish to embark upon a regulation prohibiting these young men from leaving their jobs, nor do we feel inclined, at the moment, to ask the R.C.A.F. to reject them.

Under these circumstances, the suggestion contained in the second last paragraph of your letter is one upon which we would like the R.C.A.F. authorities to act, that is, the name of each prospective recruit should be submitted to Col. Rendell for consideration before he is accepted.

Yours faithfully,

L. E. EMERSON

5. You will note from this letter that the Government of Newfoundland accepts in principle the proposal that the Royal Canadian Air Force should accept recruits in Newfoundland and have them examined in this country, but requests that the name of each prospective candidate should be submitted to Colonel Rendell, the Secretary for Defence, for consideration before he is accepted.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

849.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 406

Ottawa, December 24, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 931 of November 22, 1943<sup>1</sup> and other correspondence concerning recruiting for the Royal Canadian Air Force in Newfoundland.

2. I am advised by the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air that in view of the reduced volume of business resulting from the suspension of enlistments in ground trades and the scaling down of enlistments in the Women's Division to a replacement basis, it is uneconomical to maintain a permanent recruiting staff in Newfoundland.

3. It has, accordingly, been decided to withdraw the staff at present attached to No. 1 Group Headquarters, effective January 15. It is possible that a visit to Newfoundland during the summer of 1944 by a mobile recruiting unit may be justified with a view to selecting aircrew applicants. While no definite commitments can be made at the present time, the Officer-in-Charge of the Recruiting Unit has been instructed to discuss tentative plans in this connection with representatives of the Newfoundland Commission of Government prior to the withdrawal of the Unit on January 15.

4. It will be appreciated by the Department of National Defence for Air if you will extend to the appropriate representatives of the Newfoundland Government their warm appreciation of the fine spirit of co-operation which has been extended to the recruiting personnel and officials at No. 1 Group Headquarters in St. John's in connection with their recruiting activities during the past year.

I have etc.

[N. A. ROBERTSON]  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

850.

NPA GN1/8 4

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J. and D.8-1945

St. John's, March 8, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

My colleagues will have received the copy which I circulated of the letter of February 27th.<sup>1</sup> from the High Commissioner for Canada informing me that the Canadian Government did not consider it advisable at this juncture to proceed with the enlistment of the men of our Royal Artillery stationed in St. John's.

Since sending me this letter Mr. Macdonald has called upon me and discussed the situation fully. He has now written me a further letter, copy of which I attach.

. . .

I ask that the question be considered at the next meeting of Commission and a final decision made as to the answer which I should make to Mr. Macdonald.

H. A. WINTER

[PIÈCE JOINTE / ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve  
au commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Justice and Defence*

No. 15

St. John's, March 7, 1945

Dear Mr. Winter,

In informing my Government that I had conveyed to you its keen appreciation of the offer to make available volunteers from the Newfoundland Regiment<sup>2</sup> for enlistment in the Canadian Army, I expressed the view that our decision not to accept the offer would cause a good deal of disappointment in Newfoundland and would have the effect of preventing a number of well-trained men from taking a fuller share in the war effort, as apparently the United Kingdom authorities did not wish to accept their services as a group and the men, on their part, did not wish to proceed overseas as individuals for service in the various United Kingdom units to which they might be assigned on arrival.

I have today received a reply in which it is intimated that my Government did not appreciate this aspect of the matter, and that if your Government

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> La milice de Terre-Neuve fut officiellement élevée au rang de régiment en mars 1943.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> The Newfoundland Militia attained full regimental status as the Newfoundland Regiment in March 1943.



desires to make a formal request that available volunteers from the Newfoundland Regiment be accepted for enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces for service overseas, they would be prepared to re-examine the question. It would be helpful, in reaching a decision in the matter, if we could be assured that the United Kingdom Government concurs in the proposal. It would be understood, also, that the Canadian Government would be free to make public the fact that the request to permit enlistment of Newfoundlanders in the Canadian Armed Forces had come from the Newfoundland Government.

...

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

851.

NPA S-1-1-4

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

St. John's, March 9, 1945

...

198-'45 J. & D. 8-'45. In view of the letter addressed to the Commissioner for Justice and Defence by the Canadian High Commissioner under date March 7th, 1945, it was agreed that formal proposals should be made to the Canadian Government for the enlistment in the Canadian Forces of available volunteers from the Newfoundland Regiment. Men so accepted will be credited by the Newfoundland Government with gratuity and deferred pay proportionate to the period they have served in the Newfoundland Regiment.

...

852.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au sous-secrétaire*  
*d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air to Under-Secretary*  
*of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] May 16, 1946

Enquiries are presently being received from citizens of Newfoundland as to their eligibility for enlistment or appointment in the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Some of the enquirers have seen previous service during the past war with the RCAF and are now applying to re-enlist or re-engage, whereas others are applying for enlistment for the first time.

The RCAF will, undoubtedly, be required to operate some bases on the East Coast of Canada and will, in all probability, be active in the areas

immediately surrounding Newfoundland and Labrador. It is, therefore, considered that it would be advisable and advantageous to both Governments concerned if a certain number of Newfoundland nationals could be engaged for service in the RCAF.

It is, therefore, requested that permission be sought from the Government of Newfoundland to permit citizens of that Country and Labrador to be enlisted, appointed or re-engaged for service in the Royal Canadian Air Force. Information has been obtained through the Air Officer Commanding of Eastern Air Command that the High Commissioner [sic] of the Newfoundland Government will be agreeable to granting such permission but that it should be procured through the official Government channels.

Permission is also desired to allow qualified RCAF officers to outline to interested parties or groups in Newfoundland the future that the RCAF has to offer to suitably qualified recruits.

Yours very truly,

H. F. GORDON

853.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 289

St. John's, July 16, 1946

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 126 of July 4th<sup>1</sup> and earlier correspondence respecting permission to enlist Newfoundland nationals in the Armed Services of Canada, I may say that I have had a talk on the subject with the Honourable H. A. Winter, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, following his return from Canada. Mr. Winter, as I knew from previous conversations with him, is personally entirely agreeable to permission being granted and is making a recommendation to the Commission to that effect.

2. I am sure that it would tend to make the proposal more acceptable if we did not stress too strongly the legal and constitutional principle involved in the granting of permission to recruit for all the Canadian Armed Services. Consequently, in my conversation with him I stressed the point that all that we were contemplating at the moment was to offer posts in the Royal Canadian Air Force to Newfoundlanders who had suitable air training and qualifications. I told him that we had, in fact, received enquiries from a number of men who were very much interested and I knew it would help to solve their problem in getting re-established, particularly as Newfoundland does not offer an outlet for the type of training they have acquired from service

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

in the war. Mr. Winter will, I think, stress this point in the discussion in the Commission rather than the legal and constitutional aspect and I feel sure it will materially help to avoid a discussion on the legal and constitutional aspects of the matter and secure the object we had in mind.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

854.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État suppléant  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 336

St. John's, August 16, 1946

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 157 of August 12th<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to report that the Honourable H. A. Winter, Commissioner for Justice and Defence, has confirmed by letter that the Commission of Government has agreed to grant permission for the enlistment of Newfoundland citizens in the Armed Services of Canada. Indeed, Mr. Winter goes further and states that the Government feel that any Newfoundlanders who desire to enlist should be encouraged to do so.

Mr. Winter adds that if his Department can assist in the work of recruitment in any way he would be glad to give the necessary instructions.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

855.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le sous-ministre suppléant de la Défense nationale pour l'Air  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] January 17, 1947

Dear Mr. Pearson,

I refer to our letter of 4th January, 1947<sup>2</sup>, in which we asked that the Newfoundland Government be advised of our desire to commence an immediate recruiting campaign in Newfoundland.

Conditions have altered since the despatch of our letter to you and the present personnel strength of the Royal Canadian Air Force would appear to

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

be adequate for our purposes. We have accordingly ordered all our Commands to suspend recruiting activities and we will be unable to recruit Newfoundlanders into the R.C.A.F. It would therefore be appreciated if you would not convey our original request to the Newfoundland Government to initiate a recruiting campaign in Newfoundland. In the event, however, that the RCAF re-commences recruiting in the future, we would desire to be able to enlist any Newfoundland Nationals who might apply for entrance into the R.C.A.F. at that time.

Yours very truly,

JAMES A. SHARPE

856.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, January 20, 1947

In your memorandum of January 17th you informed me that, as a result of altered conditions since the despatch of your letter of January 4th,<sup>1</sup> you will be unable to recruit Newfoundlanders into the Royal Canadian Air Force.

I will inform the Newfoundland authorities of these circumstances and I will tell them that, in the event that the Royal Canadian Air Force re-commences recruiting in the future, you would desire to be able to enlist any Newfoundland nationals who might apply for entrance into the Royal Canadian Air Force at that time.

G. L. MAGANN

for the Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

857.

DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 34

St. John's, January 13, 1949

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your circular document Consular No. 36 dated December 28th<sup>2</sup> regarding requirements for enlistment in the Canadian services.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



2. I would judge from your despatch that Canadian residence is now a prerequisite for enlistment by Newfoundlanders in the Canadian services. As you know we have for a considerable time been receiving a fairly steady flow of applications for enlistment from Newfoundlanders and we have been advising them in accordance with your circular document Consular No. 10 of July 7th.<sup>1</sup> It would be most undesirable, particularly now that Newfoundland will likely soon be a Province of Canada, for us to commence informing applicants here that they must have Canadian residence in order to qualify.

3. As a matter of fact the number of enquiries regarding enlistment has been increasing since the July Referendum and particularly during the last few weeks. I am inclined to think that the time may have arrived when consideration might well be given to making some arrangements whereunder Newfoundlanders could apply for enlistment without travelling to the nearest recruiting centre in Canada. We find that the necessity to do this more frequently than not deters Newfoundlanders interested in joining the Canadian services from actually taking steps to enlist.

4. No doubt when Newfoundland becomes a Province of Canada facilities will be established here for recruiting as in other parts of Canada. Although the Newfoundland Government agreed in August, 1946, that the Canadian services might, should they so desire, recruit in Newfoundland, I do not think that we should set up an actual recruiting centre here at the present time. It might, however, be desirable to attach someone to the staff of this office who would be authorized to deal on the spot with prospective recruits. Arrangements could be made locally regarding medical examinations, etc. If the services are interested in tapping the potential body of recruits in Newfoundland some such arrangement as this would, I think, be worth considering.

5. In any case I would be glad to have at your earliest convenience advice regarding the application in Newfoundland of the ruling described in your circular document Consular No. 36. In the meantime it would be of assistance to us here if you could send us some copies of the type of literature which is given out in Canada to prospective recruits.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

858. DND HQ 304-75/10

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] March 29, 1949

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter of 8th February 1949<sup>2</sup> in which you enquire about the application of the present regulations concerning the conditions for

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

enlistment in the Canadian Services to Newfoundlanders. It is regretted that, in referring this matter to the appropriate officers of the Navy, Army and Air Force, it has not been possible to reply to your letter as quickly as desirable.

Residence in Canada is not a prerequisite of enlistment in the Canadian Armed Forces. Provided an applicant is a British subject and meets the age and educational requirements, he is eligible. The residence clause, which has now been waived insofar as Newfoundlanders are concerned, is necessary only for the purpose of transportation costs from places of residence outside Canada to the enlistment depot, such costs for Newfoundlanders now being borne by the Canadian Government.

A potential recruit, resident in Newfoundland, should first write to the appropriate enlistment office, listed in Appendix "A"<sup>1</sup> attached, providing proof of his age and education. If the applicant is considered suitable for further enlistment processing, transportation from Newfoundland to the appropriate recruiting office will be made at public expense.

Copies of literature<sup>1</sup> which is given out to prospective recruits are attached.

Your sincerely,

C. M. DRURY

*LES ÉPOUSES ET LES DÉPENDANTS DES MILITAIRES CANADIENS*  
*WIVES AND DEPENDENTS OF CANADIAN SERVICEMEN*

859.

DND NSS 1033-1-2

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 672

St. John's, November 6, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 59 of December 23, 1941,<sup>1</sup> in which I informed you that the United States Government had ordered the return to the United States of dependents of all military Forces in Newfoundland who were United States citizens.

2. In your telegram No. 56 of December 23, 1941,<sup>1</sup> you inquired if any reason had been given for this decision. In my telegram No. 59 of December 23, 1941, I informed you that I had inquired from the Consul General of the United States as to the reason and he informed me that no reason had been given in the order directing the repatriation. I also informed you that the newspapers assumed the reason was to put the Army on a war footing.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

3. At that time all wives and families of members of the Armed Forces who were United States citizens were sent back to the United States. I have not the exact number of people sent back at that time but I understand the number was between 700 and 1000.

4. An exception was made in the case of wives or members of families who had actual employment with the American Forces, such as stenographers. These were allowed to remain and most of them are still here and will probably remain so long as their husbands are stationed here.

5. I now enclose a copy of an editorial which appeared in *The Evening Telegram* of November 5, from which you will note that a strong suggestion is made for taking home of the Canadian women to Canada for the reasons mentioned in the editorial, which are as follows:

- (1) "Even in normal times, suitable housing accommodation had not been easy to obtain, and the city was wholly unable to cope with a large influx, particularly of women. . . The demand for accommodation—almost any accommodation—is such that flats and rooms are being rented at two, three or four times their ordinary value. In some cases, these exorbitant prices are asked for rooms containing little more than four bare walls and the minimum of the ordinary conveniences. Nothing but the dire necessity to have a roof over their heads before winter comes has induced these incomers even to consider living under such conditions."
- (2) In a city which is overcrowded, there is the possibility of an outbreak of sickness, e.g. influenza. The hospital accommodation in St. John's has always been inadequate to meet the needs of the normal population. "What would be the situation, should further demands be made upon the institutions, is not pleasant to consider."
- (3) The likelihood of an enemy attack, when the care of visitors "would add immensely to the housing and hospitalization problem".
- (4) The food supply. Transportation of supplies is not only restricted but hazardous "and there is but a single and already over-worked line of railway which has to depend upon a steamship ferry service to give communication with the mainland. It is not an unusual experience to have the port of St. John's blocked by ice, sometimes for weeks, during the winter months; it has occurred, and there is nothing to prevent its occurring again, that the cross-country service has been stormbound for considerable periods."
- (5) St. John's having been selected as a defence base implies that there are dangers to be faced and visitors are an added responsibility.
- (6) In case of attack, it would be an additional cause of concern to the Armed Services, "just when they were required to give their undivided attention to the serious matter of defence, to know that they could not give their relatives their personal help and protection if the city was attacked."

(7) In conclusion, the editorial states: "Let it not be thought for a minute what has been said on this subject means there is any lack of hospitality towards these visitors. The regret is that accommodation for them is not available. Under other circumstances they would be warmly welcomed guests, but none can be more aware than they themselves as they search without avail for the accommodation they desire of the serious problems which have been created by their presence in this and other defence centres."

6. It is, I think reasonably clear that most of the points in the editorial, if not all of them, are well taken.

7. An additional point might well have been made, namely that St. John's is different from places like Halifax in that there are no other settlements or places in Newfoundland to which, in case of need, visitors could be quickly removed. The only other large settlements on the Island are Corner Brook and Grand Falls and both places are now very well taxed to capacity with their present population. Moreover, Grand Falls is nearly 200 miles away from St. John's and Corner Brook is over 300 miles away.

8. Another point which might have been emphasized in the editorial is that the only method of travel for the wives and families of members of the Armed Forces is either by Trans-Canada Air Lines or by the railway at Port-aux-Basques and thence by steamer to Nova Scotia. Women and children are not travelling by steamer to Halifax as in prewar days: first, because of the danger, and secondly, because on the *Lady Rodney* which is the principal passenger boat, no passengers are permitted except members of the Armed Forces. T.C.A. has always a long waiting list and the Newfoundland Railway is so taxed to capacity that an order was recently issued restricting all travel. This order was made before the loss of the *Caribou* and the loss of that steamer will cause further restrictions.

9. Perhaps you may consider it advisable to obtain the views of the Commanding Officers of the three Services in Newfoundland on this matter. I understand that, with a view to reducing the number of wives who are coming here, both the Army and the Navy in recent months have made it compulsory for practically all officers to live in barracks and no living allowance is granted to them if they also rent a house or rooms for their families outside the barracks. I assume that the same order will be made with respect to the Air Force when their barracks now under construction are completed.

10. In my despatch No. 663 of November 3, 1942,<sup>1</sup> I informed you as to the possibility of the Newfoundland Commission of Government very severely restricting the duty concessions on foodstuffs and other commodities supplied to the wives and families of members of the Armed Forces. If these restrictions are put into force, it will greatly increase the cost of living for the wives and families of members of the Armed Forces who are now receiving most of their supplies free of duty.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



11. I understand the chief complaint in the matter of customs duties at the present time is because of the large amount of foodstuffs and other commodities which are being obtained by the wives and families of Canadian Forces free of duty.

12. If the arrangement now proposed with respect to restriction of duty free privileges for families of members of the Armed Forces is put into effect, it will probably tend to reduce greatly the number of wives and families now coming here, as their cost of living, together with the excessive amounts they have to pay for rented rooms or houses, will prohibit many of them from living here unless a special allowance is made for them.

13. I am not making any recommendations in the matter as I would not do so without consulting the Officers Commanding the three services here and obtaining their views, and this I have not done.

14. I thought it important, however, that you should be informed of the arguments put forward by the editor of *The Evening Telegram* which, I believe, reflects the attitude of many of the people of St. John's.

15. I may add the information, which you probably already know, that not only have all American women been removed from Newfoundland, but it is impossible now for a United States citizen who is a woman to get a permit to enter Newfoundland and, in the case of a male citizen of the United States, it is impossible for him to enter Newfoundland except on a special permit which is issued only at Washington, and upon proof that the applicant has to visit Newfoundland on essential business. Orders to the foregoing effect were issued at Washington some months ago.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

860.

DND NSS 1033-1-2

*L'officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve,  
au secrétaire du Conseil de la Marine*

*Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, to Secretary, Naval Board*

[Ottawa,] December 3, 1942

Submitted for the consideration of the Department. A copy of an R.C.A.F. message received by A.O.C. No. 1 Group, St. John's, is enclosed.

The substance of this signal formed an Item on the Agenda of the local Joint Services Sub-Committee meeting on November 30th, where it was decided that as the views and conditions of the three Services were so different, it would be preferable for each Service to present its case separately.

2. Before stating the Naval views, a review of the statements which led up to the proposal to withdraw dependents from Newfoundland is considered essential. The debatable points are as follows:

- (a) The situation at St. John's with regard to abnormal overcrowding due to the influx of war wives and dependents is no worse than in many Canadian towns and Cities— and I speak from experience of both Ottawa and Halifax. The approximate number of Naval dependents in Newfoundland is 275, and no great increase is expected. On the contrary, winter conditions and the natural limitations caused by an uncontrolled rising cost of living will tend to reduce the present level.
- (b) In view of recent developments in the European war situation I am in complete disagreement with the statement that an attack on St. John's is a likelihood and, should it happen, that personnel would be unduly affected in carrying out their duties; as far as I know this suggestion is not borne out by experience in London, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Liverpool, etc.
- (c) The inference in the 2nd paragraph (B) that Newfoundland families should have preference in transportation over the dependents of the Canadian fighting Services is a view to which I cannot subscribe.
- (d) The statement that accommodation for Naval Officers is being provided with the object of reducing the number of wives coming to Newfoundland is completely untrue.
- (e) The only foodstuffs affected by duty concessions which are available to Naval dependents are those supplied by the Y.M.C.A. and the Salvation Army Canteens. There is no issue from Service supplies on repayment.

3. As previously stated the conditions governing the existence and operations of the three Services in Newfoundland are very different, and arguments used for and against this proposal are not necessarily common to all. The Naval case is based on the fact that the main forces in this Command are employed on Atlantic Convoy under most arduous conditions, where sleep, rest and recreation are only obtained on the short visits to port. As the war progresses, increasing war-weariness and strain are certain to be met; and with equal certainty steps should be taken forthwith to do everything possible to reduce the strain. Here lies a great difference between the Naval forces and those of the other Services.

4. St. John's is a Base where men and materials are rested and repaired between operational periods on convoy. During the rest period they are non-operational, and aside from time taken for necessary training activities and giving assistance in effecting repairs on their ships, every encouragement should be given to personnel to get away from ship atmosphere. This need was fully appreciated by the former Captain (D), and is emphasized by his successor; for this reason the Seagoing Officers Club was created, and a weekly party was instituted where wives of officers and local girls are invited to meet officers from the Naval Forces. These steps have been of incalculable benefit in keeping particularly the young and unseasoned officers "on balance" and away from undesirable quarters. Similarly those ratings who have

wives in the port contribute by asking their pals to a home, which, unpretentious as it may be, is still a home and bears a close resemblance to the kind he is fighting for.

5. The Admiralty and the U.S.N. have long realized the importance of getting ships to a home port whenever operationally possible. In the case of the British groups in Atlantic Convoy the normal procedure is for ships to proceed to Liverpool or Greenock each time they arrive in the U.K. instead of turning about at Londonderry. In fact, Admiralty regulations provide that as much leave as possible is to be given to all Naval personnel to enable them to visit their homes. When American destroyers were operated out of Argentia they were sent to Boston and return after each crossing, a total distance of 1600 miles. To put the R.C.N. on an equal footing, ships of the N.E.F. should be permitted to proceed to Halifax after each trip, a proceeding which is operationally undesirable and most uneconomical. An obvious alternative is to permit personnel to bring their wives and families to Newfoundland if they so desire.

6. I cannot stress too strongly the effect of any restrictions on the private lives of the Naval personnel of this Command. The feeling that exists between the Canadian Naval Forces and the Newfoundland people can at present be called satisfactory; but if it were known that dependents of the fighting forces were prohibited from coming to this Island because of food supplies, in order that the Newfoundlanders should continue to go unrationed, there would probably be a radical change.

7. There are a number of officers and men in the Base Command who are being rested from sea duty for about a year after continuous or long service afloat during the war. I take for example Lieutenant-Commander Stubbs, ex Commanding Officer of *Assiniboine*, who has served continuously and gallantly at sea in destroyers for the last four years. He is now S.O.O. on my staff, and his wife is in Newfoundland. Is he during this recuperation period to be denied the right of living with his wife?

8. There are also a number of R.N. Officers and ratings ashore and afloat to whom the restrictions would not apply without instructions from the British Government. Also Fighting French and Norwegian Forces would be affected unless the order applies to Canadians only—a very inequitable arrangement. It is also assumed that should the proposal under discussion be implemented that no exceptions will be made in the case of Canadian Government Officials or Civilians.

9. I know the Naval staff are fully aware of many of the arguments that have been used in this memorandum and the effect of further restrictions on a very gallant Force which suffers every risk and discomfort afloat and inconvenience and makeshift ashore. Anything that can be done to make their lot easier is a step towards increased efficiency.

H. E. REID  
Commodore First Class, R.C.N.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE / ENCLOSURE]

DND (DH) 193.009 (D15)

*Le commandant de l'aviation, premier groupe aérien, au quartier général,  
région aérienne de l'Est*

*Air Officer Commanding, Air Group No. 1, to Headquarters,  
Eastern Air Command*

TELEGRAM A87

[St. John's,] November 25, 1942

Strongly recommend that R.C.A.F. be placed on war footing similar to Americans by exclusion of wives and dependents of R.C.A.F. personnel in Newfoundland no exceptions to be made. Transportation system as at present precludes the proper movement of personnel on service duty yet dependents as civilians can obtain passage on boat, rail and T.C.A. without difficulty by booking ahead under Newfoundland civil arrangements. If R.C.A.F. and other service dependents not travelling that space would be available for service movements. Shortage of supplies exists and dependents being supplied. Accommodation critical and service personnel travelling on legitimate business have to be put up in inferior accommodation and or discomfort or accommodated through courtesy of service personnel who in turn suffer discomfort. Most serious concern to my mind is leakage of information that invariably takes place when dependents in vicinity. Further the efficiency of officers and airmen invariably declines where operations are concerned and this most noticeable when it is incumbent on them to look after the welfare and entertainment of dependents when they should be available for duty thus increasing the necessity for disciplinary measures. Absolutely against dependents residing or visiting on R.C.A.F. stations or installations as A.O.C. and high officials have had to seek inferior accommodation or be inconvenienced by not being able to discuss service matters owing to presence of dependents. Have issued instructions this date endorsed by General Page that dependents of R.C.A.F. and Army personnel cannot reside or visit within R.C.A.F. stations or installations in Newfoundland without the personal approval of the A.O.C. Group and that all personnel now residing are to be cleared out. Agree with all the views put forward by press and High Commissioner. Further agree no exceptions should be made such as A.O.C. and I have already intimated to C.O. Gander that I do not want dependents on station and am taking steps to have those previously allotted as married quarters to be allotted as single quarters occupied by commanding officers thus making accommodation available for visiting senior officers and distinguished visitors which does not exist at present.



861. DND (DH) 193.009 (D15)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] January 15, 1943

...

IV. REPATRIATION OF SERVICE WIVES AND FAMILIES FROM NEWFOUNDLAND.  
CUSTOMS DUES PRIVILEGES FOR SERVICE PERSONNEL

The Committee agreed that no action should be taken to effect repatriation of service wives and families from Newfoundland. It was however further agreed that no wives, families, or dependents of service personnel would be permitted to live in any quarters or other accommodation within, or forming part of any Naval, Army, or Air Force establishment, camp or station.

With respect to the question of duty free privileges enjoyed by service personnel it was decided that every effort should be made to avoid abuses of the privileges and to restrict the importation of goods to those recognized by the Newfoundland Governmental authorities as being entitled to exemption under existing arrangements. The Secretary was instructed to refer the matter to the Director of Auxiliary Services for study of the problems involved and recommendations as to the methods whereby the desired object might be reached to the satisfaction of both the services and the Newfoundland authorities.

...

862. DND (HQ) 193.009 (D27)

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve*

*à l'officier général commandant les troupes canadiennes à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to General Officer Commanding,  
Canadian Troops in Newfoundland*

No. 36

St. John's, December 7, 1943

SECRET

Dear General Leclerc,

I am attaching herewith copy of letter dated December 6th, 1943,<sup>1</sup> which I have received from the Honourable Sir John Puddester, Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare, dealing with the problem created by wives and dependents of officers and men in the Canadian Services, resident in St. John's.

You will note that Sir John states that their presence is unnecessary and they are creating a difficult housing problem. Furthermore, Sir John points out that there is an insistent demand that additional wives and families of Canadian servicemen be prohibited from entering Newfoundland and that those already here be expelled from the country.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare states that the Newfoundland Government are reluctant to issue instructions in the matter, but feel that the Canadian Government should take the necessary action. Reference is made to the steps taken by the United States Government to deal with this position which provided a satisfactory solution.

I have referred the matter to my Department and have asked for instructions. In my despatch I advised that copy of the letter was being sent to each of the Service chiefs of the Armed Forces in Newfoundland for discussion at their next regular joint meeting which I understand takes place on Monday, December 13th.

I have informed Sir John Puddester that I will communicate with him further concerning the subject matter of his letter when it has received consideration.

The first three paragraphs of his letter deal with the replacement of civilian stocks of food consumed by Canadian Service personnel living outside barrack areas, in St. John's. This particular problem of St. John's also applies to other points throughout Newfoundland, and the Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare was requested some time ago to furnish a complete list of the withdrawals from civilian stocks of food on the part of Service personnel, so that compensation might be arranged in Ottawa.

Yours faithfully,

J. C. BRITTON

863.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D27)

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 179

St. John's, December 22, 1943

Reference my despatch No. 1011 of December 11th, 1943,<sup>1</sup> and previous despatches relative to removal of wives of members of Canadian Armed forces resident in Newfoundland. I had conference yesterday with General Officers Commanding three services who agreed that if the following arrangement could be made with the Newfoundland Government it would be satisfactory, namely, wives now resident be allowed to remain and the total number now resident to form a quota which could be filled as any of those now present leave Newfoundland. I have had discussions with Sir John Puddester who informed me that this arrangement will be satisfactory. He will further agree that the quota will not apply to native Newfoundlanders who have married or may marry Canadian officers or men. Please advise if this arrangement is satisfactory and I will exchange letters accordingly.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

864.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D27)

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 81

St. John's, February 8, 1944

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence relating to the necessity of limiting the movement of dependents of Canadian Service personnel to Newfoundland, I have the honour to enclose a copy of Memorandum relating to this matter which has today been placed on the files of this Office.

2. A copy of the Memorandum in question has been provided in confidence to the Senior Officers of the Services in Newfoundland.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémorandum du haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve*  
*Memorandum by Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, February 8, 1944

FAMILIES OF CANADIAN SERVICE PERSONNEL IN NEWFOUNDLAND

. . .

In discussing the matter with Mr. Bower, I was further informed that Sir John Puddester had been surprised, and to some extent disappointed, by the Agreement of the Canadian Government to limit the number of Service dependents permitted to reside in Newfoundland. He had referred to the complication created by the presence of these people as an argument for increased supplies and had hinted that the limitation in numbers might be necessary if the supplies were not forthcoming. He had not really expected his reference to limitation to be taken up. Sir John is now rather fearful that the matter may become public knowledge in Newfoundland and that he will be criticized, particularly by the Water Street merchants for having been responsible for an action which will have the effect of limiting their trade.

. . .

H. L. K[EE]NLEYSIDE]

865.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D27)

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 59

St. John's, February 23, 1944

IMPORTANT. 1. Following for MacKay from Keenleyside. Begins.

...

4. Commodore Taylor had a communication for [sic] Naval Headquarters which seems to suggest that National Defence for Naval Services had been informed from some quarter that the Newfoundland Government is no longer interested in the proposed limitation on Canadian personnel in Newfoundland. I checked this matter this morning with Sir John Puddester, and he informs me that the Commission of Government in fact is very anxious to complete the proposed agreement. You may inform National Defence for Naval Services of this fact.

...

866.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve  
au commissaire à la Santé et au Bien-être social*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Public Health and Welfare*

No. 3

St. John's, March 1, 1944

Dear Sir John,

May I refer to Mr. Burchell's letter of January 24th, 1944, No. 1<sup>1</sup> concerning the wives and other dependents of Canadian Service personnel now resident in Newfoundland.

I have now received information from the Officers Commanding the three Canadian Services in this country which indicates that the following dependents are resident in Newfoundland:

Royal Canadian Navy .....	334
Canadian Army .....	262
Royal Canadian Air Force .....	57

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



The figure given by the Royal Canadian Navy is not complete as it has been found impossible to obtain complete returns from personnel serving at sea. I suggest, therefore, that an allowance of 20% be granted to cover omissions. As there will, moreover, be an inevitable delay in making our arrangement known to all dependents of Service personnel, I suggest that a slight modification in all figures be allowed and that the following formal quotas be now accepted:

Royal Canadian Navy .....	400
Canadian Army .....	280
Royal Canadian Air Force .....	60

It is suggested further that we agree that these quotas be established on and be enforced after March 10th, 1944. I assume that in the meantime, the Newfoundland Government will inform all railway and steamship lines serving this country that after the date mentioned, Canadian Service wives and dependents may enter Newfoundland only when bearing permits signed by or on behalf of the Officer Commanding in Newfoundland of the Service concerned.

I understand that the Commission of Government agrees that Newfoundland wives and dependents of Canadian Service personnel are not to be included in this quota, that children subsequently born in Newfoundland of wives of Canadian Service personnel are likewise exempt, and that the appropriate Department of the Newfoundland Government will inform this Office of all arrivals and departures of persons claiming, or believed to be dependents of Canadian Service personnel.

Finally, I suggest that it be agreed that in the case of Navy wives, normally resident in Canada, who wish to visit Newfoundland to see their husbands when the latter's ships are in port, a special dispensation be arranged in the form of a permit valid for not more than 30 days and that holders of such permits be admitted to Newfoundland for the period mentioned, in excess of the Naval quota. I am informed that visits of this kind are invaluable in the maintenance of high morale among Naval personnel. I assume that such temporary visits when approved by the appropriate Officer Commanding will also be permitted in special instances as in the case of illness.

I attach hereto a brief "Outline of Procedure"<sup>1</sup> which has been agreed upon by the responsible Canadian authorities and which will, I hope, appeal to you as being reasonable and convenient.

If these suggestions meet with your approval, I suggest that this letter and your reply be accepted as constituting an agreement on this subject between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland.

Faithfully yours,  
H. L. KEENLEYSIDE

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduct. <sup>1</sup> Not printed.

867.

1156-D-39

*Le commissaire à la Santé et au Bien-être social  
au haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare to  
Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, March 10, 1944

Dear Dr. Keenleyside,

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of March the 1st having reference to correspondence that had taken place between your predecessor and myself concerning the Wives and other Dependents of Canadian Service personnel now residing in Newfoundland.

The quotas that you suggest covering the three Armed Services, namely,

Royal Canadian Navy .....	400
Canadian Army .....	280
Royal Canadian Air Force .....	60

are acceptable to this Government and will be established from March the 10th, 1944.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Immigration Authorities through the Commissioner for Finance, who will notify his personnel of the agreement now arrived at. Other paragraphs of your letter are likewise agreed to and the Immigration Authorities will be informed accordingly.

I do not anticipate any objections on their part, but if there are I shall communicate with you immediately.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. PUDDSTER

*LES RELATIONS ENTRE LES MILITAIRES ET LA POPULATION CIVILE*  
*RELATIONS BETWEEN SERVICEMEN AND CIVILIAN POPULATION*

868.

DND NSS 1033-1-1

*Le haut commissariat à Terre-Neuve*  
*à l'officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve*  
*High Commission in Newfoundland*  
*to Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, July 9, 1942

Dear Sir,

This Office is in receipt of your letter of July 2, No. 9660/104,<sup>1</sup> to the High Commissioner, concerning the statement of Sir Alfred Morine, and, as Mr. Burchell is out of town and will not return for probably another two weeks, I am taking the liberty of sending you at least an interim reply.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

I feel certain that Mr. Burchell would agree with you that Sir Alfred Morine's statement concerning the unpopularity of Canadian Servicemen in Newfoundland as compared with the American Forces is not founded on a sound consensus of opinion. Undoubtedly there have been cases of undesirable behaviour on the part of our men and possibly individuals who have had unpleasant contacts with Canadians have expressed their views to Sir Alfred Morine. The charge that Canadian Servicemen have shown an air of superiority is one that, while perhaps partly true, can in the view of many persons be more properly directed against the American soldiers. Newfoundlanders seem to be a proud and sensitive people who are easily offended by criticism made by outsiders and have become impatient with the ridicule directed against them by some Canadians and probably more Americans.

It is, I think, important for all of us to remember that there is an old anti-Canadian sentiment in Newfoundland and that only a period of good relations can overcome this prejudice. The opinion on Canada of the great mass of Newfoundlanders, who have little or no opportunity to visit Canada or to read very much about our country, is likely to be based on their contacts with Canadians stationed in Newfoundland and it is therefore important that everything possible should be done to see that behaviour is of the best.

Perhaps great consequence should not be attached to the views of Sir Alfred Morine. He is now eighty-five years old and has not lived in Newfoundland for some years. He was born in Nova Scotia and received his education in the public schools of that Province and at Dalhousie Law School. He came to Newfoundland in 1883 and was at first connected with newspaper work. He later practised law and became very active in politics. At first he was a Liberal and subsequently became a Conservative. In the nineties he was closely concerned with the French Shore Question. He was Minister of Justice and Attorney General in 1919 and leader of the Legislative Council between 1924 and 1928.

About a year and a half ago there was an article in *Liberty* entitled "Newfoundland—The Tenth Province", based on an interview given by Sir Alfred Morine, in which he favoured the entry of Newfoundland into Confederation.

Sir Alfred Morine answered the recent questionnaire of the *Financial Post* on the subject of whether Newfoundland should be invited to join Canada. He made some very sensible remarks and after explaining the present constitutional position of the country said that, while Ottawa should look into the matter, it should not invite Newfoundland to enter Confederation now because there is no authority in Newfoundland to receive such an invitation, as the Government is responsible to the Dominions Office.

He also made the following remarks which are similar to those contained in his letter to the Hon. Angus Macdonald:

The American Armed Forces are very popular now in Newfoundland. I hear on what I regard as high authority that 90% of the people of the Island would

favour a union with the United States rather than confederation with Canada, if they were to vote about the issue as they feel at present.

I may add confidentially that Mr. Burchell was informed by the Editor of the *Financial Post* that he was of the opinion that Sir Alfred Morine has come to the conclusion that there is grave danger of Newfoundland being lost to the British Empire and joining the United States if Canada does not early make an offer of Confederation. The Editor states that Sir Alfred Morine will be found expressing these views very forcibly in Canada where he can find an audience. He tried to induce the *Financial Post* to publish a very long article on the subject but they declined to accept it as he had not been resident in Newfoundland for a number of years.

I am not certain what you have in mind in asking Mr. Burchell to make discreet enquiries. Obviously Sir Alfred Morine must know a very large number of people in Newfoundland and it would be almost impossible to trace the source of his information. If it is a question of substantiating the views he expresses, while it is of course not easy to ascertain public opinion in this country, I think Mr. Burchell would not agree that the Canadian Armed Forces are much less popular than the United States Soldiers.

On the other point, namely, the readiness of Newfoundlanders to vote for annexation to the United States rather than for confederation with Canada, I think it must be admitted that there is probably some basis for such an opinion. Many Newfoundlanders apparently think that annexation to the United States would be of great value to their economic position and undoubtedly that country also appears attractive to them because of its wealth, glamour and effective publicity. You may recall that Mr. Warwick Smith, a prolific writer of letters to the press, said in a letter published in *The Daily News* on April 20 that a large number of Newfoundlanders favoured annexation to the United States. This statement provoked several correspondents to assert their loyalty to the British connection. It is just conceivable that Mr. Smith, who is a retired civil servant, corresponds with Sir Alfred Morine.

Yours very truly,

A. J. PICK

869.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D22)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 27, 1943

...

III. *Rowdyism, St. John's, Newfoundland.*

The Committee noted a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs forwarding a despatch from the High Commissioner for Canada



in Newfoundland,<sup>1</sup> and extract from the local press respecting rowdiness by members of the Armed Forces in St. John's and requesting any information that the Services might supply respecting the action taken or contemplated to assist in bettering the unsatisfactory state of affairs.

The Secretary was provided with details of the action taken by each of the Services and instructed to reply to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

...

870.

WIB vol. 11 6.5

*Mémoire du directeur des opérations extérieures,  
Commission d'Information en temps de guerre<sup>2</sup>, au gérant général exécutif,  
Commission d'Information en temps de guerre<sup>3</sup>*

*Memorandum from Director of External Operations,  
War-time Information Board<sup>2</sup>, to General Executive Manager,  
War-time Information Board<sup>3</sup>*

Ottawa, April 17, 1944

...

9. The background of the Newfoundland resentment of the presence of French-Canadian H.D. troops has a dual nature. Partly it arises from the theory sponsored so viciously by parts of Ontario, that the majority of French-Canadian troops are home defence draftees, but mainly it comes from the relative conditions of pay and allowances of Canadian and Newfoundland troops. In actual fact, the Canadian troops in Newfoundland are a mixture of H.D. and voluntary soldiers, but the Newfoundlanders regard them all as personnel who cannot be sent to an active fighting front. The Canadian soldier in Newfoundland, consequently, in the view of the Newfoundlander, gets \$1.30 or \$1.50 a day for wearing a uniform and doing very little work in a safe spot, whereas the Newfoundlander's brother gets 50¢ a day in the Imperial Army for getting killed in Italy. It should be noted that while the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force in Newfoundland are actively operational forces and are participating in actual combat to an extent that has never been realized in Canada, the units of the Canadian Army in the Avalon Peninsula area might just as well, with the exception of some numerically small anti-aircraft and coastal defence artillery outfits, be back in training camps in Canada, so far as active participation in the war is concerned. There was an obvious point in their presence, in case of landings, a year or two ago, but it is quite apparent to the people of Newfoundland that that danger has passed. It is believed that this distinction between the operational and non-operational character

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> G. W. McCracken.

<sup>3</sup> A. D. Dunton.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

of the Navy and Air Force as compared with the Army, does not exist in the minds of the Newfoundlanders in other parts of the island. At lonely outports where they man defences, Canadian soldiers undoubtedly get credit for the protection they give the small communities against possible landings. At places like Gander, also, the Canadian Army defences are so closely integrated with Air operations, that the Canadian troops there, even though some of them be H.D. personnel, are regarded as essential elements in action against the enemy.

10. A further element in the resentment by the Newfoundlanders of the presence of French-Canadian troops is the religious one. A large proportion of the population of Newfoundland is Irish Catholic. These people maintain their traditional animosity toward French Catholics. Meanwhile, in an island where religion is generally a more profound part of the life of the people than it is in Canada, the Protestant elements in Newfoundland population have a more active resentment of the presence of Catholic troops than would be expected from the typical Canadian viewpoint. A still further element is the historical friction between Newfoundland and the Province of Quebec. Altogether, the situation appears to be deteriorating, with the Newfoundlanders steadily developing new and intense prejudices against the French-Canadians. . .

11. With regard to the behavior of the Canadian sailors and soldiers, the fact that almost every restaurant on Water Street, the main business St. of St. John's, has had its plateglass front window smashed and now has it boarded up, is perhaps sufficient comment. The boards have been painted and the boarding permanently enough done to last for the duration. The restaurant proprietors apparently believe that there is no use replacing the glass. Personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy is given major credit by the people of St. John's for the condition of the windows on Water Street. Merchant seamen are also blamed for part of the damage and Canadian soldiers have a still smaller part of it. American troops do relatively little downtown roistering, and no complaints at all were heard about the behaviour of personnel of the Royal Canadian Air Force. This damage to plate glass from thrown rum bottles is excused more by the Newfoundlanders than it would be in a Canadian city, but it still is a very sore point. There is no apparent remedy for the destructive behaviour except the provision of radically new and different recreational facilities in St. John's for members of the Canadian forces. The Americans have superb facilities in their USO, and these are adequate to keep their personnel fairly civilized. With sometimes as many as 8,000 Canadian seamen in St. John's at one time, Canada needs even better facilities than the Americans have. Meanwhile an embarrassing situation involving potentially bad Canadian-American relations has arisen in St. John's. The Americans have welcomed Canadian personnel to their USO, but recently Canadians have been crowding American troops out of their own recreation establishment.

Existing Canadian recreation huts maintained by the various auxiliary service organizations are totally inadequate to the job that has to be done and there should be no delay in the erection of a Canadian three-services recreation center which will give Canadian personnel a desirable place in which to spend off-duty hours.<sup>1</sup>

...

871.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 147

[Ottawa,] June 15, 1945

Sir,

May I refer to my despatch No. 135 of May 31<sup>2</sup> concerning the reduction of Army garrisons in Newfoundland and Labrador.

2. On a visit to Ottawa the latter part of May, Mr. Gushue, Chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, in conversation with Mr. MacKay of this Department remarked that he had discovered a great deal of resentment among Newfoundlanders overseas because of the fact that Newfoundland had been garrisoned by Canadian troops while Newfoundlanders had been serving abroad. The impression among the Newfoundland troops was that Canadians in Newfoundland were mostly French-Canadians called up for home defence service. Mr. Gushue felt there was some danger of disorder if Canadian troops remained in Newfoundland after Newfoundland troops had returned in numbers unless the situation were carefully handled.

3. This information was passed on to the Department of National Defence (Army), and the Deputy Minister has now replied in part as follows:

As you know, Canadian troops in the past have been kept to the minimum considered essential for the defence of Newfoundland, in conjunction with United States forces. As a result of the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the Canadian Army garrisons are being limited to a small detachment required for the Royal Canadian Air Force at Gander and a considerably reduced number at St. John's. The decision as to when and to what extent the present number will be further reduced, or withdrawn entirely, is awaiting decision as to Government policy regarding the defence of Newfoundland vis-à-vis United States policy in the same connection.

You will be interested to know that the present Army personnel at St. John's are all English-speaking. However, regardless of whether these Canadian troops

<sup>1</sup> On doit noter que les Terre-neuviens furent très hospitaliers envers les militaires canadiens et américains et particulièrement à l'endroit des marins canadiens servant dans l'Atlantique Nord.

<sup>2</sup> Document 955.

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the Newfoundland people were extremely hospitable to Canadian and American service personnel, particularly to Canadian sailors serving in the North Atlantic.

are English or French speaking, the fact remains that the presence of Canadians in Newfoundland is the result of measures initiated at a time of grave emergency in co-operation with the United States, as being necessary for the defence of Newfoundland.

4. While the situation is probably not serious, it was thought that you should have this information.

I have etc.

G. DE T. GLAZEBROOK  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

*LES RELATIONS INTERGOUVERNEMENTALES SECONDAIRES*  
*SECONDARY INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS*

872.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 9-10, 1941

...

CANADIAN ARMY

...

10. Road Construction and Maintenance

- (b) The matter of road construction and maintenance of roads subjected to heavy Service traffic has, it is understood, been brought to the attention of the State Department and the Department of External Affairs by the Newfoundland Commissioner for Justice and Defence.

...

873.

NPA S-4-2-4

*Le commandant de l'aviation, premier groupe aérien,*  
*au secrétaire de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Air Officer Commanding, Air Group No. 1,*  
*to Secretary, Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, June 29, 1942

Dear Sir,

No. 1 Group, R.C.A.F., has now available two transportation aircraft, one twin-engine Goose amphibian and one single-engine Norseman land-plane, and it is the intention to place the Norseman on floats and use it as a seaplane during the summer.



When conditions permit and the aircraft are not engaged in official Air Force transportation, these aircraft can be made available for the use of the Commission of Government. It would be appreciated if the availability of these transportation aircraft could be made known to the several Commissioners and if they could be informed that if they require air transportation by the R.C.A.F., it will be given high priority.

Yours very truly,

C. M. McEWEN  
Air Commodore

874.

DND HQ 004-75/10

*Le chef de l'état-major de l'Air*  
*au commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est*  
*Chief of the Air Staff*  
*to Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command*

[Ottawa,] January 4, 1943

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND  
THE NEWFOUNDLAND AUTHORITIES IN THE MATTER OF  
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS

1. Subsequent upon correspondence and consultations between the appropriate Canadian and Newfoundland authorities, agreement has now been reached upon the principles which are to govern the relations between the Canadian Armed Forces in Newfoundland and the Newfoundland authorities in the matter of investigation of accidents.

2. A statement of the views expressed and agreed upon are set out hereafter. It is requested, please, that the same be forwarded to the appropriate Air Force authorities throughout your Command for their guidance in future cases.

3. In the case of fatal flying accidents in which only flying personnel are involved, it will be unnecessary for the Newfoundland authorities to hold a Coroner's inquest. Where, however, third parties are involved, an inquest will be held and every effort made to avoid bringing out any information of a technical secret nature.

4. In case of other accidents outside an airport the Newfoundland civil authorities will hold the usual appropriate inquiry or investigation. In addition the usual service investigation will be held unless a Coroner's inquest has been held by the civil authorities or some other form of civil inquiry has been held which appears to the service authorities to be satisfactory. Where third parties are involved the usual practice of holding a service investigation in addition to the Coroner's inquest, for the purpose of providing material for settling any claim against the Crown, will be followed.

5. In the case of an accident occurring within the boundaries of a Canadian Air Base in which civilians, such as Newfoundland workmen, are injured, whether or not Canadian Service personnel are also injured, general provisions of the preceding paragraph will apply. The appropriate civil authorities are to be admitted to the protected area for the purpose of making such investigation as the Commissioner for Justice and Defence of Newfoundland may deem necessary. In elaboration of the foregoing the following procedure has been agreed upon:

- (a) At Gander and Goose Bay, Newfoundland has police and rangers and in case of accidents there the police and rangers must, as a matter of course, immediately begin the inquiries while the trail is warm. They must have access to all witnesses and participants in order to take statements and collate the evidence. Similar preliminary steps being taken by the Service authorities should not interfere with the immediate work of the civil authorities and Service authorities are to co-operate with the civil police in making the quickest and most thorough effort to obtain the evidence while it is fresh in the minds of witnesses. The investigation consequent upon such civil inquiries (generally by a Magistrate) will be ordered by the Department of Justice of Newfoundland, and if ordered the Service authorities at the Air Base in question are to facilitate the work of the civil authorities to the fullest extent.
- (b) At Torbay, Newfoundland has no police and rangers at the present time. In the case of an accident there the Service authorities are to immediately notify the Secretary for Justice or Chief of Police and an immediate entry into the protected area is to be permitted as soon as the police arrive and they are then to proceed with their inquiries under circumstances identical with those set out in the case of Gander and Goose Bay above.
- (c) The Newfoundland authorities will notify the Service authorities at the Air Base where such an accident occurs when it is their intention to send police or a Magistrate to hold investigations. Should, however, such notification be delayed or not sent owing to an oversight, the Service authorities are not to interfere with the admission of officials of the Department of Justice duly authorized, bearing in mind that the power to issue permits for entry into prohibited areas rests with the Commissioner for Justice whose Deputy is the Air Officer Commanding in this respect.

6. The Newfoundland authorities have advised that every effort will be made on the part of the officials of the Department of Justice for Newfoundland to facilitate any inquiries which may be made by Service authorities and to collaborate with them in every respect.

J. A. SULLY  
Air Vice-Marshal  
for the Chief of the Air Staff

875.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 5, 1943

...

## FEDERAL CONTRIBUTION TO ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

19. THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, in respect of this matter which had been referred to External Affairs on April 21st, submitted a recommendation that the Canadian government should not offer to pay any fixed sum in lieu of taxes which might be regarded as recognition of liability to taxation, but that a further sum of \$10,000 for street repair might be offered to Newfoundland authorities in view of the damage caused to city streets in St. John's, by the operation of Canadian military vehicles. Copies of this recommendation had been circulated.

(Secretary's memorandum, May 4, 1943<sup>1</sup>—C.W.C. document 504).

...

876.

3772-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire*  
*à la Justice et à la Défense*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner*  
*for Justice and Defence*

No. 7

St. John's, January 24, 1944

Dear Sir Edward [Emerson],

I have been instructed to state that the Government of Canada is prepared to enter into an agreement with the Government of Newfoundland establishing the basis to be adopted for the settlement of claims arising out of traffic accidents involving vehicles of the Government of Canada and vehicles of the Government of Newfoundland in the following terms:

- (a) The Agreement would cover all vehicles owned or controlled by the Government of Canada, including vehicles used by the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, or the Royal Canadian Air Force (hereinafter called Canadian vehicles), and all vehicles owned or controlled by the Government of Newfoundland, including vehicles used by the Armed Forces of Newfoundland and including railway trains, rolling stock and gasoline propelled cars owned or controlled by the Newfoundland Government (hereinafter called Newfoundland vehicles).
- (b) The Agreement would apply to accidents wherever they occur which take place on or after September 3rd, 1939, which have not already been disposed of, and which involve a Canadian or Newfoundland vehicle.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

- (c) Neither Government would make any claim against the other for any damage caused in an accident to which the Agreement applies to any vehicle, stores or other property of the Government of Canada, or to any vehicle, stores or other property of the Government of Newfoundland.
- (d) Neither Government would make any claim against the other in respect of the death of or injury to any member of the Armed Forces of Canada or of Newfoundland caused by a Newfoundland vehicle or a Canadian vehicle in an accident to which the Agreement applies.
- (e) If, arising out of an accident to which this Agreement applies and in which both a Canadian vehicle and a Newfoundland vehicle are involved in circumstances in which the Canadian Government and the Newfoundland Government respectively assume responsibility for any liability of persons in their service, any claim is made against either Government by a third party (including a person in the service of either Government), then the amount of any judgment obtained by the claimant and the costs, expenses and disbursements connected therewith or the amount of any settlement made with the claimant agreed to jointly by the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments, shall be borne equally by them. A claim made against a person in the service of the Government of Canada or of the Government of Newfoundland shall, for the purposes of this paragraph, be deemed to be a claim made against that Government if such Government assumes responsibility and not otherwise.

I shall be glad if you will inform me whether the Government of Newfoundland agree to an arrangement on this basis. If so, this Note and your reply to that effect will be regarded as constituting an Agreement between our two Governments which will continue in force in respect of all accidents which may occur prior to the expiration of three months from the date on which either of the two Governments gives notice to the other of its intention to terminate the Agreement.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

877.

3772-40

*Le commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
au haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, February 7, 1944

Dear Dr. Keenleyside,

I wish to refer to letter No. 7 of January 24th from Mr. Burchell on the subject of a proposed agreement between the Government of Newfoundland and



the Government of Canada in respect to the settlement of claims arising out of traffic accidents involving vehicles of the two Governments.

2. This letter was discussed in Commission and I am directed to inform you that the Government of Newfoundland agrees to an arrangement on this basis. Furthermore Mr. Burchell's letter and this reply will be regarded as constituting between our two Governments an agreement which will continue in force in respect of all accidents which may occur prior to the expiration of three months from the date on which either of the two Governments gives notice to the other of its intention to terminate the agreement.

Yours faithfully,

L. E. EMERSON

878.

DND HQ 004-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 303

St. John's, June 30, 1944

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication No. 177 of June 19th<sup>1</sup> respecting the request of the City Council for the co-operation of the defence authorities in protecting newly paved streets from damage by heavy equipment.

2. There is nothing we can do to make for better relations than to co-operate wholeheartedly in this work. The citizens of St. John's are exasperated at the very bad state of the city streets and the roads leading out into the country and no one can try to drive a car, or go in a bus over them, without soon sharing their exasperation. Local feeling, I should say, is stronger against Canada than it is against the United States. For while the heavy military traffic of both countries has largely contributed to breaking down the city streets and the neighbouring roads, the United States authorities have contributed in a very much larger way than we have to the construction and maintenance of good roads that are largely used by civilian traffic. I think it would be only just and fair if both of us made a grant to enable the local authorities to rebuild the streets to the condition in which they were when we moved into the country, though I realize this is a broad question and could hardly apply to St. John's only. The very least we can do, however, is to ensure that when the city

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

authorities rebuild the streets and roads we have so largely broken down, we should take every precaution to see that we do not damage them a second time if it can be avoided.

3. Since writing you on June 22nd,<sup>1</sup> I have discussed the local road situation at some length with the Manager of the McNamara Construction Company which is now engaged in carrying out paving work on two of the city's leading thoroughfares. I have also approached the Service chiefs on the three specific proposals put forward by Sir Wilfrid Woods and, as soon as they have had time to study the proposals he has made and to report upon them, I shall take the matter up again, for the local situation has reached a point where, unless we do something substantial to meet the city's wishes, an ugly situation may well develop. In this connection, I am enclosing for your information, an account in the local press of yesterday's meeting of the City Council. You will note that a suggestion was put forward that either legal action be taken against drivers of heavy vehicles, or that all street repair work be stopped and the general public left to force the issue—presumably by storming offending vehicles or other violent action. The first suggestion was adopted and, if carried out will certainly prove awkward. I should doubt, however, that they would really go quite so far, except as a last resort.

4. I am rather disturbed, however, at the instruction in the concluding paragraph of your despatch under reference, namely, that I should inform the City Council that the decision in any particular instance as to whether heavy equipment of the Armed Forces may or may not use the streets must in the interests of defence be left to the Commanding Officer of the Service concerned. In our meetings this question about the prerogatives of the defenders of the Island bedevils the discussion. All regulations designed to protect the streets from heavy traffic would automatically and as a matter of course be waived if any question of repelling an invasion arose. But whatever may have been the position in earlier years, it is now obvious to everybody that neither the Germans, nor the Japanese, are in any position to attack this Island. I feel sure that there will be full cooperation from the Service chiefs and from the contractors' organizations and that the whole matter can, with good sense, be settled without abrogating any over-riding rights we, or the United States Forces, may possess in matters of defence. I think, however, it would be unwise to re-emphasize our rights at this time, unless there are larger questions of policy involved of which I have no knowledge. I should, accordingly, be grateful for your further observations on this point.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

879.

DND HQ 004-75/10

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 196

Ottawa, July 5, 1944

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 303 of June 30, 1944 concerning damage to the streets by heavy equipment of the armed services.

2. I regret to observe that there seems to be considerable feeling in the St. John's City Council over the question of damage to the streets by heavy equipment of the armed services and Canadian contractors.

3. It is regrettable also that the Council seems to be under some misapprehension about the willingness of the Canadian Government to co-operate in protecting the newly paved streets. The first intimation that the City Council desired assurance by the Canadian Government that special care should be exercised in the use of the streets that the city proposes to pave was received by this Government on May 22 in Mr. Britton's despatch No. 241 of May 19.<sup>1</sup> The matter was immediately referred to the Departments of National Defence and Transport, and a reply was sent in my despatch No. 177 of June 10, 1944,<sup>1</sup> which intimated that the Service departments were quite prepared to co-operate with the city and had so instructed their local Officers Commanding. It was felt, however, that some reservation should be made with respect to defence requirements. It is not desired that the reservation with respect to defence should be unduly stressed. Presumably when the local Officers Commanding have an opportunity of studying Sir Wilfrid Woods, proposals an amicable and mutually satisfactory arrangement can be achieved.

4. While the military situation has greatly improved it would seem undesirable to make commitments which would leave the Defence services entirely at the mercy of municipal regulations with respect to use of the streets. Indeed, it may be observed that Sir Wilfrid Woods has not made any such request. It may also be observed that under the Bases Agreement of April 1941<sup>2</sup> the United States has unrestricted use of the streets, with respect both to the amount and type of traffic. It would scarcely seem reasonable under these circumstances that Canada should be expected to agree to restrictions which might hamper defence, and especially in view of the larger responsibilities of Canada in and about St. John's.

5. With regard to your suggestion that some assistance should be given to the City to restore the streets to pre-war conditions, at present I can scarcely concur.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix B.

6. It may well be that the streets have been damaged by the equipment of the armed services and contractors, but this situation has arisen in many Canadian municipalities. Moreover, the Canadian Government has agreed to pay for services rendered by the City in lieu of taxes, as has also the British Admiralty with respect to Admiralty property. The Canadian Government does not pay taxes or make payments in lieu of taxes on defence properties in Canadian municipalities. Moreover, since the time when Canadian troops were first stationed in the St. John's area the Canadian Government has paid the municipal share of customs taxes on coal imported into the area for the use of Canadian forces. It is understood that last year this amounted to about \$14,000 (See my despatches Nos. 353 of November 16,<sup>1</sup> 1943 and 74 of March 4, 1944<sup>1</sup>). It is understood that no taxes of any sort or municipal rates are paid by the United States to the City. It may well be that the United States has done a good deal to maintain the upkeep of certain roads. At the same time, the Canadian Government contributed \$20,000 to the reconstruction of Kings Bridge Road. Under these circumstances it would appear that Canada has assisted the City of St. John's at least as amply as have other governments. If further protests are received from the City it might be desirable to remind them of this assistance.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

880.

DND HQ 004-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 320

St. John's, July 11, 1944

Sir,

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your communication No. 196 of July 5th concerning damage to the streets of St. John's by heavy equipment of the armed Services, and note, with much satisfaction, that it is not desired that the reservation with respect to defence should be unduly stressed.

2. There is no question, of course, of leaving the Defence Services entirely at the mercy of municipal regulations with respect to the use of the streets, and no desire whatever on the part of the municipal authorities to limit the use of the streets in case of emergency, or indeed, for unavoidable heavy traffic arising out of the fact that St. John's is an important naval and military base. Under the Base Agreement of April, 1941, the United States has unrestricted use of the streets with respect to the amount and type of

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



traffic, and Sir Wilfrid Woods has been good enough to say that he did not wish to impose on the Canadian Forces the restrictions the Government was precluded by the Agreement from applying to the United States Forces. What the Municipal Authorities and the Government desire is that both we and the United States should agree to take all reasonable precautions to ensure that the roads are not unnecessarily damaged by heavy traffic.

3. I have completed discussions with the various Service Chiefs and the two Contractors, and all are willing to co-operate in safeguarding the streets from further damage. I have assured Sir Wilfrid Woods, the Commissioner for Public Utilities, whose Department has jurisdiction over the highway system, that the Canadian Government would be pleased to co-operate in limiting the use of the city streets by tractors and other heavy equipment to the minimum essential for purposes of defence, and have suggested that the next step might be that we arrange for a meeting of the respective technical Services of his Department, and perhaps the City Engineer's office, with our armed Services, the Canadian Contractors and Technical Services of any other authority using the city streets for heavy traffic. I have talked the matter over with Mr. Hopper, the United States Consul-General, and more recently with Mr. Reid, the Acting Consul-General, and they have taken a similar position.

4. There have been two further developments of interest since I last reported on this matter. Mr. Grant Jack, an outstanding roads engineer from Ontario, has arrived to accept the position of city engineer, and is already busily at work examining the problem. The City Council, in response to strong public pressure, has further discussed the question, and has gone to the length of forwarding a letter to the Attorney-General advising him of the seriousness of the situation, and of the Council's intention to issue summonses to drivers of vehicles who fail to adhere to the regulations laid down.

5. While we have not done nearly as much as the United States has done to build roads in Newfoundland that are used by the Newfoundland people, the United States had done far less to damage the streets than we have. They have built a large modern dock costing approximately \$1,000,000 at the eastern end of the harbour adjacent to Fort Pepperrell, their base here. Consequently, whereas our heavy tractors are using the main streets in the commercial part of the city where the old docks are, the United States heavy traffic hardly touches the city streets at all and goes almost directly to Fort Pepperrell.

6. I would not, at this stage, wish to do more than to mention the possibility of making a grant to enable the local authorities to re-build the streets to the condition in which they were when we moved into the country. It is much too big and involved a question to be taken up at the moment, although my view is that it would only be fair for us to do this eventually. The fact that our Armed Services have damaged highways in our own country, and that the Canadian Government does not pay taxes or make payments in lieu of taxes on defence properties in Canadian municipalities, does not, as far

as I can see, have any bearing on the problem at all. In our own country we can do what we like. An entirely different situation arises when we are dealing, as in this case, with another country. If we wish to gain the goodwill of the population here, help in rebuilding the city streets that have disintegrated under the traffic we have put upon them would be one of the things that should eventually be carefully considered.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

881.

DND HQS 7410-3

*Décret du Conseil*

*Order in Council*

P.C. 4849

July 16, 1945

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated July 7th, 1945, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, representing as follows:

- (a) The Canadian Government has, during the present war, become the owner of real property in St. John's, Newfoundland, for use by Canadian military and air forces.
- (b) The City of St. John's has asserted that the Canadian Government is liable for taxes on such property, and this claim has been rejected. The City of St. John's has also made a claim against the Canadian Government for damage to St. John's streets caused by Canadian service vehicles.
- (c) Minute of Council P.C. 8911 of November 23, 1943, reads in part as follows,

It is expedient in the special circumstances of this case, and in order to deal with the claim of the City of St. John's, but without in any way admitting any liability on the part of the Canadian Government, to provide for a voluntary contribution of \$10,000, out of War Appropriation, to the appropriate authorities in Newfoundland for street repairs in the City of St. John's, in lieu of taxes and in view of the damage caused by Canadian military vehicles.

The Minister, therefore, recommends that the payment of the sum of \$10,000 by the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland to the appropriate authorities in Newfoundland be approved and authorized to be charged to the War Appropriation for the fiscal year 1943-44.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

- (d) The Canadian Government accordingly offered to pay to the City of St. John's a voluntary contribution of \$10,000 in lieu of taxes and in view of the damage caused by Canadian military vehicles.
- (e) This offer was rejected but the following counter-proposal was made by the Municipal Council of St. John's:

Under our local Municipal Laws, all buildings are liable to taxation at the rate of sixteen per cent. on the appraised value. The Council,

however, directs me to say that it is prepared to grant the Government of the Dominion of Canada the same privileges as are being extended to the British Admiralty, and to charge a rate of five per cent. on the appraised rental value of buildings owned by your Government within the City Limits.

The Council wishes me to add that the foregoing offer is made without prejudice to any other claims which the City may have against your Government.

The phrase "other claims" refers in particular to claims arising out of damage to streets by Canadian service vehicles.

- (f) On the basis of 5% of annual rental value, the amount payable annually in respect of Canadian Army property owned by the Canadian Government is \$3,835.45 and the amount payable annually in respect of Royal Canadian Air Force property owned by the Canadian Government is \$1,522.50. Some of these properties have been owned since 1941, others since 1942, 1943 or 1944. The total amount payable to the end of 1944 in respect of the Army property would be \$9,445.98 and in respect of the Royal Canadian Air Force property \$1,813.71.
- (g) It is expedient, in the interests of good relations with the City of St. John's, to reach a settlement on the basis of the counter-proposal mentioned in paragraph (e) above, provided that the legal position of the Canadian Government is preserved, i.e. that payment is accompanied by a reservation of legal liability to pay taxes on real property owned by the Canadian Government.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, concurred in by the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of National Defence for Air, advise,

1. That Minute of Council P.C. 8911 of November 23, 1943, be hereby revoked;
2. That the policy of the Canadian Government shall be to pay to the City of St. John's annually a sum equal to 5% of the rental value of real property owned by the Canadian Government, provided that the rental value shall be a matter for annual agreement between the interested departments of the Canadian Government and the City of St. John's, provided that each such payment shall be accompanied by reservation in respect of liability on the part of the Canadian Government to pay any taxes on such property, and provided that the annual payments are accepted by the City of St. John's in full settlement of its claim for taxes on such property;
3. That authority be granted to the Department of National Defence and the Department of National Defence for Air to pay to the City of St. John's the sums of \$9,445.98 and \$1,813.71 respectively in full settlement of the City's tax claims against army and air force property owned by the Canadian Government up to the end of 1944, to be charged to the War Appropriation for the fiscal year 1945-46;
4. That the payments authorized in the immediately preceding paragraph shall be made through the Department of External Affairs and the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland and that payments for 1945 and future years may be made direct to the City of St. John's provided that the rules laid down in paragraph 2 hereof are observed.

H. W. LOTHROP

Associate Clerk of the Privy Council

SECTION C  
LE COMMANDEMENT  
COMMAND

882.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 499

[St. John's,] July 29, 1940

Owing presence Canadian forces in Newfoundland it is desirable to legislate as to their position as visiting forces. We propose to adapt the English Visiting Forces Act 1933 in same way as was done in Canada under their Chapter 21 of 1932-33. Is this agreeable to you?

883.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 766

[London,] September 24, 1940

Your telegram 29th. July No. 499. We think best course would be for Newfoundland to pass Legalization [Legislation?] on lines of Canadian Act, Chapter 21 of 1930-1933, but limited to visiting Forces from Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa and Eire.<sup>1</sup> It is considered that if legalization [legislation?] were to extend to visiting forces from the United Kingdom there would be a possibility (though without exhaustive examination of legislation which would take a considerable time, it cannot be said that this is a certainty) that provisions of Newfoundland legislation might be held to be invalid on the grounds of repugnancy to Army and Air Force Act. In the circumstances it would seem best to leave position of any United Kingdom Force which might be present in Newfoundland to continue to be governed as at present by Army and Air Force Act.

884.

NPA S-4-1-1

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense*  
*à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence*  
*to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J.69(a)-1940

[St. John's] November 19, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

Under Section 5(4) of the Visiting Forces Act, 1940 it is provided that if Forces are acting in combination any Officer of the visiting Force

<sup>1</sup> Terre-Neuve adopta la loi sur les forces du Commonwealth britannique le 15 octobre 1940.

<sup>1</sup> Newfoundland adopted the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act on October 15, 1940.



appointed by His Majesty or in accordance with Regulations made by or by authority of His Majesty, to command the combined Force, shall have all the necessary powers. By sub-section (5) Forces shall be deemed to be acting in combination if they are declared to be so acting, by Order of the Governor in Commission.

2. The Canadian Government have recently appointed Brigadier-General Philip Earnshaw, D.S.O., M.C., as Officer Commanding the Canadian Forces in Newfoundland. It is clear that there should be one Commander of the Newfoundland and Canadian Forces and that this Officer should be able to plan in collaboration with the Officer commanding the Newfoundland Militia for the defence of this country.

3. I therefore propose that the Governor in Commission should declare that these two Forces are acting in combination and that Brigadier-General Earnshaw should be appointed to command the combined Force.

. . .

L. E. EMERSON

885.

1156-C-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 67

Ottawa, November 29, 1940

Your confidential telegram No. 63 of November 22.<sup>1</sup>

Canadian Military Authorities concur in appointment of Brigadier P. Earnshaw, to command combined Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces in Newfoundland.

886.

NPA GN 1/3 320/35

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

No. 11

Ottawa, December 16, 1940

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch of October 25<sup>2</sup> regarding the Newfoundland Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act.

Enclosed are three copies of Order in Council No. 3822 of August 13, 1940,<sup>1</sup> passed under the Canadian statute, relating to the Canadian military and air forces in Newfoundland.

It would appear to be desirable that the Governor in Commission and the Commissioner for Defence of Newfoundland respectively make certain orders under the Newfoundland statute regarding the Canadian military and air forces in Newfoundland. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

I should be grateful if you would consider these requests and suggestions and if you would send me copies of any orders that may be made.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

887.

DND HQS 7410-7

*Mémorandum du chef adjoint d'état-major général  
au chef d'état-major général*

*Memorandum from Assistant Chief of the General Staff  
to Chief of the General Staff*

Ottawa, April 1, 1941

1. To note notes of interesting conversations held by G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command and O.C. "W" Force with Colonel Welty, Commanding Newfoundland Base Command, U.S. Army, from which you will see that our friends appear to be desirous of inching a bit into that part of Newfoundland for which Canada has undertaken responsibility for defence, in time of peace, at any rate.

2. You will note also that G.O.C.-in-C. would appreciate an opportunity of discussing the whole situation with you—a discussion which I suggest should be productive of much good.

3. As I see this matter, as long as the United States are at peace and so long as the black contingency envisaged by the Blue Basic Plan<sup>1</sup> does not arise, the United States should restrict themselves to the defence of their leased areas. I think our attitude should be that if they are dissatisfied with the defence measures we are taking for that part of Newfoundland for which we have assumed responsibility, their recourse should be to request us to increase the adequacy of such measures.\*

MAURICE POPE  
Brigadier

<sup>1</sup> Probablement le premier plan conjoint canado-américain de 1940.

<sup>1</sup> Probably Joint Canadian United States Plan No. 1—1940.

\* Notes telles que dans l'original:

\* Notes as in original:

(1) Please inform G.O.C.-in-C. that subsequent to next meeting of J.D.B. probably last week in April I shall plan to visit him—also to proceed to Newfoundland. Command, defence arrangements Nfland can then be discussed.

(2) It is most desirable to discourage (tactfully) large U.S. Army commitments in Nfland. Only if the "impossible" happened is there any argument for a U.S. Div. being despatched—and there would be weeks, and months, before any German attempt at landing could be made, even after that. H.D.G.C.[RERAR].

The issue of the "Joint 1941 Plan"\*\*\* should clear up most of the points raised by G.O.C.-in-C. [initials illegible] 2-4-41

\*\*\*Probablement ABC-22. Voir le document 894.

\*\*\*Presumably ABC-22. See Document 894.

888.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D2)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major**Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 2, 1941

. . .

## 6. Canadian and U.S.A. Forces in Newfoundland

C.A.S. raised the questions of (a) Command and (b) co-ordination of communication arrangements, as between Canadian and U.S. Forces in Newfoundland.

- (a) The particular question raised was whether the proper channel of communication between the Officer Commanding the U.S. Military Forces in St. John's Newfoundland and A.O.C. Eastern Air Command was through the Commander Canadian Military Force "W" and the G.O.C. in C. Atlantic Coast, or direct with A.O.C., E.A.C. The Committee was unable to give a ruling in this matter, the question of command not having yet been completely settled.
- (b) C.A.S. stated that R.C.A.F. W/T frequencies and call-signs had been given to the U.S. Army Air Corps at Washington, and raised the question as to whether the War W/T Call-signs and frequencies of Digby Aircraft operating in Newfoundland should be furnished to the Commander of the U.S. Military Forces at St. John's. The Committee was of the opinion that such action was both necessary and desirable.
- (c) The larger question of exchange of Codes and Cyphers with U.S.A. Forces was also raised. As all Codes and Cyphers in use by the Canadian Forces are the same as those used by U.K. Forces it was clear they could not be divulged to the U.S.A. without U.K. permission. The Secretary was therefore instructed to draft a submission to the Ministers recommending that this matter should be brought to the attention of the United Kingdom Authorities with a view to obtaining a ruling.

. . .

889.

DND HQS 7410-7

*Le commandant des troupes canadiennes à Terre-Neuve  
à l'officier général commandant en chef, région de l'Atlantique*

*Commander, Canadian Troops in Newfoundland,  
to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Atlantic Command*

SECRET

St. John's, May 7, 1941

## APPRECIATION RE DEFENCE OF AIRPORT

With reference to cable 0 540, dated 19 April, 1941,<sup>1</sup> I beg to submit herewith, two copies of my appreciation.<sup>2</sup> In submitting this, I wish to make the following remarks:

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

2. At my request, the O.C., U.S. Nfld. Base Command, Colonel M.D. Welty, obtained permission from the U.S. First Army to accept the Canadian "Scales and Forms of Attack". This agreement was necessary if we were to approach the problem in "collaboration".

3. Further, Colonel Welty agreed on a joint identical list of "assumptions" concerning our joint instructions. These of course may not be according to your views, but they seemed to us, after a consideration of local factors, to be reasonable. A change of assumptions might change the plan.

4. The scale of attack is a considerable one, particularly if applied at several places simultaneously, as it may well be. The Airport set up, as it will be when there are U.S. Air Corps, ultimate scale ferry service, two million gallons of gasoline and a vital W/T service in full operation, is a prize for the enemy, which justifies the complete sacrifice of a considerable force of men and equipment.

5. Colonel Welty and I are unanimous, that considering all local factors, there must be one Commander in Command for the defence of Newfoundland, and that any compromise on that would be unwise. The island is large, the communications most inadequate. A joint Services Committee, plus Americans added, with the senior officer authorized in case of emergency to assume command, is suggested as the most workable arrangement. This would not interfere with normal service commands, would co-ordinate efforts and assure full co-operation and weight of a joint effort when an emergency occurs. It is essential that this question should be settled at once, while the defence of Newfoundland is being built up.

6. I would like these remarks to go forward attached to the appreciation, as they are explanatory and tied in to it, though not a part of it.

7. At the formal request of the Commissioner for Defence of the Newfoundland Commission of Government, I have given him a copy of this appreciation.

P. EARNSHAW,  
Brigadier

890.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence  
to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J. and D. 23-1941  
CONFIDENTIAL

[St. John's,] May 15, 1941

I submit herewith a Bill<sup>1</sup> to amend the Militia Act so as to provide for a declaration by the Governor in Commission that the Newfoundland Militia shall be on active service.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



2. The Army Act, passed at a time when active service meant service outside of Britain does not contain a provision for a force being on active service whilst at home.

3. The Canadian forces serving in Newfoundland are on active service under a Proclamation made under the Militia Act of Canada. The Officer Commanding the Combined Canadian and Newfoundland forces has represented that the present situation is such as to justify a declaration that the Newfoundland Militia should be on active service, and further that the two forces serving in combination should be placed in the same position. I agree with this representation and recommend accordingly that the necessary steps be taken.

4. In view of the fact that Act is in the nature of a war measure it should not be published for comment and I recommend that it be enacted through all three stages and that the order under it be made and given effect immediately.

5. I also submit a draft order<sup>1</sup> under the Bill which I recommend should be made as soon as the Bill is passed, declaring that the Newfoundland Militia shall be deemed to be on active service.

L. E. EMERSON

891.

1156-C-39

*Le secrétaire du Comité de guerre du Cabinet  
au président, section canadienne de la CPCAD*

*Secretary Cabinet War Committee  
to Chairman, Canadian Section of PJBD*

Ottawa, May 27, 1941

Dear Colonel Biggar,

At the Prime Minister's request, I am writing in answer to your letter of May the 26th,<sup>2</sup> with regard to the disposition of Canadian forces in Canada and Newfoundland in the circumstances contemplated in Plan 1 of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

The subject was discussed at today's meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, and in reply to the enquiries contained in the last paragraph of your letter, I have been directed to inform you that, on the part of the Canadian government,

- (1) there would be objection to the exercise by the United States of unlimited authority over the disposition and employment of Canadian forces, in the circumstances contemplated;  
there would be no objection, however, to the exercise by the United States of limited authority, that is an authority subject to the determination of war policy by the governments of the two countries;

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

- (2) there would be objection to agreeing to a formula capable of the two interpretations to which your letter refers.

Yours very truly,

[A. D. P. HEENEY]

892.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D2)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] June 25, 1941

. . .

### 3. Joint-Service Sub-Committee for Newfoundland

The Committee decided that the Heads of the three Services stationed in Newfoundland should be formed into a Sub-Committee to be known as the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, under the chairmanship of the Senior Officer, with the following Terms of Reference: "To secure the fullest measure of co-operation between the Services and to co-ordinate all details respecting the defence of Newfoundland." The Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, will report direct to the Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast.

. . .

893.

NPA S-4-2-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 1181

[London,] July 4, 1941

SECRET. Addressed to High Commissioner, Ottawa, No. 1181. Repeated to Governor of Newfoundland No. 599.

Admiralty have had under consideration the general question of naval control and command in the Western Atlantic.

#### 2. Present situation is as follows:

- (a) Atlantic west of 30 degrees west and north 40 degrees north lies within American and West Indies Station.
- (b) The eastern Seaboard of Canada together with base at Halifax is administered and local forces commanded by Commanding Officer of Atlantic Coast, under C.N.S. Ottawa.

- (c) The convoy escorts working from Halifax have since 1939 been operated by a Royal Navy Flag Officer Rear-Admiral, Third Battle Squadron, West Indies, C. in C. AW1.
- (d) The base at St. John's together with local force and Newfoundland escort force are commanded by [an] Officer of the Royal Canadian Navy Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Force.

3. For prosecution of the Battle of the Atlantic (now ocean wide) Admiralty consider there should be a single co-ordinating authority for the operation of all convoys and escort forces over the whole transatlantic route and that this authority should continue to be the C. in C. Western Approaches.

4. To achieve this and to remove anomalous position of Rear-Admiral, Third Battle Squadron, following arrangements are proposed:

- (a) The Western Approaches Station to be extended to Canadian Seaboard, its southern limit to west of North Atlantic Station to run along latitude 40 degrees north until 67 degrees west and thence northwards to join Coast at United States Canadian Frontier.
- (b) C. in C. Western Approaches to have overriding operational control for all convoys and escorts in his extended command.
- (c) Subject to (b) above all bases in Canada and British bases in Newfoundland to be administered by Royal Canadian Navy who would also be in operational control of convoy escorts and local forces working from coast bases.

5. It is proposed that a Flag Officer be appointed in command of Western Atlantic Coast for which he would be responsible to C.N.S. Ottawa, under instructions to be laid down later. It is also proposed to abolish post of Rear-Admiral, Third Battle Squadron. Under this scheme Flag Officer or Commodore Commanding Eastern Atlantic Coast Force would be administrative authority for Halifax and in operational local forces based on that post and also of convoy escorts under general direction of C. in C. Western Approaches. He would also have under his orders Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Forces. As controlling authority for Western Atlantic convoy routes he would thus have considerable responsibilities with strong naval forces of all types under his command and should therefore be a specially selected and experienced officer.

6. In view of size of forces involved and vital importance to this country of safety of incoming convoys it is proposed that Flag Officer should be lent to Royal Canadian Navy from Royal Navy. It is suggested that present Commanding Officer of Atlantic Coast might be appointed as Chief of the Staff to Flag Officer to preserve continuity of local administration and defence.

7. Please put proposals to Canadian Government immediately and invite their acceptance. If Canadian Government agrees generally we suggest that details be worked out between Atlantic and Chief of Naval Staff, Ottawa, direct and we would submit for Canadian Government's approval name of an officer for appointment to post of Flag Officer Western Atlantic Coast and Newfoundland.

894.

DND HQS 5199-W-1-B

*Les militaires, CPCAD, aux chefs d'état-major du Canada  
et des États-Unis*

*Service Members, PJBD, to Chiefs of Staff of Canada and  
United States*

J.B. No. 325 (SERIAL 717)

Montreal, July 30, 1941

MOST SECRET

There is submitted herewith a copy of Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (short title ABC-22)<sup>1</sup> prepared by the Service members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

S. D. EMBICK,  
Major-General, U.S. Army

F. L. HOUGHTON,  
Captain, R.C.N.

H. W. HILL,  
Captain, U.S. Navy

MAURICE POPE,  
Brigadier

FORREST SHERMAN,  
Commander, U.S. Navy

A. A. L. CUFFE,  
Air Commodore, R.C.A.F.

CLAYTON BISSELL,  
Lieut.-Colonel, U.S. Army

[PIÈCE JOINTE / ENCLOSURE]

*Plan défensif de base canado-américain n° 2  
(titre abrégé ABC-22)<sup>2</sup>*

*Joint Canadian-United States Basic  
Defence Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22)<sup>2</sup>*

J.B. No. 325 (SERIAL 717)

[Montreal,] July 28, 1941

MOST SECRET

## SECTION I

## PURPOSE OF THIS PLAN

1. There has been submitted to the Government of the United States and to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom a report of Staff Conversations held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941. The United Kingdom Government has referred this report to the Canadian Government for their concurrence. The report, which bears the

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 100. La négociation du plan ABC-22, au cours de laquelle le Canada revendiqua avec succès le principe de la coopération, est documentée au volume 8, chapitre I, partie 4.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 100. Negotiation of ABC-22, in which Canada successfully asserted the principle of co-operation, is documented in Volume 8, Chapter I, Part. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Le texte complet se trouve au volume 8, document 160.

<sup>2</sup> For complete text, see Volume 8, Document 160.



short title "ABC-1", includes a United States-British Commonwealth Joint Basic War Plan.

2. ABC-1 assumes that joint agreements between Canada and the United States for common action in war under the concepts of ABC-1 will conform generally to the agreements reached in the United States-British Staff Conversations. This plan is intended to supplement those agreements, and to provide for the most effective use of Canadian and United States Forces for the purposes listed in paragraph 3, should the United States and the British Commonwealth be associated in a war against Germany and her allies.

3. Under such circumstances, co-operative action by Canadian and United States Forces will be required primarily for purposes connected with:

- (a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas;
- (b) the protection of sea communications within the coastal zones;
- (c) the defence of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland, (which includes Labrador) and the northern portion of the United States.

4. The coastal zones are the whole area of the navigable waters adjacent to the seacoast and extend seaward to include the coastwise sea lanes and focal points of shipping approaching and departing from the coast.

## SECTION II

### SPECIAL PROVISIONS

5. Except as otherwise provided herein, the assumptions, concept and other provisions of ABC-1, where applicable, shall form a part of this plan.

6. Co-ordination of the military effort of the United States and Canada shall be effected by mutual co-operation, and by assigning to the forces of each nation tasks for whose execution such forces shall be primarily responsible. These tasks may be assigned in Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plans, or by agreement between the Chiefs of Staff concerned, the United States Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such.

7. In effecting mutual co-operation, as provided in paragraph 6, the forces of one nation will, to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of the other nation.

8. Each nation shall retain the strategic direction and command of its own forces, except as hereinafter provided.

9. A unified command may, if circumstances so require, be established over United States and Canadian forces operating in any area or areas, or for particular United States and Canadian forces operating for a common purpose:

- (a) when agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or
- (b) when the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces concerned agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity

of command, and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command. All such mutual agreements shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate establishment of unity of command in cases of emergency.

10. Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to co-ordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such co-ordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operations. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective co-ordination. In no case shall a commander of a unified force move naval forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Oceans, nor move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land area, without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned.

11. The assignment of an area to one nation shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other nation from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

12. For all matters requiring common action, each nation will require its commanders in all echelons and services, on their own initiative, to establish liaison with and co-operate with appropriate commanders of the other nation. The principal commanders of Canadian and United States forces who will co-operate under this plan are as follows:

## CANADA

## UNITED STATES

Commodore Commanding New-  
foundland Force (RCN)

Commander in Chief, United States  
Atlantic Fleet (USN)

Commanding Officer,  
Atlantic Coast (RCN)

Task Force Commanders, United  
States Atlantic Fleet (USN)

Air Officer Commanding,  
Eastern Air Command (RCAF)

Commander North Atlantic Naval  
Coastal Frontier (USN)

General Officer Commanding in  
Chief, Atlantic Command (CA)

Commanding General Northeast De-  
fense Command (USA)

Air Officer Commanding Eastern  
Air Command (RCAF)

Commanding General, GHQ

Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast  
(RCN)

Commander in Chief, United States  
Pacific Fleet (USN)

Air Officer Commanding Western  
Air Command (RCAF)

Task Force Commanders, United  
States Pacific Fleet (USN)

Commander Pacific Northern Naval  
Coastal Frontier (USN)

General Officer Commanding in  
Chief Pacific Command (CA)

Commanding General Western De-  
fense Command (USA)

Air Officer Commanding Western  
Air Command (RCAF)

13. Under the provisions of ABC-1 the United States will assume responsibility for the control and protection of Associated overseas shipping in the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas. Pending the establishment of effective United States agencies the British Naval Control Service Organization will, in accordance with ABC-1, continue in the exercise of its present functions.

14. Within the coastal zones of Canada and the United States, responsibility for routing and protection of shipping is allocated as follows:

- (a) Canada will be responsible for routing and protecting coastwise and independently routed overseas shipping within coastal zones of Canada and Newfoundland.
- (b) The United States will be responsible for routing and protecting Associated overseas shipping except as provided in sub-paragraph (a).
- (c) The routing of shipping passing from the coastal zone of one nation into the coastal zone of the other, will be effected in the Atlantic by agreement between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast, and the United States Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier; and in the Pacific by agreement between the Canadian Commanding Officer, Pacific Coast, and the United States Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.

15. Each nation will provide within its own territory certain base facilities for use by the other nation. These facilities are listed in Annexe II.<sup>1</sup> So far as practicable, each nation will make available its own bases, harbors, and repair facilities, for use by the forces of the other.

16. To facilitate common decision and action, Canada and the United States will establish in Washington and Ottawa, respectively, officers of all Services who will be charged with the duty of representing their own Chiefs of Staff, *vis-à-vis* the appropriate Chief of Staff of the other nation. They will also arrange to assign liaison officers where needed for effectuating direct co-operation between Commanders of forces in the field.

17. This plan will be placed in effect by the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the United States when so directed by the Canadian and United States Governments.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

## SECTION III

## JOINT TASK OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

18. Protect the sea communications of the United States and the British Commonwealth, and defend the territory of Canada, Newfoundland, and the United States, including Alaska, in order to ensure the ultimate security of Canada and the United States.

## SECTION IV

## TASKS

19. The tasks set forth in this section are those which will be undertaken jointly by the Armed forces of Canada and the United States, should the latter enter the war. These joint tasks are:

*Joint Task One:* Protect associated overseas shipping in the northern portions of the western Atlantic and Pacific areas.

*Joint Task Two:* Defend Newfoundland and protect associated sea communications within the coastal zone.

*Joint Task Three:* Defend eastern Canada and the north-eastern portion of the United States, and protect sea communications within the coastal zones.

...

20. *Joint Task One*

Protect associated overseas shipping in the northern portions of the western Atlantic and Pacific areas.

*Canadian Tasks*

All Services—Support the United States Navy in the execution of this joint task.

*United States Tasks*

Army—Support Associated naval operations.

Navy—Protect overseas shipping by escorting, covering, and patrolling, as may be appropriate, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

21. *Joint Task Two*

Defend Newfoundland and protect associated sea communications within the coastal zone.

*Canadian Tasks*

Army—Defend Newfoundland, in co-operation with other Canadian and United States Services. Co-operate in the defence of the United States bases in Newfoundland.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the coastal zone. Provide the naval defence of St. John's and Botwood. Support the defence of Newfoundland. Co-operate with the Royal Canadian Air Force in denying Hudson Strait to enemy forces. Assist the United States Navy in initial movements of United States forces from the Maritime Provinces to Newfoundland.



Air Force—Defend Newfoundland in co-operation with other Canadian and United States Services. Co-operate in the defence of United States bases in Newfoundland.

#### *United States Tasks*

Army—Defend Newfoundland in co-operation with Canadian and other United States Services. Defend United States bases. Support associated naval operations.

Navy—Support the defence of Newfoundland and its coastal zone. Patrol Placentia Bay. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of United States forces in Newfoundland.

#### 22. *Joint Task Three*

Defend Eastern Canada and the Northeastern portion of the United States, and protect sea communications within the coastal zone.

#### *Canadian Tasks*

Army—Defend the Maritime Provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the Canadian Coastal Zone. Provide the naval defence of the harbours of Gaspé, Halifax, Sydney, Shelburne, and Saint John, N.B.

Air Force—Defend Eastern Canada. Support Associated naval operations.

#### *United States Tasks*

Army—Defend the northeastern portion of the United States. Support Associated naval operations. Support the defence of the Maritime provinces and the Gaspé Peninsula.

Navy—Protect sea communications in the United States Coastal Zone. Support the defence of the northeastern portion of the United States. Support the defence of Eastern Canada and its Coastal zone.

. . .

### SECTION V

25. The forces estimated to be available for the operations required by this plan are indicated in Annexe I<sup>1</sup>—*Military Forces*.

### SECTION VI

26. The facilities to be provided by the two governments concerned for the joint execution of this plan are indicated in Annex II<sup>1</sup>—*Facilities to be Provided by Canada and the United States*.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

895.

DND NSS 1048-48-31

*L'Amirauté au commandant, région de l'Atlantique*  
*Admiralty to Officer Commanding, Atlantic Command*

TELEGRAM 1524B/29

[London,] July 31, 1941

Consequent on U.S. Government disposition it has been decided 3rd Battle Squadron should be gradually withdrawn from North Atlantic Convoy Escort Force. (ii) As regards action: (A) HMS *Ramillies* will be sailed from Iceland to U.K. to be taken in hand for refit (B) HMS *Royal Sovereign* is to have her refit at Clyde extended as necessary in order to undergo certain alterations and additions which time has precluded during her 3 weeks stay at Clyde. (iii) As soon as one of these ships has completed [refit] HMS *Revenge* will be withdrawn for similar attention. (It is probable she will be relieved temporarily by either HMS *Ramillies* or HMS *Royal Sovereign*). (iv) HMS *Resolution* will return to U.K. on completion of her refit and will recommission ready for her new service. . .

896.

2408-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

St. John's, August 15, 1941

Sir,

For some time the command of the Newfoundland Militia has rested in an officer who has also performed the duties of Director of Recruiting and other services in connection with the Department of Defence. This arrangement is unsuitable under existing circumstances and the Officer Commanding the Combined Canadian and Newfoundland Forces has recommended that the Commanding Officer of the Newfoundland Militia should be in a position to give full time to his military duties.

The present Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Rendell, C.B.E., is required by the Government to assume the office of Secretary for Defence and he is of opinion that none of his officers has at present had sufficient experience to take command. After discussing the matter with Brigadier Earnshaw it has been decided that I should request you to be good enough to second an officer from the Canadian Army who is capable of taking this post.

3. The force consists of roughly three hundred officers and men and it is thought that an officer of the rank of major will satisfy the requirements. The Government of Newfoundland will provide the officer with first class fare and subsistence to St. John's, Newfoundland and return. Such officer will, of course, receive pay and allowances from the Newfoundland Government at the rate current for his rank and seniority in the Canadian Army from

the date of his departure for St. John's until his return. It is further suggested that the appointment be for one year at the end of which period the position will be reviewed in the light of experience with the object of appointing a Newfoundland officer to take command of the force if a suitable appointee is found available.

4. I should be grateful if you would give your sympathetic consideration to this proposal and let me hear from you if possible by telegram at your convenience.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

897.

DND NSS 1048-48-31

*L'Amirauté au commandant de l'aviation, service de défense côtière*

*Admiralty to Air Officer Commanding, Coastal Command*

TELEGRAM 1145A/13

[London,] September 14, 1941

IMPORTANT. Commencing with HX 150 leaving Halifax on 16th September the U.S.A. will assume responsibility of trans Atlantic trade convoy on north Atlantic route when to westward of a line from North Pole down meridian 010° West to latitude 065° North thence to position 053° North 026° West and thence down meridian 026° West. (ii) U.S.A. or Canadian force will provide anti-submarine Ocean escort group for trade convoys to and from western Atlantic ports and meeting point south of Iceland between longitudes 030° and 026° West. Royal Navy escort group will provide escort to the eastward of meeting point. (iii) U.S.A. escort groups will escort HX convoys and Canadian group augmented as necessary by Royal Naval escort ships will escort SC convoys. Mixed U.S. and British escort groups will be avoided. (iv) This information is only to be given to those officers and men who necessarily require it in course of their duty and they are to be warned that it is not to be divulged. (v) The communication arrangements are given in Admiralty message 1150A/13.<sup>1</sup>

898.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 9, 1941

CANADA-U.S. FORCES IN WESTERN ATLANTIC—  
UNIFIED COMMAND

22. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR read a communication which had been received by the Chief of the Air Staff from the U.S. Chief

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

of Naval Operations, inviting the R.C.A.F. to place such Canadian air forces as were assigned to ocean escort duty in the Western Atlantic area, under the command, for this purpose, of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

(See letter of October 2nd, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, to the Chief of the Air Staff, Ottawa.)

23. MR. POWER said that this request was based upon a provision of the Joint Canada-U.S. Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (ABC 22) which provided for the establishment of a unified command for common purposes over U.S. and Canadian forces, if circumstances so required, and when agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned.

The Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff had already agreed to have Canadian naval forces accept U.S. command for ocean escort purposes in the Western Atlantic. The Air Staff, however, took the view that the request should not be granted. "Co-operation" had provided a satisfactory basis for the co-ordination and joint action of Canadian air forces with Canadian and British Naval forces, since the beginning of the war. There was no reason to give to a foreign neutral power more than had been given to the Canadian and British Navies. It was proposed to reply in this sense to the U.S. Navy Department.

24. THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS suggested that it would be inconsistent to have the Air Force base a negative reply upon the political ground that the United States was a foreign state not participating in the war, when the Navy had already accepted U.S. command. If the two Services were to take different stands, it would be preferable to have the refusal of the Air Force based upon some practical operational distinction.

25. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES observed that there had been no difficulty in so far as the Navy was concerned, in accepting the U.S. request. Unified command in operations for the protection of shipping was desirable.

26. THE SECRETARY drew attention to the fact that, while the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations based his request upon a provision of the Joint Canadian—U.S. Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (ABC No. 22) this plan had not yet received the approval of the Canadian government.

It was understood, however, that approval would be recommended to the Committee at an early date.

27. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR agreed that, if the U.S. Navy's request were to be refused in respect of the Air Force, the refusal should be based, not upon constitutional grounds, but upon some practical operational reason inapplicable to joint operations by naval forces.

28. After further discussion, the Committee agreed to defer decision pending further consideration of the question by the Minister of National Defence for Air, with Officers of his department.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



899.

2408-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 83

Ottawa, October 11, 1941

Reference my telegram September 6 No. 781.<sup>1</sup> I have now been informed that Major A. T. Howell, M.C., Royal Montreal Regiment, has been selected for the Command of the Newfoundland Militia under the conditions outlined in paragraph 3 of your letter of August 15, 1941. Major Howell will be despatched to Newfoundland as soon as the necessary arrangements for transportation are made.

900.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 15, 1941

. . .

## JOINT CANADIAN-UNITED STATES BASIC DEFENCE PLAN NO. 2

17. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR, as ASSOCIATE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, submitted a recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that approval be given to "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2" (short title—ABC-22). The Plan had already received the approval of the President of the United States and it was desired to have early Canadian approval, so that operations might be set on foot to bring the Plan into effect at short notice.

While there were certain differences in detail between the new Plan and recommendations already considered by the Committee in reports from the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, these did not involve matters of importance, and the Chiefs of Staff reported that the Plan involved "no obligation upon the government of Canada not already accepted pursuant to the recommendations made in the First Report of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, or by agreement with the United Kingdom government in the conduct of present war operations."

(See amended memorandum of September 30th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Chiefs of Staff, to the Ministers.)

18. The Committee agreed that approval be given, on the part of the government of Canada, to Joint Canadian-United States Basic Plan No. 2 (ABC-22).

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

901.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 925

[London,] November 3, 1941

SECRET. My telegram 4th July No. 599. Admiralty now propose to leave existing arrangements for Command in Western Atlantic as they are for the present. Please consider telegram under reference and connected messages as cancelled.

902.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, November 6, 1941

## CANADIAN-U.S. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC—COMMAND

1. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR reported that the Chief of the Air Staff had received a reply from the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Stark had welcomed the assurance that the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet could count on the fullest co-operation and support of the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, R.C.A.F., and had accepted co-operation between the two forces as an alternative to the unified command which had been proposed.

(See letter of October 27th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, to the Chief of the Air Staff, Ottawa.)

903.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, November 10-11, 1941

## UNITED STATES NAVY

## 1. Exchange of Information

The exchange of information with the Canadian Navy is proceeding in a highly satisfactory manner. Normal channels of communication are supplemented by direct use of telephone and landwire, day and night, between Naval Service Headquarters Ottawa and the United States Navy Department in order to expedite and co-ordinate the co-operative effort of the two navies in active operations in the North Atlantic. Each service is being kept fully informed of the operations of the other. The relationships which have been

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

established between the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and his Task Force Commanders and the responsible senior officers of the Canadian Navy are most gratifying.

It has become evident that some improvement is needed in the arrangements for exchange of operating information and for obtaining the co-operation of Canadian air units based on Newfoundland in support of naval operations in the Newfoundland area. The appropriate Task Force Commander has been instructed by the Commander-in-Chief to make necessary arrangements with the Canadian air commander in Newfoundland. It is believed that the completion of better communication facilities between ships at Argentia and Gander Lake will help in this matter.

. . .

## 7. Joint Defence Plans

Joint Basic Defence Plan No. 2 has been issued to the naval service. Under present circumstances U.S. naval forces in the Atlantic are operating under Navy Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 5.<sup>1</sup> Appropriate instructions concerning their supporting operations have been issued to U.S. Army units concerned.

During the preparation of this plan the British and Canadian naval and air attachés in Washington were consulted and draft copies were given to them for comment. Under the arrangements finally completed, Canadian naval units engaged in ocean escort of shipping in the Western Atlantic Area are operating under the direction of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. Co-ordination of the activities of the United States Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force in protecting shipping is being effected by the method of co-operation.

. . .

904.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 10, 1941

. . .

## U.K.-U.S. BASES AGREEMENT—COMMAND OF JOINT FORCES IN NEWFOUNDLAND

3. THE PRIME MINISTER read a communication from the U.K. High Commissioner, setting out the text of an agreement with the United States with regard to outstanding questions.

<sup>1</sup> Suivant l'attaque japonaise contre la flotte des États-Unis à Pearl Harbour en décembre 1941, l'effort naval des États-Unis fut principalement déployé dans le Pacifique laissant en grande partie la bataille de l'Atlantique aux mains des Britanniques et, de plus en plus, aux Canadiens.

<sup>1</sup> Following the Japanese attack on the United States fleet at Pearl Harbour in December, 1941, the United States naval effort was deployed mainly in the Pacific, leaving the Battle of the Atlantic largely in British and, increasingly, Canadian hands.

The government's attention was directed, particularly, to the effect of the agreement upon the question of command of joint U.S.-Canadian forces in Newfoundland. The special interest of Canada in Newfoundland had been recognized at the time of the bases agreement by the conclusion of a protocol. In order to ensure Canadian command in that area, it was suggested that the matter be taken up by the Prime Minister direct with the President. It was also suggested that the Newfoundland government be considered in any discussions of the question.

4. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR observed that there had already been signs of pressure being exerted in favour of U.S. command. A number of Kittyhawk aircraft, which were to be delivered to the R.C.A.F., had been held by the United States, and their release offered on condition that they be subject to U.S. strategic direction when incorporated in the R.C.A.F. This condition had been refused by the Chief of the Air Staff, and subsequently, the aircraft had been released, unconditionally.

...

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au Premier ministre*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Prime Minister*

1000/35

Ottawa, December 6, 1941

MOST SECRET

My dear Prime Minister,

Discussions have been taking place in the United States between the Joint Staff Mission for the United Kingdom and the United States Chiefs of Staff on outstanding defence questions in respect to the United States leased bases in the Western Atlantic, and I am enclosing herein a copy of the draft Agreement<sup>1</sup> which has been negotiated on this subject. You will note that in Articles 1, 21 and 23 the words "Great Exuma" have been inserted in pencil, and that Article 26 (b) (3) has been erased. These modifications were recently agreed upon after further discussion with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

The Agreement thus revised has now been considered and confirmed by the United Kingdom Government, and it is understood that it will be submitted by the United States Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt for his approval. In forwarding the document to you I have been asked to make the following observations.

Newfoundland was expressly excluded from the scope of these negotiations as presenting a special problem of its own, which would presumably be discussed by the Canadian-United States Permanent Joint Defence Board with

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



representatives of Newfoundland present. It has been agreed by the Board that Newfoundland, as the gateway to Canada, falls within the Canadian sphere of defence, and the special position of Newfoundland in this respect was recognized in the protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement of the 27th March, 1941.

It is, however, thought likely that the present Agreement will be regarded to a considerable extent as a precedent for Newfoundland although, until the Newfoundland Government have seen the draft Agreement, which is being forwarded to them from the United Kingdom by air mail, they would hope that it will not be assumed that they themselves are prepared to look upon it in that light. In this connection particular importance attaches to the question of command in the event of joint operations by British Commonwealth and United States forces, which is dealt with in Articles 20 and 21 of the Agreement. From discussions which they had with you when you were in England, the United Kingdom authorities understand that the Canadian Government are contemplating that if any question of command arose the Commander should be a Canadian officer. They themselves entirely agree with you in thinking that it would be essential to secure this if possible, and this is also the wish of the Newfoundland Government. If the present Agreement were applied to Newfoundland, the position at the moment is that a Canadian Commander would presumably be appointed, since for the present the Canadian troops outnumber the United States troops there. It is, however, open to the United States to increase the number of their troops on the island, and in fact it is understood to be their intention, if necessity were to arise, to raise their forces to the strength of a division. Moreover they have recently appointed a Major-General to command the United States troops in Newfoundland whereas the Canadian Commander is a Brigadier. It seems likely, therefore, that the United States would make every endeavour to ensure that the Commander should be a United States officer if the necessity for joint operations arose.

The United Kingdom Government would accordingly be grateful if appropriate action could be taken to raise with the United States Government the question of arrangements for dealing in Newfoundland with the matter covered as regards the Colonies by the present Agreement, especially this question of command.

I have been asked to add that the Agreement enclosed is also of interest to Canada in that there is at present a Canadian battalion at Jamaica which, under the proposed arrangements, will come under the command of the United States officer.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

905.

1156-C-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 49

Ottawa, December 12, 1941

In view of importance of position occupied by Newfoundland in the defence scheme for this hemisphere, the Canadian authorities propose to appoint Major-General L. F. Page, D.S.O., to be General Officer Commanding Canadian-Newfoundland troops in Newfoundland. Major-General Page is now in command of the 4th Division.

Please communicate this information to the Newfoundland Commission of Government, and say that the Canadian Government hopes that the Newfoundland authorities approve of this selection.

In your approach to the Newfoundland Government, please do not repeat not give the impression that the nomination of General Page is dependent upon Newfoundland approval. It is being referred to the Newfoundland authorities as a matter of courtesy.

906.

1156-C-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 55

St. John's, December 19, 1941

Your telegram No. 54 of December 18th<sup>1</sup> regarding Major-General Page.

I conferred with Governor and also with Commissioner for Defence and handed each of them a copy of first two paragraphs ending with "this selection" of your telegram No. 49, December 12th. After I had given them a short biographical sketch of Major-General Page's career, they both said appointment appeared to be a most suitable one.

Commissioner for Defence asked if I wanted formal approval in writing, to which I replied I did not think this necessary as all I wanted to know was that appointment would be well received by Commission of Government. I have no doubt I can obtain formal approval in writing if you so instruct.

Following paragraph in cypher.

Both Governor and Commissioner for Defence expressed the hope that appointment of so experienced a man as Major-General Page means that Canadian Government is desirous of controlling the command of all army troops in Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

907.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 19, 1941

. . .

## ARMY COMMAND IN NEWFOUNDLAND

9. THE SECRETARY reported that, at a recent meeting of the Chiefs of Staff with the Under-Secretary of State and other officers of External Affairs, the communication from the U.K. High Commissioner, considered at the War Committee's meeting of December 10, was reviewed.

In that communication Mr. MacDonald had suggested that, rather than adopt the principle which had been used to decide the question of command in the other "lease bases" Canada should take steps to see that a Canadian officer was placed in command of all troops in Newfoundland.

(Two letters, U.K. High Commissioner to External Affairs, December 6, 1941.<sup>1</sup>)

10. MR. HEENEY said that it had been pointed out at the meeting with the Chiefs of Staff that the whole question of command in Newfoundland, including the possibility of having to consider a single unified command for air and naval, as well as army formations, would almost certainly be raised at an early meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. As a consequence, it was agreed that it would be preferable to leave the British proposal in abeyance until the Canadian Section of the Board were prepared, in the light of the Board's discussions, to make a recommendation to the government.

11. THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that this particular question was directly related to more general proposals for an allied council, unified command, and various conferences. These questions were now reaching a critical stage and Canada should be prepared to participate along with the United Kingdom and the United States. The Canadian people would expect participation, and careful consideration should be given to the form of Canadian representation.

12. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after some discussion, agreed to defer the question of army command in Newfoundland, pending discussion of the subject by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduites.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

908.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions**PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

New York, December 20, 1941

4. The Board discussed the measures of co-operation now in effect between the forces of the various Services present in Newfoundland. The degree of co-operation now existing was noted with gratification, but the Board considers it necessary to stress the need for decentralization of command sufficiently to permit local operational control and full co-operation between all forces assigned to the local defence of Newfoundland, and also to permit immediate local action on requests from Task Force Commanders of the United States Atlantic Fleet for support of naval operations by the forces present.

5. The Board considered the possibility that in the prosecution of the war, situations can arise suddenly, requiring immediately the further integration for joint defence of the military forces of the United States and Canada, advance preparation therefor, or the movement of military forces or equipment of one country into or through the territory of the other. The Board therefore, approved the following as its TWENTY-SECOND RECOMMENDATION:

That the United States and Canadian Governments now authorize the Commanders named in paragraph 12 of ABC-22, or their duly authorized representatives, to effect by mutual agreement any arrangements they deem necessary for the perfection of preparation for the common defence, including but not limited to, the installations of accessory equipment in the territory of either, the transit of armed forces, equipment or defence materials into or through the territory of either, and the utilization by either nation of the base and military facilities of the other.

909.

JWP Vol. 1 p. 326

*Extrait de The Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>**Excerpt from The Mackenzie King Record<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa, December 29, 1941]

I [Mackenzie King] spoke specifically about the Atlantic coast and the question of command between the Americans and ourselves in the Newfoundland area. Said quite openly to him the problem we faced was that

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie King s'adressait à Churchill au cours d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet à laquelle assistait le premier ministre britannique lors d'une visite à Ottawa.

<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie King was talking to Churchill at a Meeting of the Cabinet War Committee which the British Prime Minister attended during a visit to Ottawa.



while we had been in [the war] during two and a quarter years, things would be so arranged that the U.S. and Britain would settle everything between themselves, and that our services, Chiefs of Staff, etc. would not have any say in what was to be done. . .

910.

1156-C-39

*Mémoire du sous-chef de l'état-major général, du sous-chef  
de l'état-major naval et du directeur du service des plans  
au Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Memorandum from Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Chief  
of the Naval Staff and Director of Plans to Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 31, 1941

## COMMAND RELATIONS—NEWFOUNDLAND

1. At the 131st Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee held 23rd December 1941 (Minute 8)<sup>1</sup> Chiefs of Staff decided that V.C.G.S., D.C.N.S. and A.M.A.S. should meet together and prepare as clear and concise a statement as possible of the present position of command relations between United States and Canadian Forces in Newfoundland.

2. In pursuance of this decision we have duly considered this question and we append hereunder for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff, a statement of the present position and our conclusions in respect thereof.

3. The question of command relations between United States and Canadian Fighting Services in Newfoundland (as well as elsewhere) was duly provided for in ABC-22 which has now, in accordance with directions received from the Canadian Government, been placed in effect by the Chiefs of Staff.<sup>2</sup>

. . .

6. From the foregoing it is clear that ABC-22 emphasizes that the command relations between the Services of the two countries shall be effected by mutual co-operation, with provision for the institution of a unity of command only when the Chiefs of Staff concerned agree that such a step is necessary or that local commanders, in the event of an emergent situation arising, come to a similar conclusion. This last provision is merely a recognition of the common doctrine that the local commander on the spot not only may, but must, take such action in an emergency as he considers that superior authority would order if such superior authority were actually present.

7. In our view the situation in Newfoundland is not such as to require the establishment of a general unity of command, nor [sic] that there have been

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Ici suivaient les paragraphes 8 et 9 du plan ABC-22. Voir le document 894.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Here followed paragraphs 8 and 9 of ABC-22. See Document 894.

any developments that would justify local commanders in Newfoundland in reaching such a decision of their own responsibility. Nothing has occurred since ABC-22 was drafted and approved which has caused the Chiefs of Staff very materially to alter the forms and scales of attack applicable to eastern Canada, including Newfoundland and Labrador. Nor, indeed, have the War and Navy Departments come to a different conclusion, for it is noted from a Joint (U.S.) Army-Navy Newfoundland Defence Plan, a copy of which has been made available to us, that the probable forms of attack assumed therein are of much the same order as those laid down by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. This defence plan clearly states as one of its assumptions that "no major amphibious threat can be reasonably expected".

8. The present command relations between the three Canadian Services and the two U.S. Services are as follows:

(a) NAVY

In ABC-22 the Royal Canadian Navy is given the task of protecting the sea communications in the coastal zone of *Newfoundland*, while U.S. Navy is charged with the task of *supporting* the defence of Newfoundland and its coastal zone. The Royal Canadian Navy is quite capable of discharging the above-mentioned task and no question of a unity of command therefore arises. On the other hand, an important provision of ABC-1 has been in effect for some months, namely, that the strategic direction of the forces operating in the Western Atlantic (less Canadian coastal zones) shall be assumed by the United States. In consequence such elements of the Royal Canadian Navy as have been allocated as convoy escorts come under the strategic direction and operational command of the U.S. Navy, while they remain so allotted. This arrangement is working to the entire satisfaction of both the United States Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy. Consequently no need arises for a further extension of unity of command over the Royal Canadian Navy in the discharge of its task of protecting sea communications in the coastal zones.

(b) ARMY

(i) Under ABC-22 the Canadian Army is charged with the task of defending Newfoundland in co-operation with other Canadian and United States Services and also to co-operate in the defence of United States bases in Newfoundland. The Canadian Army has established garrisons at St. John's, Gander and Botwood. Provision is also being made for the establishment, next spring, of garrisons at Lewisporte and Goose Inlet. In view of the scales of attack that have been laid down, these garrisons are required only to defend their respective locality against sporadic attack and minor raids. In these circumstances, in the event of attack each garrison, except St. John's, will be required to conduct the defence of its particular locality independently. Mutual support is unlikely to be possible. It is improbable that the G.O.C. will

be able to influence the course of these short-lived actions. It is just conceivable however, that on occasion the United States Army might be in a position to lend support, and in these circumstances we are of opinion that supporting forces as might be made available should so act under the command of the local Canadian Army Commander.

(ii) At St. John's the question of command relations is confused and admittedly unsatisfactory. Here the United States Army and Canadian Army have both provided coast artillery, anti-aircraft defence units and infantry garrisons. It is obvious that the defence of this port should be entrusted to one commander and as the port is the main Canadian Naval base in Newfoundland, it would seem logically to follow that its defence should be entrusted to the Canadian Army. This complicated situation has arisen from the fact that when the question of United States leased bases in the western hemisphere was being worked out, it was understood that the United States Navy intended to use St. John's as a naval base. Later it was ascertained that St. John's harbour would be too small for their purposes and therefore the United States acquired another base at Argentia, where the United States Navy is now established. In these circumstances it would be reasonable for the U.S. Army to relinquish its base at St. John's, or at least to reduce it to a lower scale and to concede to Canada primary responsibility for its defence. In any event, it is considered that Canada, having provided three permanent coast artillery batteries at St. John's, should suggest to the United States that it is prepared to construct the remaining counter-bombardment battery required to the north of the harbour entrance and to assume primary responsibility and the command of the combined St. John's garrison. Should the U.S. not be agreeable to this course then it is recommended that the principle of co-ordination of military effort between the forces of the two armies at St. John's be effected by mutual co-operation, but that in no case should the Canadian Army contemplate a proposition even remotely suggestive of a unity of command under the U.S. Army Commander.

(c) AIR FORCE

In respect of the Royal Canadian Air Force, command relationships are as provided in ABC-22 as stated in Para. 3 above.

Newfoundland, from the R.C.A.F. point of view, cannot be considered as a separate entity but must, by virtue of its situation in relation to the Maritime sections of Eastern Air Command, be considered as a part of that Command.

Newfoundland, from the point of view of air, is considered as a forward area of Eastern Air Command lying along the Great Circle approach to Canada, supported in depth by the Maritimes. Consequently, whereas tactical command is being decentralized to the Officer Commanding, No. 1 Operational Group, St. John's, Newfoundland, it cannot be divorced from the over-riding command of the Air Officer

Commanding, Eastern Air Command, either for the conduct of seaward operations requiring the combined forces of the R.C.A.F. coastal organization, or from the point of view of reinforcement of such operations, reinforcement of air bases or elsewhere in Newfoundland and Labrador, including Army reinforcements as and when equipment is obtained.

A further element comes within the scope of R.C.A.F. operations, namely, the present and developing co-operation with Coastal Command, R.A.F., coincident with the increase in range of modern aircraft, the intensification of the Battle of the Atlantic, and the possible withdrawal of U.S. aircraft and ships from the Atlantic to meet the situation in the Pacific Ocean.

No situation has yet arisen in which unity of command is deemed to be essential or advisable by the R.C.A.F.

## 9. Conclusion

Our conclusions in this matter of command relations in Newfoundland may be summarized as follows:

- (a) That the question of command relations between the United States and Canadian Fighting Services serving in Newfoundland was duly provided for in ABC-22.
- (b) That ABC-22 clearly provides that each nation shall retain the strategic direction of its own forces except by mutual agreement between Chiefs of Staff concerned or local Commanders, (these latter agreements being subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff) and that the co-ordination of the Military effort of the United States and Canada shall be effected by mutual co-operation.
- (c) That the Royal Canadian Navy has allocated a portion of its force to serve as convoy escorts under United States strategic direction and operational command.
- (d) That it would appear desirable to ask the United States authorities to agree to the appointment of a Canadian O.C. Defences at St. John's.
- (e) That apart from (c) and (d) above, the present situation in Newfoundland is not such as to indicate either the necessity or the desirability of establishing a unity of command over the Fighting Forces of Canada and the United States serving therein.

MAURICE POPE  
Major-General

H. E. REID  
Commodore

F. V. HEAKES  
Group-Captain



911.

NPA S-4-2-3

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 37

[Ottawa,] January 7, 1942

MOST SECRET. Addressed to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 37, repeated to Governor of Newfoundland No. 1. Your telegram No. 2090.<sup>1</sup>

Note has now been received from Department of External Affairs stating that Canadian Government has for some time been giving careful consideration to whole question of command of military forces in Newfoundland and that the subject has from time to time been under discussion in Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Note continues as follows:

The policy that the Canadian Government has followed in Newfoundland as in other areas in which Canadian and United States troops are collaborating has been to proceed on the principle of co-operation rather than of unity of command. This method has so far proved satisfactory and it is not presently intended that any change should be made.

If at a later time it should be found desirable to adopt principle of unity of command Canadian Government for the present naturally desires to see military direction of forces in Newfoundland placed in the hands of a Canadian Officer. Major-General L. F. Page has been sent to take command of Canadian and Newfoundland army forces in the Island and if unity of command in that area should be effected this senior Canadian Officer would be eminently suitable for the post.

912.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D3)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, January 7, 1942

. . .

### 3. COMMAND POSITION IN NEWFOUNDLAND

The Committee considered a memorandum<sup>2</sup> on Command Relations in Newfoundland prepared by the Canadian Service Members of the P.J.B.D. in accordance with Minute 8<sup>1</sup> of the 131st Meeting of the Committee. The Chiefs of Staff expressed their concurrence in this memorandum with the exception of Paragraph 9 (*d*), which stated "that it would appear desirable to ask the United States Authorities to agree to the appointment of a Canadian O.C. Defences at St. John's". The Committee are of the opinion that it would

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 910.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 910.

be better to effect any necessary arrangements on these lines by mutual co-operation between the appropriate Commanders on the spot. With this amendment incorporated, the Secretary was instructed to promulgate this memorandum to the J.S.C., Atlantic Coast, and J.S.S./C. Nfld., for the information and guidance of all concerned.

...

913.

NPA GN1/3 4

*Mémoire du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence to  
Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J and D. 3-1942

[St. John's,] January 14, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

In his telegram No. 981 of December 2nd, 1941<sup>1</sup> the Secretary of State referred to an Agreement which had been reached in London between representatives of the United States and of the British Government, dealing with defence and command in the Colonies, in which United States Bases have been or are being established. This Agreement<sup>1</sup>, copy of which is annexed, does not apply to Newfoundland.

2. In his telegram No. 982 of December 2nd, 1941<sup>1</sup> the Secretary of State instructed the United Kingdom High Commissioner for Canada in presenting this Agreement to the Prime Minister of Canada, to say to the latter, *inter alia*, that this Agreement might in a large measure be used as a precedent for an Agreement dealing with the same subjects in Newfoundland, and in our message<sup>1</sup> in reply to the Secretary of State, which was repeated to the High Commissioner, we expressed the hope that the Prime Minister of Canada would not believe that we concurred in this view.

3. Since the exchange of these messages we have had no word either from London or Ottawa. We do not know whether any approach has been made by the Canadian Government to the United States Government, with a view to an Agreement being reached.

4. There is no unity of command in Newfoundland, nor is there any Agreement of which I am aware, under which unity of command can be put into effect, even in the case of emergency. I am informed that there is a Joint Services Defence Sub-Committee consisting of Officers of the British Forces in Newfoundland, this being an offshoot of a committee which sits at Halifax,

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

consisting of the representatives of the British Forces in the Eastern Commands. The Newfoundland Government is not represented on this Local Sub-Committee.

5. Recently I had from General Brant a request that a Proclamation issue declaring the existence of certain so called "defence areas". They were to be areas with centres at St. John's, Carbonear, Bay Roberts, Argentia, Stephenville and other places, and the radius of each area was to be ten miles from the centre. Within these "defence areas" no aircraft was to approach or land, except under regulations made by the Military Authorities, and in case of an emergency the civil population were to obey the orders of the Military Authorities.

6. I understand that R.C.A.F. operate their planes under a code of signals which is recognized throughout the British Empire, and that so far as Newfoundland is concerned they are supposed to approach the various airports from fixed directions and to identify themselves by signals which are changed from time to time. If they do not carry out these regulations they are liable to be fired upon. I do not know whether American planes coming to Newfoundland and particularly to those airports controlled by R.C.A.F. obey these regulations or feel bound by them, but I understand from General Brant that he does not consider the regulations themselves effective.

7. The anti-aircraft defences of St. John's are manned by U.S. Forces and on January 9th General Brant wrote me annexing a formal report<sup>1</sup> from a Lieutenant in charge of anti-aircraft operations to the effect that two Canadian planes had risked being fired upon because they had not complied with the regulations. In his covering letter General Brant makes this the basis for a claim that the Proclamation above referred to is necessary. I have replied to him in terms of the letter<sup>2</sup> which is annexed hereto.

8. The situation is not at all satisfactory. I have no knowledge of any plan for the defence of the Island. I am told generally that the Canadian General is to co-operate with the American General. I know of no provision for any unity of command in case of an emergency. I am requested to cause a Proclamation to be issued because one Commanding Officer complains of the action of Forces under the command of another, and altogether I am of opinion that the safety of the country is jeopardized by lack of unity. The country is like a ship with several Captains.

9. I recognize that the question of a unified command is one of some delicacy and it may take time before agreement can be reached thereon. I do not think that the Canadian Government feels strong enough to press its views that the supreme command should rest in a Canadian Officer, and whilst in this position of weakness, it prefers to let the question drift, hoping that something will turn up. I do not believe anything will turn up because I think that the Americans, particularly the local Commanding Officer, wish for an American O.C.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

10. It might help matters if a Joint Local Defence Committee was formed presided over by the Commissioner for Defence, at which all plans for the defence of the country would be discussed. It is possible that out of this would come, at any rate, one co-ordinated plan with an agreement as to who should be Commanders of the respective Forces, in case of an emergency.

11. I suggest for the consideration of the Commission that I should approach the Commanders of the Forces here along these lines and see whether they feel like submitting such a proposal to their respective Government. It will, at any rate, be the first step towards reaching some settled policy. The present situation is the reverse of satisfactory.

L. E. EMERSON

914.

NPA GN1/3 4

*Mémorandum du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence to  
Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J and D. 3(a)—1942

[St. John's,] January 15, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Since writing my memorandum J. & D. 3, I have received from General Brant letter dated January 14th, in answer to my letter annexed to my previous memorandum. Copy of this letter is annexed.<sup>1</sup>

2. It is an inaccurate construction of my letter to say that only the R.C.A.F. have any interest in the flight of aircraft over this country. It is also inaccurate to say that I am "well aware" of General Brant's efforts to improve the code of identification signals, or that I am again "well aware" of the fact that the lack of progress is due to the remote control at Halifax and Ottawa over the military Forces in this country. On two occasions General Brant has expressed to me the opinion that the code of signals is not good and that he has flown into practically every Canadian airport on the Atlantic seaboard without giving identification signals. Furthermore, I understand formally from Brigadier Earnshaw that a code of signals proposed by General Brant was considered by the Commanders of the British Forces here and turned down as unworkable.

3. This letter shows further how impossible the situation is becoming and how necessary it is for some co-ordinating body such as the Defence Committee which I have propounded in my Memorandum J. & D. 3.

L. E. EMERSON

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



915.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Le général commandant la région du nord-est des États-Unis  
au commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est*

*Commanding General, United States Northeast Command, to  
Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command*

SECRET

[ ,] January 15, 1942

My dear General,

The Joint Canadian—United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 contains two tasks in which we are all interested, namely:

Joint Task 2: Defend Newfoundland and protect sea communications within the Coastal Zone.

Joint Task 3: Defend eastern Canada and the northeastern portion of the United States, and protect sea communications within the Coastal Zone.

As the United States Army Commander charged with the Army's participation in these tasks (under designation in the Joint Plan as "Commanding General, Northeast Defence Command (USA)"), and in accordance with paragraph 12 of that plan, I am desirous of establishing liaison with you with a view to the preparation of joint plans applicable to our respective forces.

In order to get action started on the preparation of a Joint Plan to carry out the tasks quoted above, I have asked the Commanding General of the Newfoundland Base Command, in co-operation with the representatives of all services represented in Newfoundland, to prepare a joint plan. I am inclosing a copy of my letter to him.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to task No. 3, I have written to the General Officer, Commanding in Chief, Atlantic Command, Halifax, proposing that a General Staff Officer from my headquarters and an officer of my Air Force go to Halifax to consult with his staff and with yourself for the mutual exchange of information which will be necessary for the formulation of a Joint Plan. I have asked that the Canadian Army Commander consult with you as to an appropriate date when it would be convenient for my staff officers to visit your headquarters.

Sincerely yours,

H. A. DRUM

Lieutenant-General, U.S. Army

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

916.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D3)

*L'officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve,  
au quartier général de la Marine*

*Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force, to Naval Services Headquarters*

TELEGRAM 2115Z/28

[St. John's,] January 28, 1942

Newfoundland Base Command, United States Army, has been instructed to prepare as promptly as possible a joint plan in conjunction with the other heads of services here, to carry out the missions assigned in ABC 22. Presume this in accord with arrangements of Joint Defence Board and that instructions will be issued to Canadian senior officers in due course but notification from General [illegible—Drum?] mentions sending signed copies to higher authority for approval by the two Governments which seems contrary to usual practice.

917.

NPA GN1/3 4

*Mémorandum du commissaire à la Justice et à la Défense  
à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Justice and Defence to  
Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

J. and D. 10-1942

[St. John's,] January 30, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with the direction of the Commission I invited the Commanders of the various Forces to a meeting at my office on January 24th at 3 p.m. Colonel Rendell, Secretary for Defence, was present and made a Minute of the discussions, and I think I cannot do better than annex a copy of that Minute, as indicating the attitude assumed by those present.

I refrained from bringing up the question of unity of command. It is quite obvious that the Canadian Commanding Officers here have been instructed to take no part in matters involving policy and that they would probably refuse to discuss the matter. In my opinion we should leave the subject of unity of command until we have heard from the Dominions Office and decide our next step as a result of that reply.

L. E. EMERSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

NPA GN1/8 4

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion tenue pour discuter de problèmes de défense  
Minutes of a Meeting held to Discuss Defence Problems*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, January 24, 1942

The Commissioner for Defence was in the Chair. There were present:  
Major-General Page (Canadian Forces)

Major-General Brant (U.S. Army)  
Rear-Admiral Murray (R.C.N.)  
Air Commodore McEwan (R.C.A.F.)  
Captain Morgan (U.S. Navy)  
Capt. Cohen (U.S. Navy)  
Lt.-Col. Rendell (Secretary for Defence)

The Commissioner for Defence thanked those present for their attendance and stated that the meeting was called with a view to discussing general defence measures, and, if agreed, to establish a Local Combined Joint Defence Committee for the discussion of defence problems.

The Commissioner stated that under the Constitution, the Governor in Commission is responsible for the defence of Newfoundland and by statute the administration is delegated to the Commissioner for Defence. In view of the fact that Newfoundland possessed very few local fighting forces, and because of Newfoundland's geographical position, the authorities at Ottawa and at Washington had decided to send Defence Forces to this Country. These arrangements were in the hands of a Canada-United States Permanent Joint Defence Committee. The Commissioner stated that negotiations had been conducted in Washington for the formation of a Local Joint Defence Committee in the Colonies where United States bases had been established. Agreement had been reached on these formations and they were now operative. Copy of the Agreement had been received in Newfoundland in early January.

The Commissioner felt that the setting up of a Local Defence Committee would be of value in co-ordinating ideas and defence measures. Any conclusions of high policy as far as the Newfoundland Government was concerned might have to be referred to His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and he presumed that other members of the suggested Committee would also have to refer certain matters to higher authority.

The Commissioner then asked if it was agreed in principle that a Combined Local Defence Committee should be set up in this Country. He felt that it was important that the Nfld. Government should have knowledge of the number of troops stationed in the Country, and precautionary measures for defence established and to be established, and that similar knowledge should be available to the Commanders of the different Forces.

Major-General Page referred to correspondence which showed that in the plans designed for islands to the South, Newfoundland was deliberately left out. He stated that on receipt of his letter from the Commissioner for Defence he had referred the matter to higher authority in Canada and was instructed that if a Local Defence Committee were proposed to be set up, the matter would be entirely outside the scope of his authority. Such a Committee could only be set up by agreement between the three Governments. However he felt strongly that a Co-ordinating Committee is very essential. He stated that the Canadian Navy, Army and Air Force, were in close touch with the Civil Defence Committee.

General Brant was of opinion that a Local Joint Defence Committee would perhaps be duplicating the work of a committee already in existence.

The established Joint Defence Committee was functioning and doing a good job. What might be termed a Local Joint Committee was already functioning in conjunction with the Civil Defence authority. At the same time he was of opinion that it was essential for Naval, Military and Air Commanders to get together from time to time to co-ordinate defence measures.

The Commissioner stated that some consultation with a representative of Government was also necessary so that civil authority may be informed of what is going on and give assistance when necessary.

Rear-Admiral Murray stated that his instructions were practically the same as those of General Page, that is that a Defence Committee, as such, is a matter for the Governments concerned. He strongly favoured a Co-ordinating Committee which would be in touch with civil authority so as to get the full co-operation of the public. He said that Canada had assumed the responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland and apparently Canadian Government authorities were disturbed by the possibility of the setting up a committee which might conflict in matters of policy and cut across present channels of communication. Plan had already been outlined in general terms between Canada and the United States for the defence of the Country.

General Brant said that under existing arrangements matters would have to be referred in any case to the Permanent Joint Defence Committee for decision.

The Commissioner thought that that referred to the numbers of men stationed at different points and matters of that nature but not to local operations. He felt that the name of the committee was not so important, but, provided the Commanders of the Forces agreed, some committee should be set up. He instanced as the type of questions to be discussed and settled, the advisability and possibility of a blackout over the whole of the Avalon Peninsula.

A discussion on this matter ensued and Air Commodore McEwan referred to the local radio stations which would act as a direct guide to any plane, even in foggy weather. He felt that it might be necessary under certain circumstances to close down the radio stations until Radio Direction Finders were installed. General Brant stated that he was pressing for priority to be given to his requisition for Radio Direction Finders. The Commissioner remarked that these matters were such as might be usefully discussed by the suggested committee and asked if the meeting agreed to a Co-ordinating Committee being established. Both Major-General Page and Rear-Admiral Murray felt that such committee would be of great value and thought that the Canadian Government would undoubtedly agree.

Major-General Brant held the same opinion.

The Commissioner expressed his satisfaction and suggested that the committee would meet when necessary only, and not at stated periods. A meeting could be called by any Commanding Officer or by himself when matters of importance were to be discussed. As an example he quoted the possibility of arranging for the defence of Bay Bulls where ships awaiting repairs must be sent to allow other ships to enter St. John's. The establishment of defence



works there would involve the co-operation of the Naval, Army and Air Forces as well as civil authorities in declaring prohibited areas. The exchange of ideas at a meeting would mean early decision and quicker action.

Captain Morgan stated that although Canadian and United States Forces were stationed in Newfoundland for defence purposes the United States Navy was not included as a Defence Force for Newfoundland. He had to deal with local conditions entirely as they affected the area of Argentia. He was happy to be able to say that he had received the utmost co-operation with different Newfoundland Government Departments on all matters in connection with the control of his area. He was also working in full collaboration with Army and Air authorities as well as Newfoundland Civil Police. He explained the system of co-ordination between Army, and Navy as it applied to United States practice.

Rear-Admiral Murray stated that the function of the Navy under his command was not the defence of Newfoundland, but the defence of coast-wise shipping and the Naval Base and to run escort across the Atlantic.

Captain Morgan explained the blackout arrangements that obtain in Argentia and stated that he had had some discussion with the Lighthouse authorities concerning the leading lights and lighthouses in the area. His Forces control the operation of small craft in the area. When visibility was poor, or at night, small craft were not allowed to move at all.

There was some discussion about the control of aircraft and flying regulations. Major-General Brant explained briefly the orders to aircraft crews and suggested that regulations in this respect should be stiffened as in his opinion they were not adequate.

Air Commodore McEwan referred to correspondence which he was expecting dealing with General Brant's suggestions. It had been promised within a few days.

Major-General Page was of opinion that the Canadian and United States Flying Services were in complete accord concerning flying regulations and operations, but that Major-General Brant was inclined to move more quickly than Air Commodore McEwan was in a position to do. It was decided to defer further discussion until this letter was received.

The Commissioner stated that he will publish under Defence Regulations any matter that would assist generally if advised by technical advisers.

It was decided to defer discussion of continuous blackout and its extension until after a test from the air and other tests had been made.

Major-General Page enquired concerning the precautions for guarding cable stations and was informed that this was being done by the Civil Police.

The question of introducing Daylight Saving was brought up and this was deferred pending a decision as to whether the blackout would be permanent. The Commissioner stated that it would take a very short time to institute the necessary regulations for Daylight Saving if it seemed advisable.

With reference to survivors from Merchant Marine ships Major-General Page stated that it was outside the functions of his office but wished to state

that any facilities under the control of the Canadian authorities would be placed at the disposal of the Representative of the Ministry of Shipping.

The question of reserve food supplies was mentioned and it was explained that the Government, in conjunction with the Trade, was making arrangements for the establishment of depots outside the City limits for storing supplies of certain essential foods. The arrangements were being handled by a Joint Committee of members of the Government and the Trade under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare.

Major-General Page then referred to the subject of Venereal disease and enquired concerning the Newfoundland law regarding detention and treatment. The Commissioner asked him to write him on the matter and promised to take it up with the Commission of Government and to make a statement at a later date. Captain Morgan stated that in this connection Argentina was well under control but there was no accommodation for isolation.

Rear-Admiral Murray suggested that steps should be taken to impress on the crews of local tugs and Customs boats that they should be on time when assisting in getting ships out of port. It has occurred that the sailing of convoys has been delayed and ships have had to remain outside unprotected for longer periods than is necessary or safe. Captain Morgan referred to a misunderstanding that had occurred in one instance at Argentina between the Customs and the Naval Authorities there, but this has now been cleared up and is unlikely to recur.

In view of the present dangers to shipping off the coasts of Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces, Rear-Admiral Murray and the Commissioner agreed that it would be wise to have SS. *Burgeo* and SS. *Bacaulieu* and *Caribou* fitted with guns for defence. These ships have been strengthened and are ready to have guns placed and the necessary work which would be done at Halifax would not delay sailing beyond a few hours.

Before the meeting adjourned the Commissioner again asked if it was generally agreed that those present would consider themselves a Committee for the purpose of Co-ordinating defence measures, and this was agreed.

The meeting then adjourned.

918.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D4)

*Le quartier général de la Marine à l'officier supérieur,  
détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve*

*Naval Service Headquarters to Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force*

TELEGRAM 2049Z/29

[Ottawa,] January 29, 1942

Your 2115Z/28. No objection to preparation of a Combined Operational Plan based on ABC. 22 copy of which should be sent to N.S.H.Q. for information. Approval of the Canadian Government is not necessary unless any principle contrary to ABC. 22 is involved. No Operational Plan based on ABC. 22 has been prepared at N.S.H.Q.

919.

1156-C-39

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

1000/34

Ottawa, February 24, 1942

SECRET

Dear Mr. Robertson,

May I refer to Note No. 70 of December 30th, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Secretary of State for External Affairs? I communicated the substance of this letter to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, repeating it to the Governor of Newfoundland; and the latter Government have considered it, in conjunction with the Agreement, referred to in my letter to the Prime Minister of December 6th,<sup>2</sup> between the United Kingdom and the United States of America regarding local defence in certain colonies.

The Commission of Government have expressed their views to the United Kingdom Government. They observe that they have not been informed of any discussions or conclusions of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence regarding the unity of command. They do not find themselves able to accept the position that the principle of co-operation rather than unity of command should be permitted to continue. The statement that it has worked satisfactorily so far must, in their view, be considered in the light not only of the current circumstances in Newfoundland but also of experience elsewhere in the war. So far there has been no emergency in the island. The Commission of Government regard it as most unsatisfactory that unity of command should be left to be established and the commander chosen when the emergency arises; especially as it is likely to arise without any warning. They point out that paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the Agreement, which I have mentioned above, support this view: and that the powers are now associated in war against a common enemy. They point out that unity of command in France in the early stages of the war and now in the Far East are further examples of the recognised need for it. The Commission of Government conclude that they know no reason to justify the belief that recognised military practice on this vitally important matter is inapplicable to Newfoundland: and that it will come as a great shock to the people of Newfoundland when they realise that at this stage of hostilities the defence of the island is still suffering from this universally recognized weakness. The Commission of Government in these circumstances urge upon the United Kingdom Government that this question be reopened without loss of time and that the situation should be rectified.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 911.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 911.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

The United Kingdom authorities cannot but consider that the Newfoundland Government has the chief interest in this matter: and they feel also that, as Newfoundland is vital to the defence of Canada, it is proper that the command in Newfoundland should be exercised by a Canadian officer. The question, however, is clearly one which in their view must be pursued by the Canadian authorities in consultation with the Newfoundland Government direct with the United States authorities through the medium of the Joint Defence Board or otherwise.

I have been asked accordingly to represent these considerations to the Canadian Government and to express the earnest hope that the Canadian authorities can take further steps to secure, in the circumstances which obtain today, the immediate establishment of unity of command in Newfoundland.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

920.

1156-C-39

*Mémoire du Comité des chefs d'état-major  
au ministre de la Défense nationale, au ministre de la Défense nationale  
pour les Services navals et au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Memorandum from Chiefs of Staff Committee  
to Minister of National Defence, Minister of National Defence  
for Naval Services and Minister of National Defence for Air*

SECRET

[Ottawa, March 10, 1942]

1. The Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following measures be implemented at once with a view of establishing unity of command as between the three Canadian Services in respect to the defence of the West Coast of Canada, the East Coast of Canada and Newfoundland:

- (a) The Senior Member of the Joint Service Committee on the West and East Coasts to be designated as Commander-in-Chief, West Coast Defences and East Coast Defences respectively.
- (b) The primary function of the Commander-in-Chief will be to co-ordinate the preparation and execution of the defence plans of the three Services in respect to such forces as may be allotted to his Command by the Chiefs of the respective Services. He will act as Chairman of the Joint Service Committee and will, in consultation with the Senior Commanders of the other Services, allocate tasks to the three Services and co-ordinate the combined effort.
- (c) The Commander-in-Chief will not exercise tactical command in respect to any Service other than his own. He will exercise strategic direction of all three Services and tactical command of his own Service.



- (d) The channel of communication between Commanders-in-Chief and Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, will be direct to the Chief of Staff of the Service or Services concerned. The channel of communication between the Commander of each Service and his Chief of Staff will continue as heretofore.

The Senior Member of the Joint Service Committee in Newfoundland will be designated, in respect to the three Canadian Services, as Commanding Newfoundland Defences. His functions in respect to Newfoundland will be the same as those laid down above for Commanders-in-Chief, West or East Coast Defences. The only difference being that he will be subject to the general direction of the Commander-in-Chief, East Coast Defences, and will communicate direct to that Commander. Newfoundland will be considered as a sub-command of the East Coast.

2. Submitted for consideration.

PERCY NELLES  
Vice-Admiral,  
Chief of the Naval Staff

L. S. BREADNER  
Air-Marshal,  
Chief of the Air Staff

K. STUART  
Lieut.-General,  
Chief of the General Staff

921.

703-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 66

Ottawa, March 21, 1942

Following from Keenleyside for Emerson. Begins. Following representations by Newfoundland authorities and United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada, the Canadian Government has decided to ask the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to report on the Command situation in Newfoundland. The next meeting of the Board will be in Montreal on Monday, March 30th, and the members of the Board will be glad to have you attend to participate in this discussion. We are also informing the United Kingdom High Commissioner that if he wishes to be present he will be most welcome. Will you please let me know your plans? Ends.

922.

703-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 77

Ottawa, March 28, 1942

Following from Keenleyside for Emerson. Begins. With reference to recent telegrams regarding the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and in particular the subject of command in Newfoundland, I have now to inform you that this topic has, within the last few days, been made a subject of discussion between Service members of the Board in Washington and in Ottawa. It has been decided that rather than wait for a recommendation of the Board, the matter will be considered by the Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the provisions made for such consultation in Plan ABC-22. In view of the arrangements being made for this direct consultation between Chiefs of Staff, the matter will be removed from the Agenda for the meeting of the Board on April 7.

. . .

923.

1156-C-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
de Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
of Great Britain*

No. 44

Ottawa, April 16, 1942

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence relating to the problem of command in Newfoundland, I have the honour to inform you that this matter has been carefully considered by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and discussed informally with the United States Chiefs of Staff; and after reviewing the arrangements now in force and the considerations advanced in your letter of February 24, 1942 (No. 1000/34), it has been decided that the establishment of unified command in Newfoundland would not under present circumstances contribute to the result that we all desire, the increased security of Newfoundland and its people.

It will be recalled that provision has been made under Plan ABC-22 not only for consultation between the Chiefs of Staff but also for the immediate establishment of unified command in any area within the realm

of their responsibilities should such action be found desirable. I am assured that the situation in Newfoundland will be reviewed from time to time with this fact in mind.

I have etc.

[N.A. ROBERTSON]  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

924.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D7)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, April 17, 1942

. . .

ITEM 5. JOINT CANADIAN-U.S. DEFENCE PLAN—NEWFOUNDLAND

The Joint Defence Plan has been submitted in draft form to the Heads of Canadian Services, Nfld., and to the O.C., U.S. Forces. Suggestions for amendments were discussed which are to be embodied in a further draft which will be considered at a later date, before forwarding to higher authority for approval.

. . .

925.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D9)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] June 16, 1942

. . .

II. COMBINED INFORMATION CENTRE, NEWFOUNDLAND

The V.C.A.S. tabled an extract from the Minutes<sup>1</sup> of the 76th Meeting of the Joint Service Committee, Atlantic, and a cypher message<sup>1</sup> from A.O.C. No. 1 Group to A.O.C., E.A.C., timed 0045/10/6, recommending the establishing of a Combined Information Centre at St. John's N.F., for all Canadian and U.S. Forces, to be built, manned and operated by the R.C.A.F. The scheme has the concurrence of the U.S. Army and Navy in Newfoundland.

C.G.S. questioned whether it was intended to direct operations from this centre, in which case the question of unified Command would arise. V.C.A.S. explained that the R.C.A.F. fighter squadrons would be controlled

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

from there, but that for the other Services, it was intended only for the collection, filtering and distribution of information from all sources and to all Services.

The cost of the building was estimated at \$100,000, and would be borne by R.C.A.F.

It was pointed out that all three Canadian Services in St. John's required more space. Navy and Air Force in particular had outgrown their combined space in the Naval Administration building, which was not capable of enlargement.

The Committee concurred in the recommendation and V.C.A.S. undertook to initiate action to implement it.

• • •

926.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D9)

*Le secrétaire du Comité mixte de la côte de l'Atlantique  
au secrétaire du Comité des Chefs d'état-major*

*Secretary, Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast, to Secretary,  
Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

Halifax, July 8, 1942

1. (a) I am directed to say that the Joint Service Committee, at their 89th Meeting, gave consideration to amendments in connection with a Combined Plan for the Defence of Newfoundland which were forwarded by the Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland.

(b) Copy of original Plan amended accordingly, is attached.<sup>1</sup>

2. The original Plan signed by the American Commanders and subscribed to by the Canadian Commanders, subject to approval of higher authority, was considered by the Joint Service Committee at their 71st (15 May) and 73rd (22 May) Meetings at which time a large number of observations were made, principally objections to provisions which, in the opinion of the Committee, made the Plan one primarily to establish Unity of Command.

3. (a) The Committee consider that their objections have now been met and have approved of the amended Plan, subject to the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

(b) This concurrence is recommended.

4. The Committee wishes to point out that they feel that they have achieved protection of the principle of co-operation as opposed to the American desire for Unity of Command, largely through the co-operative attitude of the American Naval Commander, notwithstanding his expressed belief in the necessity for Unity of Command to ensure success. It is pointed out that the Plan now provides for certain action *in the event* of Unity of

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Command being established under the provisions of A.B.C. 22. While the Committee considered that these arrangements are unnecessary, in view of the co-operation shown they consider that it is desirable not to press the matter further since no Unity of Command is established under the Plan as now amended.

5. In connection with the above, the Committee consider it desirable to obtain concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in view of the opinion expressed in para. 9(e) of Memorandum on Command Relations,<sup>1</sup> Newfoundland, forwarded with H.Q.S. 5199-2 dated 8th January, 1942.<sup>2</sup>

J. E. BURNS  
Major G. S.,  
for the Secretary, Joint Services Committee,  
Atlantic Command

927.

1156-C-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre de la Défense nationale*  
*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister of National Defence*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 4, 1942

Dear Colonel Ralston,

As you are aware, we have been under pressure from Newfoundland, and to some extent from London, to take steps which will result in the establishment of a unified command over the Canadian and United States forces operating in that area. Both the British and Newfoundland authorities express the hope that when such unification takes place the supreme commander will be a Canadian.

I understand that this general problem has had a long and somewhat troubled history in the deliberations of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

When the matter was raised by the United Kingdom High Commissioner and by Sir Patrick Duff earlier this year, we replied, on authority of a letter dated April 14, 1942, from the Chiefs of Staff by saying, in part:

This matter has been carefully considered by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and discussed informally with the United States Chiefs of Staff; and after reviewing the arrangements now in force and the considerations advanced in your letter of February 24, 1942 (No. 1000/34) it has been decided that the establishment of unified command in Newfoundland would not under present circumstances contribute to the result that we all desire, the increased security of Newfoundland and its people.

As you will observe, we gave no reasons, merely stated an opinion.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Earnscliffe has recently returned to the subject and it is apparent that neither the United Kingdom nor the Newfoundland Commission of Government is satisfied by our reply. It has been intimated that when Major Attlee arrives in Newfoundland the matter is sure to come up again and that his visit will certainly result in a request for reconsideration by Ottawa. Under the circumstances it seems to me that it might be desirable for us to anticipate this development by having this problem re-examined by the Chiefs of Staff now. We could then either

- (a) take steps to meet the British and Newfoundland desire, or
- (b) have ready a reasoned argument to justify a continuance of the present policy.

If it should be decided by the Chiefs of Staff that the time has now arrived for the establishment of a unified command on the Island, it will be necessary to give additional thought to the means to be taken to ensure that this command is vested in a Canadian officer. It may be that this can only be accomplished by agreeing to a "saw-off" which would give command on the Pacific Coast to an officer of the United States forces.

I shall be grateful for an indication of your views as to the steps that should be taken to meet the situation outlined in this letter.

Yours sincerely,

[N. A. ROBERTSON]  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

928.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D10)

*Mémorandum du Sous-comité mixte de planification  
au Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Memorandum from Joint Planning Sub-Committee to  
Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 8, 1942

UNITY OF COMMAND, NEWFOUNDLAND

1. The Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee have studied the communication dated August 4th, 1942, from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs addressed to Colonel, the Honourable J. L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, on the subject of Unity of Command, Newfoundland, and submit the following comments:

- (a) Newfoundland, for purposes of defence, is not regarded as a separate area but part of a strategic area embracing also the Maritime Provinces and part of the Province of Quebec.

- (b) The air operations, protecting shipping off the lower Western coast of Newfoundland and along the South coast of Newfoundland to 55° West longitude, are conducted from air bases in the Maritimes and not from Newfoundland. The air protection of these parts of the Newfoundland coast is also done from Maritimes Canadian bases.
- (c) Unity of Command, as between the Canadian Forces in Newfoundland, has been established under the senior Canadian Officer there, responsible to the G.O.C.-in-C., Atlantic Command.
- (d) The United States and Canadian Commanders in Newfoundland have developed a comprehensive Combined Plan for the Defence of Newfoundland, in which provision for Unity of Command is specifically made in any local circumstances requiring same. In addition, the Plan has provided for a Military Committee consisting of the United States and Canadian Commanders in Newfoundland, the allocation of Joint Tasks, the designation of general areas of operations as well as areas of special United States and Canadian commitments. This Plan is based on ABC-22 and conforms to the principle of command by co-operation.
- (e) Whereas Unity of Command for Newfoundland under a Canadian Commander is specifically mentioned by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, this would appear more as a hope than a realizable certainty as there is no indication of any such desire on the part of the American Commanders.
- (f) The question of a "saw-off" between Newfoundland and the West Coast would, in the first instance, be an unequal trade, for Canada, in giving up Command of its entire coast, would be doing so to obtain Unified Command over what may only be considered a part of the East coast. In this connection, it is again stressed that Newfoundland and the Maritimes are one strategic area.

Additionally, recent investigation has shown the inadvisability of United States Command over either coast. The Air Member of the Joint Canadian Staff in Washington has recently placed before the United States Members of the Combined Planners the Canadian Appreciation of Canada's air strategy, both coasts, together with a detailed analysis of our operational organization for comparison with their own. The Americans were prepared to accept the Canadian standard as being the minimum air defence requirement for both coasts, but when compared with their own, the extraordinary proposition was made that, whereas the Canadian standard should represent the minimum air defence requirement, the Americans were at present far below the Canadian minimum requirement, and therefore Canada should scale down to their present, inadequate scale of defence—an illogical but realistic situation, due to United States sending practically their whole aircraft production abroad.

Such a condition may, in part, explain the tremendous shipping losses along the American seaboard which, if continued, may decide the outcome of the war.

Therefore, under these circumstances, to place a Canadian coast under United States Command would be tantamount to reducing our air strength at a time when every effort is being made to increase it.

- (g) Furthermore, it has been demonstrated, and is visibly evident to our observers, that the United States has not got over its teething troubles, inherent in its comparatively recent entry into the war, and neither on the East coast nor on the West coast (including Alaska) is she up to the British or Canadian standard in operational methods and control in respect of air. At the present time her operations lack cohesion and co-operation. Her Army and Navy Air Forces are indeed very far apart. It is here that unity must first be achieved concerning the accomplishment of which there is no evidence.

#### CONCLUSION

2. Whereas the previous decision of the Chiefs of Staff was based on objections in principle to the establishment of Unity of Command, there is ample practical evidence to support the decision then arrived at which now makes such establishment even less desirable, particularly as the present Canadian organization is now achieving admirable results in the submarine warfare.

F. V. HEAKES  
Air Commodore, R.C.A.F.

H. G. DEWOLF  
Captain, R.C.N.

J. H. JENKINS  
Colonel

929.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D11)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] August 19, 1942

...

#### IV. COMBINED PLAN FOR THE DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND (Deferred from 175th Meeting)

The Committee, after consideration of the Report of the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, concurred in the approval of the Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast, of the Plan, as submitted under cover of ACS. 11-7-4, dated 8th July 1942.<sup>1</sup>

...

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



930.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

. . .

Ottawa, September 30, 1942

## NEWFOUNDLAND—UNITY OF COMMAND

34. THE PRIME MINISTER reported that the U.K. Secretary of State for the Dominions had expressed to him the view that the establishment of unity of command in Newfoundland, under a Canadian officer, was of urgent importance.

35. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR NAVAL SERVICES said that the Chiefs of Staff were not in favour of pressing for unity of command in Newfoundland. They pointed out that there was no unified command in the United Kingdom.

In his own view, arrangements in Newfoundland should be similar to those which had been made, at the War Committee's direction, on the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, where one officer had been designated as a Commander in Chief. The question of obtaining U.S. agreement to one command, over the forces of both nations, was another matter.

36. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR agreed that a unified Canadian command in Newfoundland should be established.

37. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after further discussion, and subject to reference to the Minister of National Defence, agreed that a unified command for Canadian forces in Newfoundland should be established on the model of the Atlantic and Pacific Coast commands. Thereafter, the question of unified command with the American forces should be taken up with the United States.

. . .

931.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet**Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

. . .

[Ottawa,] October 7, 1942

## NEWFOUNDLAND—UNITY OF COMMAND

8. THE SECRETARY reported that, upon being informed of the War Committee's decision of September the 30th, the Chiefs of Staff had drawn attention to the reference to Newfoundland in their submission of March 10th, approved by the War Committee on March 18th.

Provision had been made for unified command of the Canadian forces in Newfoundland, at the same time and along the same lines as in the Atlantic

and Pacific commands, with the qualification that the officer commanding in Newfoundland was subject to the general direction of the Commander-in-Chief, East Coast Defences.

(Letter, Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Secretary, October 3, 1942 and enclosed submission.<sup>1</sup>)

9. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR suggested that the United States would not regard joint Canadian command subordinate to the Canadian commander on the Atlantic coast as a satisfactory basis for unity of command, in Newfoundland, as between the forces of both nations.

Before approaching the United States on the subject, consideration should be given to separating Canadian command in Newfoundland from that on the mainland.

10. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, agreed to refer the proposal made by Mr. Power for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff.

...

932.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 21, 1942

...

NEWFOUNDLAND—UNITY OF COMMAND

40. THE SECRETARY submitted a report of the Chiefs of Staff on the subject of command in Newfoundland.

The Chiefs of Staff had concluded, after due consideration, that Canadian command in Newfoundland should not be separated from that on the mainland. They regarded the defence of the Maritimes, Newfoundland and Labrador as a single strategic problem; Newfoundland forces depended for re-enforcements upon the Maritimes; large increases in Newfoundland forces, increased facilities and duplication would be required by creating an independent command in Newfoundland.

(Letter, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to the Secretary, and attached report, October 21, 1942.<sup>1</sup>)

41. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FOR AIR said that the Air Staff, reporting on existing arrangements with the United States, had pointed out that under the Joint Canada-U.S. Defence Plan (ABC-22), a unified command could be established when the necessity arose. Under this arrangement, Major-General Page would assume command of combined forces unless and until a senior U.S. officer succeeded Major-General Brant.

42. THE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF said that Mr. Emerson of the Newfoundland Commission of Government had been present at the meeting of the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Joint Defence Board when General Brant had referred to arrangements for unity of command. The Newfoundland government were, therefore, aware of these arrangements.

43. THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF remarked that the present arrangement provided for a unified command, in the future, under certain conditions which had not yet arisen.

44. THE WAR COMMITTEE noted the report of the Chiefs of Staff that present arrangements were regarded as satisfactory.

. . .

933.

DND HQS 7410-28

*L'officier général commandant les troupes canadiennes à Terre-Neuve  
au quartier-général de la Défense nationale*

*General Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland  
to National Defence Headquarters*

TELEGRAM 1730Z/18

[St. John's,] March 18, 1943

Newfoundland militia now officially titled Newfoundland Regiment Local Homeguard Units such as Grand Falls Home Guard now officially termed Newfoundland Militia.

934.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Mémoire du sous-directeur adjoint, contrôle du vol,  
au directeur du personnel militaire du Conseil de l'Air*

*Memorandum from Assistant Deputy Director, Flying Control,  
to Air Member for Air Staff*

[Ottawa,] July 27, 1944

CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT IN CANADA,  
LABRADOR AND NEWFOUNDLAND BY THE R.C.A.F.

1. Attached herewith is a précis outlining the developments leading up to the present situation with respect to the R.C.A.F. control of aircraft movements in Labrador and Newfoundland.

2. As developed in this précis, Canada has no specific agreement with the U.S. authorities for the control of all aircraft movement throughout Labrador and Newfoundland. This situation requires immediate clarification in order that the R.C.A.F. may implement the organization necessary to carry out the regulations contained in C.A.P. 365, which has been accepted by U.S. authorities.

J. M. H. LANGFORD  
Squadron-Leader

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Précis*

[Ottawa,] July 26, 1944

CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT IN CANADA,  
LABRADOR AND NEWFOUNDLAND

## PART I

## DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

1. Defence Regulation No. 27, published by the Newfoundland Government 1st September, 1939, provides:

No. 27. No one shall without the permission of the Board of Customs, take off from, or land on, or fly over the Island, in any aircraft.

It will thus be seen that, as early as September, 1939, flights in and over Newfoundland were prohibited except with the permission of the Board of Customs.

2. In April, 1941, the Canada-Newfoundland Agreement was signed. Under this Agreement the Government of Newfoundland transferred to the Government of Canada, for the duration of the war, the control of the Newfoundland airport, together with the seaplane bases at Botwood and Gleneagles. These comprised the available air bases in Newfoundland at that time.

[3.] In paragraph 19 (b) of this Agreement<sup>1</sup> it is provided:

(b) The Newfoundland Department of Customs will not issue permits to fly over any part of Newfoundland without the prior consent of the Commanding Officer, R.C.A.F.

4. The completion of the above Agreement transferred to the R.C.A.F. the control of the movement of civil aircraft in Newfoundland.

5. Since Canada assumed control of the air bases, the Newfoundland Government has not concerned itself with respect to regulations for the Control of military air traffic and is apparently quite satisfied to leave the framing of such regulations to Canada and the United States. The following extract taken from a letter dated 27th January, 1942 from the Commissioner for Justice and Defence to the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, deals with the matter:

As to Military planes, these I understand are governed by International Regulations, identical for R.C.A.F. and the United States. This was confirmed to me by Air Commodore McEwen, and General Brant, at a meeting in my office on Saturday last, 26th January.

The reference made to "International Regulations" may refer to "S.D.158—Routing, Recognition and Identification of Aircraft".

These are regulations for defence purposes which detail the methods of recognition and identification of all allied aircraft, ground forces, naval vessels, etc.

<sup>1</sup> Vraisemblablement l'article 17(b).

<sup>1</sup> Actually Article 17(b).



## JOINT CANADA-UNITED STATES MEETING AUGUST 19TH, 1943

## PART II

6. A Joint Canada-United States meeting was convened at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on 19th August, 1943, to discuss details regarding the control, maintenance and defence of certain airfields in Canada, used jointly by Canada and the United States, and to review the 32nd Recommendation drafted for submission to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, covering these subjects. The subject of airways traffic control was brought up under Section I of the proposed recommendation which confirmed the control of aircraft movements in operational areas in Canada to Canadian authorities.

## FORMATION OF SUB-COMMITTEE

7. After a general discussion it was agreed that the problem should be worked out by a Sub-Committee who were to set up standard regulations covering the movement of aircraft on air routes in Canada. The Sub-Committee convened in Washington, D.C. on 23rd September, 1943 and consisted of representatives of the following agencies:

R.C.A.F.  
D.O.T.  
U.S.A.A.F.  
U.S.N.  
C.A.A.

## RECOMMENDATION OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

8. After considerable discussion the Sub-Committee drafted a report which included among others the following recommendation:

- 3 (b) (ii) That air traffic control throughout Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador be under the authority of Canada.

9. Exception to the above recommendation, insofar as it affected Labrador and Newfoundland, was taken by A.M.A.S. who considered it to be outside the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee. In a letter dated 18th November, 1943, to the Senior U.S. Member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, A.M.A.S. made the following suggestion:

With respect to paragraph 3 (b) (ii), I would suggest that it might be advisable to have this paragraph deleted. It deals with a matter which is quite outside the terms of reference of the Sub-Committee and one which is covered by the Thirty-Second Recommendation and special agreements.

10. C.A.P. 365 "Regulations for Control of Aircraft Movement in Canada" (which included Labrador and Newfoundland) was published and went into effect as from 1st December, 1943. In a letter dated 3rd January, 1944 from the Senior U.S. Member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, official U.S. concurrence was received which included certain changes suggested

by the Canadian Air Member in a letter dated 18th November, 1943. The concurring U.S. agencies were:

The War Department General Staff  
Army Air Forces  
Navy Department  
Civil Aeronautics Authorities

11. Copies of C.A.P. 365 were sent to the Newfoundland Commission of Government and to the A.O.C.-in-C., R.A.F.T.C. in Montreal.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN  
NEWFOUNDLAND AND AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS THROUGH  
THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

12. In despatch No. 926 dated 19th November, 1943, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the High Commissioner for Canada took exception to the R.C.A.F. policy of making regulations in regard to the control of air traffic over Newfoundland without consultation with the Newfoundland Commission of Government. The High Commissioner pointed out that there would not have been the slightest difficulty in obtaining approval from the Newfoundland Government to whatever regulations were deemed necessary by the Canadian and American Governments.

13. The question of these regulations was discussed by Air Commodore K.M. Guthrie and the High Commissioner on 2nd December, 1943, during the latter's visit to Ottawa. It was pointed out that these regulations are intended primarily to provide for the orderly movement of aircraft, and to reduce the chances of accidents. After some discussion it was agreed by the High Commissioner that this was essentially a Service problem, and, as such, would not require the formal approval of the Newfoundland Government. The High Commissioner was assured that the Air Officer Commanding No. 45 (A.T.) Group, R.A.F., was being kept fully informed regarding the new regulations, and that officers in his Command had expressed satisfaction with them.

EXISTING SITUATION OF CONTROL IN LABRADOR AND NEWFOUNDLAND

PART III

14. The 31st and 32nd Recommendations are confined to aerodromes *in Canada*. The special agreements effecting control of aircraft movements in Labrador and Newfoundland are:

- (i) Control of military aircraft, Canada-Newfoundland agreement.
- (ii) C.A.P. 365, R.C.A.F. Regulations for control of Aircraft Movements.
- (iii) Joint Control Agreement R.A.F.T.C.-U.S.A.T.C.
- (iv) Aerodrome control at Goose Bay (File S.19-88-3 May 28th).

15. Whilst C.A.P. 365 has been accepted by the Newfoundland Commission of Government, U.S. authorities and R.A.F.T.C., there does not exist

a specific authority delegating the control of all aircraft movements throughout Newfoundland and Labrador to Canada and consequently, no authority for C.A.P. 365 to be implemented in this area. Neither is there authority for the R.C.A.F. to provide personnel, equipment, nor recommend expenditures for establishing airway traffic control in this area.

16. To effect control in this area, the R.C.A.F. require the American personnel be replaced in the tower by Service personnel at Goose Bay and to arrange purchase of American Control tower equipment, to replace the American personnel operating approach control at Goose Bay, to purchase American control tower equipment at Gander prior to replacing American personnel there, the authorization for funds for installing Botwood Radio Range, the authorization for funds to establish landline communications in Newfoundland, the authorization for funds to provide equipment for a Flying Control Airway Centre at St. John's, Nfld.

#### RECOMMENDED ACTION

17. It is suggested that the 32nd Recommendation be amended to apply to Labrador and Newfoundland, or that a Recommendation similar to the 31st and 32nd be proposed for submission to the Joint Board on Defence.

935.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Le représentant de l'aviation canadienne, CPCAD,  
au représentant principal de l'armée des États-Unis, CPCAD*

*Canadian Air Member, PJBD, to Senior United States Army Member, PJBD*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 14, 1944

Dear General Henry,

Subsequent to the joint U.S.-Canada meeting held in Ottawa on August 19th, 1943 to discuss the provisions of the proposed 32nd Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, a sub-committee met in Washington on September 23rd to draft regulations for the control of air traffic in the operational areas of Canada. These regulations, approved by the United States and Canadian authorities, have since been brought out as R.C.A.F. publication C.A.P. 365 and have been in force since 15th December, 1943.

At both the meeting in Ottawa and Washington it was agreed that it was essential that the authority vested in the R.C.A.F. should extend throughout the areas under consideration, including the terminal airports in Newfoundland and Labrador. The regulations were accordingly drawn to meet this requirement. It was recognized, however, that it would be necessary to specially train R.C.A.F. personnel to handle the traffic at Goose Bay and Gander and it was agreed that until this training period was completed the existing arrangement whereby both services operated from the same tower should be continued.

This initial training period has now been completed and the necessary R.C.A.F. personnel are on duty at both points and are thoroughly familiar with the requirements of the stations. It is proposed, therefore, that the R.C.A.F. should now take over the full responsibility provided for in the regulations.

It would be appreciated therefore if the appropriate U.S. services could be notified of the intended action so that the necessary steps may be taken to co-ordinate transfer of control to the R.C.A.F. detachments.

...

W. A. CURTIS  
Air Vice-Marshal

936.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Le représentant principal de l'armée des États-Unis, CPCAD,  
au représentant de l'aviation canadienne, CPCAD*

*Senior United States Army Member, PJBD, to Canadian Air Member, PJBD*

Washington, September 1, 1944

Dear Air Vice-Marshal Curtis:

Reference to your letter of 14 August 1944, File S.15-1-204 (Plans J), to me regarding the RCAF taking over the control towers at the Goose and Gander airfields, U.S. Army Air Transport Command is agreeable to the suggestions of the RCAF that they operate the control towers at Goose Bay and Gander airports provided that there is in each tower at all times one (1) AACCS Control Tower Operator. This requirement they believe advisable and even necessary because of the possibility of misunderstandings between U.S. Army pilots and RCAF Control Tower Operators.

...

GUY V. HENRY  
Major-General, U.S. Army

937.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Mémoire du chef de l'état-major de l'Air  
au ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Memorandum from Chief of the Air Staff  
to Minister of National Defence for Air*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 12, 1944

...

MEETING OF PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE SEPTEMBER 6-7, 1944

1. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence met in Montreal September 6-7, 1944. The Department of National Defence for Air was represented by Air



Vice-Marshal W. A. Curtis, Canadian Air Member, and Group-Captain W. F. Hanna. The following topics were discussed by the Board:

...

#### FLYING CONTROL, NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR

15. Air Vice-Marshal Curtis referred to the transfer to Canada of flying control in Newfoundland and Labrador. General Henry stated that this was agreeable to the United States authorities if one competent member of the United States Forces could remain in each tower. The Canadian Section expressed satisfaction with this arrangement.

...

938.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D47)

#### *Procès-verbal d'une conférence des commandants alliés à Terre-Neuve* *Minutes of a Conference of Allied Commanders in Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, August 9, 1945

#### 1. PRESENT

Rear-Admiral E. G. Rose USCG,  
Commander Task Force TWENTY-FOUR.  
Brigadier L. C. Goodeve, DSO,  
Commander Cdn Tps in Nfld.  
Commodore 1st Class C. R. H. Taylor, RCN,  
Flag Officer Newfoundland Force.  
Colonel A. H. Warren, US Army.  
Group-Captain R. S. Grandy, RCAF.  
Captain G. H. Griffiths, RCN.  
Lieutenant H. C. McCormick, USNR.  
Commander J. D. S. Cromarty, RCNVR.  
Major J. J. Aylward, US Army.  
Wing-Commander D. J. Brooker, R.C.A.F.  
Lt.-Colonel I. E. Berner, Cdn Army, Secretary.

2. Brig. Goodeve, at the request of Admiral Rose, acted as Chairman and opened the meeting with a brief reference to para 410 of the Combined Plan for the Defence of Newfoundland.<sup>1</sup>

3. The Conference reviewed the circumstances which brought this Plan into being and the recent changes and developments in the war situation, with consequent material reductions and changes in dispositions and missions of the Armed Forces under respective commands in Nfld.

4. It was felt that the circumstances which gave rise to the formation of the Combined Plan for the Defence of Newfoundland have now so considerably altered that the Plan in its present form is of little, if any, material value and that it would seem to serve no useful purpose to amend this Plan in an effort to met the new conditions.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

5. It was therefore agreed that the Combined Plan for the Defence of Newfoundland in its present form be held and filed for disposal as may be determined by each holder of copies thereof. Consequently it was also agreed that this would be the final Conference of Allied Commanders in respect of this Plan, *vide* para 410 thereof.

I. E. BERNER  
Lt.-Col., Secretary

## PARTIE 6 / PART 6

# LES RELATIONS DE DÉFENSE DANS L'APRÈS-GUERRE POSTWAR DEFENCE RELATIONS

## SECTION A

### LA STRATÉGIE DE DÉFENSE DEFENCE PLANNING

939.

7-CR(s)

*Mémoire du secrétaire du Comité de travail  
sur les problèmes d'après-guerre  
au sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures*<sup>1</sup>

*Memorandum from Secretary, Working Committee  
on Post Hostilities Problems,  
to Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[Ottawa,] November 13, 1944

Regarding consideration by the Working Committee on Post Hostilities Problems of the question of post-war defence in Newfoundland and Labrador, I should like to suggest that this be put on the Agenda for the next meeting of the Working Committee and that the matter be the subject of general discussion with both General Pope and Mr. MacKay present. I have had a talk with Mr. MacKay and he has prepared a memorandum indicating what the War Committee has agreed to as regards defence properties in Newfoundland. A copy of this memorandum is attached.<sup>2</sup>

It appears that the War Committee has had before it certain specific proposals regarding Canadian defence properties in these areas, but it has not passed on the general proposal that Canada should assume responsibility for the post-war defence of Newfoundland and Labrador. The file reveals that on the basis of a suggestion from Mr. MacKay, Mr. Robertson made the suggestion in War Committee that Canada should assume responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland and Labrador and the North West Atlantic, and that a joint United Kingdom-Canada-Newfoundland Defence Board

<sup>1</sup> H. H. Wrong.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

should be established. The War Committee agreed that the proposal might provide a suitable objective of the Canadian policy and that a memorandum should be prepared along these lines. It appears, however, that Mr. Keenleyside would not agree to the idea of the United Kingdom being included in the Joint Defence Board and the memorandum to the War Cabinet was revised accordingly. The War Committee, however, would not agree to the revised submission and the Minutes of a meeting of April 19th record that the decision was deferred "pending further consideration of the questions involved". No further action appears to have been taken since then. Likewise, no action has been taken on General Pope's memorandum suggesting that he be authorized to discuss informally with the United States Military members of the P.J.B.D. the question of the United States relinquishing certain of their defence rights in Newfoundland in favour of Canada, particularly at St. John's, on the principle that Canada should assume responsibility for the general defence of Newfoundland, and that the United States should limit their occupation of bases to those which would enable them to meet their defence requirements farther afield. From the foregoing it seems to me that an informal discussion at this point in the Working Committee, with General Pope and Mr. MacKay present, would be useful, particularly so that we could have a clear idea of what particular proposals (if any) should be put before the War Committee at this time.

G[EORGE] I[GNATIEFF]

940.

7-CR(s)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de travail  
sur les problèmes d'après-guerre*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Working Committee  
on Post Hostilities Problems*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] November 17, 1944

PRESENT:

H. H. Wrong, Esq., Department of External Affairs, Chairman  
H. L. Keenleyside, Esq., Department of External Affairs  
R. A. MacKay, Esq., Department of External Affairs  
Colonel J. H. Jenkins, Department of National Defence (Army)  
Commander H. S. Rayner, Department of National Defence (Naval Services)  
Group-Captain S. W. Coleman, Department of National Defence (Air)  
Lt.-Commander J. S. Hodgson, Department of National Defence (Naval Services)  
Squadron-Leader J. M. Sutherland, Department of National Defence (Air)  
Captain D. A. Hogg, Department of National Defence (Army)  
R. M. Macdonnell, Esq., Department of External Affairs  
J. W. Holmes, Esq., Department of External Affairs, Secretary  
G. Ignatieff, Esq., Department of External Affairs, Assistant Secretary.

...

2. POST-WAR DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR—  
CANADIAN POSITION

The Chairman explained that it was proposed that there should be a preliminary discussion of this question in order to decide whether a report should be made to the Government at this time on the general question of whether Canada should assume responsibility for the post-war defence of Newfoundland and Labrador. This question had been under consideration for some time, and submissions on various aspects had been made through different channels to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and to the War Committee. As Mr. Keenleyside and Mr. MacKay had been especially associated with this question, the Chairman was glad to have their attendance at this meeting. He suggested that the meeting should consider two questions: (a) whether or not the Working Committee-Advisory Committee channel was an appropriate one for making recommendations at this time to the Government; (b) what should be the scope of the recommendations.

The discussion revealed agreement that the question should be considered in the Working Committee with a view to framing recommendations.

...

It was agreed that the question should be referred to the P.H.P. Joint Drafting Group to consider on the basis of Mr. MacKay's memorandum,<sup>1</sup> and that Mr. MacKay should be asked to associate himself with the Group in preparing a paper for consideration in the Working Committee. The Chairman suggested that it would be desirable to have a paper ready for submission to the Advisory Committee within a month.

...

941.

7-AD(s)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de travail  
sur les problèmes d'après-guerre*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Working Committee  
on Post Hostilities Problems*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 15, 1944

...

3. POST-WAR DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR—  
CANADIAN POSITION (C.P.H.P.) (44) Report 7, Draft 1)

The paper submitted by the Joint Drafting Group<sup>1</sup> was considered paragraph by paragraph and it was agreed to, subject to the following:

...

Paragraph 10. This paragraph to be revised and shortened. The view was expressed that no recommendation should be made for the setting up of a Canada-Newfoundland Permanent Joint Defence Board, unless it was evident

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



that Newfoundland desired such a Board. Defence arrangements for Newfoundland during the present war had been carried out by direct relationship between Government authorities and, as the proposals envisaged continuation of the present arrangements on a peace-time scale, there was no reason why there should be special machinery devised to control it. Moreover, the analogy of the P.J.B.D. would not apply, as Newfoundland had no Armed Forces of its own, and no military staff to deal with. It was agreed, however, that it was important that appropriate recognition should be given to Newfoundland's formal equality, and that a sense of partnership in the defence arrangements should, if possible, be created.

...

Paragraph 21 (a). To be revised in accordance with the suggestion of General Pope that, in view of the established United States rights under the Leased Bases Agreement, it was not sufficient merely to advise the United States on action to be taken by Canada. They should be consulted, and the concurrence of the United States should be sought through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. This sub-paragraph to be amended accordingly.

...

942.

7-AD(s)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de travail  
sur les problèmes d'après-guerre*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Working Committee  
on Post Hostilities Problems*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] December 29, 1944

...

3. POST-WAR DEFENCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR—  
CANADIAN POSITION—(C.P.H.P. (44) Report 7, Draft 2)

The Chairman invited discussion of the paper<sup>1</sup> with a view to its approval for submission to the Advisory Committee. He pointed out that many of the considerations in the paper were fundamentally of a political rather than a strategic nature. One of the political difficulties which had to be met was the lack of consciousness of any need for defence in Newfoundland after the war. It was difficult for the Committee to put forward anything but the most tentative recommendations regarding the action which might be taken. The most important factor probably was the attitude of the Newfoundlanders themselves and in this connection it might be desirable for the Committee to have the views of Mr. Scott Macdonald, the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland, who was expected shortly in Ottawa. An effort would be made to arrange for him to meet the Working Committee or the Advisory Committee when this paper would be considered.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

In the meantime the Chairman read a letter<sup>1</sup> from Mr. Macdonald in comment on Mr. MacKay's memorandum<sup>2</sup> which had been discussed at the Thirty-fifth meeting of the Working Committee. This letter expressed Mr. Macdonald's general views on post-war defence relationships between Canada and Newfoundland. A copy had been circulated to the Post Hostilities Joint Drafting Group in connection with the preparation of the present paper. In commenting on Mr. Macdonald's letter the Chairman pointed out that while the prospect of a favourable reception of defence proposals by the Newfoundlanders did not appear favourable according to Mr. Macdonald, it did indicate the importance of a careful consideration of the possible reaction of the people of Newfoundland to the proposed Canadian policy.

General Pope pointed out that both the United Kingdom and United States had made hard bargains with Newfoundland and it would be unfortunate if Canada were to adopt the same attitude. It was important that Canadian policy should be one of co-operation in defence with Newfoundland. The Chairman suggested that one of the difficulties arose from the fact that Canada, unlike the United Kingdom and the United States, had not made firm legal arrangements covering its establishments in Newfoundland.

Mr. MacKay suggested that perhaps Mr. Macdonald underestimated the United Kingdom interest that adequate provision should be made for the defence of Newfoundland by Canada. On the other hand he appeared to over-estimate the effect of Newfoundland opinion on decisions of the Commission Government. Thus, if the United Kingdom were anxious that Canada should take over increased defence responsibilities, the Commission would in all probability take a firm stand, and, as in the case of Goose Bay lease, would hold to its policy in spite of adverse comment at the time in Newfoundland. In any case, opinion in Newfoundland on relations with Canada was by no means uniform. General Pope said that it was inconceivable that the United Kingdom would be unwilling to have Canada take over a responsibility which they themselves were unable to assume.

943.

7-AQ(s)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité consultatif  
sur les problèmes d'après-guerre*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Advisory Committee  
on Post Hostilities Problems*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] January 12, 1945

PRESENT:

N. A. Robertson, Esq., Department of External Affairs, Chairman  
Lt.-General J. C. Murchie, Chief of the General Staff  
Captain Harold Grant, representing Chief of the Naval staff  
Air Vice-Marshal J. A. Sully, representing Chief of the Air Staff

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Major-General Maurice Pope, Privy Council Office  
 W. C. Clark, Esq., Deputy Minister of Finance  
 A. D. P. Heeney, Esq., Secretary to the Cabinet  
 H. H. Wrong, Esq., Department of External Affairs  
 Captain D. K. MacTavish, Privy Council Office (Secretary)  
 Lt.-Col. E. W. T. Gill, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee  
 G. Ignatieff, Esq., Department of External Affairs, Assistant Secretary

...  
 The paper was approved, subject to the amendments which had been agreed, for submission to the War Committee.  
 ...

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

7-CR(s)

*Texte de la position canadienne face à la défense de Terre-Neuve  
 et du Labrador après la guerre*

*Text of Canadian Position on Post-War Defence  
 of Newfoundland and Labrador*

C.P.H.P. (45) REPORT 7 (Revised Final) [Ottawa,] January 12, 1945

SECRET

#### A. THE PRESENT POSITION

1. In recent years it has become recognized that Newfoundland and Labrador are of concern to Canada in:

- (a) the defence of the eastern and northeastern air and sea approaches to Eastern Canada;
- (b) the control of the Northwest Atlantic generally;
- (c) the protection of trade routes between North America and Western Europe;
- (d) the prevention of unneutral acts by foreign belligerents in Canadian coastal waters;
- (e) the protection of the steel industry at Sydney, which is dependent on iron ore from Bell Island;
- (f) the protection of Canadian coastal shipping.

As the Prime Minister has stated (8th September, 1939): "The integrity of Newfoundland and Labrador is essential to the security of Canada".

2. Canada's special, but not exclusive, interest in the security of these territories has been fully acknowledged by both the United Kingdom and the United States. The Protocol annexed to the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941 expressly states among other things:

that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence, and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government.

that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of the agreement . . . the Canadian Government as well as the government of Newfoundland will have the right to participate.

As the Leased Bases Agreement is to be effective for ninety-nine years from 1941, the continuation of Canadian interests is recognized by the language of the Protocol.

3. Continued acceptance of Canadian responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador after the war has been recommended by the Advisory Committee on Post Hostilities Problems: the Report entitled "Post-war Canadian Defence Relationship with the United States" (C.P.H.P. (44) Report 5 (Revised Final) October 26th, 1944)<sup>1</sup> includes the following recommendation:

that Canada should continue to accept responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, and that the part of the United States in the defence of these territories should be limited to the operation of their leased bases in Newfoundland.

4. During the present war Canada has always been careful to obtain the consent of the Newfoundland Commission of Government to all extensions of defence activities in Newfoundland: thus it has been tacitly admitted that Canada has no rights there beyond those granted by the Newfoundland Government. As matters now stand, Canada will have no general defence rights and few specific defence rights for the fulfilment of a post-war policy of accepting defence responsibilities in the territory. Our present general rights,—freedom of movement of troops, the use of ports and territorial waters for belligerent purposes, the right of passage by land, sea and air, the right of landing and takeoffs, etc.,—will lapse after the war unless continued by specific agreement. Canada's only confirmed specific right arises from the Goose Bay Agreement, which clearly implies the right of continued use for military purposes for ninety-nine years from September 1941. Additional specific rights may be accorded to Canada in the near future: the Newfoundland Commission of Government has recently approved in principle the enactment of confirming acts regarding other properties (including the grant of the express rights of military use) as follows:

- (a) ninety-nine year lease to marine railway and ancillary facilities at Bay Bulls;
- (b) fifty-year lease to defence facilities constructed at Botwood;
- (c) fifty-year lease to defence facilities constructed at Gander (though not expressly including the use of the runways);
- (d) title in fee simple to Torbay Air Base;
- (e) title to certain other minor properties such as radio stations (but excluding stations at Cape Ray).

#### B. PROPOSED FUTURE POLICY

5. The fulfilment of the "responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador" (as proposed in paragraph 3 above) requires, in addition

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



to the military use of specific properties, that the Canadian Armed Forces be accorded reasonable freedom of action and movement into, from and within the territory of Newfoundland and Labrador during peace as well as war. It is therefore proposed that—preferably, but not necessarily, as the result of a formal invitation originated by the United Kingdom,—Canada should seek to assume responsibility, in co-operation with Newfoundland, for the local defence of the Newfoundland-Labrador area, including the immediately adjacent areas of the high seas. It will be noted that the proposal relates only to *local* defence as opposed to general or regional security. While it must be admitted that the two are complementary aspects of a single problem, arrangements affecting the one need not in any way interfere with the other. Such a policy need not be inconsistent with the establishment of a post-war world security organization, nor with Canada's post-war defence relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, nor with "general security" interests of the United Kingdom and the United States in Newfoundland, as will be indicated below.

6. However, it is recognized that any direct request from Canada for these defence rights would probably be misinterpreted by the people of Newfoundland as a step in the direction of annexation or at least domination, and, if so, would no doubt be strongly opposed. Such a request would also probably be viewed with concern by the Governments of the United Kingdom and United States unless they were informed in advance and assured that their interests would not be prejudiced or their respective rights impaired. Moreover, any approach to the question from the point of view of exclusive legal rights would be inexpedient, since it would provoke opposition from the other parties concerned.

#### C. THE PROPOSED POLICY IN RELATION TO A WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION

7. It appears probable that some form of world security organization will be established after the war. Newfoundland and Labrador, in view of their geographical location in the Northwest Atlantic, would be of importance in the plan of general security. The proposed policy would assist in the safeguarding of the security of the region and could also be integrated into a general security plan. If individual bases, such as St. John's, Goose Bay or Gander, should be designated as "United Nations bases", the responsibility for organizing and administering these bases would properly be vested jointly in Canada and Newfoundland.

8. The policy proposed in paragraphs 5 and 6 would further Canada's own strategic security. It is, therefore, a measure [of] reinsurance against the possibility that such an organization does not materialize or proves ineffective, and against any delay on the part of the Organization in taking military action. The policy would slightly reduce the degree of Canada's dependence upon any such organization and upon her probable allies in the event of a future general war.

## D. ACCEPTABILITY TO NEWFOUNDLAND

9. The proposed policy would probably be opposed by the people of Newfoundland, unless:

- (a) the original negotiations with the Newfoundland Commission of Government, and any measures adopted for the implementation of the joint responsibilities assumed, formally recognized the equality of Newfoundland and Canada;
- (b) the policy carried direct advantages to Newfoundland, and was generally more satisfactory to Newfoundland than alternative arrangements which that territory might share with the United Kingdom or the United States;
- (c) it was made clear from the outset that Canada's sole concern was defence and that defence rights would not be used as a cover for securing a preferred position in other fields (e.g. civil aviation).

10. It cannot be concealed that the "equality" of Newfoundland in these arrangements would be more formal than real, but it would be most desirable that they should convey to Newfoundland a sense of partnership. The question whether the arrangements can best be carried out by direct relationship between the two governments or by the establishment of special machinery, could be decided at a later date when the wishes of Newfoundland on the matter are known.

11. The main consideration is to secure a defence arrangement that would permit reasonable freedom of action at all times for Canadian defence forces and at the same time would be acceptable to the people of Newfoundland. Canada will possibly have to carry the financial responsibility for the defence of the Newfoundland-Labrador area, since there is at present little prospect that the Newfoundland budget will permit of anything but "token" contributions. On the other hand, Newfoundland has already provided some unimproved sites for defence installations and other facilities useful for defence purposes such as the railway, roads, port facilities, and telecommunications services.

12. In addition, it might be desirable to offer favourable terms for the participation of Newfoundland personnel in defence duties, such as:

- (a) facilitated recruitment of Newfoundland personnel in the Canadian Armed Forces; and
- (b) assistance in the establishment and training of Newfoundland militia. In this way it might be argued that Canada will be helping Newfoundland to establish an indigenous defence force.

13. If the arrangements are reasonably satisfactory, they should prove equally acceptable regardless of whether Newfoundland continues after the war as a Crown Colony or whether a form of representative government is instituted or dominion status restored. If Newfoundland should at some future time become a tenth Canadian province, its defence would automatically merge with the general defence of Canada, and defence facilities could be

maintained and establishment distributed at will: in such a case the proposed policy would provide a logical interim measure pending federation. In this connection the most recent indication of Canadian Government policy is contained in a statement of the Prime Minister made in July, 1943:

If the people of Newfoundland should ever decide that they wish to enter the Canadian federation and should make that decision clear beyond all possibility of misunderstanding, Canada would give most sympathetic consideration to the proposal.

Such a development cannot, however, be regarded as inevitable: there is a strong current of anti-Canadian feeling in Newfoundland, and a strong desire for autonomy; and in Canada the opinion is widely held that federation with Newfoundland would involve acceptance of a continuing financial liability. While such sentiments predominate, federation hardly appears likely. The situation is further complicated by the extra-territorial rights of the U.S. in Newfoundland: accordingly, extensive re-negotiation would probably be a prerequisite to federation.

#### E. ACCEPTABILITY TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

14. Any defence rights which the United Kingdom may have in Newfoundland have not in recent years entailed a direct military commitment of the United Kingdom. Since the withdrawal of the Imperial garrison in 1870, it does not appear that the United Kingdom ever stationed forces in Newfoundland: this is hardly surprising, in view of the apparent immunity of the territory to enemy attack until recent years. During the war of 1914-18, H.M. ships of the Atlantic Coast Patrol manned chiefly by Canadians, conducted regular mine-sweeping patrols at the port of St. John's, but this was primarily for the protection of trade rather than for direct local defence. During the present war, when the new vulnerability of North America suddenly became recognized, the United Kingdom's military resources were so overstrained that nothing could be spared for the local defence of Newfoundland, hence the assumption of this task by Canada and the United States.

15. The principle of the proposed policy would probably be regarded with favour by the U.K. Government,—provided that the procedure for implementation is satisfactory and provided that reasonable guarantees are given,—especially in view of:

- (a) the number and magnitude of British post-war military commitments elsewhere;
- (b) the fact that acceptance of the proposal would involve little more than a continuation of current defence arrangements in Newfoundland. In this connection it is of interest to note that a recent War Office request to Canada for an estimate of requirements for Canadian coast artillery also included a request for a separate estimate of long-term requirements for coast artillery for Newfoundland, and stated that the Newfoundland Government had been advised to that effect.

16. Nevertheless, the U.K. has a continuing and vital interest in the strategic security of Newfoundland in view of that territory's importance in the protection of trans-Atlantic communications—the lifelines of the United Kingdom itself. As Canada cannot accept in advance any commitment to enter into a future general war simultaneously with the United Kingdom, the Admiralty would undoubtedly be anxious to ensure that its interests were protected in the event of Canadian neutrality. The United Kingdom is unlikely to permit a recurrence in Newfoundland of its present dilemma in Ireland. Moreover, by virtue of Britain's trusteeship for Newfoundland, concurrence in principle should be obtained from the United Kingdom before Canada makes any official approach to the Newfoundland authorities.

17. Any attempt by Canada therefore to assume continuing responsibility jointly with Newfoundland for the local defence of the area should meet the strategic and political requirements of the United Kingdom. The Admiralty may require continued rights in St. John's Naval Base comparable to those enjoyed by the Royal Navy in Halifax and Esquimalt pursuant to the Orders-in-Council of 1910-11. It should be noted that if Canada is to assume the responsibility indicated, the right to continue to operate and administer the St. John's Base in peacetime must be obtained from the United Kingdom as title-holder.

#### F. ACCEPTABILITY TO THE UNITED STATES

18. After the war the United States will undoubtedly retain, under the Leased Bases Agreement, those defence facilities in Newfoundland which are essential to the fulfilment of its security requirements in the Northwest Atlantic region generally, i.e., the naval base at Argentia and the air base at Stephenville.

19. The remaining U.S.-leased base, the U.S. Army Station at St. John's (Fort Pepperrell), was selected at a time when the U.S. navy expected to base its ships at that port, and was completed notwithstanding the fact that St. John's harbour was subsequently found to be totally inadequate for the purpose. It appears possible that the station will in the near future be reduced to care and maintenance, if not completely abandoned.

20. In view of the vital U.S. interest in the general security of the region, and the continuing U.S. military rights in Newfoundland, it is essential that the United States be consulted regarding the proposed policy. In any discussion of the subject with U.S. authorities it should be emphasized that the policy is in no way exclusive and is not in essence a new development, but merely a method of continuing the defence arrangements presently in force.

#### G. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY

21. The appropriate procedure for the execution of the policy proposed in this memorandum would depend upon the state of public opinion in the



countries concerned; but for illustrative purposes it is suggested that execution might involve the following steps:

- (a) informal discussion of the question in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence;
- (b) an informal approach to the U.K. authorities with a view to obtaining from them a formal request or suggestion that Canada and Newfoundland assume joint responsibility;
- (c) the Newfoundland Commission of Government should be informed of this approach to the United Kingdom;
- (d) on receipt of a favourable reply from the U.K., negotiations should be instituted between Newfoundland and Canada.

22. It is considered most desirable that the question should be raised at an early date rather than after the war, since:

- (a) after the war, as matters now stand, Canada will have no right to operate generally within the territory of Newfoundland: once Canadian forces have been withdrawn, it would be difficult to "reoccupy" in peacetime;
- (b) provision for the defence of Newfoundland would be an important consideration in the settlement of the constitutional issue in Newfoundland, and it is, therefore, desirable that Canada's position should be made known to the United Kingdom Government before decisions on the constitutional question are taken;
- (c) after the war, a sense of immunity from attack, already present, will probably increase in Newfoundland, which, whether realistic or otherwise, might well preclude a successful revival of the question of defence arrangements.

944.

7-CR(s)

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, February 23, 1945

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I have now had an opportunity to read the report of the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Planning mentioned in Mr. Wrong's letter of January 31st,<sup>1</sup> and forwarded with Mr. MacKay's letter of February 13th.<sup>1</sup>

The proposal set forth in the report, as I understand it, is that the United Kingdom Government be requested to instruct the Commission of Govern-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ment here to negotiate with Canada an Agreement providing for the joint defence of Newfoundland.

Such a proposal, in my view, does not take sufficient account of the basic fact that the defence of Newfoundland is already provided for in large measure by a third party, the United States, whose installations—the U.S. Army Base at Fort Pepperrell, the U.S. Navy Base at Fort MacAndrew, and the U.S. Air Base at Harmon Field—dwarf anything that we would ever establish even if there were a much greater need for defence than there is. I do not see the slightest likelihood that, having expended hundreds of millions of dollars establishing these bases and taking every precaution to see that their rights are fully recognized by the British and Newfoundland authorities, the United States would contemplate withdrawing its forces from the Island. Nor is it probable that having the biggest installations they would sit by and allow a Canadian-Newfoundland Board to take over the responsibility for the defence of the Island and the planning and direction that such an assumption of responsibility would entail. Moreover I find it difficult to see that a legitimate line can be drawn between the defence of Newfoundland and the defence of the area around it, an idea that seems to run through the report though it is not brought out very explicitly. Our planes at Goose Bay or Torbay or at the seaplane Base at Botwood or our war-ships at Bay Bulls or St. John's would inevitably be integrally associated with the defence of the whole area.

Nor would the scheme of joint defence be of any practical value even if we achieved it. Newfoundland would not be able to contribute anything—either money, technical assistance or administrative direction—but would, in return for nominal association in defence, get the right to interfere in everything we did or didn't do.

Any value the proposal might have lies, of course, in the belief that it would make the continued presence of our Forces here more palatable to Newfoundlanders. There is undoubtedly some truth in this point. But whether it is worth the risk of re-opening the whole question of our post-war military rights by admitting that we have no such rights, and the practical disadvantage of Newfoundland's interference in our arrangements is very questionable. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the main Newfoundland objection to the granting of long-term leases for defence purposes is that Canada thereby secures commercial rights for civil aviation at the expense of Newfoundland. It is quite true that nothing we do in this field can be done without the consent of Newfoundland. Nevertheless, the strongly held popular view is that the building of these bases on Newfoundland sites gives us in practice a preferred position in commercial aviation in Newfoundland. Even if we agreed to give Newfoundland an equal voice with ourselves in the defence of Newfoundland and undertook to provide all the troops and meet all the expenses that would be involved, it would not meet their main criticism, the alienation for defence purposes (for which they do not feel the slightest need) of valuable sites for commercial air bases.

I have already set forth the position as justly as I can in my letter of December 1st<sup>1</sup>, and I think the steps there outlined are the ones we should take. For convenience of reference perhaps I should briefly recapitulate that position and bring it up to date. In our Agreements with Newfoundland we have already secured large bases for long periods at Goose Bay, Botwood, Torbay and Bay Bulls. In the proposed Confirming Acts we have already asked for the right of military user which is implied in the basic Agreements, though it would, of course, have been very much better to have been specifically written into these Agreements when they were first negotiated. Moreover, we are paying for the establishment of, and are actually operating, a considerable Naval Base for the British Admiralty at St. John's which, it is contemplated, will in due course be handed over for permanent control by Canada. It is much better, I think, that we should go ahead on the assumption that we have clearly implied post-war military rights than that we should act as though we haven't got them and must now ask for them. If the Commission of Government, in the final analysis, should refuse to carry out the obligations entered into in their freely accepted Agreements, then we would have strong grounds on which to approach the United Kingdom authorities, who are responsible for the conduct of Newfoundland's external affairs, and ask that the Agreements be duly carried out.

I note that Mr. Wrong, in his letter of January 31st, states that these bases are insufficient for the defence of Newfoundland in that they would not permit of adequate training operations. Could not training be done in our own bases in Canada? In any case the danger that one or more of our allies will attack Newfoundland is clearly so remote as to be hypothetical. In these circumstances would it not be unwise to antagonise Newfoundland opinion further by asking for broader post-war military rights even though those for which we have already asked may not be quite perfect?

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

945.

7-CR(s)

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 10, 1945

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

I refer to your letter of February 23rd commenting on the report of the defence of Newfoundland, approved by the Advisory Committee on Post Hostilities Planning.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

This report has not yet gone beyond the official level, and will probably not do so for some time in view of the present pre-occupation with internal political matters. Nevertheless, the general principle that Canada should assume definite, though not exclusive responsibility for the post-war defence of Newfoundland, has been indirectly agreed to as a result of approval of another report on Canada's relations with the United States. In a sense, therefore, the report on the defence of Newfoundland is a report on the means of carrying out accepted policy. Whether the most effective means is that of clearing up titles to base areas to which we have already been promised title, or whether an additional over-all agreement providing for continued co-operation with Newfoundland in defence matters is preferable is the essential point at issue.

It was generally agreed by the Committee that mere title to defence properties was not entirely satisfactory; first because it would limit freedom of action of defence forces in peace-time, and second, because it would leave Newfoundland in the somewhat invidious position of being a mere military protectorate. I note that you think the joint defence arrangements with Newfoundland are likely to be objectionable in practice since they would permit interference on Newfoundland's part. There is, no doubt, some point to this objection. The question is whether possible interference would out-weigh the advantages to be derived from an arrangement which recognized Newfoundland's interests and susceptibilities.

You are, no doubt, right in assuming that the United States will not likely relinquish the bases, and that it will provide adequately and can provide more abundantly for the defence of Newfoundland than Canada could. There are, however, certain political considerations of importance. Were the United States exclusively responsible for the defence of Newfoundland in 1914 or 1939, Canada's freedom of action to intervene at once in support of Great Britain might well have been severely restricted. The Canadian people are not likely to accept willingly a situation which might limit their future freedom of action in the event of any major crisis in the North Atlantic region. The military defence of Newfoundland is of less consequence to Canada than the protection of long-run Canadian interests in the North Atlantic region. We cannot, therefore, permit Newfoundland to become an exclusive military protectorate of the United States.

I am inclined to think that the Newfoundland people will eventually see Canadian participation in their defence in a better perspective than they now do. They like to call their country "Britain's Oldest Colony"; I can scarcely conceive of them wanting to become a mere military protectorate



of the United States. They may come to look upon Canadian participation in defence of the region as an off-set against exclusive protection by the United States. The question of civil aviation should also be straightened out before long. Eventually the Newfoundland people may learn that air fields which are at best likely to be merely refueling stops in trans-Atlantic communications, are not likely to be revenue producers. Indeed, the prospects are that they will have to ask for assistance for maintenance.

Yours sincerely,

[N. A. ROBERTSON]

946.

7-CR(s)

*Mémoire du conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>*

*Memorandum by Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa,] May 2, 1945

The following seemed to me to be the chief points which arose in the course of the discussions with Mr. Winter about postwar defence arrangements in Newfoundland.<sup>2</sup>

1. Willingness to consider any reasonable proposal. Mr. Winter thought that the Newfoundland Government and public opinion would accept any suggestions on the part of Canada which took into account the fact that Newfoundland could make only a small contribution. He did not appear to think it important whether a joint Canadian-Newfoundland scheme were undertaken or whether Canada was given sole responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland. He felt that the United Kingdom would be interested and should be consulted but knew of no plans or their part to provide for the defence of Newfoundland after the war.
2. Relief and a certain amount of surprise that our principal interest is in defence arrangements and that we are not entertaining designs to control the civil use of airfields. Mr. Winter thought that this

<sup>1</sup> R. A. MacKay.

<sup>2</sup> Ces discussions eurent lieu le 1<sup>er</sup> mai au bureau de R. M. Macdonnell entre les représentants de Terre-Neuve (H. A. Winter, H. G. Puddester et H. A. L. Pattison) et ceux du Canada W. F. Hanna, G. Ignatieff et R. A. MacKay).

<sup>2</sup> These discussions took place on May 1, in R. M. Macdonnell's office between Newfoundland representatives (H. A. Winter, H. G. Puddester and H. A. L. Pattison) and Canadian representatives W. F. Hanna, G. Ignatieff and R. A. MacKay.

would go a considerable distance in pacifying public opinion in Newfoundland. He gave the impression of being rather agreeably surprised at the absence of Canadian economic imperialism although he said that he had never himself agreed with those who suspected Canada's intentions.

3. The immediate problem in the minds of the Newfoundlanders is the civil use of the airfields, particularly Torbay and Gander. They are not in a position to fulfil the letter of agreements with Canada under which they are to take over control and operation at the end of European hostilities. They would obviously like us to help them out by looking after these fields for some time to come, but at the same time they will want our consent to making a number of changes which will permit them to meet the requirements of civil airline companies. For example, Pan American Airways will undoubtedly want to acquire or erect buildings to take care of civilian traffic for which our consent would be necessary.
4. In an entirely personal and confidential discussion Mr. Winter suggested that we consider how the problems of defence arrangements and civil aviation would be affected in the event of confederation. It was agreed that confederation would provide the easiest and simplest solution.

In general Messrs. Winter and Pattison thought that problems of defence and civil aviation could not be separated and should be discussed at the same time. The view of the Canadian representatives was that these were separate problems and that they should not be merged. The Newfoundlanders urged an early meeting to discuss both problems while the Canadian representatives pointed out that it would be some months before the Canadian Government could be expected to have reached decisions on the question of postwar defence arrangements.

At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that Mr. Winter would discuss with his colleagues in the Newfoundland Government the general lines of our discussion with a view to holding intergovernmental discussions at some time in the future. It seemed clear that neither Newfoundland nor Canada would be ready for such discussions until September or October. For their part the Canadian representatives said that they would continue their consideration of the defence problems and would endeavour to secure the views of the Government whenever this was possible.

On the question of civil use of the airfields it was agreed to recommend that the existing arrangements should be continued in force (i.e. that Canada would continue her operational control) but that Canada would be prepared to consider sympathetically any *ad hoc* revisions and amendments which might be put forward by Newfoundland in order to enable them to take care of post-hostilities civil aviation needs.

947.

7-AB(s)

*Mémoire du secrétaire du Comité de travail  
sur les problèmes d'après-guerre  
au sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Memorandum from Secretary, Working Committee  
on Post-Hostilities Problems,  
to Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] June 28, 1945

...

## III. NEWFOUNDLAND

This is perhaps the most urgent outstanding business of the P.H.P. You will recall that the Advisory Committee approved a paper on the "Canadian Post-war Defence Policy in relation to Newfoundland and Labrador" (C.P.H.P. (45) Report 7 (Revised Final) of the 12th January). Since then there has been a visit to Ottawa by Mr. Winter, one of the Newfoundland Commissioners, and talks with him regarding the Confirming Acts which Newfoundland Government wish to postpone pending discussion of the civil use of air bases. This question has come to the fore, particularly with regard to a request from the Swedish Government for use of Goose Bay for trial trans-Atlantic flights. There has also been an approach from the Admiralty to the R.C.N. suggesting that the R.C.N. should turn over its facilities at St. John's to the Admiralty. The R.C.N. has been asked by the Department to hold its hand pending decision on the broader question of Canadian defence policy in respect of Newfoundland. The question of the disposal of surplus defence assets by the three Canadian Services in Newfoundland has also been raised. Correspondence from Mr. Macdonald indicates the need for an early start of negotiations with the Newfoundland Government on post-war Canadian defence relations with Newfoundland and it is suggested that early consideration be given to whether the paper approved by the Advisory Committee needs revision before being submitted to the War Committee in the light of subsequent developments.

...

948.

7-AB(s)

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Memorandum by Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] July 25, 1945

## POLITICO-STRATEGIC PLANNING

This note is merely an attempt to list as a basis for discussion the chief matters connected with post-war defence policy and organization which are now pending or are likely to call for active consideration in the near future.

## 1. Newfoundland

The questions of Canadian defence properties, civil aviation rights, continuing Canadian responsibility for defence and the political and economic policy to be followed towards Newfoundland are all closely connected and require consideration together. The P.H.P. Paper completed in January is already out of date. Do we require some new interdepartmental organization to deal with Newfoundland problems together, containing representatives of External Affairs, Privy Council, Chiefs of Staff and Finance, with authority to co-opt other members for special purposes? Is the time ripe for suggesting a small Cabinet Committee on Newfoundland matters?<sup>1</sup>

949.

50204-40

*Mémoire du conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures<sup>2</sup> au sous-secrétaire d'État  
associé aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for  
External Affairs<sup>2</sup> to Associate Under-Secretary of State for  
External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 6, 1945

## POST-WAR DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITIES IN NEWFOUNDLAND

1. In the absence of any clear-cut decision with respect to defence responsibilities in Newfoundland and with a view to retrenchment, each of the armed services seems to be following its own course with regard to withdrawal from Newfoundland and the disposal of surplus assets there.

- A. Naval Service has reduced Botwood to a care and maintenance basis, and presumably St. John's is now reduced to this basis as well. They would probably have withdrawn completely except for a hint from this Department to go slow.
- B. The Air Force were anxious to withdraw, but have been restrained because of United States requirements for the use of Goose and Gander for planes returning with service personnel. It is possible that the United States will wish to have Goose and Gander available so long as United States forces remain in occupation in Germany. Information disclosed by United States members of the Permanent

<sup>1</sup> Au début de 1946, un organisme interministériel non-officiel fut mis sur pieds pour s'occuper des questions concernant Terre-Neuve. Plus tard la même année un comité interministériel et un comité du Cabinet furent formés dans le même but.

<sup>2</sup> R. A. MacKay.

<sup>1</sup> An informal interdepartmental organization to deal with Newfoundland questions was set up early in 1946, and later that year an interdepartmental Committee and a Cabinet Committee were formally established for the same purpose.



Joint Board on Defence at the September meeting is that the War Department is preparing a memorandum to be forwarded to the Canadian Government indicating continued defence interests in various airfields, including Goose and Gander...

- c. The Army is anxious to clear out of Newfoundland completely, and will propose to us and Crown Assets shortly that an offer be made to the Newfoundland Government to take over all surplus assets there at a "knock-down price". Army apparently proposes, also, to clear out all personnel in Newfoundland at the earliest possible date. If the Army's proposals are carried through, three months hence there may not be a single coast defence gun, anti-aircraft gun or machine gun in working order in Newfoundland, and no Army personnel.

2. This retreat from Newfoundland seems to me to be unduly precipitate in view of the present international situation and in view of our probable commitments in the event of the United Nations Organization getting under way.

3. In view of the probability that we shall have to discuss the civil use of airfields at an early date with the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments and in view of the general understanding which I think we have reached with the Newfoundland Government that post-war defence arrangements and civil aviation should be considered at the same time, I suggest that some action should be taken:

- (a) to slow down the "retreat" from Newfoundland;
- (b) to give consideration to long-term defence requirements in the region, assuming we continue to bear about the same proportion of responsibility for defence there as we did during the war—the Chiefs of Staff Committee would appear to be the appropriate body to undertake this; and
- (c) that consideration be given to the political arrangements that might be made with Newfoundland, assuming we continue responsibility for defence there—presumably a job for this Department.

950.

50204-40

*Le secrétaire du Comité des chefs d'état-major au sous-secrétaire  
d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>*

*Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Acting Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

Ottawa, November 12, 1945

The Chiefs of Staff, at their meeting of November 9th, considered your letter of October 12th<sup>2</sup> regarding the provisions which should be included

<sup>1</sup> H. H. Wrong.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

in any short term civil air agreement with Newfoundland so as to safeguard Canada's defence interests in that region.<sup>1</sup>

The Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following provisions should be included in any such agreement:

- (1) Canadian defence forces to have the right of free movement in, through and over Newfoundland and Labrador territory and territorial waters, including the right of ingress to and egress from any defence installation, and the use of existing roads, railways, port facilities, etc.
- (2) Canadian defence forces to have the right to use any aerodromes in Newfoundland or Labrador presently built or constructed in the future, except those presently leased to the United States, including the right to the continued use of such buildings and facilities as may be agreed upon with the Newfoundland Government from time to time, and the right to store certain types of equipment including bombs, ammunition, fuel, oil, etc., for use as required.
- (3) Canada to have the right to establish and operate such facilities and installations other than aerodromes as may be required for the defence of Newfoundland, subject to the prior approval of the Newfoundland government.
- (4) Newfoundland Government to consult with the Canadian Government before conceding any military rights to any third nation in respect to aerodromes or other military installations or the basing of any military forces whatsoever.
- (5) Canada to have the right to take over and operate in their entirety all aerodromes other than those presently leased to the United States and all other facilities and installations considered necessary to the defence of Newfoundland when a state of emergency has been declared or is considered to exist.

These recommendations are made on the understanding that the conclusion in the report of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Hostilities Problems; viz., "that Canada should continue to accept responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, and that the part of the United States in the defence of these territories should be limited to the operation of their leased bases in Newfoundland," will form an integral part of any new agreement, and on the further understanding that Goose Bay, Gander and Torbay aerodromes will be kept in operation.

E. W. T. GILL  
Lieutenant-Colonel

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 983.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 983.

SECTION B  
LA LIQUIDATION DES BIENS DE GUERRE<sup>1</sup>  
DISPOSAL OF WAR ASSETS<sup>1</sup>

951.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, January 17, 1945

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## TRANSFER OF MILITARY HOSPITALS TO NEWFOUNDLAND

35. THE SECRETARY reported that a proposal had been made that the hospitals at Botwood and Lewisporte, which were no longer required by the Army, be transferred with their equipment to the Newfoundland government, who required them for local needs.

The Newfoundland government had not suggested that they would be unwilling to pay for these facilities, but it had been suggested by the Canadian High Commissioner that, since the salvage value would be very low and civilian need great, it would be desirable to transfer them as a gift on the part of the Canadian Government.

An explanatory note had been circulated.

(Secretary's note, Jan. 16, 1945<sup>2</sup>—C.W.C. document 922).

36. THE MINISTER OF MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY observed that it was established policy that surplus equipment should not be donated for charitable purposes.

It would create an awkward precedent if surpluses outside of Canada were to be given away. On the other hand, when the Army declared these facilities surplus, there would be no difficulty in having them made available to Newfoundland at a reasonable price.

<sup>1</sup> Entre 1945 et 1947 le gouvernement canadien liquida la plupart de ses surplus de guerre à Terre-Neuve. Le gouvernement terre-neuvien se vit offrir la première option d'achat et nomma un représentant pour sauvegarder ses intérêts. Le haut commissaire canadien recommanda que les propriétés pouvant être utiles au gouvernement terre-neuvien lui soient données. Cependant, le gouvernement canadien ne fut pas de cet avis. Les documents reproduits ici illustrent un de ces cas.

<sup>1</sup> Between 1945 and 1947 the Canadian Government disposed of most of its surplus war assets in Newfoundland. The Newfoundland Government was offered first refusal, and it appointed an agent to safeguard Newfoundland interests. The Canadian High Commissioner recommended that properties which could be of use to the Newfoundland Government be given to it, but the Canadian Government did not think this appropriate. The documents here reproduced illustrate one case of this kind.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

37. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after further discussion, agreed that the hospitals and equipment should be disposed of to Newfoundland in the normal way and not by gift.

...

952.

1156-BF-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, February 10, 1945

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I am greatly disappointed to learn that the recommendation I put forward last October that the military hospitals at Lewisporte and Botwood be presented to the Newfoundland Government as a gift from Canada, when no longer required by the Army, has been turned down by the War Committee.

I am even more disappointed by the grounds on which the recommendation was turned down, namely, that "a policy had been established for general application in Canada that surplus equipment should not be donated for charitable purposes". This consideration, while it may be and doubtless is perfectly valid in Canada, is surely not relevant to the situation in Newfoundland. Here we need to employ every counter we have to gain good-will for Canada or rather to help remove the feeling of coolness and suspicion with which Canada is, and has long been, regarded. The transfer of these hospitals at an appropriate and well publicized ceremony broadcast over the Island, would have redounded very greatly to our advantage and would have given a unique opportunity to touch upon the numerous mercy-flights and other assistance we have rendered to the Island during the course of the war. It would have been particularly valuable at this time when we are endeavouring to secure important concessions from Newfoundland consolidating our position at Gander and securing the right of military user in connection with the installations we have established as well as confirming property titles.

I do not see how we can sell these properties for anything commensurate with what they cost to build and we can hardly dismantle them and move them away from communities which very badly need them without antagonising public opinion in these communities and, indeed, in the Island generally. In view of the War Committee's decision, however, I have in-



formed the Government that they would be given a chance to buy them if they wished and I assume that the next step will be for the representative of the War Assets Corporation in Newfoundland to endeavour to get the best price he can for them.<sup>1</sup>

I hope to write you shortly on the general question of the disposal of surplus assets when I have had further discussions with the General Officer Commanding and the local agent of the War Assets Corporation.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

### SECTION C

#### LE RETRAIT DE L'ARMÉE CANADIENNE WITHDRAWAL OF CANADIAN ARMY

953.

1156-C-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 124

Ottawa, May 21, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to advise you that in view of the reduction of the Canadian Army commitment in Newfoundland it has been decided to replace the present General Officer Commanding by an officer of the rank of Brigadier. Similar changes have recently been made by the Royal Canadian Air Force and the United States Army with respect to their Senior Officers in Newfoundland.

2. Brigadier L. C. Goodeve, D.S.O., has been selected to succeed the present General Officer Commanding, Major-General H. N. Ganong, C.B.E., and will take over the duties of his new appointment on June 1 next. The Newfoundland Commission of Government should be informed of the impending change.

I have etc.

R. G. RIDDELL  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve décida de ne pas acheter l'hôpital de Lewisporte mais offrit \$35,000 pour celui de Botwood.

<sup>1</sup> The Newfoundland Government decided not to buy the hospital at Lewisporte but offered \$35,000 for the one at Botwood.

DND (DH) 955.003 (D1)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Sous-comité mixte de Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland*

SECRET

St. John's, May 28, 1945

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ITEM I

## REDUCTION OF OPS TPS CDN ARMY

All AA Arty and Cst Arty Cape Spear reverted to Trg role 10 May 45. Remainder of Cst Arty and Inf have combined Ops role.

Nfld Govt is considering question of demobilization and may request withdrawal of Nfld Regt personnel manning Cst Arty def and watching stns at Bell Island.

It was decided that if the Nfld Govt made such a request that the present situation justified concurrence.

It was also decided that all Inf could be reverted to a trg role except one combat team in St. John's and outposts of one sec each at Bay Roberts and Harbour Grace.

It was noted that NDHQ GSO 190 advised withdrawal of all Cst Arty and Inf when scale of attack indicated no further risk.

. . .

955.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire*  
*à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner*  
*in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 135

Ottawa, May 31, 1945

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to advise you that in view of the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the following reductions in the Army garrisons in Newfoundland and Labrador will be made in the course of the next three months:

	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Other Ranks</i>
From Goose Bay and Rigolet	27	464
From Newfoundland	64	1153

These withdrawals include the remaining Coast and Anti-Aircraft Artillery personnel in Labrador and Newfoundland—less small maintenance detachments which are being left in the St. John's area.

2. When the above withdrawals have been completed, the only Army personnel remaining in the Goose Bay and Gander areas will be small detachments for supplying the continuing Royal Canadian Air Force garrisons and for special "Upper Wind" studies. In the St. John's area, the troops remaining will consist of Infantry and Services personnel, in addition to the small artillery detachments mentioned above.

3. Will you please inform the Newfoundland Commission of Government accordingly.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

956.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, June 14-15, 1945

. . .

CANADIAN ARMY

. . .

Second Rcmdn—Defence of Newfoundland

2. (a) The AA Artillery at Gander and the Coast and AA Artillery at St. John's have been taken out of action and personnel are being returned to Canada.
- (b) When these withdrawals have been effected, the remaining Canadian garrison in Newfoundland will number about 1,900 all ranks, concentrated mainly in the St. John's area. This figure will be further reduced when the Headquarters and admin establishments have been reviewed.

. . .

957.

10298-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, September 6, 1945

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Yesterday there was considerable animation in the town and in the port as the last contingent of the United States Army, about twelve hundred

strong, embarked for home on the troopship *Claymont Victory*. A large crowd of civilians, mostly women, was on hand to wave them farewell and the vessels in the Harbour joined in with their whistles to give them a resounding send-off. With the departure of these troops Fort Pepperrel and Fort McAndrew are now down to a care and maintenance basis with engineer, supply, medical, ordnance and other details amounting to approximately 600 men in the one and somewhat less than 300 in the other.

The departure of the United States Military Forces will bring into relief the continued presence of Canadian troops in St. John's. They number approximately 1,200 men and, unlike the Americans, who have their own base, about a mile outside the city, superbly provided with cafeteria, cinema, library, church, sports and recreational facilities, are located in the town and, consequently, are constantly in the public eye. The assumption among Newfoundlanders, of course, is that the Canadian troops will be leaving very shortly. While I have not yet heard any unfavourable comment on their continued presence here the matter is likely to attract public attention before very long.

The position seems rather anomalous in any case since our interest in post-war defence has always been regarded as predominantly in air and naval bases. Both of these services, however, have reduced their forces rapidly. The Royal Canadian Navy will reach a care and maintenance basis in St. John's by the end of this month when all but approximately 300 men will have left. The Royal Canadian Air Force has already been reduced to a mere 20 men here though at Torbay, some three miles distant, there is a personnel of 834. At Gander strength has been reduced to 750, all ranks, and when another 100 have left the station will be down to the minimum necessary to maintain the base as an operating air-port. Another 155 are engaged on radar work in various parts of the Island but three of the five remaining radar stations are about to be dismantled and the personnel returned to Canada. In any case the Air Force personnel live on their own stations and do not come into close contact with Newfoundlanders.

It would not seem wise to leave Canadian armed forces, and particularly the Canadian Army here indefinitely, in such comparatively large numbers, without some understanding with the Newfoundland Government on the question of post-war defence rights. This question is, in turn, bound up with the allied question of securing valid property titles to the bases and commercial aviation rights on them and it will be several months at least before any settlement can be reached. In these circumstances I think it would be desirable to give early consideration to the further reduction of the Canadian troops here.

Brigadier Goodeve takes the view that his Force is, in effect, pretty well down to a care and maintenance basis but that the large amount of stores, equipment and buildings at various places, not yet disposed of, and the fact that Canadian troops guarding this material are dispersed in small groups



rather than congregated together in a single camp makes it necessary to retain more personnel for maintenance than the United States have. He points out that the Infantry Battalion, the Edmonton Fusiliers, with its restricted and reduced strength serves, to a considerable extent, for guards, caretakers, labour and housekeeping and that, if they were not available, civilian labourers, civilian caretakers, etc., would have to be employed.

I recognise that there is much force in Brigadier Goodeve's view. I feel, however, it would be desirable that, now that the war is definitely over in all theatres, we should proceed more rapidly with the disposal of stores, equipment and the buildings in which they are housed so that a sizable reduction can be made in the Canadian troops here particularly those that are directly under the eyes of the people of St. John's, for I think it would be unwise to give any ground for the growth of a popular belief that we intend to remain in military occupation without any agreement with the Newfoundland Government according us post-war defence rights.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

958.

10298-40

*Minute d'une décision du Comité spécial du Cabinet sur la défense*<sup>1</sup>

*Record of a Decision of Special Cabinet Defence Committee*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 1, 1945

CANADIAN ARMY GARRISON IN NEWFOUNDLAND; PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL

At a meeting of the special Cabinet Defence Committee on September 24th, the Secretary read a memorandum from the Minister of National Defence, recommending the withdrawal of Canadian Army troops from Newfoundland, with the exception of those required for servicing R.C.A.F. establishments there.

The Committee, after discussion, agreed that the withdrawal of Canadian Army garrisons in Newfoundland be proceeded with except those personnel required for maintenance and administration purposes and for servicing R.C.A.F. detachments; it being understood that these continuing requirements would involve retaining some Army personnel in the Island on a diminishing scale for some considerable time.

<sup>1</sup> Ce comité spécial exista de septembre à décembre 1945.

<sup>1</sup> This Special Committee existed from September to December 1945.

959.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, November 7-8, 1945

. . .

CANADIAN ARMY

. . .

Second RCMN—Defence of Newfoundland

2. Withdrawal of the Canadian Army garrison in Newfoundland has been proceeding. The remaining infantry battalion has now been withdrawn. Present strength of the garrison is approximately 660 all ranks. Gradual withdrawal of the remaining maintenance and service troops will continue.

. . .

960.

1156-D-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire à la Justice*  
*et à la Défense*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner*  
*for Justice and Defence*

No. 9

St. John's, June 6, 1946

Dear Mr. Winter,

I wish to inform you that the last detachment of the Canadian Army in Newfoundland, which has remained behind for the purpose of safe-guarding Government properties pending their transfer to the War Assets Corporation for disposal, will be withdrawn from Newfoundland by June 30 as the transfer of the properties will be completed by that time.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

961.

10298-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 261

St. John's, July 3, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on June 29th the St. John's *Evening Telegram* took notice of the departure of the last Canadian Army troops remain-

ing in Newfoundland by publishing a news story and an editorial on the subject.

2. The news story contained an expression of appreciation from Major B. C. Bate, M.B.E., M.C., D.C.M., Officer Commanding Canadian Troops in Newfoundland, for the kindness and hospitality extended by the citizens of Newfoundland to members of the Canadian Army. It also contained a brief historical note which listed officers who had commanded Canadian troops in Newfoundland since 1940. A somewhat cryptic passage found its way into the article. It read "Newfoundlanders have grown to know well one facet of Canadian manhood, the lustre from which will soon be dimmed by distance. May God help them to cut and polish their own country to a flawless jewel in the diadem of the British Empire."

3. A more sober appraisal was offered by the same newspaper's editorial which stated that since Canadian troops "first came to our shores to assist in the defence of the Island and to convert it into the outer bulwark of the New World . . . Newfoundlanders and Canadians have come to a far better understanding of each other than they ever had before and we have come to esteem them as we believe they have come to regard the people with whom they have sojourned." It also affirmed that Canadian troops "have been held in high regard both because of the conduct of the forces during their stay and because of the service which they rendered in the days when danger threatened."

I have etc.

PAUL A. BRIDLE  
for the High Commissioner for  
Canada

#### SECTION D

#### LA FERMETURE DES BASES NAVALES CLOSING OF NAVAL BASES

962.

2011-40

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 6, 1945

Dear Sir,

In view of the successful close of anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic, consideration has been given to R.C.N. requirements at the St. John's, Nfld. Base.

2. This base will be required by the R.C.N. for a short time to carry out running repairs to small number of ships employed on transport duties. It is estimated that the base as a whole will be reduced to care and maintenance by about 30th September, 1945. At that time, in the absence of specific directions to the contrary, it is proposed to return the base to the Admiralty who hold title to its facilities.

3. In this connection it is observed that the Cabinet War Committee has recently approved as Government policy the acceptance by Canada of continuing responsibility for the "local defence" of Newfoundland, as recommended by the Post-Hostilities Planning Advisory Committee.

4. As the St. John's Naval Base is directly related to the question of "local defence" in Newfoundland as well as to regional defence and security in the Northwest Atlantic, your attention is invited to the conflict which appears to exist between the original arrangement with the Admiralty and the subsequently approved government policy.

Yours truly,

W. G. MILLS

963.

2011-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals  
Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister  
of National Defence for Naval Services*

SECRET

Ottawa, June 21, 1945

Dear Sir,

I refer to your letter of June 6 concerning Royal Canadian Navy requirements at St. John's Naval Base, Newfoundland.

I note that it is estimated that the Base will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis by September 30, 1945 and that at that time, in the absence of specific directions to the contrary, it is proposed to return the Base to the Admiralty.

It may be observed that Canada's post-war defence position in the Newfoundland-Labrador region is still somewhat indefinite. Although the War Committee has approved of the report of the Post Hostilities Planning Advisory Committee on "Post-War Defence Relations with the United States" and inferentially of the acceptance of continued responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland, which is referred to in paragraph 23, sub-paragraph (e) of the report, the report on the "Post-War Defence of Newfoundland and Labrador" (C.P.H.P. No. 7, 12th January, 1945)<sup>1</sup> has not yet been

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 943.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 943.



considered by the War Committee. It is hoped, however, that this report will be disposed of by the War Committee at a reasonably early date.

As you also know, the Canadian Government had hoped to obtain secure titles to various defence areas and installations in Newfoundland, including Torbay Air Base and Bay Bulls Marine Railway. Although the Newfoundland Government has agreed in principle that Canada should have title to these properties, including the right to post-war military use, it has recently requested that the matter of title be left in abeyance pending general discussion between the two Governments concerning post-war use of the properties in question, and presumably concerning the overall defence situation. In the meantime, the Royal Canadian Air Force is continuing in possession and control not only of Torbay Air Base, but of Botwood and Gander Air Bases as well, which, under the Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941, are to revert to Newfoundland after the cessation of hostilities.

In view of these considerations, it is suggested that it would be undesirable to take independent action with respect to vacating St. John's Naval Base, which, as you observe, is directly related to the local defence of Newfoundland. Since the Agreement with the United Kingdom providing for construction and operation of the Base, as set forth in the Canada Treaty Series 1941, Supplement 27, leaves open the question of post-war control and operation of the Base, it is thought that continued occupation by the Royal Canadian Navy, pending decision on policy, would not violate the letter or the spirit of the Agreement.

It is, of course, possible that the Admiralty, as the title-holder to the Base, will wish to know when the Royal Canadian Navy is likely to vacate. If such a question should arise, it is suggested that the Admiralty might be advised that a date cannot very conveniently be set pending a review by the Canadian Government of post-war defence arrangements.

Yours sincerely,

[J. E. READ]

964.

7-CR(a)

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals  
au sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services to  
Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, July 9, 1945

Dear Sir,

With reference to my memorandum TS. 11813-3 dated 3rd July, 1945,<sup>1</sup> concerning matters affecting the relinquishing of the St. John's Naval Base to Admiralty control, it is now desired to draw your attention to the fact

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

that the Naval Service has no further requirement for the Naval development at Botwood, Newfoundland.

2. While construction of this development was for the most part completed the Base has never been occupied or used operationally.

3. In view of the considerations outlined in your memorandum of 21st June, it is presumed that for the time being the Naval Service should remain in possession of the facilities at Botwood pending a review by the Government of post-war defence arrangements. It is noted that consideration of this matter, by the War Committee, is expected at an early date.

Yours truly,

W. G. MILLS

965.

7-CR(s)

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 6, 1945

Dear Sir,

Please refer to my letter T.S. 11818-3 F.D. 416 dated 3rd July<sup>1</sup> regarding the St. John's Naval Base.

For your information the Base has now been reduced to a naval complement of some 2,000 personnel. In view of the minor nature of present naval commitments in the area, this complement will soon be considerably in excess of numbers actually needed for continuing R.C.N. requirements at St. John's.

It is therefore intended to proceed with the reduction of the base complement, to the extent that by late September of this year only sufficient personnel will be borne at St. John's to provide for the care and maintenance of the Base and to render minor services to H.M.C. Ships which may call there.

This number will thereafter be retained at St. John's until further advice is received regarding Government policy.

It is hoped that this course will meet with the concurrence of your department.\*

Your truly,

W. G. MILLS

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

\* Note telle que dans l'original:

\* Note as in original:

Yes. R[OBERTSON]

966.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D47)

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals  
au sous-secrétaire d'État associé aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services to  
Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 11, 1945

Dear Sir,

With reference to your memorandum 7-CR(S) dated 26th July,<sup>2</sup> I wish to advise that the Naval Service has no further requirement for the Naval development at Botwood, Newfoundland, and unless your Department considers it desirable for the Naval Service to remain in possession of this Base, pending clarification of the policy of post-war defence of Newfoundland, it is the intention of the Department to declare this development as surplus and offer it for disposal without further delay.

2. For your information, following is a rough outline of defence developments undertaken by the Naval Service at Botwood, total cost of which amounts to approximately \$588,000.00

- (a) wharf 887 ft.—fully complete;
- (b) large administration building of semi-permanent construction—95% complete;
- (c) fifteen (15) contractors shacks;
- (d) certain rights of way to above properties.

It is pointed out that no firm agreements have been signed with respect to the sites on which the above establishments, including the wharf, have been situated.

3. May I be advised if there is any objection to the course outlined above, being taken.

Yours truly,

W. G. MILLS

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<sup>1</sup> H. H. Wrong.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

967.

NPA GN1/3 1/45

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions  
au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions  
to Governor of Newfoundland*

N.655/52

[London,] August 25, 1945

SECRET AND PERSONAL

My dear Governor,

Would you please refer to our saving telegram No. 31 of the 22nd August,<sup>1</sup> which foreshadowed the early withdrawal of the Canadian Navy from the Naval Base at St. John's?

The questions arising from the Canadian decision were recently discussed at a meeting at the Admiralty which fortunately coincided with London's visit for the Air Conference. London himself was able to attend the meeting together with Chadwick of this Office, and I am now enclosing for your information a copy of the minutes<sup>1</sup> of the discussion which took place.

As you will see, the chief difficulty which is now likely to arise is as to the future financing and maintenance of the Base. We are given to understand by the Admiralty that, provided that the Base is put on a care and maintenance footing, the actual annual expenditure is not likely to be large and that it could, if necessary, be met from Admiralty funds, although this would involve yet a further drain on our slender dollar resources.

The crux of the matter lies however in the responsibility for the maintenance of the base. As to this, the Admiralty are most anxious, on general grounds, that Canada's interest in Imperial defence should be maintained and developed and, with this in view, they feel it very important that the Canadian Government should be encouraged to play a preponderant part in the defence of Newfoundland. They have emphasised that the size of the Canadian Navy, which up to the outbreak of war scarcely existed, is now a very real factor in the decisions which will have to be taken. The Naval Staff have themselves expressed the view that it is in the general strategic interest that Newfoundland should come within the sphere of Canadian Defence, and I imagine that in principle you would agree that this is a logical conclusion to the lessons of the last six years of war. In other words the Admiralty would for their part welcome control of the Base, and financial responsibility for it, passing to Canada—such control being exercised, if need be, under cover of a United Kingdom or Newfoundland maintenance staff.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



As the minutes of the discussion show, however, we fully recognize the political implications of anything which might be represented as encroachment by Canada on Newfoundland Sovereignty (especially when it is part of St. John's harbour which is in question) and we have made it clear to the Admiralty that the position of the Commission and ourselves as trustees for Newfoundland—particularly when the constitutional question is so much in our minds—is by no means an easy one. We have in particular explained to them the reaction of Newfoundland public opinion to the Goose Bay question and have pointed out that, whilst Newfoundlanders remain generally so suspicious of Canadian intentions, it may be very difficult for the Commission—let alone any future independent Government—to agree that Canada should finance, and thus by implication control, the maintenance of the Base.

As a first step the Admiralty intend, as our saving telegram implies, to send out a small Mission to look over their property with a view to seeing what could be disposed of or leased, and we are assured that the members will work in close touch with the Commission in this respect. The Admiralty also hope, as an interim measure, to be able to persuade the Canadian Government to supply a care and maintenance party until the end of December; this would allow an interval during which the major problems as to future responsibility and finance might be settled.

It would in the meantime be very helpful to us and to the Admiralty if you could let me have at an early date your personal views as to the attitude which the Commission (and Newfoundland public opinion) would be likely to adopt towards the Admiralty's proposals for the Canadian financing of the Base. Would they for instance be prepared to accept this—provided always that the Canadian authorities subsequently agreed, and on the understanding that Newfoundland personnel would be employed as far as possible; or would they on the contrary be likely to feel that the political objections would be so great that the charge would eventually have to be met from Admiralty funds?

There would of course be no objection to your consulting Commissioners informally and confidentially over this, should you wish to do so. The object of this letter is to obtain initial reactions which would help the Admiralty and ourselves in working out proposals here to be put officially to the Commission for concurrence.

Yours sincerely,

P. A. CLUTTERBUCK

968.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D48)

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au sous-ministre  
de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister  
of National Defence for Naval Services*

SECRET

Ottawa, August 31, 1945

I refer to your letter of August 11 concerning Botwood Naval Base. I note that, provided this Department has no objection, it is proposed to declare this development surplus and offer it for disposal.

I may say that this Department has no objection to this course of action.

N. A. ROBERTSON

969.

NPA GN1/3 1/45

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint  
aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
for Dominions*

SECRET AND PERSONAL

[St. John's,] September 18, 1945

My dear Clutterbuck,

Your N.665/52 of August 25th.

I have gone carefully into the matter you asked me about and have obtained several opinions.

I am quite sure that should Canada be prepared to foot the bill for care and maintenance of the naval base here and accept the administration thereof on behalf of the Admiralty employing Newfoundland personnel as far as possible, that there would be no objection on Newfoundland's part and no political repercussions would arise.

This seems to me to be the only solution of the matter and I think the Admiralty's view is correct.

I think the Canadian Government may probably prove anxious to do this, and so keep their foot in the door as it were, if they could justify their action in parliament.

From the Canadian naval point of view I think they would like to skin out lock, stock, and barrel as soon as they can.

The obligation that Canada is being asked to accept will entail the employment and maintenance of not less than 3 officers and 50 to 60 men (the latter being Newfoundland personnel) which are already being employed.

This obligation will cost their Canadian naval budget in the neighbourhood of \$150,000, to \$200,000 annually which, with a possible budget of only

say \$25,000,000 and a personnel of say 15,000 is quite a slice to have "frozen" with no productive value to show for it.

This maintenance cost may seem excessive, but the base is so scattered, south side stores, north side dockyard, oil storage, Nissen hut settlement, Buckmaster's barracks, and Bay Bulls marine yard, that I think fully that number and possibly more might be wanted but this is my own estimation of it.

The barracks etc., would have to be kept heated in the winter as they are not solid permanent buildings and would quickly deteriorate with damp and snow getting in.

The machinery in the yard and power plant would have to be warmed up and started occasionally and could not merely be put in white lead and tallow "for keeps".

What Newfoundland does *not* want is that this base should become a Canadian base but that Newfoundland should remain part of the United Kingdom, and so long as Canada merely acts as caretaker for Admiralty property, honour would be satisfied and their sentiments would not be offended.

They would, I feel sure, prefer to have a British administration in charge, but the Admiralty point of view is pretty obvious.

I hope this will be helpful to the Admiralty and yourselves and I am sure the reaction I indicate is correct and proposals on these lines would receive the full support of the Commission and of Newfoundlanders.

I might add that Newfoundland could not entertain the cost of maintenance herself.

Mr. Winter considers the Defence question is one of the strongest arguments in favour of Confederation with Canada.

Yours sincerely,

HUMPHREY WALWYN  
Vice-Admiral

970.

7-CR(s)

*Mémoire d'une discussion entre J. S. Macdonald, R. A. MacKay  
et l'amiral G. C. Jones*

*Memorandum of Discussion between J. S. Macdonald, R. A. MacKay  
and Admiral G. C. Jones*

SECRET

Ottawa, September 21, 1945

RE: ST. JOHN'S NAVAL BASE

Mr. Macdonald and I [R. A. MacKay] visited Admiral Jones this afternoon in his office, Naval Building, to discuss the matter of Loran Stations in Newfoundland. In the course of conversation Admiral Jones expressed

the view that St. John's Naval Base had no continuing value for Canada. He said that in view of the construction of Argentia on such a permanent basis by the United States there was no reason for another naval base in peacetime in the area. In view of the type of construction in St. John's care and maintenance cost would be very high. He felt that future conditions of naval warfare might be considerably different and present construction in St. John's would be of little use. When asked whether he would hold the same views if it were clear that Canada would continue to carry responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland the Admiral, although less definite in his statement, clearly implied that he would still hold these views. He said he felt St. John's was roughly in the same position as Gaspé.

Under all these circumstances he could see no reasons for Canada carrying on care and maintenance at St. John's but thought that the base should be turned over promptly to the Admiralty.

With respect to Bay Bulls repair base, he felt that this should be turned over to the War Assets Corporation for disposal, similarly to the Gaspé development.

971.

1156-AC-39

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 223

Ottawa, October 15, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter under date of October 11,<sup>1</sup> from the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Service asking for the advice of this Department with respect to the disposal of Bay Bulls Marine Railway and other facilities.

2. It will be observed that the Deputy Minister states that the Department of National Defence for Naval Service does not wish to retain the Marine Railway. He suggests as a remote possibility that an arrangement might be made with the Newfoundland Government whereby it might take over the whole installation on the understanding that it would be maintained in reasonable repair and made available to the Canadian Government in the event of an emergency.

3. If the Newfoundland Government is not interested in acquiring the installation, disposal by other means will be necessary. There are, however, two difficulties in the way of disposal by other means. In the first place, under Newfoundland law fixtures erected on leased land revert to the owner of the soil when the lessee vacates the property unless the lease specifically

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



provides otherwise or unless a special arrangement providing otherwise is made between the lessor and the lessee. The Newfoundland Government would thus appear to have a claim to the installation erected on the property in Bay Bulls in the event the property is being vacated by Canada. This claim would appear to be strengthened in the case of Bay Bulls in view of the fact that no formal lease for the property was drawn up and in view of the fact that the Newfoundland Government purchased most, if not all, of the land from private owners and contributed as well to the cost of construction.

4. A second difficulty is that the agreement between the Newfoundland and Canadian Governments providing for the development includes as one of the conditions "after the war the property to be used for naval purposes only except by mutual agreement between the two governments concerned." (See letter from Sir Wilfrid Woods to Mr. C. J. Burchell of October 30, 1942.)<sup>1</sup> It would thus appear that Canada could not transfer any rights to the use of the property to private persons without the consent of the Newfoundland Government.

5. Before a recommendation is made on the matter it would be desirable to ascertain the views of the Newfoundland Government. Would you, therefore, canvass the situation informally with the Newfoundland authorities and advise me accordingly.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG

for the Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

972.

NPA GN1/3 1/45

*Le secrétaire, délégation de l'Amirauté britannique aux États-Unis,  
au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary, British Admiralty Delegation in the United States,  
to Governor of Newfoundland*

Washington, October 19, 1945

Dear Sir Humphrey [Walwyn],

As you are aware, the Admiralty have appointed a small mission, consisting of myself, Rear-Admiral Sebastian of the British Admiralty Technical Mission, Ottawa, Mr. Martin and Mr. Baseden representing the Civil Engineer-in-Chief and the Chief Surveyor of Lands, Admiralty, respectively, to report on which of the existing facilities at St. John's should be disposed of, and which should be retained on care and maintenance, particular attention being given to the more permanent items and those which would take a long time to replace in the event of an emergency arising, the policy being

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

that the facilities at St. John's are not required for naval use in peace time but that it is necessary that St. John's should be available again if required as an operational base in time of war. The object of the Mission is to recommend the most advantageous and economical arrangement for meeting the foregoing requirements as far as possible, and the reduction of care and maintenance charges.

2. It will not be practicable for a Royal Navy care and maintenance party to be stationed permanently at St. John's, and it is thought desirable for political reasons that the work of maintenance should be carried out by Newfoundland personnel.

3. The Admiralty would welcome the Royal Canadian Navy accepting liability for both the responsibility and the expense of maintaining the facilities which it may be decided to keep in being in St. John's, and have instructed us to discuss this aspect of the matter with the Canadian Navy Board.

4. Mr. Baseden has now arrived from the Admiralty, and we are proposing to visit Ottawa shortly, as instructed by the Admiralty, and then to proceed to St. John's, firstly to raise the matter with the Commission, and we shall be very grateful for your advice how this had best be done, and then to consider what should be the future of the existing facilities.

5. We are planning to arrive at St. John's on the 1st November, and I will inform you of this as soon as it has been definitely fixed.

Yours sincerely,

J. N. C. CHAMPION

973.

2011-40

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, November 28, 1945

Attention: Mr. R. A. MacKay

Dear Sir,

RE: NAVAL BASE AT ST. JOHN'S, NEWFOUNDLAND

With further reference to your letter of the 21st June, a British Admiralty Mission proceeded early this month to St. John's, Newfoundland, to go

into the question of the future of the facilities constructed at that place for Naval use.

On the 29th October, two members of the Mission, Mr. Champion, Secretary of the British Admiralty Delegation Washington, and Rear-Admiral (E) Sebastian, Royal Navy, called on this Department with a view to ascertaining whether the Royal Canadian Navy would accept the responsibility and the liability for the expense of maintaining the facilities which it might be decided to keep in being at St. John's. These two members of the Mission were advised that the R.C.N. were prepared to carry on with the present arrangements to the end of March, 1946, but any proposal that the R.C.N. should administer and pay for the maintenance of the Base at St. John's, Newfoundland could only be dealt with on receipt of a request from the United Kingdom Government through the usual channels.

The Mission has now returned, and a copy of their report has been presented informally to the Canadian Naval Service by Rear-Admiral Sebastian.

The proposals which have been recommended by the Mission to the Admiralty are, in effect, that the Newfoundland Government take over the Admiralty's interest in the properties, and in return maintain them in a condition desired by the Admiralty. These proposals would not extend to all the facilities which have been erected, such as the oil fuel depot, where it is considered that commercial interests will probably take over the plant on some arrangement. Included in their recommendations, the Mission propose that periodic inspections should be made by the Royal Canadian Navy, acting as agents for the Admiralty, to see that the various properties are in a condition which would permit of the base being brought into operational use if so required; and, furthermore, if the Newfoundland authorities wish to make alterations to any of the properties, it is proposed that they should first seek the approval of the Royal Canadian Navy in Ottawa, who would deal with such matters as agents of the Admiralty, submitting only matters of major importance to the Admiralty.

It is thought advisable to acquaint your Department with this report of the Admiralty Mission, which would involve the R.C.N. acting as the Admiralty agents in the matter of periodic inspections, etc.

Present intentions are that the R.C.N. will not provide funds to maintain the Naval Base at St. John's, Newfoundland after the 31st March, 1946, and it is requested that you kindly indicate whether the situation as outlined in your letter above referred to has now changed or been clarified to such an extent that the proposals made by the Admiralty Mission may be given formal concurrence, so far as the Royal Canadian Navy is concerned.

Yours very truly,

W. G. MILLS

974.

1156-AC-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 42

Ottawa, March 14, 1946

Sir,

I refer to your despatch No. 54 of February 21<sup>1</sup> regarding Bay Bulls and the Marine Railway.

2. In view of the unwillingness of the Newfoundland Government to take over the property on a care and maintenance basis, it is felt that a lease for the property for ninety-nine years, in accordance with the original agreement, should be requested. The lease should include the boom defence area and the water pipe line as well as the area on which the Marine Railway and the installations for the operation of the repair depot are located. The lease should be in the name of the King in the right of the Dominion of Canada. It should also embody a clause excluding commercial use of the Marine Railway except with the permission of the Newfoundland Government. Since the Newfoundland Government is unwilling to take over or dispose of the base and since the base was constructed for defence purposes presumably the Newfoundland Government will have no objection to including in the lease rights of military use as required by Canada.

3. The Newfoundland Government should be advised that the Canadian Government wishes to dispose of the base either as a single unit or in separate items, and, under the circumstances, it is felt that a lease is the most satisfactory method of procedure.

4. It is suggested that in order to expedite matters it would be desirable for us to draw up a draft of the lease from this end and present it to the Newfoundland Government. It would, however, be useful to know in advance whether the Newfoundland Government are likely to have any objection to this procedure and to the proposed terms. Will you therefore discuss the matter with the appropriate Newfoundland authorities informally and advise me accordingly.<sup>2</sup>

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> A notre connaissance, il n'existe aucun bail.

<sup>2</sup> No record of a lease has been found.



975.

NPA GN1/3 1/45

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 116

[London,] May 16, 1946

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Sir Edward Emerson's secret despatch No. 66 of the 15th March<sup>1</sup> and to connected correspondence regarding the future of the St. John's Naval Base, and to inform you that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, after full consideration of the proposals put forward by the Newfoundland Government and by the Admiralty Mission to St. John's, have now requested that the following general programme should be put before the Commission for their approval:

- (1) Admiralty policy requires that a nucleus of properties should be maintained at St. John's so as to enable St. John's to function as a Naval base at reasonably short notice in war or emergency. For this purpose the Admiralty consider that the following properties are required:

Dockyard Area	Site No. 5
Magazine Area	Sites Nos. 6 and 18
Administration	Sites Nos. 2 and 3
Buildings	
East Hospital	Site No. 1
West Hospital	Site No. 20
Stores Areas	Sites Nos. 16 and 17
Oil Fuel Depot	Site No. 7

Of these Site No. 7 has already been disposed of separately to Imperial Oil.

- (2) There is no naval requirement to use any of these properties in peace-time. It is noted that the Newfoundland Government can make use of all of them except Sites Nos. 6 and 18 and it is understood that a number of the properties have already been taken over. The Admiralty propose that for the future the following arrangements should apply.
- (3) The Newfoundland Government would hold themselves responsible to the Admiralty for the Care and Maintenance of all the properties

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

in paragraph 1 except Site No. 7. The Admiralty propose to invite the Royal Canadian Navy who operated the base in war, to visit St. John's periodically for purposes of technical naval inspection and also to lay down exact standards of maintenance to meet naval requirements. In the meanwhile, standards of maintenance applicable to Newfoundland Government buildings will meet requirements.

- (4) As regards finance, it is suggested that for each site in paragraph 1, the Newfoundland Government should keep an account for the first year showing on one side outgoings such as costs of Care and Maintenance and on the other assessed rentals in the case of Government occupation, or actual rentals received by the Newfoundland Government in the case of private or municipal occupation. At the end of a year's working (calculated unless there is any undue delay in the matter, from the date when the Newfoundland Government assumes responsibility for the last of the sites in paragraph 1), the figures would be jointly examined to see if settlement on any broader and more formal basis was practicable. During this period the Newfoundland Government would act as Agents for the Admiralty. The records kept by the Newfoundland Government would, of course, show the date on which the Newfoundland Government took over each particular site.
- (5) In the case of properties on Crown land, the Admiralty should be regarded as having a secure title, and it is, of course, understood that the Admiralty would have the right of re-entry to any of the sites in paragraph 1 in war or emergency.
- (6) The Newfoundland Government would be free to use the properties for any purpose they wished provided (a) no structural alterations were made without prior Admiralty approval, (b) terms of lease to any third party were referred for prior Admiralty approval.
- (7) In the case of Sites Nos. 6 and 18, the Admiralty hope that the Newfoundland Government will carry out necessary maintenance as part of these arrangements. If possible the sites should be leased to a third party. The magazines would require periodical inspection and ventilation and should not, therefore, be sealed up. The only requirement for Site No. 18 is to preserve the site for mooring a floating dock. If no use can be made of the buildings on that site, they should be disposed of in order to avoid the cost of maintaining them, due regard being paid, however, to the fact that the heating plant installed in a building on Site No. 18 serves the buildings on site No. 6.

- (8) The Admiralty have no future requirement for any of the other sites (except Buckmaster's Field). They would, therefore, like the Newfoundland Government to act as their disposal agent for these properties and to endeavour to obtain the best commercial terms possible. It is noted that the Newfoundland Government have a requirement for Site No. 13 which is, of course, on Crown land, so that no question of disposal arises.
- (9) In the case of Site No. 19 referred to in paragraph 8 of the Newfoundland Government's despatch, the Admiralty consider that they could not defend accepting less than a fair commercial price for this property. They would, therefore like the Newfoundland Government to report what offers could be obtained for it either on the basis of a sale or a lease. If the Newfoundland Government wish to lease or purchase the building for the use of the Canadian Institute for the Blind, the Admiralty would be glad to know what price or rental the Newfoundland Government would propose to pay.
- (10) All offers obtained for the sites which are available for disposal should be reported to the Admiralty for decision, together with the Newfoundland Government's recommendations on the matter. It may well be that in some cases the best procedure would be merely to abandon the properties.
- (11) The Admiralty propose that Mr. Champion should visit St. John's again in the middle of June 1946 so as to clear up any outstanding matters and report to the Admiralty. It is hoped that this visit will be acceptable to the Newfoundland Government.
- (12) As regards Buckmaster's Field, the Admiralty have noted the contents of the Newfoundland Government's despatch and they suggest that the whole matter should be discussed with Mr. Champion in June. In the meanwhile, the Admiralty would like the Newfoundland Government to accept responsibility on their behalf for maintenance of the buildings on this site to a sufficient extent to keep them marketable.

2. I should be glad to learn at an early date whether the arrangements outlined in the foregoing paragraphs—and in particular the proposal in paragraph (3) relating to periodic technical inspections by officers of the Royal Canadian Navy—meet with the approval of the Commission of Government.

I have etc.

ADDISON

976.

2001-40

*Le sous-ministre de la Défense nationale pour les Services navals  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of National Defence for Naval Services  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, May 20, 1946

Dear Sir,

With reference to your letter of 19th April, 1946,<sup>1</sup> regarding post-war arrangements for the Naval Base at St. John's, Newfoundland, the following information is forwarded.

#### ST. JOHN'S

Canadian stores have been listed and the inventory despatched to Naval Service Headquarters. These lists of Canadian stores will be declared surplus to Crown Assets Allocation Committee in the course of the next few days.

Lists of Admiralty stores, which have also been received, will be dealt with under such arrangements as the Admiralty may make for their disposal.

The Newfoundland Government has taken over certain Admiralty-owned buildings and properties in St. John's, and the decision regarding the disposal of any remaining Admiralty-owned buildings and properties which the Newfoundland Government does not wish to acquire rests with the Admiralty.

The finalization of the leasing of the oil tanks is being dealt with by the Admiralty.

The Secretary of the British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, has been requested to visit Ottawa on or about the 24th May, to discuss the future of the St. John's Base, particularly with respect to the care and maintenance of buildings which have not been taken over by the Newfoundland Government. That official has been notified that it is considered that all charges for care and maintenance of the properties in St. John's should be assumed by the Admiralty as soon as the surplus Canadian-owned stores and equipment have been taken over by the War Assets Corporation.

To complete the picture, the following information is added with respect to Botwood and Bay Bulls:

...

#### BAY BULLS

Stores and equipment at Bay Bulls, such as lockers, tables, buoys, W/T Masts, etc., have been declared surplus to War Assets Corporation. Declara-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



tions of properties and buildings are being held in abeyance until clarification of the property rights has been made, which is in hand by your Department.<sup>1</sup>

There is also some difficulty regarding the use of the haul-out, but this will be declared surplus to War Assets Corporation with the stipulation that it is not to be used except with the concurrence of the Newfoundland Government.

When all Canadian equipment and properties mentioned above have been turned over to the War Assets Corporation or otherwise disposed of (which it is hoped can be arranged by the end of the current month), it may be considered that the Canadian Naval Service will have no further direct commitments in Newfoundland other than assisting the Admiralty with such interim inspections or administrative supervision from Ottawa as it may be expedient to arrange on behalf of the Admiralty. A resident civil engineer has been engaged at the request of the British Admiralty Delegation to supervise the demolition of some buildings, restoration of sites and maintenance of the properties in St. John's, Newfoundland, and it is proposed that his services be a direct charge to the Admiralty.

Yours truly,

W. G. MILLS

977.

NPA GN1/3 1/45

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

DESPATCH 227

St. John's, August 22, 1946

SECRET

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to Your Lordship's despatch No. 116 of the 16th of May, on the subject of the Admiralty properties in Newfoundland.

2. During his recent visit to St. John's Mr. Champion discussed with the Commissioner of Public Utilities the various points raised in the despatch with a view to completing action.

3. The views of the Commission of Government, where it is necessary to record them, are as follows—the references are to the subparagraphs of Your Lordship's despatch.

<sup>1</sup> Le restant des propriétés et des édifices, incluant le mécanisme de halage, furent vendus par la Corporation des Biens de guerre en décembre 1948.

<sup>2</sup> The remaining properties and buildings, including the haul-out, were sold by the War Assets Corporation in December 1948.

- (1) Requirements are noted.
- (3) The Government agrees to maintain the buildings, exterior and interior, and the equipment and services in good condition to the general standard applicable to Government buildings. It also undertakes to keep the buildings in a condition suitable for re-occupation by the Admiralty in the event of war or other emergency. It agrees that an agent of the Admiralty may make periodic inspections to see that the buildings are so maintained.
- (4) It was the clear understanding of Commission that the liability concerned care and maintenance only—para. 3 of Sir Edward Emerson's Secret despatch No. 66 of the 15th March<sup>1</sup> refers. The question of rentals, where Government is the occupier, is new ground. It is not the wish of the Commission to profit at the expense of the British taxpayer but it desires to point out that maintenance charges are extremely high in Newfoundland, particularly in the matter of heating and weatherproofing. The Commission has, in fact, expended the sum of \$12,000, for cleaning and painting alone, on the buildings already taken over. It is felt, therefore, that care and maintenance charges are a fair offset to rents and the Commission is unable to agree to any rental payment. We would also draw Your Lordship's attention to the fact that we do not propose to make any claim for any administrative work we may do on behalf of the Admiralty. In the case of buildings which may be leased to private individuals or public bodies rents will be credited to the Admiralty and expenditure on care and maintenance charges will be debited.
- (5) To meet the wish of the Admiralty in the matter of title to properties on Crown land the Government undertakes that, so long as a building remains on Crown land, it will not divest itself of ownership and the ownership will be available to the Admiralty. If ownership were transferred absolutely Government would be depriving itself of the possibility of sale in years to come. The right of re-entry, in the event of an emergency, is agreed.
- (6) Noted.
- (7) Government will endeavour to lease on behalf of the Admiralty.
- (8) Agreed.
- (9) The Government is in communication with the Institute for the Blind on the subject of this building. A separate despatch will be addressed to Your Lordship in due course.

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

- (10) Noted.
- (11) The Commission has appreciated Mr. Champion's visit and the assistance which he has rendered us.
- (12) Government regrets that it is unable to take over Buckmaster's Field. The reasons which actuated Commission in coming to this decision are referred to in para. 9 et seq. of Sir Edward Emerson's despatch No. 66 of the 15th March and further elaboration is unnecessary. St. John's Housing Corporation is not interested in the property. Mr. Champion is addressing the Admiralty on the matter. I understand that he is in negotiation with two parties but that no decision has yet been reached. The Commission will provide watchmen for the Field pending its ultimate disposal. This provision covers a period of six months only. We cannot accept responsibility for any general maintenance. Government will act as agents for sale.

I have etc.

GORDON MACDONALD

978.

NPA GN1/3 1/45

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

SECRET

[London,] November 19, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your Secret Despatch No. 227 of the 22nd August regarding the Admiralty properties in St. John's.

2. From that despatch it emerged that the Commission of Government were ready to accept all the suggestions for the disposal of the St. John's Naval Base originally proposed by the Admiralty with the exception that:

- (a) they could not accept the contention that rental payments should be made for sites which the Government might take over.
- (b) general maintenance of Buckmaster's Field could not be accepted beyond an initial period of six months.

I now have to inform you that following further consultation with the Admiralty it has been agreed that the Commission of Government should not be expected to pay rentals for the premises which they themselves take over. So far as the question of the disposal of Buckmaster's Field is concerned, I enclose a copy of the relevant extract<sup>1</sup> from Mr. Champion's Report. It is understood that the discussions which Mr. Champion had with the two parties concerned in Newfoundland were designed merely to "test" the market and to enable him to make suitable recommendations to the Admiralty. His discussions with the Royal Trust, who are the owners of the site, were believed to be known to the Commission of Government, with the result that there should be no difficulty in their continuing the negotiations where they were left by the Admiralty representative. The Admiralty would of course prefer that the Newfoundland Government should endeavour to dispose of the property as their agents on the best terms available, but would request that any offers made should be referred to them before a definite commitment was entered into. The Admiralty would naturally be prepared to accept the cost of any advertising etc., which the Commission of Government might consider necessary.

3. One further outstanding matter relates to the building at Fort Amherst. The Admiralty have now agreed that this building, which is already in occupation by the Newfoundland Government, should now be handed over to them formally free of charge.

4. So far as the maintenance of the St. John's Naval Base is concerned I enclose for the information of the Commission of Government a copy of the terms of Maintenance<sup>2</sup> which were agreed upon following discussions between Mr. Champion and the Canadian Naval Authorities. According to Mr. Champion's Report, these terms were agreed to by the Commission of Government who undertook to sign a copy of the terms to which would be attached a list of the properties, together with a copy of the inventories of each property as and when it was handed over. It is not fully clear from your despatch under reference whether this arrangement was in fact agreeable to the Commission, and I should now be grateful to learn whether they have in fact formally concurred therein.<sup>3</sup>

. . .

I have etc.

ADDISON

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>3</sup> A notre connaissance, aucun accord formel n'exista.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> No record of formal concurrence has been found.



## SECTION E

BOTWOOD, GANDER ET TORBAY  
BOTWOOD, GANDER AND TORBAY

979.

10298-D-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

No. 202

St. John's, June 6, 1945

Sir,

In view of the decision not to proceed with the passage of the Confirming Acts but to leave the question of safe-guarding titles to property and the securing of post-war military and civil aviation rights to be bargained for at a conference to be held within twelve months, it would seem desirable to give some consideration to the question of whether these discussions should be expedited or left over until next year.

2. I am inclined to think that it would be preferable to expedite the discussions for the same general reasons that have led me to press, for the past year, for the passage of the Confirming Acts, namely, that our general bargaining position grows progressively weaker as dependence on our support becomes less and the war recedes into the background and postponement of a settlement involves risks that more than balance any probable advantage.

3. One of the results of the cessation of hostilities is already making itself felt. As restrictions on censorship are being lifted and the need for secrecy is past, the people of Newfoundland are beginning to show a desire to know exactly what commitments have been or are being made with Canada in respect of the Bases. Their desire in this respect is all the more natural in that the rights and privileges accorded to the United States are set forth in public Acts available to everyone. A few days ago the *Daily News*, the leading newspaper in Newfoundland, raised the question in an editorial as to what had been done or is being done with respect to the Air and Naval Bases and whether Canadian military establishments in Newfoundland are needed any longer. This desire for fuller information is a legitimate one and is a reason for proceeding as early as may be practicable, with discussions and the publication of such agreement as can be secured.

4. I am inclined to think, also, that we should endeavour to get these questions settled before the general atmosphere respecting the retention of bases deteriorates. Recently I had a talk with Lieutenant-General Grunert of the United States Army who was returning from a visit to Iceland, which comes under his Command, and learned from him that there was already a

considerable agitation among Icelanders for the return of the United States Base there. The example of the relinquishing of bases on Iceland, the Faroes, the Azores, North Africa, Iran, Brazil, etc. will, of course, not be lost on public opinion in Newfoundland.

5. There are one or two considerations respecting personnel that have a bearing on these negotiations. The term of the present Governor, Sir Humphrey Walwyn, expires on January 16th next and will not be renewed. He is friendly to Canada and not given to haggling over details. I should think his influence in getting over difficulties that may arise would be in our favour. Moreover, the health of Mr. Winter, the most intelligent and friendliest member of the Commission, is far from robust and might easily lead to his retirement before many months.

6. A very important consideration to keep in mind, also, is the forthcoming revision of the Constitution. The time-table of the proposed constitutional changes is, indeed, of very considerable importance in our plans. I have, therefore, made an effort to review the question in the light of all the information at present available. Sir George London and Sir John Puddester, with whom I discussed the matter recently, confirmed, in general, the information I have already forwarded in my despatch No. 161 of April 21st,<sup>1</sup> and earlier correspondence. On the whole they are inclined to think the process will take rather longer than Mr. Dunn had envisaged a month and a half ago. Sir George stressed the points that nothing could well be done until the bulk of the Armed forces had been repatriated and that the taking of the census or national registration, on which the voters' lists will be based, would be a considerable task in view of the great number of isolated settlements in Newfoundland and Labrador. He doubted whether it would be completed sufficiently in advance of the close of navigation to make it practicable to hold the election to the National Convention this year. The campaign could not be carried out effectively before the re-opening of navigation in the Spring and would require a month or so to complete. A further month would elapse before the Convention met here in St. John's. No one, of course, can say how long the deliberations of the Convention will last. They felt it was safe to assume, however, that a satisfactory list of questions for submission to the electorate could not be compiled before mid-summer of next year. It would require another month or two to hold the plebiscite. If it resulted in favour of a return of Responsible Government a Bill would have to be put through the Parliament at Westminster terminating the present Government and setting up a new Constitution. That itself would probably require a matter of months. New elections would then have to be held for the establishment of a Legislative Assembly. Both felt, therefore, that the likelihood was that the Commission would continue in office till the late Autumn of 1946 or perhaps till early in 1947, even if the plebiscite went against it. As soon as the voting takes place, however, it will (if it is

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

against the retention of the Commission) not be possible to get decisions on matters of vital importance, for the Commission will naturally hesitate to commit their successors. Indeed, it will be progressively harder to get decisions on important matters once the public mind is taken up with the question of establishing a new Constitution. The press, indeed, has already taken the position that until the people of Newfoundland have had an opportunity of voting on their post-war Government no binding Agreements should be entered into. I do not think any of the members of the present Commission would go so far as this but the influence of the forthcoming changes will be felt long before they are actually made and their imminence provides a further important reason in favour of pushing ahead with the negotiations.

7. A further point, but one not entirely to be over-looked, is that the Newfoundland Government is under-staffed, ill-organized and unaccustomed to conducting negotiations speedily. Moreover, the legislative process not only requires that a Bill be read three times, as in a Parliamentary regime, but that it be submitted, with a Statement of Objects and Reasons, to the people and sufficient time allowed, usually a month for important questions, for them to express their views on it. It may well be, therefore, that considerable time will elapse after the conference opens before we can secure a decision and get it implemented.

8. For these various reasons I think it would be desirable for the competent technical authorities to begin the preparation of our case just as soon as they can secure the necessary information on our post-war defence and civil aviation needs and that we should aim at having our preparations completed and the negotiations begin by the middle of September.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

980.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 170

Ottawa, July 24, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to advise you that it is now proposed that No. 10 (BR) Squadron, Royal Canadian Air Force, presently stationed at Torbay, should be disbanded.

2. The effect of this action if and when approved, is that the Royal Canadian Air Force will have no operational squadron in Newfoundland.

For the time being the airfield at Torbay will however continue to be maintained and controlled by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Likewise, Gander and Botwood will be maintained and controlled according to the terms of the Air Bases Agreement of 1941<sup>1</sup> pending negotiations between the two Governments.

3. The Newfoundland Government should be advised confidentially of the proposal to disband No. 10 (BR) Squadron.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

981.

10298-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 257

Ottawa, October 6, 1945

1. The Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941 provides that Gander, Gleneagles and Botwood should be handed back to the Newfoundland Government at the close of hostilities. On July 20 last the Acting High Commissioner, Mr. Britton, informed the Hon. H. A. Winter, Commissioner of Justice and Defence, that in view of the uncertainties then as to military requirements, Canada was prepared to continue operation and control of the bases, pending general discussions about their post-war use and other matters.

2. In view of the termination of hostilities in both Europe and Asia, the Canadian Government is now prepared to transfer these bases back to Newfoundland at an early date in accordance with the terms of the Air Bases Agreement of 1941.

3. Botwood seaplane base has already been declared surplus to defence requirements, and the Royal Canadian Air Force wish to vacate at the close of the present flying season. On the assumption that Newfoundland will wish to operate Botwood for purposes of civil aviation, the Newfoundland Government will be accorded priority in purchasing facilities and surplus equipment there. In view of the desire of the armed services to withdraw all personnel from Botwood as soon as possible, it is hoped that the Newfoundland Government will be prepared to take over at an early date.

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice E.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix E.



4. With respect to Gander, it is anticipated that the United States Army Air Force will require use of the base and facilities there for some months. Continued operation of the base for defence purposes will, therefore, be required for the time being, although it is thought that civil rather than military administration would be feasible. In view of the need for continuous operation, facilities there have not been declared surplus to requirements, but it is anticipated that many facilities and much equipment will eventually be available for purchase by the Newfoundland Government. Would you enquire of the Newfoundland Government whether it would be prepared to take over Gander and, if so, the approximate date.

5. It will be recalled that paragraph 7 of the Air Bases Agreement provides that the Newfoundland Government agrees to lease to the Canadian Government for fifty years the lands at the airport occupied by hangars, works, and buildings constructed by the Canadian Government. Paragraph 18 also provides that the continued use of the bases by the Canadian Forces after resumption of control by Newfoundland will be the subject of consultation between the two governments. The Canadian Government is not yet in a position to state its post-war requirements at Gander, but it is suggested that this matter may be left over for discussion between the two governments, as provided in paragraph 18 of the Agreement.

6. Both the Air Bases Agreement and the Goose Bay Agreement contemplate discussions between the Newfoundland and Canadian Governments about the post-war use of airfields. In view of the desirability of facilitating arrangements for civil aviation it would seem advisable that these discussions be held at a reasonably early date. Please enquire of the Newfoundland Government whether they have any views on the matter.

7. In addressing the Newfoundland Government on the above matters, will you kindly convey to them in appropriate terms the appreciation of the Canadian Government for their co-operation in making the airfields available for defence purposes and for the harmonious relations which have existed throughout.

982.

PRO DO 35 1149 X/J 9723

*Minute de la seconde réunion sur l'aviation civile tenue aux Bermudes<sup>1</sup>*

*Record of Second Meeting on Civil Aviation held in Bermuda<sup>1</sup>*

Bermuda, December 18, 1945

...

14. Finally, the Newfoundland Delegation drew attention to the hangars at Botwood. Major McCrindle said that B.O.A.C. had no requirement for these hangars as their trans-Atlantic flying boat service would be withdrawn in any case at the end of the summer of next year. Mr. Howe said that if there

<sup>1</sup> A ce sujet, voir le chapitre II, partie 1.

<sup>1</sup> On this subject, see Chapter II, Part 1.

was no known requirement for these hangars, the Canadian War Assets Corporation would have to dispose of those assets as best they could. The original cost had been between two and three million dollars.

983.

MacKay Papers vol. 4

*Mémoire du conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*<sup>1</sup>

*Memorandum by Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[Ottawa,] January 2, 1946

EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY USE OF GANDER AND TORBAY  
DURING THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AVIATION,  
DECEMBER 15-21, 1945

1. Although the United Kingdom were informed that we proposed to raise the question of military use of the above fields, because of its relation to civil use, the United Kingdom delegation stated they had no authority to discuss military matters. The Newfoundland delegation took the same line. It was pointed out to both delegations that they had taken no exception to our suggestion that this topic should be explored. It was also pointed out that it was difficult to arrange for the transfer of Gander Air Base to Newfoundland without clearing up the question of post-war military use. It was finally agreed that members of the Canadian delegation should meet with members of the Newfoundland delegation and the United Kingdom representative from the Dominions Office to discuss the situation informally. A meeting was, accordingly, held on December 20. Present were: Mr. A. J. Walsh, Commissioner of Education and Home Affairs, Mr. J. S. Neill, Commissioner of Public Utilities and Supply, Squadron-Leader H. A. L. Pattison, Director of Civil Aviation, of the Newfoundland Delegation; Mr. A. D. McLean and Mr. R. A. MacKay of the Canadian Delegation; Mr. J. Chadwick of the Dominions Office.

2. Mr. MacKay drew attention to Article 7 of the Air Bases Agreement of 1941 which provided for a lease to Canada to areas on which defence installations might be constructed, and to Article 18 which provides for consultation between the governments concerned, on the termination of control by Canada, with respect to continued military use of the base by Canada. He also summarized the correspondence leading to the approval by the Newfoundland Government of the establishment of a military air base at Torbay, and he said that although arrangements were much less specific than those for Gander he felt that since there was no indication in the correspondence that the use of Torbay for defence purposes was limited to the duration of the war, whereas occupation of Gander was so limited, the inference was

<sup>1</sup> R. A. MacKay.

that it was intended that Canada should have continued military use. He felt, however, that military use of Torbay should not be decided on the basis of an interpretation of documents but should be based on the common interest of Canada and Newfoundland in hemispheric defence.

3. Mr. Walsh took strong exception to the above interpretation of the correspondence relating to Torbay. His view was that since there was no express statement in the correspondence that Canada was to have military use at the termination of hostilities it was not intended that she should have such use. He said, further, that the granting of post-war military use now would probably be regarded in Newfoundland as a new and unnecessary limitation on Newfoundland sovereignty. He said, also, there were practical objections to have "a foreign military force" in Newfoundland, especially since, unlike United States bases, military forces at Torbay could not be confined to the base area in view of its relatively small size.

4. Mr. MacKay said that it was not anticipated that it would be necessary to keep Canadian military forces in Newfoundland, but that in view of the great advances in aerial warfare during the late war and in view of the continuance in Newfoundland of United States bases, it was felt desirable that Newfoundland bases should be available to the Royal Canadian Air Force for immediate use in the event of another emergency.

5. Mr. Chadwick suggested that, with a view to maintenance of [the] Commonwealth relationship, it was undesirable to leave the defence of Newfoundland entirely to the United States. He suggested that a joint defence board for the Newfoundland region, which would include representatives of the United Kingdom, Newfoundland and Canada, might be worth consideration.

6. It developed that Squadron-Leader Pattison, Director of Civil Aviation, was very much concerned about the lack of space at Gander for civil air operations should Canada insist on a lease to all the area to which she would be entitled under the Air Bases Agreement. Mr. MacKay suggested that, although he was not empowered to give an undertaking, he thought the Canadian Government might consider favourably an arrangement whereby the proposed leased areas would be made available to Newfoundland provided other satisfactory arrangements for military use could be made. In private discussion Mr. Pattison had learned from United States officers that the United States intended to retain a small establishment at Gander so long as they had a military establishment in Europe. He wondered whether this would affect Canadian policy with respect to transfer of the base. Mr. MacKay said he had heard nothing about this and he doubted whether the United States had any legal right to continue an establishment there after the transfer of the base to Newfoundland.

7. Mr. MacKay suggested that consideration might be given to an arrangement along the following lines: (a) Provision of facilities for the storage of military equipment and supplies at Gander and Torbay; (b) the Royal Canadian Air Force to be entitled to use either base for patrol purposes and for

training purposes if required; (c) if additional defence installations in or about base areas were required they might be erected after consultation with the Newfoundland Government; (d) in the event of emergency both bases should be immediately available to Canada. (e) In view of the uncertainty about the future constitutional status of Newfoundland he suggested further that an interim arrangement, say, for three years, subject to termination thereafter on twelve months' notice by either party might be more acceptable.

8. The Newfoundland delegation showed considerable interest in these proposals, especially in the suggestion of a short-term arrangement. In private discussion afterwards both Mr. Neill and Mr. Walsh seemed favourably disposed to such an arrangement and considerably relieved that we might not press for a permanent arrangement.

9. With respect to Torbay, the Newfoundland delegates raised no objection to granting Canada a clear title. They did object to providing for military use by statute, as was done in the case of the United States bases, and as Canada requested previously in a draft confirming Act. Mr. MacKay expressed the view that since military use was a political rather than a proprietary right he thought it could be satisfactorily covered by an intergovernmental agreement. Mr. Walsh noted that provision for the discipline of Canadian forces in Newfoundland in peacetime and exemption from customs for military supplies would probably require legislation. He said Newfoundland might repeal the Visiting Forces Act, which at present covers discipline, and would be averse to granting any customs exemption.

10. In private discussion with the British delegation it developed that the Royal Air Force is likely to ask for emergency landing rights at Torbay, and the same, and possibly some permanent facilities, at Goose. It may be anticipated that representatives from the Air Ministry will be prepared to participate in the discussions on Newfoundland airfields recommended to be held before February 1 next by the Bermuda Conference, presumably in Newfoundland. (It was suggested by the Newfoundland delegates that some meetings should be held at Gander to enable delegates to see the situation there.)

984.

DND (DH) 193.009 (D50)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major**Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

TOP SECRET

[Ottawa,] January 8, 1946

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## CANADIAN DEFENCE INTERESTS IN NEWFOUNDLAND (CSC 401)

4. The meeting considered Dr. MacKay's report on interdepartmental discussions regarding postwar defence arrangements with Newfoundland in the light of the preliminary discussions held at Bermuda and of the Newfoundland attitude to these matters as reported by Mr. J. S. Macdonald, Canadian High Commissioner there.



This report recommended that the United Kingdom should be included in any agreement with Newfoundland and that the defence arrangements recommended by the Chiefs of Staff at their 338th meeting be scaled down to the following provisions so as to be more acceptable to the Newfoundland authorities:

- (a) rights to use Gander and Torbay for military purposes;
- (b) property rights at Cape Spear, Amherst and Chain Rock to be set aside and made available to Canada in an emergency;
- (c) St. John's Naval base to be made available to Canada in an emergency; and
- (d) consultation between Newfoundland and Canada with a view to co-ordinating defence efforts in an emergency.

It was also suggested that Canada might be willing to forego rights for leased areas at Gander and Botwood; the lease to Bay Bulls Marine Railway; and for Naval installations at Botwood.

(Memorandum from Dr. R. A. MacKay, Chairman, Interdepartmental Meeting on Defence Arrangements with Newfoundland, 8 Jan. 46<sup>1</sup>)

#### 5. The Committee

- (a) agreed that Canadian defence interests would be adequately protected by arrangements of the type proposed provided a further reservation was included to the effect that facilities at Gander and Torbay should not be disposed of without prior consultation between Newfoundland and Canada;
- (b) recorded the view that the division of responsibility as between Canada and the United States of the local defence of Newfoundland should await the outcome of the joint defence talks.

. . .

985.

8316-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 9

Ottawa, January 21, 1946

SECRET

1. Discussions with Newfoundland on military use of airfields and related matters.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. In order to expedite discussions when the meeting takes place it is thought desirable to advise the Newfoundland authorities regarding our views. We are also advising the United Kingdom.

3. In view of Canada's interest in the security of Newfoundland and in view of the large expenditures made by Canada there during the war it is thought desirable at this time when wartime operations are being wound up to reach a general understanding with Newfoundland with regard to defence. Present Canadian defence plans do not call for the stationing of Canadian forces in Newfoundland in normal times, but it is thought desirable that essential facilities be maintained and that an understanding be reached with Newfoundland in order that Canadian forces might be able to operate promptly in the area in the event of another emergency.

4. It is recognized that the Newfoundland Commission of Government is naturally reluctant to make extensive commitments in view of the uncertainty as to the future political status of the Island. It is thought, however, that an effective arrangement which would be unobjectionable to the Newfoundland and Canadian people can be worked out.

5. We have in mind an arrangement along the following lines:

- (a) A general understanding between the Newfoundland and the Canadian Governments to consult with one another as occasion may require with a view to co-ordinating their defence activities in the Newfoundland-Labrador region.
- (b) With a view to enabling Newfoundland to reorganize Gander for purposes of civil aviation, Canada would consider foregoing the lease promised by the Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941 if Newfoundland would maintain there certain storage and other facilities required for the use of the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Meteorological Service and Trans-Canada Airlines; if Newfoundland would permit use of the air base by Canadian military planes as occasion might require and would undertake to permit operation of the base by Canada if required in the event of an emergency. The question of compensation for facilities turned over to Newfoundland and convertible to civil use should also be discussed.
- (c) With regard to Torbay, it is hoped that as Newfoundland is not prepared to operate the base it will confirm title in Canada. We should also like to be assured of military use similar to that for Gander, though maintenance of facilities there would be a Canadian responsibility.

- (d) With regard to St. John's Naval Base, it is felt that Canada should be assured that the base would be available in the event of an emergency. It might be desirable to include as part of the general agreement the understanding recently reached by the Admiralty and the Royal Canadian Navy with the Newfoundland Government with regard to the base.
- (e) Canada would be prepared to renounce any claims to a lease at Botwood as promised in 1941 and to a lease to the Marine Railway at Bay Bulls as promised in correspondence between the two Governments in August and September, 1942. The disposal of these facilities and of naval installations at Botwood should be discussed at the meeting.
- (f) We should also like to clear up certain other questions of tenure, such as: the Cape Ray radio station; the status of the oil storage property on the South Side Hill in St. John's; St. Andrews radio station: and possibly the Loran stations.
- (g) It is hoped that Newfoundland will be prepared to reserve for defence purposes certain battery sites used during the war. It is hoped also that it will agree in principle to the installation by Canada, after consultation, of other defence facilities if and as required.
- (h) If the Newfoundland Government considers a long-term arrangement objectionable the Canadian Government would consider an arrangement which would permit of alteration or termination on notice after a specified term of years.

6. It is thought that after discussions on military arrangements we should proceed to negotiate a general civil air agreement with Newfoundland, but it is unlikely that we shall be prepared to discuss this at the Newfoundland meeting. We may propose instead a meeting shortly thereafter in Montreal.

7. It is suggested that you advise the Newfoundland authorities in writing along the lines suggested above and discuss the matter with them orally in order to ascertain their views.

986.

8316-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 17

London, January 24, 1946

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 13 of 21st January.<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to Canadian Government for opportunity afforded us of studying

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

their views on Newfoundland defence problems prior to discussions which are due to take place in Newfoundland next week. Text of your telegram has been communicated to members of United Kingdom delegation to forthcoming Conference, who will come prepared to discuss suggestions made.

As regards (d) and (e) of paragraph 5, however, United Kingdom delegation will not contain any Admiralty representative and we feel that questions affecting St. John's naval base and Bay Bulls would best be dealt with separately, i.e., that meeting in Newfoundland should be confined to discussion of air bases. We assume, in this connection, that it is common intention that Goose Bay should be also included in agenda, together with other Newfoundland bases.

987.

8316-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 17

Ottawa, January 25, 1946

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 17, January 24, Defence discussions with Newfoundland.

2. It is greatly regretted that the United Kingdom delegation will not be in a position to discuss questions affecting St. John's Naval Base and Bay Bulls, since we had hoped to examine the whole situation with respect to defence installations and their disposal.

3. It is hoped that the United Kingdom authorities will have no objection to our discussing St. John's and Bay Bulls with Newfoundland, and especially Bay Bulls, which was a Canadian and Newfoundland financial responsibility.

988.

8316-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 18

London, January 26, 1946

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Your telegram No. 17 of January 25th, defence of Newfoundland. When composition of United Kingdom delegation



to Newfoundland discussions was under consideration, we had not appreciated that it would be desire of Canadian Government that talks should range beyond questions relating to military user of air bases. In these circumstances we fear that our delegation will not, repeat not, feel confident to discuss future of naval base and of Bay Bulls. On other hand, [we] should, of course, see no objection to discussion of these matters as between Canadian and Newfoundland delegation[s].

989.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Le représentant de l'aviation canadienne, CPCAD,  
au représentant principal de l'armée des États-Unis, CPCAD  
Canadian Air Member, PJBD,  
to Senior United States Army Member, PJBD*

Ottawa, February 15, 1946

## UNITED STATES DETACHMENT—GANDER

Dear General Henry,

You will recall telling me at the last meeting of the Board that you propose leaving a small detachment at Gander to handle United States A.T.C. aircraft diverted to that aerodrome. You will no doubt also remember my saying that the R.C.A.F. would be unable to house and mess these personnel after May 31st, 1946.

Arrangements have now been concluded with the Newfoundland Government whereby the whole of Gander will be turned back to Newfoundland on March 31st, 1946. It is anticipated that the R.C.A.F. will leave some personnel until May 31st to assist the Newfoundland authorities during the handing over period. Nevertheless, after March 31st, all buildings will belong to the Newfoundland Government and they will also have complete responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the aerodrome.

I am sure you appreciate the situation and should be greatly obliged if you will advise when it will be convenient to withdraw United States personnel and equipment. If there is any way in which the R.C.A.F. can be of assistance, please advise and I can assure you that every effort will be made to meet your requests.

Yours very truly,

W. A. C[URTIS]  
Air Vice-Marshal

*Le ministre des Pêcheries au Premier ministre**Minister of Fisheries to Prime Minister*

Ottawa, February 21, 1946

Dear Mr. King,

I have the honour to submit, herewith, a report on the Conference at St. John's, Newfoundland, on the disposition of the Air Bases constructed or enlarged by Canada during the war and problems of common defence in the post-war period at which I headed the Canadian delegation. Copies of the draft Articles it was agreed that each delegation would recommend to its Government for approval are attached,<sup>1</sup> together with copies of the Minutes<sup>2</sup> of the meetings and the communique<sup>2</sup> given to the Press at the close of the Conference. You will find also attached clippings<sup>3</sup> from St. John's newspapers concerning the Conference and showing the interest of the local people in Canadian constitutional matters.

I may add that, accompanied by technical officers, I inspected the Air Bases at Gander, Torbay and Goose Bay and also the Naval Installations in St. John's and Bay Bulls. I also visited the Canadian Army posts in and around St. John's and the Joint Services Cemetery where a number of Canadian servicemen are buried.

It was the first time a delegation from the Canadian Government had visited Newfoundland since 1941 and much public interest was taken in our visit though the proceedings of the Conference were, of course, secret and only a short statement was given to the Press at the close of the meetings. I accompanied the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland to a meeting of the Rotary Club of St. John's, which occupies a very prominent part in the life of the City and, indeed, of the whole Island. I also attended with him the Annual Meeting of the Newfoundland Board of Trade where the Canadian Government Trade Commissioner gave an address. I met, informally, some forty or fifty of the leading business and professional men of St. John's at a reception given by the High Commissioner at his residence. I formed the impression that Newfoundlanders are beginning to be concerned about the constitutional and economic position of the country. While there is as yet no strong current of opinion in favour of seeking union with Canada, the question is definitely beginning to engage the serious attention of an increasing number of Newfoundlanders and we may well hear more of it in the course of the next year or eighteen months.

Yours sincerely,

H. FRANCIS G. BRIDGES

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>3</sup> Non reproduites.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Rapport de la délégation canadienne sur la réunion  
tenue à St. John's au sujet de l'abandon des bases aériennes  
et des problèmes de défense d'après-guerre*

*Report of Canadian Delegation on a Meeting  
Held in St. John's to Discuss the Disposition of Air Bases  
and Problems of Post-War Defence*

SECRET

[ , February , 1946]

The Conference met at St. John's, Newfoundland, on January 29th and continued to February 6th. The following representatives were present:

## Newfoundland Delegation:

Hon. J. S. Neill, Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply.

Hon. H. A. Winter, Commissioner for Justice and Defence.

## Technical Advisers:

Squadron-Leader H. A. L. Pattison, Director of Civil Aviation.

Mr. R. Manning, Secretary for Public Works.

Mr. J. G. Howell, Secretary for Customs.

Mr. W. S. Roddis, Secretary for Posts and Telegraphs.

Mr. H. G. Puddester, K.C., Secretary for Justice.

## United Kingdom Delegation:

Mr. J. Chadwick, Dominions Office.

Mr. M. W. Low, Air Ministry.

## Technical Adviser:

Group-Captain S. K. V. Harris, Royal Air Force.

## Canadian Delegation:

Hon. H. F. G. Bridges, Minister of Fisheries.

Mr. J. S. Macdonald, High Commissioner for Canada.

Mr. R. A. MacKay, Department of External Affairs.

## Technical Advisers:

Captain G. J. Griffiths, Royal Canadian Navy.

Brigadier L. C. Goodeve, Canadian Army.

Colonel J. H. Jenkins, Canadian Army.

Air Commodore C. R. Dunlap, Royal Canadian Air Force.

Group-Captain W. W. Bean, Royal Canadian Air Force.

Mr. B. A. Rogers, Legal Advisor.

Mr. E. Bosse, Private Secretary to Minister of Fisheries.

Mr. H. H. Bindon, Chief Meteorological Officer, Gander.

Mr. J. S. Neill acted as chairman. The following Agenda, drawn up by the Newfoundland delegation and incorporating various points raised previously by the Canadian Government, was adopted:

1. Military use of Gander, Goose and Torbay (Remitted from the Bermuda Conference).

Discussions suggested by Canada

2. General defence—
  - (a) Maintenance of works constructed by Canada.
  - (b) Understanding to permit Canadian forces to operate promptly in event of emergency.
  - (c) Understanding between Newfoundland and Canada to consult, as occasion may require, with view to coordination of defence activities in Newfoundland-Labrador region.
  - (d) Reservation of War Battery Sites by Newfoundland for defence purposes.
  - (e) Installation by Canada, after consultation, of other defence facilities as required.
  - (f) Long or short term agreement.
3. Gander—the lease: proposed revision of Clause 7 of the Agreement of 17th April, 1941—conditions thereof—compensation for buildings taken over by Newfoundland. (Question of maintenance of storage and other facilities by Newfoundland for use of Canada: Customs position).
4. Torbay. Title
  - Military use (Notification before user)
  - (Military use by United Kingdom)
5. St. John's Naval Base—use of by Canada. The discussions with the Admiralty Mission re user of Buildings and facilities.
6. Botwood and Bay Bulls. Disposal of buildings and facilities.
7. Tenure of —
  - (a) Cape Ray Radio Station.
  - (b) St. Andrews.
  - (c) Loran Stations.
8. Oil Storage property, South Side Hill, St. John's.
9. General Civil Air Agreement.

Discussions suggested by Newfoundland with U.K.

10. R.A.F. area at Gander: Use of area and buildings for civil purposes.



While the atmosphere of the gathering was at all times cordial and the Newfoundland delegation appeared desirous of being co-operative, it was evident from our discussions that they had been instructed that they must do nothing a sensitive Newfoundland public might regard as an infringement of Newfoundland sovereignty. The fact that the people are shortly to be consulted respecting the question of changes in the constitutional form of Government made the present Commission of Government feel they were more or less in the position of a caretaker Administration. Early soundings made it clearly impractical to secure a long-term Agreement, say for ten years or longer. At a meeting with the full Commission of Government at which the basic principles of the proposed Agreement were discussed at some length it was apparent that the Commission felt compelled to insist on a short-term Agreement or, alternatively, on an Agreement that would make every step of any importance taken thereunder expressly subject to the permission of the Newfoundland authorities. It was accordingly decided that the best course would be to work for a three year Agreement that would continue in force thereafter subject to revision by mutual agreement or termination on twelve months' notice. This proposal was finally accepted and written into the Agreement giving us in effect four years certain with the fair likelihood that it will continue in effect indefinitely.

The draft Agreement takes the form of a series of Articles, a copy of which is attached,<sup>1</sup> which the various delegations agreed to recommend to their respective Governments for approval. Briefly, it provides for the re-transfer to Newfoundland of the air bases at Gander, Gleneagles and Botwood (it should be noted that the main area and installations which are owned by the Canadian Government at the Botwood seaplane base are not included in the Agreement), which the Canadian Government agreed in 1941 to take over and operate during the war. It is proposed that the Canadian Government will forego long-term leases to the sites on which hangars and other buildings were erected during the war and will sell to the Newfoundland Government for the sum of \$1,000,000 the hangars, buildings and surplus equipment of the R.C.A.F. at Gander Airport. While the hangars, buildings and equipment cost many times that amount they have little or no continuing value for commercial purposes and the technical advisers and the representatives of the War Assets Corporation here consider the offer a reasonable one which should be accepted. It should be noted that with the exception of the hangars, which are too small to handle the larger aircraft coming into use on the trans-Atlantic run, all Canadian built buildings at Gander are of temporary construction. A further factor that had an important influence on price was the decision of the United Kingdom Government, announced at the meeting, to transfer its hangars and other buildings at the Gander Airport to Newfoundland, without consideration. The result of this offer is Newfoundland can now concentrate operational activities in the

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed

United Kingdom area of the airfield. The Canadian Government might have insisted on long-term leases to the individual sites on which the hangars and buildings were constructed but they are not of any particular use to Canada, and would certainly create a good deal of antagonism in Newfoundland, whose people strongly resent the idea of granting of long-term leases of Newfoundland territory to other countries. Moreover, some of the hangars, buildings, etc., might stand in the way of the commercial development of the airport.

Our position at Torbay is adequately secured with confirmation of title to the lands on which the airport and its subsidiary installations are constructed, and rights of military user accepted.

With respect to defence generally the three Governments agree to consult from time to time with a view to co-ordinating defence requirements in Newfoundland, and it is agreed that the Government of Canada may establish and operate anywhere in Newfoundland such defence facilities and installations as may be agreed in such consultations to be necessary.

Canadian military aircraft are given permission to fly over Newfoundland and use airports under Newfoundland control and to carry out air photography and make topographic and hydrographic surveys.

The Newfoundland delegation agreed to accept in principle the following Article respecting the reservation of military sites. It was considered, however, that for security reasons it would be preferable to set forth the substance of the Article in an Exchange of Notes rather than to incorporate it in an Agreement that would be published and thus indicate to any future enemy the sites of our installations.

The Government of Newfoundland shall retain, as military reserves, the following sites used during the recent war, namely, the sites at Cape Spear, Chain Rock and Fort Amherst used for coast artillery defence; the sites on Radio Range Road, New Lewisporte Road and the South Side Camp at the Newfoundland Airport at Gander used for heavy anti-aircraft defence; and the sites at Spotted Island, Brig Harbour Island, Cape Bauld, Port-aux-Basques and on Table Mountain at Cape Ray used for radar stations. Provided, however, that in the event that the Government of Newfoundland should require any of these sites for non-military purposes, the continued reservation of the sites shall be the subject of discussion between the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada.

There was general agreement, in principle, respecting the transfer of title to the oil storage property on the South Side hills at St. John's to the Imperial Oil Company, Limited. It seems probable that, after some further discussions between the High Commissioner's Office and the Newfoundland Government, a satisfactory arrangement can be made by Exchange of Notes.

A topic of discussion between the technical advisers was the question of tele-communications for air traffic control over Newfoundland. The Newfoundland technical advisers concerned expressed a desire to take over the Radio Station at Cape Ray, provided suitable terms could be arranged for

the use of the United States Army Land-Line between Gander and Port-aux-Basques. The question will have to be explored further before any definite arrangement can be reached.

It was understood that a number of other subjects, e.g. the British Admiralty installations in St. John's, tenure of properties at Bay Bulls, the Loran Stations, etc., on which there was general agreement in principle but which were rather too complicated to put in the form of draft Articles without further consideration, might be raised later. If found desirable, they would be incorporated in the definitive Agreement or settled by an Exchange of Notes outside the Agreement.

The draft Agreement unlike previous agreements having to do with defence (except the special arrangement between the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy respecting the operation of the Naval Base at St. John's) includes the United Kingdom as a contracting party. United Kingdom planes are accorded the right to use Goose Bay Airport on notification to Canada as well as to Newfoundland. Similar rights are granted at Torbay Airport. The delegation was assured, however, by the United Kingdom delegates, that the Royal Air Force had no intention of using these airports for other than occasional flights in peace-time, and possibly to station a small party in time of war.

We feel that the Agreement which has been reached is within the terms of our instructions and is as satisfactory an Agreement as the Commission of Government will accept or the people of Newfoundland approve. The views of the latter are, we feel, important from the Canadian point of view for any Agreement that would arouse strong popular criticism would not only be doomed to early termination, but would have an adverse effect on the prospect that a strong movement may develop, within the next year or two, looking to confederation with Canada.

991.

8316-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 28

Ottawa, February 23, 1946

SECRET. The draft Agreement respecting defence relations in Newfoundland has been approved by Cabinet subject to minor drafting changes for purposes of clarification, about which you will be advised in due course. The Newfoundland Government may be advised accordingly.

992.

8316-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 813

Ottawa, April 12, 1946

SECRET

1. Your telegram No. 845, March 28,<sup>1</sup> Defence Agreement with Newfoundland.

2. The High Commissioner in Newfoundland advises that the defence Agreement was signed by himself and Newfoundland representatives on April 9 and that copies would be forwarded promptly to the Dominions Office. The Dominions Office would be instructed to transmit a signed copy to you, which please be good enough to forward.<sup>2</sup>

. . .

993.

HCD

*Extrait d'un discours du ministre de la Justice*

*Extract from a Speech by Minister of Justice*

Ottawa, May 7, 1946

## INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Canada-United Kingdom-Newfoundland—Defence Agreement  
with Newfoundland

Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Minister of Justice): On behalf of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Mackenzie King) who is unfortunately prevented from being in the house at the moment, I should like to read a statement which had been prepared for him in connection with a defence agreement with Newfoundland.

I wish to table copies of an agreement recently completed between Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland concerning the disposition and post-war use of certain defence installations in Newfoundland.

. . .

At this time when we are winding up our wartime activities in Newfoundland I think it is fitting to express on behalf of the government our deep appreciation of the splendid cooperation which we have received from the Newfoundland government throughout the war and of the hospitality which

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Le texte de l'accord se trouve à l'appendice H.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the agreement, see Appendix H.



the people of Newfoundland have constantly extended to the many Canadian service personnel stationed from time to time in their midst. One advantage of this partnership in the war effort is that mutual understanding between Canada and Newfoundland has undoubtedly been strengthened. Thousands of Canadians have come to know Newfoundlanders personally and to appreciate Newfoundland's problems. And Canada will not forget that a considerable number of her sons lie in Newfoundland graves. Personal ties are bound to strengthen the bonds of friendship through the years.

It is perhaps fitting also that I should take the occasion to pay tribute to Newfoundland's direct war effort. Over 5,200 men raised by voluntary enlistment were sent overseas to the United Kingdom forces, and over 1,700 were enlisted for home defence. I am pleased to say also that over 1,200 male residents of Newfoundland served in the various Canadian armed services, and about 525 women in the various Canadian women's services. In addition, Newfoundland advanced to the United Kingdom in interest free loans, about twelve and a half million dollars. The house, I feel sure, will agree that Newfoundland, though a relatively small country, made a really substantial contribution to the achievement of victory.

994.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve  
au secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 345

St. John's, August 17, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information copy of a confidential letter of August 16<sup>1</sup> from the Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply, enclosing copy of a letter he has forwarded to the United States Consul General, agreeing to the United States' request to be permitted to remain at Gander until the Peace Treaty with Germany is signed.

It will be noted that reference is also made to the position at Goose Bay and it is stated that the customs privileges extended to the armed forces there will continue until the signature of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements  
au consul général des États-Unis à Terre-Neuve<sup>1</sup>*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply  
to Consul General of the United States in Newfoundland<sup>1</sup>*

St. John's, August 12, 1946

Dear Consul General,

I refer to your note, 879.6—GKD/jc of the 11th July,<sup>2</sup> and our conversations on the 9th August on the subject of the U.S.A.A.F. requirements at Gander.

2. We agree, in general to the request made in your letter under reference until the Peace Treaty with Germany is signed.

3. Customs privileges referred to in Article XIX of the Bases Agreement<sup>3</sup> follow this Agreement. These privileges are confined to the Armed Forces.

. . .

8. I have stated, at para. 2 above, that our Agreement extends until the Peace Treaty with Germany is signed. You have stated that you wish to remain in Gander so long as U.S. Army Occupation Forces remain in Germany. We wish to consider the position of Goose and Gander together as I gather that you wish to remain also at Goose for a similar period. It will be necessary to discuss the Goose position with the Government of Canada and I gather that preliminary correspondence has already been exchanged on the Customs issue there. Correspondence on this issue is, however, one for the Commissioner for Finance. I can state, however, that the status quo as regards the Customs privileges of the Armed Forces at Goose will continue until the signature of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

9. I am acquainting the Canadian High Commissioner with the position.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. NEILL

P.S. We assume that you will hand over the buildings to us in the condition they now are and that, if they should be destroyed by fire, you would be responsible for their value.

<sup>1</sup> G. K. Donald.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix B.

995.

50216-A-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre des Transports*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Deputy Minister of Transport*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 9, 1946

I enclose a copy of despatch No. 407 of September 21st<sup>1</sup> from the Canadian High Commissioner in St. John's, Newfoundland concerning an application which the United States Army, Newfoundland Base Command, has made to Mr. Irving of your Department for the use of a hangar at Torbay Airport.<sup>2</sup>

The High Commissioner suggests that, since the Canadian Government is at present endeavouring to secure the use of United States land-line circuits in Newfoundland free-of-charge, it might be worth while to keep these negotiations in mind when fixing rates for the use of Canadian facilities at Torbay. As the High Commissioner points out, the two proposals are not strictly comparable. The Canadian Government desires use of United States land-line circuits not only for Canadian services but also for services which are to be performed for the Government of Newfoundland and which are of direct benefit to United States forces in Newfoundland. You might, however, wish to consider the High Commissioner's views when making a decision in this matter.

I would like, in passing on to you the High Commissioner's despatch, to suggest a consideration which has no doubt occurred to you. The application under reference would seem to be connected with the whole question of the continuing use by United States forces of facilities at Canadian air bases in Newfoundland. You might, therefore, in dealing with the application, wish to consult the Department of National Defence for Air. Our view in this Department is that since we may be asking for a number of services from the United States forces, both in Newfoundland and Canada, over the next few years we should offer them as reasonable terms as possible when they wish to use Canadian property.

L. B. PEARSON

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Le 1<sup>er</sup> avril 1946, le CARC avait transféré l'aéroport de Torbay au ministère des Transports.

<sup>2</sup> On April 1, 1946, the RCAF turned Torbay airport over to the Department of Transport.

996.

50216-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 346

Ottawa, December 4, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 407 of September 21st<sup>1</sup> concerning hangar space for the United States Army Air Corps at Torbay Airport.

Tentative arrangements have been made by the District Inspector of the Department of Transport for use of a hangar at Torbay by the United States Army Air Corps at an agreed rate and the Department of Transport has received an application from the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, U.S.A.A.C. for use of the hangar on that basis. However, the Department of Transport has directed their Inspector to allow the United States Army Air Forces to occupy the hangar immediately on a certificate of occupancy and to make no billing for rental unless and until so advised.

The Department of National Defence (Air) have no objection to the use of hangar facilities at Torbay by the United States Army Air Corps.

It is considered advisable that the agreement should contain a short-term cancellation clause in order to enable the Canadian Government to take over the hangar on relatively short notice should this be necessary. The Department of Transport is prepared to negotiate an agreement on this basis with United States Army Air Corps and, at the same time to grant them the most favorable terms possible, even to the extent of granting them the privilege of using the hangar rent-free.

I have etc.

G. L. MAGANN

for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

997.

50216-A-40

*Le secrétaire du Comité ministériel de défense du Cabinet  
au sous-ministre des Transports*

*Secretary, Defence Committee of the Cabinet,  
to Deputy Minister of Transport*

[Ottawa,] November 7, 1947

Dear Commander Edwards,

The Cabinet Defence Committee at their meeting of November 4th considered what their policy should be in the matter of your department charging

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



the U.S. Air Force for hangar rental at Torbay Airport, about which you wrote me on October 16th.

The Committee decided that there was no objection to making a reasonable charge for this service and it will therefore be in order for your department to submit an account to the United States authorities in Newfoundland as proposed in your letter,<sup>1</sup> referred to above.

Yours very truly,

E. W. T. GILL

998.

50216-A-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au  
sous-ministre des Transports*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Deputy Minister of Transport*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, April 28, 1948

I wish to refer to your letter of April 15th<sup>1</sup> and earlier correspondence regarding requests received by the Department of Transport from officers of the Newfoundland Base Command (U.S. Air Force), for facilities at Torbay Airport.

2. It is noted that the facilities desired by the Newfoundland Base Command of the U.S. Air Force include rental, subject to termination upon thirty days' notice, of an additional hangar, two stores buildings and a cargo building as well as the conversion of barrack blocks to accommodate fifty families, and a barrack block and mess hall for seventy-five single men, these buildings to be rented by the U.S. Air Force.

3. When the Newfoundland Base Command of the U.S. Air Force asked the Department of Transport in the latter part of 1946 to allow them to lease a hangar at Torbay, we dealt directly with the Newfoundland Base Command through official channels and an arrangement believed to be satisfactory to both parties was eventually worked out. We were prepared to do this because the U.S. Air Force had had the use of hangar space at Torbay on an informal basis since 1944, and the lease of a hangar to the U.S. Air Force on a short term cancellation basis appeared to us to involve little change in the basic situation.

4. The requests which the Department of Transport has recently received from the Newfoundland Base Command seem to me, however, to go considerably further. I would suggest that the Department of Transport should inform the appropriate officer of the Newfoundland Base Command that the requests referred to above raise questions regarding which the Department of Transport does not feel disposed to deal directly with the Newfoundland

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Base Command. They should add, I think, that the requests constitute a matter which might perhaps better be raised through the normal diplomatic channels.

ESCOTT REID  
for the Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

999.

50216-A-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve  
Assitant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, April 28, 1948

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

With reference to despatch No. 95 of April 28th,<sup>1</sup> you will recall that in your despatch No. 407 of September 21st, 1946,<sup>1</sup> you informed us that the U.S. Army Air Force desired to rent a hangar at Torbay Airport from the Department of Transport and that they had taken the matter up with the Airport Manager. Tentative arrangements in this connection which appeared suitable to you and to the authorities concerned here were subsequently made and, after the matter had been further considered, the Department of Transport was given authority to charge the U.S. Air Force a reasonable rental for use of the hangar. They have accordingly instructed their District Inspector to arrange with the U.S. Air Force for the execution of a lease to hangar No. 4 at the Airport. The lease is to be for a period of one year and thereafter from year to year, subject to termination by either party upon thirty days' notice in writing.

2. You will recall that the U.S. Air Force has had the use of hangar space at Torbay on an informal basis since the early part of 1944. This arrangement was made between the R.C.A.F., which was then in charge of the Airport, and the U.S. Air Force. They were allowed the use of hangar space to accommodate the Commanding General's personal land-plane visiting the Airport and to provide for routine inspections and minor repairs to other U.S. Army Air Force aircraft. This informal arrangement was evidently continued after the Department of Transport was made responsible for the administration of the Airport in 1946, and later that year, the U.S. Air Force put forward the request for a lease to a hangar of which you informed us in your despatch No. 407 of September 21st.

3. Our files do not indicate that the Newfoundland authorities have ever been officially notified of the above arrangements. There can be little doubt that they were fully aware of the arrangements made during the war and

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

that they know that the U.S. Air Force has continued, since the cessation of hostilities, to use hangar space at the Airport. I think, however, that it would probably be advisable for you, when discussing with them the question of the installation of a Ground Controlled Approach System at Torbay, to refer to the arrangements regarding hangar space which have been in effect and to inform them of the lease of hangar No. 4 which the Department of Transport is arranging with the Newfoundland Base Command. You will probably wish to stress the informal nature of the arrangement and the fact that the lease is subject to termination upon thirty days' notice.

Yours sincerely,

ESCOTT REID

1000.

50216-A-40

*L'ambassadeur des États-Unis au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador of United States to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

No. 236

Ottawa, August 11, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Excellency,

I have the honor to inform you, on instructions from my Government, that the United States Government desires to lease certain additional facilities at Torbay Airport, Newfoundland, to be used by the Newfoundland Base Command.

The matter of leasing the additional facilities in question has been discussed informally with the Department of Transport of your Government by the Military Attaché of this Embassy at the request of the Department of the Air Force through the Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers. It is understood that the Department of Transport is agreeable to granting the desired lease to the United States subject to formal approval. The facilities desired to be leased are as follows:

- (a) Hangar no. 3—39,019 square feet.
- (b) Stores Building no. 46—21,285 square feet for Air Corps Supply.
- (c) Cargo Building no. 78—2,871 square feet for Traffic Warehouse.
- (d) Stores Building no. 14—5,373 square feet for storage and maintenance of tugs, fork lifts and other vehicles.
- (e) Seven (7) 10,000 gallon Avgas Storage tanks.
- (f) Crash Station no. 15—2,970 square feet (at no charge).

I am directed to express the hope that it may be found possible to grant the lease of these facilities to the United States Government.

As it has been ascertained that a considerable amount of time will be required by the Airport Manager at Torbay to furnish the buildings with proper utilities for use during the winter months in the event that the lease

can be arranged, your early attention to this request would be greatly appreciated.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

RAY ATHERTON

1001.

50216-A-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au chargé d'affaires par intérim des États-Unis<sup>1</sup>*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Acting Chargé d'Affaires of United States<sup>1</sup>*

No. 311

Ottawa, October 26, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to Mr. Atherton's confidential note No. 236 of August 11, 1948 and Mr. Pearson's acknowledgement of August 24, 1948<sup>2</sup> regarding the wish of the United States government to lease additional facilities at Torbay Airport, Newfoundland, for use by the Newfoundland Base Command.

2. I am writing to confirm that there is no objection in principle to the lease of the additional facilities requested, subject to the negotiation of a satisfactory form of lease by the Department of Transport and the appropriate United States authorities. I should mention that one of the clauses of the lease will probably enable the Canadian government to re-occupy any of the leased facilities on giving thirty days' notice.

Accept etc.

ESCOTT REID  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1002.

1156-Z-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au conseiller  
High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Counsellor*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, January 21, 1949

Dear Bert [MacKay],

We should give some thought to the matter of the Torbay Airport, particularly as to whether or not we should endeavour, at the present time, to clear up the title to this Airport.

...

<sup>1</sup> J. F. Harrington.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



I discussed the matter informally with Sir Albert Walsh when we were in Ottawa together and he told me that the matter of clearing up the title to the Airport was in the hands of his Department and that about a year ago he was proceeding with the matter of clearing up these titles when he received a request (I think he called it a demand) from Canada that the Canadian Government be given the right to use the Airport for military purposes as well as for civilian purposes. He informed me that he immediately told his staff to lay the matter aside and he did not bother with it any more.

You recall that when I was in your office in December I looked through your files and found that it was quite correct that a request was made of the Newfoundland Government that Canada should be given military rights to this Airport. This was certainly a mistake as the effort should all have been concentrated on first clearing the titles. As I understand it the present position therefore is that we have title to a certain portion of the Airport by deed from people who were supposed to have some interest in a certain portion of the lands. A large part of the area is Crown land in respect of which we have no title but we have an agreement with the Commission of Government to give us title. There are other lots which are supposed to be owned by somebody but who the somebody is I do not know.

The question which should now be determined is whether or not we should obtain a grant from the Commission of Government or allow the matter to stand over until after the 31st day of March.

If we take any action in the matter now we may open up new sores, as we did when the title to the Goose Bay Airport was obtained after a long delay extending over three or four years. We cannot, however, completely clear up the title at the present time except by legislation of the Commission of Government in the form of an Expropriation Act, and this may cause still further trouble at the present time.

My present opinion in the matter is that we should wait until the 1st of April when Newfoundland becomes a Province of Canada and I presume we can then pass our own Expropriation Act and clear up the title. The only objection to this is that the new Provincial Government may not stand back of the Agreement with the Commission of Government under which we were to obtain a grant of the Crown lands without payment. Assuming that we would have full powers of expropriation, as I think we would have, the worst that could happen would be that we would have to pay something for the Crown lands if the Government demanded payment.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1003.

1156-Z-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

Ottawa, March 25, 1949

Following for Burchell from MacKay. Begins. Reference your letter of January 21 regarding title to Torbay Airport. We took this up with Transport on the basis of your letter and C. P. Edwards agrees that the matter of clearing the title be left until after the date of union. Ends.

SECTION F

GOOSE BAY<sup>1</sup>

1004.

10298-40

*Mémorandum du secrétaire par intérim, section canadienne de la CPCAD<sup>2</sup>*  
*Memorandum by Acting Secretary, Canadian Section of PJBD<sup>2</sup>*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] September 10, 1945

The following extracts from the Journal of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence for its meeting of September 4-5 relate to Newfoundland questions:

Air Vice-Marshal Curtis inquired as to the continuing military needs of the United States at Goose Bay and Gander. General Henry stated that by January 1, 1946, it was expected that the amount of United States military traffic would have dropped considerably, but that there would be a continuing need for facilities at Goose Bay and Gander so long as United States forces remained in Europe. Air Vice-Marshal Curtis explained that the Royal Canadian Air Force was considering turning over the administration of these fields to the Department of Transport and agreed to communicate directly with General Henry on this point. With regard to the long range interest of the United States in the maintenance of Goose Bay and Gander, it was stated by the United States Section that the United States Government would shortly communicate with the Canadian Government, listing the airfields in Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador which the United States regarded as possessing continuing defence value. The Board noted that this list would certainly include Goose Bay and probably Gander as well.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Les problèmes de juridiction civile, de privilèges douaniers pour les militaires canadiens et leurs dépendants et d'imposition des Canadiens travaillant à Goose Bay ne sont pas documentés ici. Les dossiers pertinents à ces problèmes se trouvent au ministère des Affaires extérieures et au ministère de la Défense nationale.

<sup>2</sup> R. M. Macdonnell.

<sup>1</sup> Canada-Newfoundland issues not documented here were civil jurisdiction, customs privileges for Canadian servicemen and their dependents and taxation of Canadians working at Goose Bay. Relevant documentation is in Department of External Affairs and Department of National Defence files.

1005.

50218-40

*Le représentant principal de l'armée des États-Unis, CPCAD, au représentant de l'aviation canadienne, CPCAD*

*Senior United States Army Member, PJBD, to Canadian Air Member*

TOP SECRET

Washington, January 7, 1946

SUBJECT: U.S. Requirements at Goose Bay and Gander Airports

1. At the 7-8 November 1945 meeting of the Board, Air Vice-Marshal Curtis, Senior Canadian Air Member, requested information regarding take-over dates for buildings now occupied by United States Forces at Goose Bay and Gander Airports.

. . . .

3. Air Transport Command will have necessity for retaining existing facilities at Goose Bay for the continued safe operation over the North Atlantic Route. Goose Bay is also an ATC supply point for outlying weather and communications stations in Eastern Canada and Baffin Island, and is also a weather alternate for Stephenville. The current ATC estimate indicates the following personnel requirements at Goose Bay:

1 January 1946	83 officers
	621 enlisted men
1 April 1946	73 officers
	474 enlisted men
1 July 1946	66 officers
	409 enlisted men.

GUY V. HENRY

Major-General, U.S. Army

1006.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Le représentant de l'aviation canadienne, CPCAD, au secrétaire par intérim, section canadienne de la CPCAD*

*Canadian Air Member, PJBD, to Acting Secretary,  
Canadian Section of PJBD*

Ottawa, January 21, 1946

U.S. DETACHMENT—GOOSE BAY

Dear Mr. Macdonnell,

1. You will recall that in the memorandum<sup>1</sup> which Major-General Henry presented at the Board meeting in Quebec, January 16th and 17th, with regard to U.S. Detachments at Goose Bay and Gander, the figures were given

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 1005.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 1005.

in each case. The figures for Goose Bay are very large and are apparently required in part because Goose Bay is used as an A.T.C. supply point for outlying weather and communications stations in Eastern Canada and Baffin Island.

2. It would therefore appear that there is an urgent necessity for Canada (in this case the Dept. of Transport) to take over and operate the essential weather stations now operated by the United States.

3. As far as the U.S. requirements to service their aircraft, using Goose Bay as an alternate to Stephenville, are concerned, these should not be any greater than those needed at Gander. In fact, I can see no reason for them retaining any detachment for this purpose, as the R.C.A.F. or whatever Canadian agency is operating the aerodrome can provide all the normal facilities at a weather alternate.

4. This matter is passed to you for any further action you feel is warranted. It would obviously be undesirable for Goose Bay to be turned over to a civil agency before the United States military detachment is withdrawn.

Yours sincerely,

W. A. CURTIS  
Air Vice-Marshal

1007.

DND HQS 15-1-204

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au sous-ministre  
de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister  
of National Defence for Air*

BY HAND

Ottawa, February 16, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

May I refer to the letter of January 21st from the Canadian Air Member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to the Canadian Secretary dealing with Goose Bay.

We agree that, as stated in the final paragraph of your letter, it would be undesirable for Goose Bay to be turned over to a civil agency of the Canadian Government before the United States military detachment is withdrawn. It does not appear practicable, however, for the Department of Transport to take over additional weather stations in Eastern Canada and Labrador at an early date and this method of offering the United States an opportunity to cut down their requirements at Goose Bay is therefore eliminated.

In the circumstances it does appear to us desirable to retain Canadian forces at Goose Bay so long as the United States Army is established there. It was only after lengthy, and at times difficult, negotiations that a lease for defence purposes was obtained, and to abandon all defence activity at



Goose Bay does not appear to be consistent with Canadian long-term interests. If all Canadian forces were withdrawn, it is possible that the United States would wish to establish a permanent detachment, a course which would be in conflict with the Canadian Government's desire to avoid expansion by United States forces in the Newfoundland and Labrador area beyond their present leased bases.

Certainly, until the proposed joint defence planning between Canada and the United States has made some progress, we would hope that a withdrawal from Goose Bay could be deferred.

N. A. ROBERTSON

1008.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, March 23, 1946

Dear Mr. Robertson,

The Commissioner for Finance, Mr. Ira Wild, telephoned me this morning to express his surprise that apparently the United States Government were proposing to remain for some considerable time at Goose Bay. He read me a letter from the United States Commanding Officer there which stated that plans were being formulated for the establishment of a Service Club in Area F for American, Canadian and Newfoundland civilians employed by the United States Government at Goose Bay. The Club would be run by a Board composed of United States Commissioned Officers and representative civilians. The letter went on to request that a Licence be issued and the Club be given the privilege of exemption from duties on beer and spiritous liquors that would be sold on the premises.

Mr. Wild stated that while, under the American Bases Agreement Act, the United States had duty free privileges on their established bases in Newfoundland, no such privileges apply at Goose Bay. He proposes to inform the Officer Commanding the United States Forces at Goose Bay that, while there is no objection to the issue of a Licence, Newfoundland duties would be levied on all imported products consumed in the Club.

Mr. Wild further stated that he did not think it was ever contemplated that there would be a more or less permanent American establishment at Goose Bay and expressed surprise that they were apparently making plans to remain for some considerable period. I had noted in the account of a recent Departmental meeting that Mr. MacKay referred to the continued presence of the United States Forces at Goose Bay, mainly for meteorological

purposes. As the information was marked "confidential" I did not feel justified in passing it on. I have always been strongly of the opinion that, having secured bases at Goose Bay and Torbay, the Canadian Government should maintain adequate defence forces on them. Otherwise there is no sound ground on which we can advance claims for continuing rights on these bases that are not granted on similar bases developed in other parts of the world in the course of a war against a common enemy. It would seem to me highly desirable to take over and operate all necessary services at Goose Bay so that the United States will have no excuse to maintain their forces there. In any case I should be greatly interested to have any information that may be available on developments there.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

1009.

1156-X-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, March 29, 1946

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

This is a brief and admittedly inconclusive reply to your letter of March 23rd about United States plans for staying on at Goose Bay. We can appreciate the feelings of the Newfoundland authorities.

Recent discussions in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, however, have revealed that the United States War Department not only wants to maintain a force of about five hundred Air Transport Command personnel at Goose Bay for an indefinite period, but has reached the conclusion in the last few weeks that they would like to station operational forces as well. Since they regard Goose Bay as a Canadian base, they are making their approaches to Canada and would like to have this subject considered in the talks on joint defence planning which are expected to take place before long.

As we have only just received this information, there has been no time to consider what policy the Canadian Government should adopt. Obviously, however, it should be in your hands, though we are not yet in a position to say anything to the Newfoundland authorities about it.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1010.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*  
*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 29, 1946

2. The Board discussed at length the question of immediate air base requirements in Northern Canada and Labrador. It was recognized that, although the United States at the conclusion of the war in Europe had declared the Crimson Route in Northeastern Canada to possess no continuing defence value, this declaration was based on then existing considerations. In general, the Board were agreed that final decisions could not be reached until the joint Canada-United States planning groups had submitted their recommendations. It was felt, however, that the contemplated studies would reveal a need for a number of air bases in the North and that considerations of prudence and economy indicated the desirability of maintaining these bases since to close them down and later to bring them back into operation would involve considerable additional expense. The Board stressed the importance of the maintenance of bases required for the completion of the programme of photography for air charting and mapping. The Board agreed upon the following conclusions and requested the Secretary of the Canadian Section to bring them to the attention of the appropriate authorities:

- (d) Goose Bay is considered vital to the defence of the United States and Canada and should be maintained as a military base on such a scale as to provide for the stationing of operational squadrons as required.

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

52-C(s)

*Mémoire du CARC à la CPCAD*  
*Memorandum from RCAF to PJBD*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 29, 1946

AIR BASE REQUIREMENTS IN NORTHERN CANADA AND LABRADOR  
IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENTS

*Introduction*

1. There have been constructed air base facilities in Northern Canada and Labrador which assume strategic importance in the defence of the North American continent. These are: the Northwest Staging Route from Edmonton

to Alaska; the Mackenzie River Air Route, particularly the northern portion; the Crimson or Northeast Staging Route, including The Pas, Churchill, Southampton Island, Frobisher Bay and Fort Chimo; Goose Bay.

2. The disposition of these bases is under review by the Canadian Government and it is felt that it would be helpful if the Permanent Joint Board on Defence could make observations and recommendations as to their future defence value.

. . .

### *Existing Facilities*

. . .

#### (d) Goose Bay

Goose Bay has proven its importance to any trans-Atlantic air operations between United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. This is due to its location close to the direct route from Eastern Canada and the United States to northern Europe and also its peculiarly suitable meteorological conditions.

For the same reason, it can be deduced that its strategic value for defence is vital. Major-General Henry has already indicated the desire of the United States Army to continue use of this aerodrome and to eventually station combat air units there. It is therefore apparent that the United States Section attaches considerable importance to this base and it is felt that it would be desirable for the Board to record its views on the strategic value of Goose Bay.

. . .

1011.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

No. 89

Ottawa, April 30, 1946

SECRET

Sir,

I refer to your letters of March 23 and April 17<sup>1</sup> concerning the Service Club opened by United States military authorities at Goose Bay Air Base.

2. It is felt that the incident was of sufficient importance to warrant a reminder through diplomatic channels to the United States that Goose Bay

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Air Base is a Canadian base and that the Agreement governing the use of the Base is the Agreement of October 10, 1944, between Canada and Newfoundland. I enclose a copy of a despatch to the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, under date of April 29, in which the Canadian Ambassador is instructed to leave a memorandum with the United States authorities along the lines of the despatch.

3. Would you please give the Newfoundland authorities an oral expression of our views as set forth in the enclosed copy of our despatch to the Canadian Ambassador in the United States and explain the action taken. You might also inform them that although United States military officials have shown interest in continued use of Goose Bay Air Base no formal request has been received. You should also explain to them that this information is secret.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur  
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador  
in United States*

DESPATCH 520

Ottawa, April 29, 1946

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to advise that the Newfoundland Government has recently made certain complaints to the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland about the operation of a United States Service Club at Goose Bay Air Base.

2. It is understood that the United States Commanding Officer at Goose Bay Air Base informed the Newfoundland Commissioner of Finance by letter on or about March 23 that plans were under way for the establishment of a Service Club at Goose Bay Air Base which would be open to United States, Canadian and Newfoundland civilians employed by the United States Government there. A request was made for a licence for the Club and for exemption from custom duties on beer and spirituous liquors offered for sale on the premises.

3. The Newfoundland authorities allege that the proposed Club was opened without awaiting a reply to the request for a licence; that alcoholic liquors on which no customs duty has been paid to the Newfoundland

Government are being sold on the premises; that alcoholic beverages have been sold to Indians, Eskimos and minors, contrary to the laws of Newfoundland; and that complaints have been received that residents of the area had been molested by Indians and Eskimos who had been drinking at the Club. The Newfoundland authorities have intimated to the Canadian High Commissioner that they take a serious view of these breaches of Newfoundland law.

4. It may be observed that since Goose Bay is under lease to Canada by the Agreement of October 10, 1944, between Newfoundland and Canada, Canada is responsible to Newfoundland for observance of the Agreement. This Agreement provides that "the laws of Newfoundland shall be applicable throughout the Air Base and to all persons therein or thereon." It is felt therefore that the United States military authorities at the Air Base will be glad to co-operate by strictly observing Newfoundland laws. In this connection it is thought that the Newfoundland authorities are not adverse to granting a Club licence for the premises in question, but they would hope that the regulations regarding the conduct of licenced clubs would be strictly observed.

5. It is also thought that since Goose Bay is a Canadian base the appropriate channel of communication between United States military authorities there and the Newfoundland Government on matters relating to the use of the Base would be through the Canadian Station Commander.

6. The incident also raises an important point of procedure with respect to post-war use of the Base by United States forces. The Newfoundland authorities have expressed some surprise that the United States military authorities should apparently be contemplating the maintenance of a considerable military establishment at Goose Bay. The Agreement of October 10, 1944, between Canada and Newfoundland provides that the Base will be available to the United States "for the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary or advisable in the interests of common defence." The Governments referred to here are obviously the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland, the Parties to the Agreement. I am aware that United States officials have raised with Canadian officials the question of continued use of the Base by United States forces. But it was assumed that these discussions were of a highly confidential nature and consequently the Canadian Government had not informed the Government of Newfoundland. It is somewhat unfortunate that action taken by a local United States military commander may have given the impression to the Newfoundland authorities that, without consulting them, the continued maintenance of a United States military establishment at Goose Bay had already been agreed to.

7. It is suggested that if the Governments of Canada and the United States ultimately agree that continued military use of Goose Bay Air Base by United States forces is desirable, the appropriate course would be for the Canadian Government then to consult the Government of Newfoundland with a view to securing their concurrence.

8. It is not thought desirable to lodge a formal protest about the matter with the United States Government. It is, however, suggested that the matter might be discussed informally and that a brief memorandum might be left with the appropriate officials.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1012.

1156-X-39

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of National Defence for Air to Under-Secretary of  
State for External Affairs*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 3, 1946

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I wish to refer to the despatch from the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Canadian Ambassador, Washington, No. 520, dated April 29th, 1946.

Concerning the establishment of a Service Club at Goose Bay by the United States Forces, I am having this matter investigated by the Commanding Officer of the Station.

The latter part of the communication deals with the continued occupation of the Base by American Forces. Up to the present time the United States has considered that it is necessary to maintain a Force there to service American Army planes being returned from Overseas. It is becoming quite clear, however, that they have no intention of moving out, but on the contrary are contemplating increasing their establishment. Already they have applied for permission to construct married quarters for their personnel, and it has been indicated that unless air bases can be established in Iceland and Greenland they will desire to maintain a considerable defensive force at Goose Bay. As you already know their application has been refused by Iceland.

As you are no doubt aware the Permanent Joint Board on Defence is giving early consideration to the question of air bases in the Arctic area, and at that time the future requirements at Goose Bay will be carefully considered.

It might be desirable to re-assure the Newfoundland Government that no agreement for the continued maintenance of the United States military establishment has been agreed to.

Yours sincerely,

COLIN GIBSON

1013.

1156-X-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur  
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador  
in United States*

TELEGRAM EX-1519

Ottawa, June 13, 1946

SECRET. We have felt for some time that it would be desirable to clarify the position of United States forces at Goose Bay. The United States have no postwar rights at this Canadian leased base, but we know from discussions in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence that they attach importance to it and are likely to want to keep personnel stationed there.

2. The Newfoundland authorities have made it known that they are not altogether happy about the anomalous status of the United States forces at Goose Bay. Apparently, there is a fair amount of opinion in Newfoundland to the effect that since the war is over, those forces should go home. This makes for difficulty in dealing with relatively minor problems, such as allowing dependents of U.S. personnel to live at Goose or obtaining customs free privileges for U.S. forces. More important, however, is the broad question of what postwar rights the United States Government wants and how far these may be acceptable to Canada and Newfoundland. On this subject we have had no word from the United States Government (except the indications in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence mentioned above) and we feel that the problem warrants early discussion.

3. Since MacKay is in Washington on other business, we think you might take advantage of his presence to arrange an informal discussion with Hickerson and Parsons. The principal object would be to persuade the State Department to raise with us at an early date, since we are the landlords at Goose Bay, the postwar position of the United States at that base. The preliminary view of officials here leans toward a Canada-Newfoundland-United States agreement, which like the recent Canada-Newfoundland-United Kingdom



agreement, would be for a short term and subject to extension or revision. The uncertainty regarding Newfoundland's constitutional position makes it impracticable to conclude a long term agreement. Indeed, in order to meet Newfoundland opinion and to avoid criticism in other parts of the world, it might be desirable to place the emphasis in such an agreement on the need for the Air Transport Command to use the base as a stopover enroute to and from United States occupation forces in Europe, and to limit its duration to the occupation period. This would have the advantage of appearing as a solution of a problem left over from the war rather than as a new defence agreement.

4. MacKay has recently had discussions with two of the Newfoundland Commissioners and can provide you with additional background. We hope that you can arrange to take him with you to a meeting with Hickerson.

1014.

1156-X-39

*Mémoire d'une conversation tenue à Washington au sujet du  
statut des troupes des États-Unis à Goose Bay<sup>1</sup>*

*Memorandum of a Conversation held in Washington on the  
Status of United States Forces at Goose Bay<sup>1</sup>*

SECRET

[Washington,] June 18, 1946

Reference Teletype EX 1519, June 13, 1946

Mr. Stone and Mr. MacKay met Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Parsons of the State Department informally this morning and explained the situation to them in accordance with the Department's message referred to above.

Mr. Hickerson expressed as his personal opinion that the arrangements between Canada and the United States for reciprocal landing rights on notice at military air bases for service planes and the practice of *ad hoc* arrangements for such matters as training exercises were working very satisfactorily. Although Goose Bay was in Newfoundland territory, he felt personally that in principle it should be included under existing arrangements for Canadian Military fields. He felt that the Army Air Forces would not doubt want the use of Goose Bay as an alternate landing field as long as the United States occupation forces remained in Europe, but he did not see any need for stationing garrison forces other than ATC personnel at the base. Mr. Parsons implied that the United States Air Forces were now particularly interested in training under northern conditions and that they were stationing considerable forces for training in Alaska and in Newfoundland during the coming summer. He understood that the army authorities would also be interested in Goose for training purposes. It was evident that the State Department is under considerable pressure from military authorities for the use of bases

<sup>1</sup> Rédigé par R. A. MacKay.

<sup>1</sup> Written by R. A. MacKay.

outside the United States and that the State Department officials were endeavouring to restrain military authorities.

Mr. Stone and Mr. McKay suggested that it would be desirable to have a clear understanding between the United States and the Canadian Government about the use of Goose Bay by the United States forces before approaching Newfoundland authorities about the matter of married quarters for United States personnel there and about the continuation of canteen privileges. A suggestion was made by Mr. Parsons that the United States Government should approach the Newfoundland Government direct about the maintenance of personnel at Goose, in view of the provision of the Bases Agreement of 1941 which provides that United States forces located outside the base areas by agreement of the Government of Newfoundland shall be entitled to the same privileges as those in base areas. Mr. Stone and Mr. MacKay suggested, however, that since Goose Bay was a Canadian lease-hold they thought the proper channel was through the Canadian Government or that following an agreement between the Canadian and United States governments a joint approach to Newfoundland might be considered. This view seemed to be accepted by Mr. Parsons and Mr. Hickerson, although they said that the United States might, in view of the Bases Agreement, feel it desirable to make formal arrangements with Newfoundland following agreement with Canada. It was agreed, however, that the matter of procedure should stand over.

Mr. Parsons agreed to consult General Henry about the United States requirements. Mr. Parsons subsequently telephoned Mr. Stone to the effect that General Henry confirmed the impression that the United States would want to retain A.T.C. personnel at Goose so long as United States occupation troops were in Europe. General Henry implied that there had been some discussion about other requirements but that thinking in the matter was still vague. Mr. Parsons said General Henry would enquire further and try to get a specific statement about United States requirements at an early date.

With respect to customs free privileges, Mr. Parsons pointed to the clause of the Bases Agreement, assuring extension of these privileges outside the base areas. He implied that the United States would certainly press for continuation of these privileges for its personnel at Goose. Mr. Stone and Mr. MacKay pointed out that it would create a very difficult situation if the United States forces had such privileges while the Canadian forces did not. Mr. MacKay stated that in recent discussions with Commissioners Neill and Winter at Ottawa about the continuation of customs free privileges the Newfoundland Commissioners had taken a strong stand against any extension beyond June 30. It is possible that the United States will make a direct approach to the Newfoundland authorities asking for an extension of their continuance beyond June 30, although it was pointed out to them that this might make more difficult a satisfactory settlement of the problem with Newfoundland regarding the continuance of United States forces there, unless this question were cleared with the Newfoundland Government in advance.

1015.

1156-X-39

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

SECRET

Ottawa, July 5, 1946

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

During the visit of the Honourable H. A. Winter here recently, Mr. MacKay discussed quite informally with him the problem regarding the continuance of United States forces at Goose Bay. He showed Mr. Winter the memorandum of the discussion which Mr. Stone and he had recently in Washington with Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Parsons. A copy of this memorandum was sent you a few days ago.

Mr. Winter seemed to be somewhat surprised that the United States was so interested in keeping forces at Goose Bay and seemed to think the case even for keeping ATC personnel there for servicing planes while the United States had occupation forces in Europe was rather weak. On the other hand he seemed to appreciate that if the United States made strong representations about the matter some concessions might have to be made.

Mr. MacKay stressed the fact that we had as yet received no formal request, except for the construction of married quarters. He said, as you have already told the Newfoundland Government, that we had made no commitments nor would do so without consulting them.

I may say that the purpose of the discussion was merely to prepare the ground should the United States come forward with a request shortly, as we have reason to anticipate.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. R[OBERTSON]

1016.

52-C(s)

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État associé  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Associate Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

SECRET AND PERSONAL

St. John's, August 30, 1946

Dear Mr. Wrong,

I spent last evening at Fort Pepperrell at the home of Brigadier-General C. V. Haynes, Commanding General of the United States Army. Mr. G. K.

Donald, United States Consul General, Major-General J. B. Brooks and Mr. G. S. Roper, Civil Air Attaché at the United States Legation at Ottawa, were also of the company. The talk turned to questions of aviation and I think I should pass on to you that the United States Field Commanders, of which the two mentioned are typical, appear to be really in earnest in their desire to see the United States established at Goose Bay. They even talked of the necessity of extending the runways to 10,000 feet and of building up a giant base. In their view the North Country is taking on great strategic importance and they regard the Goose Bay air base as the natural entrance to this area. They tell me that they wish to keep open not only the existing bases in the Far North but to establish more. In this connection I was told that the new air base in the far north of Greenland—Tula,<sup>1</sup> I think they call it—will be ready to receive the first planes by the middle of September. I am sure that I am not telling you anything with which you are not already aware but it may possibly be of some value to have this confirmation of how keenly the field Commanders feel about the matter.

In my own view it would be quite fatal to the development of Canada, as a nation, to have the United States take over the defence of the North Country or to have them muscle in and assume control of even a part of the defences. Not only would it infringe on Canadian sovereignty but it would involve us, sooner or later, in complications and perhaps hostilities with the U.S.S.R. All this, however, is obvious and I mention it merely in passing.

...

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

1017.

52-C(s)

*Mémoire du secrétaire, section américaine de la CPCAD, au secrétaire, section canadienne de la CPCAD<sup>2</sup>*

*Memorandum from Secretary, American Section of the PJBD, to Secretary, Canadian Section of PJBD<sup>2</sup>*

SECRET

Washington, September 18, 1946

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES FORCES AT GOOSE BAY, LABRADOR

This memorandum deals with the desire of the United States Government for permission, initially from Canada and secondly from the Newfoundland Government, to station operational forces at the Canadian leased base at Goose Bay, Labrador, for a protracted period. It does not deal with the relatively minor question of the continued presence of the detachments of the United States Army Air Forces which are currently stationed at Goose Bay and Gander. These detachments, as you know, service the airline of supply

<sup>1</sup> Thule.

<sup>2</sup> R. M. Macdonnell.



to our occupation troops in Germany. In so far as the Government of Newfoundland is concerned, their presence has been agreed to by Commissioner Neill until the peace treaty with Germany is signed.

At the meeting of the Board on March 21-22, 1946, you inquired what military personnel the United States desired to maintain at Goose Bay after July 1. It was agreed at that meeting that long-term requirements and related problems of the future of Goose Bay by the United States should be determined in connection with studies in the field of post-war collaboration.

In the Journal of the Board for the meeting of April 29, 1946, the following statement appears: "Goose Bay is considered vital to the defense of the United States and Canada and should be maintained as a military base on such a scale as to provide for the stationing of operational squadrons as required."

On June 19, 1946, the Joint Planning Section submitted a memorandum to the Joint Canadian-United States Military Cooperation Committee, referring to the future presence of United States combat units at Goose Bay. This memorandum refers to "the outstanding significance of this base in future defense plans" and concludes "it would certainly be desirable that final arrangements permit the presence of United States combat units at this base."

In the meantime, on June 14, 1946, the then Chargé d'Affaires, Canadian Embassy, Washington, called on the Acting Director, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, and under instructions, initiated an informal discussion of problems relating to Goose Bay. He reported that the Canadian Government desired that the status of United States troops there be clarified and indicated the willingness, in fact the desire of the Canadian Government to work out a solution of unsettled problems relating to this base. This approach, on behalf of the Canadian Government, was considered by the War Department with the result that the Chief of Staff on July 16, 1946, requested the State Department to enter into informal discussions with the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments preliminary to a formal agreement whereby United States troops might be stationed at Goose Bay for a protracted period. He expressed the same views as to the importance of this base as had been expressed by the Board, the Joint Planners and, in fact, the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments in the preamble to the Goose Bay Lease Agreement. His request was, moreover, predicted [predicated] on the basic assumption that in any future emergency the air defense of North America would be a joint Canadian-American mission.

On August 21 the Department of State advised the War Department that at that time it was deemed inadvisable and impracticable to initiate the proposed informal discussions. Despite the Canadian initiatives above alluded

to, the State Department has adhered to this view for various reasons, not the least of which has been its desire to await the maturing of the joint appreciation and the joint planning which has been underway throughout the summer. I might add, however, that the concurrence of the War Department in deferring the problem to the present has been qualified by the view held in the highest quarters that preparations to assure the security of the northern part of the Western Hemisphere should be carried forward with maximum speed. There has been nothing in recent international events to lessen the anxiety of those charged with responsibility for preparing our military security. In fact the reverse is true.

It is believed that the Canadian Government fully shares the view that the strategic air defense of North America should be pushed out on the perimeter as far as practicable. The following reasons are presented to indicate the value to both Governments of arranging for the presence of a United States very heavy bombardment group and a United States fighter group at Goose Bay in addition to the operational forces to be maintained there by Canada:

- (a) The garrison would be augmented to the extent of the two additional groups, including one group of a type not presently maintained by the Royal Canadian Air Force. In the opinion of the competent United States military authorities no other deployment of these particular units would contribute as much to the security of the United States and, it should be added, of Canada as well.
- (b) By training personnel in rotation a substantial number of officers and men would, within a five-year period, have acquired experience in climatic conditions of that portion of the continent. These conditions are different from those obtaining at any United States base.
- (c) They would also have obtained experience of working in close cooperation with Canadian forces, a consideration of basic importance and one which, I believe, both air forces consider to be desirable. The advantage of working together would be reciprocal.
- (d) An opportunity would be afforded to develop and test winter equipment and methods. Concentration on this aspect of training is considered particularly necessary in view of the absence of concentration on it in the past. No other east coast air base affords comparable climatic and other conditions.

It is believed that the Canadian Government is also aware of the inadequacy of existing facilities in Alaska and Newfoundland to permit maximum training of available air force contingents under sub-Arctic conditions. At Harmon Field, Newfoundland, for instance, present plans contemplate the stationing

of one very heavy bombardment group, one fighter group, one all-weather fighter squadron and one very long range reconnaissance squadron. This is the maximum feasible deployment there.

The War Department recognizes that certain advantages would accrue if it became possible to station RCAF operational forces at United States bases such as Harmon Field and bases in Alaska. Many of the considerations advanced above would apply equally to the presence of Canadian forces at United States bases. It is likely, therefore, that the War Department would view favorably any Canadian request along these lines as soon as the presently congested state of affairs at our bases in Alaska and Newfoundland can be relieved sufficiently.

Article III(b) of the memorandum of Agreement dated October 10, 1944, relating to the lease of Goose Bay Airport provides that "for the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary or advisable in the interest of common defense:

- (b) use of the air base will be made available to United Kingdom military aircraft and to aircraft of the United States Navy and Army Air Forces.

Article V of the Agreement between Canada, Newfoundland and the United Kingdom respecting defense installations in Newfoundland, in force March 31, 1946, provides that

- (a) the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland and if necessary the Government of the United Kingdom will consult with one another from time to time as occasion may require with a view to co-ordinating defense requirements, in Newfoundland.

In the event that the Canadian Government agrees with this Government on the stationing of United States operational forces at Goose Bay, the United States Government would consider it desirable for the ensuing discussions with the Government of Newfoundland under Article V(a), above quoted, to be enlarged to permit participation therein by United States representatives. This course is considered desirable because of Article XIX of the Leased Bases Agreement of March 27, 1941, which reads as follows:

1. United States forces stationed or operating outside the leased areas under separate agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of the territory shall be entitled to the same rights and enjoy the same status as United States forces stationed within the leased areas.
2. The United States shall be under no obligation to maintain forces outside the leased areas by virtue of any such agreement.

In conclusion, what we are now asking is for your Government to agree with ours that, to borrow from the language of the Goose Bay Lease, in the interest of common defense it is necessary and advisable to permit our tactical air units to use and be stationed at Goose Bay for a fixed period of years. We would, however, not wish to be obligated to remain there, especially if the world situation should undergo radical improvement.

J. GRAHAM PARSONS

1018.

52-C(s)

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur  
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador  
in United States*

TELEGRAM 2582

Ottawa, October 12, 1946

TOP SECRET

For your information, Parsons gave Macdonnell at the last meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence a secret memorandum stating that the United States wished to station tactical air forces at Goose Bay in quite considerable numbers. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to you. It was left that Macdonnell would ascertain the views of the Canadian Government as to the most appropriate way in which this request could be put forward by the United States Government.

2. The subject has been given ministerial consideration here and Macdonnell has today informed Parsons by telephone that the Canadian views are as follows:

- (1) that this matter should be brought up by the United States on a diplomatic or political level;
- (2) that it would be helpful if, in the first instance any request could be made as general as possible, without too much detail and related to the joint responsibilities of Canada and the United States in Newfoundland, which would, of course, have to be consulted;
- (3) that emphasis should be placed on the desire of the United States Service authorities to use Goose Bay for training purposes and for testing winter equipment, methods, etc.

3. Parsons was also informed that it was felt by Ministers that an approach of this kind on the diplomatic level might lead to a general consideration on a very high political level of the problem of defence cooperation between the two countries and that this development is something to be desired. There are obviously various ways in which this suggestion could be carried out which would depend on circumstances. Should the President and the Prime Minister be meeting, this subject could be discussed. On the other hand, a meeting between Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Patterson, Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Abbott might be arranged.

4. Mr. Parsons said that he was grateful for this information and would discuss it with the appropriate authorities. He thought that it would be well received and that the idea of high level political consideration of defence problems was very sound.



1019.

52-C(s)

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au Premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Prime Minister*

TOP SECRET

[Ottawa,] October 30, 1946

When Mr. Atherton called on me this morning, he left the attached "oral message" which, I understand, the President read to you on Monday<sup>1</sup>, and which concerns Canada-United States cooperation in defence matters. A copy of this "oral message" was also handed by the State Department to our Ambassador in Washington. In doing so, Mr. Hickerson said that the "message" had been prepared in the State Department with a view to its possible presentation to you. However, following his discussion with you, the President had spoken to the Acting Secretary of State, and told him that he had read the document to you, but had not given you a copy. He then told Mr. Acheson that, on reflection, he thought it would be a good thing if the paper were given to you. It was then sent to Mr. Atherton for that purpose.

From the above, it seems clear that both the President and the State Department attach considerable importance to the statements of policy and the proposals included in the document in question. It is, indeed, an important statement; especially that part of it beginning on page 4, which suggests the desirability of decisions by the Canadian Government on the following problems:

1. Further Canadian Government endorsement of joint planning now in progress;
2. Approval of the 35th Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence;
3. Stationing of United States Army Air Forces at Goose Bay.

. . .

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Note verbale*

TOP SECRET

[Washington,] October 30, 1946

The Government of the United States is grateful to the Government of Canada for the favorable consideration which the latter has given to proposals relating to joint defense. In no case has any military project which this Government considered urgent been delayed by any lack of cooperation on the part of Canada.

. . .

<sup>1</sup>Le Premier ministre revenait à peine d'une visite chez le président Truman.

<sup>1</sup>The Prime Minister had just returned from a visit to President Truman.

Although many problems remain for future determination, the United States Government believes for the reasons set forth in this memorandum that decisions by the Canadian Government on the following existing problems would be timely and would enhance the security of the Canadian and American people:

...

3. It is hoped that the Canadian Government, with Newfoundland concurrence, will permit the stationing of certain United States Army Air Force units at the Canadian 99-year leased base at Goose Bay, Labrador. Reciprocally, (as soon as the present congestion can be relieved), the United States authorities will be agreeable to a similar arrangement at United States bases in Newfoundland proper. While remaining an important feature of the defenses of the northeastern approaches to the continent, these latter bases are, however, too close to Canada and the United States to provide adequate protection against ultra-modern high speed aerial attack. Moreover, they do not afford as would Goose Bay, a highly favorable situation for the acquisition by United States and Canadian Air Force units of the experience of training together under cold weather conditions, of testing northern equipment and of coordinating their respective methods and tactics. Finally, arrangements of this kind at Goose Bay and other bases would be consistent with the joint responsibilities which the two Governments have discharged in the past for the defense of Newfoundland.

...

1020.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire au Services publics  
et à l'Approvisionnement*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner for  
Public Utilities and Supply*

No. 67

St. John's, November 12, 1946

SECRET

Dear Mr. Neill,

My Government is in receipt of a request from the United States that members of the United States forces stationed at the Goose Bay Airport be permitted to have their dependents join them.

The Canadian Government is disposed to grant the United States request but to limit it, as you have done with respect to customs arrangements, to the period during which the United States maintains occupation forces in Germany.

Before taking any definite action on the matter, however, it would be appreciated if you could let me know whether this proposed arrangement would be acceptable to the Newfoundland authorities.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

1021.

1156-X-39

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État suppléant  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 591

St. John's, November 30, 1946

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 204 of November 18th<sup>1</sup> respecting the United States request to be permitted to station married personnel at Goose Bay I have to inform you that the Commission of Government has now agreed that dependents of United States Forces stationed at Goose Bay Airport will be permitted to enter Newfoundland territory and take up residence for a period limited to the time during which the United States maintains occupation forces in Germany, subject to the following conditions:

1. That the military forces of the United States set up at Goose Bay Airport a civilian commissariat from which all United States civilians may purchase necessary supplies of food, clothing and other goods on which Newfoundland Customs Duties have been paid. Duty free concessions apply only to uniformed members of the armed forces but dependents of such members of the armed forces and other civilians are required to pay duty of normal application as provided in the Newfoundland Revenue Act, 1946.
2. That the military forces of the United States agree to the examination by Newfoundland Customs Officials of all parcel post packages, expressage and freight consigned to individual members of the armed forces. Under present arrangements only packages addressed to civilians are passed over to Newfoundland Customs for assessment of duty but with dependents of military personnel at the Airport, it is essential that all such packages be submitted for examination although no duty would be charged on goods purely for the use of the members of the armed forces.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

3. That the Newfoundland Immigration and Customs Officials stationed at Goose Bay Airport be notified in advance of the arrival of aircraft with civilian personnel on board so that regular Immigration and Customs procedure be carried out before such persons leave the landing area.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1022.

52-C(s)

*Mémoire des conversations canado-américaines sur la défense  
tenues à Ottawa*

*Memorandum of Canadian-United States Defence Conversations  
held in Ottawa*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, December 16-17, 1946

PRESENT:

CANADIAN

Mr. L. B. Pearson, Under-Secretary of  
State for External Affairs  
Mr. Arnold Heeney, Clerk of the Privy  
Council  
Mr. R. M. Macdonnell, Department of  
External Affairs  
Mr. Evan Gill, Cabinet Secretariat  
Major-General Mann, Vice Chief of the  
General Staff  
Commodore de Wolf  
A/V/Marshal Curtis  
Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Department of  
Finance

AMERICAN

Ambassador Atherton  
Major-General Henry  
Brig.-Gen. Lincoln  
Rear-Admiral Carey Jones  
Capt. Anderson  
Col. Van Devanter  
Mr. J. G. Parsons, Dept. of State  
Mr. George Kennan, Dept. of State  
Mr. Edward A. Dow, Jr., American  
Embassy, Ottawa

. . .

IV. GOOSE BAY

Colonel Van Devanter read from a prepared statement, the substance of which was that the most probable route of approach to North America included Iceland, Greenland and the line Newfoundland-Labrador-Eastern Canada, the latter portion of which was only about 1200 miles from the main continental industrial centers. Goose Bay was considered to be the only suitable base for very heavy bombardment groups and in fact could be said to be the most important all-round strategic air base in the western hemisphere.

During the ensuing discussion Mr. Pearson and Mr. Heeney referred to the desirability for political reasons of emphasizing the training side of the Goose Bay project, although Mr. Parsons pointed out that Goose Bay was intended for offensive purposes. He added that it was a "facility in being" and there were evident advantages to be derived from this fact.



Mr. Pearson said that regardless of the general question of how far the U.K. should be brought into the Canadian-American discussions it would be essential to discuss the disposition of Goose Bay with the U.K., as Canada was only a limited lessee there.

It was agreed that there was urgency with respect to the basing of a VHB group at Goose Bay and that a very preliminary discussion should be held immediately in Ottawa between certain of those present at the meeting and the United Kingdom High Commissioner to Canada.

. . .

1023.

DND (DH) 955.003 (D 4)

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité des chefs d'état-major*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee*

TOP SECRET

[Ottawa,] April 27, 1948

. . .

GOOSE BAY, LABRADOR—U.S. AIR OPERATIONS

4. The Acting Chief of the Air Staff reported that the U.S. Air Force had asked for authority to station bomber and fighter units at Goose Bay, Labrador, for training at various periods between May 3rd and December 6th, 1948. Different units would be rotated for the purpose and the tactical manoeuvres proposed would include practice bombing with bombs up to 1,000 pounds in weight. These bombing exercises would take place over the open sea out of regular shipping lanes.

It was recommended that authorization for the proposed training exercises be given to the U.S. Air Force on the understanding that:

- (a) prior clearance from the Newfoundland authorities be obtained by the Department of External Affairs; and
- (b) the operations would be under the general control and supervision of the R.C.A.F. to ensure that suitable safety precautions were taken, both in respect of practice exercises and in respect of storage and handling of armament.

(Draft memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee CSC 5-21 of April 14th, 1948<sup>1</sup>)

5. Mr. Heeney asked if the numbers of aircraft and personnel involved were known; also if sufficient aviation fuel would be available at Goose Bay for the exercises.

6. Mr. Pearson observed that it would be difficult to obtain clearance from the Newfoundland authorities in time for the exercises to begin on

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

May 3rd. It would be preferable, in any case, if the exercises could be deferred until June 4th, by which time the Newfoundland referendum would have been held. He enquired also if any additional facilities or installations would be required at Goose Bay for these exercises.

7. Air Vice-Marshal Morfee stated that the numbers of aircraft and personnel involved were not known but could be ascertained without difficulty. It was probable, however, that the numbers at any one time would be small. Aviation fuel would be supplied on condition that this was replaced by the end of the period by the U.S. Air Force. It was not anticipated that any extra facilities or installations would be required.

8. The Committee, after discussion, agreed:

- (a) to recommend to the Minister that approval for the proposed exercises be granted, (the necessary action in this regard to be taken by the Acting Chairman);
- (b) that, if approved by the Minister, action to obtain clearance from the Newfoundland authorities be taken through the Department of External Affairs, it being noted that it would be desirable to defer commencement of the exercises until June 4th, if possible;
- (c) that publicity with respect to this training be kept to a minimum; and
- (d) that the action taken be reported to Cabinet Defence Committee at the next meeting.

1024.

52-C(s)

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au commissaire suppléant  
à la Justice et à la Défense*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Commissioner  
for Justice and Defence*

No. 11

St. John's, October 18, 1948

SECRET

Dear Major Flinn,

You will recall that I left with you on Saturday a copy of a despatch No. 245 of October 12th<sup>1</sup> from Ottawa regarding the desire of the Strategic Air Command, U.S.A.F., for units of its planes posted temporarily to Goose Bay, in rotation, during the summer of 1949, to have permission to carry out bombing and air gunnery practice with live munitions. I enclosed with the copy of the despatch a copy of a letter on this subject dated July 27th<sup>1</sup> from the United States Air Member of the Permanent Joint Board on

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Defence to the former United States Secretary of the Board. This letter was received under cover of a letter from the State Department supporting the proposal on behalf of the United States Government.

The scheme described above would include the following:

- (a) a "temporary bomb and ammunition disposal or storage area" in the immediate vicinity of Goose Bay;
- (b) possibly an area, containing a land surface, within 100 miles of the Goose—Resolute Bay (Cornwallis Island, N.W.T.) air route and not more than 1000 miles north of Goose Bay, which would be suitable for practice bombing;
- (c) an area within 100 miles of Goose Bay for fighter bombing practice, along with an air gunnery area.

The United States proposal in this connection has not yet been considered by the Cabinet Defence Committee. However, if the ranges are to be established and if they are to be used next summer, it is urgent to conduct a survey of possible areas for them before winter sets in.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs would therefore be grateful if you could let me know, as a matter of urgency (a) whether the Commission of Government would be prepared to agree to the general proposals outlined above, and (b) whether the R.C.A.F. may have authority to send the necessary survey personnel immediately to Labrador.

It is believed that this matter will probably go before Cabinet Committee after specific areas are recommended by the R.C.A.F. on the basis of the survey referred to. At that time, when the picture will be clearer, the proposal could again be referred to your Government for final approval.

Yours sincerely,

P. A. BRIDLE

1025.

17-B(s)

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 305

St. John's, October 19, 1948

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. My telegram No. 304 of October 19th<sup>1</sup>, proposed United States Air Force bombing areas in Labrador.

The Commission of Government agree to general proposals outlined in your despatch No. 245 of October 12th<sup>2</sup>, subject to further reference to

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Government of Newfoundland when Government of Canada is in a position to indicate what sites may be suitable for proposed operations. The Commission of Government also agree to proposal that Royal Canadian Air Force should send survey parties immediately to Labrador for purposes indicated.

1026.

52-C(s)

*Mémorandum du vice-sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa,] November 5, 1948

#### MARRIED QUARTERS FOR UNITED STATES PERSONNEL AT GOOSE BAY

It will be recalled that the Cabinet authorized on November 3 conversations with United States authorities with a view to working out "some agreement in the form of a lease which would give the United States the security of possession which they required" to erect married quarters at Goose Bay.

2. Since the extension of facilities and especially the provision of married quarters at Goose Bay might be an important consideration in negotiations for changing the status of United States bases in Newfoundland, it is suggested that the two questions should be discussed together rather than separately. If this is agreed to, Mr. Wrong might be authorized to suggest in his discussions with United States authorities about the bases that we might be prepared to do something in the way of facilitating the construction of married quarters at Goose Bay.

3. Instructions to Mr. Wrong regarding the Cabinet's decision about United States bases in Newfoundland are being drafted.\*

E[SCOTT] R[EID]

#### SECTION G

#### LES BASES AMÉRICAINES<sup>1</sup>

#### UNITED STATES BASES<sup>1</sup>

\*Note telle que dans l'original:

\*Note as in original:

Yes. B[ROOKE] C[LAXTON]

<sup>1</sup> Pour connaître l'attitude du gouvernement vis-à-vis le problème des bases américaines lorsqu'il devint clair que Terre-Neuve allait s'unir au Canada, veuillez consulter le volume 2 des *Documents relatifs aux relations entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve*.

<sup>1</sup> For the Canadian Government's attitude toward the United States bases when it became clear that Newfoundland would join Canada, see Volume 2 of *Documents on Canada-Newfoundland Relations*.



1027.

10477-B-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 222

St. John's, July 3, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to report that a parade was held yesterday at Fort Pepperrell just outside St. John's and an official farewell given to the United States Army Units that are being transferred from Newfoundland. I understand that Fort Pepperrell is being put on a care and maintenance basis and that the garrison will be reduced to approximately 550 men. Advantage was taken of the occasion by the General Officer Commanding, Brigadier-General S. M. Connell, to invite the public of St. John's to visit Fort Pepperrell. More than five thousand persons visited the Fort and were taken, in small groups over the quarters, recreation halls, bakery, laundry and other facilities of the Fort and buffet lunches were served in the barracks and mess halls to the visitors.

The Honourable H. A. Winter, Commissioner for Defence, was the guest-of-honour and, following a review and march past, gave a short address, the text of which I am enclosing for your information together with the remarks of Brigadier-General Connell who followed him<sup>1</sup>. While these are both marked by the urbanity, good humour and display of mutual admiration that always marks an official record of such proceedings, they do in a general way express the good feeling which undoubtedly exists between the people of Newfoundland and the United States garrison.

3. A number of posts, both at Pepperrell and at Fort MacAndrew near Argentia where a similar reduction is taking place, hitherto held by service personnel are being put in charge of Newfoundlanders on a civilian basis. Engineers, mechanics, carpenters, painters and other tradesmen are in demand for these posts and are being offered steady employment at good wages.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1028.

10298-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 290

St. John's, July 17, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit, herewith, for your consideration, a copy of a communication of July 16 from the Secretary of the Department for Public

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Utilities requesting the views of the Canadian Government on a proposal put forward by the Government of the United States that the Government of Newfoundland should define, in a certain manner, the extent of the territorial waters over which rights, power and authority have been granted to the United States by the Bases Agreement of 1941.

2. It will be noted that the Newfoundland Government is desirous of taking the matter up as quickly as possible with the Government of the United Kingdom and have asked for an early expression of our views.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*  
*Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, July 16, 1946

Dear Mr. Macdonald,

Under the American Bases Act of 1941 the Government of Newfoundland assigned to the United States Government certain rights, power and authority within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to or in the vicinity of the leased areas which are necessary to provide access to and defence of the leased areas or appropriate for the control thereof.

2. No Acts of the Government of Newfoundland or Agreements between that Government and the Government of the United States have been made which have delineated, defined or described the limits of territorial waters adjacent to or in the vicinity of the leased areas at Argentia and the United States authorities have now asked that the limits of the territorial waters adjacent to or in the vicinity of the leased areas at Argentia, over which the United States may exercise the rights and authorities as provided in the American Bases Act, should be defined.

3. The United States authorities have requested that the waters adjacent to the leased areas at Argentia should be defined in accordance with the annexed schedule<sup>1</sup>. On the chart<sup>1</sup> enclosed has been shown the line established by the Hague Convention as the line on which the headlands of Placentia Bay have been established. There is shown in inset on this chart the area over which the United States authorities have asked to be given rights, power and authority in accordance with the American Bases Act. This area is shown in large scale on a map, also enclosed. It will be observed that the area over which the United States authorities have requested rights, power and authority is partly inside the line established by the Hague Convention and that, where it is outside that line, the limits do not extend to the three mile territorial limit.

4. In dealing with the request of the United States authorities, it is proposed that any agreement made should take the form of exchange of notes

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government as parties to the Bases Agreement of the 27th March, 1941. By paragraph 4 of the Protocol of the same date it was agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Article 1(4) the Canadian Government as well as the Newfoundland Government should have the right to participate. The Commission of Government is of the opinion that the proposed area constitutes no more than is necessary for the exercise, on a conservative basis, of rights, power and authority for the proper control and protection of the Base at Argentia and is prepared to agree to the request of the United States authorities, subject to the recognition of admission of fishing rights for Newfoundlanders (not incompatible with military requirements within the delineated area).

It is our desire to address the Dominions Office on this subject as quickly as possible and I should be grateful for an early expression of your views upon this matter.

Yours faithfully,

R. MANNING

for Commissioner for Public Utilities

1029.

10298-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 171

Ottawa, July 27, 1946

Sir,

I refer to your despatch No. 290 of July 17 with enclosures regarding the request of the United States Government for establishing the boundaries of the waters adjacent to Argentia Naval Base over which the United States would be entitled to jurisdiction under the Bases Agreement of 1941.

2. The Canadian Government concur in the view of the Commission of Government that the proposed area constitutes no more than is necessary for the exercise, on a conservative basis, of the rights, power and authority for the proper control and protection of the base of Argentia. The Canadian Government has therefore no objection to the proposal made by the United States.

3. Would you advise the Newfoundland Government accordingly. It would be advisable when doing so to include in your reply a copy of the description of the area forwarded by the Commission of Government. Would you also

please express the appreciation of the Canadian Government to the Newfoundland Government for its consideration in consulting the Canadian Government on the matter.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG

for the Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1030.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions, rapport des militaires*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions, Report of Service Members*

TOP SECRET

New York, September 19-20, 1946

. . .

*U.S. Army*

. . .

#### 7. AAF PERSONNEL IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR.

The Board is advised that all AAF activities in Newfoundland and Labrador are being transferred from the jurisdiction of the Air Transport Command, AAF, to the command of the Commanding General, Strategic Air Command, Headquarters at Bolling Field, D.C., with sub-headquarters at Fort Pepperrell, Newfoundland.

. . .

1031.

17-D(s)

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 357

St. John's, July 23, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copies of the American Bases (Supplementary Leases) Act, 1948, which was passed on June 17th<sup>1</sup> by the Newfoundland Government.

2. This Act was not published for comment prior to enactment, as is done with most legislation passed by the Commission of Government. The first time it was made public was when it was gazetted some three weeks ago.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



3. I have discussed the Act informally with the Commissioner for Justice and Defence. He tells me that the areas leased to the United States by the Act have in actual practice been used by United States forces for many years, in most cases since 1942.

4. The areas listed in Schedule A<sup>1</sup> are simply extensions of areas already leased to the United States. The areas listed in Schedule B<sup>1</sup> are additional areas; the first lot being for radio sites and the remainder, I understand, for gun sites.

5. You will note that the enclosed Act gives the United States rights in the areas in question the same as they now enjoy in the areas which they hold under the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941<sup>2</sup>. I understand that this was also the case with the American Bases (Supplementary Leases) Act of 1942<sup>3</sup>.

6. I would have thought that under the Protocol to the Leased Bases Agreement, the Canadian Government might have been deemed to have the right to participate in discussions leading up to the passage of the enclosed Act, on the grounds that such discussions have evidently arisen, in part at least, from Article XXVII of the Agreement. This Article provides for the acquisition by the United States by supplementary lease of additional areas under certain agreed conditions. One of these conditions is that the areas should be necessary for the use and protection of the bases. This would seem to involve considerations of defence, in the sense in which that phrase is used in the Protocol to the Agreement. I note, however, that the Canadian Government does not appear to have been consulted when the American Bases (Supplementary Leases) Act of 1942 was passed. In any case, I did not in any way suggest to the Commissioner for Justice and Defence that I thought we had any reason to expect to have been consulted about the enclosed legislation.

I have etc.

PAUL A. BRIDLE

1032.

10221-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 410

St. John's, August 14, 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the Newfoundland Department of Justice have under consideration a request from the United States Consul General for permission for the United States Naval authorities at Argentia to use

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

certain areas in Placentia Bay as aircraft gunnery target areas on a permanent basis. Because of recent political developments and because of the permanent nature of the use requested, the Department of Justice proposes to submit the request to the Commission of Government for a decision. They feel that, in the circumstances, it would be helpful if they were in a position when placing the matter before their Government to say whether the appropriate Department of the Canadian Government has any comment to offer in the matter.

2. The circumstances out of which the request arises are as follows. From time to time in the past the Department of Justice, after consultation with other Government Departments which might be interested in the matter, have been giving permission to the United States Naval authorities at Argentinia, through the United States Consul General, to use certain areas in Placentia Bay as aircraft gunnery target areas. In May of this year, to obviate the necessity of permission being requested every time aircraft gunnery practice was to be carried out, the Department of Justice, at the request of the United States Consul General, gave permission for the areas in question—Fish Rock, Rowland Rock and Virgin Rock—to be used for this purpose on a permanent basis.

3. It now appears that the United States Chief of Naval Operations has disapproved of the use of these areas for aircraft gunnery practice because they lie within the confines of a civil airway. It is for this reason that the United States Consul General has requested permission to use certain other areas in Placentia Bay for this purpose on a permanent basis.

4. I enclose a copy of a letter dated July 26th<sup>1</sup> from the United States Consul General to the Commissioner for Justice and Defence and an undated copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the Commanding Officer of the United States Naval Operating Base at Argentinia to the United States Consul General. These letters deal generally with the request and give the location of the areas.

5. I would appreciate your early advice as to whether or not we wish to make any comment in this matter.

I have etc.

PAUL A. BRIDLE

1033.

10221-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 128

St. John's, August 26, 1948

IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL. Your telegram No. 179 of August 24<sup>2</sup> Air gunnery target areas in Placentia Bay.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Not had time obtain views of Services, civil aviation, shipping and fisheries authorities here.

If matter must go before Commission immediately, please indicate how much we appreciate their consulting us and that we would welcome it if they could reply that, in view of developments since they approved Rowland Rock, etc., they do not feel it would be appropriate to permit use of the three areas now proposed beyond the date of Union when the matter could be reviewed. Our attitude might change, if, say, Transport reply that new areas would conflict with a civil airway.

We would be most grateful and feel it would be useful if Commission could see its way to taking a similar line with respect to any further requests for new concessions to the U.S. authorities.

Please indicate approximate date on which reply likely to be made to U.S. Consul General so we may know whether it is worth while to send you views of other Departments here which it may take a week to obtain.

1034.

17-D(s)

*Mémorandum de la direction du Commonwealth britannique  
au conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>*

*Memorandum from British Commonwealth Division  
to Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] August 31, 1948

RE: AMERICAN BASES (SUPPLEMENTARY LEASES) ACT 1948

I refer to our conversation of a few weeks ago in connection with Mr. Bridle's despatch No. 357 of July 23rd, 1948, on the above subject.

2. This latest (Supplementary Leases) Act, which, on the basis of Article XXVII of the 1941 Protocol<sup>1</sup> concerning the defence of Newfoundland between Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, grants to the United States certain supplementary rights in areas adjacent to other areas they already hold under that Protocol, was apparently gazetted for the first time around the 1st of July, 1948, without any previous publication.

3. Mr. Bridle submits that the Canadian Government does not appear to have been approached in any way in regard to this Supplementary Agreement, either prior [to] or in the course of the procedure of publication. A perusal of our files here confirms this statement. Our representative therefore raises the question as to whether the Canadian Government should not have been at least informed of the discussions which were under way between Newfoundland and American authorities, if not fully consulted.

<sup>1</sup> R. A. MacKay.

<sup>2</sup> Ici et ailleurs, l'auteur a confondu l'accord avec le protocole. Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>2</sup> The author, here and elsewhere, has confused the Agreement and the Protocol. See Appendix B.

4. As Mr. Bridle pointed out, I think there is no doubt that this recent (Supplementary Leases) Act involved considerations of defence in the same sense in which that phrase is used in the main Protocol of the Agreement of 1941. Article 4 of that same Protocol reads as follows:

It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Articles 1 (4), II and XI (5) of the Agreement, or of any other Articles involving considerations of defence, the Canadian Government as well as the Government of Newfoundland will have the right to participate.

5. On the basis of a straight interpretation of this Article, I think it can safely be said that we have reason to expect that we should have been consulted about a piece of legislation of that nature.

6. It should be noted, however, that this question has already been raised on several occasions in the past; our representative in St. John's in February 1943, queried for instance whether there had been any consultation between the Canadian and the United States Governments with regard to an extensive system of communication lines extending across Newfoundland for the purposes of defence, which was being built by the U.S. authorities.

7. The position taken by our Government on that occasion stated as follows:

In view of the attitude of whole-hearted co-operation which has animated both Governments in this matter, the Canadian Government does not desire to apply an excessively technical interpretation to the terms of the Protocol so as to insist upon unnecessarily strict adherence by the United States authorities to its provisions in implementing minor details of the defence programme.

8. A careful examination of the various files that we have on the subject would also tend to prove that Mr. Bridle is correct when he says that the Canadian Government does not appear to have been consulted when the American Bases (Supplementary Leases) Act of 1942 was passed. No consultation on the basis of Article 4 of the Protocol of 1941 would actually appear to have taken place in this regard until July 1946 when the Government of Canada was then approached on the question of granting to the United States Government supplementary rights within the limits of the territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, leased areas at Argentina. The Canadian Government had then felt that the proposed grant constituted no more than was necessary for the existence of the already-established U.S. rights, and that there was therefore no objection to the proposal submitted.

9. It should be borne in mind, however, that all questions dealing with U.S.-Canadian relations on matters of defence in Newfoundland have always been regularly discussed, ever since the implementation of the Lease Agreement of 1941, at meetings of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.\*

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\*Note telle que dans l'original:

\*Note as in original:

As far as we are aware.



10. In the light of the above considerations, and also because there is a possibility that the present status of the U.S. bases in Newfoundland might become at some later date the subject of fresh discussions between the U.S. and Canadian Governments, it is hard to see what useful purpose would be served, were the Canadian Government to insist now on the full recognition of its rights to participate in the reaching of an agreement such as this American Bases (Supplementary Leases) Act of 1948. I am moreover inclined to believe that it would be rather politically undesirable and inexpedient to raise this particular question at all by suggesting to the persons concerned that in our opinion we should have been consulted about this recent legislation.

. . .

RAYMOND CRÉPAULT

1035.

10221-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut  
commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting  
High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 213

Ottawa, September 15, 1948

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I should like to refer to your despatch No. 410 of August 14 and my telegram No. 128 of August 26, regarding the desire of the U.S. Navy authorities at the Argentia Base to use three areas in Placentia Bay for aircraft gunnery ranges.

We have now received replies from the authorities interested in the military, shipping, civil aviation and fisheries aspects of this question and, on the basis of the views that they have expressed, there appears to be no reason to alter the opinion given in our telegram No. 128—i.e. that there is no objection here to the U.S.N. being granted use of the areas up to the time of Union when the matter can be considered again.

I have etc.

R. A. MacKAY

for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1036.

17-D(s)

*Mémoire du secrétaire des chefs d'état-major interarme des États-Unis  
au président des chefs d'état-major interarme*

*Memorandum from Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States,  
to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[Washington,] December 13, 1948

SUBJECT: U.S. BASES IN NEWFOUNDLAND

1. Reference is made to your letter of 25 October 1948<sup>1</sup> in which you requested on behalf of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee certain data regarding present and projected United States plans for base development in Newfoundland and Labrador.

2. At the present time, as you know, the United States National Military Establishment operates, under a 99-year lease agreement, establishments at Argentia, Ernest Harmon Air Force Base, Fort McAndrew, and Fort Pepperrell. In addition, United States forces are now located on, and operate from, the Canadian Air Base at Goose Bay where no United States lease agreement is in effect. A brief description of each establishment, including off-base facilities, is contained in the Enclosure hereto.<sup>1</sup>

3. Present plans of the United States military forces for the development of Newfoundland and Labrador bases and estimated costs of these developments are as follows:

- (a) Argentia—Additional communication facilities, a landplane hangar, permanent quarters for officers, enlisted men and civilian employees, central heating plant, water treatment plant, flight control tower, permanent ammunition magazine, fog dispersal plant, garage, school facilities, commissary store, roads and steam connections for piers. Total estimated costs, \$21,541,002.
- (b) Ernest Harmon Air Force Base—Housing for officers and enlisted men, mess halls, cold storage plant, utilities, recreation building, chapel, school, shop facilities, laundry and dry cleaning plant, administrative building, warehouses, and airfield lighting. Total estimated cost \$26,449,210.
- (c) Fort Pepperrell—A signal operations building and power plant. Total estimated cost, \$112,200.
- (d) Goose Bay—Expansion of POL storage, replacement of a burned hangar, extension of runways, and construction of family quarters. Total estimated cost, \$3,900,000.

4. Projected plans for further development of leased bases in Newfoundland include only Ernest Harmon Field for which a plan is now under consideration for the construction of a harbor, at an estimated cost of \$5,000,000.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

5. If adequate long-term base rights for Goose Bay are granted, it is planned to provide permanent housing and further expansion of petroleum storage at an estimated cost of \$6,000,000.

6. The present and projected strengths of United States Forces located in Newfoundland and Labrador are as follows:

	PRESENT		PROJECTED	
	Officers	Enlisted men	Officers	Enlisted men
Argentia .....	116	1109	Small increase	—
Ernest Harmon Field .....	119	692	215	1220
Fort Pepperrell .....	112	521	135	1026
Fort McAndrew .....	88	705	No appreciable change	—
Goose Bay .....	66	577	No appreciable change	—

7. The following is the cost of operating each base in Newfoundland-Labrador during the Fiscal Year 1948:

	<i>Base Maintenance and Operations of Utilities</i>	<i>Approximate Pay for Military Personnel</i>
Argentia .....	\$4,272,958	\$2,243,500
Ernest Harmon Field .....	677,304	1,633,000
Fort Pepperrell .....	777,830	1,341,500
Fort McAndrew .....	456,935	1,497,500
Goose Bay .....	718,953	1,995,500

8. The need for additional bases or base facilities by the United States forces in Newfoundland and Labrador is now under study. When these requirements, if any, are determined, plans for their future development can be furnished.

W. G. LALOR, Captain  
U.S. Navy





## CHAPITRE II/CHAPTER II

### L'AVIATION CIVILE CIVIL AVIATION

#### PARTIE 1/PART 1

#### LE SERVICE AÉRIEN TRANSATLANTIQUE<sup>1</sup>

#### THE TRANSATLANTIC AIR SERVICE<sup>1</sup>

1037.

NPA GN1/3 570/35

*Extrait d'un rapport sur le service aérien transatlantique*

*Extract from a Report on Transatlantic Air Service*

[London,] July 30, 1936

CAPTAIN MCEWEN (BY PRIVATE NOTICE) asked the Under-Secretary of State for Air whether he has any information as to the progress of the negotiations with regard to the projected North Atlantic air service?

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR (SIR PHILIP SASSOON): As has already been announced, discussions took place in Ottawa in November

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<sup>1</sup> Parce que située près de l'Europe et sise sur la route du grand cercle reliant l'Amérique du Nord à la partie la plus peuplée de l'Europe de l'Ouest, Terre-Neuve fut d'une importance cruciale pour les envolées transatlantiques et ce depuis le commencement de telles envolées. Le Canada commença à s'intéresser activement à ces envolées vers 1932. Alors que *Trans-Canada Air Lines* reliait déjà les deux extrémités du pays, le gouvernement canadien vit un avantage à prolonger son service en établissant un lien direct avec l'Europe en passant par Terre-Neuve. La Grande-Bretagne qui, avec les États-Unis était le principal usager potentiel, favorisait également le tracé passant par Terre-Neuve. En 1935, des discussions conduisant à un accord sur l'établissement d'un service aérien transatlantique eurent lieu entre la Grande-Bretagne, le Canada, l'Eire et Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> Because it is close to Europe and located far out on the great circle route between North America and the most populated part of Western Europe, Newfoundland was crucial to trans-Atlantic flying from the beginning of such flights. Canada began to take an active interest about 1932, by which time Trans-Canada Air Lines was operating a service across Canada; the Canadian Government saw an advantage in this airline having a direct link with Europe through Newfoundland. Great Britain—which, along with the United States, was the principal potential user—also favoured a route through Newfoundland, and in 1935 there were discussions between Great Britain, Canada, Eire and Newfoundland leading to an agreement on the establishment of a Transatlantic air service.

last between representatives of the United Kingdom, Canada, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland regarding the establishment of an air service across the North Atlantic. Arrangements were finally agreed upon subject to the approval of the Governments concerned, which has now been given, to enable survey flights to be undertaken and an experimental air mail to be established as soon as possible, to be followed eventually by a mail and passenger service on a minimum schedule of two flights a week in each direction. Discussions also took place immediately after the conference in Ottawa, with representatives of the United States Government in Washington with a view to assuring the fullest measure of understanding and co-operation with the United States in the development of trans-Atlantic flying. As a result understandings were reached based upon the principle of full reciprocity which it is hoped will bring about, as soon as practicable, the establishment of a trans-Atlantic air service connecting the countries concerned.

The main details of the arrangements agreed between the respective Governments are as follows:

1. A joint operating company which will be responsible for carrying on the services will be incorporated at the instance of three companies, of which one will be nominated for that purpose by the Government of the United Kingdom, one by the Irish Free State Government and one by the Canadian Government. The company nominated by the United Kingdom Government will be Imperial Airways, Limited. The board of directors of the joint company will be nine in number, of whom three, including the chairman and managing director, will be nominated by the United Kingdom company, three by the Canadian company and three by the Irish Free State company. The capital of the joint company will be subscribed and held as to 51 per cent by the United Kingdom company, 24½ per cent by the Canadian company and 24½ per cent by the Irish Free State company.
2. In return for landing facilities to be granted to the joint company by the United States Government, Pan American Airways will be granted landing facilities by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland; and that company will participate on a basis of reciprocity with the joint company in the operation of the services.
3. In the operation of the services all practical preference will be given to the direct route from this country via the Irish Free State, Newfoundland and Canada, but it may be necessary during an initial period to operate the services via Bermuda during the winter months.
4. Experimental long-distance flights and other necessary investigations will be carried out in the near future. The incorporation of

the joint company will involve some delay and it has been arranged that experimental flights and investigations will be conducted by Imperial Airways Limited. The results of the experimental flights and investigations will be placed at the disposal of the joint company when it is established. It is understood that Pan American Airways will also be conducting experimental flights.

5. The control of commercial, technical and operating matters will be secured to Imperial Airways Limited through its stockholding and through the medium of the articles of association of the joint company, subject to the superior jurisdiction of the board of directors in questions of major policy.
6. During the experimental stage flying operations will be financed by the Government of the United Kingdom. When the joint company assumes responsibility for flying operations it will receive an annual subsidy from the several Governments on an agreed basis.

Of the total annual subsidy required Canada will contribute 20 per cent, subject to a maximum of £75,000, the Irish Free State 5 per cent, subject to a maximum of £12,000, and Newfoundland a sum to be agreed between that Government and the United Kingdom Government; the remainder will be made up by the United Kingdom Government. In consideration of their contribution, the Irish Free State Government will be entitled to participate in the Empire Air Mail Scheme, if and when they so desire, without payment of further subsidy but only of the postal payment.

7. Each of the four Governments concerned has undertaken to arrange for the provision of the necessary airport, radio and meteorological facilities for the transatlantic service. In connection with the general transfer of meteorological services to a new organisation being developed in the Irish Free State the United Kingdom Government will make an annual contribution of £6,000 to the Irish Free State Government on the basis of services rendered.
8. Each of the four Governments concerned has also undertaken to grant the necessary landing and transit rights within its own territory to the joint company and to Pan-American Airways. It is contemplated that unless otherwise determined by the consent of the four Governments such rights will be exclusive in respect of transatlantic air services for a period of 15 years; thereafter the question of exclusivity and the question of granting further financial assistance to the joint company will be reviewed.
9. An Inter-Governmental Committee on Transatlantic Air Services will be established, consisting of four members appointed re-

spectively by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland to which will be referred for approval decisions of [sic] proposals of the joint company relating to transatlantic air services which may affect national policy or the relations of the Governments concerned *inter se* or with other Governments. All decisions of the Inter-Governmental Committee will be reached by unanimous vote.

1038.

72-M-36

*Rapport sur l'évolution du service aérien transatlantique*<sup>1</sup>

*Progress Report on Transatlantic Air Service*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[London, August ], 1936

. . .

II. GROUND ORGANISATION

C. NEWFOUNDLAND

(1) Air Bases.

The general arrangements in regard to air bases will be as follows:

- (a) A seaplane base at Botwood.
- (b) An auxiliary alighting area for seaplanes on Gander Lake.
- (c) A land aerodrome at Hattie's Camp.<sup>2</sup>

These bases are all required to be available for experimental trans-Atlantic flights which are due to commence early in 1937.

The Newfoundland Government were informed on the 18th May that the construction of the land aerodrome this year was approved in principle, subject to further consideration of the technical questions involved and the method of finance, and that immediate steps should be taken for collecting labour and obtaining machinery for constructional work. Work on the clearing of the site at Hattie's Camp is in progress.

(2) Meteorological Facilities.

The Canadian Government have undertaken to provide and pay the meteorological staff required for the provision of facilities for a trans-Atlantic air service on a basis acceptable to the Newfoundland Government.

Close liaison is being maintained with the meteorological service in Canada to ensure that an efficient meteorological organisation will be available when required.

<sup>1</sup> Ce rapport fut préparé par le ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne.

<sup>2</sup> L'aéroport de Gander.

<sup>1</sup> This report was prepared by the Air Ministry of Great Britain.

<sup>2</sup> Gander Airport.



An aircraft has been provided by the Air Ministry for the purpose of carrying out upper air investigations in Newfoundland. This aircraft which is based on Botwood is operated by Imperial Airways Limited to a programme laid down by the Director of the Meteorological Service in Canada.

(3) Wireless Facilities.

The main signal station will be at Botwood with auxiliary stations at Gander Lake and Hattie's Camp (if the main air base is eventually transferred to Hattie's Camp it will be necessary to transfer some of the wireless apparatus).

It is essential that the provision of the full station at Botwood and also the auxiliary stations at Gander Lake and Hattie's Camp should be proceeded with at once if the stations are to be available for experimental trans-Atlantic flights in the Spring of 1937. On account of the weather conditions the equipment must be delivered in Newfoundland before Winter if the stations are to be erected and in working order by the Spring. Further, it is important that the operators should gain experience in working before flying actually starts.

The Air Ministry has appointed an officer to proceed to Newfoundland for the purpose of supervising the erection and installation of the wireless stations by the Marconi Company.

1039.

72-M-36

*Rapport sur l'évolution du service aérien transatlantique*<sup>1</sup>

*Progress Report on Transatlantic Air Service*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[London,] October 26, 1939

I. FLYING EQUIPMENT

1. "S.30" Class (Modified Empire) Flying Boats

*Cabot* and *Caribou* operated a weekly service between Southampton and New York on an experimental basis during August and September. No mechanical or major operational troubles were experienced. (See also Part II of this report).

2. Short's Atlantic Flying Boats ("G" Class Aircraft)

*Golden Hind*

*Grenville*

*Grenadier*

Flying trials with the *Golden Hind* have shown further modifications to be required. It has been found more convenient to embody these modifications

<sup>1</sup> Ce rapport fut préparé par un comité inter-gouvernemental *ad hoc*.

<sup>1</sup> The report was prepared by an inter-governmental committee *ad hoc*.

in the second boat (the *Grenville*) for purposes of further test rather than modify the *Golden Hind* and to facilitate the work certain items of equipment have been removed from the *Golden Hind* for this purpose. The engines (Bristol Hercules IV) are also undergoing modification at the suggestion of the makers.

### 3. Short's long range landplane (specification 14/38)

It has been decided in present circumstances to suspend the development of this aircraft.

## II. EXPERIMENTAL FLIGHTS PROGRAMME

The weekly service which began with the flight of *Caribou* on the 5th August was continued until the end of September the aircraft on the last eastbound flight arriving at Southampton on the 30th September.

Eight round trips were made and all the journeys were completed without incident.

By special arrangement between the United Kingdom and Canadian meteorological authorities after the outbreak of hostilities meteorological information between the Newfoundland and Shannon Airports was exchanged in code. Commanders of aircraft were furnished confidentially before departure with full meteorological information for the next stage of flight, and additional information was as necessary sent to them in flight in the form of navigational instruction.

A full operational report on the flights is being prepared by Imperial Airways Limited and will be circulated as a separate paper.

. . .

## IV. GROUND ORGANISATION

. . .

### B. Newfoundland

The paving of the Airport runways at Hattie's Camp was completed on 5th August and final surfacing operations concluded about a month later.

. . .

Weather conditions during part of the summer were unusually adverse and a large number of bearings were given for approach both by Hattie's Camp and Botwood installations. On three occasions recently it was found necessary to bring machines in entirely by magnetic bearings. Pan American Airways now practice this approach on every occasion.

. . .

## V. AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

On the outbreak of war Pan American Airways terminated their Trans-Atlantic services on the northern and southern routes at the Shannon and

Lisbon Airports respectively. At the request of the American Company when the demand warranted it a connection was provided by Imperial "C" class aircraft between Shannon Airport and Poole.

The last eastbound journey by Pan American aircraft on the northern route was completed when the *Yankee Clipper* reached the Shannon on 5th October. The American Company have announced that this service to Europe via Shediac, Botwood and Shannon will be resumed in 1940 as soon as weather conditions permit.

During the winter season Pan American Airways propose to operate both their trans-Atlantic air services via Bermuda to Lisbon, and permission has in this connection been given to them to use Bermuda on their southern service until 1st May and on their northern service until such time as Botwood is again free of ice.

#### VI. OTHER FOREIGN ACTIVITIES

##### A. French

Up to the outbreak of War, when their activities ceased, the Latécoère flying boats of Air France Transatlantique had carried out this year five experimental trans-Atlantic flights.

##### B. German

Pre-war reports regarding the Blohm and Voss six-engined passenger aircraft type B.V.222 then being developed, stated that the aircraft would have an all up weight of some 45 tons, and a cruising speed of approximately 170 m.p.h. on long-distance runs such as that between New York and Lisbon.

At the same time the Dornier Company were said to be building a large flying boat (D.O.20) on somewhat original lines, powered by eight Jumo Diesel engines. This aircraft would be capable of carrying twenty or thirty passengers, in addition to mail, on Atlantic services, the all-up weight being somewhat similar to that of the B.V.222.

1040.

T 11-4-17

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET.

Ottawa, July 25, 1940

My dear Dr. Skelton,

I have received a telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, stating that the United Kingdom Cabinet have agreed to flights at weekly

intervals by civil flying boats of British Overseas Airways Corporation from the United Kingdom to New York via Botwood and Montreal. If permits can be obtained from the Eire authorities, a call will be made each way at Foynes. Two long-range flying boats, *Clare* and *Clyde* will be employed. The *Clare* will leave this weekend; the exact date of departure will be notified. The *Clyde* will leave a week later.

Other demands for the use of these valuable boats may arise and the United Kingdom authorities cannot count on being able to continue a series of flights for the whole season to the end of September. Either or both the boats may have to be temporarily or permanently diverted for other work at any time.

The United Kingdom authorities are anxious therefore not to refer to the resumption of these flights as a service. They will continue with such regularity and so long as weather and circumstances permit. For this and other reasons, the United Kingdom authorities are anxious that the publicity for the flights should be reduced to a minimum.

I am advised that the needs of the Ministry of Aircraft Production for space in these boats will have priority over the needs of the other United Kingdom Departments, but some mail will be carried. Only one or two priority passengers can be carried and the passenger accommodation will be primitive.

...

Yours sincerely,

GERALD CAMPBELL

1041.

72-HC-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 647

London, December 6, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to report that during the visit of the Minister of National Defence, a memorandum was prepared for him, explaining the difficulties in obtaining passages to and from Canada for official visitors and suggesting the creation of a Canadian trans-Atlantic Air Service. Since this memorandum was prepared the position regarding air transport has further deteriorated (*vide* letter from Foreign Office, Exhibit A)<sup>1</sup> and sea passage with all its attendant delays and difficulties has now become the quicker and more dependable means of communication.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



2. To meet the situation created by the slow transportation of officials and despatches of urgent national importance, I feel that in the present circumstances and with the production of large aircraft in Canada, I am warranted in suggesting that consideration be given to the initial establishment of an air line between Canada and this country.

3. Two planes operating, one from Newfoundland, the other from England, on a weekly service, could inaugurate the service, permit of time for overhauling, the servicing of craft and the necessary rest for crews between flights. The terminus in England should be in as close proximity to London as possible and Salisbury Plain is suggested where there is adequate runway for large machines. It would be necessary in this event to secure the collaboration of the Air Ministry in obtaining hangar space for one aircraft and the use of the Ministry's meteorological reports covering this side of the Atlantic.

4. In the event of unfavourable weather reports, Salisbury Plain being only four hours from London, officials could remain in London until the last minute. Under present conditions the long night journey to the taking-off point necessitates leaving London twelve hours before the scheduled departure of the plane. If during this period, unfavourable weather reports are received, unnecessary delay, perhaps of days, at the departure airport, has been the experience of many.

5. Passengers for the Canadian Government carried by British and United States Services from June to 30th November were 42, and do not include those officials for whom transportation has been arranged by Attero through the Air Ministry. Many more requested passages in connection with urgent national business, for which no accommodation was available within a reasonable time.

6. Canadian diplomatic mail, and plans, specifications etc, urgently required by the different Departments would also form a considerable part of the load where space was available, after passenger requirements had been met, and would relieve congestion on other air services, especially the west-bound bomber, thereby permitting a larger number of pilots to be transferred to Canada by plane and expedite the delivery of bombers to this country.

7. During the first ten months of this year 517 diplomatic bags have been despatched to Canada, 101 of which have been carried by bomber since the inauguration of the service in June. 66 cases or parcels of machine parts, tools or plans urgently required by the Department of Munitions and Supply have also been transported by plane.

8. The operation of this service should be for the benefit of all Government Departments. In England all requests for its use should be controlled and concentrated at Canada House. The responsibility for the actual operation of

the service should be in the hands of the Air Officer Commanding the R.C.A.F. in England or someone delegated by him working in collaboration with Canada House.

9. Financially the interest on the initial outlay should be more than covered by the money now paid out to operating companies for Canadian official passengers. Politically at the conclusion of the war, Canada would have an established air line to England which could continue to function in cooperation with our railways or be operated by the Canadian Air Lines, giving a through service from London to Vancouver.

I have etc.

VINCENT MASSEY

1042.

72-HC-40

*Le ministre de la Défense nationale pour l'Air au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of National Defence for Air to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, February 9, 1942

Dear Mr. Robertson,

The proposal set out in Mr. Massey's letter No. 647 of December 6th for the establishment of a Canadian Trans-Atlantic Air Service is admittedly a very desirable course of action for improvement of Canadian Government communication facilities to the United Kingdom. The main difficulty, however, in any such proposal is the acquisition of suitable aircraft for the operation of the service. The only types suitable for Trans-Atlantic ferry service are manufactured in the United States and, therefore, we could only obtain three such aircraft through the Munitions Priorities Board in Washington, in competition with the United Kingdom and United States requirements of the same types in actual theatres of war. I do not think that a Canadian application for aircraft to be operated in parallel to the British Overseas Airways ferry services would receive an allocation.

There is also another aspect of the proposal. Canada participated in the formation of British Overseas Airways for Trans-Atlantic Service and, therefore, it would be inconsistent for the Canadian Government now to set up an organization to operate a parallel service with a motive of providing a basis for a competing civil service after the war.

It seems to me that the more proper course of action for Canada to take is to press the United Kingdom Government to augment the facilities of British Overseas Airways service to Canada and allot to Canada a specific portion of the space available so that Canadian Government traffic can be

assured of priority, the space on east bound flights being allocated by you and on west bound flights by the High Commissioner in London.

Yours very truly,

CHARLES G. POWER

1043.

72-HC-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 374

Ottawa, February 27, 1942

Our despatch 94, February 5th,<sup>1</sup> Trans-Atlantic Air Service. After further consideration Departments concerned here feel that best course would be to ask United Kingdom Government to augment facilities of British Overseas Airways Service to Canada and to allot specific portion of space available to Canada. In this connection United States Government have requested that American Export Air Lines Inc. be granted permission to conduct a service over Canadian territory en route non-stop between New York and Foynes, Eire, for a period of five years. This service now authorized by United States Government is expected to begin this spring. It is expected that service will be operated on the basis of three trips per week by mid-summer.

1044.

72-M-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 55

Ottawa, March 11, 1942

United States Government is seeking permission through their Embassy in London for flight over Newfoundland of American Export Airline Incorporated and have asked Canada for permission to conduct service over Canadian territory en route non-stop between New York City and Foynes. We are discussing matter with United Kingdom Government through High Commissioner London and with Irish Government through High Commissioner in Ottawa.

Department of Transport of Canada has no objection to the permit being granted and states that the only feature to which exception might be taken

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

is request for permit for a period as long as five years. Transport suggests that since all such services will probably require reconsideration at close of hostilities it would be preferable to grant permit for the period of hostilities and six months thereafter. We are also considering desirability of stating in our reply to United States that we trust that the Company will give priority to passengers sponsored by the Canadian Government.

Please discuss matter with Newfoundland authorities and find out what action they are taking. Would appreciate reply at your earliest convenience since United States Government is pressing us for answer.

1045.

72-M-36

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 69

St. John's, March 12, 1942

Your telegram No. 55 of March 11th, concerning proposed flights New York to Ireland.

Newfoundland Government has not yet received any application but Woods says that he will discuss it with me when application is received. He says no doubt Newfoundland Government will agree to give permission, but they would want to consider length of permit and would probably approve Canadian suggestion in that regard.

1046.

72-M-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 64

Ottawa, March 20, 1942

Your telegram 69 March 12 American Export Air Lines.

We informed United States Minister yesterday that Canada would grant permission on three conditions:

- (a) Permit for period present hostilities.
- (b) Aircraft to comply with Defence of Canada Regulations.
- (c) Matter should be reconsidered in the event that any part of the route becomes an area of operations.



We also said we trusted that the Company would give official priority to passengers sponsored by the Canadian Government.

High Commissioner London states that United Kingdom is speaking for Newfoundland in these negotiations.

1047.

72-HC-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1016

London, April 14, 1942

Your telegram No. 374 of February 27th, British Overseas Airways.

The matter has been discussed with the United Kingdom authorities who inform me that the importance of increasing air communication with Canada is recognized, that allocation of additional Liberators is being sought and augmentation of service in the near future expected.

(2) Allocation of specific portion of space is not feasible in principle, but importance of requests from Canada, other Governments and United Kingdom departments will be appraised by Priority Committee and space allotted accordingly.

(3) I am of the opinion that this will relieve situation but will not fully meet the requirements and I therefore consider that in view of the urgent demand for speedy transportation for Canadian official personnel and mails, further consideration should be given to proposal previously advanced for an all Canadian service.

I have ascertained informally that United Kingdom authorities regard 1935 Agreement as in abeyance, and that any assistance Canada could give in provision of air transportation for the duration of the war would be welcomed, after which agreement could be further considered.

MASSEY

1048.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet  
Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 22, 1942

. . .

AIR SERVICE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

36. THE PRIME MINISTER reported that the Canadian High Commissioner in London had raised the question of the possibility of establishing a Canadian

trans-Atlantic air service in order to provide speedy transportation for Canadian official personnel and Canadian official mail.

The U.K. government could hold out no hope of improved service by British Overseas Airways, and it was now said to be practically impossible for a Canadian official to secure return air passage in other than most exceptional circumstances.

It was suggested that immediate consideration be given to the establishment of a Canadian service as soon as possible. The departments concerned could form an inter-departmental committee to report on the feasibility of the High Commissioner's proposals. Such a committee might have a continuing responsibility to advise on matters of international civil aviation affecting Canada.

(External Affairs memorandum to the Prime Minister, May 10, 1942<sup>1</sup>).

37. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, agreed to the immediate establishment of an inter-departmental committee as recommended.

It was agreed also that, in the circumstances, it would be advisable and opportune for Canada to withdraw from the 1935 agreement.

. . .

1049.

72-HC-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1682

London, June 23, 1942

SECRET. Your telegram of June 13th, No. 1156<sup>1</sup> establishment of Canadian Transatlantic air service.

1. A Committee meeting was held in Canada House with Colonel Smith, Acting Director Q.M.G. Service, representing Canadian Military Headquarters, W. C. Jackson, representing R.C.A.F. Headquarters, myself and members of my staff, to consider the proposal and questions as outlined in your cable.

2. It was felt that the proposal to allocate two Liberators to Trans Canada Airlines for operation by Trans Canada Airlines between Canada and the United Kingdom would not change the situation. Our greatest need is transportation of official passengers and mail westwards. We fully appreciate prac-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

tical difficulty in the way of obtaining allocation of aircraft for this purpose but we are still convinced that the only satisfactory solution would be an all Canadian line under direct Canada House control for allocation of seats, and urgent parcels. The service representatives concur with me in the opinion that the matter is not merely one of practical convenience but has a very important bearing on the Canadian war effort.

. . .

7. . . . Although it may seem to be outside the immediate scope of the present discussion, I should like to emphasise my entire agreement with the points made in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the Department of External Affairs memo of May 8th<sup>1</sup> on the establishment of a Canadian Transatlantic air service. I do not think that the importance of the longer range considerations involved can well be exaggerated and I strongly feel that without establishment of a Canadian service now the relative position of Trans Canada Airlines would be difficult to maintain in the future. The Canadian service would of course operate in the closest co-operation with the existing British airlines.

MASSEY

1050.

CWC

*Mémorandum du secrétaire du Comité de guerre du Cabinet  
au Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Memorandum from Secretary, Cabinet War Committee,  
to Cabinet War Committee*

DOCUMENT 219

[Ottawa,] July 7, 1942

SECRET

RE: CANADIAN ATLANTIC AIR SERVICE—MILITARY

The Interdepartmental Committee on International Civil Aviation reports as follows:

#### Canadian trans-Atlantic Air Service

In accordance with the decision of the War Committee on July 1st, 1942 on the first recommendation made by the Interdepartmental Committee on International Civil Aviation, a despatch has been forwarded to Mr. Massey for communication to the government of the United Kingdom, stating that it is essential that Canada House be given first call on 4 seats and 600 pounds of mail and parcels weekly on the two planes which it is proposed Trans Canada Air lines operate for British Overseas Airways Corporation on the trans-Atlantic service.

The Committee, however, is of the opinion that the only complete solution is the establishment of an independent Canadian trans-Atlantic air service. This step, which is urgent in terms of the war effort, would meet Mr. Massey's

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

difficulties which are likely to increase, and would also be of great postwar importance. The Canadian service would be operated by Trans Canada Air Lines for the Canadian government and would carry only official government passengers, important mail and parcels. It would be a military service in the same sense as certain American air lines which are now operated on behalf of the government of the United States and designated as military lines.

The Interdepartmental Committee on International Civil Aviation repeats, therefore, its second recommendation, made to the War Committee on July 1st, that informal exploration be launched, through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, as to the possibility of obtaining two planes from the United States, for the establishment by the Canadian government of a Canadian military trans-Atlantic service, to be operated by Trans Canada Air Lines.

#### 1935 Agreement

In accordance with the decision of the War Committee, on May 22nd, 1942, a communication has been approved and is being sent to Mr. Massey for the government of the United Kingdom, making known Canada's desire to withdraw from the 1935 Agreement which had provided for the establishment of a joint trans-Atlantic air service.

A. D. P. HEENEY

1051.

72-M-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 222

Ottawa, September 26, 1942

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to previous correspondence concerning the intergovernmental trans-Atlantic air agreement of December, 1935, between the United Kingdom, Ireland, Newfoundland and Canada.

2. The agreement provided for the formation of a joint operating company, the capital stock of which would be owned by a United Kingdom, an Irish and a Canadian company. The joint operating company was to take over responsibility for operating a transatlantic air service as soon as "the regular flying stage" was reached. It was hoped that this would be in 1938. The joint operating company has, however, never been set up. Thus the agreement has remained inoperative and in abeyance and presumably will remain inoperative and in abeyance so long as hostilities continue.

3. Already in the seven years which have passed since the agreement was drawn up conditions, so far as transatlantic flying is concerned, have



changed greatly. It is to be expected that further material changes in circumstances will take place during the remainder of the period of hostilities. In the opinion of the Canadian Government it is thus clear that at the conclusion of hostilities it will be found that conditions have changed so greatly since 1935 that the agreement of that year no longer provides a useful basis for dealing with the postwar situation.

4. The Canadian Government is therefore of the opinion that it would be wise for the states which are partners to the 1935 Agreement to recognize this fact and to agree to meet in conference, as soon as may be convenient after the conclusion of hostilities, to consider the whole situation with regard to transatlantic flying in the light of the then existing situation.

5. I should be grateful if you would on October 12 inform the Commission of Government of Newfoundland of the Canadian Government's desire, in view of the considerations set forth above, to withdraw from the 1935 agreement, and of its willingness to enter into an agreement with Newfoundland, the United Kingdom and Ireland to meet in the kind of conference described in the preceding paragraph. I am making the same request of our High Commissioners in the United Kingdom and Ireland. My reason for specifying the date of October 12 is to ensure that the Governments of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Newfoundland are informed simultaneously.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1052.

72-M-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 183

Ottawa, October 3, 1942

SECRET

My despatch No. 222 of September 26. Inter-governmental Trans-Atlantic Air Agreement.

Please postpone from October 12 to November 9 delivery to Newfoundland Government of notice of our desire to withdraw from the Agreement. I understand that Mr. Howe is now discussing with United Kingdom Government certain questions relating to temporary arrangements for Trans-Atlantic air service during the war. The situation might be confused if in the middle of Mr. Howe's negotiations or shortly afterwards we were to give the United Kingdom Government notice of our desire to withdraw from the Agreement. Postponement till November 9 of the notice should help to keep the two

issues separate, the issue of temporary arrangements during the war and the issue of obligations which we are under after the war concerning permanent arrangements.

I am sending similar instructions to the Canadian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

1053.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, October 21, 1942

. . .

6. MR. HOWE raised the question of the Canadian position in respect of trans-Atlantic air service. It was evident that the United Kingdom would do nothing to meet our needs. They insisted upon control over all presently available space and had, so far, refused to allocate planes for operation by Canadian crews. This was most unsatisfactory, both as regards present and post-war needs.

In these circumstances, it would be recommended that Canada undertake the building of some fifty transport planes for Canadian operation. As an interim measure, to meet the immediately urgent problem of handling Canadian mail, it was proposed that an attempt be made to obtain three aircraft from the United States for the institution of a Canadian Trans-Atlantic service. This service would be a government operation for the purposes of carrying Canadian mail and Canadian personnel.

Canada should withdraw now from the 1935 agreement, and the communication to that effect should be despatched forthwith.

7. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, approved the proposals of the Minister for operation of a Canadian trans-Atlantic air service, and for withdrawal by Canada from the 1935 agreement.

. . .

1054.

72-M-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire*  
*à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner*  
*in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 312

Ottawa, December 29, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 630 of October 26th<sup>1</sup> enclosing a copy of your letter of October 24th<sup>1</sup> to the Newfoundland

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Government giving notice to the Newfoundland Government of Canada's desire to withdraw from the Inter-Governmental Trans-Atlantic Air Agreement of December 1935 between the United Kingdom, Ireland, Newfoundland and Canada.

I enclose a copy of a letter dated December 9th<sup>1</sup> from Mr. Attlee, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to the Canadian High Commissioner in London in which Mr. Attlee states that the United Kingdom authorities hope that we shall not, at this stage, press for the abrogation of the Agreement. Mr. Attlee goes on to say that he is informing the Government of Newfoundland of the substance of his letter.

It does not appear to me that Mr. Attlee's letter brings forward any considerations which were not weighed by the Canadian Government before they came to their decision to give notice of their desire to withdraw from the Agreement. Before replying, however, to the United Kingdom Government I should like to have the reply of the Newfoundland Government to your communication of October 24th.

Would you be good enough, therefore, to press the Newfoundland Government for a reply.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1055.

72-M-36

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 767

St. John's, December 31, 1942

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 630 of October 26th<sup>1</sup> enclosing a copy of a despatch sent to the Commissioner for Public Utilities on October 24th,<sup>1</sup> concerning Canada's desire to withdraw from the Inter-Governmental Trans-Atlantic Air Agreement of December, 1935, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of the reply<sup>1</sup> received from Sir Wilfrid W. Woods stating that the Newfoundland Government will be ready to enter into a conference on the subject of the Agreement at the end of the war.

I have etc.

A. J. PICK  
for the High Commissioner  
for Canada

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1056.

72-M-36

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

513A/152

Ottawa, April 23, 1943

Dear Mr. Robertson,

We have received a telegram from the Dominions Office in regard to the arrangements for the British Overseas Airways Corporation trans-Atlantic service during the summer months, when it is hoped to revert to the use of the North Atlantic route.

The question has been discussed by the Air Ministry both with British Airways and with Squadron-Leader Pattison, the liaison officer in Newfoundland, of the terminal to be used in Newfoundland for this summer service. Operationally Botwood is regarded as being preferable to Gander, where in any case it is reported that accommodation of the kind required would not be available; and it is understood that negotiations have accordingly been on foot with the Canadian authorities concerned for the release of suitable surplus Canadian Army accommodation at Botwood. The R.A.F. Transport Command at Gander have, however, recently stated that according to their information the subject is still under consideration in Ottawa, and that meanwhile the Canadian Army are unwilling to release the accommodation in question. The matter is now becoming one of some urgency as it is hoped to be able to revert to the North Atlantic route by the middle of next month. We have accordingly been asked to enquire whether it is possible to expect a favourable decision in the near future. The facilities which the British Airways hope to be able to use are, of course, fully known to the R.C.A.F. in Newfoundland, and I understand also in Ottawa.

There is one subsidiary point to which the Dominions Office have drawn attention. According to paragraph 6 of the Agreement dated 17th April, 1941 for the transfer to Canada for the duration of war of the control of Newfoundland air bases, Canada assumed the non-financial obligations of Newfoundland including the provision of ground facilities for trans-Atlantic flights, if these obligations arose out of the Ottawa negotiations of 1935. The increasing frequency of services now necessitates additional base facilities at Botwood, which under the 1935 Agreement it would have been for the Newfoundland Government to supply. The Air Ministry hope, therefore, that



the Canadian Government will agree that the provision of these facilities is now a matter for which they would be responsible.

Yours sincerely,

PATRICK DUFF

1057.

72-M-36

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 125

Ottawa, May 5, 1943

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 767 of December 31, 1942, concerning the views of the Newfoundland Government on Canada's desire to withdraw from the Intergovernmental Trans-Atlantic Air Agreement of December, 1935. You may now give the Newfoundland Government a reply in the following terms:

The Canadian Government remains of the opinion that the 1935 Agreement does not provide a satisfactory basis for dealing with the post-war situation in view of the material changes in circumstances which have already taken place since the Agreement was drawn up and the further changes which will undoubtedly take place before active hostilities cease. In the opinion of the Canadian Government the situation after the war is going to be so different from the situation in 1935 that in the interests of all concerned it would be better to start the discussions on post-war policy with a clean slate. The Canadian Government's suggestion, therefore, was that the United Kingdom, Ireland, Newfoundland and Canada agree now that the 1935 Agreement be regarded as abrogated and that they further agree to meet in conference as soon as may be convenient after the conclusion of hostilities to consider the whole situation with regard to transatlantic flying in the light of the then existing situation.

During the six months which have passed since the Canadian Government made this suggestion, the Canadian, United Kingdom, United States and other Governments have been carefully studying the whole question of the proper organization of international air transport after the war. These studies will, no doubt, lead in due course to intergovernmental discussions. Until these discussions take place, the Canadian Government will not press its view on the 1935 Agreement on the Governments of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Newfoundland.

We are asking our High Commissioners in the United Kingdom and Ireland to make similar communications to the Governments of the United Kingdom and Ireland.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1058.

72-HC-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

SECRET

Ottawa, May 8, 1943

Dear Mr. Burchell,

On October 30 I wrote to you about the projected Canadian air service across the North Atlantic. I said that Mr. Howe was trying to obtain three transport planes from the United States to be operated by Trans Canada Air Lines.

Mr. Howe was unable to obtain these planes but we did secure some time ago a Lancaster plane from the United Kingdom and we propose to start a shuttle service across the North Atlantic with this plane. T.C.A. believes that with one plane they can do one round trip a week and they estimate that they can inaugurate the shuttle service by the beginning of June.

The Government-owned Victory Aircraft plant at Malton is now working on the York plane which is a transport adaptation of the Lancaster. We expect to be able to put three York planes on a trans-atlantic service somewhere between November 1, 1943 and January 1, 1944.

I enclose a copy of a letter of May 5<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Massey which will bring you up to date on this subject.

We have not yet informed the United Kingdom of our proposals so that it is not desired that you should at the present time say anything to the Newfoundland authorities. However, we shall, of course, need landing and transit rights in Newfoundland and we shall therefore in due course be asking you to get in touch with the Newfoundland Government. Meanwhile, the information given in this and the enclosed letter is strictly confidential.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1059.

72-M-36

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
adjoind de Grande-Bretagne*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy High  
Commissioner of Great Britain*

Ottawa, May 11, 1943

Dear Sir Patrick [Duff],

On April 23 you wrote to me concerning the arrangements in Newfoundland for the British Overseas Airways Corporation Trans Atlantic Service during the summer months.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

I have received a communication from our High Commissioner in Newfoundland in which he says that Air Commodore Heakes has told him that satisfactory arrangements have now been made for accommodation at Botwood, and that the representatives of British Overseas Airways Corporation have been advised accordingly and are entirely satisfied. Air Commodore Heakes also says that additional base facilities at Botwood have been satisfactorily arranged.

You will, of course, understand that this action is being taken with a view to co-operating in a service which will help the general war effort and that it does not involve an admission that the Canadian Government is under a legal obligation to make this provision.

Perhaps you will be good enough to let me know whether, in view of this information, it will be necessary for me to reply further to your letter of April 23rd.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1060.

PRO DO 35 1110 A201/9 X/J 9642

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner in Great Britain*

A. 201

[London,] May 18, 1943

SECRET

My dear High Commissioner,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th May<sup>1</sup> informing me of the decision of the Canadian Government not to press their suggestion for abrogating the 1935 Inter-Governmental Trans-Atlantic Air Agreement. I need hardly say that this decision is most welcome to the United Kingdom Government, and I should be glad if you would convey to Ottawa an expression of our appreciation.

May I assume that the Canadian Government have communicated in a similar sense with the Governments of Eire and Newfoundland?

Yours sincerely,

C. R. ATTLEE

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1061.

72-HC-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 150

Ottawa, May 21, 1943

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my secret letter to you of May 8th regarding the proposed Canadian Air Service across the North Atlantic, and to the letter of May 5th<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Massey, copy of which was enclosed with the letter to you of May 8th.

In order to avoid the possibility of the Newfoundland Government receiving the impression that we are carrying on negotiations behind their back, I should be grateful if you would inform the Newfoundland Government, for their confidential information, that Canada proposes to establish this wartime service. It is thought that you might communicate to the Newfoundland Government the information contained in the first seven paragraphs of the letter to Mr. Massey of May 5th. You might make it clear to the Newfoundland Government that the service is not a commercial or permanent service, but a war service which will, for the most part, be used by members of the Armed Forces, for mail of the Armed Forces, and for materials for the Armed Forces.

It is imperative that the information given to the Newfoundland Government at this time be treated as strictly confidential, for it may create an unfavourable impression in the United States if the information reaches the United States Government before they are informed officially.

The government of Eire is not being informed of the proposed service at this stage as it is felt that the matter does not directly concern them.<sup>2</sup>

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> De fait, le gouvernement de l'Eire fut mis au courant avant que le service soit inauguré.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, the Government of Eire was informed before the service was inaugurated.



1062.

72-HC-40

*Le commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

A.8/6

St. John's, July 30, 1943

Sir,

With reference to your note No. 72A of 19th July, 1943,<sup>1</sup> I have the honour to inform you that the Newfoundland Government is glad to concur, so far as Newfoundland is concerned, with the arrangements set forth in the exchange of notes of July 15th, 1943<sup>1</sup>, and July 16th, 1943<sup>1</sup>, between the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments concerning the establishment of a Canadian Government trans-atlantic service on a wartime basis. The Newfoundland Government herewith grants permission for the aircraft on this service to take off from, land on and fly over Newfoundland for the duration of the war and six months thereafter.

Yours faithfully,

W. W. Woods

1063.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 687

[London,] December 3, 1943

MOST SECRET. Following for Woods from Clutterbuck. Begins. Air Ministry have been turning over in their minds idea discussed with you in a very preliminary way that development of Civil Air Services after the war between Newfoundland and North American continent might to mutual advantage be undertaken as joint Newfoundland-United Kingdom enterprise, e.g., through formation for this purpose of a Newfoundland registered company with United Kingdom financial support.

2. Idea behind this suggestion is that Newfoundland will no doubt wish to develop her own Air Services to Canada and the United States after the war if only in order to prevent control passing to either or both of these countries but is likely to be handicapped in doing so by lack of capital equipment and skilled personnel. These deficiencies could however be supplied from United

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Kingdom through B.O.A.C. or some other nominee of United Kingdom Government if latter were given joint participation in a specially formed Newfoundland Company licensed by Newfoundland Government to conduct and operate such services.

3. In this connection we have noted with interest information conveyed in your Minim Prece telegram No. 72 of 22nd November<sup>1</sup> regarding formation of a new local Company in Newfoundland with the object of "engaging in Air Transport activities to the Empire and foreign points after the war". We see that the authorised capital of this company is only \$100,000 part of which it would appear is to be subscribed from Canada. No doubt Company has only been formed in a small way to start with but development of Air Services is a costly business and it is clear that undertaking on this scale would not permit of very ambitious operations. It is noted too from the same telegram that Russell<sup>2</sup> in recent press interview has advocated "establishment of control by Newfoundland of its own Air Services after the war". Not clear whether there was any connection between Russell's statement and formation of new Company or whether former was referring to possible development by Newfoundland Government Railway of its own Air Services to Canada and the United States.

4. Should be very grateful for your views on these developments and also for comments on Air Ministry's suggestion above in light of current trend of opinion in Newfoundland. In particular guidance would be helpful on the following points

- (i) What significance is to be attached to the formation of the new Company referred to in paragraph 3 above and has it approval and support of the Newfoundland Authorities? If so is it likely to be granted Licence to operate?
- (ii) In view of limited scope for the development of Airways of direct interest to Newfoundland does the Newfoundland Government contemplate licensing more than one operator? If not might it not better serve Newfoundland's interests to explore possibility of a joint Newfoundland-United Kingdom undertaking such as that tentatively discussed with you by Air Ministry?
- (iii) If such a joint undertaking were established would the Newfoundland Government regard it as essential that Newfoundland interests should have controlling share in financial arrangements? (Air Ministry point out that from United Kingdom standpoint proposition would of course be more attractive and might be more readily acceptable if capital structure were such as to give United Kingdom nominee controlling share).

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> H.B. Russell, gérant général du chemin de fer de Terre-Neuve.

<sup>2</sup> H.B. Russell, General Manager of the Newfoundland Railway.

- (iv) Are you now in a position to send us as arranged in discussion with Air Ministry statistics of mail conveyed to and from United States and Canada in 1939. Very helpful if this information could be supplemented by statistics or estimates of passenger traffic between Newfoundland and the other two countries in the same year.

5. If you should feel that idea of joint United Kingdom-Newfoundland undertaking is worth pursuing we should no doubt have to take Canadian Government into consultation before plan finally takes shape. But at present exploratory stage we feel that discussion of matter which primarily concerns Newfoundland should be confined to United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments. You will of course appreciate desirability of treating suggestion as highly confidential in view of danger of misunderstanding which might result from any disclosure.

1064.

PRO DO 35 1111 A341/142 X/J 9642

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 594

[Ottawa,] February 24, 1944

SECRET and PERSONAL. Your telegram No. 495<sup>1</sup> and connected telegrams. I venture to make the following comments. Canadian Government have, as you know, been paying great attention to civil aviation problems, and it represents one of main subjects in foreign relations engaging their attention. They have all along felt that matter was so important and issues so complex, that progress could best be made by frank and early discussion with all principal parties concerned. At first they felt that prior Commonwealth discussion would have appearance of "ganging up" against us [U.S.]. For this reason they felt some hesitation in participating in Commonwealth talks last year. But when approach made to President Roosevelt showed that he anticipated no difficulty on that score, they readily agreed to discuss civil aviation with other members of the Commonwealth in London. They share our disappointment at the delay in arranging wider discussions since, in their opinion the matter is urgent, time for further purely Commonwealth consultation has passed, and round table discussion with United States (and other Powers) should be next move.

2. They have in meantime, produced a Draft International Convention which represents the result of much close study of the problem following on the discussion in London. Their object in preparing Draft has been solely to produce base for discussion, and they have no delusion that other Powers will subscribe to all suggestions contained in it. They do not expect this in the case either of United Kingdom or of United States of America, or of the other Powers. Though they look forward to agreement with United

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Kingdom on most matters, they do not expect it always on all matters, and they see positive advantage, as proof of vitality and genuineness of Dominion freedom within co-operative partnership of the Commonwealth, expression of difference of opinion between members of the Commonwealth sometimes occurs in talks of this character with the United States.

3. As stated, Canadian authorities have taken great care over preparation of Draft Convention, and they would, I think, have welcomed some general expression of appreciation from United Kingdom authorities of this constructive contribution to study of problems facing us all. They would have had no objection if at same time reply had also indicated that United Kingdom could not subscribe to various suggestions in Draft. But what in fact has happened has been that messages have reached Canadian Government through three separate channels, and sometimes more than one message, urging that on no account should the document be shown to the United States. For reasons expressed above, Canadians do not share United Kingdom view that it would be undesirable and contrary to Commonwealth interest to present Draft to United States as a basis for discussion without prior Commonwealth agreement. I am sure that they will be irritated by fact that only reaction of United Kingdom authorities to receipt of their memorandum has been insistent plea that [? it should] not be communicated to United States. This feeling may, I fear [? be] increased by action of United Kingdom Government suggesting to United States without consulting Canada that invitations should be sent to the other Dominions (your telegram No. 245<sup>1</sup>). I personally fully appreciate delicacy of position *vis-à-vis* the other Dominions (four groups missing) and that it might have been improper or inexpedient not to invite them. I am merely reporting authorities' view. They also would have appreciated difficulty about other Dominions, and no doubt would have been prepared to consider it carefully. At same time, rightly or wrongly, they regard Canada as having a special place in post-war civil aviation. In conformity with views of "functional representation" expressed by Mackenzie King they would therefore have expected her representatives to take part naturally in discussions with Major Powers on the subject. They are likely to feel hurt that, without any previous consultation, United Kingdom have taken line that, as Canada is to be invited all other Dominions must automatically be invited, also thus relegating Canada from her position as an important nation, with qualifications and rights of her own in certain matters to that of only one out of a number of British Dominions.

4. There is a further more general consideration I should like to mention. Before the war, Canadian foreign policy was far too negative and unwilling to accept commitments in the international sphere, although admittedly in the last resort it could generally be relied upon to follow a lead from Britain. The war has given as sharp and salutary a jolt to Canada as it has to other nations. She is now more conscious of her international responsibilities, and is ready to play her full part in world affairs. It seems to me that from the general point

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



of view it would be greatly to our interest to encourage this development, and to give a friendly welcome to any move such as the interest now being taken in international civil aviation, which shows her anxiety to co-operate fully in international machinery for the post-war world. I naturally do not agree with everything that Canada has done or proposed in this instance. But, if we give a chilly reception to moves of this kind, she will be more inclined to grow impatient at her ties with the Commonwealth. On the other hand, I am confident that, in the great majority of matters, we shall be able to count on her agreement, support and co-operation if we do not irk her by seeming to restrict her freedom, or to insist too rigidly on a United Commonwealth Front in international affairs.

5. I trust you will pardon me for expressing my views thus frankly. But the situation on civil aviation is tricky. I do not suggest that a major difficulty has yet arisen, but I can see certain awkwardnesses lying ahead and feel that you would wish to know the background situation as I see it now.

1065.

NPA GN1/3 478/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 298

[London,] May 19, 1944

SECRET. Your Telegram No. 197.<sup>1</sup> Following for Woods from Clutterbuck. Begins. Presume no decision will be reached on Bennett's application pending reference home and that you will be letting us know upshot of discussion in Commission.

2. To this end position remains that on basis set out in my letter of 4th April<sup>2</sup> it is very difficult to see how a Newfoundland Air Line could operate successfully in Trans-Atlantic Service without very heavy subsidy and this would apply too, though in less degree, to Services between Newfoundland and North American continent. We note that Bennett contends that in any international arrangement Newfoundland should be entitled by reason of her geographical situation to specially favourable share of traffic but prospects for securing agreement to this must be regarded as very doubtful and it is clear moreover that only a very great increase in Newfoundland's share would enable participation in a Trans-Atlantic Service to become an economic proposition.

3. In short it seems to us that any private Newfoundland Air Line operating to points outside the Island would be bound to look to Newfoundland Government for financial support and the Newfoundland Government will accordingly have to consider in their own interests what form of Air Line while

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

meeting the Island's requirements would be likely to involve them in least financial liability. It is still strongly felt here that both on this ground and in general Empire interests a joint Newfoundland-United Kingdom enterprise (no doubt with some participation by Canada) would provide best solution. It is appreciated that no final policy can be reached on this until it is seen how far International Agreement on conduct of Post War Civil Aviation is likely to be forthcoming but we feel that in meantime Newfoundland could usefully be forming a provisional policy in light of discussions which have taken place to date and hope that it will be possible for progress to be made in this direction.

4. Bennett's latest activities and formal application now made by him have increased concern here lest he may succeed in entrenching himself so firmly as to lead to establishing claim for recognition of his undertaking as the Newfoundland National Airline to the exclusion of an alternative form of organization which might better serve the interests both of Newfoundland and of the United Kingdom. No doubt, however, you have this aspect fully in mind. Ends.

1066.

NPA GN1/3 478/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 412

[St. John's,] October 10, 1944

IMPORTANT. Your telegram of 556 Secret.<sup>1</sup> Following for Clutterbuck from Woods. Begins. Discussion of your letter of 10th July<sup>2</sup> about Civil Aviation policy showed that Commission would be sympathetic with possibilities therein discussed more especially if Commission was satisfied that Newfoundland could in this way materially help to minimise risks of British civil aviation being driven out of the Atlantic air by unreasonable American competition. The Commission would then feel that it would have Newfoundland opinion behind it if it adopted the policy of partnership between chosen instruments of United Kingdom, Canada and Newfoundland, the Newfoundland share of international traffic being at the disposal of the partnership. We find it difficult, however, on the basis of the information at present at our disposal and in advance of discussions with United Kingdom representatives in Montreal to come to a final decision in this sense. You refer to discussions in London with Puddester, Emerson and Dunn but Emerson's report of these discussions did not throw any new light on the problems confronting us. Without some such compelling reason as that which I have indicated above we cannot overlook entirely the possibility that Newfoundland's interests might be best served by maximum air contacts with the United States, having regard to commercial and tourist possibilities. So far Commission's only deci-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

sion has been to instruct its representatives at the Montreal talks and subsequent international conference that they may agree to right of innocent passage and right to land for non-traffic purposes but should refer to Commission before agreeing to any other rights. Incidentally Critchley<sup>1</sup> when here recently expressed to me the opinion that it would be equally necessary to keep both Canada and American interests out of any proposed Newfoundland chosen instrument or internal air service. I may add that Bennett is worried. He asked me yesterday if I would tell him whether I thought the Newfoundland Government under the influence of the United Kingdom Government was going to adopt a less sympathetic attitude to his company because of its entanglements with outside interests and said he did not want to find himself in the position of having gone so far with his associates that he must fight for them at all costs. I would not commit myself but contrived to indicate that I personally thought it possible that the course of events might well make it impossible for his company constituted as proposed to be in any sense an instrument of Newfoundland policy. As time presses I am sending you this message at once, but I will bring up your message and this reply at what will be my last Commission meeting on Friday when London is to be sworn in and he may be able to send you a further message thereafter. Ends.

1067.

NPA GN1/3 478/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 426

[St. John's,] October 14, 1944

Our telegram No. 383 of 23rd September.<sup>2</sup> Civil Aviation. Commission has decided that Newfoundland should be represented at Commonwealth talks and subsequent International Conference by London, Walsh and Pattison. Considered essential new Commissioner for Public Utilities should attend and politically important that a Newfoundland Commissioner should also be present. Delegates will be authorised to agree with Freedoms I and II on page 5 of Balfour Committee's report<sup>2</sup> A.T.L. (43) 1 and with reference to Newfoundland's share of international traffic to advocate adoption for Newfoundland of the policy of a chosen instrument under the control of the Newfoundland Government. We are informing Bennett in reply to a written inquiry from him that he should be prepared for the adoption of this policy by us. We are not, however, making any public announcement at present and shall probably await outcome of Commonwealth talks. We have received from High Commissioner for Canada an invitation to send representatives to Montreal by 23rd instant and also copy of agenda<sup>2</sup> containing seven items which is presumably that referred to in your telegram G. No. 62.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A. C. Critchley, directeur général de la *British Overseas Airways Corporation*.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> A. C. Critchley, Director-General of *British Overseas Airways Corporation*.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1068.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 486

[St. John's,] November 20, 1944

TOP SECRET. Your telegram No. 623 of November 17th.<sup>1</sup> Commission has carefully considered your telegram and notes the great importance attached by United Kingdom Government to unanimous acceptance by Empire Countries of a common plan. We must, however, point out that the Convention appears to have been called for the purpose of restricting Air Services and is therefore diametrically opposed to the position set forth in the final sentence of paragraph 6 of your telegram. Some of our difficulties arise from this fact.

We were fully conscious of the other arguments outlined in this paragraph, but we had been led to understand that general acceptance of proposals was unlikely. We have felt that nothing short of this would justify grant by Newfoundland of Freedoms III, IV and V.<sup>2</sup> There would be the strongest public

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> La Conférence internationale de l'Aviation civile tenue à Chicago à la fin de 1944, a convenu de deux instruments multilatéraux ayant trait au droit de vol. L'Accord relatif aux services aériens internationaux réguliers stipule que chaque État contractant accorde aux autres États contractants les libertés de l'air suivantes:

- 1<sup>e</sup> Liberté: La liberté de traverser son territoire sans atterrir;
- 2<sup>e</sup> Liberté: La liberté d'atterrir pour des raisons non commerciales.

L'autre instrument multilatéral rédigé à Chicago est l'Accord relatif au transport aérien international. En plus des deux libertés de l'air précitées, l'Accord prévoit les concessions suivantes:

- 3<sup>e</sup> Liberté: La liberté de débarquer des passagers, du courrier et des marchandises embarqués sur le territoire de l'État dont l'aéronef possède la nationalité;
- 4<sup>e</sup> Liberté: La liberté d'embarquer des passagers, du courrier et des marchandises à destination du territoire de l'État dont l'aéronef possède la nationalité;
- 5<sup>e</sup> Liberté: La liberté d'embarquer des passagers, du courrier et des marchandises à destination du territoire de tout autre État contractant et le privilège de débarquer des passagers, du courrier et des marchandises en provenance du territoire de tout autre État contractant.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The International Civil Aviation Conference held at Chicago in late 1944 drew up two multilateral instruments dealing with the right to fly. The International Air Services Transit Agreement provides that each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air:

- 1st Freedom: The freedom to fly across its territory without landing;
- 2nd Freedom: The freedom to land for non-traffic purposes.

The other multilateral instrument formulated at Chicago is the International Air Transport Agreement. In addition to the two freedoms of the air referred to above, the agreement provides for the granting of:

- 3rd Freedom: The freedom to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses;
- 4th Freedom: The freedom to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses;
- 5th Freedom: The freedom to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of another State and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo coming from any such territory.



feeling here against acceptance by Newfoundland if other countries held out, and you should be aware of this. We should also warn you that in any event there will be the greatest disappointment in Newfoundland if we are unable to show that she will receive real and tangible benefits from the use of the Airports on her soil. The indirect benefits which we envisage are not sufficiently patent or certain to convince the critics. If on the contrary it appears that she has had to make a sacrifice, public feeling will be strongly adverse and we shall be accused of betraying Newfoundland's interests and acting without a mandate.

Provided that the great majority of countries interested and all Empire countries agree to grant similar privileges, we are prepared to agree to grant of Freedoms III, IV and V for the compelling reasons outlined in your telegram, and in the light of the safeguards enumerated in paragraph 7. We will so inform Newfoundland representatives.

We wish to draw your attention to three points of importance to Newfoundland which appear to call for serious consideration:

- (1) From information received from Newfoundland representatives there appears to be grave doubt if an arrangement made by the chosen instrument of Newfoundland with another operating Company to operate Newfoundland's quota as her agent would be recognised by the United States, which is claiming to operate unused frequencies. It has been suggested that the international convention or agreement might expressly or by implication preclude our chosen instrument from making such an arrangement, which we have agreed with you is the most suitable for Newfoundland. Our representatives have suggested a safeguarding clause, but they doubt if it will be accepted.
- (2) We understand that traffic will pay such landing fees as may be fixed subject to review by international authority. Unless adequate rates are allowed to meet special conditions, for example heavy costs of snow clearing at Gander, it may not be possible for Newfoundland to meet half of the cost of maintenance of Gander. We appreciate that if these rates are too high traffic may go elsewhere.
- (3) Newfoundland representatives have suggested that United States may claim that her bases in Newfoundland are available to civil traffic as a result of the convention. As Article XI of Bases Agreement specifically provides that civil use is to be settled by Agreement between the two Governments, we maintain that an international convention could not be held to take the place of such an agreement even by implication. To make matter certain we feel that the question of civilian use of all war bases in Newfoundland,

including Canadian, should if possible be expressly reserved and treated outside convention.

We should be glad to know whether these points will be safeguarded.

1069.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 633

[London,] November 22, 1944

IMMEDIATE. TOP SECRET. Your telegram 20th November No. 486. We very greatly appreciate the decision of the Commission of Government to agree to the grant by Newfoundland of Freedoms 3, 4 and 5 with the proviso (which we should of course require as a necessary condition of our own acceptance) that the great majority of countries interested and all Empire countries agree to grant similar privileges. We understand your preoccupation with the need for explaining to the Newfoundland public the benefits which would flow from the acceptance of this degree of freedom for air transport but we are convinced that in fact greater advantages will accrue to Newfoundland in this way and it is in our view unlikely that if a general multilateral agreement is reached tangible benefits could in fact be obtained by any attempt to make a separate bargain with facilities available in Newfoundland territory.

2. You will however no doubt by this time have been informed by your representatives at Chicago that situation has changed owing to the putting forward by the Americans of new proposals which are wholly unacceptable to us, and we believe to a majority of the other participants in the Chicago Conference. According to the latest information available here it may prove to be impossible to conclude more than an agreement on the technical side and transport questions may have to be left for further consideration at a later date when a more general consensus of opinion may exist as to their solution. We are however repeating your telegram and this reply to our Delegation at Chicago and are calling their attention to the three points of particular importance to Newfoundland in the framing of any agreement on transport. We are asking for our Delegation's comments on (1) and (2) of these. As regards (3), point had already been raised by our Delegation and they had been instructed to ensure that in any Convention definition of the territory of contracting powers for cabotage and other purposes should be so qualified as to exclude "territory under jurisdiction and authority exercised for military purposes in the territory of another power". We assume that this qualification would meet your wishes in respect of Newfoundland.

1070.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 648

[London,] December 2, 1944

MOST IMMEDIATE. SECRET AND PERSONAL. My telegram No. 646 of today.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Swinton has telegraphed from Chicago that present instructions to Canadian Delegation require them to withhold grant of Freedoms 1 and 2 on multilateral basis and that Newfoundland representatives in that case may wish grant to be reserved also in respect of Newfoundland.

2. We feel very strongly that for reasons set out in my telegram No. 646 it is most undesirable that there should be any reservation made by United Kingdom Delegation in respect of these Freedoms. We think effect of withholding these elementary rights would be most unfortunate both generally and from point of view of Newfoundland and do not see that in the long run any practical benefit for Newfoundland is likely to be derived by doing so.

3. We hope therefore that Commission of Government will on further consideration agree that even if Canada should ultimately decide to withhold Grant of Freedoms 1 and 2 it would not be necessary to make a reservation on behalf of Newfoundland.

4. Responsibility in this matter must, however, rest with the Newfoundland Government. In the last resort, therefore, if on political grounds Commission of Government feel it impossible to agree to grant of Freedoms 1 and 2 if Canada withholds them Lord Swinton is being authorised to make reservation accordingly on behalf of Newfoundland.

5. Please repeat most immediate your reply to Lord Swinton who is being informed of substance of above.

1071.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 496

[St. John's,] December 4, 1944

SECRET. Your telegram No. 648 Secret and Personal of 2nd December. Following telegram has been sent to Newfoundland representatives at Chicago. Begins. Following for London and Walsh. No. 6 Secret. The Commission have considered the question of the grant at this stage of Freedoms one and two and if Canada agrees to sign the collateral agreement you should inform the Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation that Newfoundland is prepared also to agree. If, however, Canada should withhold assent we

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

consider that you should ask the Chairman to intimate that for the present Newfoundland wishes to reserve her position for further consideration.

You could inform Lord Swinton to this effect.

This telegram is being repeated to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs as No. 496. Ends.

1072.

NPA GN1/3 478/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 661

[London,] December 9, 1944

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup> Following is Text of message which has now been received from Lord Swinton in Washington today. Begins. The reservation of Freedoms 1 and 2 which I was instructed to make on behalf of Newfoundland is already the subject of adverse comment in American Press and will be increasingly embarrassing.

2. I explained that we had to give the Newfoundland Government time to consider this question which had come up at a very late stage. I further explained temporary constitutional position of Newfoundland and that United Kingdom Government always treated Commission Government as a local Government.

3. This explanation carries little weight, and it will certainly be said here that what United Kingdom have given with one hand they are taking away with the other. Berle who expressed great appreciation of United Kingdom action in granting Freedoms one and two, referred to Newfoundland as the key to the Atlantic route.

4. The Newfoundland objection is based partly on Canadian attitude, but they still think there is some bargaining power they can use. This is completely at variance with United Kingdom attitude, and I have repeatedly told Newfoundland Delegation their financial interest will lie in the maximum use of airfields.

5. Our frank attitude throughout the Conference has won respect. Our concession of the two Freedoms was keenly appreciated. The last British plan was considered a good practical scheme by a number of operators and non-political administrators. The sound position which we had secured by the end of the Conference is already prejudiced and may be undermined by the intransigence of Newfoundland. I sincerely hope, therefore, that Newfoundland Government can be brought to see reason and that the Embassy may be instructed with the least possible delay to withdraw their reservation. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



We are asking Lord Swinton to let us know what is the precise position regarding Canada.

1073.

NPA GN1/3 478/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 520

[St. John's,] December 22, 1944

SECRET. With reference to telegram No. 661 of December 9th, 1944, giving text of a message received from Lord Swinton from Washington, the Commission wish to point out that any embarrassment caused to him arises from the present constitutional position and not from any action of the Newfoundland Government. The Commission are fully aware that, as regards foreign relations, the final word must, under the present constitutional position of Newfoundland, rest with the United Kingdom Government, but they feel bound to point out that this situation is likely to be the cause of further embarrassment both to the United Kingdom Government and the Newfoundland Government. Public opinion here is very definitely opposed to leaving the disposal of Newfoundland territory and rights to the United Kingdom, and we must advise that any attempt on the part of the United Kingdom to disregard Newfoundland opinion on this subject may lead to serious and unfortunate consequences. The Commission are deeply appreciative of the position taken up by your Lordship on this question.

A great deal of embarrassment would, in the opinion of the Commission, have been avoided if the Newfoundland representatives had been invited to the Civil Aviation Conference on terms similar to the invitation extended to the Commissioner for Natural Resources and the Chairman of the Fisheries Board in 1943 when they attended an International Fisheries Conference in London. On that occasion the Newfoundland representatives kept just as closely in touch with the official United Kingdom delegates as if they had been part of the delegation and the arrangement worked well. Indeed, on the occasion in question the Newfoundland delegates extricated the United Kingdom delegates from a somewhat delicate situation *vis-à-vis* Canada. The Commission suggest that consideration should be given to the adoption in future of this procedure. The question is likely to arise again in an acute form in 1945 when an international fishery conference may be called by the United States, largely as the result of a great deal of spade work on the part of Newfoundland. It will be most unfortunate if the Newfoundland representatives have to attend such a conference in an advisory capacity only and not as fully accredited representatives of their country.

In deciding to withhold Freedoms 1 and 2 until an opportunity could be had of discussing the question with Sir George London and Mr. Walsh on their return from Chicago, the Commission had very much in mind the indeterminate position of the bases constructed by Canada and the United States in Newfoundland, and also the state of public feeling which had been awakened by the publication of the terms of the lease to Canada of Goose Bay Airport.

As regards the former, it now appears that Newfoundland's position in relation to the Canadian and United States air bases is satisfactorily covered and the Commission, through the United Kingdom, would appear, under the Two Freedoms Agreement, to have the right to designate any one of the airports in Newfoundland as a commercial airport to the exclusion of all the others. The maximum concentration of traffic at Gander is clearly desirable having regard to our liability in respect of the heavy costs of airport operation. The Commission would appreciate confirmation by the legal advisers to the Dominions Office on the legal points involved.

Turning to the grant of Freedoms 1 and 2, the Commission agree that the best interests of Newfoundland will be served in the future by the freest possible use of such airport as may be designated in Newfoundland for commercial aviation, in the belief that such use will promote employment and provide the most favourable travel facilities to Newfoundlanders and those wishing to visit the Island. Having reached this decision, however, the Commission is brought up rather sharply against the position of Newfoundland under the cabotage rule so long as Newfoundland is not a separate state. It appears to the Commission that the United Kingdom will have full control of all civil aviation which comes within the definition of cabotage and Newfoundland will have little say in the matter. The position may well arise as regards transatlantic traffic that Newfoundland citizens may find great difficulty in obtaining passages to and from the United Kingdom, especially in the early post-war period, and the position would be aggravated by the fact that such passengers might well have to wait for several days at a Newfoundland airport for passage on a United Kingdom plane when many planes belonging to other countries were continually passing through and on which accommodation might have been obtained but for the cabotage rule.

The Commission have considered this position very carefully. They would like to make a public announcement to the effect that Newfoundland is prepared to Grant Freedoms 1 and 2 to all comers, but in making this announcement, the Commission will have to lay particular emphasis on the benefits to be expected. They feel that they should be given an undertaking by the United Kingdom Government that, as regards cabotage, the rights of Newfoundland citizens to passages on the transatlantic service will be fully safeguarded and the United Kingdom authorities will take steps, in agreement with the Commission of Government, to prepare a scheme whereby an adequate number of such passages can be secured to Newfoundlanders on reasonable terms.

1074.

NPA GN1/3 3/45

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 93

[London,] February 24, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL. My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>1</sup> Canadian Trans-Atlantic Air Service. My message to Canadian Government. Begins. No. 37. Confidential. Your telegram 19th February No. 42.<sup>1</sup> Carriage of Fare-paying Traffic.

Since Montreal Commonwealth Air Conversations in December 1944, we have been considering suggestion made by Mr. Howe that Canadian Government Trans-Atlantic Air Service operated by Trans-Canada Air Lines as agents of Canadian Government should on occasion carry fare-paying traffic.

2. On full consideration we do not wish to offer any objection to this proposal so far as United Kingdom is concerned provided of course that frequencies and capacity of the Service continue to be regulated strictly by war requirements and that non-official traffic will be limited to classes subserving the national interest and only carried in any spare space which may be available after official requirements have been satisfied.

3. Canadian Government will no doubt consult Newfoundland Government also.

4. We note your readiness to agree to carriage of fare-paying traffic on United Kingdom non-commercial air transport services operating to Canada. We have not (repeat not) yet decided to charge fares for fill-up traffic on return ferry service operated by B.O.A.C. between Prestwick and Montreal to requirements of A O C-in-C., Transport Command R.A.F., but we are considering the matter and will communicate our conclusions as soon as possible.

5. As regards question of tariffs we feel sure that you will share our view that fares and freight rates should form subject of prior agreement between us. [Ends.]

1075.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements à la commission pour Terre-Neuve**Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. and S. 78-'45

[St. Johns,] May 9, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

. . .

In regard to the "study and recommendations" submitted by the Air Transport Limited, it will be recollected that Commission Minute No.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

427-44 of meeting held on 12th May, 1944,<sup>1</sup> authorised a letter to Air Transport Limited in which it was stated that the Government were prepared to accord co-operation in a "factual survey of Newfoundland and Labrador in relation to air transport in all its aspects and with particular emphasis on internal domestic requirements" which the Company proposed to conduct.<sup>2</sup> Our co-operation consisted of facilitating the acquisition of certain charts, etc. from various Services and the provision of certain meteorological information. The report now attached<sup>1</sup> embodies the results of that survey. The memoranda by the Director of Civil Aviation were compiled as a result of departmental discussions on the subject.

It will also be recollected that the original proposed set-up of Air Transport Limited involved the participation of capital from Canadian and American groups, as well as a Newfoundland group. On the 14th October, 1944, the Company was informed that it "should be prepared for the possibility that the Newfoundland Government will decide to exercise through a "Chosen Instrument" under its control Newfoundland's rights in relation to international traffic." The implications of this were apparently sufficient to induce a modification of the proposed set-up of the Company which has now disentangled itself from the foreign connections it had formerly established as indicated in a letter of 29th December, 1944, of which a copy is attached.<sup>3</sup>

G. E. LONDON

1076.

72-NL-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 159

Ottawa, July 10, 1945

SECRET

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that during Lord Cranborne's recent visit to Ottawa informal conversations were held between him and the Honourable C. D. Howe on civil aviation matters relating to Newfoundland.

2. It was agreed that a conference between the United Kingdom, Newfoundland and Canadian Governments should be held as soon as conveniently

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Voir les documents 1063, 1065-1067.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 1063, 1065-1067.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



possible. Lord Cranborne agreed to take up the matter with Newfoundland on his return to London. An inter-Departmental committee is being organised here to make preparations. Canada's interests in the use of Newfoundland's airfields for trans-Atlantic flying would appear to be adequately safe-guarded, since both Canada and Newfoundland have signed the so-called "Two Freedoms" agreement, drawn up at the Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference, permitting transit overhead and the use of designated airfields for refuelling stops. The important problems likely to arise in these discussions are (1) what fields are to be designated for international traffic, and (2) what arrangements should be made for the maintenance and operation of such fields and ancillary facilities, such as weather and direction-finding stations, in the Newfoundland-Labrador region.

3. It has been generally assumed that Goose Bay and Gander Airfields and Botwood Seaplane Base would be used for trans-Atlantic flying and that many of the defence installations erected there by the Canadian Government would be convertible to or useful for civil air purposes. Apart from technical aviation problems, responsibility for the maintenance and operation of these facilities will raise important political questions. Presumably, if Goose Air Base is designated for international traffic it will be operated by Canadian authorities. Under the Air Bases Agreement of 1941, Botwood and Gander are to be returned to Newfoundland. Whether Newfoundland will be financially able to maintain these fields and whether they will have the technical personnel available to operate them and their ancillary services are unanswered questions. Under the International Civil Aviation convention the International Air Authority may on request provide or maintain facilities in a country which is unable to provide or maintain them. Whether in the event that Newfoundland cannot maintain and operate these fields and facilities they should be placed under the International Authority or whether assistance should be provided by Canada and/or the United Kingdom may be important questions in the forthcoming discussions.

4. It is also possible that consideration may be given to the use of other fields, notably Harmon field and the emergency field at Buchans. The use of Gander appears to be distinctly limited because of frequent adverse weather conditions and because the nature of the terrain prevents extension of the runways to the desired length for large transport planes. There is some disposition in Trans-Canada Airlines circles to urge the development of Buchans field. The United States would apparently be willing to open Harmon field to trans-Atlantic traffic, provided other Newfoundland fields were available to United States airlines. (See note from the State Department of June 12, copy of which is being sent you under covering despatch of today's date relating to Harmon field.)<sup>1</sup> No official of this Department is familiar with either of these fields, and there is little information on our files about them. It might, therefore, be useful if you found an opportunity to see these fields on your forthcoming visit to the western part of the Island.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

5. You will be kept advised about preparations for the conference and about any other relevant developments. In the meantime, any views you may have on any aspect of the problem will be appreciated.

I have etc.

R. M. MACDONNELL  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1077.

72-RV-40

*Le ministre des Munitions et des Approvisionnements  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of Munitions and Supply  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, August 20, 1945

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Thanks for copy of Cypher Teletype WA-4248<sup>1</sup> from the Canadian Ambassador in Washington.

Trans-Canada Air Lines is already using Harmon Field, Stephenville, Newfoundland, by local arrangement with the Officer Commanding the field. Very happy arrangements have been established and Trans-Canada officials are particularly pleased with the courtesies extended by those in charge of the field.

I suggest that the Government should advise the Government of Newfoundland and the Government of the U.K. that an early discussion of the use of bases in Newfoundland is desirable.

In negotiations for Trans-Atlantic flying, it should be noted that Gander airport is not suitable for heavy Trans-Atlantic planes without considerable and costly reconstruction, whereas Harmon Field, Stephenville, is a satisfactory base. Therefore, the two intermediary airports to be retained for Trans-Atlantic flying should be Goose airport in Labrador and Harmon Field in Newfoundland.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. HOWE

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1078.

72-AFJ-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
en Grande-Bretagne*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
en Grande-Bretagne*

TELEGRAM 2024

Ottawa, September 1, 1945

The Hon. C. D. Howe is considering attending on behalf of Canada the Commonwealth-USA Telecommunications Conference scheduled for November 15th in Bermuda. He considers that the Conference would provide a good opportunity to discuss with the United Kingdom bilateral agreements in civil aviation relating to the North Atlantic and West Indies routes, and to discuss civil aviation rights in Newfoundland.

It would be very welcome to us if the United Kingdom would send to Bermuda representatives with whom Mr. Howe could agree in principle on the above matters subject to later governmental approval.

Would you please obtain the views of the Dominions Office and advise us.

1079.

72-AFJ-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 2350

Ottawa, October 9, 1945

Your telegram No. 2903 of October 6th,<sup>1</sup> Civil Aviation discussions with Mr. Howe at Bermuda. We welcome your advice that the United Kingdom authorities would be very willing to send representatives. Their assumption that Mr. Howe has in mind discussions about bilateral agreements between Canada and the United Kingdom is correct. He does not envisage tripartite talks among Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

1080.

72-AFL-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Ambassador in United States*

TELEGRAM EX-3578

Ottawa, October 9, 1945

IMMEDIATE. Your WA-4806,<sup>1</sup> civil use of military airfields in Newfoundland. Please reply to State Department's note of September 14<sup>2</sup> as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Begins. The Canadian Government has no objection to the use of the airfields at Goose, Gander and Torbay by Pan American Airways, Trans-Continental and Western Airways, and American Export Airlines on their proposed scheduled operations over Canada to Europe. It is pointed out, however, that the use of the fields will require the concurrence of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments. In addition to the above air fields, the Canadian Government would be prepared to consider making available the fields at Montreal, Moncton and Quebec for International Two Freedoms traffic.

There is no objection to the use of Mingan by designated U.S. air carriers as long as that airport be maintained in a serviceable condition but, if at a future date it reverts to a caretaker basis, no responsibility will be assumed for its maintenance for trans-Atlantic operations.

It is noted that the question of the use of Harmon Field by TCA or other commercial aircraft cannot, in the opinion of the Newfoundland Government, be settled until the general question is dealt with and that the Newfoundland authorities are in communication with the Dominions Office on this subject.

With reference to para. 3 of the note of September 8th<sup>1</sup> to the Chargé d'Affaires of the United Kingdom, the Canadian Government would expect that Canadian air transport enterprises now holding traffic rights (or receiving future traffic rights) in the territories in which the military bases have been established, would be permitted to exercise such rights at these bases, such rights to be available to Canadian air transport enterprises on a non-discriminatory basis *vis-à-vis* airlines of the United States and the United Kingdom, subject to cabotage reservation. Ends.

1081.

72-AFL-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au conseiller spécial  
du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Special Assistant  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, October 12, 1945

Dear Mr. MacKay,

With reference to my telegram No. 217 of October 11th<sup>2</sup> on preparations for the use of Gander as a civil airport I had a further informal conversation on the subject with Sir George London and Squadron-Leader Pattison today. They tell me that what the Americans appear to have in mind is that the three Companies which have been carrying on Trans-Atlantic flights under the United States Army Transport Command via Botwood viz., Pan-American, American Export Airlines and Trans-Continental and Western Airlines are intent on continuing the flights using land planes via Gander as soon as

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



the Clipper operations via Botwood terminate, which will be about the end of the present month or a little earlier. All of the three Companies have put through their survey flights and are now engaged in what they call familiarization flights following which they will secure certificates from the Civil Aeronautics Board at Washington to carry on Trans-Atlantic flights.

All of the lines are anxious that there be no break between the termination of their Clipper services and the inauguration of their Trans-Atlantic flights by land planes and it is for this reason that the Americans are so anxious to get established at Gander with accommodation for passengers and facilities for servicing planes. Sir George told me that General Connell went so far as to suggest that the most expeditious and generally best way of dealing with the matter would be to give the three Companies a franchise to set up and operate these facilities at Gander. Sir George pointed out, however, that such a development would be quite impossible as the airport would have to be run as a Newfoundland airport and it would not be desirable to give a franchise to three American Companies when eventually a great many Companies including British, Canadian, French, Swedish and others would also be using the airport. He does not, however, wish to discourage or hamper the Americans from going ahead with their commercial services.

Sir George's general idea seems to be that, while Gander would not be officially designated as a commercial airport for several months, the United States Companies could continue to run scheduled plane services through it on the understanding that they would have to be content with such facilities as could be easily provided. There are a good many vacant buildings in the United States zone and doubtless they can improvise some sort of accommodation that will serve the purpose until a more elaborate and permanent organization is set up. There is, however, no mistaking the determination of the Americans to get the Trans-Atlantic services through Gander operating without loss of time nor of the desire of the Newfoundland Government to encourage them in the project.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

1082.

72-AFL-40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 473

[London,] October 13, 1945

SECRET. Your despatches Nos. 173<sup>1</sup> and 174<sup>2</sup> of 31st August and your subsequent telegram No. 341 of 2nd October.<sup>3</sup> Future use of Newfoundland Air Bases.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Document 807.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

1. We have now had opportunity of discussing with Ministry of Civil Aviation questions arising out of presentation of United States Note to Commission of Government, and our views are summarized as follows:

- (1) We note that United States Government seek permission for commercial aircraft to land at Gander, Goose Bay, Torbay, Harmon Field and Argentia, and we understand that Canadian Government in so far as they are concerned would see no objection to use of first three of above mentioned bases for this purpose. We note further that United States Consul General has indicated that United States requirements would be satisfied by grant of general rights at Gander with emergency rights elsewhere. We on our side appreciate desirability of opening up Newfoundland Airports without delay for Trans-Atlantic traffic, and we would suggest, therefore, that Commission should now inform United States and Canadian Governments that they intend, as an interim measure and until the future use for Civil purposes of the United States and Canadian bases in Newfoundland has been finally determined, temporarily to designate Gander as their principal International Trans-Atlantic base, Goose Bay, Torbay, Harmon Field and Argentia being scheduled as bad weather alternatives. Communications to United States and Canadian Governments should however stipulate that responsibility for diversion of aircraft away from Gander would rest solely with Air Traffic Control Authorities at Gander;

. . .

- (3) We agree with view expressed in final paragraph of your despatch No. 174 that question of future use of Canadian controlled air bases in Newfoundland should be discussed at early date between Canadian, Newfoundland and United Kingdom Governments and we hope shortly to be able to address you more fully on this matter. In the meantime we would suggest that proposals as to use of Torbay, or of Harmon Field and Argentia, for regular Continental and Internal Services (as distinct from emergency use for Trans-Atlantic Service) should be postponed.
- (4) As to Landing Fees we agree with proposal at (B) in your telegram No. 341 that these should be payable to Newfoundland at rates to be determined; we also agree that Newfoundland personnel should be employed at the bases wherever possible.

2. We assume that subject to any further comments which they may have on above points, Commission will, before sending reply to United States Consul-General, discuss position fully with Canadian High Commissioner in St. John's and make sure that Canadians are in agreement.

3. As Canadian High Commissioner in London has also approached us in the matter, we should be grateful if you would inform us as soon as possible of terms in which you intend to reply to United States Consul General.

1083.

72-NL-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 292

Ottawa, December 4, 1945

Your teletype No. 263 of December 3rd,<sup>1</sup> Bermuda discussions on civil aviation. Have now been advised by Dominions Office that United Kingdom Government agree to hold Bermuda discussions during week of December 17-22 and that United Kingdom delegation will be headed by Lord Winsters, Minister of Civil Aviation.

Canadian delegation consisting of Mr. Howe, Mr. Symington, Mr. R. A. MacKay, Mr. J. R. Baldwin and Mr. T. M. Bryson, assistant to Mr. Howe, plan to arrive in Bermuda on December 15th and depart December 23rd.

1084.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions  
Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 420

[St. John's,] December 5, 1945

SECRET. Paragraph 3 of my Secret telegram No. 414<sup>1</sup> application by U.S.A. for third and fourth freedoms.

2. Canadian Government raises no objection. Canada would expect that any rights made available to U.S.A. would be extended to her. She assumes that "position as regards rates and capacities which would arise if freedoms are granted will fit in with any general proposed pattern".

3. Canadian Government also states that she understands granting of freedoms would only apply in respect of traffic on through North Atlantic service and do [sic] not involve establishment of separate special service between U.S.A. and Newfoundland. She suggests that as grant of third and fourth freedoms is inter-related with fifth freedom decision might be postponed for discussion at Bermuda.

4. I have now received your Secret telegram 561.<sup>1</sup> I will reply as soon as possible.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1085.

NPA GN1/3 3/45

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 422

[St. John's,] December 7, 1945

SECRET. Your Secret Telegram No. 561.<sup>1</sup> Neill, Walsh and Pattison will proceed to Bermuda. It is politically important that a Newfoundland Commissioner should be included in delegation.

1086.

NPA S-5-5-4

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 13

[London,] January 9, 1946

SECRET. Your telegram No. 455 of 31st December last.<sup>1</sup> I have now studied full record of Civil Aviation discussions in Bermuda and am glad to learn that Commission have approved recommendations of Conference in so far as they concern Newfoundland.

2. As regards paragraph 2 of your telegram I agree that United States authorities should now be informed that Commission are prepared to comply with their request for grant of IIIrd and IVth Freedom rights at Gander subject to conditions set out at (c) 1-5 of Summary of Conclusions of Bermuda Talks.

3. As regards future of Gander generally necessary steps will be taken in accordance with conclusions reached at Bermuda to invite Canadian Government to continue in control of Meteorological Services and Tower Control and to seek assistance of Air Ministry in maintaining Air Traffic Control and Signals Organisation as temporary measure. I trust in this connection that it will prove possible for Commission in advance of preparation of detailed Memorandum for presentation to P.I.C.A.O. to provide me with some general indication of cost involved in operating Gander as an International Civil Airport and of staff which will be required to this end (See in this connection my telegram No. 583 of 11th December last.<sup>1</sup>).

4. As regards paragraph 5, I will telegraph further as soon as possible regarding practice to be followed for designation of Gander.

5. In the meantime I have noted from Summary of Conclusions that it was decided in Bermuda that discussions on Military user of Newfoundland Air Bases should take place in Newfoundland not later than 1st February. I assume that next step will be for Newfoundland Government to issue invita-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



tions to Canadian and United Kingdom Governments to send representatives to take part in these discussions and it would seem desirable since time is short that these invitations should be issued as soon as possible.

1087.

NPA S-5-5-4

*Communiqué de presse du commissaire  
aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements*

*Press Release by Commissioner  
for Public Utilities and Supply*

P.U. and S. 13-'46

[St. John's] January 16, 1946

## BERMUDA CONFERENCE

## DECEMBER 1945

Upon his return from the Bermuda Conference the Commissioner for Public Utilities granted interviews to the Press and afforded general information on the proceedings of the Conference. The Commissioner now wishes to acquaint the public of the results achieved. This can most conveniently be done in summarised form.

## 1. Traffic Rights for U.S.A. Airlines in Newfoundland

The Government of the U.S.A. had requested the grant of Third and Fourth Freedom rights to the U.S. Airlines who have been allotted North Atlantic routes by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Government is prepared to grant these rights on the following conditions—

1. Newfoundland to be granted reciprocal rights to operate to the U.S.A., these rights to be assigned for the time being to B.O.A.C. to exercise on behalf of the Newfoundland Government.
2. That in accordance with the principle that broad equilibrium should be maintained between capacity and traffic offering, the U.S. would be granted the right to exercise third and fourth freedom privileges in respect of seven United States services through Gander in each direction per week, the United States Government to decide which services each week should enjoy these rights.
3. That the Newfoundland Government reserves the right to approve the fares to be charged, but will not seek a rate lower than that established by the operators conference or by a majority of the operators on the route.
4. That in deciding to which weekly services traffic rights in Newfoundland should be assigned, the United States Government should be invited to bear in mind the convenience of Newfoundland passengers in relation particularly to the schedules of Newfoundland rail services.

5. That the above arrangements are understood to be an interim arrangement subject to review in six months or a year's time in accordance with experience gained in the interim.
2. The Third and Fourth Freedom rights, as applied to the present case, are—
  - (a) The right of U.S.A. aircraft to carry traffic (passengers, cargo, mail) from U.S.A. to Newfoundland;
  - (b) The right of U.S.A. aircraft to carry traffic (passengers, cargo, mail) from Newfoundland to the U.S.A.

The principle that broad equilibrium should be maintained between capacity and traffic offering was followed. ("Capacity" means the load which can be carried over a route during a specified period: "traffic offering" means the number of passengers (including freight) who actually travel over that period). It will be seen, therefore, that the Newfoundland public will, if the arrangements are acceptable to the U.S.A., have two opportunities of flying to and from the U.S.A.—once by a U.S.A. plane and once by B.O.A.C. This is a liberal arrangement under the "capacity-traffic" principle.

3. The question of direct service from Newfoundland to the U.K. was discussed. No difficulty is anticipated at present in providing passages on the B.O.A.C. return ferry service which operates through Gander every week day. The terminal point is, at present, Prestwick. Later this year it is hoped that B.O.A.C. will be operating daily service on a commercial basis. This will be adequate for Newfoundland traffic.

#### 4. Gander Airport

It was agreed that Gander should be designated as the Newfoundland international airport—this in accordance with the policy of Government. Government is now taking over control of Gander, but in certain of the technical services—meteorological, air traffic and signals—assistance is being sought from the Air Ministry and the Canadian Government. It will not be possible for Government to take over meteorological control for some time—long term training is involved—but other controls will be taken over in the near future. (An Air Ministry Order has been circulated to Newfoundland personnel in the R.A.F. informing them of vacancies in technical staff at Gander. Applications have been received and are under consideration.)

#### 5. Goose Bay

Canada will be granted the first four Freedoms at this Canadian built airport. It follows, therefore, that T.C.A. could use Goose for Trans-Atlantic services in so far as she wished to do so. Landing fees would enure to Canada at this port.

#### 6. Torbay

It was agreed that Canada should be confirmed in her title to the land. Newfoundland will have civil rights of user equal to those enjoyed by Canada.

Newfoundland will have the usual Customs and Immigration facilities at the airport. Landing fees would enure to Canada. Maintenance charges are met by the Dominion Government.

7. The question of the military use of Gander, Goose and Torbay will be discussed at a Conference which will be held in the near future in Newfoundland.

8. The Commissioner hopes that this summary of the proceedings may be of interest to the general public.

[J. S. NEILL]

1088.

72-NL-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 8

St. John's, January 21, 1946

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Commission of Government has approved recommendations of Bermuda conference insofar as they concern Newfoundland.

2. Steps are being taken, through the Dominions Office, to invite the Canadian Government to continue to operate the meteorological services.

3. Newfoundland Government has informed United States Consul General that they are prepared to grant third and fourth freedoms to United States lines in Newfoundland on conditions set forth in paragraph C of Conclusions and Recommendations of Bermuda Conference.

1089.

PRO DO 35 1149 X/J 8146

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions  
Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 70

[St. John's,] February 23, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL. Following for Clutterbuck from Neill. Begins. We would be very grateful if you made tentative enquiries as to whether the B.O.A.C. would take over the control of Botwood this year. We have no trained staff available, and the financial burden of keeping the base open for one company would be a considerable strain.

2. We would appreciate a reply at your earliest convenience. Ends.

1090.

PRO DO 35 1149 X/J 8146

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions**Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 86

[St. John's,] March 14, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL. My telegram of 23rd February No. 70. Botwood. Following for Clutterbuck from Neill. Baltimore office of the B.O.A.C. have informed us that the Transatlantic flying-boat service has been terminated, following on the purchase of five Constellations for the Atlantic service this summer.

1091.

PRO DO 35 1149 N516/29 X/J 9723

*Le ministère de l'Aviation civile de Grande-Bretagne  
au secrétaire adjoint aux Dominions**Ministry of Civil Aviation of Great Britain  
to Assistant Secretary for Dominions*

R.6922/45

London, May 22, 1946

Dear Antrobus,

Your letter of 17th May (N.516/29)<sup>1</sup> and enclosures about the grant of traffic rights to U.S. airlines at Gander.

2. The issues in relation to the U.S.A. are fairly straightforward and the conclusions of the Bermuda (December) Conference were dominated by two main considerations, viz:

- (1) The desire of all parties to afford the maximum possible protection to the T.C.A. service between St. John's, Gander and Canada with its connection at Moncton for the U.S.A.
- (2) The necessity for securing B.O.A.C.'s rights to carry traffic between the U.S.A. and Newfoundland without involving the exercise of Fifth Freedom rights which could not be granted on a discriminatory basis.

3. In order to meet (1) it was decided, with some reluctance on the part of Newfoundland, to limit traffic rights granted to U.S. airlines at Gander to the exercise of Third and Fourth Freedoms on the basis of two frequencies a week in each direction. In order to meet (2) it was decided that Newfoundland would designate B.O.A.C. to exercise her reciprocal Third and Fourth rights in any agreement with the U.S.A. and so obviate placing the rights of B.O.A.C., as a U.K. airline, on a Fifth Freedom basis.

4. I think that we must admit the U.S. contention that the subsequent U.S.A.-U.K. (Bermuda) Agreement has somewhat changed the position, although it has not in any way deprived Newfoundland of her freedom to

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



limit Third and Fourth Freedom and refuse Fifth Freedom rights to U.S. airlines if she wishes.

5. The crux of the matter lies in the attitude of Canada. Mr. Howe made it plain that there was no incentive to Canada to maintain the service of T.C.A., which Newfoundland needs for her connections with Canada, if they were to be exposed to unlimited Third and Fourth [Freedom] competition of U.S. airlines and Fifth Freedom competition of the U.K. and foreign airlines on the direct Gander-New York services. As you know Canada will not in any circumstances grant Fifth Freedom rights at Montreal, and Newfoundland is entirely dependent on the T.C.A. service for air communication with Canada. Thus, unless Canada is prepared to modify her attitude towards competition with the T.C.A. service, Newfoundland is placed in the unhappy dilemma of either adhering to the Bermuda (December) decisions or losing her T.C.A. connection with Canada.

6. Newfoundland, quite naturally, feels that it is in the interests of her public to have access to the maximum possible number of services operating between Gander and the U.S.A. and Walsh was only persuaded, with difficulty, to accept the limitations which Canada, with our support, desired to impose.

7. I notice that Canada has been informed of the nature of the U.S. claim and it seems to me that we should await her reactions before we commit ourselves to any expression of opinion. In order to expedite settlement, I suggest that the High Commissioner might be asked to seek the views of Canada, since the protection of her T.C.A. service is the main obstacle to conceding the U.S. claim.

Yours sincerely,

W. W. BIRKETT

1092.

NPA GN1/3 6/46

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 10

Ottawa, June 12, 1946

IMMEDIATE. SECRET. Following for Flinn from Neill. We recommend that following telegram be sent to Secretary of State. Begins. Your secret telegram No. 187,<sup>1</sup> Air Freedoms. At conversations held in Ottawa on 11th June on subject of renewal of T.C.A. Agreement Canadian Delegates stated that they had no objection to grant of 3rd, 4th and 5th Freedoms to trans-Atlantic operators though 5th could not of course be operated into Canada without her consent. Canadian delegates suggested that grant should be made by bi-lateral agreements.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

In view of this attitude we have agreed that Neill may state at conversations to be held this week in Washington that we are prepared to grant Freedoms referred to on non-discriminatory basis provided usual bi-lateral agreement is made. Ends.

. . .

1093.

72-AGT-40

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 249

May 28, 1948

Sir,

I have been informed by the Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply that the United Kingdom authorities are anxious to proceed with the designation with I.C.A.O. of weather alternates in Newfoundland.

2. In this connection the Newfoundland Government would be grateful if the Canadian Government would formally agree to the United Kingdom Government designating Torbay and Goose Bay Airports as weather alternates on behalf of Newfoundland. Such designation would, of course, be in conformity with existing practice.

3. I understand that the Newfoundland Government is making a similar approach to the United States authorities with respect to the Airports at Argentia and Stephenville.

I have etc.

PAUL A. BRIDLE

1094.

72-AGT-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve  
Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 102

Ottawa, July 23, 1948

Your telegram No. 128 of July 19.<sup>1</sup> Designation of Goose Bay and Torbay as weather alternates to ICAO.

1. Canadian Government agrees that United Kingdom may now proceed with their concurrence to designate to ICAO as weather alternates on behalf of Newfoundland Torbay and Goose Bay airports. I have learned that the United States have agreed to a similar procedure in respect to the airports Argentia and Stephenville.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## PARTIE 2/PART 2

LE SERVICE DE TRANS-CANADA AIR LINES À TERRE-NEUVE<sup>1</sup>  
THE TRANS-CANADA AIR LINES SERVICE TO NEWFOUNDLAND<sup>1</sup>

1095.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 10

Ottawa, October 7, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter from the Deputy Minister of Transport, dated October 3, 1941,<sup>2</sup> in which Commander Edwards asks that steps be taken to approach the Newfoundland Government with a view to obtaining permission for the operation of a regular airmail, passenger and express service from the terminal in the Maritime Provinces to Gander Lake Airport and thence to Torbay by Trans-Canada Air Lines.

You will observe that Commander Edwards is prepared to give assurance that the proposed service will in all respects be equal to that given on the Canadian transcontinental route. He points out that the new service will in no way affect the intergovernment agreement covering the operation of the Trans-Atlantic Air Service but that it will be a purely local, and a logical development of the present Trans-Canada service. He adds, however, that the Trans-Canada Air Lines will require exclusive operating rights for a period of, say, five years in order to justify the necessary expenditures involved in instituting the service.

I shall be grateful if you will have this matter taken up at once with the appropriate officers of the Newfoundland Government.

I have etc.

NORMAN ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Voir également les documents 1063 et 1091-92.

<sup>1</sup> See also Documents 1063 and 1091-92.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1096.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 14

St. John's, October 15, 1941

1. Certain factors make it desirable to give consideration to establishment of a Canadian commercial air service, including air mail, between Canada and St. John's. I am informed unofficially that this question has been subject of earlier enquiry and correspondence with Newfoundland Government, but I respectfully suggest it is of the greatest importance and should be fully examined in the light of existing political and commercial circumstances, as well as of those connected with defence.

- (a) An increasingly large number of persons are coming to Newfoundland from Canada on business. Much of their work is directly connected with Canadian defence measures, especially contracts for construction of defence works, dockyards and barracks, and it is of interest to the Canadian Government that these men should be able to make the trip quickly;
- (b) The number of Canadian Government officials who are required to visit Newfoundland in the course of their duties also seem to be increasing. By train and boat, and provided connections are made, such persons leave Ottawa on Sunday afternoon and arrive in St. John's Thursday morning. By using C.T.A. [T.C.A.?] in Canada time is shortened but not materially as this end of journey is the slow part;
- (c) Mail from here, which is subject to censorship, may take an even longer time as it is liable to be held over until the next train unless posted well before train time;
- (d) In promotion of friendly relations between Canada and Newfoundland which is at present matter of real importance, speedier means of communication and travel between the two countries would be of material assistance;
- (e) During the winter months service across Cabot Strait and on Newfoundland railway is subject to considerable delay on account of weather conditions, and has in the past been limited to twice a week.

2. I have not discussed the matter formally or otherwise with members of Newfoundland Government, but Canadian service officers here inform me in their opinion the Newfoundland Government would probably not be averse to establishment of such a service and would prefer that it should be Canadian rather than American.



3. American interests have commenced enquiry with a view to establishment of an air service to Torbay aerodrome. I informed you of their approach to R.C.A.F. in my despatch No. 11 of October 2nd.<sup>1</sup> I understand that Mr. Earle, of Harvey and Company, St. John's, local agents of an American company, has left for Ottawa to pursue the matter further.

1097.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État au Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 11

Ottawa, October 16, 1941

Your telegram of October 15th, 1941, No. 14. Commercial air service between Canada and Newfoundland.

We wrote to you on this subject on October 7th, 1941, despatch No. 10. We agree with your observations and hope that it will be possible to arrange for establishment of service in question. Keenleyside discussed matter with Wild who expressed sympathetic interest.

1098.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 16

St. John's, October 21, 1941

1. Your despatch No. 10 of October 7th was only received at 6:00 p.m. yesterday.

We conferred with Commissioner Woods this morning and found his understanding was that Trans Canada Air Services had definitely refused to undertake this service and accordingly, with the consent and approval of Dominions Office, he had authorized negotiations to be opened by Harvey and Company with North East Air Lines, and apparently all that remained was the consent of the Canadian Government to use Torbay and Gander aerodromes.

It was unfortunate that I was not advised earlier as negotiations have been continuing during the past two weeks. See my despatch No. 11 of October 2nd,<sup>1</sup> as I advise in my telegram No. 14 of October 15th, Mr. Earle of Harvey

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and Company left for Ottawa last week to endeavour to finalize arrangements. He carried letter of introduction to J. A. Wilson from the Newfoundland Government.

I believe, however, that the attitude of the Newfoundland Government will be favourable to T.C.A. In their negotiations Harvey and Company were willing to agree to condition that services should only be limited to duration of the war, and Dominions Office in giving their consent also imposed this condition. I anticipate, therefore, that the Newfoundland Government will probably object to giving exclusive operating rights to T.C.A. for 5 year period.

Harvey and Company were notified by Woods of our application and their representative immediately called on me and explained how far they had gone with negotiations with North East Lines, but that it was on the understanding that the T.C.A. were definitely not interested. Harvey and Company would prefer to have T.C.A. as they are also their agents here, but have gone so far with North East that they are a bit embarrassed. Earle's instructions were to finalize arrangements with Canadian Government and then proceed to Boston to finalize with North East Lines.<sup>1</sup>

My conference with Woods this morning was informal but I have filed formal application today embodying request contained in your despatch and will telegraph you reply.

1099.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 24

St. John's, November 3, 1941

Your despatch No. 10 of October 7th, and subsequent telegrams and letters with reference to T.C.A. establishing air service to Newfoundland.

Sir W. W. Woods advises me that he has been authorized to inform me that the Newfoundland Government will welcome proposed service on the understanding that present authorization is limited to period of the war, and that during that period no monopoly or special privileges will be granted to

<sup>1</sup> *North East Air Lines* reçut ultérieurement un permis lui permettant d'exploiter une ligne non commerciale visant à desservir les bases américaines à Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> *North East Air Lines* was subsequently granted a licence to operate a non-commercial service in support of United States bases in Newfoundland.

T.C.A., and further states that he would be glad to be acquainted with details of any plans that may be decided upon in accordance with this authorization.

1100.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 26

St. John's, November 4, 1941

My telegram No. 24 of November 3rd. Have had further conference with Woods and suggest that you send me by telegraph reasons why five year monopoly required and when these are presented Government will reconsider their decision and quite possibly may grant same.

1101.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 29

[Ottawa,] November 13, 1941

Reference your telegram of November 4, 1941, No. 26. Trans-Canada Air Line Service to Newfoundland. Please place the following considerations before the Newfoundland Government:

- (a) The organization of the service is being undertaken largely because of the insistence from the Canadian Government that improved communications between Newfoundland and Canada are absolutely necessary for the efficiency of our war services. The operation will, from the nature of the terrain and the climate, be more difficult than any other operation now undertaken by the Company and the prospects of making it a success commercially are certainly no greater than on other routes where their equipment and personnel, both difficult to obtain today, could be used to greater advantage.
- (b) Both the Canadian Government and Trans-Canada Air Lines must necessarily spend a very considerable sum on the air navigation facilities essential to operate the route with safety and regularity. These include the cost of the aerodrome at Torbay; the cost of the radio range stations, now in course of erection, at Sydney, Gander

and Torbay; the cost of two further radio stations which will probably be found necessary for safe navigation of the route; the installation of two-way radio by Trans-Canada Air Lines for communication purposes along the line of the route; the cost and provision of special aircraft and equipment required to operate the service; the installation of the ground services essential for this operation.

- (c) These items represent a capital investment of considerable magnitude from which no commensurate return can be expected in any period less than five years. Experience shows that if the operating company pays its operating expenses, depreciation, and interest on the investment in the initial period, the results may be considered satisfactory. On these grounds it cannot be expected that the Canadian Government and Trans-Canada Air Lines will invest the necessary capital if they are open to unrestricted competition from other sources which may use the facilities created for the operation of the line without having been called upon to make the capital expenditures involved in the equipment of the line.

The Canadian Government would be prepared to reconsider the whole situation at the conclusion of hostilities in the light of the conditions existing at that time.

1102.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 37

St. John's, November 24, 1941

Your despatch No. 10 of October 7th. Newfoundland Government desire clearer definition of last three words of fourth line from bottom of page one, and particularly is the phrase intended to cover only use of Gander and Torbay aerodromes. Also ask specifically if intended to cover all or any of the following lanes:

- (1) Lanes between terminal in Maritime Provinces and Gander,
- (2) Lanes between Gander and Torbay,
- (3) Direct lanes between terminal in Marine Provinces and Torbay,
- (4) Any other lanes in air over Newfoundland.

Their letter also states it would assist Government if some information could be given as to size and type of planes which would be used, and charge which would be made for carriage of mail and parcels.



1103.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 41

Ottawa, December 4, 1941

SECRET

Sir,

With reference to your telegram of November 24, 1941, No. 37, regarding the proposed commercial air service between Canada and Newfoundland, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the Deputy Minister of Transport, in which Commander Edwards answers the questions raised in your telegram under reference.

In the course of the conversation with Mr. Keenleyside this afternoon, the Deputy Minister of Transport indicated that, if it became necessary, in your opinion, to make a concession to the Newfoundland authorities in connection with these negotiations, he would have no serious objection to the dropping of Trans-Canada's request for "exclusive operating rights" over the routes under consideration. If you decide to make a concession on this point, you should, of course, point out to the Newfoundland authorities that this does not mean that Canada would be obligated to assist any competing line by granting flying, or landing, facilities over or on Canadian territory. The fact is that Canada would not grant such facilities to any such line.

I shall be grateful if you will keep me informed in regard to the progress of your negotiations.

I have etc.

NORMAN A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1104.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 11

St. John's, January 13, 1942

Your despatch No. 41 of December 4th regarding air service between Canada and Newfoundland. Commission of Government inform me they

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

agree in principle to the establishment of a regular air service but say there are several matters which call for further elucidation. Edwards' letter of December 3rd,<sup>1</sup> contents of which I communicated to the Government, states that the Department of Transport had in mind only Moncton, Gander and Torbay when making application for exclusive operating rights. Government letter points out as air ports at Moncton and Torbay are owned by the Canadian Government, right to refuse their use for commercial purposes to any company other than Trans Canada rests in the hands of the Canadian authorities and that consequently application for exclusive privileges limits itself to use of Gander airport. They also point out if permission is granted to Trans Canada to use Gander without granting exclusive rights it is difficult to see what competition is to be feared between Moncton and Torbay which are apparently to be terminal points.

On the other hand, if the Newfoundland Government completely excludes other parties from the use of Gander for commercial purposes, development of air service to other points in Newfoundland connected with the continent might be deferred for period of five years. Also requested is more definite description of nature of exclusive rights which are sought. For instance is it intended to exclude a commercial line direct from the United States to Gander and thence to Argentina or to exclude B.O.A.C. or Pan American Airways from carrying passengers from the Newfoundland airport to any western continental terminal now used or hereafter chosen by either of these companies? Newfoundland Government feel that Gander for these purposes is merely intermediate point and various kinds of service might develop if Gander remains open for use by other parties.

Government also desire further information as to the charge which will be made by Trans Canada for carriage of various classes of mail from Newfoundland to Canada and of proposed schedule of service for both mail and passengers.

It is also suggested that possibly a member of Transport Department familiar with operation of aeroplane service might be detailed to visit St. John's at an early date with the view of discussing the foregoing and other matters which are bound to arise, as it is felt speedier progress could be made by personal discussion with someone familiar with the whole problem rather than by correspondence. This suggestion has my approval enabling negotiations to be finally and quickly closed.

I have not communicated to Newfoundland Government information contained in second paragraph of your despatch No. 41.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1105.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 20

Ottawa, January 26, 1942

Your telegram of January 26th, 1942, No. 28,<sup>1</sup> Commercial Air Services to Newfoundland. J. A. Wilson, Director of Air Services; O. T. Larson, Vice-President of Trans-Canada Air Lines; and a representative of the Post Office Department will leave Montreal on Thursday morning of this week, weather permitting, for Torbay.

1106.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire suppléant  
aux Services publics*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

No. 9

St. John's, February 6, 1942

Sir,

Referring to the conferences which we have had with you and the Honourable Mr. Wild during the past two days respecting the commercial air service to Newfoundland by Trans-Canada Air Lines, I have the honour to put before the Commission of Government for their approval the following proposal:

The Government of Newfoundland will issue a permit to Trans-Canada Air Lines to operate a scheduled air mail passenger and express service over its territory, between airports in Canada and Gander and Torbay, and any other places in Newfoundland at which airports may hereafter be constructed by the Government of Canada with the approval of the Government of Newfoundland, and to which the Government of Newfoundland may consent to such service being extended, on the following conditions:

1. The permit shall be from April 1st, 1942 renewable from year to year thereafter.

2. Six months' notice of cancellation may be given by either the Government of Newfoundland or Trans-Canada Air Lines.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

3. The granting of this permit will not affect the Inter-Governmental agreement covering the operation of the Trans-Atlantic Air Service.

4. The Newfoundland Government undertake not to grant a permit for commercial flying between Newfoundland and the North American Continent which may compete with the traffic of Trans-Canada Air Lines under this permit without prior consultation with the Government of Canada.

5. Trans-Canada Air Lines shall provide a service comparable to that given on Trans-Canada Air Lines services in Canada.

6. The initial frequency shall be one round trip daily six days a week weather permitting, but this frequency of schedule may be increased without further permit.

7. The rates and regulations for the carriage of passengers and express shall be comparable to those prevailing from time to time on Trans-Canada Air Lines in Canada.

8. The conditions governing the carriage of mail by air on the service shall be agreed on by the Postal authorities of Canada and Newfoundland from time to time.

9. Trans-Canada Air Lines' operations shall be conducted in accordance with Air Regulations of Canada, and the Air Defence Regulations and Customs and Immigration regulations prevailing from time to time in Newfoundland.

10. The Government of Newfoundland shall exempt from Customs duties and taxes all aircraft, engines, parts and accessories, radio, motor tank trucks, materials for original construction and equipment of hangars and buildings at the aerodromes, and all other equipment necessary for the establishment and operation of the Service which may be imported by Trans-Canada Air Lines or by the Government of Canada. Provided that this exemption from duties shall not apply to vehicles or equipment of any class used on public highroads other than motor tank trucks, nor to other articles or materials not specified above, e.g., office supplies and equipment, consumable stores, wearing apparel of all kinds, food-stuffs imported by or for the Company or to be used in any hostel or by its employees or passengers.

11. The Government of Newfoundland shall permit the entry, free of duty and taxes, of special aviation fuel and petroleum products necessary for the operation of the aircraft on the service.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL



1107.

72-RV-40

*Le commissaire suppléant aux Services publics au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

St. John's, February 7, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that your letter to me of the 6th instant, No. 9, was considered in Commission by the Government this morning and I am instructed to say that, subject to the approval of the Right Honourable Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and subject to the slight modification mentioned below, the Government accepts the offer therein contained.

The modification suggested, and to which I understand you agreed orally on the telephone, is to para. 9, the words "defence regulations" being eliminated so that it will then read "Trans-Canada Air Lines operations shall be conducted in accordance with Air Regulations of Canada, the Air, Customs and Immigration Regulations prevailing from time to time in Newfoundland".

The Secretary of State's approval is being sought by cable and I will communicate with you as soon as I hear from him.

I am to add that the Government appreciates very much the spirit of friendly co-operation displayed throughout these negotiations and feel sure that the agreement now consummated will add another link in the happy relations between our two countries.

I have etc.

L. E. EMERSON

1108.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire suppléant  
aux Services publics*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

No. 11

St. John's, February 9, 1942

Dear Mr. Emerson,

I have your letter of February 7th, your file AG-54. The modification to my proposal which you suggest in your letter is entirely satisfactory and makes the proposal read as was intended, but your wording is much better than mine.

I note this afternoon that in the despatch which I sent to Canada, I inserted the word "and" after the word "Canada" so that the modification to which you referred in your letter reads in the final copy which I have sent to Canada as follows: "Trans-Canada Air Lines operations shall be conducted in accordance with Air Regulations of Canada and the Air, Customs and Immigration Regulations prevailing from time to time in Newfoundland." May I suggest that you make the same change in your copy.

I am very pleased that our conferences resulted in so satisfactory an arrangement. I think that perhaps February 7th may be looked upon as a red letter day because as a result of our conference, Newfoundland has been brought closer to the mainland of America.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1109.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 63

St. John's, February 27, 1942

My despatch, No. 88 of February 9th,<sup>1</sup> Commercial Air Service to Newfoundland. Sir Wilfrid Woods has informed me that Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs has now approved Agreement for Trans Canada Air Service.

1110.

72-RV-40

*Décret du Conseil*

*Order in Council*

P.C. 34/3017

April 15, 1942

#### MUNITIONS AND SUPPLY—AIR

The Board had under consideration a memorandum from the Honourable the Minister of Munitions and Supply reporting:

That, in connection with the organization, maintenance and operation by Trans-Canada Air Lines of a line of aircraft between Moncton,

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

New Brunswick, and the airports in Newfoundland at Gander and Torbay, via Sydney, Nova Scotia, a survey of the route shows that it will be necessary to use the Radio Ranges installed at the airports at Sydney, Gander and Torbay, and in addition, to establish two further Ranges, one in the vicinity of Port-aux-Basques and the other near Millertown, Newfoundland, together with emergency landing facilities at the last two named points;

That it will also be necessary to construct a small terminal building at Torbay for the accommodation of radio equipment and passenger traffic, together with a taxi strip and approximately one mile of road connecting the airport buildings to the nearest highway; to provide transmitter buildings, one at Sydney and one at Torbay, and to erect living quarters for the Radio Meteorological staffs at Sydney, Port-aux-Basques, Millertown and Torbay;

That time has not permitted a complete detailed survey, but an estimate places the cost of carrying out the above noted works at \$600,000;

That the installation of the equipment and the construction of the facilities, above noted, and the inauguration of the air service by Trans-Canada Air Lines are required as essential parts of the military activities now taking place in both Canada and Newfoundland, which activities demand rapid movement by air on schedule of military and official personnel, official plans and documents, mail and express connected with the prosecution of the war.

The undersigned, therefore, on the advice of the Director of Air Services, concurred in by the Deputy Minister of Transport, recommends that approval be given for an expenditure of \$600,000, under the direction of the Department of Transport, to be chargeable to the War Appropriation for 1942-43, for the erection of buildings and installation of facilities required for the successful operation of an air mail and passenger service by Trans-Canada Air Lines between Moncton, New Brunswick, and the Airports in Newfoundland at Gander and Torbay, via Sydney, Nova Scotia, and that a cash allotment of \$300,000 be made available for the period April 1st to June 30th, 1942, for the completion of surveys, the purchase of equipment, the awarding of contracts and other essential work required to be undertaken immediately.

The Board concur in the above report and, having approved the estimate of expenditure and cash allotment, submit the same for favourable consideration.

A. D. P. HEENEY

Clerk of the Privy Council

1111.

T 11-4-17

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 250

St. John's, May 2, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the first airplane carrying mails and passengers arrived at Torbay Airport and departed therefrom today, thus opening the service by the Trans-Canada Air Lines to Newfoundland.

2. It will stand out as a historic day in Newfoundland as it means that this country is no longer isolated from the North American Continent.

3. An announcement has also been made that beginning May 4 Pan-American Airways will operate a service from New York to England via the North Atlantic route, with the seaplane base at Botwood being used for refuelling and other purposes. This service will be utilized for airmail from Newfoundland at the rate of 35c. per half ounce, although this mail will not be taken on at Botwood but will be carried to Moncton by the daily service of the Trans-Canada Air Lines and placed on the planes at Shediac. The reason for sending mail in this way is that it is a more rapid means of transmission than is available between St. John's and Botwood.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1112.

T 11-4-17

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 260

St. John's, May 8, 1942

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 250 of May 2nd concerning the commencement of the commercial air service by Trans-Canada Air Lines between Canada and Newfoundland, I reproduce herewith the following



editorial from the *Fishermen-Workers Tribune* of May 1st which indicated the significance of this service to Newfoundland:

## RED LETTER DAY

May 1st, 1942, is destined to become a Red Letter Day in Newfoundland history for it was on that date that the first regular air mail service between Newfoundland and the North American mainland went into operation.

No longer will it be necessary to wait for weeks to receive an answer to a letter sent to Montreal, Toronto, New York, or any of the important mainland cities. The transportation of mail is no longer a matter of days but of hours. By both parties making use of the Air Mail it will now be possible to get an answer to a letter sent to any of the Eastern cities within three days, whereas, formerly you were lucky if you got an answer within ten days. This will be invaluable in the more efficient conduct of business.

And, on May 4th, Newfoundland is to have a direct Air Mail service to the United Kingdom by Pan American Airways. Formerly, Newfoundland could send letters across the Atlantic by plane, but the letters had first to go to New York, and that trip took longer than the trip from New York to England. Under the new set-up the New York trip is eliminated and Newfoundland gets a direct service.

All of which serves to prove how quickly things are moving around us and how great are the changes that are taking place each and every day.

One definite effect of all this will be to make Newfoundland better known to the world, and the simplification of the transportation problem by the inauguration of the air passenger service will unquestionably serve to bring more and more visitors to our shores. All we need now is some place to put them when they get here.

I have etc.

A. J. PICK

for the High Commissioner for Canada

1113.

DND HQC 33-8-1

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 463

St. John's, August 17, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 435 of August 4, 1942<sup>1</sup> concerning the courtesies to be extended on Trans-Canada Air Lines to the members of the Commission of Government.

2. At the date of writing this despatch, I have not received any reply to the above mentioned despatch.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

3. Subsequent to the date of my despatch No. 435 of August 4th, I received a letter from Mr. Wilson, Director of Air Services, under date of July 29th, from which I quote as follows:

Trans-Canada Air Lines was advised some time ago to grant priorities to the members of the Newfoundland Commission of Government. The Company has issued instructions to its agents concerning this and mentioned the Commissioners by name. It would be appreciated, however, if you would get in touch with the Officer-in-Charge in Newfoundland to see that no essential points have been overlooked. So far as this Department is concerned, it will be in order for you to notify the members of the Commission of Government officially concerned as to what has been done.

4. In the same letter, Mr. Wilson informed me as follows:

So far as this Department is concerned, we will be satisfied to act upon a recommendation for a seat priority given from the office of the Minister responsible for any one of the Government Departments. We are assuming here that all such requests will be related directly toward the promotion of the war effort, since we have no authority to take action on any other grounds.

5. I have not yet conveyed this information to the members of the Newfoundland Commission of Government officially as I have been awaiting a reply to my despatch to you No. 435 of August 4th.

6. I would appreciate it if you would reply to my despatch by early mail. The Commission of Government will, I know, be very pleased to have the courtesy of "must ride" privileges on Trans-Canada Air Lines and to be placed in this regard in the same position as Canadian members of the Cabinet.

7 The members of the Commission of Government will also be very pleased to know that a "must ride" priority may be obtained for Newfoundland Government officials who have to travel on matters relating directly towards the promotion of the war effort.

8. The procedure suggested by Mr. Wilson is that a telegram should be sent to him making the request.

9. I understand that it is proposed in the near future that the Canadian National Defence Department of Air will put in service a special plane which will make trips, perhaps three times a week, at stated times for the transport of Naval, Army and Air personnel between Canada and Newfoundland, independently of the Trans-Canada Air Lines.

10. I would be glad to know if this arrangement is definite as it will relieve [sic] a number of seats for civilian travellers.

11. The present position is that all available seats in the Trans-Canada planes have been booked up for weeks ahead. The people of Newfoundland have suddenly all become very air-minded and there is a great deal of dis-

satisfaction, particularly in the business community, because it is impossible for the men who have business connections in Canada to obtain seats on the plane.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1114.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au vice-président de Trans-Canada  
Air Lines*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Vice-President of Trans-Canada  
Air Lines*

St. John's October 17, 1942

Dear Mr. Larson,

Additional Service—Montreal-St. John's

I have your letter of October 13<sup>1</sup> and am pleased to note that there is to be an additional plane for the Canada-Newfoundland Service. This additional service will be hailed with great delight in this country, particularly since the sad loss of the mail boat with so many lives.

It is not necessary to obtain permission for this service from the Newfoundland Government but you might let me know soon as the authorization is granted from Ottawa and, as a matter of courtesy, I will notify them of the additional service which you are rendering.

Your faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1115.

DND HQC 33-8-1

*Mémoire du chef de l'état-major de l'Air au ministre  
de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Memorandum from Chief of the Air Staff to Minister of National  
Defence for Air*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] January 4, 1943

T.C.A. OPERATIONS R.C.A.F. STATION, GANDER

1. It is apparent from information received that Trans-Canada Air Lines are attempting to make R.C.A.F. Station, Gander, a collection and disposal point for civilian as well as Service passengers, particularly when their aircraft have been unable to get through to Torbay.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. The Commanding Officer at Gander has apparently informed T.C.A. that no operations are to terminate or lay over at Gander except in an emergency. He has stressed the following points in support of his action:

- (a) T.C.A. are clearing flights from Moncton to St. John's, Newfoundland, when weather conditions are unfit beyond Gander. One flight last week left 8 women and 6 men passengers on the station for 2 days;
- (b) Requests by telegram from all points in Canada and Newfoundland are increasing requesting permission for civilian men and women to emplane and deplane at Gander for points all along the Newfoundland railway;
- (c) Accommodation and facilities for providing meals, M.T. and guarding the passengers from intrusion on the working part of the station are not available.

3. The A.O.C., No. 1 Group, concurs in the action taken by the C.O. at Gander and suggests that Gander cannot be made a civil airport without agreement of U.S. Forces. He recommends it remain strictly Service.

4. Gander airport is one of the most fruitful places for unauthorized or inquisitive persons to pick up secret information about Allied air activities, being as it is an R.C.A.F. B.R. and Fighter station and the main Western Atlantic terminal for long-range bombers being ferried to the U.K. by R.A.F. and U.S. Ferry Commands.

5. There is no city in the vicinity which can justify its use as a terminal for the collection and disposal of civilian passengers.

6. Our original agreement with the Department of Transport permitted the use of Gander and Torbay airports by T.C.A. subject to the same restrictions as are in force at Dartmouth. At Dartmouth civilian passengers are not allowed to loiter around the station. They leave the station for Halifax as soon as they arrive by air, and when leaving Dartmouth by air, arrive at the station just before the aircraft departs.

7. In view of the purely Service aspect of Gander Station and its isolation from any large civilian community, I recommend that T.C.A. flight stops at the station should only be permitted under the following conditions:

- (a) For the emplaning or deplaning of Service passengers or civilians employed by Government Departments or by contractors working on Government Defence projects;
- (b) For deplaning and onward transport by rail of purely civilian passengers in an emergency where, owing to adverse weather or mechanical fault, the aircraft is prevented from continuing its journey past Gander in either direction, providing T.C.A. has arranged for accommodation, meals and guarding the passengers while on the station;



- (c) Unless carrying passengers of a purely Service nature, such as described in sub-para. (a), T.C.A. flights not to be cleared from Moncton for Torbay unless meteorological information gives reasonable assurance that flights can get through to St. John's;
- (d) Gander not to be considered normally a collection or dispersal point for pure civilians using the T.C.A. service into Newfoundland.

8. If you concur, the attached letter will be dispatched to the Department of Transport.

L. S. BREADNER  
Air Marshal

1116.

DND HQC 33-8-1

*Le commandant de l'aviation, région aérienne de l'Est, au secrétaire,  
ministère de la Défense nationale pour l'Air*

*Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, to Secretary, Department  
of National Defence for Air*

Halifax, March 15, 1943

USE OF TORBAY BY T.C.A.

1. Confirming telephone conversation with Air Vice-Marshal Cowley in reference to No. 1 Group signal A.107 dated 24th February, which was addressed to E.A.C. and repeated A.F.H.Q. The signal reads:

Difficult situation exists with respect to T.C.A. at Torbay. Torbay operations are on an increasing scale and it is not unusual for three aircraft to arrive daily. They have no accommodation whatsoever except an inadequate corner of Hangar No. 2, with no sanitary or toilet facilities except that passengers have to walk through an operational hangar to R.C.A.F. facilities on far side.

There is no evidence here of construction proceeding in the area previously agreed for T.C.A. where the following facilities have been installed:

- (a) paved taxi strip
- (b) concrete parking area
- (c) cleared area for hangar site
- (d) cleared area for administration building
- (e) good gravel road to main paved Portugal Cove, St. John's road.

Present situation creates a bad security problem and interferes with R.C.A.F. operations inasmuch as there is considerable congestion on present taxi strip. Anticipate greatly increased use of Torbay Airport due to intensification submarine warfare off Newfoundland. Request high priority be given to continuation of T.C.A. area development.

2. The views of the Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group, in this matter are concurred in and it is recommended that the Department of Transport be pressed to provide separate facilities for civil aviation.

G. O. JOHNSON  
Air Vice-Marshal

1117.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 354

St. John's, August 17, 1944

Sir,

From time to time when, by reason of bad weather or other sufficient cause, planes of the Trans-Canada Air Lines are held up for several successive days at Sydney or Moncton, citizens come to this Office to request priority for their relatives or friends. When I tell them that priorities are reserved for Government employees travelling on urgent business connected with the war effort, they are not impressed. Some even go so far as to tell me that private citizens are often actually doing more urgent and vital business, as far as the war effort is concerned, than are the officials who are granted priority over them. I am, of course, not in any position to judge of the truth of such assertions. It is clear, however, that the Newfoundland public is far too often sufficiently inconvenienced to make them exasperated against the Company and indirectly against the Canadian Government which is identified with it. For this reason I think that, while I haven't access to very much information on the subject, I should call your attention to two or three factors that have a bearing on our general relationship.

2. Flights by Trans-Canada Air Lines to and from Newfoundland for the past four months of 1944 were recently reported in the local press as follows:

	Flights Made	Percentage of Scheduled Flights Operated
April .....	102	85%
May .....	120	96%
June .....	90	75%
July .....	95	77.4%

3. The operating percentages indicate the severe handicap imposed by weather conditions on schedules to and from St. John's, particularly during June and July. Similar conditions have also obtained during the first ten days of the present month.

4. I have been credibly informed that, over the weekend of August 5th, there were from fifty to sixty passengers in Sydney awaiting return to Newfoundland having been delayed for periods ranging from a few days to two weeks, and that a similar condition applied at Moncton. Delays may be

expected in the winter months, and it will be recalled that the Honourable P. D. H. Dunn, Commissioner for Natural Resources and Mr. Ray Gushue, Chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board and party were delayed at Moncton in February of this year for a ten day period. The two delays referred to were exceptional and were, of course, unavoidable, but nevertheless they have resulted in unfavourable comment concerning T.C.A. service to Newfoundland. The most vociferous complaints emanate in many instances from passengers travelling on pleasure jaunts, but nevertheless the criticism is not calculated to enhance T.C.A.'s reputation in this country.

5. Newfoundland air travellers are now in a position to make comparison between T.C.A. and American Export Airlines and Pan American Airways operating from Botwood. The agents for these two American airlines have been booking fifteen passengers per trip three trips weekly from Botwood to Shediac during the past several weeks.<sup>1</sup> I have not obtained accurate figures covering flying conditions at Gander and Botwood as compared with those at Torbay—these will be readily available from T.C.A. or the R.C.A.F. Headquarters—but from personal observation I should think that a much higher percentage of T.C.A. flights could arrive and depart from Gander than has been the case at Torbay.

6. This brings up the point with which you are already familiar, that T.C.A. are handicapped in respect to restrictions covering persons entering the military area at Gander while civilians are allowed more or less free access at Botwood. The reasons for this apparent discrepancy are, of course, appreciated as it is a question mainly of the lack of accommodation for civilian passengers at Gander, and of security. The general travelling public are not concerned with the practical details of the problem and perhaps some steps could now be taken to adjust the position by erecting satisfactory accommodation for civilian T.C.A. passengers at Gander Airport, and relaxing security precautions to allow free entry and access to civilian T.C.A. passengers at Gander Airport.

7. It is difficult to counter the complaints in respect to the services of T.C.A. as compared with Pan American Airways and American Export Airlines. It seems to the uninformed traveller that the United States civilian airlines are able to secure additional concessions to T.C.A. insofar as Gander and Botwood are concerned. The fact that the Botwood Base and Gander Airport are both under the operational control of the R.C.A.F. does not seem to improve the position insofar as T.C.A. are concerned.

8. Much, if not all of the criticism of T.C.A. operations which has reached appreciable proportions during the past few weeks would be eliminated, and T.C.A. would be able to compete on an equal basis with the two United States airlines taking civilian Newfoundland passengers from Botwood, if

<sup>1</sup> De fait, seul *Pan American Airways* offrait ce service.

<sup>1</sup> In fact, only *Pan American Airways* was providing this service.

permission is granted to allow T.C.A. passengers to embark and land at Gander in periods of bad flying weather when it is possible to land at that airport and not at Torbay.

9. While my information is far from complete, I feel that these complaints should be brought to your attention. An adjustment of the conditions now applying as regards to civilian passengers at Gander would seem highly desirable, and immediate steps should be taken to adjust conditions to bring them into line with those applying at Botwood.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1118.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 307

Ottawa, October 5, 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

Your despatch No. 354 of August 17 dealt among other things with the possibility of Trans-Canada Air Lines being able to use Gander as a regular stop. In my reply No. 258 of August 31<sup>1</sup> I stated that the question was being taken up here.

2. I am glad to be able to inform you that new arrangements have been worked out between the Department of Transport and the Department of National Defence for Air. I enclose copies of a letter dated September 28<sup>1</sup> from the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air to the Deputy Minister of Transport setting forth the conditions under which Trans-Canada Air Lines may make scheduled stops at Gander. The Department of Transport states that these arrangements appear satisfactory for the time being.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



1119.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 51

St. John's, January 27, 1945

Sir,

With reference to my despatch of January 9th, 1945, No. 18,<sup>1</sup> respecting Trans-Canada Airlines Newfoundland operations, I have the honour to report that the Company's agents have announced that with the increase in service, effective February 1st, 1945, additional passenger accommodation will be made available to civilian and wartime travellers.

A general schedule revision will take place and the two daily flights from St. John's will now provide through service to Montreal and the West, instead of one, as was previously the case. Trans-Canada Airlines agents have indicated that East bound passengers may now leave Montreal at 8 A.M. and arrive in St. John's at 5.50 the same afternoon.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1120.

NPA S-5-5-4

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire à la Justice*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner for Justice*

No. 8

St. John's, June 1, 1946

Dear Mr. Winter,

With reference to our recent conversations respecting the desirability of a meeting to discuss air facilities and services between Canada and Newfoundland I may say that I am today in receipt of a communication from the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs suggesting that it would be desirable if a meeting could be held in Ottawa in the near future to discuss questions of technical services and traffic rights. It is pointed out, in each of these two general fields, an agreement between Canada and Newfoundland would appear necessary. Separate agreements would seem to be more feasible than a single agreement covering both fields since the incorporation of arrangements for technical services with those concerning traffic rights would probably be both unwieldy and of little advantage.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The technical questions are the provision of airway traffic control for the Northwest Atlantic and for Newfoundland, the provision of meteorological services for Newfoundland, and the communications required to operate these two services. These problems were discussed at the recent Gander Conference. It is suggested that the recommendations of that Conference and any future changes that are agreed to should be incorporated into an agreement on air navigation facilities and services.

It would seem desirable that traffic rights should be covered by a new inter-governmental agreement to replace the existing agreements regarding the Canada-Newfoundland and the trans-Atlantic services of Trans-Canada Air Lines. Such an agreement should deal with the traffic rights in Newfoundland and the use of the leased air bases in Newfoundland. Since the United States is pressing for the opening of Harmon, Argentia and Goose Bay as regular civil airfields, it is further suggested that the proposed meeting between Canada and Newfoundland would offer a useful opportunity for discussion of the policy to be followed in respect of the United States requests. We understand that the United States is likely to press for a meeting on this subject shortly after the present session of Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation Interim Assembly.

The Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation Interim Assembly meeting, which commenced May 21st, will probably last about three weeks and a meeting towards the end of June would therefore appear desirable. Ottawa would be the most satisfactory place for such a meeting from the Canadian point of view.

I understand from our telephone conversation this morning that a meeting in Ottawa the last week in June would be most convenient for your Government and that it would be desirable that discussions be carried on as expeditiously as possible in order not to drag on into July. In the absence of Mr. Neill, who, I find, will not be back in St. John's until June 6th, I am communicating this information to my Government.

I shall endeavour to provide you with our proposals for the Agenda of the forthcoming Conference as far as possible in advance of the meeting.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

1121.

72-NL-40

*Décret du Conseil*  
*Order in Council*

P.C. 2543

June 28, 1946

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report dated 18th June, 1946<sup>1</sup> from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, represent-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ing that representatives of the Government of Newfoundland and the Government of Canada have negotiated an agreement on Air Transport between Canada and Newfoundland;

That the draft agreement provides *inter alia*, that

- (a) the Government of Newfoundland will grant permits to an airline designated by the Government of Canada to operate an air service between Newfoundland and Canada and a trans-Atlantic service over Newfoundland;
- (b) Trans-Canada Air Lines shall be the designated Canadian airline;
- (c) the service provided by Trans-Canada Air Lines and the rates and regulations for traffic shall be comparable to those offered by Trans-Canada Air Lines in Canada and the fees charged by the Government of Newfoundland in connection with the bases and facilities shall be comparable to those charged Trans-Canada Air Lines in Canada;
- (d) the Canadian and Newfoundland postal authorities shall arrange the conditions covering the carriage of air mail;
- (e) the Newfoundland Government agrees to exempt from customs duties certain classes of goods used by the airline;
- (f) the terminal of the regional service to Newfoundland shall be Torbay. The Canadian Government shall have the right to operate an aerodrome at Goose Bay which, with Gander, may be used as alternate points of call. Buchans may also be used. The airfields at Torbay, Goose Bay and Buchans shall be available as alternate bad weather airports for the air services of other nations on trans-Atlantic operations;
- (g) landing fees at Goose Bay and Buchans shall be paid to the Canadian Government and the profits from the operation of these airfields shall be paid to the Newfoundland Government;
- (h) at any other air bases in Newfoundland which may be available for commercial traffic the Government of Canada shall be granted most favoured nation treatment;
- (i) the provisions of the Agreement may be modified by direct agreement between the competent air authorities of Canada and Newfoundland, confirmed by an exchange of notes;
- (j) the Agreement will continue in force subject to cancellation on 12 months' notice by either party;
- (k) the Agreement will come into force on signature;

That a copy of the draft agreement is annexed; and

That it is expedient to make provision for the signature of this Agreement on behalf of Canada.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, concurred in by the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply, advise that Mr. James Scott Macdonald, the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, be authorized to sign on behalf of the Government of Canada an agreement based upon the attached draft.<sup>1</sup>

A. D. P. HEENEY

Clerk of the Privy Council

1122.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures au haut  
commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs to High  
Commissioner in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 189

Ottawa, August 26, 1946

Sir,

In Article I of the agreement between Canada and Newfoundland on air transport, concluded on July 29th of this year, the airline designated by Canada is granted the right to pick up and set down in Newfoundland traffic carried between Canada and Newfoundland "and any other traffic which the Government of Newfoundland may from time to time indicate."

I would appreciate it if you would approach the Newfoundland authorities and ask whether they would agree, under the terms of the above provision, to Trans-Canada Air Lines carrying from time to time such local traffic as might offer within Newfoundland between the following airports:

Goose

Gander

Torbay

Buchans (when used)

Stephenville (when opened up by agreement between Newfoundland and the United States)

We understand that not only would this be a convenience to Newfoundland, but it will help us to carry out our agreement to employ citizens of Newfoundland wherever possible. It is also considered essential in connection with the maintenance of Goose, since air service into Goose is the only means of movement of personnel and goods to and from the airport. In respect of the service to Goose, the benefits to the Labrador section of Newfoundland would be very considerable.

The present TCA service from Sydney to Torbay would be used normally for the carriage of any local traffic which might offer between Torbay, Gander

<sup>1</sup> Le texte de l'accord se trouve à l'appendice I.

<sup>1</sup> For text of Agreement see Appendix I.



and Stephenville when it is opened up. As far as movement from Newfoundland to Goose is concerned, it is not our understanding that TCA plans to operate any regular local service between Goose and Gander or other points in Newfoundland, but that it might be desirable to run non-scheduled services from time to time from Newfoundland to Goose for the carriage of special traffic.

You might at the same time mention to the Newfoundland authorities that it is the intention of TCA to operate a local service from Canada into Goose primarily to carry goods and personnel in connection with the operation of the airport. This local service will probably operate from Moncton on a relatively infrequent basis such as once a week or once a fortnight. We assume that in view of the traffic rights granted to us at Goose there would be no objection raised by the Newfoundland authorities. We feel that it would nevertheless be wise to inform Newfoundland of our intentions.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1123.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 397

St. John's, September 18, 1946

Sir,

With reference to your communication No. 189 of August 26, respecting the question of securing permission from the Newfoundland authorities for the carriage of local traffic within Newfoundland, I may say that the Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply has indicated that his Government would have no objection to the proposal set forth in your despatch under reference. He has pointed out, however, that the Newfoundland Government would have to reconsider the question of cabotage if a local service is operated in Newfoundland.

I enclose for your information a copy of his letter of September 17<sup>1</sup> in reply to my letter No. 53 of August 30,<sup>1</sup> embodying our proposal, copy of which has already been forwarded to you.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## PARTIE 3/PART 3

L'UTILISATION DES BASES MILITAIRES<sup>1</sup>USE OF MILITARY BASES<sup>1</sup>

1124.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis**Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*

DESPATCH 528

Ottawa, May 8, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that by P.C. 1970 of March 16, 1942, the Trans-Canada Air Lines was authorized to organize and maintain a service between Moncton and the airports in Newfoundland, Gander and Torbay, via Sydney. In connection with this service the Trans-Canada Air Lines have been asked to make a regular call at Stephenville, one of the new United States army air bases in Newfoundland. I should appreciate it if you will make enquiries from the United States Government as to whether they are agreeable to Stephenville being made a regular point of call on the service between Sydney, N.S., and Torbay, Newfoundland.

If the United States Government is willing that regular calls should be made at Stephenville the Trans-Canada Air Lines would wish to establish their own radio communication station there. For this purpose approximately 400 to 600 square feet of space would be required, including radio and housing accommodation for two radio operators and one mechanic. Power not exceeding 800 watts would be required to operate the transmitter.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1125.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 129

St. John's, May 21, 1942

My despatch No. 246 of May 1st<sup>2</sup> Trans Canada Air Lines service to Newfoundland. I now have a letter from Commissioner of Public Utilities in

<sup>1</sup> Voir également les documents 1076-77, 1080, 1082 et 1120.

<sup>1</sup> See also Documents 1076-77, 1080, 1082 and 1120.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

which he states he has been informed that Trans Canada Air Lines is making use of Harmon Field, Stephenville, as a recognized emergency landing field and that formal application should have been made before regular use was made of an air port in Newfoundland which was not mentioned in permit. Will you please advise Trans Canada accordingly and inform them they should not make stop at Stephenville as a regular emergency port without first obtaining formal permission from Newfoundland Government. In the meantime Stephenville should not be used except in the case of very greatest emergency for the purpose of saving life.

1126.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 134

St. John's, June 1, 1942

My telegram No. 133 of today's date,<sup>1</sup> Trans Canada Air Lines. Fowler, Operating Manager of Atlantic Division, Trans Canada Air Lines, is here this morning and has explained the necessity of stopping at Stephenville to refuel when Torbay and Gander are blanked out by fog. I therefore conferred informally with Woods who says that no objection will be raised to such stops provided it is understood that a formal application will be filed at a later date. Please advise Trans Canada immediately of this decision.

1127.

72-RV-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1630

Washington, July 1, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 741 of June 24<sup>2</sup> concerning a regular call by the Trans-Canada Air Lines at Stephenville, Newfoundland. As pointed out in our WA-957 of May 13,<sup>1</sup> the War Department have strong objections to allowing commercial planes to make regular calls at military fields. This question came up for discussion at the State Department a few days ago and we were informed that the War Department continues to hold strongly to this view.

2. The United States authorities therefore, have no intention of making a formal request for a scheduled stop at Stephenville and so far as they are

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

concerned the matter can be regarded as closed. We understand that the United States postal authorities and the representatives of the War Department in Newfoundland who originally put forward the proposal have been suitably advised.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON

1128.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 46

St. John's, January 29, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that some difficulty has arisen in the past few weeks with regard to the T.C.A. plane stopping at Stephenville to pick up or land passengers.

2. I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter which I have sent today to Mr. Larson, the Vice-President of the T.C.A., in which I informed him of the attempt I have been making to avoid conflict between the T.C.A. and the Commission of Government of Newfoundland with regard to stopping at Stephenville.

2. [sic] It will be a bit of a nuisance for this Office to attend to this matter but I do not see any method of controlling the situation except through this Office.

3. The procedure which we have followed up to the present time meets with the approval of Sir Wilfrid Woods, the Commissioner for Public Utilities, and of the Chairman of the Customs Board and I think is one which should be continued.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au vice-président  
de Trans-Canada Air Lines*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Vice-President of  
Trans-Canada Air Lines*

[St. John's,] January 29, 1943

Dear Mr. Larson,

The matter of the T.C.A. planes making special stops at Stephenville is one that must be carefully watched in order to avoid any difficulty with either the Commission of Government or with the American Base Command.



The position is that under its annual permit from the Newfoundland Government the T.C.A. has not authority to pick up or land passengers at the airport at Stephenville. It is therefore necessary in each individual case to obtain the formal consent of the Commissioner for Public Utilities, Sir Wilfrid Woods and also of Mr. Hutchings, the Chairman of the Customs Board. This consent has always been obtained through my Office, in the first instance usually by telephone, but in all cases I have sent a following memorandum so as to make it a matter of record.

It is also necessary to obtain the consent of the American Base Command and this consent has also been obtained through this Office. The procedure which I have followed is to telephone the Office of the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command at St. John's and obtain his consent and when this is obtained I confirm it by a memorandum in writing which is mailed to him. The American Commanding General arranges for the stop with the authorities at Stephenville by communication direct with the airport, there.

Up to within recent weeks all applications for the T.C.A. plane to stop at Stephenville came through this Office and the procedure above outlined was followed by me in all cases. In some cases the request was made through the T.C.A. in Canada, and if the T.C.A. was willing to make the stop, this request was repeated to me and I made the necessary arrangements with the Commissioner for Public Utilities, and the Chairman of the Customs Board and also with the American Base Command.

In the same way if the American Base Command desired the plane to stop at Stephenville, application was made to me by Major-General Brant's office and I made the necessary arrangements with the T.C.A., with the Commissioner for Public Utilities and with the Chairman of the Customs Board.

This practice has worked very smoothly up to the last two or three weeks. . .

In order to clear the matter up to the entire satisfaction of the American Forces in Newfoundland I thought it desirable to have a personal conference with Brigadier-General Brooks and accordingly called on him by appointment this morning.

Brigadier-General Brooks is quite willing to continue the procedure arranged by me with Major-General Brant which was that all requests for a stop at Stephenville should come in the first instance to this Office so that I can obtain the necessary permission from the Newfoundland Commission of Government for the making of such a stop and thus avoid any conflict between the T.C.A. and the Newfoundland Government.

Brigadier-General Brooks also agreed that all applications by the American Base Command should come through him to my Office so as to give me an opportunity of making the necessary arrangements with the Newfoundland Government.

Brigadier-General Brooks, however, impressed upon me that it was not desirable to make frequent stops at Stephenville to pick up or land passengers and that only persons of importance or who are travelling on necessary war

work should be granted this permission. He informed me that during the present week two or three of his own officers had applied to him to request the T.C.A. to stop at Stephenville and that he had refused their applications. No doubt these were the same men who had applied to Mr. Houlton and in respect of whom I had instructed Mr. Houlton to inform them that the only application the T.C.A. could entertain for a stop at Stephenville for American officers was one which came from General Brooks to me.

Brigadier-General Brooks also informed me that he would allow a stop at Stephenville when requested by me. I assured him that all applications would be carefully sifted and that I would not make the request except for persons of importance who were travelling on necessary war work.

I understand from Captain Fowler that it is desirable in the interest of safety for your pilots to make more or less frequent stops at Stephenville so that they can become thoroughly acquainted with that Airport in case they have to make emergency landings there, and therefore, as I understand it, there is no objection on the part of the T.C.A. to making occasional stops at Stephenville, but rather the making of such occasional stops is looked upon favourably by your Operational Manager in this area and by your pilots.

May I suggest that the proper officials of your Company in Canada, including particularly officials at Moncton, should be instructed to communicate with me if they receive any requests for a stop at Stephenville. I also suggest that any such requests should be carefully sifted and should not be forwarded to me unless your officials consider the person who desires to make the stop is of sufficient importance and is really travelling on war work. I must also be informed as to their names and the nature of their business. In the case, for example, of Colonel Fox, if the application came direct from Government authority in Washington, I should be so advised.

If some such procedure as that above outlined is not followed, the T.C.A. will be in conflict with the Commission of Government of Newfoundland, as any stop which is made at Stephenville without their consent will be considered as a violation of the T.C.A. permit.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1129.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 93

St. John's, February 16, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 37 of February 12, 1943<sup>1</sup> relative to the T.C.A. plane stopping at Stephenville.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. In the arrangement in connection with this matter, I had in mind a suggestion made to me by the operating managers of the T.C.A. that it was desirable to make more or less frequent stops at Stephenville in order that their pilots could become thoroughly acquainted with this airport and its approaches. This was stated to be desirable as, on account of the nature of the surrounding country, it might be difficult for a pilot to use this airport in the case of an emergency, unless he had made frequent previous landings there.

3. With this in view, I have recommended the stopping of the plane at Stephenville to pick up or land passengers on several occasions.

4. I now understand, however, that presumably because their pilots have made sufficient landings at this airport, the T.C.A. do not desire to make stops there, except for very special passengers. The stopping at Stephenville involves a very considerable delay and may prevent the plane from making connections with the outgoing planes from Moncton.

...

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1130.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 331

Ottawa, October 26, 1943

Sir,

In your despatch No. 786 of October 2<sup>1</sup> you recommend that arrangements be made for Trans-Canada Airlines to make a regular stop at Stephenville at least once a day for the duration of the war. You go on to suggest that it would, perhaps, be advisable for you in the first instance to obtain the views of the Canadian and Newfoundland governments and having ascertained their views notes might be exchanged between those two governments, drawing attention to the importance of the use of this airport to the people of the west coast of Newfoundland. You suggest that the notes might then be presented to the United States government by us.

2. I am glad to inform you that the competent Canadian authorities are of the opinion that a renewed effort should be made to obtain the consent of the United States authorities to Trans-Canada Airlines stopping at Stephenville on the day service to Newfoundland for the duration of the war. In view of the fact, however, that the stop at Stephenville would be made in order to suit the convenience of residents of Newfoundland, it is considered that it would be appropriate that the first approach to the United States

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

government be made by the Newfoundland government. We shall be glad to support the proposal which they make.

3. Trans-Canada Airlines would, of course, be willing to comply with any security regulations which the United States authorities might wish to impose on a commercial service calling at Stephenville.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1131.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 918

St. John's, November 16, 1943

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 331 of October 26th, 1943, regarding the possibility that the Trans-Canada Airlines should make a regular stop at Stephenville.

2. I note your suggestion that it would be appropriate that the first approach to the United States Government should be made by the Newfoundland Government, and the Canadian Government would be glad to support any proposal which they would make.

3. I talked this suggestion over confidentially with the Honourable Mr. Emerson, who in the absence of Sir Wilfrid Woods, is acting as Commissioner for Public Utilities.

4. Mr. Emerson rather backed away from the suggestion that the first approach should be made by the Newfoundland Government, because he feared the possibility of the American Government asking permission to use Stephenville or Argentia for commercial purposes for their own planes in return for their permission to allow Canadian planes to land at Stephenville.

5. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Emerson's views that it might prove embarrassing to both Canada and Newfoundland if the original request came from the Newfoundland Government.

6. My original thought was that it would be reasonable for Canada to make the request because of the fact that we have recently given permission for American Export Airlines to stop at Gander, and to carry passengers between the mainland and Newfoundland, which is in opposition to Trans-Canada Airlines, to some extent at least.

7. I then put up confidentially to Mr. Emerson, the query as to whether or not the Newfoundland Government would give their consent to the T.C.A. stop at Stephenville.



8. His own personal opinion was that consent would be willingly given because it would be such a convenience to the people of the West Coast, but he said the matter would have to be presented to the Commission for a decision.

9. You might let me have your views in the matter, after reading this despatch, but in any event, it would be preferable to let the matter stand over until Sir Wilfrid Woods' return to Newfoundland. I understand he is expected back almost any time now.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1132.

72-RV-40

*Le général commandant l'armée des États-Unis à Terre-Neuve au  
surintendant des opérations de Trans-Canada Air Lines  
à Moncton<sup>1</sup>*

*General Commanding United States Army in Newfoundland to Operations  
Superintendent of Trans-Canada Air Lines in Moncton<sup>1</sup>*

CONFIDENTIAL

[St. John's,] January 29, 1944

SUBJECT: FUEL STOP AT HARMON FIELD, NEWFOUNDLAND.

1. This confirms teletype from this Headquarters approving use of Harmon Field as a fuel stop.

2. The Commanding Officer, North Atlantic Wing, Air Transport Command, desires that trips to be kept to a minimum due to long hauls necessary during winter to maintain required levels of gasoline supply.

3. The following agreement as discussed verbally and in your letter of 13 January 1944 must be adhered to:

- a. No passengers will be boarded or deplaned at Harmon Field except under the present agreement whereby passengers engaged in war work may be boarded or landed with the prior consent of the Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command; the High Commissioner for Canada, Newfoundland; and the Commissioner for Public Utilities, Newfoundland.
- b. For security reasons, all cabin window curtains must be drawn ten (10) minutes prior to landing and kept closed until ten (10) minutes after takeoff.

4. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Commanding Officer, Harmon Field and you may be assured that any assistance necessary for successful operations will be extended.

JOHN B. BROOKS  
Major-General

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<sup>1</sup> F. I. Young.

1133.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 392

St. John's, September 2, 1944

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 354, of August 17, 1944,<sup>1</sup> concerning Trans-Canada Air-lines service to Newfoundland, I have the honour to inform you that Mr. F. I. Young, operation superintendent for this area, is, at the moment, in St. John's, and has discussed with me, the possibility of utilizing Argentia as an alternate landing field for T.C.A. planes flying from Gander to Torbay, when weather conditions preclude landing at Torbay.

2. I have had occasion to draw your attention to the unfavourable comments concerning T.C.A. service to this country which have become all too prevalent recently, and to make some suggestions designed to overcome existing difficulties in the case of civilian T.C.A. passengers landing and embarking at Gander airport. It seems to me desirable, that any measures which can be taken to improve T.C.A. service to St. John's should be encouraged, and the suggestion put forward by Mr. F. I. Young falls into this category.

3. Mr. Young discussed the possible stop with Naval Officials at Argentia some weeks ago and has, he informs me, received official approval from the Naval Department at Washington. The communication containing this approval will be made available to me within the next two or three days, at which time I shall send forward a copy for your files. I have also discussed the matter informally, with the Secretary for Public Utilities of the Newfoundland Government, who intimated, unofficially, that any steps taken to improve T.C.A. service to St. John's should be encouraged, and that he feels the Newfoundland Government would agree to the use of Argentia as an alternate stop for T.C.A. planes travelling from Gander to St. John's when weather conditions make Torbay unserviceable. He was fairly out-spoken in the matter of T.C.A. service for 1944 which was not good. It would, of course, be necessary to make an official approach to the Newfoundland Government in the matter and I should like to have your approval of such a step before writing to Sir Wilfrid Woods.

4. If the United States Navy are prepared to extend permission for the use of the airport at Argentia as an alternative airport to Torbay when weather conditions make landing there impossible, it would seem to me desirable to accept their offer, unless it raises issues of which I am not aware.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 1117.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 1117.

1134.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 273

Ottawa, September 11, 1944

Sir,

I wish to refer to your despatch No. 392 of September 2nd concerning the possibility of Trans Canada Air Lines using Argentia as an alternate landing field when Torbay is closed because of weather. Obviously, we welcome any development which will improve T.C.A.'s services, and if the United States Naval authorities are agreeable to this step, the Canadian Government should take whatever action is necessary to make Argentia available to T.C.A.

The Department knows of no consideration which would influence the Canadian Government against taking this step, and you are therefore authorized to make an official approach to the Newfoundland Government at your discretion.

It will be interesting to see whether the United States Naval authorities are willing to give official permission. As a rule the armed forces of the United States have shown themselves reluctant to have civilian planes land at service fields. It may prove to be necessary to make arrangements in Washington, but we are prepared to do this if the necessary arrangements cannot be made in St. John's.

I have etc.

HUGH L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1135.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 410

St. John's, September 15, 1944

Sir,

With reference to your despatch, September 11, 1944, No. 273, concerning proposed use of Argentia as an alternate landing field when Torbay airport is closed because of weather conditions, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the communication dated August 14, 1944,<sup>1</sup> from Lt.-Commander I. Schlossbach, United States Navy, to Mr. F. I. Young, Operations Superintendent, Trans-Canada Airlines, Moncton, N. B.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. It will be observed that the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy, has granted permission to Trans-Canada Air Lines to utilize Argentia as an alternate field, whenever weather at St. John's is below limits.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1136.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 449

St. John's, October 5, 1944

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch of September 15th, 1944, No. 410, relative to the proposed use of Argentia as an alternative landing field for Torbay when weather conditions preclude landing or taking off from the latter airport.

2. I am attaching copy of my letter No. 94 of September 16th, 1944,<sup>1</sup> to the Honourable Sir Wilfrid Woods, in which permission of the Newfoundland Government for the stop was requested, and also copy of Sir Wilfrid's reply of September 30th, 1944,<sup>1</sup> notifying the Commission of Government's approval.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1137.

72-RV-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 393

Washington, February 14, 1945

Sir,

In accordance with the instruction contained in your EX-522 of February 13, 1945,<sup>2</sup> we have given to the State Department a memorandum requesting permission for Trans-Canada Air Lines to make commercial stops at Harmon Field, Stephenville, Newfoundland. I enclose two copies of the memorandum which is dated February 14.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémemorandum**Memorandum*

[Washington,] February 14, 1945

During the course of the recent discussions in New York on Canada-United States aviation questions the Canadian representatives raised the question of obtaining permission for Trans-Canada Air Lines to make commercial stops at Harmon Field, Stephenville, Newfoundland, which is under the control of the United States Army. The Canadian Embassy would be grateful if the competent United States authorities could examine the position with a view to seeing whether commercial stops could not be made without interfering with military requirements.

Trans-Canada Air Lines operates a service from Canada to St. John's, Newfoundland, which is an extension of their trans-continental service. The St. John's area is thus well served but the absence of a commercial stop on the west coast of Newfoundland results in great inconvenience to residents of that area who wish to travel to Canada. There is a demand on the part of those residents for air communication with Canada which at present cannot be met unless they first travel overland to St. John's.

If Trans-Canada Air Lines were permitted to use Harmon Field they would be able to provide a needed service for west coast residents. Moreover, the uncertainty of weather conditions in Newfoundland makes it most desirable that Trans-Canada Air Lines should be able to count on landing on the west coast, without the necessity of requesting permission on each occasion, when fields further east are closed down. It is therefore the hope of the Canadian authorities that the United States authorities will be able to agree to the regular use of Harmon Field by Trans-Canada Air Lines.

1138.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 127

St. John's, March 13, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram No. 65 of March 7th, 1945,<sup>1</sup> respecting the extension, for a further period of one year from March 31st, of the Agreement for the maintenance of a commercial air service between Canada and Newfoundland by Trans-Canada Air Lines, and to report that I had a conversation on the subject this afternoon with Sir George London.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. I pointed out that it would be a very great advantage to persons residing in the Interior or on the West Coast of Newfoundland if the planes could stop at Stephenville and suggested, in accordance with your instructions, that it would greatly increase the usefulness of the service if, in renewing the license, permission could be given to land at that port, contingent upon our obtaining the permission of the Government of the United States to do so.

3. Sir George stated that the United Kingdom Government attached the greatest importance, particularly since the Chicago Air Conference, to keeping the traffic in and out of the American Bases to strictly military traffic, and stated that any request to land in Stephenville would have to be referred to the United Kingdom Government. He was certain that they would be prepared to concur in it only in the event that the greatest pressure was applied. The question of post-war commercial aviation was of paramount importance from the United Kingdom point of view and there was no doubt that the United Kingdom authorities desired that military air-bases be restricted to military use and not used for civil aviation.

4. In view of the attitude he outlined and of the certainty of prolonged negotiations before permission could be secured, I did not pursue the matter further but limited myself to securing the extension of the license in the present form. The matter will come before the Commission of Government at its next meeting, but I do not believe that there will be any objection to renewal for a further period of one year.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1139.

72-RV-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM WA-3093

Washington, June 13, 1945

Reference your EX-522 of February 13th<sup>1</sup> and subsequent correspondence concerning the Trans-Canada Air Lines stop at Stephenville, Newfoundland. Following is the text of a memorandum dated June 12th which has just been received from the State Department. Begins.

The Department of State has received and carefully considered the Canadian Embassy's memorandum dated February 14th, 1945, expressing the hope that the United States authorities will find it possible to agree to the regular use of Harmon Field, the United States Army Airfield near Stephenville, Newfoundland, by planes of the Trans-Canada Air Lines.

It has been noted that Trans-Canada Air Lines desires to make commercial stops at Harmon Field in order to provide a service for residents of the west coast of Newfoundland who wish to travel to Canada, and also to land at Harmon Field when weather conditions make it impracticable to proceed to St. John's without the necessity of requesting permission on each occasion.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

As the Canadian Government is aware, the use by commercial aircraft of the bases acquired under the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the late Lord Lothian dated September 2nd, 1940, is governed by the provisions of Article XI (5) of the Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom for the establishment and operation of United States bases, signed March 27th, 1941, which reads as follows:

*Article XI.*

- (5) Commercial aircraft will not be authorized to operate from any of the bases (save in case of emergency or for strictly military purposes under supervision of the War or Navy Departments) except by agreement between the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom; provided that in the case of Newfoundland such agreement shall be between the United States and the Government of Newfoundland.

The appropriate United States authorities are prepared, however, to agree to the commercial use of Harmon Field by planes of the Trans-Canada Air Lines, as well as by the commercial planes of other nations, for transit purposes and for picking up and discharging traffic, provided that similar privileges could be enjoyed by commercial planes of the United States. Such an arrangement would be on the understanding that the United States military authorities would operate the field but that the Newfoundland authorities would be granted facilities to carry out national treatment in respect to customs, immigration, quarantine and other matters of national interest to be agreed upon, and that a reasonable landing fee would be charged by the United States to cover expenses incident to providing facilities for the use of commercial aircraft. It would also be understood that the use of Harmon Field by the planes of any country would be subject to the prior approval of the United States Government, and that operations into, at, and away from the field would at all times be subject to the control of the United States military authorities who would have the right at any time for reasons of military necessity to prevent any plane from using the field.

This Government is prepared to initiate negotiations with the Government of Newfoundland with a view to making Harmon Field available for use by commercial aircraft on the above understandings, and would appreciate being informed whether the Canadian Government is prepared to advise the Government of Newfoundland of its concurrence, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Protocol, annexed to the above-mentioned Bases Agreement which reads as follows:

*Protocol*

- (4) It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Articles I (4), II and XI (5) of the Agreement, or of any other Articles involving considerations of defence, the Canadian Government as well as the Government of Newfoundland will have the right to participate.

At the same time this Government would appreciate knowing whether the Government of Canada, in negotiations with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland, would be prepared to support similar arrangements for the use by United States commercial planes of Goose Bay Air Base in Labrador, as well as of other Canadian military airfields in Newfoundland. The United States Naval Air Base at Argentia should likewise be included in such arrangements and it is assumed that the Government of Canada would advise the Newfoundland Government and the Government of the United Kingdom of its concurrence.

Message Ends.

1140.

72-RV-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 229

Ottawa, August 17, 1945

Use of Harmon Field by United States and Canadian civilian planes.

The United States Government has instructed its Consul General at St. John's to request the Newfoundland Government's permission for the commercial use by United States and Canadian planes of Harmon Field and the United States Naval Airbase at Argentia on the conditions set forth in the memorandum dated June 12th, 1945,<sup>1</sup> from the Department of State, copy of which you received with my despatch No. 161 of July 10th.<sup>2</sup>

Will you please promptly advise the Newfoundland Government of the Canadian Government's concurrence in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement?

Here follows the text of the United States reply to our note No. 256 of July 17th<sup>2</sup> to the State Department, copy of which was referred to you:

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Canadian Ambassador and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his note No. 256 of July 17th, 1945, relative to the regular use of Harmon Field, in Newfoundland, by planes of Trans-Canada Air Lines.

This Government notes that the Government of Canada is prepared to advise the Government of Newfoundland of its concurrence in the regular use of Harmon Field by commercial aircraft, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of the protocol annexed to the bases agreement signed March 27th, 1941.

It has also been noted that the Government of Canada states that Trans-Canada Air Lines' service to Newfoundland is an extension of a Canadian Domestic Service and not a Trans-Atlantic Service; consequently the Canadian request need not be regarded as a precedent to govern the treatment by Newfoundland of applications for landing rights for Trans-Atlantic Services.

The basis for such a distinction is not apparent as article XI (5) of the bases agreement does not prohibit the use of military airfields for certain commercial purposes but provides simply that 'commercial aircraft will not be authorized to operate from any of the bases except by agreement.' The principle would, therefore, be the same whether the commercial aircraft are operating as a part of a domestic service or of a Trans-Atlantic Service.

However, in view of the desire of the Canadian Government to bring about the improvement of Trans-Canada Air Lines' local service as promptly as possible, this Government is today (August 13th) addressing instructions by telegraph to the Consul General at St. John's, Newfoundland, to request the Newfoundland Government's permission for the commercial use by United States and Canadian planes of Harmon Field and the United States Naval Airbase at Argentia on the conditions set forth in the Department of State Memorandum of June 12th, 1945, to the Canadian Embassy. It is hoped that the Canadian Government will promptly advise the Newfoundland Government of its concurrence, in accordance with the above-mentioned provision of the protocol.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 1139.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 1139.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



This Government is further advising the Newfoundland Government that if, as an interim measure and without prejudice to the request just referred to, it should be in a position to agree at once to the use of Harmon Field by Trans-Canada Air Lines on its Moncton-St. John's route, the Government of the United States would be willing to concur, pending the determination of the question of the wider use of the airfield by commercial planes.

The Government of the United States is glad to note that the Government of Canada agrees that the present is an appropriate time to determine the post-war use of military bases and that it is prepared to negotiate with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland and this Government regarding the commercial use of the international airports at Goose Bay, in Labrador, and other Canadian military airfields in Newfoundland. The Canadian Government's views as to the practical measures to be taken to institute such negotiations would be appreciated. In the meantime, this Government is advising the Newfoundland Government of its interest in taking part in negotiations in the immediate future with respect to the use by commercial aircraft of the other military bases in Newfoundland territory, including Goose Bay.

Our immediate interest lies in bringing about use of Harmon Field by T.C.A., and you will note that the United States is advising Newfoundland that if, as an interim measure and without prejudice to the other request, Newfoundland will agree the United States will concur. Our note No. 256 of July 17th to the Department of State puts a case for exceptional treatment for T.C.A., which may be of use to you in discussions with Newfoundland.

You should add that, on the general question of civil use of airfields, we would be prepared to have Goose, Gander and Torbay opened for use by commercial planes for Two Freedom traffic and to discuss procedure for granting traffic rights. By raising the general question with the Newfoundland authorities, it will overcome the objection raised in your despatch No. 275 of August 11th<sup>1</sup> that our negotiations are conducted through the United States. The fact is that we approached the United States to get rights to Harmon Field, as we considered that this could be dealt with as an exception. We cannot object to the United States opening the general question on the strength of our specific request for rights at Harmon.

1141.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. AND S. 124-'45

[St. John's,] August 20, 1945

I submit, for consideration, the attached copy of a communication<sup>1</sup> from the United States Government which was personally delivered to me by the American Consul General, with the request that the matter, particularly that aspect of it regarding the interim use of Harmon Field by Trans-Canada Airlines, might be given early attention.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. The inhabitants of the West Coast in general, and of Cornerbrook in particular, approached me through the West Coast Association early in the year with the request that arrangements should be made for a commercial stop by the T.C.A. at Harmon Field. I replied that, while admitting the convenience to them of such a stop, Harmon Field could be used for commercial purposes only after agreement had been reached between the Governments concerned and that, whilst military traffic continued at a high intensity through this military air base, the time would obviously not be ripe for the opening of negotiations with the American Government. (I have reason to believe that copies of the correspondence were subsequently sent by the Association to the American Consul General, possibly with a view to initiating or encouraging action from the American side, and that he replied to the effect that he had nothing to add to my observations.)

3. The Association made a point of the fact that the T.C.A. did occasionally stop at Harmon Field. Such stops, however, have been made only in an emergency—occasioned by weather conditions or other circumstances such as important business visits to Cornerbrook in connection with the paper mills and, to that extent, connected with the war effort—and have been permitted only upon special request in each case. It has been my aim to hold down such requests to a minimum so that claims that Harmon Field was “open to commercial air traffic” could not be established against us with the disadvantages that might emerge therefrom.

4. I have little doubt that the West Coast Association has also made representations direct to the T.C.A., and the note from the Canadian Embassy in Washington to the United States State Department, mentioned in the attached document, may have originated from this source. I have been aware for some time, however, that the Canadian Government (or the T.C.A.) were interested in this question, because, in applying for the renewal this year of the T.C.A.'s annual permit to use Torbay Airport, the Canadian High Commissioner asked whether regular stops at Harmon Field could also be permitted. I pointed out that this request would cause some embarrassment and might lead to delay in issuing the Torbay Airport permit, so he withdrew the request and his formal application contained no reference to Harmon Field. It may be of interest to note that the Canadian High Commissioner informs me that he has no information regarding the present representations of the U.S. Government.

5. Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Schedule to the American Bases Act reads “Commercial aircraft will not be authorized to operate from any of the bases (save in case of emergency or for strictly military purposes under the supervision of the War or Navy Departments) except by agreement between the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom; provided that in the case of Newfoundland such agreement shall be between the United States and the Government of Newfoundland”. While the agreement in this case is to be specifically that of the Newfoundland Government it is obvious that in a matter of such complexity we shall need the guidance

of the United Kingdom, both on technical and general grounds. The Protocol<sup>1</sup> mentioned in the attached document does not appear in the Newfoundland legislation, but I believe it provides for the participation of Canada in any discussions relating to the use of the American Bases, specifically mentioning Articles I (4), II and XI (5). The final paragraph of the document contains a hint, or more than a hint, that the time is fast approaching for a general discussion of the post-war use of military air fields, and stakes a United States claim to sit in on discussions relating to the commercial use of Goose Bay and other military air fields established by Canada in Newfoundland. The latter, to my mind, indicates Torbay Airport, since Canada cannot claim to have established Gander or Botwood Airports, though it has undoubtedly expanded them considerably.

6. This communication raises the important question of the civil commercial use of the American Base airports which is inherent in the Bases Agreement legislation and also, indirectly, the similar question inherent in the Goose Bay Agreement legislation, and I agree with the implication that this whole matter should be dealt with comprehensively. The Goose Bay Agreement specifically provides for the inclusion of the United Kingdom in discussions on Goose Bay, but the American Bases Agreement does not specifically include the United Kingdom in, and may perhaps be read as to exclude it specifically from, the discussions on the American Bases in Newfoundland. It may, therefore, be necessary to decide whether we desire the United Kingdom to come in on this latter discussion more directly than in a mere advisory capacity, and if so we must, presumably, ask the United Kingdom Government whether it wishes to do so. In such case, we should obviously have to stake a claim for the United Kingdom when replying to the present communication. On the other hand, the wording of the Bases Agreement may have been selected with an eye on the future of this country. While the present political set-up persists, Newfoundland cannot enter into any agreement with a foreign power on any matter without United Kingdom Government approval. If this is the present position, it would appear that we must notify the Dominions Office of the receipt of this document and give our views as to the method of procedure.

7. There is the more immediate point of the civil use of Harmon Field—and also Argentia (though the latter would, I think, in practice, be still only a matter of emergency terminal stop by T.C.A. as heretofore when the weather is bad at Torbay rather than a traffic stop enroute as in the case of Harmon Field)—as an interim measure pending settlement of the whole question.

8. It has to be borne in mind that the International Air Services Transit Agreement (the Two Freedoms Agreement) makes a general grant of the two freedoms to "scheduled international air services," but excludes from this general grant, privileges in respect of "airports utilized for military purposes to the exclusion of any scheduled international air services". By definition, the T.C.A., flying as it does over the territory of more than one

<sup>1</sup> Voir l'appendice B.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B.

state, and flying a regular public service according to a published time table, is a scheduled international air service, and its admitted use of Harmon Field, as a regular commercial stop, would destroy the military exclusiveness of that airport, which would then become open to the exercise of the two freedoms by other nations joined in the Agreement.

9. It will be noted in the second paragraph of the attached document that the U.S. claims rights in respect of its own commercial aircraft, and also envisages similar claims by other nations if the field is open to the T.C.A. This goes further than mere traffic stops (the second freedom) and extends the matter to commercial stops which involve the third and fourth freedoms. (If the T.C.A. is allowed to carry passengers from St. John's to Harmon Field and vice versa, it involves cabotage also). This matter, therefore, though apparently quite simple on the face of it, introduces the important question of the exercise of the third and fourth (and possibly third, fourth and fifth) freedom rights not only for the T.C.A. but for American services and for the services of any other countries "approved by the U.S.A.". This question is of major importance to Newfoundland and will require most careful consideration with all the expert assistance we can enlist.

10. In my opinion there would be great danger in permitting the interim use of Harmon Field by the T.C.A. before the whole matter is fixed up comprehensively. Though it is not quite clear whether the U.S.A. would demand it, it is clear that we should not be in any position to resist a claim to the interim use of Harmon Field by U.S.A. commercial services also. It would be difficult to hedge about this interim position with safeguards sufficient to render the position innocuous or non-prejudicial in respect of future discussions. The only immediate benefit accruing would be the convenience of such passengers from the West Coast of the Island as might wish to patronise the service (without travelling to Gander), and I doubt whether this is of sufficient weight or importance to warrant the grave risk of jeopardising our position generally.

11. I feel that the elements involved in considering even the interim use of Harmon Field are basic elements and that it is begging the question to treat them superficially. And I feel that, at the risk of some possible acrimonious criticism from Cornerbrook, we should take the view that there should be no commercial use of Harmon Field until the subject has been thoroughly discussed at a conference and the whole matter comprehensively settled. It follows from this that we shall have to forego the privilege of such emergency stops as I have mentioned earlier in this memorandum and this again may give rise to further criticism.

12. I suggest that our best course of action is to report this document to the Secretary of State with an indication that, in our view, the whole question of the commercial use of the U.S. air bases and the Canadian military fields should be taken up in full conference at an early date.

G. E. LONDON



1142.

72-RV-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 278

St. John's, August 21, 1945

Sir,

In accordance with the instructions set forth in your telegram No. 229 of August 17th, (which unfortunately was delayed in transmission and did not reach me till this morning) I called on Sir George London this afternoon and informed him that, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol annexed to the Bases Agreement of 1941, the Canadian Government concurs in the request put forward by the United States, through its Consul General in St. John's, for the regular use, for transit purposes and for picking up and discharging traffic, of Harmon Field and the United States Naval Air Base at Argentia by United States and Canadian planes on the conditions set forth, namely, that the United States military authorities would operate the fields but that the Newfoundland authorities would be granted facilities to carry out national treatment in respect of customs, immigration, quarantine and other matters of national interest to be agreed upon, and that a reasonable landing fee would be charged by the United States to cover expenses incident to providing facilities for the use of commercial aircraft. It would also be understood that the use of Harmon Field and Argentia by the planes of any country would be subject to the prior approval of the United States Government, and that operations into, at and away from the fields would at all times be subject to the control of the United States military authorities who would have the right at any time for reasons of military necessity to prevent any plane from using the fields.

2. I added that with respect to the general question of the civil use of air-fields we would be prepared to have the airports at Goose Bay, Torbay and Gander open for use by commercial planes for Two Freedom Traffic and to discuss the procedure for granting traffic rights.

3. I emphasized, in conversation as well as in writing, that our immediate interest lies in securing permission for Trans-Canada Air Lines to make use of Harmon Field and told him that I understood that the United States has informed Newfoundland that if, as an interim measure and without prejudice to the other request, Newfoundland would agree, the United States would concur. In accordance with your suggestion I developed the point that while the use of Harmon Field would permit Trans-Canada Air Lines to give a better domestic service to Newfoundland and would permit better operation under unfavourable weather conditions it would be an extension of a domestic service with no trans-Atlantic flying involved and the request was not one that need necessarily prejudice the larger question of the use of bases in Newfoundland for international services.

4. Sir George London brushed aside this suggestion as completely irrelevant. He referred me to Article I of the International Air Services Transit Agreement that "two freedoms" shall not apply with respect to airports utilized for military purposes "to the exclusion of any scheduled international air service." He stated that this provision was carefully inserted by the British delegation for the express purpose of safeguarding their position and emphasized that, in his view, this formal request for the right to use Harmon Field for civil aviation purposes opened up the whole question of the use of military bases for civil aviation not only in Newfoundland but in all countries in which the United States had military bases.

5. The United States representative, Mr. Hopper, in putting the matter up to Sir George London had made clear that the request for the opening up of Harmon Field for civil aviation had come from Canada. He also made clear that the Government of Canada had been in consultation with them and had agreed that the present is an appropriate time to decide the use of military air-fields generally for the post-war period. I enclose, herewith, for your information copy of the memorandum<sup>1</sup> left with Sir George by Mr. Hopper.

6. Sir George expressed the view that the Commission of Government would be aghast at the suggestion that the military bases be used as civil airports with the military authorities in full control of operations and charging landing fees to reimburse them for expenses. Newfoundland would have little or nothing to say, no revenue to collect for the use of Newfoundland territory and the use of the military bases for commercial operations would compete with traffic on Newfoundland's own airport at Gander. In any case, it was much too big a question to be dealt with by the Commission of Government and at its next meeting he would recommend that the whole question be referred to the Home Government. He added that the Air Ministry had hoped that the question would not be raised at so early a date but that now that it had been raised by the United States acting at the request of Canada there was probably no alternative but for them to take the matter into consideration and in due course come to a decision one way or the other.<sup>2</sup>

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Il s'ensuivit une longue négociation impliquant la Grande-Bretagne, le Canada, Terre-Neuve et les États-Unis, négociation liée à une autre négociation semblable entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis au sujet de l'utilisation à des fins civiles des bases bailonnées dans les Indes Occidentales et de l'intérêt que portait le Canada dans l'utilisation à des fins civiles de la base de l'armée de l'air des États-Unis située à Kindley Field dans les Bermudes. Cette négociation avorta en octobre 1947 lorsque le gouvernement des États-Unis décida d'aller de l'avant au sujet des accords sur les Indes Occidentales sans faire référence aux accords sur Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> There ensued a protracted negotiation involving Great Britain, Canada, Newfoundland and the United States which was connected with a similar negotiation between Great Britain and the United States over civil use of leased bases in the West Indies and with the Canadian interest in civil use of the United States Army Air Force base at Kindley Field, Bermuda. This negotiation ended abortively in October, 1947 when the United States Government decided to go ahead with the West Indies arrangements without reference to Newfoundland arrangements.

PARTIE 4/PART 4  
LES SERVICES MÉTÉOROLOGIQUES  
METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES

1143.

Skelton Papers 245

*Le ministère de l'Air de Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire officiel  
du haut commissariat en Grande-Bretagne*

*Air Ministry of Great Britain to Official Secretary,  
High Commission in Great Britain*

London, August 23, 1935

Dear Colonel Vanier,

As requested I am enclosing herewith a copy of my letter<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Wiseman of the Dominions Office together with the memorandum on the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland. I may say that when the Office here found out that we already had an extensive service in Newfoundland it was decided that there was no necessity to send some one from here to organize the taking of observations and the collecting of the reports. There will be no action taken until after the proposed conference in Ottawa, and future action will depend on the decisions reached here [there?]

Yours very truly,

J. PATTERSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire sur les services météorologiques à Terre-Neuve*  
*Memorandum on Meteorological Services in Newfoundland*

[London, August 19, 1935]

The Meteorological Service of Canada established a Meteorological Service in Newfoundland about 1905. The Newfoundland Government paid the observers and purchased the instruments. The Canadian Service inspected the stations and generally supervised the work and issued the forecasts and storm warnings. This Service was maintained up to 1932 when owing to the financial conditions in Newfoundland it was discontinued. At that time the stations in operation were: Belle Isle, Fogo, St. John's, Cape Race, Burin and Port-aux-Basques. Belle Isle and Cape Race observations were taken by the staff of the Wireless stations and were directly under the Canadian Service since these stations were maintained by the Dominion Government. Consequently these stations were not affected when the Newfoundland observations ceased.

In August 1934 the Director of the Canadian Meteorological Service was requested to go to Newfoundland to advise the Commission of Government

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

in regard to re-opening the Service. As a result of this visit the Newfoundland Service was resumed in September 1934, with the following stations in operation—Cartwright, Belle Isle, Fogo, St. John's, Cape Race, Grand Banks, St. George's, and Millertown. These stations report twice a day to Toronto and the Canadian Service issues forecasts for shipping, aviation and forest hazards during the Forest fire season.

In 1933 a survey of the situation was made in connection with a ship to shore service that it was proposed to inaugurate from Rod Bay in the Straits of Belle Isle to Moncton N.B. and with the thought that it would ultimately result in a Trans-Atlantic service. The stations were thus selected with these services in view.

At the above stations and at Northwest River fog and visibility observations are taken, and fog observations are also taken at Botwood, Norman, Cornerbrook, Cornerbrook Dam, Deer Lake, Pointe Amour, Point Riche, Howley, Bonavista and Ramea.

At the stations that telegraph observations the Commission Government of Newfoundland pays the observers but the Canadian Service has supplied the instruments. At the other stations I could not say whether or not payment is made but in most cases I believe the observers are Government employees and they may be expected to do this as part of their duties.

The Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources has charge of the work and he has an assistant who supervises it. The Canadian Service supervises the work indirectly through the Secretary of Natural Resources.

In anticipation of the service in the East a Memoir is now in the Press dealing with the Climate of the Maritimes and the Gulf of St. Lawrence with special reference to aviation. This Memoir contains all the fog data that we have been able to collect from light houses and should be representative of the situation in Newfoundland and districts surrounding it.

1144.

72-M-36

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du comité interministériel sur les services aériens transatlantiques*

*Minutes of a Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Transatlantic Air Services*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] January 29, 1936

Members of Committee

Mr. V. I. Smart,

Deputy Minister, Department of Railways and Canals, Chairman.

Department of External Affairs

Mr. Loring C. Christie,

Counsellor, Department of External Affairs.



Department of National Defence

Mr. J. A. Wilson

Controller of Civil Aviation.

Post Office Department

Mr. P. T. Coolican,

Assistant Deputy Postmaster General,

(Represented by Mr. George Herring).

Department of Railways and Canals and Marine [sic]

Mr. C. P. Edwards,

Director of Radio.

Department of Finance

Dr. W. C. Clark.

Deputy Minister, Department of Finance.

Also Present:

Post Office Department

Mr. G. Herring,

Chief Superintendent, Air Mail Service.

(Representing Mr. Coolican).

Mr. F. E. Jolliffe,

Assistant Director, Administrative Services.

The meeting opened in the office of the Deputy Minister of Railways and Canals at 16:00 hours, January 27th, 1936.

In the unavoidable absence of the Secretary, Mr. Wilson acted.

PROVISION OF METEOROLOGICAL SERVICE

Consideration was given to the provision of the meteorological services outlined in a report of the Technical and Operating Sub-Committee appointed during the conversations with the other Commonwealth governments in Ottawa in November, 1935, and embodied in the conclusions unanimously reached by the conference (see paragraph 18 of report attached to minutes of final meeting, dated December 2nd, 1935).<sup>1</sup>

It was decided that:

- (a) Mr. Patterson, Director of the Meteorological Service, should submit to the Minister of Marine immediately an estimate covering these services in Canada and Newfoundland, and the Controller of Civil Aviation should draft a letter, to be signed by the Chairman of the Committee, to the Prime Minister, drawing his attention to the necessity for including provision for these in the main estimates, a copy of this letter to be forwarded to the Minister of Finance.
- (b) The Director of the Meteorological Service should again make representations through his Department to Treasury Board for the appointment of the necessary staff for this organization so that they might be appointed as soon as possible and undergo a period of training in their duties before actual operations commenced.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduct.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Mr. Patterson explained that provision for certain of these appointments had been made in the estimates for the current fiscal year and that funds were now available in his appropriations for such appointments. Application had been made some months ago but so far no action had been taken to approve them.

...

1145.

CTS 1940 No. 11

*Texte d'un accord entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve sur le prélèvement  
des données météorologiques à Terre-Neuve*

*Text of an Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland on the Taking of  
Meteorological Observations in Newfoundland*

[Ottawa,] May 18, 1940

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING, represented herein by the Minister of Transport of Canada, acting under the authority of an Order in Council (P.C. 1443) dated the 11th day of April, 1940, herein-after called "the Minister",

Of the First Part;

and

HIS EXCELLENCY VICE-ADMIRAL SIR HUMPHREY THOMAS WALWYN, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the Island of Newfoundland and its Dependencies in Commission, hereinafter called "the Government",

Of the Second Part.

WITNESSETH that the parties hereto, in consideration of the covenants, provisos, agreements and conditions herein contained, hereby covenant, promise and agree, each with the other, as follows:

1. That in this agreement the following words shall, unless the context requires a different meaning, have the following meanings, respectively, that is to say:

"Minister", or other words relative thereto, or of like import, shall mean and include the party of the First Part as above designated or described, or His successors and assigns;

"Government", or other words relative thereto, or of like import, shall mean the party of the Second Part as above designated or described, or his successors and assigns.

"Minister of Transport" shall mean the person holding the position or acting in the capacity, of the Minister of Transport for the time being, and shall include the person holding the position or acting in the capacity of the Deputy Minister of Transport, for the time being.

"Controller", or other words relative thereto, or of like import, shall mean the Controller of Meteorological Services of the Department of Transport of Canada for the time being or such person duly appointed to act in that behalf.

2. That at the stations (hereinafter referred to as "the said stations") in Newfoundland where meteorological observations are required the Government will:

- (a) provide the necessary office accommodation for the instruments required in taking such observations;
- (b) take the necessary precautions to assure that reasonable care is taken of all such instruments;
- (c) permit its employees to take meteorological observations;
- (d) permit its employees to make the necessary returns;
- (e) permit its employees to receive all necessary instructions and supervision from the Minister of Transport.

3. The Government will pay to its employees taking meteorological observations as in Clause 2 hereof provided such allowance for their services as may be approved by the Minister of Transport, payment to be made monthly or quarterly as may be agreed upon.

4. That the Government will pay to the employees of the Minister recruited in Newfoundland for meteorological work in Newfoundland the salaries fixed by the Minister of Transport.

5. That the Minister will supply to the Government free of charge the necessary instruments and supplies for the said stations and will furnish the necessary instruments for taking meteorological observations, and the Minister or his representatives will inspect the said stations as frequently as may be necessary.

6. That all instruments and supplies required by the said stations and furnished by the Minister shall be admitted to Newfoundland duty free and shall remain the property of the Minister.

7. That the Minister will furnish to the Secretary for Natural Resources of Newfoundland a certified list of those employees of the Government mentioned in Clause 3 hereof and who are meteorological observers performing services for the Minister setting out the amount to be paid each such employee, together with a list of the employees of the Minister as mentioned and defined in Clause 4 hereof certified by the officer designated for that purpose by the Controller.

8. That the cost of telegraph messages from any of the said stations in Newfoundland to Newfoundland Airport made with reference to or in connection with meteorological reports shall be borne by the Government without reimbursement.

9. That any payment for overtime brought about by the transmission of messages between Botwood, Campbellton, Placentia and St. John's, and St. John's and Newfoundland Airport, shall not be a charge against the Minister.

10. That except as provided in Clauses 8 and 9 hereof the Minister will reimburse the Government for all expenses in meeting the requirements of the Minister as in Clause 2 hereof provided and will reimburse the Government for payment of allowances paid to employees of the Government taking meteorological observations for the Minister as in Clause 3 hereof provided, and will also reimburse the Government for the salaries paid to employees of the Minister as in Clause 4 hereof provided (such payments are to be made only upon receipt of invoices certified by the Controller).

11. That nothing in this Agreement will effect [sic] the arrangements that may be made between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland for the provision of radio and meteorological services as provided in Section 18 of Part IV of the record of conclusions attached to the Minutes of the final meeting of the Committee on Trans-Atlantic air services, held in Ottawa, during the months of November and December, 1935.

12. That this Agreement shall be for a term or period commencing on the 1st day of April A.D. 1939 and shall continue in force until terminated by three months' notice in writing given by either party to the other.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Minister has hereunto set his hand and seal and His Excellency the Governor in Commission has caused the Great Seal of Newfoundland to be affixed hereto and has signed these presents.

SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED  
by the Minister in the  
presence of—

V. I. SMART  
Deputy Minister of Transport.

W. WHITMARSH

GEO W. YATES SEAL  
Secretary

SIGNED, SEALED AND DELIVERED  
by the Government in the  
presence of—

BY HIS EXCELLENCY'S COMMAND,

GEO. R. COOK

J. A. WINTER  
Commissioner for Home Affairs  
and Education.

1146.

72-AGT-40

*Le haut commissaire en Grande-Bretagne au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Great Britain to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 97

London, January 11, 1946

Your telegram to Dominions Office No. 275 of December 29th,<sup>1</sup> Bermuda Conference.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



## II. Following are conclusions of Meteorological Sub-Committee.

- (1) Newfoundland Government to provide living accommodation for Canadian civil service personnel. Requirement at Gander for:
  - (a) Chief Meteorological Officer, 1 married quarter.
  - (b) Forecast staff, 9 married quarters.
  - (c) Meteorological assistants recruited in Newfoundland, 15 married quarters.
  - (d) Radio range staff, 3 or 4 married quarters.At same time existing Canadian Department of Transport single quarters should be retained. Living accommodation to be designated for Canadian personnel but no objection to temporary release.
- (2) In view of national benefits from meteorological organization, question of Newfoundland making appropriate financial contributions to be considered.
- (3) Department of Transport should be consulted regarding office quarters for Canadian staff.
- (4) Conditions of service of Newfoundland staff recruited should be further considered, particularly regarding pension eligibility.
- (5) Regarding provision of internal meteorological services, desirable discuss later:
  - (a) Continued operation on civil basis of internal communications supplied by Canadian and United States forces.
  - (b) Designation of administrative and financial responsibility for provision and maintenance of additional communications required for outlying weather station[s] in Newfoundland.

III. Sub-Committee further recommended questions (1) to (5) above should be discussed later on official level. Further planning of Gander for all functions relating to operation of air base for civil purposes should be discussed in detail and expert advice from Canada and United Kingdom should be made available. In event of military discussions on Newfoundland air base [sic] being delayed further, recommended official talks relating to matters above should take place on or before February 1st, 1946.

## IV. Full text being forwarded by next air bag.

1147.

72-AGT-40

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion sur les services météorologiques à Terre-Neuve*  
*Minutes of a Meeting on Meteorological Services in Newfoundland*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, May 2, 1946

The meeting was held in the Department of Natural Resources, St. John's, at 11: a.m., May 2, 1946.

Those present were:

## NEWFOUNDLAND

Mr. K. Carter	Secretary for Natural Resources (in the chair)
Mr. B. V. Andrews	Fishery Officer, Department of Natural Resources
Mr. D. J. Gillis	Director of Agriculture, Department of Natural Resources
Mr. N. MacLellan	Acting Forestry Officer, Department of Natural Resources

## CANADA

Mr. P. D. McTaggart-Cowan	Meteorological Division Department of Transport
Mr. H. H. Bindon	Meteorological Division Department of Transport

At the request of Mr. Carter, Mr. McTaggart-Cowan gave a brief outline of the Conference recently concluded at Gander and stated that the present meeting was to consider the remaining items of the Agenda with a view to obtaining a basis of agreement for recommendations to be submitted to the Governments of Newfoundland and Canada in connection with the future of the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland. In particular he drew attention to the Bermuda Conference at which Canada had signified her desire to withdraw entirely. He said that at the Gander Conference the Newfoundland representatives had requested that Canada continue to be responsible for the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland for a period of years. The following problems in connection therewith were referred to this meeting:

- (i) Policy regarding the Meteorological Reporting Stations;
- (ii) Meteorological Services required in Newfoundland for other purposes than Civil Aviation;
- (iii) Staff problems, including compensation;
- (iv) Distribution of costs of Meteorological Services in Newfoundland.

It was agreed to recommend that, because of the long and happy association between the Department of Natural Resources and the Department of Transport and because of the importance of meteorology to the basic industries of Newfoundland, the Meteorological Division should continue to

be directly associated with the Department of Natural Resources in matters affecting the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland.

The meeting agreed to recommend that the Climatological Stations in Newfoundland should be re-located so as to provide information of maximum benefit to the basic industries of Newfoundland—agriculture, fisheries and forestry. The re-location of the stations would be studied by Canada and made the subject of continuing discussion at a later date.

Mr. McTaggart-Cowan stated that the location of the Meteorological telegraphic reporting stations was determined by the requirements of civil aviation as laid down by PICAQ inasmuch as the service for civil aviation had been requested by the Newfoundland representatives at the Gander Conference to conform to PICAQ standards.

Mr. Andrews said that, with regard to the requirements of the fishing industry for meteorological service, the present coastal and fishing forecasts covered all their requirements with respect to Newfoundland and the Grand Banks but that between June and September an additional fisherman's forecast for the Labrador coast would be very helpful to the fishing fleet in those waters. The Canadian representatives agreed to recommend that this additional forecast be provided.

Mr. MacLellan stated that the Newfoundland Government Forestry Division was in consultation with the Forestry Offices of Bowater's Newfoundland Pulp and Paper Mills Limited and the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company, Limited and would make, in the near future, a combined proposal for meteorological service for forestry. Their principal interest was in forest fire hazard forecasts. The Canadian representatives expressed their readiness to examine Mr. MacLellan's proposals as soon as they were formulated and foresaw no difficulty in providing the required service.

Mr. Gillis outlined briefly the agricultural development programme of the Newfoundland Government and named the principal regions involved as:

- Avalon Peninsula
- Burin Area
- Hermitage Area
- Codroy Valley—St. George's Area
- Humber Area
- North West Coast Area
- Point Leamington Area
- Cape Freels Area
- Eastport Area.

He stated that the present public forecast service, broadly speaking, covered the needs of these areas, but that forecast for maximum and minimum temperatures for some of these areas would be desirable in the spring and autumn. Extended warnings of prolonged wet and dry spells

would also be valuable. He further suggested that the climatological stations in Newfoundland be repositioned so as to provide information on the climatic conditions of the agricultural areas named. The Canadian representatives agreed to examine these suggestions and put forward a definite proposal as to how best this could be done. The matter would then be discussed further.

Mr. Andrews, Mr. Gillis and Mr. MacLellan then withdrew from the meeting.

Mr. McTaggart-Cowan outlined the present conditions of employment of the Newfoundland citizens employed by the Canadian Government for meteorological duties in Newfoundland and Labrador. . .

Mr. McTaggart-Cowan introduced the question of distribution of costs, advising that the Canadian Government might desire that the Newfoundland Government assume a greater portion of the cost of the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland in view of the increased benefit of the Service to the public.

Mr. Carter expressed the view that discussion on the extent of the contribution by the Newfoundland Government to the Meteorological Service was outside the scope of this meeting but agreed to discuss possible methods of handling the financial and accounting arrangements for the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland.

The following methods were agreed as possible alternatives:

1. That the Canadian Government pay all accounts directly and that the Newfoundland Government bear their share of the cost by a direct transfer of funds to the Canadian Government;
2. That the Department of Natural Resources pay, in the first instance, all accounts and reclaim the total amount from the Department of Transport. The Newfoundland Government would bear their share of the cost by a direct transfer of funds to the Canadian Government.
3. That the Department of Natural Resources pay all accounts in certain categories and submit others for payment to the Department of Transport. (This is the present arrangement.)
4. That the Department of Natural Resources obtain in their budget a sum equal to the agreed contribution of the Newfoundland Government, pay all accounts submitted until the sum is exhausted and thereafter recover from the Canadian Government the full amount of all accounts paid.

It was agreed to recommend that either alternatives Numbers 2 or 4 be adopted. It is inherent in either scheme that, in general, other Newfoundland Government departments would submit accounts to the Department of Natural Resources for services rendered to the Meteorological Service rather than provide free service as part of the Newfoundland Government contribution.



Mr. McTaggart-Cowan raised the question of the continuation of the present arrangements for customs-free entry into Newfoundland for Canadian Government equipment and supplies necessary for the operation of the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland.

Mr. Carter stated that this matter would have to be raised with Mr. J. G. Howell and made an appointment with him for 11.00 a.m., May 3rd.

Mr. Howell confirmed, at that time, that the present arrangements would be continued.

...

PARTIE 5/PART 5  
LE CONTRÔLE DU TRAFIC AÉRIEN<sup>1</sup>  
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL<sup>1</sup>

1148. NPA S-5-5-4

*Procès-verbal d'une conférence sur les services de navigation aérienne  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Minutes of a Meeting on Air Navigation Facilities in Newfoundland*

CONFIDENTIAL [St. John's, May 20,] 1946

The Conference met in the Eastbound Inn, Gander, at 4.30 p.m., April 27, 1946<sup>2</sup>, having been delayed two days by bad flying weather.

The following representatives were present:

CANADA	
Mr. J. S. Macdonald	High Commissioner for Canada (in the chair).
Mr. D. S. Robertson	Department of Transport Civil Aviation.
Mr. C. C. Bogart	Department of Transport Civil Aviation.
Mr. E. F. Porter	Department of Transport Radio Division.
Mr. P. D. McTaggart-Cowan	Department of Transport Meteorological Division.
Mr. H. H. Bindon	Department of Transport Meteorological Division.
NEWFOUNDLAND	
Mr. H. A. L. Pattison	Director of Civil Aviation
Mr. W. S. Roddis	Secretary for Posts & Telegraphs
Mr. H. J. Clarke	Department of Posts & Telegraphs
Mr. T. M. McGrath	Newfoundland Civil Aviation
Flight-Lieut. W. Woznesensky	In charge of Gander Airport Tower Control
Squadron-Leader C. M. Brant	Newfoundland Civil Aviation
Mr. V. T. Myrick	Newfoundland Aviation

...

<sup>1</sup> Voir également les documents 934-37.      <sup>1</sup> See also Documents 934-937.  
<sup>2</sup> Cette conférence se termina le 1<sup>er</sup> mai.      <sup>2</sup> This Conference ended on May 1.

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Résumé des conclusions et des recommandations de la conférence  
sur les services de navigation aérienne à Terre-Neuve**Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference  
on Air Navigation Facilities in Newfoundland*

CONFIDENTIAL

[St. John's, May 20,] 1946

1. The Newfoundland representatives informed the Conference that they are now operating the Northwest Atlantic Oceanic Airway Traffic Control at Gander and will continue to provide the required minimum Airway Traffic Control service at Gander until such time as the Control Centre at Moncton assumes this responsibility.

2. The Conference recommends that the Royal Canadian Air Force be asked to keep the Torbay Airway Traffic Control Centre in operation until May 15 in order to permit time for full consideration of alternative arrangements.

3. The Conference agreed that because of the PICAQ decision on the location of the Northwest Atlantic Airway Traffic Control Centre at Moncton, it was desirable, for technical reasons, to have a unified system for Airway Traffic Control at Moncton for Eastern Canada and Newfoundland.

4. The Conference recommends that the designation of Airways in Newfoundland should be determined by agreement between Newfoundland and Canada and information pertaining thereto disseminated by inclusion in the appropriate Canadian manuals accompanied by a note indicating that the designation was made by agreement with the Newfoundland authorities. Amendments thereto should be similarly agreed to and disseminated.

5. The Conference recommends that, in order to facilitate the expeditious solution of detailed matters pertaining to air navigation facilities and services, direct liaison, on a technical level, should be established between the appropriate officers of the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments.

6. The Conference recommends that a joint approach be made to the United States authorities by the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments with a view to making arrangements for the use and maintenance of:

- (a) Land-line facilities in the United States cable;
- (b) The FM radio station at Millertown;
- (c) The open line section from the end of the United States cable at Stephenville to the FM radio station at Cape Ray;
- (d) The equipment attached to the United States cable in connection with the provision of required land-line communications.

7. The Conference recommends that the communications requirements of Airway Traffic Control could best be met by maintaining in operation the FM radio link between Cape Ray and New Waterford including the repeater station at Cape North.

8. The Newfoundland representatives agreed to recommend to their Government that the operation of the FM link at Cape Ray be undertaken by the Department of Transport subject to the following provisions:

- (i) That the Newfoundland Government may take over and operate the FM link at Cape Ray at any time after due notice and consultation;
- (ii) That the network, including the link, would be used only for aeronautical traffic, except with the permission of the Newfoundland Government;
- (iii) That the Newfoundland Government will be afforded circuit facilities in the link at Cape Ray as may be required in the future, it being understood that prior notice would be given and any necessary technical rearrangements or additions made by agreement between the two Governments.

9. The Newfoundland Government are prepared to continue to handle all point-to-point and air-to-ground civil international operational traffic in and out of Newfoundland and to operate the Newfoundland based end of the required communications channels.

10. The Newfoundland Government consider it essential that the Canadian Government continue to operate the Meteorological Service in Newfoundland for a further period of years.

11. The Conference recommends that the installation of the required meteorological circuits form part of the general programme for the establishment of Airway Traffic Control communications and the existing facilities be maintained until the new facilities have been satisfactorily installed.

12. With regard to Meteorological communications, the Newfoundland representatives agreed to recommend to their Government that:

- (a) Their Civil Aviation Division provide all required international radio communications, provided certain technical details could be satisfactorily arranged between them and the Radio Division of the Department of Transport and ARCAN;
- (b) Their Department of Posts & Telegraphs provide all required communications within their sphere of operations, and in addition maintain the land-line teletype equipment and machines other than those which, by agreement, are the responsibility of the United States of America;
- (c) The Meteorological teletype equipment and machines at Gander be continued to be made available to the Meteorological Division.

13. With regard to the provision of Radio Range facilities in Newfoundland, the Newfoundland representatives stated that they would recommend to their Government that:

- (a) Radio Ranges installed by Canada should be operated by Canada for as long as they maintain Airway Traffic Control for the Newfoundland area;

- (b) The Newfoundland Government should approach the United States Government with the view to obtaining assurance that the operation of the Radio Ranges located at the United States leased bases in Newfoundland conform with the procedures followed in the general Newfoundland Radio Range network and, further, endeavour to arrange for close liaison with the Canadian authorities operating the system;
- (c) The Newfoundland Government supply the necessary ancillary services in connection with the operation of the Radio Range at Gander.

14. The Conference recommends that the Canadian Government's forthcoming publication "Radio Aids to Air Navigation" should contain information regarding air navigation facilities in Newfoundland, and that the Newfoundland Government undertake to keep the Canadian Government supplied with the information required in addition to taking any action required by PICAO.

15. The Conference recommends that Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS), etc., be exchanged primarily on operational channels, but that until suitable channels exist the internal Meteorological teletype, and later the Airway Traffic Control teletype, should be used as a temporary expedient.

16. With reference to the distribution of costs for providing air navigation facilities and services in Newfoundland, the Canadian representatives stated that the Government of Canada would be prepared to provide the Airway Traffic Control for the Newfoundland area and to operate the Radio Ranges at St. Andrew's, Buchans, Gander and Torbay if the Newfoundland Government would:

- (a) Make payment for services rendered by Canada;
- (b) Make the required communications facilities available without cost to the Canadian Government;
- (c) Bear the operating cost of the four Radio Ranges;
- (d) Obtain assurance from the U.S. Government that the Radio Ranges at Stephenville and Argentia would be retained in operation;
- (e) Maintain the other aids to air navigation in Newfoundland, such as D/F, S.B.A., S.O.S. 51, etc.

[17.] The Newfoundland representatives stated that, as the services in question were not of direct benefit to Newfoundland, that other nations were also beneficiaries and that, in any case, Newfoundland was already making numerous and valuable contributions in the provision of ancillary services, they could not recommend that their Government should contribute to the costs involved. They could not, therefore, recommend acceptance of conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Paragraph 16 of this summary.

18. The Canadian representatives stated that, in view of the considerations advanced by the Newfoundland delegation, they would recommend to the Canadian Government that the general question of division of costs be



revised in the light of the statement made in paragraph 17 above and that, in the meantime, an effort be made by the Canadian Services involved to maintain Airway Traffic Control, Radio Ranges and the FM radio link to Canada, as well as the Buchans end of the Buchans-Millertown FM radio link, provided that:

- (a) Required trunk circuits in the U.S. cable and other wire facilities from Cape Ray to Argentia and Torbay continue to be available at no cost to Canada;
- (b) The Newfoundland Government continue to maintain the lines from the trunk circuits to the equipment and machine locations for both Airway Traffic Control and the Meteorological Service;
- (c) The Newfoundland Government maintain, move and carry out minor revisions to this equipment and machines as may, from time to time, be required.

19. The Newfoundland representatives agreed to recommend to their Government the acceptance of these provisions, and further stated that although the Newfoundland Government cannot be fairly expected to pay, they do not consider that the Canadian Government should be called upon to pay the total cost as these services are for general international use.

. . .

1149.

72-AGT-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au chargé d'affaires par intérim aux États-Unis*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Chargé d'Affaires ad intérim in United States*

No. 1015

Ottawa, August 27, 1946

Sir,

It is desired to enquire of the United States authorities regarding the use of United States land-line communications in Newfoundland for certain services ancillary to civil aviation.

2. Under an Agreement of 1935, between Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Newfoundland, Canada undertook to provide the meteorological service in Newfoundland for the purpose of trans-Atlantic civil aviation. This arrangement was continued by agreement between Canada, Newfoundland and the United Kingdom reached in Bermuda in December, 1945. During the war the United States also established meteorological services in Newfoundland, and it is understood that the United States proposes to continue certain meteorological stations, notably those at Argentia, Stephenville, and Goose Air Bases. Close co-operation and regular inter-change of meteorological information has developed between the Canadian and United States services in Newfoundland, so that in effect the two services in Newfoundland constitute a unified meteorological system.

3. During the war airway traffic control in the Newfoundland region was shared between the Royal Canadian Air Force which exercised control over domestic airway traffic from Torbay, and the Royal Air Force Transport Command which exercised oceanic control from Gander. The North Atlantic Route Service Conference, held in Dublin in March, recommended the establishment of a single airway traffic control centre for the northwest Atlantic at Moncton, Canada. This recommendation was approved and has been acted upon by the Canadian Government. Subsequently, by agreement between the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments, the Canadian Government undertook to include under the Moncton centre the responsibility for domestic airway traffic control over Newfoundland, provided that the necessary communication services in Newfoundland could be made available without cost to the Canadian Government.

4. On the withdrawal some months ago of the Royal Canadian Air Force from Torbay and of the Royal Air Force Transport Command from Gander airway traffic control was transferred to civil authorities in accordance with the recommendations of the Dublin Conference. In order to permit of continuous operation in trans-Atlantic civil aviation, arrangements were made directly between officials of the Canadian Department of Transport and the United States service authorities in Newfoundland for the use of certain circuits in United States land-line communications for the meteorological and airway traffic control services. Some of the necessary connections have already been made by United States personnel at the various airfields. The Canadian Government greatly appreciates the prompt co-operation of the United States authorities in this regard.

5. Certain further facilities are, however, required for efficient operation. In particular, certain circuits are needed by Aeronautical Radio Canada (ARCAN), which is the agent of the Canadian Government, for the provision of trans-Atlantic aeronautical radio services and which will provide air/ground/air and operational point to point communications for all trans-Atlantic civil aircraft. At the request of the Newfoundland Government, the requirements of ARCAN with respect to the United States land-line system in Newfoundland are here included under item "D. Operational Requirements" in the attached memorandum. There is urgent need for a simplex teletype circuit from Cape Ray to Gander.

6. A complete statement of requirements, including those already in use and anticipated, is attached hereto.<sup>1</sup>

7. The Canadian Government hope that the United States authorities will find it possible to permit the use free of charge to the Canadian Government of the facilities in land-line systems in Newfoundland noted in the attached memorandum. It may be observed that the use to which such facilities will be put will be of very considerable advantage for purposes of defence. As noted above, the meteorological services in Newfoundland

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

constitute in effect a unified system and the facilities provided by the Canadian meteorological service will be available to the United States military authorities as well as to civil operators. A single unified airway traffic control system will provide for the safety not only of civil aircraft using Newfoundland fields, or passing over Newfoundland, but for the safety of military aircraft as well. It may also be observed that the Canadian Government is providing the meteorological service, airway traffic control, and the facilities of ARCAN in Newfoundland as a contribution to international civil aviation, and that the number of United States civil aircraft benefitting from these services will be much greater than the number of Canadian civil aircraft.

8. Will you kindly present a written statement of the requirements of the Canadian Government to the United States authorities, explaining the reasons for the request that these requirements may be made available free of charge.

I have etc.

[H. H. WRONG]  
for the Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1150.

72-AGT-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM WA-3947

Washington, November 4, 1946

Your despatch No. 1015 of August 27th and subsequent correspondence. Land-line communication facilities in Newfoundland.

Following is text of State Department's note dated November 1st authorizing the use of these facilities free of charge, by ARCAN. Begins.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Canada and refers to the Embassy's note dated September 4th, 1946<sup>1</sup> regarding the desire of the Canadian Government to make necessary arrangements with this Government whereby Aeronautical Radio Canada (ARCAN) may use, free of charge, certain United States Army communication facilities located in Newfoundland.

The Secretary of State has been informed by the Secretary of War that the War Department perceives no objection to the use, free of charge, of the facilities by ARCAN. Accordingly, the Secretary of State is pleased to inform the Chargé d'Affaires that the facilities referred to in the Embassy's note of September 4th, 1946 may be used by the Canadian Government, free of charge, for the purposes specified in the Embassy's note.

The Secretary of War is instructing the cognizant Army officials to work out the details of this matter with the proper officials of ARCAN.

Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1151.

72-AGT-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 333

Ottawa, November 22, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to our despatch No. 1015 of August 27th to our Ambassador in the United States (a copy of which was referred to you), requesting that authorization be obtained from the United States Government for the use of the United States land-line communication system in Newfoundland for the use of the Airway Traffic Control, Meteorological and ARCAN services.

We have now been advised by our Embassy in Washington that the United States Government has agreed to make available to the Canadian Government, free of charge, its land-line communication facilities in Newfoundland for these three services. Accordingly the arrangements necessary for the utilization of these facilities for the operation of the three services will now be worked out by officials of the Department of Transport and Trans-Canada Air Lines with the United States Army and Newfoundland officials in Newfoundland on a technical level. I should appreciate your passing this information on to the Newfoundland authorities.

I have etc.

SYDNEY D. PIERCE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1152.

72-AGT-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 114

St. John's, March 3, 1947

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit, herewith, copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the Acting Commissioner for Finance, asking that the Canadian Government give an undertaking that the circuits made available by the United States Army for meteorological and air traffic control services in Newfoundland, the operation of which will now be the responsibility of the Canadian Government, will be used solely for the purpose of passing communications

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



coming within the category of meteorological and air traffic control messages, the Newfoundland Government to determine from time to time the class and type of message which may be considered as coming within this category.

On general principles the request seems to be an eminently reasonable one, particularly in view of the similar undertaking given by the United States authorities. It is, however, a matter that comes primarily within the purview of the Department of Transport. Accordingly I am confining myself for the moment to acknowledging the letter and indicating that it is being brought to the attention of the competent authorities.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1153.

72-AGT-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire aux Finances*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner for Finance*

No. 5

St. John's, April 22, 1947

Dear Mr. James,

I wish to refer to a letter of March 1st<sup>1</sup> signed by Major W. H. Flinn in his capacity as Acting Commissioner for Finance requesting an undertaking that the United States circuits now being operated by the Department of Transport for meteorological and aeronautical services will not be used for commercial purposes.

In reply I may say that while the principal service required by the Department of Transport is for the purpose of exchanging meteorological data and passing air traffic control messages, the Department may, of course, transmit certain Departmental administrative messages on the meteorological circuit. In addition to circuits for handling meteorological and Air Traffic Control messages, a circuit has been established for the purpose of handling operations traffic. This circuit will be operated by ARCAN, the communication agency of the Department of Transport, in accordance with current PICAO communication standards respecting operational messages. Types of traffic not in accordance with these PICAO standards will not be handled on the ARCAN circuit.

On the basis of the foregoing, you may be assured that the communication facilities made available by the United States Army will only be used for Canadian Government business and to carry out international commitments, and will not otherwise be operated or used for the handling of traffic unless this is mutually agreed upon by the Canadian and Newfoundland authorities.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. MACDONALD

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



CHAPITRE III/CHAPTER III  
LES AFFAIRES ÉCONOMIQUES  
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

PARTIE 1/PART 1  
LE COMMERCE ET LES APPROVISIONNEMENTS<sup>1</sup>  
EN TEMPS DE GUERRE<sup>1</sup>  
TRADE AND WARTIME SUPPLIES<sup>1</sup>

1154.

821-32

*La commission pour Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Commission of Government of Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM

St. John's January 12, 1935

Your telegram 4th December.<sup>2</sup> Commission of Government has given careful consideration to representations made, and having regard to very large quantity and value of annual importations into Newfoundland from Canada (which are materially larger than those to Canada from Newfoundland) feel that cost of according to Canadian produce and manufacturers same preference as granted to Great Britain and Northern Ireland would be prohibited from the point of view of revenue unless a preference were granted by increasing existing tariff rates, a course which in view of low standard of living at present existing in Newfoundland and depressed conditions of fisheries, they regret would be impracticable. While it is true as stated in your telegram that Canada admits Newfoundland fish free of duty, similar preference to Canadian fish is granted by Newfoundland and in addition Canada has valuable rights of fishing round the coast of Newfoundland and calling at any Newfoundland port for bait and ice.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Voir également les documents 186, 188  
et 204.

<sup>1</sup> See also Documents 186, 188 and 204.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1155.

9180-40

*Le vice-président de la commission pour Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Vice-Chairman, Commission of Government of Newfoundland, to Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, November 28, 1940

Sir,

During a visit to Ottawa in June, 1940, the Chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, Mr. R. Gushue, discussed informally with officials of the Canadian Government the question of trade relations between Canada and Newfoundland. Prior to this, the matter had been mentioned from time to time when members of the Newfoundland Government and others had met Canadian officials, in particular during and since the negotiations for the Trade Agreements with the United States in 1938. At the conversation in June, 1940, the view was generally accepted that an exchange of memoranda on this subject would help to clarify the various questions involved, and it was agreed that for this purpose, the Newfoundland Government should take the initiative with a preliminary approach to the problem.

2. The broad facts of the matter are, of course, well known. Canada, by virtue of both her proximity and her natural resources, has long held a dominant position among the countries from which Newfoundland derives her imports. With the development of Canadian manufacturing industries, this fact has become increasingly more pronounced. Competition is mainly with the United States and the United Kingdom; but the fact is that whereas forty, and to some extent even thirty years ago, importations into Newfoundland from these three countries were approximately equal in value, at the present time, and for some years past, Canada has enjoyed a larger share of Newfoundland trade than either the United Kingdom or the United States. Just before the present war Newfoundland was Canada's eleventh best customer among the countries of the world, and the fifth best among those of the British Commonwealth. Today her place must be even more important.

3. It would be easy to show how Newfoundland's imports from Canada have fluctuated with the alternations of prosperity in the Island. From nearly thirteen million dollars in 1929-30 Newfoundland's imports from Canada fell in value to less than six millions in 1932-33, but had risen again to ten millions in 1937-38 and over twelve millions in 1939-40. The variety of goods imported is very wide, comprising manufactured goods of all kinds, articles of food and raw materials for industry. The parts of the Dominion concerned in Newfoundland trade are not confined to the Eastern Seaboard, though the Maritime Provinces have many close links with Newfoundland; but include also the manufacturing districts of Quebec and Ontario, and



the Western Provinces which provide wheat for this market. It would presumably not be disputed that the Newfoundland market, and thus also the prosperity of the Newfoundland people, are of serious importance and interest to Canada.

4. Other sources of income and profit to Canada are derived in Newfoundland and must not be left out of this review. Canadian Banks and Insurance Companies have, for many years, undertaken substantial and profitable business in the country. The services rendered by banking and insurance institutions are, of course, of great value to Newfoundland herself, and their importance is appreciated. Nevertheless, the substantial sums which have been deposited on savings and other accounts in the Canadian Banks or paid in insurance premiums make it clear that Newfoundland has made its contribution to the development of these important Canadian Institutions and thus again that the prosperity of Newfoundland is a factor of importance to Canada herself.

5. The economic position of Newfoundland is almost entirely bound up with her export trade. Newfoundland is dependent on export trade for the prosperity of her people and for her very existence. Although every year the trade returns show a steady surplus of Newfoundland's exports over imports, it is unfortunately the case that the countries to which Newfoundland products are exported are, in the main, countries from which she has been unable to purchase products to a substantial extent. This is particularly the case as regards exports of salt codfish, the industry which has for many years given and still at the present time gives, the greatest amount of employment to Newfoundland. The markets to which this product is exported are Cuba, Brazil, Portugal, Spain, Greece, the British and Foreign West Indies, and before the war Italy. Exports from Newfoundland to these countries vary from about \$100,000 in the case of Cuba to over \$1,000,000 in the case of Portugal, whereas the value of this country's imports from those territories is relatively small and always much less than the corresponding value of the exports. Only in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom is there anything approaching a balance of trade. It will be seen that Newfoundland has and must necessarily retain a substantial surplus of exports to countries other than Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, and that this surplus is regularly used to pay for the heavy excess of imports from Canada herself. These features have long been prominent in the economic life of this country.

6. Our ready co-operation with your Government in the matter of Exchange Control during the present war and the benefits which have accrued to the Dominion of Canada therefrom are of too recent origin to justify more than mere mention. We feel also that reference is not out of order to the strategic position [of] this country in the defence of the Dominion of Canada and of [to?] the readiness of its Government and people to permit the entry of your troops and naval and air forces for the defence of Canada, thus making this country almost without doubt the first battle ground in any attempt at invasion of North America.

7. We appreciate the practical difficulties of improving trade relations with Canada by the export of goods from Newfoundland. Newfoundland's exports to Canada have for many years past been a fraction only of her imports. Whilst Canada's trade in Newfoundland has grown in the manner described above, the same cannot be said for Newfoundland's exports to the Dominion. In recent years two-thirds of the export trade has taken the form of iron ore and smaller amounts of subsidiary raw materials required for the iron and steel industry at Sydney, Nova Scotia. These materials leave Newfoundland in unprocessed form and yield the minimum amount of income and labour value to the country of their origin. The Newfoundland iron mines are, as you are aware, owned and operated by the Canadian industry itself. The remaining one-third of Newfoundland's exports to Canada consists in the main of fishery products amounting in value to some \$500,000 to \$750,000 annually. Whilst there should be room for development of this last named group of Newfoundland's exports to Canada it is doubted whether in the near future this country's industries will so expand as to permit of its competing to a substantial extent in Canada with the products of the Dominion. Even in foreign markets active competition between the exports of the two countries is in practice confined to salt codfish and certain other fishery products, industries upon which, as already remarked, the very existence of the Newfoundland people may be said to depend.

8. The Dominion of Canada can, however, show its appreciation of Newfoundland's attitude and conduct in the past and the value of its goodwill in future by agreeing to associate Newfoundland with it in any trade treaties which it has in contemplation with other countries. It is suggested that, as a practical step in this co-operation, the Government of Canada might advise the Government of Newfoundland of any negotiations which are about to be undertaken from time to time in markets where Newfoundland is likely to be affected. Progress could best be made in building up mutual confidence if advance information regarding trade negotiations which Canada may enter into could be notified to Newfoundland on the understanding that if Newfoundland wishes to participate she should be free to do so. Furthermore, the right of inclusion of Newfoundland on most favoured nation terms should be recognised in the case of any Trade Agreement or arrangement made by Canada affecting articles in the export of which Newfoundland might be interested.

[9.] The United Kingdom which, so far as import and export trade with Newfoundland is concerned, is relatively in a much less favourable position than Canada, has adopted a similar policy and has associated Newfoundland with herself in several Trade Agreements. We feel sure that on any other occasion when Newfoundland may be interested the Government of the United Kingdom will act in the same manner; we now suggest that a similar policy be adopted by the Canadian Government.

[10.] The Newfoundland Government would be grateful to have an exchange of views with your Government on this important matter, and

expresses the intention of examining in the most friendly manner any proposals related to it which may be put forward by the Government of the Dominion.

I have etc.

J. C. PUDDESTER

1156.

9180-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre du Commerce*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister of  
Trade and Commerce*

Ottawa, January 23, 1941

Dear Mr. Wilgress,

Shortly after your Trade Delegation left for South America, we received a lengthy communication from the Government of Newfoundland reviewing the course of commercial relations between Canada and Newfoundland, and requesting that, as a token of recognition of all that Newfoundland had done for Canada, we should undertake to keep the Newfoundland Government informed about any commercial negotiations we had in prospect with third countries and arrange for the insertion of an "optional clause" in trade agreements concluded which would enable the Newfoundland Government to adhere to the agreement if it so wished.

The review of Canada's commercial relations with Newfoundland was rather tendentious and open to argument on a good many counts. The specific request to which it led up was not, however, to my mind an unreasonable one. I am inclined to think that the Government might, on more or less compassionate grounds, do something to meet the Newfoundland desiderata in regard to the negotiation of commercial treaties and I so informed the Minister of National Revenue, who raised the question on his return from St. John's last month. I told him, however, that I thought that consideration of the questions of general policy raised by the Newfoundland Government's initiative might well wait until your Minister's return from his trade mission because, under present conditions, it was primarily in Latin American markets that Canadian and Newfoundland exports compete with each other.

We are ready to take up with the Newfoundland Government a number of vexed questions relating to the customs treatment of Canadian fish, fishing vessels and equipment, which has been in an unsatisfactory state for years, but do not want to do so until we have returned at least an interim reply to their despatch of the 28th of November. I should, therefore, be glad to receive at your early convenience the views of your Department on the questions put forward in that despatch.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1157.

9180-40

*Le sous-ministre du Commerce au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, January 24, 1941

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I have received your letter of January 23 with regard to the lengthy communication, dated November 28, 1940, which was received from the Government of Newfoundland shortly after our Trade Mission left for South America.

In this communication the Government of Newfoundland reviewed the course of commercial relations between Canada and Newfoundland. This led up to the conclusion that, having regard to the large volume of goods which we sold to Newfoundland without taking very much in return, it is to our interest to help to develop markets for Newfoundland products. It was, therefore, requested that the Newfoundland Government should be kept informed of any commercial negotiations we had in prospect with third countries and that we should arrange for the insertion of an "optional clause" in trade agreements concluded, which would enable Newfoundland to adhere to the agreement if she so wished.

It must be admitted that there is a great deal to the arguments advanced by the Government of Newfoundland, but I see great difficulties in the way of meeting their request for the insertion of an "optional clause" in trade agreements which we might conclude with other countries.

Our fishing industry in the Maritime Provinces has been agitating for some years against the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement, largely on the grounds that the extensive concessions which Canada granted the British West Indies have been of no benefit to the fishing industry, as the preferences we obtain on salt fish from the colonies are also extended to Newfoundland—the chief competitor of Canada in these markets. They have been pressing for the conclusion of trade agreements with foreign countries and have largely had in mind the possibility that such trade agreements might result in Canada securing, at least temporarily, a tariff advantage over Newfoundland. The experience derived from the negotiations with the Dominican Republic has served to bring about a better understanding on the part of the Maritime fishing interests of the principles which have to underlie trade negotiations with other countries, but they would be certain to object most strenuously to the inclusion of Newfoundland in any trade agreements we might conclude with foreign countries, which provide markets for salt fish.

We can ascribe the Newfoundland request largely to the agitation which has taken place in the Maritime Provinces and the Government of Newfoundland undoubtedly have in mind the possibility that Canada might



conclude trade agreements with either Cuba or Brazil, which would result in lower duties being extended to salt fish imported from Canada than on the same product imported from Newfoundland.

The request of the Newfoundland Government that they should be informed about any commercial negotiations we have in prospect with third countries is a reasonable one and I think we should do our best to comply with this request. There may be occasions, such as the visit of the Trade Mission to South America, when discussions between representatives of the Canadian Government and representatives of other Governments may result in considerable progress being made as to the basis on which a trade agreement could be negotiated. In such cases we would not be able to inform the Government of Newfoundland in advance of the discussions, but we could advise them before any definite decisions had been reached by the Canadian Government.

As regards the proposal to insert an "optional clause" in trade agreements which may be concluded with other countries, I think it should be pointed out to the Government of Newfoundland that this proposal gives rise to great practical difficulties. It might be mentioned that it has been the policy of the Canadian Government to adhere to the principle of equality of treatment in commercial relations and that we have endeavoured to maintain the principle that there should be no discrimination as between Empire countries in Empire markets, such as the preferences which Newfoundland extends to other Empire countries but not to Canada. In our relations with foreign countries we have adhered to the most-favoured-nation clause, which embodies the principle of equality of treatment in relations between trading nations. While, therefore, we would not take any action which would preclude the granting to Newfoundland of any concessions which might be extended to Canada, and would be prepared to keep the Newfoundland Government informed of negotiations which were contemplated, it might be difficult to arrange for the inclusion of Newfoundland within the scope of the concessions which the foreign country might be prepared to grant to Canada. This is a question which could best be dealt with *ad hoc*, in the case of negotiations with each particular country, rather than that the Canadian Government should agree in advance to act for Newfoundland as well as for Canada in negotiations with other countries. There are only a few countries with which Newfoundland would be interested in securing the same tariff treatment as Canada and it could, therefore, be proposed to the Government of Newfoundland that the two Governments should consult closely with one another when either Government undertakes negotiations for a trade agreement with a foreign country, which offers outlets for the sale of salt fish—the chief export product which is common to both countries.

Yours faithfully,

L. D. WILGRESS

1158.

NPA S-5-5-2

*Mémorandum du commissaire aux Services publics à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities to Commission of  
Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 73-241

[St. John's,] September 15, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

I annex for discussion in Commission a copy of a report<sup>1</sup> by Mr. Curtis, Head of the Supplies Division of the Department of Public Works, on his inquiries in Washington and Ottawa relative to priorities for imports of essential requirements into Newfoundland from the U.S.A.

2. This question of priorities first arose in connection with Government purchases and was dealt with as a matter of course by the Supplies Division of the Public Works Department. About two months ago, however, we found that various Companies and Firms in Newfoundland were confronted with the same problem and some of them invoked Mr. Curtis's assistance. Late in August I decided that immediate action was called for to obtain information as to procedure and I sent Mr. Curtis to Ottawa and Washington to obtain this information.

3. The first point to be settled by the Commission of Government is where responsibility for handling Newfoundland priorities should rest. The choice appears to be between the Supplies Division of the Public Works Department and the Customs Department. I do not think it matters much which it is, but, on the whole, I think it should be the Supplies Division—especially if we are able to retain Mr. Curtis's services.

4. Subject to settlement of this point, I agree that we should post a clerical officer in Washington for a few months to handle the clerical and routine work in connection with Newfoundland applications. These applications would be routed to him through the Supplies Division which would, of course, seek instructions where necessary from the Secretary for Public Works or the Commissioner for Public Utilities in regard to the recommendation to be made in each case. I propose to set up a small Departmental Committee in which representatives of H.M. Customs and the Board of Trade would be invited to serve. The Supplies Division will probably need some additional staff, but it will be a little time before we can say what addition will be called for.

. . .

W. W. WOODS

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1159.

2551-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 8

St. John's, September 25, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copy of letter<sup>1</sup> which I have received from Canadian Breweries Limited.

2. My instructions as High Commissioner in Australia were to keep away from all trade matters, except when I received special instructions from you or was asked by the Trade Commissioners in Australia to assist them.

3. I should appreciate it if you would advise me as to how I should deal with this letter and with similar requests in respect of trade matters. In the meantime, I am not answering the letter but will await your instructions which, perhaps, might be sent to me by telegram.

4. One difficulty I see in the matter is that I will get in trouble if I attempt to arrange for the sale of beer from Canadian Breweries Limited, as other breweries in Canada will naturally object.

5. My own personal views are that I should keep out of entanglements in trade matters, but it is going to be embarrassing for me to do so.

6. Please advise if the Department of Trade and Commerce has under consideration the sending of a Trade Commissioner to Newfoundland. If the business warrants such an appointment and a Trade Commissioner was appointed, I would be relieved from many calls which I know I am bound to receive in respect of assistance in trade matters.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1160.

2551-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 4

Ottawa, September 30, 1941

Your despatch No. 8, September 25. As High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland you are not expected to find markets for the products of any particular company or, indeed, push sales of Canadian goods generally.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Canadian correspondents seeking your assistance should be advised, if the matter is one respecting trade enquiries, commercial intelligence or sales promotion, to write to the Department of Trade and Commerce; or, if the matter is one involving the Newfoundland Government or Government policy, bring it to the attention of the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. In the present case, where sales promotion and perhaps to some extent Newfoundland Government policy are both involved, your correspondent might be asked to place the matter before the Department of Trade and Commerce.

1161.

703-40

*Mémoire du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures<sup>1</sup>  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs<sup>1</sup>  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

[Ottawa,] March 6, 1942

VISIT OF MESSRS. DUNN AND GUSHUE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

This morning, at your suggestion, a meeting was held with the above mentioned gentlemen, with Mr. Angus taking part in the discussion, and the following subjects were covered briefly:

- 1) Tariff arrangements with the United States affecting war imports and exports.
- 2) Proposals for the establishment of parity of exchange between Canada and the United States.
- 3) Fire protection in the Gander Airport area.
- 4) Newfoundland, and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
- 5) General trade policy of Canada and Newfoundland.

Tariff arrangements with the United States  
affecting war imports and exports

Mr. Dunn expressed some apprehension in regard to reports that have been received in Newfoundland to the effect that Canada and the United States might be making arrangements for the remission of duties on imports into their respective countries of war materials obtained in the other. He was afraid that the position of Newfoundland might be prejudiced if this programme should develop, and when pressed for particulars mentioned the position of the Newfoundland pulp and paper industry. We informed Mr. Dunn that no arrangements had yet been completed; that the situation in the United States made it unlikely that any action would be taken in the immediate future, and that we would let Newfoundland know before any final programme was adopted.

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside.



Proposals for the establishment of parity of exchange  
between Canada and the United States

Mr. Dunn stated that the Newfoundland Commission of Government had been alarmed by suggestions emanating from what seemed to be responsible quarters to the effect that Canada and the United States might shortly arrange for the re-establishment of parity as between the Canadian and the United States dollar. We informed Mr. Dunn that there was little likelihood of any such development; that most of the agitation for the establishment of parity was created by speculators in the United States, and that Newfoundland would be warned before any programme of this kind was adopted.

...

General trade policy of Canada and Newfoundland

Mr. Gushue referred to a proposal made by the Newfoundland Commission of Government in 1940 to the effect that the two countries should follow similar policies in the general field of external trade. He stated that the communication which had been addressed to us by the Governor of Newfoundland had never been acknowledged, much less made the basis for any serious discussion of the subject to which it referred. He added, however, that on a visit to Ottawa during the same year the matter had again been referred to but that the Newfoundland Government had never been informed as to any views that the Government of Canada might have developed in consequence of that meeting. I informed our visitors that I had never heard of this discussion but promised to look into the matter and communicate with them through our High Commissioner as soon as possible.

1162.

9180-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 161

St. John's, March 20, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 54 of March 10, 1942<sup>1</sup> in which you state that during his visit to Ottawa, the Honourable Mr. Dunn inquired why no reply had been sent to a letter from the Vice-Chairman of the Commission of Government, dated November 28, 1940, concerning the association of Newfoundland with Canada in negotiations as to trade agreements.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

2. In the telegram under reference, you also state that your records show that this despatch received very careful consideration by the Departments concerned and that a memorandum<sup>1</sup> was prepared in August, 1941, together with a dossier containing copies of the principal recent documents on the two major unsettled problems of commercial relations with Newfoundland, and sent to me.

3. I duly received the dossier which was brought to me by Mr. Pick last September. I also read through this file myself when I was in Ottawa in August last.

4. Rightly or wrongly, I decided to follow the advice which I found in a letter on the file from the Minister of Finance, the Honourable Mr. Ilsley, "to let this matter drift" and therefore did nothing about it, but awaited further developments, and certainly expected it to be one of the matters which the Commission of Government would take up with me after I had settled here as High Commissioner for Canada.

5. I have, however, the following comments and recommendations to make:

- (1) This subject matter is full of dynamite and I did not want any explosions during my first few months of office here. At all events, now that I have been here for six months I am better equipped to handle the explosion if it does come.
- (2) There was no necessity for Mr. Dunn and Mr. Gushue to make a special trip to Ottawa to discuss this matter with the Department of External Affairs there. I know them both intimately and meet them both two or three times a month and have had frequent conversations with them. Neither of them have either directly or indirectly referred to this subject matter.
- (3) Before my appointment as High Commissioner a draft letter was prepared in the Department of External Affairs in answer to Sir John Puddester's letter of November 28, 1940. In this draft letter, the matter of inclusion of Newfoundland in Canadian trade treaties was practically made conditional on Newfoundland granting to Canadian fishermen privileges similar to those granted under Canadian law and regulations to Newfoundland fishermen, such as freedom from customs duties on stores and equipment and the landing of their catches for temporary storage in Newfoundland ports.

If I had sent a letter in the form of this draft during the first few months of my arrival here, I am afraid the result would have been that I would have had to pack up my bag and go back home because of the resentment which would have been aroused here. I do not mean that it will be impossible to obtain these privileges but

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

a lot of preliminary work will have to be done and there must be a closer drawing together of the fishing industry in Newfoundland and Canada before any arrangement of this kind could be made.

My reading of Newfoundland history since my arrival here leads me to the conclusion that what has held Newfoundland back more than anything else is, first of all, the refusal of the British Government to allow any settlement in Newfoundland during the first three hundred years or more after the Island was discovered; (no grants of land to individuals were permitted until the year 1824 either at St. John's or in any part of the Island) and secondly, the extraordinary protocol to the Treaty of Paris added by the British Government and the still more extraordinary interpretation put upon that protocol by the British Government under which no settlement was allowed within six miles of the whole western coast of Newfoundland. This continued practically up to the year 1904, when the British Government bought out the French rights under the protocol. The western coast of Newfoundland is the finest and most fertile section of the whole country and, in the ordinary course, if it had not been for the protocol arrangement, that section of Newfoundland would have been well settled and perhaps more prosperous than any other part of the Island.

The spectre of the French claims to land and dry fish, and also the similar spectre which continued for many years of the right of the United States to land and dry fish, is one which the Newfoundlanders have constantly before them.

Any suggestion, therefore, that Canada should be granted any special fishing rights on any of the shores of Newfoundland brings up the old spectre in bold relief and it will take some negotiations to persuade the Newfoundlanders to give any country, even Canada, the rights which are in any way similar to those granted to France or to the United States by the British Government in days of long ago.

- (4) I entirely agree with the view of the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce in his letter to Mr. Scott Macdonald, dated June 27, 1941, No. 13876-C, in which he says as follows:

It would seem to me that in order to carry out the suggestion of the Commission of Government of Newfoundland it would be necessary that Canada and Newfoundland should first of all hold a conference and agree upon future cooperation in the production and sale of salt fish. I would, therefore, propose that instead of complying with the suggestion put forward by Newfoundland we should suggest that the two Governments at some future date should consult together with a view to co-ordinating policies in relation to the production and export

of salt fish, and that if out of this conference the two Governments are able to agree upon a satisfactory working basis for co-operation in the sale of salt fish to other markets we would then be glad to consider the suggestion set forth in Sir C. J. Puddester's communication.

In that connection I have the honour to refer to my telegram to you No. 59 of February 21, 1942, in which I advised you that Mr. Dunn and Mr. Gushue were leaving for Halifax, Washington and Ottawa in connection with fishery matters and the concluding paragraph of my telegram was as follows:

The matter of fisheries has always been one of conflict between Newfoundland and Canada. You might perhaps impress upon Finn the value of some better cooperation being arranged.

- (5) When I met the Honourable Mr. Dunn in Montreal at the time of the Montreal conference, he mentioned to me that he had been in Nova Scotia and thought that he had matters lined up to arrange for a joint Fishery Board for Newfoundland and Canada and that he was going to Ottawa to discuss the matter further with Dr. Finn. He added that he thought it might take a year before the Board was actually formed, but said that he had been to Lunenburg and other places in Nova Scotia and met some of the fish dealers and he said that he found them to be agreeable to the suggestion.
- (6) I would appreciate it if you would obtain a report from Dr. Finn as to Mr. Dunn's conference with him and ask Dr. Finn's opinion as to whether it may be possible to organize a joint Fishery Board. If this could be arranged, the chief point of conflict between Newfoundland and Canada would disappear and the other matters referred to in Sir John Puddester's letter of November 28, 1940 could, I think, be quickly settled.
- (7) I do not propose to take this matter up with Sir John or any of the Commissioners, at least until the return of Mr. Dunn and Mr. Gushue. In the meantime, I would like to hear from you in the matter and particularly would appreciate having a telegram from you reporting as to whether or not there is anything in Mr. Dunn's statement to me as to the possibility of a joint Fishery Board being organized for Canada and Newfoundland.
- (8) If and when I do take the matter [up] with Sir John Puddester, my present view, subject to any advice you may give me, is that it should be along the lines expressed by Mr. Wilgress in his letter to Mr. Scott Macdonald above quoted.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL



1163.

9180-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 67

Ottawa, March 31, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge your despatch No. 161 of March 20, 1942, which is being referred for comment to the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of Fisheries. I shall let you know the result in due course. In the meantime there are one or two points which may be considered.

Messrs. Dunn and Gushue stated their views on the cooperative marketing of fish at a meeting presided over by the Honourable Monsieur Michaud, at which the Deputy Minister of Fisheries and the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce were present. Mr. Angus attended this meeting as a representative of the Department of External Affairs.

The Newfoundlanders outlined the history of the Fish Marketing Board which was set up in Newfoundland during the depression and emphasized the great economies which had been obtained by eliminating middlemen and selling in bulk to overseas markets. They emphasized the importance of frozen fish and the great advantage which inshore fisheries would obtain from this method of processing. They also expressed the hope that Canada and Newfoundland might be able to combine in marketing fish. They pointed out that any plan for cooperative marketing was politically possible only if the demand for it came from the fishermen so that the plan did not appear to be imposed from above by a government. They, therefore, intimated that they might bring the matter up for discussion while they were in the Maritime Provinces. The meeting was a friendly talk on matters of common interest and was not in any sense a negotiation.

Nothing was said at the meeting to raise the broader issue of associating Newfoundland in such trade agreements as Canada may negotiate from time to time, nor was anything said of the possibility of granting fishing rights on the shores of Newfoundland to Canadians.

Under these circumstances it would not appear advisable to raise the question of trade agreements until the views of the Departments of Fisheries and Trade and Commerce have been ascertained. Should any of the Newfoundland Commissioners raise the question you might reply that it is so closely associated with the problem of collaboration in marketing fish that we should wait for the results, if any, of the discussions between Messrs. Dunn and Gushue and the Canadian Department of Fisheries.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1164.

3588-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre du Commerce*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Deputy Minister of  
Trade and Commerce*

[Ottawa,] April 4, 1942

Dear Wilgress,

The High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland writing under date of March 26th refers to the appointment of a Priorities Officer, Mr. W. E. Curtis. The High Commissioner is apprehensive that this officer will not make any vigorous attempt to prevent the importation of non-essential supplies. Some force is lent to this conjecture by the fact that it is on customs duties levied on these imports that the Newfoundland Government gets a substantial part of its revenue.

As a check on the Priorities Office the High Commissioner suggests the appointment of "a Canadian Trade Commissioner who would in reality be a priorities officer. His work would be not so much to sell Canadian goods, although perhaps that might be developed especially in regard to essential supplies which are now being imported from the United States and other countries, but of which we have a surplus in Canada which we could export."

The High Commissioner goes on to say:

I can see the need to have somebody here to investigate conditions on the spot from time to time, and be in a position to advise, from inside information which he could obtain here, as to whether or not a quantity, say, of sugar, hay or fertilizer or any other goods should or should not be imported from Canada to Newfoundland, and in what quantity.

The kind of man I have in mind is one who has had training under Wilgress in the Department of Trade and Commerce, and preferably also one who has had experience as a Trade Commissioner or Assistant Trade Commissioner.

The suggestion that we should appoint a Trade Commissioner who would not in reality be a Trade Commissioner in order to check the work of the priorities officer who it is suggested will not in reality be a priorities officer seems to me to be open to a good deal of objection. In any case it is something which would require discussion with the Department of Munitions and Supply and with the Shipping Board. Before entering on these wider discussions I should appreciate it if you could arrange to discuss this suggestion with me personally.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1165.

3588-40

*Le sous-ministre du Commerce au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, April 8, 1942

Dear Robertson,

I have received your letter of April 4, with regard to the communication which you have received from the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, who, writing under date of March 26, has referred to the appointment of Mr. W. E. Curtis as Priorities Officer for Newfoundland and then goes on to suggest the appointment of a Trade Commissioner or Assistant Trade Commissioner to act as an advisor on the question of supplies for Newfoundland.

As I told you over the telephone, when we discussed this question to-day, the situation referred to in the High Commissioner's letter is a reflection of the present state of international trade. It is natural that the Newfoundland Priorities Officer will desire to secure as large a volume as possible of supplies from Canada, while we will endeavour to confine exports to Newfoundland to goods which are essential to that country.

There have been many proposals in the past for us to appoint a Trade Commissioner to Newfoundland. We did maintain a Trade Commissioner's Office in that country from 1905 to 1920, but our experience at that time was that there was not sufficient work to keep a Trade Commissioner fully employed. There are only a few importing firms in Newfoundland and they are able to get full information about Canadian sources of supply through the branches of the Canadian banks established in that country.

It is possible that under war conditions there might be some justification for the appointment of a Trade Commissioner to be attached to the Office of the High Commissioner and, particularly, to advise on what supplies should be permitted to be exported from Canada to Newfoundland. I agree with Mr. Burchell that a man who has had experience as a Trade Commissioner or Assistant Trade Commissioner would be most suitable for the work which he has in view, particularly if he had also some experience of our export control organization before being sent to Newfoundland. We have a surplus of Trade Commissioners at the present time and would have no difficulty in finding a man to spare for a position in Newfoundland, but I am still doubtful if the volume of work, even under war conditions, would justify such an appointment. Up to the present we have had no great difficulty about deciding what supplies should be permitted to be exported to Newfoundland and we always have facilities for checking on the essentiality of the goods for which Newfoundland firms place orders in Canada. Mr. Burchell, however, would be in the best position to judge the extent to which a Trade Commissioner

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

attached to his office would have sufficient work under war conditions to keep himself fully occupied, and before giving further consideration to this question Mr. Burchell might be asked to elaborate more fully on this point and indicate more clearly the type of work which he thinks such a Trade Commissioner could perform.

Yours faithfully,

L. D. WILGRESS

1166.

C 13876-C

*Le sous-ministre du Commerce au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] April 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of copy of confidential despatch No. 57, dated March 31,<sup>1</sup> to the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, together with a copy of Mr. Burchell's despatch No. 161, dated March 20, on the general subject of cooperation between Canada and Newfoundland in matters pertaining to the fisheries and the association of Newfoundland with Canada in negotiations for trade agreements.

I have little to add in the way of further comment to my letters of June 27, 1941,<sup>1</sup> and July 7, 1941,<sup>1</sup> addressed to Mr. Scott Macdonald. I agree with Mr. Burchell that it is better not to initiate any further discussion of this matter with Newfoundland authorities unless and until they again bring up the question. In this event, reference could be made to the desirability of Canada and Newfoundland coordinating policies in relation to the production and export of salt fish before it would be practicable to associate Newfoundland in such trade agreements as Canada may negotiate from time to time with other countries, which provide a market for the products common to both countries. Now that Messrs. Dunn and Gushue have discussed, informally, with representatives of the Canadian Government the question of coordination of policies in relation to the marketing of salt fish, there is more justification for linking up this development with the possibility of Canada acting also for Newfoundland in the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries.

This may seem to be obviously stalling tactics, but in view of the uncertainties as to the position of international trade relations after the war we have every justification in not going too far in committing ourselves at this time to the association of the two countries in trade agreement negotiations.

Yours faithfully,

L. D. WILGRESS

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



1167.

2551-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au ministre du Commerce*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Minister of Trade and Commerce*

[St. John's,] May 30, 1942

Dear Mr. MacKinnon,

I have your letter of May 18th.<sup>1</sup>

I was indeed sorry that I missed meeting you when I was in Ottawa. My plans, however, are to get to Ottawa quite frequently now that we have a regular air service between Newfoundland and Canada. On my next visit, I will certainly plan to meet you. I find that I can present a picture of what is going on in Newfoundland to those interested in Ottawa much more clearly in two or three days' visit, than I can do by three or four months of correspondence.

I am very pleased that you decided to appoint a Trade Commissioner to Newfoundland. It is, I think, of great importance that we should draw Newfoundland and Canada closer together, and a Trade Commissioner can be exceedingly helpful to that end.

I am afraid that we Canadians have treated Newfoundland too long as a sort of poor relation. It is surprising, when you think of it, that no Prime Minister of Canada has ever made an official visit to Newfoundland since the organization of the Canadian Provinces into a federation.

I fear that, with the great scarcity of many essentials in Canada, the shortage of shipping and the submarine menace around our coast, Newfoundlanders will certainly experience great hardships unless Canada stands by her and assists her. I found, however, when I was in Ottawa that the position taken by everybody with whom I came in contact was to treat Newfoundland, in the way of supplies, as if she were a Province of Canada. This, I think, is the proper attitude. If we had adopted a somewhat similar attitude in years gone by, relations with this country would have been very much closer than they are at present.

I find the people here very congenial and friendly and I am enjoying living with them, although of course conditions are quite different from what they were in Australia, where I was exceedingly happy in my relations both with the Government officials and with the people generally.

As I was the first High Commissioner appointed by Canada to any of the other Dominions, it was left more or less to me to work out the position.

My feeling is that the position of a High Commissioner who represents one Dominion in another is entirely different from that of a Minister or Ambassador to a foreign country. As I see it, a High Commissioner is perhaps first and foremost an Empire missionary. He should not only look after the interests of his own Dominion in the Dominion to which he is

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

accredited, but should also, so far as possible and practicable, look after the interests of the Dominion in which he is temporarily resident insofar as its relations with his own Dominion are concerned.

I found this policy worked in Australia and I hope and believe it will be a sound policy in Newfoundland.

The Trade Commissioner which [sic] you are sending here should, I think, have the same understanding. As conditions now are in Newfoundland, he will be not only a salesman for Canada but, above all, he should regard himself as an ambassador of Empire and of goodwill from Canada to Newfoundland.

Since my return from Ottawa, I have discussed with various members of the Government of Newfoundland and Government officials the possibility of a Trade Commissioner coming here from Canada, and I have found unanimous and hearty response to the suggestion. I am quite sure that if your Trade Commissioner works along quietly here, he can fit in very efficiently and usefully with the work of the Commission of Government and with the various merchants and can do most useful work, both for Canada and for Newfoundland.

I would also like to let you know how much I enjoyed working with your Trade Commissioners in Australia. I found them exceedingly useful to me in my work and I was very happy at any time to assist them in their work.

The same happy relations will, I know exist between the Trade Commissioner whom you may send here and this Office.

With kind regards,

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1168.

3588-40

*Le sous-ministre du Commerce au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Ottawa, June 3, 1942

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of copy of an air mail letter, dated May 27th,<sup>1</sup> which you have received from Mr. C. J. Burchell, K.C. High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland, regarding the appointment of a Canadian Trade Commissioner to Newfoundland. Mr. Burchell came to see me on May 12th, just as I was leaving Jamaica, and we had a fairly complete conversation regarding the appointment of a Trade Commissioner at St. John's. It was quite clear from what Mr. Burchell told me that there is

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

lots of useful work which a Trade Commissioner could undertake under war conditions. From the point of view of this Department, it would be useful to have a representative in Washington [sic] who could assist us in work pertaining to the Export Permit Branch and the Canadian Shipping Board. There is also work which a Trade Commissioner could do on behalf of various other Departments of the Government.

I discussed the whole question very frankly with Mr. Burchell and told him about the Trade Commissioners who might be available for this assignment. We agreed that the officer appointed should be regarded as a Trade Commissioner but that he should work very closely under the direction of Mr. Burchell. For this reason it would be very useful if the Trade Commissioner could have his office in the same premises as that of the High Commissioner. His office, however, would be regarded as an independent entity and we would pay the salaries of the staff of the Trade Commissioner and also our share of the rent. Mr. Burchell very kindly offered to provide stenographic assistance to the Trade Commissioner until such time as he could engage a suitable stenographer.

This understanding reached with Mr. Burchell was confirmed by his letter to you of May 27th. Following my return from Jamaica this question was taken up with the Minister and he has approved of the establishment of a Trade Commissioner's position at St. John's, Newfoundland, and the assignment thereto of Mr. R. P. Bower, formerly assistant Trade Commissioner at Sydney, Australia, and now with our Export Permit Branch. A Recommendation to Council to this effect was submitted on May 23 and I am informed by the Minister that this Recommendation has been approved. Accordingly, arrangements are being made for Mr. Bower to proceed to Newfoundland around June 22. He will be assigned a living allowance of \$2,000 which in addition to his salary of \$2,940 it is thought should be sufficient for him to maintain himself and his family at St. John's.

Mr. Bower's rank in the Commercial Intelligence Service is that of Assistant Trade Commissioner and he will retain this rank and will be regarded as Acting Trade Commissioner at St. John's, Newfoundland. He will, however, sign himself as Trade Commissioner and to all intents and purposes will discharge the duties in the same manner as if his rank were that of a Full Trade Commissioner.

Frankly, we regard the establishment of this position at St. John's, Newfoundland, as a wartime measure in order to deal with the many pressing trade questions which arise between the two countries as a result of the various wartime controls. The whole position will be reviewed at the end of the war and we will then consider if it is worthwhile maintaining a Trade Commissioner's post at St. John's, having regard to the fact that previous experience has shown that Canadian firms have no difficulty in forming connections with Newfoundland importers, owing to the close relations between the two countries.

The Minister proposes to make a Press announcement regarding the appointment of Mr. R. P. Bower as Trade Commissioner at St. John's, Newfoundland, and further details regarding the establishment of this position can be taken up with your Department after Mr. Bower has arrived at his new post.

Yours faithfully,

L. D. WILGRESS

1169.

NPA GN1/3 1/42

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 638

[London,] November 24, 1942

One of the main tasks of Combined Food Board in Washington (composed of Wickard, Secretary for Agriculture, representing United States and Brand, head of British Food Mission, representing United Kingdom) is to determine most suitable allocations in interests of war effort of foodstuffs in short supply. For this purpose Board is assisted here by Committee known as the London Food Committee, consisting of representatives of United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Southern Rhodesia. Main duty of this Committee is to co-ordinate essential import requirements of Empire countries, and also of Allies and Neutrals outside Western Hemisphere and when necessary to communicate global picture of these requirements (and also in appropriate cases of supplies of foodstuffs available for export) to the United Kingdom member of the Combined Food Board. United States are similarly responsible for bringing together corresponding data regarding their own requirements and those of Allies and Neutrals in Western Hemisphere and the two halves of world picture thus produced are collated in Washington by Secretariat of Board. The Board then considers most suitable allocations.

2. Canada is not a member of London Food Committee but makes known her requirements in Washington, where Canadian Representatives sit on working Committees of the Board concerned with particular commodities. Question arises through what channel Newfoundland requirements might best be put forward, with a view to inclusion in total picture presented to Combined Food Board. If Commission of Government so desire provision could be made for Newfoundland to be accorded membership of London Food Committee with a view to Newfoundland Food requirements being presented with those of United Kingdom and Eastern Hemisphere countries. But since North America is principal source of supply for Newfoundland it is suggested that best course would be for Newfoundland requirements to be included with those of Canada when latter are presented in Washington for communication to Combined Board. If Commission agree, we will approach Canadian Government accordingly.



1170.

NPA GN1/3 1/42

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au Secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 479

[St. John's,] December 18, 1942

Your telegram No. 638 of 24th November, 1942, Combined Food Board. In view of our geographical position and of Canada and United States being our main sources of supply we regard it as preferable that our statement of requirements should be presented to Board on our behalf by Canadian Government.

In our view it is undesirable that our requirements should be included as part of Canada's needs. Conditions here are not comparable with those prevailing in Canada and allocations on basis of conditions prevailing there would not be practicable here where alternative commodities, especially foodstuffs, might not be available.

In approaching Canada on our behalf we should be glad if following points could be reserved:

- (a) Canada would transmit our statements of requirements without amendment, together with any explanations in support unless modification in our demands have been mutually agreed.
- (b) That allocations should be made specifically to Newfoundland.

1171.

NPA GN1/43 1/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 62

[London,] February 6, 1943

IMPORTANT. Your telegram No. 34 of 1st February.<sup>1</sup> Foodstuff requirements.

1. My immediate following telegram contains summary of telegram from High Commissioner, Ottawa No. 280 in reply to my No. 27.

2. Canadian Government's reply appears substantially to meet wishes of Commission of Government as set [out] in your telegram No. 479 of 18th December and subject to possible adjustment in light of experience [;] proposals made should in fact form good working basis for satisfactory understanding. You will see that Canadian Officials are being instructed to discuss with Dunn and Gushue in Washington as to presentation of Newfoundland's estimated requirements.

3. Grateful if you would let us know as soon as possible whether procedure proposed is generally acceptable to Commission. If so it will remain to

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

secure formal approval of Combined Food Board of arrangements on these lines and we would take this up with Canadian Government with a view to approach being made to Board as soon as possible.

1172.

NPA S-6-1-7

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[London,] February 6, 1943

My immediate preceding telegram. Following is summary of telegram No. 280 from High Commissioner, Ottawa in reply to my No. 27 of 3rd January.<sup>1</sup> Begins.

1. Canadian Authorities agree in principle with proposals in telegram No. 27. They are awaiting information as to progress of investigations which U.S. Board of Economic Warfare have for some time been making into Newfoundland's essential requirements of foodstuffs and other products in short supply. Officials of Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board are being consulted in connection with above enquiries in order to ensure that Newfoundland requirements are met on scale commensurate with that found possible for Canada and U.S.. Canadian Authorities are, however, of opinion that presentation of Newfoundland programme to Combined Food Board through Canada Representatives on Committee of Board need not interfere with plans of Board of Economic Warfare and may help to avoid confusion.

2. Canadian Authorities entirely agree Newfoundland's requirements should not (repeat *not*) be included as part of Canada's. Express agreement making it duty of Combined Food Board to provide for Newfoundland should avoid, misunderstandings and difficulties such as have arisen in past, in obtaining from Board either increased Canadian allocation to allow for[,] or separate allocation to[,] Newfoundland.

3. While Canadian Government agree to transmit Newfoundland estimates without amendment it would not be practicable for them in view of Board of Economic Warfare investigation to instruct their Representatives on Combined Food Board Committees to refrain from discussing or criticising Newfoundland estimates, if this appeared out of scale with Canadian and U.S. estimates exactly as they might discuss or criticise those of any other country. If Board find it necessary to reduce Newfoundland's requests to bring them into line with consumption in Canada and U.S., responsibility for reduction will lie with Board who will probably be acting on strength of information furnished to it by Board of Economic Warfare. Prior discussion between Canadian and Newfoundland Authorities on the other hand (see 3 (A) of your No. 479 of 18th December)<sup>1</sup> might throw such responsibility primarily on Canadian Authorities.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1173.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne aux États-Unis au gouverneur  
de Terre-Neuve*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in United States to Governor  
of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 9

Washington, February 18, 1943

Following for Sir Wilfrid Woods from Dunn. Messages referred to by Wild have not been received, but I have seen a summary of Canadian views regarding presentation of our case to Combined Food Board. As Canada must reserve the right to criticize our demands, consequently whenever she thinks them too high our case is unlikely to be strongly presented. In view of misconceptions entertained by Canadians as to conditions in Newfoundland, and their ignorance concerning outport conditions, my view is that it would be undesirable to present our case through Canada.

2. I understand that it might be possible for members of British Food Mission to undertake presentation of our requirements. We should have to provide them with the necessary material, and in the cases of major importance they would wish to invite a Newfoundland representative to put the case to the Combined Food Board. It is thought that there would not be much difficulty in obtaining concurrence of the Ministry of Food in this arrangement which would be preferable to representation through Canada, whose interests are more likely to conflict with ours.

3. On receipt of missing telegrams I shall cable you again if there is anything in them which would alter view expressed herein.

1174.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 60

[St. John's,] February 23, 1943

Your telegrams Nos. 62 and 63 of the 6th February foodstuff requirements. Dunn has telegraphed from Washington that he understands it might be possible for members of the British Food Mission to undertake presentation of our requirements and that in cases of major importance they would wish to invite a Newfoundland representative to put the case to the Combined Food Board. Having regard to the advanced stage of negotiations with Canada and possible adverse repercussion on all supply matters which might be anticipated if withdrawal from previously suggested arrangements were made at this late stage and also having regard to imperative necessity of establishing immediate avenue of approach to Combined Food Board we prefer to adhere

to original proposals and should be glad if you would communicate accordingly with Canada without any further delay. If in light of later experience approach through Canada proves unsatisfactory we could raise the question again.

1175.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 5

[Ottawa,] March 4, 1943

SECRET. For Commissioner for Public Utilities from Curtis. [Begins.] Combined Food Board. At meeting presided over by Angus, External Affairs, alternative scheme to that agreed between Newfoundland and Dominion Office was suggested. Main features are that provinces should be made for all food-stuffs for Newfoundland whether controlled by Combined Food Board or not. Basis of suggested allocation is average of Newfoundland imports for three years 1937/8 1938/9 1939/40 plus ten percent to cover higher purchasing power and standard of living and further ten percent to cover transients including ships stores and canteens. Canada and U.S.A. to be our only sources of supply and they would absorb quantities which we had hitherto obtained elsewhere. Generally speaking the proportion which would be allotted to us by Canada and U.S.A. individually would be in same proportion as in average for three years mentioned above but where more convenient one country may undertake sole responsibility for supply. Suggested scheme has merit from our point of view of preserving our relations with Board of Economic Warfare. In principle Price and I consider it might be more satisfactory that [than?] sole approach to Combined Food Board through Canada since Canada has suggested it herself and is obviously not enthusiastic over previous proposals.

(a) We endeavoured obtain higher total weighting than twenty percent but Canada will probably be restricted to ninety percent of previous consumption over basic period for her own needs. We have been invited Washington for meetings Monday to discuss further with Canadian representatives and Board of Economic Warfare there and are proceeding accordingly. If after discussions there we still agree as to merits of proposals may we agree in principle. We should not agree on matters of detail and should ask for assurance that military supplies taken from civilian stocks would be replaced. Glad receive telegraphic instructions from you through here by Sunday.

(b) Dunn has not reached here yet.

Ends.



1176.

3265-V-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 27

St. John's, March 6, 1943

IMMEDIATE. Your despatch No. 46 of February 24th,<sup>1</sup> allocation of food-stuffs to Newfoundland was only received today. Have had informal conference with Newfoundland authorities and I think that I can say that they will approve in principle of proposal, except that they will insist with probably a very considerable degree of accuracy that 10 per cent increase because of improvement in higher standard of nutrition and of consumption is too small. They point out that during the basic year as high as 80,000 out of a population of 300,000 were on dole of 6 cents a day. I think that if additional 10 per cent was offered, making 30 per cent in all, the proposal might be satisfactory to Newfoundland authorities except that they might desire to reserve judgment until it is seen how 10 per cent allowance for ships stores and canteens and local purchases by military personnel work[s] out in actual practice.

1177.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne aux États-Unis au gouverneur  
de Terre-Neuve*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in United States to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

Washington, March 10, 1943

Following for Commissioner for Public Utilities from Curtis. Reference Winsor's Telegram of March 6th,<sup>2</sup> Combined Food Board. The alternative referred to in my telegram sent through High Commissioner does not cut out approach to Board but embraces all food stuffs irrespective of whether they are controlled by Board which deals only with a few commodities in very short supply. On such items as Board are interested in our avenue of approach would be either or both Canadian or United States in such proportion as these countries had undertaken to supply our needs under alternative plan.

(2) At meeting this morning with Board of Economic Warfare and Canadian officials we argued in favour of increase in weighting but without success. General food position of Allied Nations and future intentions

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

of Canada and United States regarding rationing were disclosed. Having this in mind a request for consignment percentage was virtually unsupportable but we obtained agreement that any case of proved hardship to Newfoundland under proposed formula would be sympathetically considered by both countries. Meeting ended without any definite conclusion being reached. We were asked at very short notice to attend meeting of State Department which had apparently been called for the purpose of arranging for exchange of notes finalizing proposals made by Canada. We again made representations re 20 per cent weighting. Your point regarding inadequacy of standard [of] living in basic period was pressed and elicited a counter offer that we could accept 1941/42 import figures less repeat less 20 per cent. It was strongly emphasised to us that immediate decision as to plan we were going to adopt was essential. Allocations when agreed to would be in any case be on quarterly basis adjusted to meet normal trade practices in Newfoundland. If developments in allied food position made provision imperative this would be especially considered. Without any current statistics available and keeping in mind your instructions we stated that we could not make any agreement on actual quantities. We undertook to re-examine quantities originally proposed by Canada in the light of this counter offer but in the meantime agreed in principle to the scheme provided satisfactory agreement could be reached as to quantities. Sub-Committee, consisting of one Board of Economic Warfare representative, one Canadian representative, Price and myself, was appointed to guard quantities and endeavour to reach agreement and report back to full meeting at State Department tentatively arranged for Monday next. First meeting of Sub-Committee on Thursday.

Knowing that, we propose to acquaint Puddester of position at once so that he can attend meeting if he desires. Assume that if Puddester concurs proposals can be finalized on Monday next. Attitude of both Canadian and United States representatives most co-operative and Newfoundland's special position appreciated.

1178.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 109

[St. John's,] April 5, 1943

Your telegram No. 95 of 3rd March,<sup>1</sup> foodstuff requirements. Following informal discussion between Canadian Government officials and United States Board of Economic Warfare Canadian Government have put forward alternative proposal that in view of dependence of Newfoundland upon Canada and United States for foodstuffs as well as for other consumers' goods not con-

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

trolled by Combined Food Board, these two countries should assume general responsibility for meeting Newfoundland's needs. With respect to commodities subject to allocation by the Combined Food Board, Canada or the United States, as the case may be, would add to its own application for allocation the amount required for export to Newfoundland. Procedure regarding all foodstuffs to be provided Newfoundland has now been discussed in detail with Canada and United States officials in both Ottawa and Washington and agreed to in principle and quantities to be supplied by each country tentatively agreed. It is now anticipated that there will be an exchange of letters between the Canadian and United States Governments confirming arrangements and further details will be sent to you when copies have been received.

1179.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne*  
*Dominions Secretary to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

TELEGRAM 930

[London,] April 13, 1943

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Addressed to High Commissioner, Ottawa No. 930, repeated to Governor, Newfoundland No. 157. Your 589 of 11th March.<sup>1</sup> Newfoundland's Foodstuff Requirements.

1. My immediately following telegram contains Text of telegram No. 109 of 5th April from the Newfoundland Government regarding revised arrangements contemplated.

2. Meanwhile substance of proposals as set out in your telegram under reference had been communicated to British Food Mission in Washington. Latter regarded proposals as attractive and likely to provide useful working solution in particular case of Newfoundland. They have indicated, however, that in their view:

- (1) Scheme should have formal approval of Combined Board and
- (2) Desirable that any formula accepted as general rule for ascertaining Newfoundland's food requirements should be understood to be subject to modification in particular instances on recommendation of appropriate Combined Food Board Committee.

3. Hope that matter may now be concluded fairly quickly. Suggest therefore that you should thank Canadian authorities for their action, tell them informally of view of Mission as set out above and suggest that as soon plan can be regarded as sufficiently definite they should arrange to present it to Combined Food Board for approval. They would no doubt consider whether this action would have to await formal exchange of letters referred to in Newfoundland telegram No. 109.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1180.

PRO DO 35 115 572/1/1 X/J 9827

*Extrait du procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité conjoint sur l'Alimentation*  
*Excerpt from Minutes of Meeting of Combined Food Board*

[London,] May 3, 1943

5. Food supplies for Newfoundland and Labrador. Arrangements made by B.E.W. and Canadian W.P.T.B. together with schedules reported to Board in letter from Secretary of State with proposed official letter to Canadian Minister. Agreed that Secretary of State be informed of Board's approval subject to provision for adjustment of any item in light of Board's distribution arrangements or other programmes.

1181.

3265-V-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1104

Washington, May 12, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 395 of April 10th<sup>1</sup> in regard to the plan worked out by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the Board of Economic Warfare for meeting Newfoundland's food requirements from the United States and Canadian sources.

2. Resulting from the request made to the State Department, on your instructions, to initiate the exchange of notes to put this plan into execution, a draft note from the State Department was submitted to you in my teletype WA-1894 of April 20th,<sup>2</sup> and your approval was given, subject to certain modifications as conveyed in your teletype EX-1453 of April 21st.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently, a further alteration in respect to the relation of this program with the Combined Food Board was cleared by my WA-2161 of May 5th,<sup>2</sup> and your concurrence as conveyed in your EX-1613 of May 7th.<sup>2</sup>

3. As a result of these informal exchanges of views on the draft, I have now received from the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States, the attached note together with the schedule<sup>1</sup> referred to therein. I would draw your attention to the request made on page four of the note asking for an expression from the Canadian Government confirming in turn the agreement as outlined in this note.

I have etc.

L. B. PEARSON  
 for the Minister

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis au ministre aux États-Unis*  
*Secretary of State of United States to Minister in United States*

Washington, May 10, 1943

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to the negotiations which have been carried on between representatives of our two Governments regarding the joint supply of the food requirements of Newfoundland and Labrador. The Board of Economic Warfare of the United States and the Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board have now agreed to a program of supply whereby each country will assume the obligation of providing Newfoundland and Labrador with certain foodstuffs in specified amounts in accordance with the details set forth in the schedules attached.<sup>1</sup> Upon the understanding that the Government of Newfoundland has also concurred in principle in this program, the Department of State desires to confirm this agreement between our two Governments.

In addition to the agreed allocation of supply for the twelve-months period, April 1, 1943 to April 1, 1944, this Government further understands that:

- (a) Each country will, to the best of its ability, supply Newfoundland with thirty-five per cent of the quantity mentioned in the schedules during the three-months period beginning April 1, 1943, twenty-five per cent in each of the two succeeding quarters and fifteen per cent in the quarter commencing January 1, 1944.
- (b) The Canadian and United States export control authorities will exchange reports every three months relative to the quantities licensed for export to Newfoundland. Newfoundland authorities, on the other hand, will be asked to submit reports to each Government on the quantities imported during similar periods.
- (c) Each country will accept the responsibility of replacing any foodstuffs purchased by its armed forces from civilian sources in Newfoundland.
- (d) Modifications of the amounts specified in the schedules may be necessary from time to time as unforeseen shortages occur in the supplying countries or food production in Newfoundland fails to measure up to advance estimates. Such modifications will be a matter of informal agreement between the Board of Economic Warfare and the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, in consultation with Newfoundland authorities, and will be implemented through the usual allocation procedures established in each country. In making revisions upward of scarce foodstuffs, it is assumed that the policy of equality of sacrifice among civilian populations of the three countries will be recognized, due account being taken of certain peculiarities in Newfoundland's consumption habits.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduites.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

- (e) Each country will make every effort to replace or supply substitutes for goods lost in transit.
- (f) The aforementioned agencies of the respective Governments will assist the Newfoundland Government in the event that commodities under domestic restriction or allocation control are not available in the commercial markets of the supplying country. This responsibility will include representations on behalf of Newfoundland to other departments of each Government and to the Combined Food Board whenever such action is necessary.
- (g) All the foregoing supply arrangements are subject to adjustment to conform with any distribution arrangements or other programs that may be recommended by the Combined Food Board.

The Department would appreciate an expression from the Canadian Government confirming in turn this agreement as outlined herein.

Accept, etc.

CORDELL HULL

1182.

3265-V-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis*  
*Minister in United States to Secretary of State of United States*

No. 264

[Washington,] May 19, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of May 10th, 1943, in which you refer to the negotiations which have been carried on between representatives of our two governments regarding the joint supply of the food requirements of Newfoundland.

I am pleased to inform you that the Canadian Government confirms the agreement as outlined in your note under reference.

Accept, etc.

LEIGHTON MCCARTHY

1183.

3265-V-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM WA-5773

Washington, November 19, 1943

Following for J. H. English, Department of Trade and Commerce, from Scott. Begins. Since the despatch of my WA-5758 of November 18th<sup>1</sup> re

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Cogan's suggestion for a meeting in Newfoundland to discuss the serious food position in that country, I have had an opportunity of talking the matter over with Roy Geddes.

According to my understanding of Cogan's point of view, resulting from Price failing to deal adequately with the clearance procedure from his end, there has been an unnecessary and serious delay in the movement of certain foodstuffs from the United States, particularly meat. Geddes readily concedes that this may be the case, but on the other hand points out there may also have been some degree of failure on the part of the Americans to implement their share of the program. To the extent that this is true, Geddes and I are inclined to the opinion that the Americans should answer to the Newfoundlanders themselves, rather than to involve us, if our records indicate that we have lived up to our own undertakings.

Accordingly, Geddes has undertaken to contact you on his return to Ottawa with a view to checking our records to see what the Canadian performance has been at the end of the second quarter of the agreement, which I believe is September 30th.

Pending the result of this study, Geddes would like to see no commitment given on our part toward attendance at a meeting in Newfoundland. I think when he sees you he will confirm his growing apprehension that the Americans are tending to hold back on some of their programmes in the hope that we can take over the load. As illustrations he has in mind leather for Newfoundland and feeding stuffs for Iceland.

On the other hand, it is realized that you may already have sufficient background from Bower which would lead you to support Cogan's suggestion, but I think it would be advisable to wait until you have discussed the matter with Geddes before I commit our side to a meeting in Newfoundland, indeed, if the American program has fallen down, Geddes and I are both inclined to feel that a meeting should take place in Washington for the purpose of finding out where we stand on the agreement. Ends.

1184.

3265-V-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, November 27, 1943

Dear Mr. Angus,

I have your letter of November 22nd,<sup>1</sup> in which you give me information as to the meeting with Sir John Puddester, and Mr. Curtis.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Apparently you are under the impression that there was some fault with the Canadian canteens is not supplying the information. This is entirely erroneous. As is explained in the enclosed letter from Mr. Bower,<sup>1</sup> the whole fault is with Mr. Price, who totally neglected the matter in spite of repeated requests from Mr. Bower.

Price is a perfect nuisance to us here, and the sooner he leaves, the happier we will all be. He sent in his resignation. This was promptly accepted, effective November 1st, much to his own surprise and disgust. They had nobody to take his place, however, and have therefore had to keep him on. This week, however, he left for Washington, and I understand his purpose in going there is to endeavour to get employment with some of the U.K. offices there or in New York. The request was made of the Canadian Government through Mr. Wild to send a man from Canada to assist the Food Controller, and presumably he would have taken Price's place, but the Wartime Prices and Trade Board very properly refused to accede to this suggestion. If this had been done, it would have involved us all in further trouble with Newfoundland merchants who have been used to doing their own ordering as and when they please, and are very restive under the controls which have been placed upon them.<sup>2</sup>

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1185.

3265-V-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 17

St. John's, January 14, 1944

Sir,

May I refer to the conference which was held in Mr. Robertson's office about a year ago, attended by Mr. Robertson, Mr. Towers, Dr. Clark, Mr. Dana Wilgress, Mr. Donald Gordon and others, in which I suggested that a joint arrangement should be made with the United States under which the United States and Canada would jointly allocate supplies to Newfoundland.

2. At that conference, I pointed out the situation which then existed was that Newfoundland was obtaining supplies from the United States and supplies from Canada, and that neither country had any information as to the supplies the other country was furnishing. I recall that Mr. Gordon suggested that somebody should go down to Washington right away and have a working arrangement made with the United States and this met with the approval of all those present.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Voir également les documents 1238 et 1248.  
1248.



3. As a result of that conference, the representatives of the United States and Canada got together and in conference with representatives of the Newfoundland Government arranged a quota for all the food supplies and the documents which were drawn up at that time set forth the various items of food supplies required by Newfoundland and the quantities which would be supplied respectively by Canada and the United States so far as reasonably possible.

4. My attention has now been called by Mr. R. P. Bower, Canadian Trade Commissioner, to the Minutes of the Meeting of the Commodity Subcommittee of the Food Requirements Committee held on December 17th and December 29th and I note that the suggestion has been put forward that in lieu of a joint agreement, there should be bilateral agreements between Canada and Newfoundland, and Newfoundland and the United States.

5. May I point out that the Joint Agreement has worked very smoothly so far as all three parties to the Agreement are concerned, and I may also respectfully state that bilateral agreements would not carry out the purpose which I had in mind in making the original recommendation, would I am sure be unsatisfactory to the Newfoundland Government, and might very possibly break up the harmony between the three Governments which now exists.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1186.

3265-V-40

*Le conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

PERSONAL

Ottawa, January 18, 1944

Dear Mr. Burchell,

A copy of your despatch No. 17 of January 14, on the subject of the Food Agreement with Newfoundland, is being forwarded to the Department of Trade and Commerce. While it is under consideration, I might perhaps point out informally that the Minute of the Food Requirements Committee to which you refer may have lent itself to misunderstanding. It is not contemplated that there should be bilateral negotiations between Newfoundland and Canada and bilateral negotiations between Newfoundland and the United States. What is contemplated is that all three countries should consult just as they did a year ago and work out a similar program by which part of Newfoundland's requirements would be met from Canadian sources and part from sources in the United States.

It is, however, thought that it might be more satisfactory to have two bilateral agreements than to have one triangular agreement. The advantages of two separate agreements would lie in making it completely clear to the Newfoundland authorities to which country they should look for each part of their supplies and to make clear the limit of what they might expect to obtain from each country. Our experience under the triangular agreement has been that Newfoundland has exhausted the supply in the cheaper country before turning to the country in which prices are higher and have then found that their supplies could not be furnished at short notice and perhaps that they could not be furnished at all. The fact that the agreement is triangular leads to an assumption that both Canada and the United States have underwritten each others undertakings.

While it is no doubt true that even with two separate agreements either country would attempt to go to the rescue in the case of an unavoidable default by the other, it would at least be clear that its action in such case was a special act of goodwill and not an incident of the agreement.

There is obviously very little difference between one overall agreement and two separate agreements reached as a result of a three-corner negotiation. It has, however, been the view of the authorities immediately concerned with the agreement here that the latter device would work rather more smoothly than the former. It is possible that this explanation will dispose of your objections but, if not, it will at least bring the issue forward for discussion, and it will be greatly appreciated here if you will let us know if you see any difficulty in the way of the course of action contemplated in the Minutes of the Food Requirements Committee.

Yours sincerely,

H. F. ANGUS

1187.

3265-V-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
par intérim à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 61

Ottawa, February 25, 1944

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the negotiations with the United States and Newfoundland representatives concerning the renewal of the Food Agreement, outlined in the State Department's note of May 10, 1943, have been entirely successful. Not only has an agreement been reached on the quantities of various foods to be supplied by the United States and by Canada, but a complete understanding has been reached as to the conditions under which the details of this Agreement may have to be modified in accordance with supply conditions.

2. The next step will be to put the Agreement into writing and for us to address a note to the State Department asking for United States concurrence. The Agreement will, like its predecessor, be subject to the approval of the Combined Food Board. Newfoundland has not been a party to the Agreement in the past but has expressed approval of it and so has the Dominions Office. The reason for this procedure has been that Newfoundland is assuming no major obligations under the Agreement. The Newfoundland representatives distinctly prefer the present form of agreement to a possible alternative of two separate agreements between Newfoundland on the one hand and each of the two supplying countries on the other. The reason seems to be that Newfoundland, which is itself undertaking no major obligations, would feel in a weak position in dealing with either of the supplying countries while under the present type of agreement either of those countries could be relied on to protest if the other does not live up to its undertakings.

3. The proceedings were concluded with great despatch and were marked by complete cordiality and complete confidence. The Newfoundland delegation expressed its appreciation of what had been done to meet its wishes and its complete conviction that when these wishes had not been met the reason had been that the supplying countries were unable rather than unwilling to furnish the supplies. On the other hand no suspicion was voiced by either of the supplying countries concerning the character of the administrative measures in Newfoundland for giving effect to the Agreement.

4. One main cause of friction has been removed. The Agreement is now concerned entirely with Newfoundland's civilian supply, and there will be special programming for the supplies required for canteens and other military establishments. The request for this modification came from the Newfoundland representatives and although some administrative inconvenience may be involved the Canadian and United States representatives felt that it was essentially fair that they should be asked to determine what supplies should reach their troops, and that the supplies for United Kingdom military and naval establishments and for ships' stores could also be most effectively dealt with under separate arrangements.

5. In the course of the negotiations the Newfoundland delegates, and particularly Mr. Symes, expressed concern over the low level of nutrition in Newfoundland and anxiety to increase nutritional standards, particularly as far as the supply of milk products was concerned. Both last year's Food Agreement and this Agreement have been based, in the main, on the prewar scale of supplies with some allowance for greater prosperity. It was not possible, in view of the great demands which are made on milk products at present, to give effect to the suggestion that the programme should take account of nutritional standards. It would, however, appear that this is a question which must sooner or later be faced and that if after the war the authorities in Newfoundland are prepared to concern themselves seriously with the question of nutrition they should be able to count on the sympathetic

support and, if necessary, on the material assistance of Canada. Our undertakings in connection with the Conference on Food and Agriculture make it especially important that we should not neglect a country which is our immediate neighbour.

6. It would, therefore, be appreciated if you can keep in touch with any post-war planning which may be undertaken in Newfoundland with respect to nutrition and keep the Canadian authorities informed as to what part Canada will be expected to play in providing supplies. It may even be possible that we can provide some assistance in connection with the planning in view of the nutritional studies which are taking place here.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1188.

3265-V-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis*  
*Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State of United States*

No. 222

Washington, June 12, 1944

Sir,

I have the honor to refer to your note of May 10, 1943, confirming an agreement for meeting the food requirements of Newfoundland and Labrador.

As a result of negotiations between representatives of the Foreign Economic Administration and of the Canadian authorities concerned with food supplies, a supply programme for Newfoundland has been agreed on for the year beginning April 1, 1944. Representatives of the Commission of Government of Newfoundland were present at the meetings, which took place in Ottawa, and concurred in principle and in detail with the programme.

In addition to the agreed allocation of supplies for the twelve months period, April 1, 1944, to April 1, 1945, two copies of which are enclosed,<sup>1</sup> the Canadian Government further understands that

- (a) Allocations will be made on a quarterly basis in order that if it becomes necessary to do so reductions and substitutions may be made from time to time. It is understood that in any one quarter the United States would be willing to ship up to fifty per cent of the next quarter's allocation and to charge the shipment against that quarter. It is also understood that any quantities allocated in one quarter but not called for may be carried forward from one quarter to the next but that, at the end of the agreement year, any quantities which have not been called for will be cancelled.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



- (b) If one commodity in a group should be unavailable, substitution of a closely related item will be allowed; and if one supplying country finds itself unable to supply a particular commodity, or to make a suitable substitution for it, the other country will attempt to make up that country's quota for the commodity in question.
- (c) Each country will make available quarterly statements to the other two countries showing the quantities of commodities imported or exported as the case may be.
- (d) If either Canada or the United States undertakes to supply part of the quota of the other country to Newfoundland, the Government of Newfoundland has undertaken to supply the necessary particulars immediately.
- (e) The present agreement is limited to civilian supplies and, unlike its predecessor, excludes supplies to canteens, whether inside or outside the barrack area, ship stores, and supplies for certain civilian wartime organizations.
- (f) Each country will make every effort to replace, or supply substitutes for, goods lost in transit.
- (g) The appropriate agencies of the respective Governments will assist the Newfoundland Government in the event that commodities under domestic restriction or allocation control are not available in the commercial markets of the supplying country. This responsibility will include representations on behalf of Newfoundland to other departments of each Government and to the Combined Food Board, whenever such action is necessary.
- (h) All foregoing supply arrangements may be subject to adjustments to conform with any modifications which may be recommended by the Combined Food Board.

The Canadian Government would appreciate an expression from the Department of State confirming in turn this agreement as outlined herein.

Accept, etc.

M. M. MAHONEY  
for the Ambassador

1189.

3265-V-40

*Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis à l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis*  
*Secretary of State of United States to Ambassador in United States*

843. 24/23

Washington, June 24, 1944

Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June 12, 1944, which refers to the joint undertaking of this Government and the Canadian Government to supply the food requirements of Newfoundland for the period from April 1, 1944 to March 31, 1945.

The list of items in the proposed program has been submitted to the Foreign Economic Administration, which has the responsibility for securing allocations of materials coming from United States supply. The Department is informed that this list correctly represents the amounts to be supplied to Newfoundland during the program period.

The Department of State concurs in the general outline of the mutual undertaking as set forth in paragraphs (a) through (h) in the note under reference, and it is assumed that the food supply program became operative retroactively to April 1, 1944.

Accept, etc.

For the Secretary of State:

DEAN ACHESON

1190.

C 13876-C

*Le commissaire au commerce à Terre-Neuve au directeur du Service de renseignements commerciaux, ministère du Commerce*

*Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland to Director of Commercial Intelligence Service, Department of Trade and Commerce*

St. John's, October 19, 1944

#### THE FUTURE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

Dear Sir,

As you will have gathered from press comments, there is shortly to be a debate in the House of Commons in London, upon the future of Newfoundland. There are great expectations in this country as to what the debate will bring forth. Some people say that England will make enough available to this country to keep Newfoundland in a constant state of prosperity. Unquestionably, the final decision will be a disappointment.

In today's *Daily News* there is an item in the editorial page which is of great interest to us and I am quoting extracts from it, showing you the trend of its argument.

It is possible that a sense of obligation may be involved in a grant to Newfoundland in which case dollars may be made available. But if the scarcity of Canadian dollar exchange is as bad as the *Financial Post* puts it, Britain will be hard put to it to give us any. This may be a wrong assumption. But if it does not err, the question arises whether there is anything we can do to help Britain help us. One way would be to do without financial help for even development purposes. But what would happen to us in that event? Of course, if some proposition of the kind so often put forward in the *Daily News* for a deal by which we would exchange control of air and defence facilities for an annual grant from Britain, Canada and America running into at least a total of \$5,000,000 a year were possible of achievement, our financial problem would be solved. Failing this we have to think of something else.

There is only one other way of solving this problem. That is, for us to buy from Britain an amount equivalent to the dollars she may plan to give or lend us.

That could possibly be accomplished by increasing United Kingdom preference, or employing the maximum amount of U.K. machinery and services in all development and other public projects. The other alternative is to establish a Newfoundland dollar on a sterling basis which would situate us favourably for making the bulk of our purchases from Britain and would facilitate the extension to us of sterling grants. It would not hinder us in our general export trade and we would actually gain by selling much of our produce in American dollars provided also we could buy most of our needs in the British market.

It would create some disturbance of our trade relations. We would not, for example, be able to buy as much from Canada as we have done because Canada sells us many times as much as we buy from her. On the other hand it would not necessarily disturb our trade with America because we may expect to have a favourable balance of trade with that country. Certainly our export trade would be facilitated because so many of our competitors are within the sterling group. In the long run, of course, the principal influences would be the stability of the British economy created through the revival on a huge scale of British export trade and the balancing of the peacetime budget, and the ability of the British market to supply us on a competitive basis with the bulk of our needs.

When I was in Ottawa I mentioned the wisdom of attempting to negotiate a trade agreement with Newfoundland at the present time. What I am afraid of is that if we do not act now while we have something to offer, it will be too late. I am aware of the reasons why you do not believe it is possible to do anything at the present time, but I do not want you to be ignorant of the danger we are running by letting this matter stand.

Yours faithfully,

R. P. BOWER

1191.

C 13876-C

*Le directeur du Service de renseignements commerciaux, ministère du  
Commerce au commissaire au commerce à Terre-Neuve*

*Director of Commercial Intelligence Service, Department of Trade and  
Commerce, to Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] November 3, 1944

Dear Mr. Bower,

I wish now to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 19th, your file 150, in which you refer to the future trading position in Newfoundland and recommend that steps be taken, without delay, to negotiate a trade agreement with Newfoundland.

There are, of course, many factors affecting the advisability of proceeding along the lines which you evidently have in mind but I feel that it would be highly desirable for you, at your earliest convenience, to prepare a memorandum setting out your ideas as fully as possible as to the type of agreement which it would be practicable for Canada to seek. Presumably, it

would not be difficult to outline what Canada would wish to obtain from Newfoundland in the nature of tariff concessions but there may be considerably more difficulty in developing the other side of the picture. That is to say, what Canada could give Newfoundland that would be regarded by the Colony as an adequate balancing of the scales. However, as suggested, I think that you should give prompt and careful attention to a memorandum elaborating our previous correspondence on this subject.

You may consider it desirable, after a more detailed study of the matter, to come to Ottawa in the near future for discussions and if this should be the case, authority will be granted immediately for the purpose concerned. Possibly, on balance, the best procedure would be for you to prepare a memorandum, submit it to us for consideration, and then visit Ottawa, to clarify the various points concerning which we may be in doubt. You might let me have your views on this possibility.

Yours faithfully,

C. M. CROFT

1192.

C 13876-C

*Le commissaire au commerce à Terre-Neuve au directeur du Service  
de renseignements commerciaux, ministère du Commerce*

*Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland to Director of Commercial  
Intelligence Service, Department of Trade and Commerce*

CONFIDENTIAL

St. John's, November 7, 1944

TRADE TREATY WITH NEWFOUNDLAND

Dear Mr. Croft,

This will acknowledge your confidential letter of November 3 on the above subject. I hope you will have time to study my reply and the enclosures as I consider them of the utmost importance and interest.

First of all, may I suggest that you read the Press clippings attached? (A) is an editorial from the *Daily News* of November 6.<sup>1</sup> (B) is an editorial from the *Western Star* of October 28<sup>1</sup> and (C) a front page item from the same issue of the *Western Star*.

Canada's stock is at an all time low in Newfoundland, not because of the beef problem, but largely because of the Goose Bay airport deal, the formal agreement of which was announced about ten days ago. The feeling is worse than it would ordinarily be because the newspapers have been carrying on a very bitter anti-Canadian campaign. Not a single issue of the St. John's *Daily News* has been printed since the Goose Bay lease was announced that has not contained vitriolic attacks against Canada. Not a newspaper has been published in the whole island that has not contained

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



anti-Canadian editorials bolstered by numerous letters to the Editor along the same lines. The radio too, has added its share of abuse. There are some who see in this abuse an attempt to discredit the Commission of Government rather than to stir up anti-Canadian sentiment. On the whole, however, the views of the press are shared by the business community.

On Saturday, November 4, the Newfoundland Board of Trade addressed an open letter to the Commission of Government protesting in the strongest possible terms, the action of the Commission of Government in negotiating this agreement in the name of Newfoundland. This letter read in part as follows:

After full consideration of the terms of the Agreement the principles involved, and the various implications which would become relevant upon its ratification, the Board regards it as its duty to address the Government on this important issue . . .

It is our feeling, under the circumstances, that for the Canadian Government to seek such an agreement gives expression to an attitude of unfriendliness towards Newfoundland, a lack of respect for her national sensitivity, and a disregard for what is her reasonable ambition for material advantage. For an unrepresentative Newfoundland Government to enter into such negotiations was unstatesmanlike and unpatriotic . . .

It seems pertinent to record here the inclusion of a despatch relating to the abandonment of a convention between Great Britain and France, dealing with the right of the French to fish on the coast of Labrador from Cape Charles to Blanc Sablon, from the Colonial Secretary, Henry Labouchère to Governor Darling on behalf of the Imperial Government, dated March 26, 1857 and we quote:

The proposals contained in the convention having now been unequivocally refused by the Colony, they will of course fall to the ground; and you are authorized to give such assurance as you may think proper, that the consent of the community of Newfoundland is regarded by Her Majesty's Government as the essential preliminary to any modification of their territorial or maritime rights . . .

The conclusion is inevitable therefore, that in seeking a ninety-nine year lease of this territory for military purposes, the Canadian Government seeks a measure of control over the Goose Bay Airport through which she will be enabled to exercise a prior authority over civil operations for the period of the Agreement. To expect that she would not do so is to ask Newfoundland for a measure of confidence in Canada's goodwill towards this country which her attitude in this matter seriously impairs, if not altogether destroys . . .

We are certain it is the feeling of the people of Newfoundland that this Agreement should not have been proposed, and that its ratification would stand out in the future, as an injustice imposed upon a small country while her constitutional status was in suspension and, as a source of dissension and ill-will towards the Government of Canada, contrary to our historic relations . . .

Two things are manifest from a study of the above extracts:

- (1) Canada is even more unpopular than usual at the present time:
- (2) The people of Newfoundland resent any commitments made in their name by the present Administrative authority—the Commission of Government.

In connection with the second point above — the feeling is so strong that I am satisfied that any trade agreement now made by the Commission of Government with the Government of Canada — whether it was a good agreement or not — would be renounced by the people of Newfoundland at the first possible opportunity simply because it was a product of the Commission of Government. This would be doubly certain to take place if the agreement in question conferred any advantage on Canada.

Furthermore, the Commission of Government after the abuse it has taken over the Goose Bay Agreement, could never be induced (except under the greatest of pressure from the United Kingdom Government) to negotiate a trade treaty with Canada which would offer us any concessions. If we cannot hope to conclude an agreement which will offer us concessions, why attempt an agreement at all?

The fact of the matter is, we are now too late. Before this Goose Bay agreement was announced, we were in a fairly strong position here. We had helped the country out during a very trying period — at some inconvenience to ourselves — and there was a general appreciation of this fact despite a latent anti-Canadian attitude. I believe we could have arranged something at that time which would have given our products the same treatment as are [sic] at present accorded those from the United Kingdom. If we could not have arranged for such an agreement to take effect immediately, I think we could have laid the ground work for a treaty which would have become effective at the end of the war. Now anti-Canadian feeling is at a point where, unless it subsides, it will be absolutely impossible for us to negotiate any sort of a favourable trade treaty with Newfoundland.

I understand that the whole scheme of Imperial Preferences may be abandoned after the war in the process of implementing the Atlantic Charter. If that is so, then there is not much point in attempting to negotiate a treaty now which would either be negative in its concessions or would be limited in the term of its operations.

As you say in your letter, there are many factors affecting the advisability of proceeding along the lines I recommended in my previous letter, and, in view of the situation here to-day, I do not believe there is much we can hope to accomplish.

With your permission, I would like to prepare a memorandum along the lines that you suggest for your study and comment. This memorandum would be my idea of what we might hope to receive under normal conditions and assuming that the present hostile attitude toward Canada abates. I do not think that there is any great urgency about this matter now as I am satisfied we can do nothing for some time to come. I do not therefore intend to give this work the same priority which I would have given it under other circumstances so that the memorandum may be longer in reaching you than would otherwise have been the case. Unless, too, there is a marked change for the better in the general attitude towards Canada, I do not think that we will be able to progress to the point where it will be necessary for me to

visit Canada to discuss the matter with you. Should the situation improve — or should I have occasion to change my mind — I will immediately advise you.

Yours faithfully,

R. P. BOWER

1193.

C 13876-C

*Le commissaire au commerce à Terre-Neuve au directeur  
du Service de renseignements commerciaux, ministère du Commerce*

*Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland to Director  
of Commercial Intelligence Service, Department of Trade and Commerce*

St. John's, December 11, 1944

Dear Sir,

TRADE TREATY WITH NEWFOUNDLAND

Further to my letter of December 6<sup>1</sup> and the attached report<sup>2</sup> on a possible Trade Treaty with Newfoundland, it has occurred to me that if it is decided to attempt to negotiate a Trade Treaty with Newfoundland in the near future, it would be a good move to make this attempt either just before or just after negotiating an agreement to supply Newfoundland's food requirements for 1945. This would have the virtue of putting Newfoundland in the position of having to ask for certain concessions for the coming year and our action in meeting these requests would be fresh in their minds when discussing Trade Treaty matters.

I am aware that there are certain objections to this proposal, but I would like to put it forward for your consideration. If you are in favour, the suggestion might be put to Newfoundland that they should send delegates to Canada to negotiate a Trade Treaty at the same time as they are sending representatives to discuss the 1945 food allocations.

As the local Government can do absolutely nothing without encountering the severest criticism from the press and public it would be a good idea to try to arrange for the Newfoundland delegates to bring with them a large advisory committee made up from the merchants and business men in the community. You will remember that eighteen months ago, the Newfoundland delegates were accompanied by Mr. Brookes and Mr. Winter, representing the merchants of Newfoundland. This was one of the best things that ever happened to us as both these men, previously convinced that Canada was endeavouring to beat Newfoundland down, returned from the meeting enthusiastic supporters of the stand we had taken. I will await your comments with interest.

Yours faithfully,

R. P. BOWER

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 1192.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 1192.

1194.

C 13876-C

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 41

Ottawa, February 2, 1945

Sir,

The Department of Trade and Commerce has referred to us for comment a report<sup>1</sup> by Mr. R. P. Bower, Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland, on the considerations which would have to be taken into account in a trade agreement between Canada and Newfoundland. No doubt you have seen this report and we would welcome your views on it and also any observations you could make in general on the advisability of concluding an agreement and as to whether the time is propitious. The view that is held here is that the time is not ripe because the balance of trade is so heavily in Canada's favour and because the Commission is probably not disposed at this time to give consideration to an agreement.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON

for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1195.

3265-V-40

*Le secrétaire d'État des États-Unis à l'ambassadeur aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State of United States to Ambassador in United States*

843.24/2-645

Washington, March 14, 1945

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Canada and has the honor to refer to the joint undertaking of this Government and the Canadian Government to supply the food requirements of Newfoundland for the period from April 1, 1944 to March 31, 1945.

The agreement expires on March 31 of this year, and it is, therefore, proposed that the current arrangement be extended through December 31, 1945, at the same ratios of participation as are now in effect. Any modifications that may be dictated by seasonal demands or as the result of the experience of the past year will be handled as they arise by mutual exchange of information with the interested parties.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 1192.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 1192.



The United States Government would appreciate being informed whether the Canadian Government agrees to the extension of the present arrangement through December 31, 1945.

1196.

3265-V-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux États-Unis*  
*Ambassador in United States to Secretary of State of United States*

No. 94

Washington, March 19, 1945

The Canadian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honor to refer to Mr. Stettinius' note of March 14, 1945, suggesting that the present arrangement between the United States and Canadian Governments to supply the food requirements of Newfoundland for the period from April 1, 1944 to March 31, 1945, be extended through December 31, 1945, at the same ratios of participation as are now in effect.

The Canadian Ambassador has been requested to inform the Secretary of State that the Canadian Government concurs in the extension of the present agreement through December 31, 1945.

1197.

C 13876-C

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 133

St. John's, March 19, 1945

Sir,

I regret that in the absence of Mr. Britton I could not get around to dealing with your communication No. 41 of February 2nd requesting my observations on the negotiation of a Trade Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland which was proposed by Mr. Bower, the Canadian Government Trade Commissioner.

2. I have secured from Mr. Bower a copy of the report<sup>1</sup> to which you refer and have read it with interest. It may be useful for future reference to have this memorandum bringing together as it does the background of previous negotiations and some of the considerations that will have to be kept in mind in any trade negotiations that are entered into between Newfoundland and Canada. I do not think, however, there is much to be said for considering the negotiation of a Trade Agreement at this time or in

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 1192.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 1192.

the near future. Indeed, I can hardly think of anything that would be more destructive of general confidence and the possibility of working out sound international tariff and general economic relations than for Canada at this juncture to start making preferential Trade Agreements with other parts of the Commonwealth. Nor would it be sound policy, either from a general or a local point of view, to endeavour to secure long-term tariff advantages from the fact that under allied supply arrangements Newfoundland is temporarily dependent upon Canada for an unusual proportion of its supplies. It might possibly have been worth-while endeavouring at the beginning of the war to secure the same rates as are accorded to the United Kingdom though most of these are on commodities in which we are not interested. At any rate there is no present prospect of securing a favourable Trade Agreement. It should be remembered, however, that in this country rates of duty, though high, are levied almost entirely for revenue. They are gradually being reduced as a larger part of the revenue is secured by direct taxation. In the meantime their reimposition does not mean here as it usually does elsewhere, that Canadian goods are excluded for the benefit of goods of local manufacture but only that imports of the classes of goods for which the demand is elastic may be somewhat restricted by the higher prices made necessary by the duties.

3. An endeavour to secure a more favourable trade position than we now enjoy, or to make the present favourable situation more permanent in character would, I feel sure, do nothing to make relations more cordial with Newfoundland. It would, almost certainly, have the opposite effect. In my view no steps should be taken to attempt to negotiate a Trade Agreement with Newfoundland at least until the delicate and difficult negotiations respecting post-war military and commercial rights on the Bases are disposed of either by Confirming Acts or new Agreements. If it should so happen that these problems are disposed of by the wider solution of political union, questions of trade advantage would, of course, be solved at the same time.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1198.

2959-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 365

December 1, 1945

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to a "Statement of Imports and Exports of Newfoundland by Countries, for the year ended March 31st, 1945, and Comparative Figures for the year ended March 31st, 1944," issued by the

Secretary for Customs, copy of which is enclosed with this despatch.<sup>1</sup> This statement has been issued in advance of the Customs Returns which will appear shortly and in which the Statement will be incorporated.

2. The total trade for the year 1944-45 was \$114,536,046, an increase of \$7,602,777 over last year's figure. This is a new high and represents gains both in domestic exports, which were up nearly 10%, and in non-war imports which were up by something between 10% and 20%, depending on the extent of importations for the Armed Forces. This latter figure, which in 1943-44 was \$15,907,602, will not be available this year due to a new system of compiling customs returns. It has, however, been unofficially estimated to lie in the neighbourhood of \$10,000,000, a figure which is probably low.

3. As usual, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom provided the bulk of the imports—some 98% in this case. This is indicated by the following table:

<i>Total Imports</i>	<i>Fiscal Year 1943-44</i>	<i>Fiscal Year 1944-45</i>
From Canada	\$41,483,171	\$43,034,879
From United States	18,110,312	19,362,642
From United Kingdom	2,039,041	2,088,003
<hr/>		
Total from Canada		
U.S.A. and U.K.	\$61,632,524	\$64,485,524
Total from all countries	\$62,488,649	\$65,824,066

Imports from Canada have increased appreciably in the past fiscal year. Importations from Canada for the forces in 1943-44 totalled \$13,412,600. For 1944-45 they have been unofficially estimated to approximate \$8,000,000, a figure which is likely somewhat short of the mark. On this basis, the increase in Newfoundland's non-war imports from Canada during the past fiscal year would be something between 10% and 25%. There has also been a noticeable increase in imports from the United States, while imports from the United Kingdom show little change.

4. The 10% rise in domestic exports largely reflects sales to U.N.R.R.A. and expansion of established markets for Newfoundland fish products. Greece and Italy, which have for some years as a result of the war been excluded from Newfoundland's trade, together absorbed more than \$2,000,000 worth of Newfoundland produce. While exports to Spain dropped slightly, Portugal imported substantially more Newfoundland products than during the previous fiscal year. Mexico, Brazil and the Argentine also purchased increased quantities of Newfoundland goods. The British West Indies and Porto Rico continued to be important customers. Increases in exports to several smaller countries were to some extent offset by drops in sales to certain minor markets.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

5. Canada's purchases of Newfoundland products dropped about 9% during the period under reference, while United States purchases dropped about 5%. Exports of Newfoundland produce to the United Kingdom were up slightly. These three countries together absorbed about 60% of Newfoundland's domestic exports. These statements may be indicated by reference to the following table:

<i>Domestic Exports</i>	<i>Fiscal Year</i> 1943-44	<i>Fiscal Year</i> 1944-45
To Canada	\$6,924,088	\$6,294,506
To United States	13,583,527	12,836,809
To United Kingdom	11,436,099	12,055,626
Total to Canada, U.S.A. and U.K.	\$31,943,714	\$31,186,941
Total to all Countries	\$42,397,415	\$46,414,485

6. The St. John's *Evening Telegram* comments editorially on the trade statistics presented by the Statement under reference, by stating that they "show a gratifying up-swing in Newfoundland's industrial activities." The *Daily News*, in its editorial column is somewhat more critical, stating that:

the whole picture, as it has done so often in the past, emphasizes an inherent weakness in our trading position, inasmuch as the three countries, that together supply 98% of our imports, buy from us only 60% of our exports. The position is far worse when the trade with individual countries is analysed. Canada, for example, sells us six times as much as she buys. Britain is buying six times as much as she sells, although this position will undoubtedly be rectified when British goods are in easier supply. The United States has a net favourable balance of trade with Newfoundland of \$5,000,000. As against this a group of countries to which we sell most of our fish products, supplies us with almost nothing at all.

It concludes that Newfoundland must "find means to bring our trade with all important countries into better balance . . . in readiness for a time when exchange and other difficulties may operate to our disadvantage."

7. The *Daily News* also points out that payment for goods and services in Newfoundland by "garrison troops" and "other external sources" can be regarded as operating so as to wipe out the unfavourable balance of total trade. The paper does not, however, appear to have taken account of invisible payments in the reverse direction as a result of services rendered by Canadian banking, insurance and transportation companies.

8. "The Wayfarer" writing in the *Daily News* of November 28th, analyses Newfoundland's trade on a per capita basis and concludes that the per capita rate "is significant of our complete dependence on foreign trade." He goes on to urge the necessity and justice of a revision of the United States tariff in Newfoundland's favour. He takes account of "the balance of payment to Canada on invisible trade" and concludes that, in view of Canada's being a competitor with Newfoundland in the export market, the only practical way to adjust Newfoundland's unfavourable balance of trade with Canada appears to be the granting of shipping and other subsidies. He em-



phasizes that Newfoundland's dependence on Canadian imports compels her to remain tied to the Canadian dollar.

9. I will forward you copies of the Customs Returns as soon as they are received in this Office.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1199.

PRO DO 35 1151 572/1/2 X/J 9827

*Le commissaire aux Finances au Bureau des Dominions*

*Commissioner for Finance to Dominions Office*

294.40/33

St. John's, August 29, 1946

Dear John [Chadwick],

In a personal letter you referred to the oral report I made to Commission regarding the effects of the recent appreciation of the Canadian dollar, and enquired what was my assessment of the position.

The change was quite unexpected here, and according to Graham Towers, who sent me a long cable the night before it became effective (and 'phoned as well), it was a quick decision of the Canadian Government, although I have no doubt that they had previously considered what steps they should take if the need arose. Undervaluation of the Canadian compared with the U.S. dollar had been obvious for some time; but the sudden abolition of O.P.A. was the immediate cause of the change, as well as a suitable opportunity.

I do not need to expatiate on the general effect on our economy, which you can readily judge by reference to the Customs returns. On the import side, our purchases at the moment are governed more by availability than by price. On the export side, our immediate concern was, of course, its effect on sales other than those made in Canadian dollars. We were mostly concerned about paper, herring shipments sold in U.S. dollars, and UNRRA shipments of dried cod, for which the contract had not been finally completed (although the price was to be expressed in Canadian dollars). The latter has been adjusted to the satisfaction of local shippers, thanks to stout assistance from the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board, who treated UNRRA generously by allowing them to use Canadian dollars acquired at the old price. The herring shippers caused a fuss, but they had previously been informed that futures were available if they wanted them and, in any event, they have done very well this season. The paper industry was not greatly concerned as it slapped 10% on its U.S. price, though the reincarnation of O.P.A. has now made it necessary for the industry to get official approval. We have had no complaints as yet from the mining industry.

You also asked about repercussions on staff. The instructors at the Vocational Training School have already presented a memorial asking for adjustment of their sterling salaries to give them the old equivalent in dollars.

One may expect a similar claim from the seconded U. K. Civil Servants, and I imagine that if this happens the U. K. Commissioners will not want to be left out. I think I can enumerate most, if not all, of the official arguments which will probably be put forward against adjustment, but the Instructors are feeling very aggrieved and will probably press their claim. They could not, of course, claim more than the loss on the sterling they actually need to draw out here; it would obviously not apply to any part of salary allotted to wife or family. It would be of great assistance if you could let us know whether any claim has been received or adjustment considered in respect of the numerous U. K. Government servants stationed in Canada, or if you could give us any other indication of official views on the subject. As you know there is little or no margin out here, and the 10% cut may be serious, though to some extent it will vary in accordance with the circumstances of particular individuals.

Yours sincerely,

[IRA] WILD

1200.

2959-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1085

St. John's, December 29, 1948

Sir,

I have the honour to report that figures have recently been released by the Department of Finance on the external trade of Newfoundland for the fiscal year ending March 31st, 1948. A summary of imports by commodity groups together with total exports by countries of destination are given in Table A.<sup>1</sup>

2. Accompanying the table is a summary consisting of thirteen points of special interest concerning imports for the period under review.

3. Attention is drawn to the fact that the import returns include goods consigned to the three United States bases at St. John's, Argentia and Stephenville via non-commercial channels, that is, by rail, or non-military vessels. The total value of these imports, although not recorded separately, represents a very small part of the total imports for United States military account.

4. The unprecedented dollar level of imports during 1947-48 was, in part, the result of steeply rising Canadian and American prices during 1947. The price increase in this period is strikingly illustrated by the Government index of the cost of living in Newfoundland which rose from 168.0 to 185.1 in 1947-48 or 17.1 points as against 4.3 points the year before. Allowing for

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

an adjustment for this price increase it is estimated that the physical volume of imports advanced by as much as twenty-five per cent.

5. The availability of many products influenced this change, namely, flour and grain products, meat products, oils and fats, rubber manufactures, wool clothing, lumber and manufactures, construction materials, pipe and fittings, tools, electric motors and machinery, appliances, industrial machinery and motor vehicles. The postwar expansion programme of the paper mills, mining companies, fish filleting plants and secondary industries contributed to the increases, together with the reconstruction programme of the Government and Municipalities.

6. The United States share of Newfoundland's imports has progressed in importance from 31.3% (1945-46) and 34.2% (1946-47) to 38.3% in the last fiscal year. Canada's share has slipped from 62.7% to 52.3% over the same period or a loss of 10.4% of which 7% has gone to the United States and 3.4% to other countries, mainly the United Kingdom.

7. The imports by quarters shown in Table B indicate a steeper falling off of Canada's imports in the last quarter of 1947-48 than the year before. It is doubtful if this has any special significance or political origin. The October-December quarter is the busiest import season of the year coming as it does before the onset of bad weather and freeze-up of northerly ports. Throughout last year imports were on the average heavier than the year before so that there was a smaller accumulated demand in the last quarter than existed in 1946-47. The sharp falling off probably had little relation to the approaching referendum of June, 1948.

TABLE B

Quarter	CANADA		U.S.A.	
	1946-47	1947-48	1946-47	1947-48
April-June	9,821,932	12,953,567	6,161,726	11,092,756
July-September	11,318,239	13,496,539	5,445,266	9,564,654
October-December	13,312,576	18,266,203	7,179,500	11,444,331
January-March	8,629,313	10,269,617	7,013,536	8,204,774
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 43,082,060	54,985,926	25,800,028	40,306,515

8. During the current fiscal year, different forces have been at work which have affected the country's imports. The two main periods of importation are the first and third quarters of the fiscal year. During the first quarter, importers in Newfoundland were uneasy as to the outcome of the first referendum which was to take place on June 3rd. Buying was, accordingly, cautious. When it became necessary to hold a second ballot on July 22nd, this period of hesitant buying extended into the second and third quarters, during which merchants prepared their buying programmes in relation to their anticipated inventory position on March 31st — the target date for Confederation. This is borne out by a reduction in American exports to Newfoundland of over 25 per cent during the first five months of the current

fiscal year.\* According to Canadian Export figures, however, the volume of goods shipped to Newfoundland over the same period increased by 9.2% and 8.4% for the seven months ending October.

9. The falling off of American imports does not wholly account for the loss of Customs revenue which up to August of this year was 13.8 per cent lower than last year. At the end of November, revenues were still 14 per cent behind those a year ago. During the last few months there has been a considerable expansion in bonded warehouse space according to information received from the Newfoundland Customs Department. It is evident, therefore, that the importers have adopted the practice of keeping as much of their stocks as possible in bond and removing them in small lots in accordance with daily requirements. This practice will permit importers and merchants to reduce inventories, particularly of Canadian goods, to a minimum before the merger of Canadian and Newfoundland customs. Deliveries of new goods will be postponed until April where practicable.

10. Commodities with rapid turn-over and those subject to low duties or of an essential nature have been imported throughout in the usual quantities. This will likely continue until the end of the fiscal year. Purchases of clothing, footwear, durable items, building materials, capital goods have been kept to a minimum.

11. For the first quarter of 1949 many companies are laying plans to stock up in American goods which are in heavy demand or else which will be subject to import restrictions after Confederation. The extent to which these plans are prosecuted will depend on the Emergency Exchange Control ruling of the Canadian Government on the status of American goods remaining in bond after Confederation. If, as it has been suggested, Emergency Exchange Controls are exercised in respect to such goods, purchases will be confined to the importation of only those items which can profitably be imported under Newfoundland duties (as opposed to Canadian) or to those for which 'scarcity' prices will be paid after Confederation. This buying will, however, serve to leaven imports and counterbalance the reduction in other imports during the last quarter of 1949.

12. The outlook for Canadian trade with Newfoundland in 1948-49 is, on the whole, promising. It has thus far run counter to the expectations of Newfoundland importers and merchants.

13. Had Canadian Emergency Exchange controls been in force in Newfoundland during the fiscal year 1947-48, imports from the United States would have been — according to a rough estimate — limited to as little as twenty-five million dollars or between 60 and 65 per cent of the present figure. If the same rate of spending is maintained in 1949, a 35% cutback in United States dollar purchases is forecast following Confederation. Imports for the twelve months ending June 30, 1947, (The Emergency Exchange Control base year) came to \$30,732,592. Should the same base year be used for Newfoundland as for the rest of Canada, United States imports may be reduced to as little as twenty million dollars (65% of \$30,732,592). An

\* Source: U.S. Bureau of Census monthly export returns.



upward adjustment of this figure may be necessary after a careful analysis of the components of Newfoundland's actual purchases during the twelve months ending June 30, 1947.

14. The imports from the United States after union may well fall, therefore, to fifty per cent of last year's \$40,312,868. The disruption and dissatisfaction which would result from so drastic a cut may indicate the need to select a more favourable base year such as the calendar year 1947 when United States imports totalled \$37,788,314 or 93.7% of the figure for 1947-48.

15. The export returns (See Table C) include \$2,629,334 of re-exported goods of foreign origin. Newfoundland produced goods were valued at \$77,838,593 or \$8,480,168 more than those exported in 1946-47, that is, \$69,358,425. The increase of 9.3% is considerably lower than the previous year 13.9%.

TABLE C

## Newfoundland Customs Returns for Export of Produce of Newfoundland

1937-1938	\$34,482,580
1938-1939	31,376,144
1939-1940	32,837,323
1940-1941	36,723,352
1941-1942	37,416,284
1942-1943	28,501,451
1943-1944	42,397,415
1944-1945	46,414,485
1945-1946	60,862,405
1946-1947	69,358,425
1947-1948	77,838,593

A breakdown of exports is not available for comment in this report.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

## PARTIE 2/PART 2

## LES PÊCHERIES

## FISHERIES

1201.

6262-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au secrétaire  
de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary,  
Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

Ottawa, May 10, 1938

Sir,

The attention of the Canadian Government has been drawn to changes made in the past year or two in the Newfoundland fishing regulations —

changes which have cancelled privileges that have been in operation for a great many years and which cause considerable hardship to Canadian vessels fishing in Newfoundland waters or on the neighbouring Banks.

The first of these relates to the regulations governing ships' stores. Canadian vessels calling at Newfoundland ports to take on crews, equipment, bait, etc., have had customs duties levied on the ships' stores even though such stores have not been landed in Newfoundland and have, indeed, in many cases been brought back to Canada, in part at least, unconsumed. The Canadian Government, on its side, collects no duties on ships' stores carried by Newfoundland fishing vessels, unless, as rarely happens in practice, such stores are landed in Canada.

The second point to which I should like to refer relates to the warehousing of fish. For many years past it has been the custom for Nova Scotia fishing vessels, after a trip to the fishing grounds, to place fish in Newfoundland warehouses pending their return to the Banks to catch sufficient fish to load their vessels. The fish, of course, are not intended for sale in Newfoundland. This practice has resulted in the purchase of bait, salt, etc. from local merchants and, generally, has brought more business to Newfoundland ports. In the last year or two this long-established privilege has been refused Canadian vessels. Newfoundland vessels may, however, land their catch in Canada free of duty and taxes.

In view of the hardships which the enforcement of these new regulations is causing to Canadian fishermen and of the very favourable treatment which continues to be accorded in Canada to Newfoundland fishing vessels and to Newfoundland fish, it would be greatly appreciated if the appropriate authority of the Newfoundland Government could see its way to remove the disabilities abovementioned and to restore that measure of reciprocity which has prevailed with respect to vessels and fish between Canada and Newfoundland for so many years past.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON

for Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1202.

6262-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au sénateur William Duff*  
*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Senator William Duff*

Ottawa, December 23, 1938

Dear Senator,

I have received your letter dated the 19th December, 1938<sup>1</sup> concerning the question of the collection of duties by the Newfoundland Government on the ship's stores belonging to the schooner *A. W. Chisholm*.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

I had hoped that we should be able to obtain some action by the Newfoundland authorities upon the questions of principle involved, before this. It has not been possible as yet to get a decision and, consequently, it becomes necessary to revise the course followed in these negotiations.

The Newfoundland Government is now being asked, as a matter of executive clemency, and independently of the disposition of the questions of policy involved, to give sympathetic consideration to your claim for a refund of the monies paid on account of duties and expenses.

With regard to your request that the matter should be taken up with the British authorities in London, it does not seem to me that such a course would be justified. There are a great many important interests involved in our relations with Newfoundland and, on the whole, it seems to be satisfactory to deal with the Government directly. I should hesitate to prejudice the general relations with the Newfoundland Government by taking this matter up directly with London.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1203.

6262-40

*Le secrétaire de la commission pour Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary, Commission of Government of Newfoundland, to Under-Secretary  
of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, February 9, 1939

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter of December 23rd, 1938,<sup>1</sup> which has reference to the alleged changes in the treatment accorded to Canadian fishing vessels entering ports in Newfoundland, and in particular to the claim made in respect of the schooner *A. W. Chisholm* which visited this Country in the Spring of 1937. It was the understanding of the Government that all questions in connection with this particular case had been disposed of by the remission of duties upon certain of the equipment of the schooner in question, as explained by the then Chairman of the Board of Customs to the Honourable W. Duff of Lunenburg in a letter dated 6th October, 1937.<sup>1</sup>

Section 158(1) of the Newfoundland Customs and Excise Act 1938 provides, however, that all vessels desiring to take part in the fisheries of Newfoundland must obtain a special fishery clearance and must not have on board any goods subject to duty upon which duty has not been paid. It should not be overlooked that if a Newfoundland vessel in possession of a

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

special fishery clearance touches at a Canadian or foreign port, its Newfoundland fishery clearance is automatically cancelled, and on returning to Newfoundland any such vessel becomes liable to all the Customs Regulations regarding the arrival of vessels from a foreign country and consequently to the payment of duty upon any stores or equipment which may have been purchased outside this Country. Newfoundland vessels are not therefore specially favoured in this respect.

It would not appear that vessels of Newfoundland registry receive "favourable treatment" in Canada. Any such vessels pay the dues normally chargeable on vessels of any nationality visiting Canada, and they do not receive a remission of duty upon any goods purchased there when taken on board their vessels. It is also understood that the purchase of goods, free of duty ex bond, is permitted only when a clearance is granted for deep sea fishing. The admission into Canada of fish caught by vessels of Newfoundland registry free of duty is, of course, treatment which would similarly be accorded to fish caught by vessels of Canadian registry if landed in Newfoundland for consumption here.

Vessels in possession of Newfoundland fishery clearances are permitted to land their catch in this Country and return to the fishing grounds to resume fishing. No other vessel, however, is accorded this privilege. To do so would in fact be tantamount to establishing a base in Newfoundland for foreign fishing vessels, and as these vessels would not have paid duty on their stores they would be in a position of unfair advantage as compared with local vessels which had paid such duties.

The requirement that duty be paid upon stores falls equally upon vessels of Newfoundland registry or vessels engaged in the fisheries or coastal trade of Newfoundland. Canadian vessels entering into the trade or fisheries of this Island pay neither less nor more than Newfoundland vessels. There is therefore no question of the application to Canadian vessels of any invidious distinction or indeed of any treatment different to that accorded to our own vessels.

While it may be that in the past isolated cases have occurred in which the requirements of the law were not sufficiently understood by the officers of Customs in the more remote outports, and that in consequence Canadian fishermen were not called upon to pay duties which were, in fact, prescribed by Newfoundland law, or that unauthorized landings of fish were permitted, the Government is unable to accept your contention that the enforcement of the law introduces any innovation, or that there has been any change whatever in the treatment of Canadian fishing vessels.

I have etc.

W. J. CAREW



1204.

6262-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au sénateur William Duff*  
*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Senator William Duff*

Ottawa, February 17, 1939

Dear Senator Duff,

On the 23rd December, 1938, I wrote to you concerning the *Chisholm* case.

This Department had already taken up with the Newfoundland authorities the question of principle involved. At that time, no decision had been reached on these questions of principle and, accordingly, I informed you that the Department was taking up the specific questions relating to the *Chisholm* claim itself, and urging that they should be settled immediately, irrespective of whether it would be possible to deal with the general questions involved.

Word has now been received from the Newfoundland authorities, dealing both with the *Chisholm* claim and with the broader questions of principle involved. The decision of the Newfoundland Government is adverse, in both instances.

Accordingly, the whole question is being reconsidered, with a view to submission to the Government of the question of what further action should be taken in the circumstances. The *Chisholm* claim is very closely linked with other aspects of the Newfoundland situation that have been brought to the attention of the Department from various other sources.

Yours sincerely,

O. D. SKELTON

1205.

6262-40

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du comité interministériel sur les pêcheries*  
*de Terre-Neuve et de la Nouvelle-Ecosse*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Interdepartmental Committee on*  
*Newfoundland-Nova Scotian Fisheries*

[Ottawa,] April 3, 1939

On Monday, March 20th, at 2:30 p.m., an interdepartmental Committee was convened in Room 123 East Block to study the question of the relation of Canada and Newfoundland in the matter of fisheries.

There were present:

Mr. J. E. Read, Chairman,  
Mr. P. L. Young  
Mr. Munro  
Mr. W. J. Callaghan  
Mr. N. A. Robertson  
Mr. L. D. Wilgress  
Mr. A. E. Fortington  
Mr. H. F. S. Paisley

Department of External Affairs  
Department of National Revenue  
Department of National Revenue  
Department of Finance  
Department of External Affairs  
Department of Trade & Commerce  
Department of Trade & Commerce  
Department of Fisheries.

. . .

Points of a general nature were brought in at intervals during the discussion.

Mr. Wilgress mentioned the fears that were rising over the new arrangement between Newfoundland and General Sea Foods, which might result in Newfoundland taking a large part of the United States fish quota of 15,000,000 lbs. We have the right to have this quota allocated, and there is a possibility of our doing so in the near future.

Mr. Robertson drew the attention of the Committee to the fact that, although Newfoundland and Canada may quarrel over certain small points, they both have a wider common interest in the protection of the North Atlantic fisheries against encroachments by foreigners, and also against depletion.

A third point is that our immigration regulations practically prohibit the migration of Newfoundlanders to Canada; this question might be considered when a settlement is brought about.

. . .

1206.

6262-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Commission of Government  
of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 12

Ottawa, June 13, 1940

Reference your letter February 9 1939 and other correspondence concerning position of Canadian fishing vessels in Newfoundland.

In view of changed circumstances, including war conditions, it is hoped that it may be possible to renew the consideration of the general policy of imposing duties on a ship's stores not landed during a temporary call. I expect to communicate by letter shortly for that purpose.

Meanwhile, the special question of imposing duties on fish caught by Canadian vessels which land their fish temporarily in Newfoundland before

bringing them back to Canada is a matter of great urgency and it is hoped that your Government will give consideration to interim relief for the present season, pending the discussion of more permanent arrangements. The possibility of pressure from foreign countries for similar concessions now seems to be remote and it is hoped that you will be willing to make a special concession for the present season, pending the adoption of a more permanent policy on a reciprocal basis.

1207.

6262-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Commission of Government  
of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 37

Ottawa, June 9, 1941

My telegram No. 12 of June 13th, 1940. Position of Canadian fishing vessels in Newfoundland. In view of reported scarcity of salt in Newfoundland and of loss of valuable time and increased war risk involved in bringing catches back to Canada, Canadian Government would strongly urge that Canadian vessels be accorded permission, for the present season, pending discussion of more permanent arrangement, to store their supply of salt temporarily in Newfoundland, and to land their fish temporarily in Newfoundland before bringing them back to Canada at end of fishing trip. As fishing fleet is now fitting out for summer season and question is of importance to war economy through its bearing on acquisition of foreign exchange, would greatly appreciate if you could direct attention of competent authorities to this matter and let me have reply at earliest convenience.

1208.

6262-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 36

St. John's, June 17, 1941

Your telegram of June 9th, No. 37. We regret for the reason given in this Government's letter of February 9th, 1939, to Deputy Secretary of State, proposal cannot be adopted.

1209.

NPA S-6-1-7

*L'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne aux États-Unis au gouverneur  
de Terre-Neuve*

*Ambassador of Great Britain in United States to Governor  
of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 2

Washington, January 24, 1943

No. 2 For Dunn from Van Zwanenberg.

(1) Combined Food Board has set up Committee to deal with fish and fish products, whose task it will be to suggest to Board what recommendations of assignment to make with regard to usage and destination of exports of raw fish supplies available to the United Nations. Usage will include nature of processing to be applied to raw fish when there is a choice as between canning, drying, salting, dehydrating, etc.

(2) Importance of this matter to Newfoundland was fully realized and it was felt that your view on this particular question should be expressed through direct representation on Committee rather than through Canada which is arrangement agreed on most other products. A formal communication inviting appointment of Newfoundland Representative will be forthcoming from C.F.B.

(3) Meantime first formal meeting of C.F.B. Fish Committee has been fixed for February 11th at which main object of discussion appears likely to be United States's apprehension as to supplies of dried fish for Puerto Rico. Leighton will be present representing Canada and wider problems are bound to be discussed. In particular we wish to welcome opportunity to discuss privately with you and Finn possibility of increasing frozen fish supplies to the United Kingdom. Hope therefore you will be able to arrange to be present personally and suggest you should endeavour to arrive at least one day before meeting so that we can have discussion here first.

1210.

NPA S-6-1-7

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve à l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne  
aux États-Unis*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Ambassador of Great Britain  
in United States*

TELEGRAM 5

[St. John's,] January 27, 1943

Reference telegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs No. 39 of 20th. January<sup>1</sup> and telegram from H. M. Ambassador, Washington, No. 2 of 24th January. Following for Van Zwanenberg from Dunn. Begins. Many thanks for arranging for Newfoundland representation on Fish Committee. We gladly accept invitation to nominate a representative to serve on

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Committee. Am arranging to attend accompanied by Gushue, Chairman of Newfoundland Fisheries Board. We hope to arrive on 7th. February as we have other business in Washington and will be glad to attend preliminary meeting as suggested by you. Will communicate with you on arrival. Ends.

1211.

2816-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Assistant Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, March 26, 1943

Dear Keenleyside,

Dunn tells me that when he was in Washington, the American authorities with whom he was in discussion concerning the purchase of Newfoundland fish, told him that Newfoundland must control the export price or the United States would not continue to deal with them.

He said that he agreed to do this, provided Canada would also control its export price for fish.

He also tells me that he went on to Ottawa and had a discussion about the matter there, with the result that Canada agreed to the proposal and also arranged to send some of their representatives from the Department of Fisheries here for inspection of the way Newfoundland is handling some of its fish problems.

I understand that three men arrived within the last day or two from the Department of Fisheries and are now engaged in this inspection. I also understand that the Assistant Deputy Minister of Fisheries is arriving today.

I have heard no word from you about the matter, but I am assuming that Dunn's information is correct.

I think that some joint control by Canada and Newfoundland of the price of fish is probably a step in the right direction, looking forward to a still closer cooperation between the two countries in fishery matters. There are, however, several snags which will have to be removed before any working arrangement can actually be made.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1212.

NPA S-6-1-7

*Extrait d'une circulaire du commissaire canadien au commerce à Terre-Neuve  
Excerpt from Circular by Canadian Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland*

St. John's, June 10, 1943

NEWFOUNDLAND FISH FOR WEST INDIES

During the past season, Newfoundland fish, which was sold to accounts in the islands of the West Indies was largely transported to those areas.

through the co-operation of the Canadian Shipping Board. This Board agreed that Newfoundland should share with Canada in the limited shipping space available on the West Indian boats. The ratio of Canadian to Newfoundland fish taken was roughly in proportion to the share that these two countries had of the pre-war business of the islands. The scheme was largely responsible for the fact that the bulk of Newfoundland's commitments to the islands were [sic] fulfilled.

1213.

Bates Papers vol. 4

*Mémorandum du conseiller spécial du sous-ministre des Pêcheries*<sup>1</sup>  
*Memorandum by Special Assistant to Deputy Minister of Fisheries*<sup>1</sup>

Ottawa, June 22, 1943

## SALT FISH ALLOCATION SCHEME

Because the probable world supplies of salt fish during 1943 are estimated to be only about one half of the demands of the United Nations and certain other countries, and because a proper sharing of this foodstuff is considered vital to the proper conduct of the war, the Combined Food Board in Washington evolved a plan of world rationing. The supplying countries — Canada, Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands — have been asked to co-operate in preparing a plan of world allocation. The probable world supply has been divided between the buying nations — the U.S.A., the U.K., the B.W.I., Latin America, Spain and Portugal — and each supplying country has been given quotas to be sold to certain markets.

Under the plan, Canada has agreed to dispose of its portable 27 million pound production as follows:

U.S.A.	8,380,000	lbs.	
Porto Rico	5,870,000	"	
U.K.	2,370,000	"	
B.W.I.	5,850,000	"	
Latin America	3,480,000	"	
Reserve	1,380,000	"	27,300,000

The reserve is held for the present in case readjustments have to be made later, according to shipping possibilities, production conditions, etc.

A uniform world price schedule has been fixed for all the grades and varieties of salt fish that make up this total and the participating countries (both buyers and sellers) must adhere to this price structure as part of the allocation scheme. Some varieties of salt fish of small international importance have been excluded from allocation at present — pickled herring, mackerel and alewives.

<sup>1</sup> Stewart Bates.

The operation of the scheme requires control of exports by the supplying countries and control of imports by the buying countries. In Canada, it is proposed that the salt fish industry should by its own self-government achieve the ends in view. There have been two Salt Fish Exporters Associations formed, one for the Maritimes and one for Quebec. These associations have been informed of the above allocations, and they will decide between them how each will share these totals, and then how the Association will divide its quota to the different markets among the individual members or importers. Export permits will be issued on the recommendation of the associations and in this way the total Canadian export to any one country will be made to conform to the international allocations agreed upon. No exporter can export salt fish without an export permit. And no exporter can secure a permit without the recommendation of the association, otherwise there would be no unifying force to achieve the required international distribution of the fish. In the case of small producers living near the U.S. borders, and who normally exported small amounts of green-salted and boneless fish, special arrangements will have to be worked out. All other producers will require to operate through the associations in order to establish the shares.

The value of the fish affected by this scheme will be approximately \$4,500,000.

1214.

Bates Papers vol. 4

*Mémoire du conseiller spécial du sous-ministre des Pêcheries  
à la Commission des prix et du commerce en temps de guerre*  
*Memorandum from Special Assistant to Deputy Minister of Fisheries  
to Wartime Prices and Trade Board*

Ottawa, June 30, 1943

RE: RISE IN CANADIAN SALT FISH EXPORT PRICES IN 1943

The main varieties of fish that are sold in the salted form are not under any Canadian price ceiling when sold either fresh or frozen. There has been, therefore, a steady rise in the prices of these fish, and this has affected the export price of the salted form. Furthermore, U.S.A. fresh fish prices have been ranging 20% above the Canadian prices of the same varieties, a factor adding an additional upthrust to Canadian fish prices.

In 1943 the Combined Food Board recommended that salt fish be allocated internationally, and the implementing of this recommendation added to Canadian export prices for the following reason: The essence of this allocation scheme was that there be a single world price for comparable grades. Newfoundland is the largest supplier, but her internal cost structure has risen more than that of Canada in 1942 and 1943, and the world price

was established at a level compatible with this condition in the great exporter. Since the world price was thus established, it meant a rise in the Canadian salt fish level, a rise that affected all salt fish, including pickled fish in barrels.

1215.

NPA S-6-1-7

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 80

[St. John's,] July 15, 1943

With reference to your despatch No. 170 of 25th. June 1943<sup>1</sup> we should like to be represented at the proposed conference regarding suggested measures for the policing of fisheries in the North Atlantic. Will forward later name of representative with comments on proposals.

1216.

NPA S-6-1-7

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve à l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne*  
*aux États-Unis*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Ambassador of Great Britain*  
*in United States*

TELEGRAM 35

[St. John's,] August 28, 1943

Raymond Gushue, Chairman Newfoundland Fisheries Board, has been directed by the Newfoundland Government to proceed to the United Kingdom for consultation with the Dominions Office and to attend a conference of representatives from various countries on fishery matters. Your good offices are requested in arranging passage by clipper as near September seventh as possible. Would appreciate telegraphic advice as to arrangements that may be made.

1217.

5910-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire*  
*à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner*  
*in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 382

Ottawa, December 4, 1943

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter from the Deputy Minister of Fisheries, under date of November 26, 1943,<sup>1</sup> proposing a joint investigation by Newfoundland and Canada of the herring fisheries.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



2. Herring fisheries are of very considerable economic importance to the region of Eastern Canada and Newfoundland. But although considerable biological information is available, much more information of this character is needed before the fisheries can be fully exploited.

3. The Province of Nova Scotia has recently proposed an investigation of the herring fisheries, agreeing to share the expenses. The Canadian Department of Fisheries approves of such an enquiry and proposes to invite other eastern provinces interested in the herring fisheries to participate on similar terms.

4. Since the herring is found in waters contiguous to Newfoundland and Canada, it is apparent that the investigation should be carried on in waters adjacent to each country. It is also apparent that both countries should benefit from such an enquiry. Cooperation between the two countries in the enquiry is thus highly desirable.

5. The Canadian Government accordingly invites the Government of Newfoundland to participate in the investigation. If Newfoundland agrees to this proposal, arrangements can be made between the appropriate officials of the respective governments.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1218.

5910-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 1032

St. John's, December 20, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch 382, of December 4th, 1943, relative to joint investigation by Newfoundland and Canada of the herring fisheries.

2. Mr. P. D. H. Dunn, Commissioner for Natural Resources, who was furnished with details of the proposed conference, has replied that the Newfoundland Government accepts the proposal in principle and will be prepared to discuss details for the carrying out of joint investigations by the Canadian Dominion Government, certain Provincial Governments and the Government of Newfoundland.

3. The Commissioner for Natural Resources has informed that officials of the Newfoundland Government will be available to attend any meetings called for the purpose of making suitable arrangements.

4. I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Dunn's letter<sup>1</sup> with regard to this matter.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1219.

6262-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au commissaire  
aux Ressources naturelles*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Natural Resources*

No. 16

St. John's, May 1, 1944

Dear Mr. Dunn,

I have been requested by my Government to approach the Newfoundland Government for permission for Canadian fishing vessels to land salt and fish in Newfoundland for temporary storage in bond during the present year while operating on the fishing banks of Newfoundland. In making this request I should point out that the privilege would be of considerable value to Canadian fishermen since they could return to the fishing ground to complete their catch without having to make the long voyage to Canadian ports. No competitive interest between Canadian and Newfoundland fishermen should arise because of the fixed price for salt cod, and the granting of such a privilege would not in any way injure the interest of Newfoundland fishermen.

The privilege of landing fish in Newfoundland was formerly accorded to Canadian fishermen but was withdrawn some years ago by Newfoundland. This privilege is still granted to the Newfoundland fishermen who are allowed to land stores and fish in Canada for a temporary storage while fishing off Canada.

I should be obliged if you would advise me if the Newfoundland Government are prepared to grant this request. If so, my letter and your reply would constitute an agreement in the matter.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. BRITTON

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1220.

6262-40

*Le commissaire aux Ressources naturelles au haut commissaire suppléant  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Commissioner for Natural Resources to Acting High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

St. John's, May 6, 1944

Dear Mr. Britton,

Your letter of 1st May concerning an application by the Canadian Government for permission for Canadian fishing vessels to land salt and fish in Newfoundland for temporary storage in bond during the present year while operating on the banks of Newfoundland was considered by the Commission of Government.

It was decided to grant this request subject to the following conditions:

- (1) This privilege is limited to the calendar year 1944, and is restricted to Newfoundland Customs Ports of Entry, a list of which is annexed.<sup>1</sup>
- (2) The master of each vessel reports to the Collector of Customs and furnishes him with a list showing the quantities of salt and fish to be landed, together with the location of the premises to be used for storage purposes.
- (3) The period of storage of fish shall not exceed six weeks or such period as will allow the vessel to finish its baiting and then return and pick up the landed portion of its cargo for conveyance to a Canadian port.
- (4) The owner or operator of the vessel makes application to the Newfoundland Fisheries Board for a license to import salt in which is stated the quantity to be stored and the purpose for which it is to be used.

Yours sincerely,

P. D. H. DUNN

1221.

6262-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au commissaire  
aux Ressources naturelles*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Natural Resources*

No. 17

St. John's, May 15, 1944

Dear Mr. Dunn,

With reference to your letter of May 6th, 1944, relative to the application by the Canadian Government for permission for Canadian fishing vessels to

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

land salt and fish in Newfoundland for temporary storage in bond during the present year while operating off the Banks of Newfoundland, I wish to confirm our telephone conversation in which I advised you that the conditions required by the Newfoundland Government, as outlined in your letter, are accepted by the Canadian Government.

It is suggested by the Canadian Government that May 18th would be a convenient date for the publication of the Agreement and it is desired that the Minister of Fisheries should make the announcement at the opening of the House at three p.m. In conformity with your verbal agreement I have informed the Canadian Government by cable that the time and place of the announcement of the agreement are suitable to the Newfoundland Government.

I have been directed to advise you that the Canadian Government deeply appreciates the consideration of the Newfoundland Commission of Government in granting this privilege on behalf of Canadian fishermen.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. BRITTON

1222.

5910-40

*Le sous-ministre des Pêcheries au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy Minister of Fisheries to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

762-2-2

Ottawa, May 16, 1944

Dear Mr. Robertson,

Referring to my letter of March 3rd<sup>1</sup> concerning a cooperative investigation of the herring fishery of the Gulf of St. Lawrence in which I indicated that it was the unanimous opinion of the Provinces and the Dominion Fisheries authorities that Newfoundland should be invited, I now have to report that matters have been discussed with Newfoundland at a meeting held in Ottawa on May 11th and as a result agreement has been arrived at, which is embodied in the attached memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

It will be noted that the next step is to formally invite Newfoundland to nominate a representative on the committee, whose terms of reference are set forth in the memorandum.

Could you please take the necessary steps?

Yours very truly,

D. B. FINN

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



1223.

5910-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 178

Ottawa, June 20, 1944

Sir,

I have the honour to request that you send a formal note to the Commission of Government with regard to the joint investigation by Newfoundland and Canada of the herring fisheries. This matter was dealt with in despatch No. 382, dated December 4, 1943, and in Mr. Dunn's letter of December 16, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

2. An agreement to provide for an investigation of the Atlantic herring fisheries of Canada and Newfoundland was reached by officials representing the Department of Fisheries and the provinces of Canada which are directly concerned therewith. The terms of agreement were discussed with and approved by Mr. Gushue at a meeting held in Ottawa on May 11.

3. It is desirable to place on record the essential terms of the arrangement which was approved at these discussions, and the Commission of Government should be asked to confirm an agreement between Canada and Newfoundland in the following terms:

- I. In considering and providing for an investigation, under an Investigator-in-Chief, appointed by the Fisheries Research Board, of the possibility of greater utilization of the herring fishery in the waters adjacent to Canada and Newfoundland and particularly in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, it is evident:
  - (i) That Newfoundland and each of the Atlantic provinces of Canada have definite interests in the herring fishery and its development, and that their people would gain by the increased knowledge which the investigation would provide;
  - (ii) that the investigation should be made by the Government[s] of Canada, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, and New Brunswick, in co-operation;
  - (iii) that these governments should contribute to the expenses involved by making the necessary monies available to the departments co-operating in the investigation, and, if feasible, by furnishing the facilities and personnel required for the investigation;
  - (iv) that each of the governments should undertake to co-operate in this investigation for an initial period of seven years.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

II. In order to give effect to these considerations, it is agreed that a permanent committee should be established, acting under a chairman to be appointed by the Government of Canada, to which each of the co-operating governments should be invited by the Government of Canada to name a representative. Each of the participating governments should agree to name its representative on this permanent committee as soon as possible and to co-operate fully in its work. This permanent committee should—

- (i) determine the extent and manner in which each government should contribute financial assistance on the basis of an annual budget, and provide for the financial administration of these contributions;
- (ii) consider, formulate, and approve programmes of work to be carried on under the Investigator-in-Charge appointed by the Fisheries Research Board;
- (iii) receive reports from time to time submitted to it by the Investigator-in-Charge on work which has been accomplished;
- (iv) meet at the call of the Chairman as often as may be necessary to fulfil these purposes, and at least once a year;
- (v) make such reports and recommendations to the participating governments as are necessary for the fulfilment of the objects of the investigation.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1224.

5910-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 238

Ottawa, August 17, 1944

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 330 of July 22, 1944<sup>1</sup> concerning the proposed joint investigation of the herring fishery. It is observed from your despatch that the arrangements outlined in my despatch No. 178 of June 20 are acceptable to the Newfoundland Government except that the Newfoundland Government understood that it was further agreed as follows:

The Commission of Government have consulted Mr. Gushue respecting the joint meeting held at Ottawa in May. Their understanding is that,

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

in addition to the points mentioned in your letter under reference, it was agreed:

- (a) That a trust fund be established to which each of the participating governments would make annual contributions.
- (b) That the trust fund be administered by the Fisheries Department of the Dominion Government.
- (c) That contributions to the trust fund, by each of the participating Governments be made on the basis of 20 units of \$2,000.00 each and divided among them as follows:

(i) Prince Edward Island	1 unit
(ii) New Brunswick	3 units
(iii) Nova Scotia	4 units
(iv) Quebec	4 units
(v) Newfoundland	4 units
(vi) Dominion of Canada	4 units

Total	20 units
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- (d) That, while it was agreed that co-operation for an initial period of seven years was desirable, the amount of the contribution of each Government would be provided by annual vote and that, when such vote was being considered, each Government would be free to decide whether it would participate further in the investigation.

2. While paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) embody the recommendations as to the method of financing the investigation agreed to at the meeting of May 11, which recommendations are to be submitted to the permanent committee appointed to determine the details of the investigation, the agreement signed at the meeting provides that each participant agree to cooperate in the investigation for an initial period of seven years. Until the permanent committee has been appointed and has had opportunity to determine, amongst other things, the financial details of the investigation, it is difficult to state that the expenditure required for the investigation would be limited to the amount of \$40,000 per annum, Newfoundland's share of which would be \$8,000 per annum.

3. Would you please enquire of the Newfoundland Government as to whether they consider it imperative that their contributions should be limited to the amount of \$8,000.00 per annum, or whether they would be agreeable to leave the total amount indefinite pending the organization of the permanent committee.

I have etc.

R. M. MACDONNELL  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1225.

5910-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 314

St. John's, September 8, 1944

Your despatch No. 238 of August 17th, proposed joint investigation herring fishery. Commissioner Dunn, who has just returned from the United Kingdom and resumed direction of Department, informs me this morning that Newfoundland Government is agreeable to defer fixing the total amount of its liability pending the organization of the Permanent Committee.

1226.

BC RDF NFLD

*Le gérant général de la Banque de la Nouvelle-Écosse au gouverneur  
de la Banque du Canada*

*General Manager, Bank of Nova Scotia, to Governor,  
Bank of Canada*

Toronto, February 12, 1945

Dear Mr. Towers,

The Newfoundland Fisheries Board, which with the Marketing Administration Committee is embarking on a study of postwar conditions affecting Newfoundland trade in fish, particularly salt codfish, addressed an enquiry to the St. John's Clearing House Association requesting advice, and particularly an opinion, as to the results which may come from the principles accepted at the Bretton Woods Conference in relation to Newfoundland and what steps, if any, they should take to hold the best possible position.

The four Canadian banks in Newfoundland replied individually to the enquiry and we enclose a copy of our reply which is in the form of a "Memorandum on International Exchange Problems with Special Reference to Newfoundland".<sup>1</sup> We think you will be interested in reading it.

Yours very truly,

H. D. BURNS

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



1227.

2816-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 47

St. John's, February 17, 1945

IMPORTANT. Fishing industry here seems disturbed by a report which apparently emanated from Mr. Gushue's office in Washington that the Canadian Department of Fisheries is proposing to recommend reduction in the price for salt cod for export. Apparently a conference of Newfoundland and Canadian representatives is to be held in Montreal on 27th and 28th February. Any such move would, of course, have serious repercussions for Newfoundland, which is far more vitally interested in the salt cod market than we are, and would redound to our disadvantage here. I am not, of course, sure of the facts but I think it is sufficiently important for our Department to see what, if anything, the Canadian Fisheries authorities are proposing to do in the matter.

1228.

6262-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 60

Ottawa, February 20, 1945

Sir,

May I refer to my telegram of April 20th, 1944,<sup>1</sup> and other correspondence concerning arrangements for Canadian fishermen to land fish and salt in Newfoundland for temporary storage in bond for the season 1944.

2. It would be of very considerable advantage to Canadian fishing vessels operating on the Banks of Newfoundland if arrangements similar to those of last year could be made for the present year.

3. Will you please confer informally with the Newfoundland authorities, and advise whether a direct request for landing privileges for the present year would be entertained.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1229.

2816-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 55

Ottawa, February 27, 1945

Your telegram No. 47 of February 17th. Prices of salt cod for export.

1) The Department of Fisheries advises that the report that the Canadian Department of Fisheries was proposing a reduction in the export price of salt cod for 1945 is unfounded. The Salt Fish Exporters Association in Canada prepared a brief some months ago, and among other things, did propose to the Minister that there be a reduction in the export price. The Canadian Salt Fish Administration will meet Newfoundland representatives tomorrow in Montreal, and the Administration will recommend that prices be left unchanged for the 1945 season.

2) Three points are made in explanation of the Canadian attitude with respect to the export price of salt cod:

- a) In dried salt fish, Canada's markets are entirely in the west, and particularly in the West Indies, while Newfoundland depends largely on European markets. The Iberian Peninsula has been willing to pay more than present prices, but these prices are too high for our poorer West Indian markets, where the local governments are almost all subsidizing the prices to the local consumers. The Canadian trade is aware that this high price level is switching many of their poor consumers to other products, and to try to preserve their long-run markets, our trade recommended a price reduction.
- b) With the high price levels, and with high taxation, the Canadian trade feels that these consumers are being partly squeezed for the Canadian Treasury, whereas Newfoundland merchants have been able to retain much larger shares of war profits. Newfoundland merchants can, therefore, plough back to their own industry (for its re-equipment) much of the war profit, and use this to compete against the Canadian trade in the post-war period.
- c) Canadian costs have risen much less than those in Newfoundland, and a smaller Canadian export price is probably justifiable. With lower costs, with profits frozen, and with continuous objection from all their main markets, because of the high price, the Canadian trade recommended a reduction in the export price. Because of this condition, and some others connected with Combined Food Board allocations, the Canadian trade feels that it is being made to line up with that of Newfoundland, to the detriment of its own self-interest in many instances.

3) I should appreciate your comments on these points.

1230.

2816-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 52

St. John's, February 28, 1945

IMPORTANT. Your telegram No. 55 of 27th February, prices of salt cod for export.

2. Glad to learn that it has been decided to recommend that prices be left unchanged for 1945 season. I learned from a leading firm last evening that this information had already reached St. John's and caused feeling of relief among local merchants. I am, of course, mainly concerned with the effect of moves of this kind on relations between Canada and Newfoundland and the main point I wish to make is that proposals of this kind made to the Minister of Fisheries should not reach the trade unless and until decision is finally taken. Then it should be made public with full statement of the reasons for it. Doubtless the version that will be circulated here is that due to the alertness and adroitness of the Newfoundland fishery representatives the Canadian proposal was turned down and local interest safeguarded.

3. On economic grounds, Canada has a fair case for suggesting a reduction in price and it might be possible to limit it to particular varieties that are consumed in the West Indies rather than a general reduction. The feeling here, however, and there is doubtless considerable justification for it, is that Canada's system of subsidizing keeps Canadian costs low and that the whole matter is intimately tied up with the question of competitive subsidization of exports which has caused so much trouble in the world fishery industry in the past. Mr. R. P. Bower, Canadian Government Trade Commissioner in Newfoundland, is at present in Ottawa and would suggest that he be contacted on the subject.

1231.

BC RDF NFLD

*Le conseiller spécial du sous-ministre des Pêcheries  
au ministère des Finances*

*Special Assistant to Deputy Minister of Fisheries  
to Department of Finance*

Ottawa, April 24, 1945

Dear Mr. McLeod,

I have your letter<sup>1</sup> enclosing correspondence on Newfoundland and her currency position. I should like to make the following one comment.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

You will recall that as a fish-producing country, Newfoundland has her main markets in Europe, with about one-third of her outlets in the Western Hemisphere (British West Indies, U.S.A., etc.). Her main competitors in salt fish production are Norway and Iceland, also "one-crop countries" depending on fish exports for the bulk of their cash income. These competitors are mainly within the sterling area, as are some of the markets.

It is my understanding that the discriminatory devices now used within the sterling area are more extensive and more potent than before the war: it is my understanding also that despite Breton Woods, a transitional period of three to five years may elapse before the ban on discriminatory currency arrangements becomes operative. In the post-war international trade in salted fish, it is expected that this very period will be the critical competitive period, when both Iceland and Norway — out of the salt fish trade during the war — will use every effort to restore their pre-war exports. Iceland has already begun to do so. Any discriminatory advantages that these two producing countries could find from the sterling area during the critical transitional period would be a serious deterrent to Newfoundland's future. A one-crop economy cannot wait through a transition of three to five years for subsequent international monetary stability, if within that period certain discriminatory advantages are available to competitors.

This consideration is not mentioned in Mr. Macdonald's letter to Mr. Robertson. I think, however, that it is this consideration and its latent possibilities that may have induced the Newfoundland Fisheries Board, as a board, to raise the whole question, and this is probably why Mr. Gushue has been so active in pursuing the matter. The matter, therefore, may be more than academic; Mr. Gushue seldom pursues the academic merely for its own sake.

Yours truly,

STEWART BATES

1232.

6262-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 87

St. John's, April 28, 1945

IMPORTANT. Our telegram No. 81, April 19,<sup>1</sup> and earlier correspondence respecting our request that Newfoundland Government extend by a further year the privilege of landing fish and salt for temporary storage in bond.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Commission of Government has agreed to extend last year's arrangement for a further year and propose to issue notice to that effect for publication in Tuesday evening's papers, May 1st. Assume you will wish to make announcement along lines of last year's statement for information of fishermen at same time as Newfoundland Government or shortly afterwards.

## PARTIE 3/ PART 3

LE CONTRÔLE DES PRIX<sup>1</sup>  
PRICE CONTROL<sup>1</sup>

1233.

2897-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 86

St. John's, December 2, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to report on the rising cost of living in Newfoundland.

2. I should, however, mention the fact that the Newfoundland Government has only recently attempted to keep statistics on the cost of living and the figures it issues must be considered as only of a very approximate nature. They are, however, indicative of a strong trend to higher living costs.

3. A statement recently issued by the Department of Public Health and Welfare indicates the following changes in the cost of living index since October 1938, which has been taken as the base month:

October 1, 1938	100
October 1, 1939	104
May 3, 1941	116
July 5, 1941	122
August 2, 1941	123
September 6, 1941	126
October 4, 1941	128
November 1, 1941	130

. . .

6. The cost of living for the weekly budget of a family of five earning \$1,200.00 increased in the following manner between October 1, 1938

<sup>1</sup> Voir également le document 204.<sup>1</sup> See also Document 204.

and November 1, 1941, according to the statement issued by the Department of Public Health and Welfare:

Item	1938	1941
	1, October	1, November
Food	\$11.03	\$16.11
Rent	4.50	4.50
Fuel and light	2.82	3.62
Clothing	3.00	3.90
Sundries	2.00	2.25
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$23.35	\$30.38

The percentage increases in the preceding sub-groups were as follows:

Group	1938	1941
	1, October	1, November
Food	100	146.0
Rent	100	
Fuel and Light	100	128.3
Clothing	100	130.0
Sundries	100	112.5

8. It will be seen from the foregoing table that the increase in the cost of living in Newfoundland since the beginning of the war has been of a very serious nature. There appear to be a number of reasons for the price changes. Newfoundland depends, perhaps more than any other country in the world, on imports for the necessities of life. Thus increases in the costs of commodities in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, from which countries Newfoundland secures practically all of its imports, are reflected in a high cost of living here. In addition, the higher costs of transportation and handling, together with limited shipping space, have raised the cost of landing goods in Newfoundland.

9. There have also been internal reasons for increases in the index. A special war revenue tax of  $7\frac{1}{2}\%$  on the ad valorem value of imports from countries other than Empire countries in the sterling area was introduced on November 30, 1940. As this applies to practically all goods imported from Canada and the United States, it can readily be seen how it affects the price level. This special tax was, however, taken off a number of commodities, principally fresh fruits and coal, on December 1, 1941.

10. There has been a great increase in the national income of Newfoundland, because of the United States and Canadian expenditures on defence projects. Thus a greater purchasing power exists while, at the same time, the supply of local and imported agricultural and manufactured commodities is quite limited. Under these circumstances of demand being greatly in excess of supply, it can be readily understood how prices have risen. The opinion

is sometimes expressed that local merchants have not resisted the temptation to charge what the market will bear and that all the price increases have not been due to the higher costs of imported goods or to indirect taxation. It is, of course, not easy to substantiate such a charge without official investigation.

11. At the beginning of the war a Food Control Board was established with Sir John Puddester, the Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare, as Chairman. While this committee is, I understand, of a representative character, it apparently seldom meets and has obviously not been very effective in preventing rises in the cost of food.

12. The announcement from time to time of the increases in the index naturally gives rise to editorial comment in the newspapers demanding strong action on the part of the Government. It is for this reason that there is great interest in Newfoundland in the new regulations introduced in Canada to control prices and wages.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1234.

2897-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 21

St. John's, January 8, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 130 of December 31, 1941<sup>1</sup> with which I enclosed two copies of a broadcast address by Sir John C. Puddester, the Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare, on a number of matters of government policy. The view is expressed by both the daily newspapers of St. John's that this statement is the most, or at least one of the most important official announcements since the establishment of the Commission form of government in 1934. Sir John Puddester's speech dealt with a wide variety of subjects, which may be summarized and discussed under the following headings:

1. Food Supplies
2. Price Control
3. Rent Control
4. Veterans Pensions
5. Post-War Planning
6. National Registration
7. Reduction of Taxation
8. Civil Defence
9. Free and Compulsory Education

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

### 1. Food Supplies

2. Sir John Puddester explained that there were now large stocks of food on hand, "ample to keep our people well supplied until navigation opens in the spring or even much longer than that". He then referred to the possible loss of food supplies through fire caused by enemy action to the warehouses on the waterfront of St. John's and announced that warehouses were being secured in the suburbs of the city where stocks will be stored for such an emergency. He stated: "The present plan is to store enough foodstuffs in emergency warehouses to feed ten thousand people for two months."

3. He urged housewives to lay in extra stocks of food, stating, "we shall not call it hoarding" and that the practice is "allowable on the distinct understanding that if an eventuality should arise these extra stocks will be shared with neighbours and friends who have been bombed or burnt out".

4. The public was obviously surprised at this official encouragement to hoard food, which constitutes a reversal of the previous attitude of the Government.

...

### 2. Price Control

5. Sir John Puddester argued that, because of Newfoundland's dependence on imported foodstuffs, it would be very difficult to control prices in this country by adopting the Canadian policy of a general ceiling on prices. Furthermore, he claimed that there was little or no profiteering in St. John's because of the keen competition between the retail grocers.

6. While rejecting for the present at least, the idea of a general price ceiling, Sir John Puddester announced that Regulations had been made empowering him to limit the prices of individual commodities which he and his advisers consider to be unduly high and unjustified. Three copies of the Defence (Price of Goods) Regulations<sup>1</sup> are enclosed. He also appealed to the public and to housewives to buy in the cheapest market and to pay cash, condemning the credit system which has always been one of the social evils of this country. He cited at length the appeal to Canadian housewives to help maintain the price ceiling.

7. The Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare claimed that price movements had been watched closely and that adjustments had been brought about in many instances. He referred to the fixing of the price of coal, which I reported in my despatch No. 94 of December 3rd, 1941.<sup>2</sup> He also stated that an increase of ten cents per gallon for milk demanded by the Dairymen's Association had been forbidden on the ground that justification for the increase had not been properly established. I enclose three copies of his Order, the Food (Current Prices) Order, 1941,<sup>3</sup> prohibiting milk to be sold to the consumer at a higher price than was charged on December 15th, 1941.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



8. In previous despatches I reported on the rise in prices and the constant increase in the cost of living in Newfoundland. There was little comfort for the general public in Sir John Puddester's remarks.

...

### 3. Rent Control

9. The Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare announced that it had been decided to control house rents. I enclose three copies of the Defence (Rent Restrictions) Regulations, 1941,<sup>1</sup> which prohibit landlords from charging in future higher rents than were charged on June 30, 1941. I may say that some time ago I sent Sir John Puddester a copy of Canadian Order-in-Council P.C. 9029 of November 21, 1941, respecting Leasehold Rights and Obligations in Time of War, and that he subsequently asked for an additional copy.

10. The reaction to the announced policy of rent control was, I think generally favourable.

...

### 7. Reduction of Taxation

14. It was announced that the Special War Revenue Tax of 7½% *ad valorem* on goods from countries outside the sterling area, which was imposed on December 1st, 1940, would be removed from the raw materials used for the manufacture of butterine, as discussed in my despatch No. 5 of January 3rd,<sup>1</sup> and from certain items entering into the price of agricultural produce, such as feeds, fertilizers, seeds and farm implements. Three copies of the official notice of the tariff charges are enclosed.<sup>2</sup>

15. The lifting of the Special War Revenue Tax on these items, together with the amount of the tax removed on December 1st, 1941, on which I reported in my despatch No. 88 of December 3rd,<sup>3</sup> will mean, it is estimated, a loss of revenue in a full year of approximately \$275,000.

...

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1235.

2897-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 520

St. John's, September 14, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my airmail despatch No. 515 of September 12, 1942<sup>1</sup> regarding the increase in the price of petroleum products.

...

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

3. The following is the notice of the increase which appeared in *The Daily News* of September 14th:

3½ CENTS PER GALLON INCREASE ON GASOLINE

Present Conditions Cause a further  
Increase in Price Petroleum Products

The Imperial Oil Limited have received advice that the present surcharge, now in effect, on gasoline has been increased effective as at midnight Saturday last, from 11 cents to 14 cents per gallon, and in addition, owing to increased transportation costs from the mainland to Newfoundland ports, there is an additional increase of one-half cent per gallon, which in all represents an additional 3½ cents over and above the announcement of August 24th.

The surcharge in effect on August 24th was 11 cents per gallon on all gasolines. Today's announcement, including additional surcharge and transportation costs, raises this total increase to 14½ cents per gallon.

In line with this advance naphtha gasoline, kerosene, stove oil, diesel fuel and furnace fuel have advanced to the same extent approximately.

These increases have resulted from the same causes which have made it necessary to advance the prices of petroleum products, as announced from time to time.

4. You will note that the news item, which presumably was inserted by the Imperial Oil Limited, after the form had been submitted to the Newfoundland Commission of Government, does not set out very clearly the cause of the increase in price.

5. In private conversation with several of the leading citizens of St. John's, I find that they are quite mystified as to the explanation for the increases. Many people think that the cause of the increases is an export tax which the Government of Canada have placed on gasoline for the purpose of raising a revenue.

6. There should be no mystery about this matter as the reason for the increase is well understood both by the Commission of Government and by the Imperial Oil Limited. I have explained the position very fully in my letters to the Commission of Government.

7. I think the reason for the mysterious way in which the several announcements have been made is that the Newfoundland Commission of Government does not desire the people of Newfoundland, particularly the fishermen, to know that in Canada the Government is absorbing the increase in transportation costs and war risk insurance and is permitting both fishermen and the general public to purchase gas at the ceiling price. They fear that if such an announcement is made a similar demand will be made on the Government by the fishermen, many of whom use gasoline in their motorboats.

8. It is unfortunate that a section at least of the people of Newfoundland believe the increase in price to be due to an export tax by the Canadian Government for the purpose of raising revenue. I do not know that anything

can be done about the matter to clear up the situation as, if I made an announcement as to the real facts, the Newfoundland Commission of Government would resent it.

9. I think therefore that the only policy to adopt is not to attempt to give any explanation. No doubt in time the representatives of the press will ascertain the real facts and the matter will be presented to the people of Newfoundland in its proper light.

. . .

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1236.

2897-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Under-Secretary for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 11, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

I am referring to your private and confidential letter of November the 5th,<sup>1</sup> concerning the paying of Canadian subsidies to importers and the collection of the amount of these subsidies on goods exported to Newfoundland. Last week Mr. Wild and Mr. Dunn were put into communication with the Oil Controller's office in order that they might obtain at first-hand a clear account of the reasons for the advance in the price of gasoline in Newfoundland. No member of this Department was present at these interviews and we have not yet heard whether the two Commissioners were satisfied with the explanations which they received. However, when Mr. Wild returns to Ottawa on Friday of this week, it is hoped that we shall be able to discuss the matter further with him. Advantage will be taken of this occasion to ask Mr. Wild directly if the Commission of Government has any objection to a frank explanation being issued in Newfoundland, either by a statement to the press or by your making some public statement.

An important question of policy arises both in connection with the gasoline and in connection with the requests of Newfoundland for help with war risk insurance. It is obvious that these matters could be presented in Newfoundland by way of illustration of the advantages which such a community has as a result of membership in a large confederation which is able to perform services for people in exposed localities which no one of those localities could perform for itself, relying exclusively on its own resources. It is indeed a matter of some surprise here that discussion has

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

not followed these lines, and it is quite possible that a clear statement of what Canada is doing for her own citizens might stimulate this sort of discussion. There are, however, certain dangers to be avoided. Canada must not appear to be pressing an argument of this character, either by making her help contingent on certain recognition by Newfoundland or by withholding her help in order to show Newfoundlanders the extent of their dependence on outside communities. In ordinary circumstances these difficulties would be overcome by the form of the request which we should expect to receive from the Government of Newfoundland; but as it is, we are being asked to do things in the way that is most convenient from the standpoint of the Commission of Government by enabling it to accomplish things which the Newfoundland population wants and to avoid criticism in Newfoundland. From what I have seen, I should imagine that the Commissioners themselves are perfectly aware of this situation and see all its drawbacks, and yet the Commissioners can hardly be expected to say to the public "there are certain things that you want that cannot be obtained from the resources of Newfoundland alone. You cannot expect the Government of Great Britain to provide them and if you ask the Canadian Government to do so, you put yourselves under a serious obligation. Are you prepared to accept the full consequences of this obligation?"

I should appreciate your advice as to the method by which this question of promoting some public discussion can be attacked. Do you, for instance, think that it would be expedient for us to take the matter up with the Dominions Office with a view to some statement in Great Britain of the help that Canada has given in meeting the needs of Newfoundland?

In the meantime I shall ask the Wartime Prices and Trade Board if it can supply you with a statement on the Canadian price ceiling and on the policy of subsidies.

Yours sincerely,

N. A. ROBERTSON

1237.

2897-40

*Mémorandum de la Commission des prix et du commerce en temps de guerre*

*Memorandum by Wartime Prices and Trade Board*

[Ottawa, November , 1942]

Statement concerning the circumstances under which subsidies paid to Canadian importers are withdrawn by exportation to Newfoundland.

The Wartime Prices and Trade Board is responsible for ensuring a continued flow of necessary goods for civilian consumers in Canada. At the same time it administers the price stabilization policy put into effect by the Canadian Government on December 1, 1941. When import prices



have risen to a degree which cannot be absorbed by trade and industry under the retail price ceiling, and which cannot be offset by economies in production and distribution, the Canadian Government has authorized direct government purchases abroad, reduction of duties and taxes, or the payment of subsidies on goods imported for the use of Canadian consumers.

Under the Import Policy of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (as set forth in the Statements of Policy issued on December 2, 1941, January 1, 1942 and August 1, 1942) goods which are imported for re-export to other countries *are not eligible for subsidy*. Applicants for import subsidies have to sign a certificate to the effect that the imports in question are not for re-export. In paying subsidies the concern of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board is with maintaining supplies within Canada, under the price ceiling. This is why no subsidies are payable on re-exports from Canada.

In a few cases it is impossible to determine at the time of importation how a product will eventually be used, whether for domestic consumption or for re-export. It may then be administratively unavoidable that a subsidy should be paid on all imports, but, in such cases, when the imported goods are re-exported or any finished goods in the production of which the imported goods have been used are exported, any subsidy which has been paid must be refunded to the government corporation, the Commodity Prices Stabilization Corporation Ltd., which administers the policy. Such refunds, for example the surcharge on petroleum products and refunds on butter and tea, simply have the effect of limiting the scope of subventions paid by the Canadian Government to the Canadian market.

1238.

2897-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, November 16, 1942

Dear Norman [Robertson],

With reference to my despatch No. 671 of November 6th, 1942,<sup>1</sup> the *Fishermen-Workers Tribune* has the following editorial on this appointment:

PRICE CONTROL

The appointment of Mr. E. C. Price, former head of the Customs Department, to the post of Deputy Price Controller, is one with which we find ourselves in complete agreement. While we have every sympathy with those who insist that there are sufficient Newfoundlanders available with the qualifications necessary

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

to carry through a job of this nature, we do believe that in this particular instance the end will be better served by the appointment of a man who is not likely to be influenced by local prejudices, etc.

In order to do his job successfully and to give to the overwhelming masses of the Newfoundland people adequate protection against profiteering and exploitation, Mr. Price must expect to bring upon his head the wrath of the moneyed powers of Newfoundland — and particularly of St. John's. Mr. Price's particular characteristics are ones that should enable him to withstand this deluge, and he can be assured that he will have the support and encouragement of all but a certain few if he can provide any measure of relief from the steadily mounting costs.

Owing to his familiarity with import costs due to his years as head of the Customs Department, Mr. Price is in a position to know what profits are being made by the importers and retailers, and it is to be hoped that he will apply this knowledge in the right direction.

Mr. Price, the country is looking to you to put an end to profiteering. Your task will not be an easy one and the extent of your success will be judged on the basis of results. The rest is up to you.

It is interesting to find that any appointment by the Commission of Government meets with the approval of any paper in Newfoundland and it is particularly interesting to find a Newfoundland paper approving of the appointment of an English Civil Servant to any position.

I think, personally, that the editorial hits the nail on the head. Price is, I think, the right man for the job. He is very able and I think, completely honest and also completely "hard-boiled". He made a brief speech at the Montreal Conference in March and made a very favourable impression upon men like Mr. Lockwood, Mr. E. P. Murphy, and others who spoke to me about it after the meeting. I had him picked out in my own mind as the best man to be appointed in Newfoundland to control transport which at that time certainly needed some control, although there has been a great improvement as a result of the recommendations of that Conference.

Mr. Price has been, until recent weeks, the Chairman of the Customs Board and also Chairman of the Liquor Commission. He resigned from these positions recently and Mr. H. V. Hutchings, who is a Newfoundlander, was appointed to succeed him.

Mr. Price made a visit to England last July, and it was understood that he was to return shortly to England and was to take up work there, and to receive a promotion. I also understand that his work in England would have been much more congenial than the work which he has now undertaken as Food Controller. It is, therefore, to his credit that he has decided to remain here to assume this new job.

Price is a typical English Civil Servant, and performs his work conscientiously and well. I have had a number of conferences with him over Customs matters and I always found that he fought hard for the interests of his employer, which in this case was the Commission of Government for Newfoundland.

Unfortunately, however, like so many English Civil Servants, he has what I would call an anti-Colonial prejudice. In his case the prejudice is against Canada. Both Mr. Bower and I have found his prejudice cropping up on several occasions.

Price is going to Ottawa at the end of this month at the same time as Mr. Bower is going there. His mission there is to obtain information as to the securing of food and other essential supplies for Newfoundland. I do not think he considers it part of his mission to study the methods of controlling prices in Canada, as he does not believe they would be applicable here. From what we can gather from conversations which he held with Mr. Bower his plan is along the lines of the plan adopted by Australia, which is to fix the same price on every commodity. This plan should be comparatively simple in this country as practically all supplies have to be imported and Mr. Price will be able to obtain exact information as to the costs from the Customs returns. He will also be able to obtain the freight and handling charges, and to arrive at a satisfactory price by giving the proper allowance for profit to the retailer.

I think it would be a distinct advantage for Mr. Price to discuss matters with members of the Department of External Affairs, such as Hugh Keenleyside and Mr. Angus, and it would also be valuable if Mr. Bower was also present at these interviews. I think perhaps the best way to handle the matter is for me to ask Mr. Bower to arrange with the Department of External Affairs to meet Dr. Keenleyside and Mr. Angus, and any others you suggest should be at the conference. I will ask Mr. Bower to arrange for the conference in advance so that the members of the Department of External Affairs who meet Mr. Price are able to give him an hour or two for discussion. Mr. W. E. Curtis, Priorities Officer left for Washington today and from there will go on to Ottawa. Mr. Price and Mr. Bower are leaving Newfoundland by plane on November 29th, arriving there the same evening. The conference will, therefore, be arranged for some time during the early part of that week. Mr. Curtis should also be asked to be present at the conference.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1239.

9180-40

*Le conseiller spécial du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Special Assistant to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

Ottawa, December 2, 1942

Dear Mr. Burchell,

It may be of interest to you to know that Mr. Curtis and Mr. Price as well as Mr. Bower were present at a meeting of the Export Control Commit-

tee yesterday afternoon at which the needs of Newfoundland received very full discussion. The members of the Committee were very frank in expressing their view that if Canada is to meet Newfoundland's needs on the same scale as Canadian needs, we should be satisfied that consumption is being controlled in the same way as in Canada. The extraordinary increases in Newfoundland consumption of some articles, such as canned fruit, were cited as matters which required explanation.

The Newfoundland representatives expressed themselves as in complete agreement with the principle that they should match all Canadian controls by equivalent controls suited to the circumstances of Newfoundland and cited rubber tires as an instance of their having done so. They explained the extraordinary increase in the consumption of some goods by calling attention to the demands of the armed forces, of Canadian civilian labour and of merchant ships which purchase stores in Newfoundland. Retail purchases by members of the crews of merchant ships were also mentioned as something extremely difficult to control. When individual cases of commodities were discussed it frequently appeared that the type of control imposed in Canada would be unsuitable for Newfoundland.

I understand that the Newfoundland representatives are to consult with the Wartime Prices and Trade Board and with other controlling authorities in Canada. However, from the character of the discussions which took place, I imagine that there will still be a great difference between the Newfoundland controls and the Canadian and that Newfoundland consumption will appear at first sight more extravagant than ours.

I have no doubt that you will receive a full account of this matter in due course from Mr. Bower, but you may find it convenient to have this early intimation of it.

Yours sincerely,

[H. F. ANGUS]

1240.

9180-40

*Le président de la Commission des prix et du commerce en temps de guerre  
au directeur, division de Washington de la Commission des prix  
et du commerce en temps de guerre*

*Chairman, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, to Director of Washington  
Division of Wartime Prices and Trade Board*

Ottawa, December 21, 1942

Dear Plumtpre,

We have become very much concerned, as you may know, about the wildly inflationary tendencies which have developed in Newfoundland



and in particular about the abnormal movement of supplies of all kinds to the island from Canada. The United States authorities must also have viewed some of the aspects of the supply situation with concern because early in October the Board of Economic Warfare sent a Mr. Lethbridge, of its staff, to the island to procure a schedule of the requirements which the United States was to be asked to supply in 1943.

At his behest, each importer was required to prepare a schedule showing his stock of each commodity at or about October 18th 1942, his anticipated stock at January 1st, 1943, his requirements of each commodity to be obtained from the United States in 1943, and the portion of the total to be required in the first quarter of 1943. Certain data on weights, and use classification, etc., were also required. We had previously asked the Department of Trade and Commerce to obtain through their Trade Commissioner estimates of the island's food requirements for 1943. He took advantage of the occasion of the Board of Economic Warfare survey to have inserted in the schedule a column for the first quarter requirements of all merchandise and commodities to be obtained from Canada and the total requirements from Canada for the year 1943.

The importers were given about ten days in which to complete their returns under possible penalty of obtaining no supplies if they failed to do so. When the returns were received by the Priorities Officer, the Canadian data were transcribed to other schedules and the complete submission of requirements was taken to Washington to be studied and weighed there. It was thought that we might have obtained photostatic copies of the whole but this was not done because of the prohibitive cost of making them.

The Priorities Officer went to Washington later, presumably to discuss the survey with the Board of Economic Warfare. When he had completed that tour he came to Ottawa, where he was joined by Mr. E. C. Price, the recently appointed Price Administrator, and Mr. Bower, the Canadian Trade Commissioner, who brought with him the transcriptions of the Canadian requirements which had been prepared by some four hundred and fifty odd importers. They had no facilities for recapitulating the returns there; we tendered our good offices to do it for them. The work is now in process and, when completed, the recapitulation will be forwarded to them for refinement and elimination of the duplication and over-estimation which plainly characterize them. We hope then to have a minimum estimate of their requirements. The mission of Curtis and Price was, amongst other things, to discuss supply but they had no data on which to do so except in generalities. We did, however, have a general discussion of the matter with them and left them under no illusions about our reluctance to continue supply from our declining stocks without restraint or restriction, particularly in the face of the total absence of control of Newfoundland prices. They have no definite plans for control of prices and are unlikely to have unless pressure to do so is put on

them. We learned, however, that many of the supplies for the Services are purchased through island merchants so that their importation can hardly be appraised as civilian requirements. Some of the exports for which export permits had already been withheld were said by Curtis to be of this military character. Certain arrangements were accordingly made with him to issue essentiality certificates for orders placed by island importers. We undertook to approve exports only when applications had this certificate attached by the exporter. Curtis is also, incidentally, the agent of the Department of Munitions and Supply and should be in a position to supervise the applications for essentiality certificates.

I am not at all satisfied that this mode of import control is going to be effective. I believe that we may have to resort to allocation on a supply level which has some relationship to the peacetime requirements of the Newfoundland economy but to do so we must first of all determine the requirements of the Services, of N.A.A.F.I., and other such organizations, and for ships' stores, which are to be obtained through island importers. This we are proceeding to do. In addition, we must determine, if we can, what the United States is going to allocate for civilian consumption and, I believe, discuss with them arrangements for proper and equitable allocation of the supply requirements of Newfoundland. We would wish to know that we were not carrying an undue portion of the load which derives in part from the buying of Newfoundlanders engaged on United States defence projects and the direct and indirect spending of United States and Canadian defence forces stationed there.

We should know what each country is prepared to and can best allocate so that we will neither over-supply nor under-supply the reasonable requirements of the island.

I would like you to approach the Board of Economic Warfare in this sense and determine if we may discuss this Newfoundland supply situation with them. While it may be some time before the data on the survey of Canadian requirements are compiled, the summary sent to Newfoundland for refinement and a submission of minimum requirements from Canada for 1943 received from them, I think that discussion should be opened by you with the Board of Economic Warfare forthwith.

I discussed the matter with Messrs. Towers, Clark, Robertson, Angus and Mr. Burchell, the Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland, on Friday last, all of whom are much concerned about potential developments from the current chaotic price situation in face of the impending termination of defence construction work which will return about ten thousand of the citizenry to their fishing and other normal pursuits and possibly to the dole. While the price situation is basically the concern of the Administration and the Dominions Office of the United Kingdom, it is feared that they are apathetic and because the island is in our Canadian exchange economy we may have to press some measure of control on them through the medium

of supply. Personally I am not content to have Newfoundland drawing without restriction from our potentially limited stocks, nor even drawing a rationed supply, without some earnest effort being made by them to control the retail prices of the goods at some level in appropriate relationship to their landed costs. I prefer that you do not mention this aspect of the matter to the Board of Economic Warfare authorities at this stage.

I wish that you would take this discussion in hand and let me have a report on your conversation. Geddes is familiar with the situation and will give you such further details as he has. If you consider it necessary for him to come to Washington at any stage of your discussions, he will arrange to do so.

I am not sure what avenues of approach you have to the Board of Economic Warfare but when I raised this point at our meeting, Norman Robertson thought it best not to be too formal about it, — in other words, it was agreed that you would be the best person to open the discussions and that the method of doing so should be left to your good judgment.

Yours truly,

DONALD GORDON

1241.

9180-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister in United States to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Washington, January 4, 1943

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I am enclosing herewith an exchange of communications<sup>1</sup> between Plumptre and Donald Gordon concerning exports to Newfoundland from the United States and Canada. I was a little worried when Plumptre told me about his meeting with the people at the Board of Economic Warfare to discuss this matter, in case the Board officials might attach more of an official character to Plumptre's remarks than was warranted. Plumptre, however, told me that he had emphasized that the discussions in question were to be purely exploratory and informal in character. You will see that he has also made this clear in his letter to Donald Gordon. I have, nevertheless, told him to make perfectly clear to Coe, Hamilton Rowan, and the others concerned that no conclusions in regard to Canadian official policy in this matter should be read into anything which was said during the discussions in question. I should think, however, that Plumptre's report

<sup>1</sup> Partiellement reproduites.

<sup>1</sup> Partly printed.

on these discussions will prove helpful to those in Ottawa considering the matter.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Le directeur, division de Washington de la Commission des prix  
et du commerce en temps de guerre, au président de la Commission  
des prix et du commerce en temps de guerre*

*Director of Washington Division of Wartime Prices  
and Trade Board, to Chairman of Wartime Prices  
and Trade Board*

Washington, December 31, 1942

Dear Gordon,

Your letter which asked me to initiate discussions with the Board of Economic Warfare regarding exports to Newfoundland from the United States and Canada, arrived the day before yesterday, and yesterday I took steps to carry out your instructions. The following is my report to date:

In the final paragraph of your letter you suggested an informal approach. Accordingly, I telephoned to Mr. Frank Coe, Executive Assistant to Mr. Milo Perkins. Mr. Perkins is the Executive Director of the Board of Economic Warfare. It happens that Mr. Coe is an intimate friend of mine. I arranged to have a chat with Coe and asked him to bring in any officials of the Board of Economic Warfare who might be concerned.

Accordingly, our talk was attended by the following people:

Mr. V. F. Coe — Executive Assistant to Mr. Milo Perkins

Mr. Archibald Hamilton Rowan — Acting Chief, British Empire  
Section, Office of Exports, Board of Economic Warfare

Mr. Edward M. Milans — Expert on Newfoundland in the Office  
of Economic Warfare Analysis, Board of Economic Warfare

Mr. Stanley V. Allen — Assistant Commercial Attaché, Canadian  
Legation

Mr. A. F. W. Plumptre

I was particularly anxious for Allen to be along, partly because he has considerable knowledge of the subject in question, and partly because he had a talk with Mr. Geddes on the matter when he was in Washington last week.

I explained your apprehension regarding price developments in Newfoundland and, more particularly, regarding the lack of adequate control



over exports to Newfoundland originating from Canada and the United States. I took the liberty of reading extracts from your letter of December 21. The representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare, particularly Mr. Milans, who is closely acquainted with the matter, confirmed the views expressed in your letter. Mr. Milans said that work on the voluminous material which had been collected by the Board of Economic Warfare in Newfoundland was progressing but was not yet completed. I understand it should be completed in about a fortnight.

We all felt that some form of joint action might prove desirable, in order to insure that Newfoundland did not get a volume of supplies which was either unduly large or unduly small.

The question was then raised whether it was desirable to establish some sort of formal board or whether it was preferable to execute the policy on a more or less informal basis. Mr. Coe expressed the opinion that it would probably be possible from the point of view of the Board of Economic Warfare, to establish some sort of board, if in the opinion of yourself and others, this seemed desirable. He said that there was no precedent as yet in the experience of the Board of Economic Warfare for the establishment of a board representing two countries to deal with matters affecting a third, but one such board was under discussion at the present time within the Board of Economic Warfare.

Some discussion was given to the question whether, if a board were established, it should include a representative of Newfoundland as well as representatives of Canada and the United States. The view was expressed, although I do not think it was unanimous, that if a board were established, Newfoundland should be represented. (I personally took this view, although I admitted that the fact that Newfoundland had not got responsible government tempered my general desire to see that a small country got representation on a board which primarily consisted of representatives of two large countries with an interest in its affairs.)

Despite these discussions of formal machinery, I think it was the general sense of those present that the end in view might better be attained through informal means. In such a case the question of representation of Newfoundland might not arise. Mr. Coe pointed out that the Board of Economic Warfare was accustomed to dealing with smaller countries which had claims on supplies from the United States, and that in no case heretofore had any informal board been set up. However, he admitted that the fact that a third country — Canada — was concerned in this instance, might make a difference.

It was pointed out that a considerable amount of informal cooperation already existed between the Board of Economic Warfare and the Canadian authorities concerned with export control, particularly the Office of the Commercial Attaché at the Canadian legation here. Our Commercial

Attaché in cooperation with the Canadian Export Control Committee is in constant contact with the Board of Economic Warfare and the State Department, in regard to cooperative action *vis-à-vis* exports to South America. Indeed an informal committee already exists on which representatives of the State Department, Board of Economic Warfare and Canada meet from time to time to consider the inter-relationship of export programmes.

It appeared that the Board of Economic Warfare had planned to increase its strictness in regard to control of exports to Newfoundland in any case. This of course was the primary purpose of the visit of Mr. Lethbridge to Newfoundland. In the absence of our approach to the Board of Economic Warfare they would probably have proceeded as in the case of other foreign countries, such as those in South America. That is to say, they would have appointed a representative in Newfoundland who would, in collaboration with local officials, have recommended a programme of exports from the United States to that country.

I was assured by Mr. Milans that officials in Newfoundland, so far from resenting the work which Mr. Lethbridge did in Newfoundland, had been disposed to welcome it. Unfortunately, Mr. Lethbridge himself has left the Board of Economic Warfare and gone into the United States Navy.

It was suggested, and I think generally approved, that in the absence of a formal board, the informal machinery of Canadian-American collaboration might be worked out on the following lines (I may not entirely agree with the procedure outlined, but I think it may be useful for purposes of consideration by all the parties who may be concerned):

Both the Board of Economic Warfare and the Wartime Prices and Trade Board might appoint representatives to reside in Newfoundland. It would be the responsibility of these representatives, in collaboration with the appropriate officials of the Government of Newfoundland, to draw up programmes of Newfoundland's imports at periodic intervals. These programmes would cover in considerable detail Newfoundland's expected requirements from Canada, from the United States, and perhaps from all other countries. Whenever such a programme had been completed it would be submitted complete to the Board of Economic Warfare and to the Wartime Prices and Trade Board. Representatives of each of these two organizations would meet informally, either in Ottawa or in Washington, as appeared convenient, in order to review the programme as a whole. Finally, when agreement was reached between the officials of the Board of Economic Warfare and the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, each organization would report back to Newfoundland the determination in regard to its portion of the total programme. That is to say, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board would report a determination on the supplies that were to be forthcoming from Canada, and the Board of Economic Warfare would report on the supplies forthcoming from the United States. There would be

no joint report on the aggregate forthcoming from the two countries, although this of course would be implied by the previous collaboration.

The matter of implementation of the joint determination raised some possible difficulties. It was observed that while the Board of Economic Warfare had powers to force American exporters to deliver to foreign countries the goods which were allocated to them, no such power existed or was in use in Canada. It might be necessary to use such powers in Canada as well as in the United States, if Newfoundland was to be guaranteed the level of imports which was determined by the joint discussions.

It was further noted that the Board of Economic Warfare has not the power to make final allocations from American supplies. The War Production Board has control over such supplies in general, although control over agricultural supplies is now vested in the Department of Agriculture and some other supplies are controlled by some other agencies. Therefore, the Board of Economic Warfare is not in a position to guarantee that its determination would be implemented. However, this situation would not be novel in relation to Newfoundland. The Board of Economic Warfare is in exactly the same position in obtaining supplies from the United States for all the other countries under its jurisdiction.

The above possible machinery for implementing a common policy must be regarded as extremely tentative. It is simply a basis for further discussion with all concerned.

When the contents of this letter have been considered, and when the Board of Economic Warfare has completed its analysis (in perhaps a fortnight) of its data on Newfoundland, I think it would be appropriate for Mr. Roy Geddes (assuming that he is the proper person from the Wartime Prices and Trade Board) to visit Washington and have direct discussions with Mr. Rowan and Mr. Milans. Mr. Coe indicated that he would not expect to continue in the discussions unless there was specific need for him. Mr. Rowan was designated as our normal point of contact with the Board of Economic Warfare in these matters.

Yours sincerely,

A. F. W. PLUMPTRE

1242.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 2

[London,] January 5, 1943

SECRET. Following for Wild from Clutterbuck. [Begins.] We have received telegram from United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada stating that in course of recent conversation Mr. Robertson expressed on behalf of the Canadian Government a good deal of misgiving about the economic situation which is developing in Newfoundland. He pointed out that owing to the expenditure of money on defence works, construction of which will shortly be completed, there has been a good deal of money in the Island and that the

result is an inflationary tendency which will make the situation worse if an unemployment situation develops.

He observed that the Newfoundland Government do not seem to have taken any important steps to deal with the situation and that there was neither rationing, price control, subsidizing of commodities in order to keep prices down or other measures for the same purpose. He thought that problem was likely to be accentuated because of the effect of some recent Canadian measures on supplies to Newfoundland. The prices of certain important foodstuffs in Canada are to be kept at a reasonably low level by Government subsidies. Newfoundland gets a large part of her supplies of these commodities from Canada, but the Canadian Government cannot extend the subsidies to cover exports to Newfoundland and there will be no similar check on prices of such exports. Canadian Government will probably tackle their part of the problem by confining their exports of such commodities to the quantities which would be required if the same rations of those foodstuffs as are in operation in Canada were to apply also to Newfoundland. This means that supplies of these commodities going to Newfoundland will be limited and the result would [be] likely to be that the prices would rise.

We have informed the United Kingdom High Commissioner that we understand that there has been extension recently of price control in Newfoundland and that you expected to take more comprehensive measures as soon as you had received recommendations made by Price as a result of his recent visit to Ottawa and Washington (see your letter of the 12th December).<sup>1</sup> We should, however, be glad to have your observations on the points made by Robertson and to be informed how matters now stand as regards to question of extension of price control. You should know in this connection that in approving recent proposal for increase in War Bonus, the Treasury, while expressing satisfaction at the measures taken and in contemplation to check the rise in the cost of living, as reported in your letter of the 12th December, expressed the hope that these measures may be accelerated and extended in order to place the Government and other employers in a better position to resist or at least limit further increases in remuneration with their inevitable inflationary effects. Ends.

1243.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions au commissaire  
aux Finances*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office, to Commissioner  
for Finance*

N. 265/8

London, January 5, 1943

SECRET

My dear Wild,

In connexion with our Saving telegram of today passing on to you Robertson's recent remarks to our High Commissioner at Ottawa about the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



economic situation in Newfoundland, you may like to have the following supplementary information:

(1) While Robertson spoke quite sympathetically and appeared fully to appreciate the special difficulties of the Newfoundland Government, his remarks suggested that he was under the impression that nothing at all was being done in Newfoundland in the direction of price control. This rather surprised us, especially in view of Price's recent visit to Washington and Ottawa, to say nothing of your own visit to Canada with Dunn, as a result of which one would have expected the Canadian authorities to be fairly well informed of the steps already taken or in contemplation in Newfoundland. The explanation appears to be that Robertson was basing himself on information supplied by Burchell who, we gather, has recently been in Canada, and Burchell's account must have been somewhat out of date. We have pointed this out to our High Commissioner in a telegram (No. 28 of 3rd January)<sup>1</sup> of which I enclose a copy.

(2) When in Ottawa in September, I took the opportunity of speaking both to Robertson and Donald Gordon about price control difficulties in Newfoundland, and asked them whether, in the event of your wanting expert assistance, there would be any possibility of the Canadian Government being able to spare one of their price control specialists to look into the Newfoundland position and give you his advice. Donald Gordon said that he would much like to go himself, but this, of course, was out of the question; there would probably, he felt, be great difficulties in sparing anyone for the purpose, especially as for a job of this kind he would have to be a pretty senior and responsible person, but after discussion both he and Robertson said they thought that there would be a good chance of some suitable man being made available, either from the Price Control Administration or the Reserve Bank, [sic] if we were to make an official approach to the Canadian Government on this subject.

I pass this on to you for what it is worth. I did not do so earlier, since Price's appointment came so soon after my return home, and this was followed by your own visit to Canada. But if you think that it would help you to get a man down from Canada, we should of course be very ready to take this up with the Canadian Government, and Robertson's recent conversation with the High Commissioner would give us a very suitable peg.

(3) I appreciate the difficulty of the Canadian Government in extending their internal subsidies to cover exports to Newfoundland (though I had hoped they would be prepared to play up on this). But does this mean that prices of Canadian exports will be entirely uncontrolled from the Canadian end? *Prima facie* there would seem room for negotiation on this point, especially as the Canadians have a strong interest themselves in keeping down prices in Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

(4) We have not allowed Robertson's remarks to delay our approach to the Canadian Government on the procedure for the presentation of Newfoundland's requirements to the Combined Food Board, and I take the opportunity of enclosing a copy of our telegram to the High Commissioner (No. 27 of 3rd January)<sup>1</sup> asking him to take this up.

With kind regards and best wishes for 1943.

Yours ever,

P. A. CLUTTERBUCK

1244.

NPA GN1/3 1/43

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 14

[St. John's,] February 6, 1943

Following for Clutterbuck from Puddester. Your Saving telegram No. 2 Secret, January 5th, to Wild. We are not unaware of the conditions which have prevailed in Newfoundland to which Robertson refers, nor have we overlooked the results which must be anticipated if counter-balancing action on an emphatic scale is not initiated and pursued. Price who naturally required a short period in which to investigate our food situation, price control and distribution problems and to verify existing stocks, also found it essential to ascertain how Canada has tackled analogous problems and re-actions of Canadian Officials. He has now submitted his preliminary report. See my personal letter to you dated Feb. 6th<sup>2</sup> to which a copy of his report<sup>1</sup> is annexed. We have accepted his main recommendations subject to further consideration of points of detail.

. . .

Luxury importations will shortly be much curtailed or prohibited. Investigation as suggested in Price's report will be accelerated and prices for most foodstuffs and commodities promulgated. Staff is being recruited under considerable difficulty but organization is being extended as fast as possible. At this time we consider it unnecessary to ask Canada to release any personnel for employment here as suggested.

Coupon rationing is in an advanced stage of preparation. Registration cards and coupon books are now being printed. Distribution cards throughout most of the Island for registration purposes will shortly commence. Despite

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

difficult winter conditions we look forward to early completion registration after which coupon books will be issued, and system introduced over such commodities short supply of which renders this unavoidable.

We regard subsidizing of commodities as unsuitable and impracticable having regard to Newfoundland conditions, but have recommended the suspension or elimination of certain Customs duties. (See Governor's telegram No. 19 Secret dated January 16th.)<sup>1</sup> The effects of our more recent efforts in these fields are now becoming evident. Cost of living after rising nine points between the months of July and November and by fifth on [of] one point in December declined by one-half point in January.

We have never expected or wished Canada to absorb any subsidy on goods exported to Newfoundland. For reasons explained in Paragraph 3(f) of Price's report adoption of suggestion that Canada might confine exports to quantities which would be needed if Canadian scale of rationing were applied here would be unfair to Newfoundland and would seriously depress our already inadequate standard of living, some improvement in which has occurred recently. This factor must in my view be taken into account when considering rationing fishermen's [sic] families on sugar and tea especially when they have been deprived of salt beef and canned beef.

It must be borne in mind that rationing is difficult in Newfoundland where of a total of thirteen hundred and odd towns and villages over one thousand of them are populated by less than one hundred people and may be considered remote areas. Canada herself has recognized that her remote areas should not be rationed by coupons.

We have already informally discussed with Canada the placing of a ceiling on goods produced grown or manufactured in Canada and exported to Newfoundland.

Canada has in our view not sufficiently studied special conditions here, her conclusions being probably based mainly on superficial examination of statistics etc. without adequate weight being given to modifying factors, for instance the low standard of living of the average fisherman and logger whose diet mainly consists of sugar, molasses, tea, salt beef, canned beef, of imported goods, and the vegetables and fish which he himself provides from the land and the sea.

She should be assured we have position under constant review and that every step possible will be taken to prevent inflation and restrict to the utmost, having regard to our circumstances, importation of foodstuffs and other commodities in short supply.

Cumulative effect of our proposals should achieve this end.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1245.

PRO DO 35 1151 572/1/1 X/J 9827

*Le commissaire à la Santé publique et au Bien-être social  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions*

*Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions*

[St. John's,] April 5, 1943

My dear Clutterbuck,

In your letter of the 29th March, No. N572/1/1<sup>1</sup> you raised several points relating to our food and price control measures, and the steps we have in contemplation in these fields to counteract the inflationary tendencies facing us.

You will have received our Telegram No. 109 dated 5/4/43,<sup>2</sup> saying very briefly that we have agreed to new plans, which will ensure to Newfoundland a definite share of food commodities. Herewith is enclosed a copy of a report<sup>2</sup> by Price and Curtis on their recent visit to Ottawa and Washington which sets out in detail the course of the negotiations and the agreement reached. A few items still remain to be adjusted, but we anticipate that it will shortly be possible to set out the detailed arrangements made in an exchange of letters between the Canadian and United States authorities. You will notice that I joined Price and Curtis towards the end of their negotiations and I am satisfied that the special position of Newfoundland and circumstances obtaining here, have been thoroughly explained to the senior officials of both the Canadian Wartime Prices and Trade Board and the Board of Economic Warfare, and this must inevitably improve the mutual understanding of all concerned. I could not rest satisfied in my own mind unless I explained personally to the authorities in the U.S.A. and Canada, Newfoundland's peculiar difficulties. I thought I knew more about them than the other two. I am now satisfied that we did all we could. I especially wanted to impress upon the authorities the necessity of procuring barrelled beef for the fishermen. (By the way I saw Mr. MacDonald in Ottawa and had tea with him. I had lunch with Sir Patrick Duff and had interesting talks with both.)

A statement on the lines suggested by you is in course of preparation and a copy will be sent to you at the same time as we send it to the High Commissioner in Ottawa for transmission to External Affairs, but frankly I am not sure that at this time we can add much to the information we gave Angus and others so very recently.

In the mean time I would say that the Board of Economic Warfare has undertaken to review the prices charged on any foodstuffs exported from the United States. If the invoice price exceeds their internally prescribed maximum price plus reasonable additions for charges and expenses incurred in

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



preparing the goods for export and any intermediate brokers' charges and profit, permission to ship the goods will be withheld. We have not yet made any definite arrangements on this point with Canada, although the question is not being overlooked. The difficulty is that if Canada's ceiling prices were rigidly applied to exports there might be a disinclination on the part of suppliers to bother with exports when there is a ready market in Canada for all their products. This might mean that Canada in order to implement the agreement we have now reached would have to exercise compulsory powers to ensure the despatch to us of the foodstuffs concerned. Provided therefore there is no excessive disparity between internal and export prices, it seems best to defer positive action on this particular phase of the problem. It is so much to Canada's own interest to keep this matter under review that we can be confident that this will not be lost sight of.

We are now on the last lap of registration as a preliminary to the introduction of coupon rationing, and despite considerable difficulty being experienced by printers in obtaining supplies of the special papers required for the books, we hope to be able to put this into effect probably on June 1st. Unfortunately we have been able to make but little progress in giving Price the staff he needs energetically to pursue the policy we have agreed upon. We are trying to borrow a few men from the Paper Companies on "dollar-a-year" lines and I may be able to let you know shortly what we have been able to achieve.

I thought it well to write you at once in reply to your letter, but when I send you a copy of our statement<sup>1</sup> to Ottawa I shall deal with the points outstanding in your letter.

I also enclose two copies of Speech broadcast by Price on March the 27th.,<sup>1</sup> dealing with registration.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. PUDDSTER

1246.

PRO DO 35 1151 572/1/1 X/J 9827

*Le commissaire à la Santé publique et au Bien-être social au sous-secrétaire  
d'État adjoint aux Dominions*

*Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare to Assistant Under-Secretary  
of State for Dominions*

St. John's, July 5, 1943

My dear Clutterbuck,

I am forwarding herewith copies of two addresses<sup>2</sup> delivered by Price and myself (June 8th and 26th), together with Regulations<sup>2</sup> covering the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Coupon Rationing of Sugar, Tea, and Coffee, which went into effect to-day July 5th. I trust this will give you information as to what we have done up to date.

As soon as rationing is cleared away and working, we shall further consider tightening up the price control. You will understand that it will be a difficult task to obtain 100% efficiency in this sparsely populated country of the extent of six thousand miles of Coast line and over one thousand villages in which there is less than one hundred population in each.

Thank you for your letter of recent date and the kind words about myself which it contained.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. PUDDSTER

1247.

2897-40

*Le haut commissaire adjoint de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Deputy High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

815/16

Ottawa, August 31, 1943

Dear Mr. Robertson,

The Governor of Newfoundland has asked me to send you the enclosed copy of a memorandum showing the steps taken and in contemplation in Newfoundland to maintain control of prices. The memorandum was prepared at the request of the Secretary for Dominion Affairs and copies have been sent to him. It is thought that it may be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

PATRICK DUFF

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire*

*Memorandum*

[S. John's, August, 1943]

In Newfoundland there has been a slow but definitely increasing rise in the cost-of-living, since the outbreak of war. Taking the cost-of-living index figure on the 1st October, 1938 as 100 the figure had risen to 104.4 by the 1st October, 1939. By December, 1941 it had reached 131.6 and continued steadily to rise until a peak figure of 150.2 was reached in December 1942. It stood at 148.9 on July 1st, 1943. Three main factors had operated to

cause these increases (1) rises in commodity prices in countries of supply, (it should be noted that Newfoundland imports by far the larger proportion of its food requirements), (2) increased freight, insurance and handling charges, and (3) increased spending and purchasing power consequent on war conditions, especially high wage earnings by personnel engaged under the base construction programmes of Canada and the United States of America.

2. There was too a substantial rise in house rentals, particularly in St. John's, consequent upon an influx or transfer of workers on bases (and their families) both from overseas and Outports throughout the Island.

3. In December 1941 the Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare was authorised (deputed) to carry out the duties usually associated with the terms "Price Controller" and "Rent Controller" and for convenience these terms are used throughout this memorandum.

4. The legal basis of the controls imposed is the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940. By the Defence (Price of Goods) Regulations, 1941, and the Defence (Rent Restrictions) Regulations, 1941, made under the Act cited, the Price Controller was authorized to fix, by Order the maximum prices to be charged for any goods, and increases in the rents of unfurnished dwelling houses effective as at June 30th, 1941 were prohibited, except with the prior approval of the Rent Controller.

5. Having regard to the Country's dependence on imports and to the limited means, financial and administrative, at its disposal the Commission of Government did not attempt to fix an overall "ceiling" based on prices current on a particular date or during a prescribed period. This would have involved frequent adjustments to meet the upward trend in the landed cost of imported commodities; or alternatively the payment of subsidies on a very large scale. Price control has therefore been limited to certain important commodities.

6. The Food (Current Prices) Order 1941, which imposed control over prices, was published contemporaneously with the regulations of December 1941 mentioned above (paragraph 4) and prescribed that any "specified food" should not be sold at a price in excess of that prevailing on December 15th, 1941. The only commodity then so specified was liquid cows milk; but rising costs mainly of imported feeding stuffs, made it impossible for farmers and others to continue to operate under the restrictive ceiling price, and in September 1942 revised maximum prices for both pasteurised and raw cows milk were published.

7. An Order similar in terms was made in May 1942 restricting the prices of meats of all kinds, including bologna, sausages and tinned meats (excluding meats preserved by salt or pickle), Bacon and Ham, Milks, (tinned, Condensed, Evaporated or Dried), Butter, Butterine, Oleomargarine, Cheese, Dried Fruits, Raisins, Currants and Prunes, Canned and Bottled Fruits, Tinned Soups, and Vegetables, Dried Beans, Rice, Rolled Oats, Oatmeal, Onions, Sugar, Tea, Cocoa, to those in force on May 2nd of that year.

8. In June 1942 the wholesale and retail prices of white (granulated) sugar were fixed, but have since been modified from time to time.

9. By the Autumn of 1942 it became clear that the landed costs of many of the foodstuffs subject to the Order of May 1942 (see paragraph 7)<sup>1</sup> had risen so steeply that the ceiling price placed on them could not be maintained. The position was corrected by imposing as a new ceiling the prices ruling on the dates set out below:

Tea, cocoa, coffee	}	December 14th, 1942
chicory, coffee extracts		
Salted beef and pork,	}	December 22nd, 1942.
tinned meats		

10. Experience showed that in the absence of inspectors and acute public interest, the method of limiting prices to those prevailing on a given date was unsatisfactory, and virtually incapable of enforcement. The policy was therefore adopted of fixing the wholesale and retail prices of specified goods by retail or/and trade units, and maximum prices on this basis are now in operation in respect of the following foodstuffs: Sugar, molasses, corned beef, tea, salted beef in barrels, five-cent confectionery, bread (white, brown, raisin) (Avalon Peninsula only) potatoes, cooked corned beef in tins, eggs, (imported and locally produced) butterine, (margarine).

11. In the case of the majority of the commodities mentioned in paragraph 7 which are not subject to price control orders, as in paragraphs 9 and 10, the Food Controller has fixed the maximum additions which may be made to landed costs, whether by a percentage mark up or on a unitary basis. This arrangement also applies to imported fresh meats.

12. In the case of molasses a number of special difficulties were experienced in fixing prices. By long standing custom, prices had been fixed by the trade varying with the quality (fancy, choice, grocery) of the molasses and the size of the container (tierce, puncheon, barrel). Had this practice been followed it would have been virtually impossible for a consumer to know the retail price which he should pay. The whole season's importations were therefore handled as one unit, the importers acting as a trade group, differences due to quality and size of containers were ignored, and flat basic wholesale and retail prices fixed. To these prices were added permissible additions to take care of freight and insurance charges to certain distributive Outports.

13. To purchase motor tyres and tubes users must first obtain a permit from the Supplies Division of the Government. Retail prices of tyres are fixed by the Price Controller and communicated to the trade and to the Supplies Division. The maximum price which may be charged for any tyre or tube is endorsed on the relative permit to purchase issued by the Supplies Division.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



14. To control the price of coal, Regulations were published in August 1942<sup>1</sup> prohibiting import except under licence, and the Price Controller was authorised to fix sale prices. Great uncertainty prevailed in St. John's as to the prices properly payable to merchants by consumers. A shipment of coal might become subject to heavy demurrage due to convoy or heavy weather delay, discharging difficulties, and the like, while another cargo might escape these hazards. Resentment was felt by householders and others because of the disparity in prices between one merchant and another and this was not always easy to explain. It was decided therefore that the position could best be met under a pooling system, and in St. John's a Company limited by guarantee was formed to operate the "pool". Only members of the "pool" are granted licence to import, and all expenses of operation, in chartering vessels, and discharging them etc., are borne by the pool. The profit per ton and chargeable expenses were agreed and a flat maximum sale price per ton prescribed for a period, subject to revision from time to time in the light of experience.

15. Fishermen's motor fuel has since June 1st been placed under price control. Base wholesale and retail prices at St. John's were agreed with the principal importers additional sums being allowed to them in respect of freight etc., to their tankage or barrel points, around the coast. Maximum additions to these prices to cover freight and insurance to retail points were fixed.

16. The price of gasolene (petrol) has since 1941 been regulated in St. John's by a gentleman's agreement between the Price Controller, importers, distributors and retailers. Until recently the prices charged at Outports for gasolene were strictly in line with St. John's prices, when allowance was made for freight and other expenses. Recent experience has shown however, that in some Outport areas there is a tendency to charge unwarranted prices, and a price control order is under consideration.

17. Certain commodities in short supply (e.g. axes, agricultural implements, tinned beef) have been brought into Newfoundland from time to time under Government purchase, and the wholesale and retail prices have been fixed after consultation with the trade.

18. Freight tonnage rates payable to schooners registered in Newfoundland for the conveyance of goods between ports in the Island, and Labrador and to and from ports in Canada have been fixed by the Commissioner for Public Utilities on the advice of the Transportation Control Board.

19. The increase in the population in certain areas (see paragraph 2) led to much overcrowding and a practice became general of purchasing houses ostensibly for the occupation of the new owner but actually to take advantage of the opportunity to obtain new tenants at higher rentals or for sub-letting. This led to numerous evictions both by new and old owners and landlords, as the Rent Restrictions Regulations did not contain any

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduits.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

prohibition against a landlord dispossessing his tenant by simple notice to determine the tenancy. In November 1942 therefore the Rent Regulations were revised and it is now not possible to obtain possession of houses etc., unless the landlord can prove failure to pay rent, nuisance, or need of the premises for the occupation of himself or his family and then only if reasonable alternative accommodation is available. The number of cases in which permission has been granted to increase rent or to evict tenants is almost negligible. While a certain amount of hardship has no doubt been experienced by landlords, whose income from their property has not increased, to meet the increases in the cost-of-living and repairs, yet it must be admitted that the regulations have been of inestimable benefit to the community as a whole.

20. It is estimated that at this time about sixty per cent of all foodstuffs have been brought under some form of price control. It is proposed to continue and to extend the policy of fixing the prices of such goods. No orders dealing with commodities other than food (except as mentioned in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16) nor with services have yet been published but such extension to cover other commodities and services is under consideration.

1248.

2897-40

*Le secrétaire de la Commission des prix et du commerce en temps de guerre  
au sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures*

*Secretary, Wartime Prices and Trade Board,  
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, October 12, 1943

Re: Newfoundland Price Control

Dear Mr. Wrong,

A few weeks ago the Commissioner of Finance of the Newfoundland Commission of Government called to see me with a most urgent request that we provide them with one or two of our men to go to Newfoundland to take over price control there. He emphasized the difficulties with which they were faced and the needs of their case. He was referred to me by Mr. Angus, and I saw him without knowing that a similar request had been presented to the Board through your Department a short time ago when we stated that we did not think it possible to assist.

I have again discussed the matter with the Executive Committee of the Board and the opinion is that we cannot provide the requested assistance. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to find men of sufficient seniority who could be spared from our staff. But more than this, we feel it would be unwise from a national point of view to undertake this task. The failure to inaugurate a system of adequate price control in Newfoundland up to the

present time renders the task before any new appointee an extremely difficult one. To make any success of it the appointee would have to do many unpopular things. There is great doubt as to whether the Newfoundland Commission is prepared to undertake the steps necessary to inaugurate a proper system of price control. Perhaps with full support a respected local man could succeed, but for an outsider the task is nearly impossible in our opinion. In such circumstances we feel it would be extremely unwise for an official Canadian Board to provide men for price control in Newfoundland. It would merely heighten a suspicion that is, unfortunately, too general that Canada is trying to acquire control of Newfoundland.

These opinions are frankly stated and are naturally intended to be confidential to you and your associates. I have told the Commissioner of Finance of our own staff difficulties and have explained how very hard it will be to find any suitable men that we could release. He indicated to me that the request would probably be renewed. In the circumstances and having regard for the nature of our objections, we feel that the refusal to meet the request should come officially from the Department of External Affairs. We would prefer that the refusal should not be based upon our inability or unwillingness to find men but should be based upon the real reason, which is that we do not feel it is wise for us to send any officials of ours to undertake this task.

Yours faithfully,

R. M. FOWLER

1249.

NPA S-7-2-4

*Le secrétaire de la commission pour Terre-Neuve au secrétaire adjoint  
Secretary for Dominions*

*Secretary, Commission of Government of Newfoundland, to Assistant  
Secretary, Dominions Office*

[St. John's,] November 1, 1943

Dear Tait,

In your telegram No. 495 of the 15th September<sup>1</sup> about Crosse's allowance you stated that the Treasury wished to be furnished with some authoritative evidence in support of the view that the cost of living in Newfoundland is at present higher than in Canada.

I hoped to be able to obtain from the Canadian Trade Commissioner a detailed comparative statement of living expenses in Newfoundland and Canada, but he tells me that owing to pressure of work he has been unable to complete the comprehensive study which he has in mind. He has promised

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

to let me have the result of his survey when he finds time to complete it. He informed me, however, that from a preliminary study made by the Canadian High Commissioner and himself he would estimate that cost of living in Newfoundland is from 50 to 75 per cent higher than in Canada. He mentioned that the Canadian Government had recently granted a substantial increase in his allowances on account of the very high cost of living in Newfoundland. He also stated that his allowance is considerably higher than that paid to the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Australia, where he himself had been stationed previously.

The Manager of the Bank of Montreal states that his Bank recognised long before the war that the high cost of living in Newfoundland was much higher than in Canada; this was reflected in substantially higher living allowances paid to staff in Newfoundland compared with those paid in Canada. He estimated that the cost of living in Newfoundland was some 50 per cent higher than in Canada. The Manager of the Bank of Nova Scotia who has recently made a study of the subject in support of a successful claim by his staff for increased allowances because of the high cost of living in Newfoundland, also estimates that the higher cost here amounts to at least 50 per cent. In granting their allowances the Banks have, of course, had regard to the lower scale of direct taxation in Newfoundland.

These Canadian representatives all state that in present circumstances at any rate the cost of accommodation is higher here than in Canada. They have in mind particularly conditions existing in St. John's. I should say that there was not a great deal of difference in peacetime, but competition by the military for vacant accommodation and congestion arising from other wartime causes have driven up prices very considerably, especially for furnished accommodation.

I attach a schedule<sup>1</sup> of comparative prices which has been drawn up by a Canadian member of Curtis' staff who is employed on purchasing for the Department of Munitions and Supply. These prices relate entirely to foodstuffs of common consumption. The Newfoundland prices are those ruling in St. John's; the Canadian prices have been confirmed against current advertisements appearing in Montreal and Toronto newspapers. When it comes to toilet articles such as tooth paste, razor blades etc. the same differences will be found. For example a packet of razor blades which cost 25¢ in Canada is priced 40¢ in Newfoundland.

To all of us here the high cost of living in Newfoundland compared with that in Canada is so obvious as not to call for proof. Our high tariff very definitely increases the cost of living although Customs duties generally receive more than their fair share of blame. Duties affect dry goods, hardware and luxury goods much more, of course, than foodstuffs. Additional transportation, insurance and handling costs and allowances for loss in transit of perishable commodities, together with the common practice of marking up

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



profit on total landed cost, all play an important part. These factors operate in peacetime; they are responsible for a higher differential in wartime.

Even if Newfoundland costs were no higher in peacetime, the fact that our official cost of living index shows a wartime increase of 50% against Canada's 18% should speak for itself.

I enclose an article<sup>1</sup> by a Canadian writer in St. John's which was recently published in a Canadian paper and republished here. Allowing for a good deal of journalistic overstatement, it would I think go a long way to answer your point if further argument were needed. His statement, by the way, regarding the greater profusion of foodstuffs in Newfoundland strikes us as curious. When we visit Canada we get exactly the opposite impression.

I hope that the information which I have supplied will meet your purpose. If the Canadian Trade Commissioner manages to find time to complete his proposed survey I will let you have copy.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,

[W. J. CAREW]

1250.

2897-40

*Le président de la Commission des prix et du commerce en temps de guerre  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chairman, Wartime Prices and Trade Board,  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, December 31, 1943

Dear Mr. Robertson,

NEWFOUNDLAND

You may remember a short chat I had with you on the telephone a short time ago in regard to conditions in Newfoundland in particular reference to the almost alarming reports which have appeared in recent despatches.

In the course of making a general world survey of inflationary conditions in belligerent countries our Research Division has produced the enclosed *confidential* memorandum.<sup>1</sup> I send it to you because it gives a birds-eye view of conditions in Newfoundland and will perhaps add something to despatches from Canadian Government officials. It seems obvious that the Newfoundland situation is fated to get steadily worse.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with protocol to know if actions or suggestions from Canada would be considered appropriate. But I assume the

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le document 1253.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 1253.

distress of an old neighbour might call for some sympathy and that in turn might inspire some thinking as to whether or not some assistance can be suggested in proper quarters.

Yours sincerely,

D. GORDON

1251.

NPA S-7-2-4

*Mémorandum du commissaire aux Finances à la commission pour  
Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Finance to Commission of Government  
of Newfoundland*

F.104-'46

[St. John's,] October 8, 1946

COST OF LIVING INDEX FIGURE

This note is an attempt to summarize the Finance Department's views on the Supply Department report<sup>1</sup> on the cost of Living index figure and the wider problems arising therefrom. As I see the position, the responsibility for framing the cost of living index figure and for controlling prices has been placed on the Supply Department, but the Finance Department is vitally interested because the cost of living impinges on the economy of the country at so many points and Government revenue and expenditure are sensitive to the manner in which this question is handled.

2. It is evident that the control of prices in Newfoundland hitherto has been impaired by the absence of a public opinion which was ready to tolerate close control, and all the vexations which that entails; possibly by a certain leniency on the part of the magistracy; and by the lack of sufficient trained staff to enforce control effectively throughout the country. It is clearly impossible for us in this small community to resist major price trends in the U.S. or Canada, but there are considerable fields in which we can still take effective action and these may be considered, for convenience, under three main heads:

- (a) Pre-landing costs
- (b) Costs on landing
- (c) Post-landing costs.

...

12. The Commission will perhaps wish to consider whether a further enquiry into the cost of living should be authorized. My own view is that we already possess, or are able to obtain, all the information necessary to enable

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

us to reach decisions. A further enquiry might throw an intolerable burden on Government Departments already hard-pressed by the Convention. It could hardly be completed in less than six months and, during that time, either we as a Government would be bound to take executive action to check or reduce the rise in the index, or we should allow the position to drift almost beyond further control. The only argument in favour of a further enquiry is that we could engage trading and consumers' interests and thus defend ourselves against yet another charge of arbitrary government, but I think that we should best earn the thanks of the population by ourselves grappling with the position promptly and vigorously; and surely we could forestall criticism by the issue of a carefully worded statement outlining the steps which we propose to take.

13. If the Commission reach decisions at Thursday's meeting, I propose to circulate for Friday's meeting a draft telegram in continuation of my letter of the 28th of September, 1946,<sup>1</sup> to Mr. Syers.

R. L. M. JAMES

1252.

2897-40

*Mémoire<sup>2</sup> des dépêches 445 et 446 (26 septembre 1947) du  
haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum<sup>2</sup> on Despatches 445 and 446 (September 26, 1947)  
from Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

[Ottawa,] November 7, 1947

1. The report<sup>3</sup> states that the high cost of living may be attributed primarily to high prices in supplying markets outside Newfoundland. The important secondary causes are the cost of inward carriage and of distribution. A further cause is the present method of raising revenue by import duties.
2. The report states that the profits of the distributive trades are on the whole not unduly high.
3. The report recommends that
  - a) freight charges on the Newfoundland Railway be re-examined;
  - b) further changes in the taxation system to a system of direct graduated taxation should be considered;

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Rédigé par P. A. Bridle.

<sup>3</sup> Le rapport fut préparé par une commission d'enquête sur le coût de la vie à Terre-Neuve.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Written by P. A. Bridle.

<sup>3</sup> The report was prepared by a Commission of Enquiry into the cost of living in Newfoundland.

- c) the Government should enter into negotiations with the Canadian Government and with the provision trade to explore the possibility of securing flour for the Newfoundland market at a flat price, lower than that now charged by the Canadian Wheat Board, and steps should be taken, if necessary by state purchase, to ensure that all Newfoundland merchants buy at the same price over fairly long periods.
4. The Acting High Commissioner is of the opinion that it is doubtful if the implementation of any of these recommendations would considerably reduce the cost of living in Newfoundland.
5. The St. John's *Daily News* and the St. John's *Evening Telegram*, commenting editorially on the report, are not optimistic that under present world conditions the cost of living can be materially reduced.
6. The *Daily News*, which is inclined to be critical of Canada and to champion the cause of Newfoundland merchants, emphasizes that profiteering cannot be blamed for the high cost of living. It is of the opinion that tariff revision and reduction of the price of flour purchased in Canada are the most hopeful means of reducing the cost of living. On the latter point it argues that "the Canadian Government may well consider that its highly favourable balance of trade with this country justify [sic] some reduction from the world price which we have been charged". It also asserts that Canada has a highly favourable balance of invisible trade with Newfoundland and that the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board has acquired Newfoundland balances in American dollars "which, during the past five years, must have totalled some hundreds of million of dollars".

1253.

2897-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 139

St. John's, January 26, 1949

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 13 of January 6th<sup>1</sup> in which I reported on the cost of living index for St. John's as of November 6th, 1948.

2. The cost of living index for St. John's as [of] December 4th, 1948, is 185.1, that is the same as November 6th, 1948.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



3. The following figures summarize the position:<sup>1</sup>

1st October, 1938	—	100.0	3rd July, 1948	—	183.7
1st October, 1939	—	104.4	7th August, 1948	—	190.2
6th September, 1947	—	172.1	4th September, 1948	—	184.8
4th October, 1947	—	176.0	2nd October, 1948	—	185.5
1st November, 1947	—	178.8	6th November, 1948	—	185.1
6th December, 1947	—	179.5	4th December, 1948	—	185.1

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

## PARTIE 4/PART 4

LE CONTRÔLE DU CHANGE ÉTRANGER  
FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL

1254.

NPA GN1/3 320/25

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[Ottawa,] June 23, 1939

SECRET. Following for Penson. Begins. Holmes's letter of June 20th.<sup>2</sup> As we understand it the primary object of your visit will be to discuss with the Canadian Authorities the position of Newfoundland in relation to Canadian counter part of the United Kingdom draft Defence Regulations relating to finance as enclosed in Clutterbuck's letter to you of April 22nd.<sup>2</sup> Discussions which took place here with the Bank of Canada during Osborne's visit indicated that the position of Newfoundland in exchange matters was of particular importance and that in so far as her currency is the Canadian Dollar it was essential that she should be brought within the scheme co-ordinated with Canada. Otherwise the Island would constitute gap through which losses might occur or would suffer inconvenience by Canadian control.

<sup>1</sup> L'indice au Canada s'établissait ainsi pour la période correspondante:

Octobre	1938	100.0
Octobre	1939	101.6
Septembre	1947	138.0
Octobre	1947	140.6
Novembre	1947	142.0
Décembre	1947	144.3
Juillet	1948	146.5
Août	1948	155.5
Septembre	1948	156.9
Octobre	1948	157.8
Novembre	1948	157.6
Décembre	1948	156.9

<sup>1</sup> The index in Canada was as follows during the corresponding period:

October	1938
October	1939
September	1947
October	1947
November	1947
December	1947
July	1948
August	1948
September	1948
October	1948
November	1948
December	1948

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

It is understood that Draft Regulations have been prepared by the Bank of Canada and that these have been discussed with the Department of Finance but have not been submitted to or approved by Canadian Government generally. I shall accordingly endeavour as soon as you have made definite arrangements as regards visiting Ottawa to ensure that no difficulty is put in the way of your discussing the position of Newfoundland privately with Bank of Canada and Department of Finance. It will however be desirable that your visit should be regarded generally as of a routine character.

You will no doubt inform England as soon as possible as to probable date of your arrival. If you can be here by July 10th it now appears probable that Towers and Gordon of the Bank of Canada and Clark will all be available. Ends.

1255.

NPA GN1/3 320/35

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 243

[St. John's,] August 25, 1939

SECRET. Following for Machtig from Penson. Repeated to High Commissioner for H. M. Government in United Kingdom in Canada. Begins. Reference your Telegram No. 187 Secret, June 13th,<sup>1</sup> and related correspondence. Documents furnished by Bank of Canada subsequent to my visit to Ottawa have been studied and addition is being made to local Draft Defence Act giving power to make regulations imposing exchange control on lines of Bank of Canada draft proposals. Latter are referred to in Holmes's telegram to me of June 23rd, of which you were no doubt informed. They were discussed by Bank of Canada representative with Bank of England and are described as at least as far-reaching as United Kingdom proposals. Local regulations, a draft of which is now being prepared, could be put into force if and when justified by circumstances. Regulations would follow Bank of Canada draft as closely as possible. Think you should probably have this information in view of possible developments. See also paragraph 3 of your Circular Telegram C No. 13 Secret of August 24th.<sup>1</sup> Ends.

1256.

NPA GN1/3 320/25

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 289

[St. John's,] September 16, 1939

IMPORTANT. SECRET. Repeated High Commissioner in Canada. Your No. 308/Secret<sup>1</sup>. Information was received here on evening September 14th

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

that Canadian Government was likely to impose exchange control regulations on night of September 15th to be effective September 16th. We were asked to act simultaneously. Penson had previously received draft of proposed Canadian Regulations and a redraft reached him the same day as the telegram referred to above. A draft of regulations had been prepared here on basis of first Canadian draft and had been sent to Canada semi-officially. In circumstances, in view of action which was actually taken by Canadian Government on 15th September this draft with certain amendments to conform with revised Canadian draft was passed by Commission, and brought into force midnight September 15th, effective on morning September 16th.

These regulations made under Newfoundland Defence Act provide for establishment of Newfoundland Foreign Exchange Control Board to act in close co-operation with and generally on same lines as Canadian Board. Board will have the duty of controlling dealings in foreign exchange, payments of Canadian dollars to non-residents, and licensing of exports and imports. To meet immediate needs an open licence for exports and imports has been issued. This will be withdrawn and arrangements similar to those to be enforced in Canada substituted as soon as necessary forms and administration has [sic] been established.

It will be appreciated by you that it was unfortunately impossible to arrange for prior consultation with you having regard to danger that Newfoundland might lose recourse to Canadian Board for exchange in the event of delay here in imposing regulations. Arrangement made will result in Canada permitting unrestricted transfer of Canadian currency and balances to Newfoundland and guaranteeing the Canadian Banks recourse to the Canadian Board for exchange sold in Newfoundland. Please refer telegram of High Commissioner in Canada to us of June 23rd in which position of Newfoundland in relation to Canadian Exchange Regulations is set forth.

1257.

C 26896

*Extrait du Commercial Intelligence Journal<sup>1</sup>**Excerpt from Commercial Intelligence Journal<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa,] October 6, 1939

## NEWFOUNDLAND

*Foreign Exchange Control Regulation*

Under Section 1, of the Defence Act of Newfoundland 1939 published in the Newfoundland Gazette of September 5, 1939, power was given to the Newfoundland Governor in Commission to make war regulations for certain purposes among which were included:

<sup>1</sup> Publié par le ministère du Commerce.<sup>1</sup> Published by the Department of Trade and Commerce.

For controlling foreign exchange transactions and in connection therewith for licensing exports and imports and for providing for the declaration by persons resident or being in Newfoundland of their holdings of foreign exchange and foreign securities and for requisitioning the same if deemed desirable.

In accordance with these powers the Newfoundland Governor in Commission issued foreign exchange control regulations effective September 16 (published in the *Newfoundland Gazette* of September 19) which were similar to those issued by the Foreign Exchange Control Board of Canada effective the same date, and summarized in the *Commercial Intelligence Journal* No. 1860 of September 23, 1939 (page 569).

According to the Newfoundland regulations "Foreign Currency" means any currency other than Canadian dollars and that [sic] a "resident" means any person ordinarily resident in Newfoundland or in Canada.

In view of these rulings no exchange permits are required in order to import goods from or export goods to Canada provided there is no transaction in "foreign exchange". It is necessary, however, as is the case of Canada trading with Newfoundland, that export or import licenses, as the case may be, be obtained by the Newfoundland exporter or importer. It is, further, possible for a resident in Newfoundland to make payment in Canadian dollars to a resident in Canada without an exchange permit.

1258.

1156-D-39

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister in United States*

DESPATCH 704

Ottawa, October 15, 1940

Sir,

With reference to the acquisition of certain Naval and Air bases in Newfoundland by the United States, I have the honour to request that you will discuss with the appropriate representatives of the United States Government the suggestion which is outlined in the following paragraph.

2. When the Newfoundland bases are established and American forces installed, it is possible that the United States Government may decide to pay the officers and men, who are thus stationed in Newfoundland, in Canadian dollars. If this should be done, it is the earnest desire of our Foreign Exchange officers that the United States Government should acquire the Canadian dollars which it will need for this purpose by purchase from the Bank of Canada or from some other Canadian institution at the established rate. In other words, it is hoped that Washington will not endeavour to supply its needs by buying Canadian dollars in the "Black market" in New York or elsewhere.



3. If the United States Government continues to pay the personnel in Newfoundland in United States dollars, the situation, of course, will be satisfactorily handled by the legal banks and exchange institutions.

4. I shall be very much obliged if you will discuss this matter informally with the appropriate officials and let me know in due course what views they may express with regard to it.

I have etc.

O. D. SKELTON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1259.

1156-D-39

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 2208

Washington, October 21, 1940

Sir,

With reference to your despatch No. 704 of October 15th I have the honour to inform you that we have discussed with the State Department the question of the payment of United States forces in Newfoundland and in particular the undesirability from the Canadian point of view of having them paid in Canadian dollars purchased in the "Black Market".

2. The Department promised to give every consideration to our informal representations. At the present time, however, the various Departments concerned are only beginning to get around to such administrative details. We gather that the negotiations for the acquisition of these bases were carried on in such secrecy, on such a personal basis and in such general terms that departmental officials are having a difficult time determining exactly what was implied in the agreements and how they should be carried out in detail.

3. It is altogether probable that United States forces in Newfoundland will be paid in United States dollars, which can be sold at the official rate to local financial institutions. However, the State Department has promised to keep this problem in mind and I shall report on subsequent developments.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY  
for the Minister

1260.

BC RDF 131-8

*Le président de la Commission de contrôle du change étranger  
au ministre des Finances*

*Chairman of Foreign Exchange Control Board  
to Minister of Finance*

[Ottawa,] December 9, 1941

Dear Mr. Ilsley,

In my letter of 10th May,<sup>1</sup> which you acknowledged under date of 17th May,<sup>1</sup> on the subject of rates I advised you that the Board was applying the midrate of \$4.45 to its purchases of sterling from the United Kingdom Control and to its sales for repatriation purposes to the Dominion Government.

When the Commissioner for Finance for Newfoundland was in Ottawa recently he spoke to us informally regarding the rate on transfers which he has occasion to make to the Dominions Office. These transfers represent, in part, provision for public debt obligations and, in part, budget surpluses which Newfoundland is lending to the United Kingdom Government. He has now made a request in writing that in future such transfers be arranged at the midrate of \$4.45.

As you are aware all exchange transactions entered into by the chartered banks in Newfoundland with the consent of the local Board pass through our accounts. The spread between the buying and selling rates in these transactions thus accrues to this Board. While we pay to the banks' Head Offices the usual commission of 1/8% of Newfoundland business, we do not give the Newfoundland Board any share of the spread, although we pay their very modest office expenses. The request of the Commissioner seems, therefore, a very reasonable one for him to make, and we recommend that we should agree.

Will you please advise me if you concur.

Yours sincerely,

G. F. TOWERS

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1261.

BC RDF 131-8

*Le ministre des Finances au président de la Commission  
de contrôle du change étranger*

*Minister of Finance to Chairman of Foreign Exchange Control Board*

Ottawa, December 12, 1941

Dear Mr. Towers,

I have your letter of December 9th, and agree with you that we should accept the request made by the Commissioner of Finance for Newfoundland that the rate on transfers which he has occasion to make to the Dominions Office should be the midrate of \$4.45 to the pound sterling.

Yours very truly,

J. L. ILSLEY

1262.

C 26896

*Mémoire du chef de la division du tarif extérieur,  
ministère du Commerce, au chef de la direction des licences d'exportation,  
ministère du Commerce*

*Memorandum from Chief of Foreign Tariffs Division,  
Department of Trade and Commerce, to Chief of Export Permit Branch,  
Department of Trade and Commerce*

Ottawa, March 23, 1942

NEWFOUNDLAND EXPORT CONTROL

With reference to your telephone inquiry, the only Newfoundland regulations respecting export control other than to Enemy countries, which we have are:

Regulations issued September 1, 1939, under the Newfoundland Defence Act contain the following:

No person shall, without a licence in writing from the Newfoundland Board of Customs or such other person or persons as may at any time hereafter be appointed for the purpose by the Commissioner for Finance, export or ship any provisions or foodstuffs; or any animal, poultry, or bird, alive or dead, suitable for food.

Newfoundland foreign exchange control regulations issued September 15, 1939, provide that:

No person shall export any goods or other property from Newfoundland except under and in accordance with the terms of a licence granted by the Foreign Exchange Control Board.

In a despatch of January 16, 1942,<sup>1</sup> the Governor of Newfoundland informed the High Commissioner for Canada that the Newfoundland Government is prepared to adopt the export permit system for newsprint.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

We have not been able to find any reference as to the policy followed in Newfoundland respecting the sale or export of essential war materials.

WM. GILCHRIST

1263.

BC RDF NFLD

*Mémoire du Service de recherches de la Banque du Canada  
à la Commission de contrôle du change étranger*

*Memorandum from Research Department, Bank of Canada,  
to Foreign Exchange Control Board*

[Ottawa,] November 12, 1942

From information contained in the Bank's files, I<sup>1</sup> believe I have cleared up the mysteries concerning Newfoundland transfers to the United Kingdom for interest and sinking funds. On December 1st, 1941, Mr. Turk received a letter from Wild, the Commissioner of Finance, in which he requested that permission to use the mid-rate through us for transfers in connection with non-interest bearing loans be extended to include payments for debt service. This was done and, as noted in your list, there have been two subsequent payments prior to June 30th, one for £400,000 and one for £120,000.

Coming down to June 17th, 1942, I find a letter from the Secretary for Finance, in which he says that Newfoundland requires £770,400 per annum, of which interest consists of £592,400 and sinking fund £178,000. I assume that this is a fixed annual amount because it does not refer to any particular year. The letter goes on to state that £520,000 of this was transferred through the Bank of Canada, which ties in with your list. The difference of £200,000 consisted of exchange purchased through the Bank of Montreal in St. John's in 1941 prior to the introduction of the system of remitting to us, which I referred to in the above letter to Mr. Turk. There is still one puzzling feature to the situation. In this letter of June 17th from the Secretary for Finance there is a request to transfer the sterling equivalent of \$222,500 (£50,000 at 4.45) to the United Kingdom, and it is said to be for service on our sterling debt in connection with issues on or about June 30th.

As you will see, they appear to have transferred the full amount of £770,400 earlier in the course of the year, my only explanation for this additional amount being that it must refer to payments immediately after June 30th. Wild arranged for transfers through the Bank of Canada for account of non-interest bearing loans to the United Kingdom while here in Ottawa in October 1941. Hence it is possible that some portion of the loan was transferred through the Bank of Montreal before this date and hence without our having any record of it.

<sup>1</sup> G. S. Watts.



1264.

BC RDF NFLD

*Mémorandum du Service de recherches de la Banque du Canada au gouverneur  
de la Banque du Canada**Memorandum from Research Department, Bank of Canada, to Governor,  
Bank of Canada*

[Ottawa,] December 14, 1942

## RE PROPOSED TRIP TO NEWFOUNDLAND

I<sup>1</sup> have canvassed the F.E.C.B. for problems of theirs which might be usefully used as an entree to writing to Wild. At the moment there do not seem to be any outstanding problems of much consequence. While, of course, there will probably be others turn up, the only point in which the Board is specifically interested relates to Canadian companies' purchases in the U.S.A. for delivery to Newfoundland and Labrador (e.g. MacNamara Construction Co.). Here the question is that we have no assurance that the goods are actually purchased or that the companies have not obtained funds for the same purpose in Newfoundland as well.

On my own account my more specific objectives concern their balance of payments.

- (1) To try and gain some idea of their balance of payments in U.S. funds for the coming year. Most accounts seem to agree that our net gain of U.S. funds will be considerably reduced since the work on the bases is drawing to a close.
- (2) To ascertain their prospects *vis à vis* the U.K. We have never known precisely the extent of special war orders over and above their regular trade which is said to have been curtailed by shipping losses.
- (3) The extent to which we will be called on to buy sterling on balance — so far the accounts have about balance — is tied in with their budgetary position. Last year they had a heavy surplus, a good deal of which was loaned to the U.K. To date the surplus is even larger but their budget speech indicated that they anticipated a sharp contraction.
- (4) I should like to have an opportunity to find out how their trade statistics are made up. Presumably they are not very good but they may be usable if something is known of their composition. This applies to their few statistical series generally. We know little about them and a visit there would enable us (a) to make sure that we get everything useful and (b) by personal contact it might be possible to obtain informally some series not released for publication.
- (5) It should be possible to learn a good deal about their balance of payments generally and in particular the invisible items which are,

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<sup>1</sup> G. S. Watts.

with few exceptions, comparatively small in extent. If this is so it will be possible to amend our Canadian estimates to include Newfoundland. We have not been able to do this other than add in the net purchases or sales of U.S. dollars and sterling in their respective accounts.

The above reasons are entirely apart from the more general reasons for the visit which I had in mind. These include

- (1) a general familiarizing myself with the Newfoundland economy
- (2) gathering available information on its resources
- (3) its post-war prospects — for fishing
  - mining
  - pulp and paper industry
- (4) the position of the U.S.A., present and future, in Newfoundland.
- (5) their attitude towards Canada and the U.K.

1265.

BC RDF NFLD

*Le commissaire aux Finances au gouverneur de la Banque du Canada*  
*Commissioner for Finance to Governor, Bank of Canada*

St. John's, December 30, 1942

Dear Mr. Towers,

Replying to your letter of the 15th December,<sup>1</sup> we should be very happy to receive a visit from Mr. Watts to advise us regarding the working of Exchange Control and to go over any matters of mutual concern which require discussion. It was our intention that Mr. Calver<sup>2</sup> should visit Ottawa again in the near future so that he could bring his knowledge of Canadian practice up to date but, in the circumstances, his visit will be deferred until later.

I note that Mr. Watts has a special interest in the balance of payments and international trade which he would like to discuss first hand. I can assure you that we shall be ready to give him any information which is available, although I am afraid that our statistics are not so comprehensive as I should like them to be. We have, of course, full figures of Customs Returns, but there is at present some lag in the compilation of these, owing to acute staffing difficulties. We are, however, endeavouring to bring them up to date as speedily as possible.

We shall be extremely busy in Finance Department until the middle of February completing our annual Estimates and Budget for the financial year commencing the 1st April next. Although Mr. Calver would be available

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> V. Calver, le fonctionnaire du ministère des Finances de Terre-Neuve qui était responsable du contrôle du change étranger.

<sup>2</sup> V. Calver, the official in the Newfoundland Department of Finance who was responsible for foreign exchange control.

I am afraid we could not give Mr. Watts much time before then, and I would, therefore, suggest that his visit should be arranged for the latter half of February if that is convenient to you.

With best wishes for the New Year.

Yours sincerely,

I. WILD

1266.

BC RDF NFLD

*Mémorandum du directeur de la Section de la commercialisation,  
Commission de contrôle du change étranger*

*Memorandum by Director of Merchandising Section,  
Foreign Exchange Control Board*

Ottawa, February 17, 1943

I understand that Mr. Watts of the Bank of Canada is leaving shortly for a trip to Newfoundland, thus providing an opportunity to discuss outstanding problems with the Newfoundland Control. This Section has experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining surrender of Newfoundland Forms E where United States goods have been ordered through Canadian firms, the latter being responsible for payment to the American suppliers but the goods are shipped to and cleared in Newfoundland. Our difficulties may be divided into three classes as follows:

1. Goods shipped direct from the United States to Newfoundland

The Canadian payors find that the Newfoundland importers frequently do not forward the Forms E evidencing import. This results in enquiries from the Board to the resident firms who, in turn, have to communicate with Newfoundland in an effort to obtain the forms. Any action which the Newfoundland Control could take to arrange for Newfoundland importers to attach their Form E when settling with the Canadian firms would assist in eliminating such correspondence.

2. United States goods shipped "in bond intransit" through Canada to Newfoundland

It has been intimated on several occasions that because these goods ostensibly come from Canada, the Newfoundland authorities do not issue Forms E. We would like to obtain confirmation of this impression, because if so there would be no danger of the Newfoundland importer being able to purchase foreign exchange and we would be fairly safe in providing the Canadian payor with United States dollars against the evidence of the intransit Customs documents. It may be that Newfoundland would prefer to issue E forms particularly if the authorities there can establish that the goods have only passed through Canada intransit. In that event, this advice will apprise them of the situation and we can take steps to see that the Forms E are forwarded to Canada. Their cooperation as suggested in No. 1 above would

then be very helpful in this respect. As an instance of this type of transaction, we might mention that the firm of Rowlings Limited, Halifax, places orders in the United States on behalf of Mr. A. B. Harding, Norris Point, Newfoundland, arranges to have the goods shipped through Canada "in bond intransit" and they are cleared eventually at the Customs port of Bonne Bay, Newfoundland. We have been unsuccessful in obtaining Forms E for several of these shipments for the reason given above.

### 3. United States goods imported to Newfoundland on behalf of Government bodies

Difficulties have been experienced in obtaining surrender of Forms E for shipments on Government account. We are not referring so much to the special problems engaging Mr. Hogben's attention, but to shipments involving imports by such officials as the Naval Store Officer, HMC Dockyard, St. John's. We are at present in correspondence with the Ontario Hughes Owens Company concerning one Ozalid Type Developing Machine shipped to the Naval Store Officer under Department of M & S, Contract #9676, Requisition Can. 786, K. BSB 786, FD 942, shipped direct from Johnson City, New York.

We believe the importance for foreign exchange control purposes of the Forms E issued in connection with their imports may not be appreciated fully by the officials concerned and any steps which could be taken to enlist their cooperation would reduce the number of enquiries from this Board to the Canadian agents handling their purchases.

H. S. HOLLOWAY

1267.

BC RDF 2B-520

*Rapport d'une visite effectuée par G. S. Watts à Terre-Neuve*

*Report on Visit by G. S. Watts to Newfoundland*

[Ottawa, April ,] 1943

### Exchange Control

During my visit which extended on a week longer than anticipated,<sup>1</sup> Wild and Calver were most kind and helpful. I heard independently that Wild was quite pleased at my coming. Why this was the case I do not know, other than the fact that the visit represented a little recognition of his department at a time when he is rather hard pressed. Calver was keen to take me around to meet the managers of the four banks, partly, I inferred, as tangible evidence that Ottawa had an active interest in Newfoundland's exchange control.

I gathered from Calver that he regards the functioning of exchange control and his own circumstances as reasonably satisfactory. Wild leaves the administration almost entirely in his hands; only in major matters of policy or when

<sup>1</sup> Cette visite eut lieu du 24 février au 13 avril.

<sup>1</sup> This visit took place from February 24 to April 13.



particularly important individuals are seeking special favours does Calver consult with Wild and he told me that Wild always backed him up in his decisions.

I was in Newfoundland long enough to see a good cross section of control in operation and I was favourably impressed with Calver's abilities. He seems to have a thorough knowledge of the rules and regulations insofar as they concern his activities; he is self-confident and his good judgment commands the respect of those with whom he deals. It is worth observing that his position is not a very enviable one in many respects. He is the Foreign Exchange Control Board and as such is in a position to draw all the ire and abuse of the disgruntled in a small community where he is personally acquainted with most of those having dealings with the Board.

...

Calver occupies a small office in the Customs building, measuring about 5 feet by 7, the only redeeming feature being the view from his window which commands the whole harbour, and under present conditions seldom a day passes that something out of the ordinary occurs. His staff consists of a secretary, two girls in the attic who check the bank's matched forms and do a little statistical work, and an occasional part-time helper. His correspondence is comparatively small, being limited chiefly to final authorizations, since most decisions are reached and questions answered over the telephone. His immediate superior is Walter Marshall, the Finance Secretary (Deputy Minister of Finance) who subs for him when he is away.

Exchange control in Newfoundland differs from ours in two principal respects. Apart from the special  $7\frac{1}{2}$  p.c. customs levy they have done nothing to prohibit or limit imports from hard currency countries and they could be accused of negligence in this connection for even while I was there I saw authorizations for a number of imports from the U.S.A. which could have been obtained in Canada. One consequence is that the shops contain goods which we no longer see. They are, however, not without a plausible defence. They have no domestic sources such as ours; the influx of Americans has been a complicating factor; they are a separate political entity and should be permitted to take advantage in some measure at least of their special good fortune in having extensive dollar income; finally there is some point to their claim that after so long a period of intense hardship it would have been neither advisable nor equitable to shut off the flow from any source when people had a little money to spare. In any case this has now become a rather academic question for most goods of the type referred to (i.e. unobtainable in Canada) are rapidly becoming unavailable or in the case of necessities are now being supplied under agreement by Canada and the U.S.A.

Moreover, if Newfoundland has been more lenient in the matter of imports they have been a good deal more rigid and rigorous in controlling other movements. This constitutes the second main difference. While this may not be so to the extent they claim, I was able to observe that Calver sticks strictly to the letter of the law in administering the instructions and I think

we would probably regard him as rather quixotic at times. The quality of mercy is pretty well strained in St. John's, particularly in the provision of travel funds.

The reason for this tendency is partly that Calver does not like to take liberties with the instructions. More basically, however, I inferred that it devolves from the fact that any flexibility even on what we would consider justifiable grounds, would soon be broadcast around the small community and lead to continual squabbles, misinterpretation and special pleading later on. Calver, I think, realizes this and to date this (to our eyes) rather uncompromising attitude has been wise. But if and when decontrol comes about Newfoundland will have special problems, the solution of which will not enjoy the slack which we might expect to encounter. This is one reason why I believe we should initiate Calver into some of the finer points and start him thinking about the more appropriate means of releasing the brakes.

The specific points relating to F.E.C.B. business that I had to deal with were comparatively few in number and were not of first rate importance. They had to do largely with difficulties in obtaining E forms on goods ordered in the U.S.A. by Canadian firms and shipped direct to Newfoundland. It is scarcely possible to devise a cut and dried procedure to eliminate this trouble. In any case the base construction work (where most of the trouble arises) is practically completed so that it is a dying if not a dead issue. However Calver is eager to assist should any difficulties arise. In fact he will welcome having cases of this kind referred to him directly for it will provide him with an opportunity of checking on the Customs. He emphasized that all such instances should be sent to him *directly* and I gathered that this would be agreeable to the banks in Newfoundland where they are involved. He is in much the best position to deal with such questions particularly those relating to Customs.

During the course of a conversation Calver enquired whether after expenses had been met there would be any of the Board's profits accruing to Newfoundland, but at that point he was interrupted and the question was not raised again. I am fairly certain that it was a casual idea of the moment rather than a problem that concerned him greatly. I have since learned that this aspect of our relations was covered in conversations with Penson during the early days and later with Wild. I simply mention it in case it should ever be brought up again — particularly after such heavy sales of U.S. exchange to us.

Calver and Wild both expressed themselves as of the opinion that exchange control, if not here to stay, would last for a long while after the war. I might emphasize that my remarks on the possibility of relaxation of controls were not based on anything I heard in Newfoundland.

To anyone familiar with the attitude of Newfoundlanders to Canada, which at its best is suspicion and at its worst next thing to hatred, it is a

matter for comment that our Exchange Control relationships with Newfoundland Government have not resulted in cries of "intervention" or "Confederation". Actually, barring an incident while I was there, the subject has never been raised. The incident to which I refer was a speech by P. J. Cashin, a former minister of finance and now generally in disrepute among the better elements, in which he declared that we were being supplied with \$15 mm. U.S. per annum by Newfoundland to defray our deficit and that Newfoundland was in danger of being "sold up the river". But in this case he was blaming the Newfoundland Government rather than Canada. Burchell asked me about it and I advised him to pay no attention to it unless it became an issue. Nothing more was heard in the fortnight after while I was there.

Newfoundlanders will seize on any possible excuse to blame us for their trouble, be it in the *Caribou*<sup>1</sup> or the conduct of our troops and my only explanations why they have not used exchange control to attack us are, first, that it has become a world-wide phenomenon and one [on] which their position is relatively not too bad. Secondly, Penson, Wild and Calver have all, I believe, had sense enough to represent exchange control as an independent Newfoundland measure. This has shielded us and at the same time saved them from providing their opponents with a battle-cry. They have been assisted by our policy of refraining from any act that might suggest intervention. In view of the circumstances as I now see them, I am taking the liberty of re-emphasizing this policy, not because of past errors, but because of the trouble that one misstep could cause.

. . .

### The Balance of Payments

One of the principal aims in visiting St. John's was to assess the effects of the reported completion of the U.S. military bases on our net receipts of U.S. funds from Newfoundland, which in 1942 amounted to \$33.5 mm. Since it has been our understanding that the Newfoundland control compiled no statistical records whatever it seemed likely that any such effort would have to be largely inferential based on scanty piecemeal information. I was therefore agreeably surprised to learn that since last May Calver had been receiving from the Chartered Banks a classification of purchases and sales of U.S. dollars and sterling by main purposes (including in the case of U.S. funds a breakdown of exports between fish, pulp and paper, concentrates and all others). I was given a table showing these data since May and Calver has promised to send me the material monthly as it is received. I have the complete tables on file; following are the main points of interest:

<sup>1</sup> Il s'agit du S.S. *Caribou*, traversier du gouvernement de Terre-Neuve, qui fut torpillé dans le détroit de Cabot en octobre, 1942 alors qu'il était escorté par la MRC. Cent trente-sept personnes périrent dans cet incident.

<sup>1</sup> S.S. *Caribou*, Newfoundland Government ferry, torpedoed in Cabot Strait in October, 1942, when under RCN escort, with loss of 137 lives.

## NEWFOUNDLAND PURCHASES OF U.S. DOLLARS

\$000's omitted

Exports									
1942	Fish	Paper	Zinc Con- cen- trates	Misc.	Per- sonal Remit- tances	Div. & Interest	Base Contr. & Army, etc.	Other Misc.	TOTAL
May	659	875	100	14	6	4	2,752	391	4,801
June	469	800	50	—	—	43	3,224	217	4,803
July	120	1,497	325	—	17	5	2,858	398	5,220
Aug.	456	810	600	9	16	2	2,629	217	4,739
Sept.	494	850	108	36	1	6	2,753	290	4,538
Oct.	580	606	400	23	—	4	2,967	357	4,957
Nov.	1,019	200	—	355	—	3	2,135	277	3,989
Dec.	1,598	1,103	200	109	—	—	2,272	272	5,554
1943									
Jan.	1,950	854	275	78	—	2	1,295	309	4,763

## NEWFOUNDLAND SALES OF U.S. DOLLARS

\$000's omitted

1942	Imports	Interest & Div.	U.S. Contractors Earnings	Remittances to U.S.A. by U.S. Personnel (Anglo-Amer. Tel.)	Misc.	TOTAL
May	1,152	1	33	144	73	1,403
June	1,546	176*	104	82	81	1,989
July	1,525	—	—	146	454***	2,125
Aug.	1,517	—	50	103	85	1,755
Sept.	2,048	—	92	100	74	2,314
Oct.	1,536	—	42	104	82	1,764
Nov.	1,622	—	—	83	50	1,755
Dec.	1,854	676**	65	94	80	2,769
1943						
Jan.	1,218	—	—	65	67	1,350

\* Bowaters.

\*\* Buchans &amp; Bowaters.

\*\*\* Includes \$350,000 for purchase by Govt. of Steamer SS. *Honda*.



For the sake of brevity the sterling purchases and sales are not shown. The figures covering May and after are on file, but they do not show anything of particular importance. For the writer their main value, judging from their comparative smallness, was to suggest that a very large portion of Newfoundland's sterling area transactions is quoted in Canadian dollars. Calver indicated that this was probably true; at no time have any steps been taken by the control which would influence the invoicing of goods one way or the other.

In the U.S. dollar classification of the balance of payments, the item of greatest interest is of course the one headed Newfoundland Base Contractors and Army. Actually the totals under this heading include funds from four sources:

- (1) The four U.S. firms acting under the name "Newfoundland Base Contractors". This is by far the largest item.
- (2) Dollars purchased from the Army Engineers—a body who carry out some structural work but whose functions are chiefly supervisory.
- (3) Dollars purchased from the Army finance officers for the payment of troops in Canadian dollars.
- (4) Receipts from the U.S. Naval Contractors working on the Argentina naval base.

The offsets to these receipts are partially seen in the sales data — Contractors' Earnings, and Remittances. Contractors earnings arise from the fact that their headquarters are in Newfoundland and they receive all of their payments from the U.S.A. there. Any profits will therefore be returned from Newfoundland and pass through the control. The army obtain their funds entirely by buying in the official market. In the case of the Naval operations, contracting is carried on as an adjunct to operations at Quinsett, Mass., where the contractors' main operations are in progress. They receive payments on their contracts in the U.S.A. and only remit operating expenses to Newfoundland. As far as I could determine, however, these transfers are effected in the official market and not as is the case here frequently, in the free market. All of the U.S. Army and Contractors' accounts are in the Royal Bank. This is said to be the fruits of Morris Wilson's activities in the U.S.A. In the case of Argentina and Placentia it was mostly luck as they happened to have a branch there.

As evidenced in the U.S. dollar receipts from this source, base construction work is definitely on the decline. According to official figures the numbers employed in Canadian and United States projects totalled 19,000 at the peak. (I was unable to obtain the separate figures for the U.S.A.). These were presumably all Newfoundlanders. By February the number had dropped to less than 10,000 and it was stated that the numbers employed by the year end would not exceed 5,000. I was told confidentially that the figure was likely to be nearer 2,500. These will be mostly maintenance crews. The

U.S. Army base contractors will soon close out their accounts but it is expected that the Naval base operations will extend into August. All of these operations in the past have generally lasted longer than anticipated. There can be no doubt, however, that we will suffer a sharp and quite extensive loss of dollar income from this source. But it should be noted that there will be some offsets in reduced remittances on the debit side.

As for the other balance of payments items, Wild told me that paper exports would be around 40% under last year owing to a small wood cut and shipping difficulties. (Wild pointed out that shipping rates to U.S. ports for newsprint were \$40 per ton, war risk, etc., inc.) Fish exports should be appreciably higher, though Wild pointed out that the increase might be less than the outsider would anticipate. Theoretically a good many of the discharged base workers could go back to fishing; but in practice most of them have let their boats and gear deteriorate and some things, like engines, are irreplaceable. It is expected that lead and zinc concentrates will remain close to present levels. Imports from the hard currency areas generally will be somewhat lower than in the past owing to shortage of supplies and the winding up of base construction. Remittance receipts from the U.S.A. which at one time may have been as great as \$1,000,000 per annum, have fallen to negligible proportions as conditions have improved on the Island.

While we know the general direction of things to come for most of the important items, it is difficult to make anything like a precise estimate of our future net receipts of U.S. dollars, particularly as details for the full year 1942 are not available. However, on the basis of what we have my guess is that in this *calendar* year we may net as high as \$17 mm. or \$18 mm. U.S. and that our receipts will certainly be in excess of \$10 mm. This compares with \$34 mm. last year. These figures of course take cognizance of the fact that there are some base expenditures this year. But even when these have been reduced to a straight upkeep basis (i.e. garrison plus maintenance crews) it is unlikely that Newfoundland will go into the red. We should still probably net a few millions a year.

There are no changes in prospect in their relations with the sterling area. They have had no special contracts other than a few contracts for minesweepers early on in the war and their transactions with the U.K. have been reduced to very small proportions. I learned nothing that would suggest our having to accumulate sterling on balance from them. Should their customs receipts fall off substantially, as seems likely, the resultant decline in their budgetary surplus would mean that we would not be able to sell sterling on balance on the scale of last year. I was told, however, that they would require some more sterling for maturities in the future which they hope to retire.

. . .

Newfoundland's balance of payments with foreign countries has always been a gap in the balance of payments of the Canadian dollar area since

there never have been adequate data for the preparation of estimates for this region. The ideal procedure following the inauguration of control would have been for them to have adopted our statistical code, as a result of which we would simply have added their transactions into our records. One of the more remote aims of my visit was to investigate the possibility of persuading them to do something of this sort. I say remote because we do not have very strong grounds for pressing them in this direction; for them statistical operations have no imperative functional value; they have been short of staff; and particularly now that they are partially achieving the same ends in the monthly reports submitted by the banks, it would be rather difficult to justify a complicated statistical mechanism for all that remains of the unknowns.

...

### The Chartered Banks in Newfoundland

I met the managers of the main offices of the four chartered banks, Hart of the Montreal, Russell of the Nova Scotia, Baxter of the Royal and Mackay of the Commerce. All were helpful and quite frank in discussing their various problems and the types of business engaged in. Calver gave me the latest summary of the annual bank return which appears in the Press.

Summary of Bank Returns for the years ended  
31 December 1940, 1941, 1942

Deposits	1940	1941	1942
Savings .....	\$24,705,503	\$29,463,215	\$39,367,725
Other .....	8,479,581	19,025,814	25,978,962
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$33,185,084	\$48,489,029	\$65,346,687
Current Loans to Public .....	4,057,544	6,167,823	8,258,049
Bills and Notes under discount .....	954,617	1,123,048	627,863
Bank Syndicate Loan to Government	625,000	375,000	<hr/>
Loan to the City of St. John's .....	530,575	546,274	502,950
Loan to the Railway Employees Welfare Association .....	29,000	135,404	108,062
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	\$ 6,196,736	\$ 8,347,549	\$ 9,496,924

The breakdown of time deposits is roughly as follows:

Montreal	\$13 mm.
Nova Scotia	10 mm.
Royal	6 mm.
Commerce	2 mm.
Nfld. Savings Bank	7 mm.

Calver is willing to give me a copy of the returns by individual banks; while I was there he was unable to locate his working sheets from which he made up the summary. Wild told me that he was hoping to get the data on a

quarterly or monthly basis and that the banks or some of them at any rate were kicking about providing the information at more frequent intervals. He pointed out that they had to do it every month in Canada. He told me he was going to let them think it over for a little while. In any case he was not much worried since if they did not provide the information voluntarily, all he had to do was pass a law providing for such returns as he required! — Sometimes absolute government has its uses.

However as far as I was able to gather the relations between Newfoundlanders and the banks are uniformly good. The manager for the Nova Scotia is particularly popular locally, and the Commerce and Montreal men are well liked. Calver has found them very cooperative and helpful. On several occasions he has had some slight altercations with the manager of the Royal who tends to be somewhat overbearing; but these have never been serious enough to lodge a complaint and in all fairness to Baxter there is more room for difficulties between him and the control than is the case with the others since he has the U.S. Army, Navy and base contractors' accounts. Personally I found him very cooperative and I believe he is popular in business circles.

Every Newfoundlander who retains hopes of a political future should self-government be restored, seems to feel obliged to harangue against the Canadian banks periodically. The complaints generally are along the same lines as are heard in the Maritimes — that only a fraction of the Newfoundlanders' deposits are invested at home and that their assets have been drained off for investment elsewhere. But these very same individuals are the first to admit privately that they could not get along without the Canadian banks. So far as I was able to observe the banks are not guilty of any positive faults calculated to disturb our relations with Newfoundlanders. The whole system of having their finances under Canadian control must be and is galling to them, yet the banks have been there so long that they have come to be accepted without much question. Whether the banks could do more to improve their public relations in Newfoundland, should that policy become of immediate concern, is another matter. I came away with the impression that there was some scope for improvement in this direction. Staff policies are not uniform. The Nova Scotia employs a number of Newfoundlanders, one of whom is accountant. In the other banks the senior officials are all Canadians and I believe I am right in saying that virtually all of the Montreal's St. John's staff are Canadian. The Canadians are no doubt instructed not to show distaste at their appointments publicly — but in most cases from the manager down they feel that they are bearing the white man's burden and are living in hopes of a transfer. Newfoundland being what it is, such an attitude is unavoidable; nevertheless, it has a rather unfortunate effect.

The Bank of Montreal has the largest business of the four. It has most of the very large accounts including the Newfoundland Government, Bowaters



and A.N.D. Co. In addition they have traditionally financed a good deal of the Portuguese-Spanish-Italian fish export trade. Recently heavy exports to Portugal have been passing through their hands. Situated as they are, they do not pursue a very aggressive policy in going out after business.

The Bank of Nova Scotia, next in size to the Montreal, is rated as having a very sound and lucrative business. They are believed to have gained relative to the others over the past decade (exclusive of the American business of the Royal). While they do not have any of the very large accounts they have a good deal of sound commercial business in St. John's and they have retained their better outport branches, which should be in a good position now. They also have the accounts of the St. Lawrence Fluorspar at Aguathuna.

The Commerce activities have never been of very large proportions, nor has the normal business of the Royal.

One peculiarity of banking in Newfoundland that was pointed out to me on several occasions was that real savings deposits of individuals are sacrosanct. When once a Newfoundlander has established a deposit he will starve before he commits the crime of drawing on his savings. I was told of many instances of persons in dire distress throughout the depression who had refused to draw on their savings deposits to the extent of a dollar.

The bank failure of the 1890's still has a powerful effect on habits in the outports. Currency hoarding is the practice rather than the exception in many isolated districts and is evidenced by the steady trickle of old bills and antiquated gold pieces into St. John's. In many regions paper currency, particularly for some reason or other two dollar bills, are not favoured. It is believed that there has been extensive hoarding of fifty-cent pieces in the past. The manager of the Nova Scotia told me that he would not be surprised if there was a dollar hoarded in the outports for every dollar of individual savings deposits in the banks.

It will have been noticed in the table at the beginning of this section that the expansion in time deposits in 1942 was exceptionally large — almost a third. I quizzed the managers as to the nature of the increase. Their replies were not uniform but all of them agreed that part of the increase consisted of deposits by transient Canadians (Army, Navy and contractors' employees) and possibly some Americans. One of the banks had gone over their ledgers and disclosed something over \$250,000 of this kind. If this is representative of the others deposits of this kind might constitute perhaps \$2 mm. of the total and not more than \$3 mm. At the same time deposits of individual and company funds constituted an important share. Views as to the amount of real individual savings by Newfoundlanders differed. Some claimed that it was woefully small. Others were of the opinion that it was extensive. My best guess is that they represented about  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the \$10 mm. increase over the year.

1268.

BC RDF NFLD

*Mémoire du Service de recherches de la Banque du Canada*  
*Memorandum by Research Department, Bank of Canada*

[Ottawa,] December 15, 1944

NOTE ON NEWFOUNDLAND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON  
 EXCHANGE PROSPECTS

Answering a communication of this kind involves placing the request in its proper setting. The Salt Fish Board is a semi-official body with regulatory powers which have grown until it is in effect an arm of the government. Its chairman, Raymond Gushue, is regarded as extremely able and that he is thinking ahead on the subject of exchange implications should cause no surprise. It is, however, a little curious that if he instigated the letter or wrote it himself that he would not pursue the inquiry through official channels. On the other hand if the letter originated in the minds of the other members, it is natural that they would consult the Bank of Montreal who are the Government's bankers. Next it would be interesting to know if the request was connected with the drive for an independent Newfoundland currency, or whether it is simply a very natural interest among a group who will be strongly affected by exchange developments. The question can be answered in such a manner as to deal with both considerations.

Newfoundland is a part of the Canadian dollar area. In the past her trade has been divided about as follows, averaging the immediate pre-war years, 1936-1939, in \$mm. Can.:

	Exports to	Imports from	Net
Canada .....	3	9	-6
U.K. ....	11	6	+5
U.S.A. ....	7	8	-1
Others .....	10	2	+8
Total .....	31	25	+6

From this it will be seen that the main currents were a sizeable export balance with the U.K. which covered invisible debits, mainly interest on the debt, with something to spare and a large credit balance with the countries which made possible the covering of deficits largely with Canada but also on a small scale with the United States. Under pre-war conditions types of currencies did not matter. The exports to "other" countries were divided between Mediterranean countries, the West Indies and Latin America. A large share of the fish business — the bulk of exports to these countries — appears to have been financed in sterling though the countries concerned did not necessarily fall within the sterling area.

The past is no sure guide to the future. It is hoped that more active conditions will prevail in Newfoundland. This presupposes higher exports and will undoubtedly result in much higher imports. The trade structure is

such that the deficit with Canada will continue; in effect we will be receiving the proceeds of exports to other than the U.K. and U.S.A. The U.K. balance of payments will not yield a very large sterling surplus for us to accumulate. We will probably be net losers of U.S. dollars.

The main problem will be the proceeds for fish to the traditional markets. If they are financed in sterling this will mean an added burden for us; if a fair share can be paid for in dollars — as will certainly be the case to some extent — the problem is not a serious one. Certainly the problem is not troublesome enough to make us loosen our bonds with Newfoundland because of it.

Newfoundland cannot stand alone as a national entity nor can it have more than a nominally separate currency. It must belong to a currency group and the choice is small. Certainly there is nothing to be gained by adhering to the sterling area since 75% of her imports come from other areas and not more than half her exports are in that direction. Yet enough of her exports go to the sterling area or are paid in sterling that there is nothing to be gained by cutting loose from the latter. Her best hope is obviously to stick by us in the hope that our encountering the same problems on a bigger scale may result in a solution which, as a member of the Canadian dollar area, will be in her best interests as well. The cost to us will be small, but it is one that no one else would be eager to undertake. The foregoing comments do not ignore the fact that Newfoundland might re-arrange her economy to fit the U.S. dollar or sterling orbits, but one may conclude that this would not be done willingly. Finally the instrumentality of the Canadian banks renders Canadian currency inevitably the unit for practical use. Their assets are all in dollars. We have guaranteed them current requirements, but we are under no obligation to turn over the reserves that would be necessary to support an independent unit. Moreover how would they finance the establishment of monetary reserves anywhere?

I should think the proper approach from a diplomatic point of view would be to point out that the World Bank and the Monetary Fund held out hopes for free multilateral trading after the war but that this was an ultimate rather than immediate hope. It would be mentioned as well that the U.K. had publicly as much as said that sterling would not be convertible so that there might be difficulties in that direction. Thirdly it would be recalled that the F.E.C.B. has the obligation to buy and sell currencies to Newfoundland while exchange control is in force. This might be stressed. Incidentally might this not be a good time for us to explore transitional policy arrangements about foreign exchange control and of buying and selling currencies to them. Should they receive some assurance or not?

Fourthly it could be re-emphasized that where there was a chance of choice between dollars and sterling it was in the general interest to strive for the former. The general tenor would be to indicate that conditions would be difficult, but to give them some assurances and by implication suggest that they have everything to lose and nothing to gain by doing other than remaining in the Canadian dollar area.

1269.

BC RDF 2B-520

*Mémorandum de la Banque du Canada<sup>1</sup>**Memorandum by Bank of Canada<sup>1</sup>*

[Ottawa,] August 19, 1948

## QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CANADIAN BP-1 REPORTS

## 1. Treatment of Newfoundland

The treatment of transactions with Newfoundland in 1946 and 1947 has been the same as that followed in earlier years since 1940. Since there appears to be a misunderstanding as to our treatment of Newfoundland in the Canadian balance of payments a brief explanation of our theory and practice is in order. From 1940 on we have treated Newfoundland as part of the Canadian dollar area. While this relationship also existed before the war the currency aspects of the situation became more significant with the introduction of exchange control by Canada and Newfoundland. Since then our practice has been to give effect to this *de facto* situation as well as the available information would permit, but without disclosing separately in publications transactions of another country. Our procedure has been influenced by the type of information readily available and by the fact that the Government of Newfoundland has never issued either statements on Newfoundland's balance of payments or statements on Newfoundland's transactions with the Canadian Foreign Exchange Control Board.

In giving prior attention to the currency aspects of these transactions we have not overlooked the necessity of other data needed for integrating the balance of payments with Canada's national accounts. Estimates have been made in conjunction with the National Income unit of the D.B.S. covering the adjustments which should be made because of the divergence between the treatment of Newfoundland in the balance of payments and that treatment which would be most desirable from the point of view of the national accounts. It happens that these adjustments have not generally been exceptionally large, as in many years it would appear that the size of Newfoundland's balance of payments with Canada on current account has been of the general order of the net currency settlements which have entered into the Canadian current account. Similarly, before the war when Canadian transactions with Newfoundland were included in the Canadian balance of payments, the practice was satisfactory from the national income point of view and did not diverge widely from the currency situation either. This appears to have been the case since at that time Newfoundland's current account with all countries other than Canada seemed to be of the same general size as the current account balance with Canada when account was taken of special transactions arising out of the operations of Canadian owned companies in Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Préparé en vue des négociations sur l'union avec Terre-Neuve en novembre et décembre 1948.

<sup>1</sup> Prepared for negotiations on Terms of Union with Newfoundland which were held in November-December 1948.



The procedures throughout both prewar and subsequently have been affected by the lack of the satisfactory statistics which would make a thorough and accurate estimation of Newfoundland's balance of payments either with Canada or with other countries possible. Since 1940 we have, of course, had data on the amount of U.S. dollars and sterling transactions on Newfoundland's account. An analysis of these transactions under certain broad categories has also been provided by the Newfoundland Exchange Control; but we have had no complete information on transactions which took place in Canadian dollars on Newfoundland account, and in any case the analysis of the transactions in the foreign currencies was not of a type which could be directly fitted into the balance of payments categories employed in Canada or of interest to the International Monetary Fund. Newfoundland trade statistics become available only well after the event and to use them in constructing balance of payments statements would require more detail on their form and content than is now available in Canada. The international transactions of some of the larger internationally owned companies give rise to special problems connected with the exports of primary products.

The actual figures which have appeared in the Canadian balance of payments since 1940 are as follows:

1. Net purchases of U.S. dollars by the Foreign Exchange Control Board on Newfoundland account. These transactions arise primarily from current receipts and were augmented for a period of years by the expenditures of the United States Government on the construction and maintenance of bases. As the net receipts in many years to a large extent reflected these miscellaneous current transactions our practice has been to include this item in that category of the current account with the United States. We could not satisfactorily divide the net or gross amounts into balance of payments categories.

With regard to transactions in sterling these covered only part of the transactions with the United Kingdom and the sterling area, but the usual net sales were only of significant size in the war years when they generally resulted from either repatriations of securities or the extension of loans and gifts. The net sales or purchases of sterling by the F.E.C.B. on Newfoundland account have consequently been introduced as a currency adjustment in the capital account in the sterling area. While this procedure might appear inconsistent with the treatment of the U.S. dollar receipts, it should be pointed out that the amounts have been usually of relatively insignificant size except in the years when there were substantial capital payments, making this the logical place most representative of the transactions. In 1946 and 1947, for instance, the net currency adjustment in the sterling area accounts for Newfoundland was not large enough to be of any special significance. In the latter year the currency adjustment took account of known Canadian dollar transactions as well as sterling transactions as better information on these first became available in that year.

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PARTIE 5/PART 5  
LES FINANCES PUBLIQUES  
PUBLIC FINANCE

1270.

BC RDF NFLD

*Le commissaire aux Finances au gouverneur de la Banque du Canada*  
*Commissioner for Finance to Governor, Bank of Canada*

St. John's, June 6, 1940

My dear Towers,

The Newfoundland Government has in mind the possibility of raising in the course of the next few weeks a War Loan, primarily with a view to paying the interest on the Newfoundland Public Debt, which falls due at the end of the current month and the end of December. In the present grave emergency there is a general feeling that we should not allow the United Kingdom to pay the Debt interest on our behalf if that course can possibly be avoided. Whilst some part of the interest can, I hope, be met from the Exchequer in the ordinary way, there is no possibility of our meeting more than one-third of the interest due at the end of the current month without borrowing for this purpose.

This proposal has come forward on our own initiative and the Government of the United Kingdom has not asked us to take any special action in the matter. We are putting the proposal to the United Kingdom authorities as being the wish of this Government and, we believe, of the people of this country in the present emergency, public opinion here being concerned that everything within our power shall be done to relieve the burden upon the United Kingdom at the present time.

The loan would be a small one; we should naturally wish to confine it to a minimum; the sum of \$1,500,000 is what we have in mind. I have little doubt that this can be raised.

I am writing to apprise you at the present stage of what is in mind, as such a loan, even if of small amount, may possibly be regarded as having some effect upon Canadian savings. Subscriptions to a Newfoundland War Loan may possibly reduce to a small extent subscriptions to Canadian War Loans, since Corporations and others operating in Newfoundland are in many cases also operating in Canada. On the other hand, a Newfoundland War Loan will undoubtedly appeal to local Companies and individuals to whom a Canadian Loan might not have quite the same appeal on patriotic lines. Though Newfoundland residents have subscribed to Canadian War Loan, a Newfoundland War Loan for the purposes stated above would undoubtedly have a special appeal.

We must naturally give consideration to the peculiar position of this country at the present time, having regard to its dependence upon the

United Kingdom. The Loan, if issued, must be on the security of the Newfoundland Government alone. There will be no guarantee by the Government of the United Kingdom, and in view of the fact that all of our Public Debt incurred up to 1933 is guaranteed by the United Kingdom, it will probably be necessary to state specifically that the guarantee by that Government does not apply in the present case. Coming to the question of terms, it was in mind that we should offer a  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent loan at par with provision for a sinking fund sufficient to retire the loan in twenty-five years. So far as I have been able to gather indications, such a loan would be likely to be well received here. These terms cannot, however, in any degree be regarded as fixed, but only what is in mind so far. In fixing the rate of interest we have in mind that the security of the Newfoundland Exchequer alone is offered. An issue of Savings Certificates will, it is hoped, be made at the same time.

My purpose in writing to you is to let you know at the earliest possible moment that I have under consideration bringing this proposal before the Government here, and to ask for your support in spite of the fact that there would be a certain degree of overlap as between savings available in this country and those arising from activities here and the general body of Canadian savings. In writing also I need hardly say that I should be much obliged for any co-operation and advice you could give us as to the details of the proposal.

Yours sincerely,

J. H. PENSON

1271.

BC RDF NFLD

*Le gouverneur de la Banque du Canada au commissaire aux Finances*  
*Governor, Bank of Canada, to Commissioner for Finance*

[Ottawa,] June 10, 1940

My dear Penson,

Thank you for your letter of June 6th telling me what was in the wind in respect of the issuance of a war loan in Newfoundland. I can quite understand the desire to proceed along these lines. As you suggest, there may be a certain overlap — but it should be disregarded.

As regards terms, I am sure it is difficult for you to make a decision, in view of the fact that there are no market prices for other Newfoundland securities which would serve as a guide. I think you have to look at market prices and yields for governmental securities elsewhere in the Empire, and assume that it is fair to ask Newfoundlanders to subscribe on a patriotic basis for a return not differing very greatly from that which others have to offer. A  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent loan at par seems to fit into the above picture, and my only question would be whether a term of twenty-five years is somewhat

long. Perhaps it would not interfere with original subscriptions to the loan, but might have a bearing on the price at which the bonds subsequently changed hands. Too substantial a discount from offering price presents an embarrassment if further financing becomes necessary later on.

Yours sincerely,

G. F. TOWERS

NPA S-7-6-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 741

[St. John's,] November 13, 1940

MOST IMMEDIATE. Further consideration has been given financial position here in light of outturn first four months financial year and in particular to question of further measures to eliminate necessity for Grant in Aid for 1940-41. In paragraph (4) our Telegram No. 460 June 26th last<sup>1</sup> in which we communicated to you our decision not to ask United Kingdom for financial assistance for remainder of war if at all possible we stated that decision would be taken later as to form of financing sum roughly equivalent to Sinking Fund of \$800,000 by which estimated expenditure was not covered by revenue and proceeds of sale of Savings Certificates. In that paragraph we stated that we had not in mind further borrowing other than by sale of Savings Certificates or to meet purely temporary requirements. This intention we now confirm. We believe it will be in accordance with your wishes and will be endorsed by public opinion here.

As already indicated we are making further savings as compared with expenditure in printed estimates of approximately \$550,000. Having regard to outstanding commitments with which we were faced at commencement of year we believe this figure represents maximum possible.

Present estimates of proceeds of sales Savings Certificates for current financial year \$500,000.

Revenue receipts to date indicate Budget estimate will probably be obtained and exceeded by say \$200,000. Uncovered balance of expenditure less proceeds Savings Certificates is therefore approximately \$700,000. We propose to assume Newfoundland's share of cost of operation Airport as part of our war contribution and to meet sum of \$700,000 by additional taxation.

Exchange problem has also been under consideration. In your Telegram No. 714 September 6th<sup>1</sup> you asked us consider further possibility increasing

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Newfoundland imports from United Kingdom. There is also problem of endeavouring reverse present exchange trend towards United States dollar. In Canada this has been done by 10 per cent war exchange on non-Empire goods introduced in last Budget. This tax is in addition a large source of revenue. We have come to conclusion that somewhat similar arrangement should be introduced here with objects of (a) falling in line with Canada in view of our close exchange relations, (b) supporting sterling exchange, and (c) obtaining revenue. Simple tax of 10 per cent on non-Empire goods would however give predominant advantage to Canada which country imports from Newfoundland only one fifth in value of what Canada exports to us. Objects (b) and (c) above could not be realized without other measures and we propose intermediate tax 5 per cent on importations Empire goods not from sterling area, Empire goods from sterling area being free. Whole problem has recently been studied when our Chairman Board of Customs visited Ottawa and with certain exemptions wider than those permitted in Canada proposal is practicable and likely to be effective. Estimated revenue yield for balance of current financial year estimated at \$750,000.

Both Canadian and United States Governments should be informed in advance. As regards latter whole matter was discussed prior to Canadian budget in the summer. United States Government agreed Canada had legal right under Article twelve their Treaty to take action on above lines and accepted Canada's proposal provided it was of emergency character only, terminating with the War. Corresponding Article of United Kingdom Treaty to which we should appeal is sixteen. It will be of importance to give United States as much notice as possible. In view of preparation of ground for us by Canada we would suggest that approach be made through Consul General here or alternatively we be authorized communicate direct by telegraph with British Ambassador at Washington. Particularly important that proposed tax come into force not later than December first and if at all possible by November 25th as importations at this time of year are heavy.

As regards Canada we propose to take advantage of visit St. John's of Canadian Minister for National Revenue who will be here in a few days.

In addition to War Exchange Tax we propose increase Income Tax to give net additional yield of \$108,000. Details will be furnished in further Telegram tomorrow.

Effect of above changes will be to show surplus of \$150,000 to \$200,000 in current financial year. This surplus will be necessary as margin against contingencies and minor variations revenue. In this way we propose eliminate necessity for Grant in Aid (this in reply to your Telegram No. 836 of October 17th).<sup>1</sup>

Whilst we realize burdens will be heavy we have no doubt they will be accepted as similar proposals previously in patriotic spirit which inspires this

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<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

country. We do not anticipate political reactions and are convinced that these proposals will be regarded as preferable alternative to further loan. Even with these increases taxation will probably compare not unfavourably with that in Canada and certain other Dominions. Effect of proposed War Exchange tax on cost of living cannot be left out of account. We consider that increase attributable to tax should not exceed 5 per cent at most and probably less. Some increases in Government expenditure may result but be comparatively small.

A matter of immediate importance is to give notice and if possible secure assent of United States Government to proposed War Exchange tax and on this ground we request your most urgent approval of these measures.

1273.

NPA S-7-6-1

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 957

[London,] November 20, 1940

IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL. Your telegram of 13th. November No. 741. We agree to proposal to introduce a war exchange tax of 10% on Foreign goods and of 5% on import of non sterling Empire countries, provided United States and Canadian Governments do not object. It should be noted however that Article XVI of United Kingdom-United States of America Trade Agreement is not in such wide terms as Article XII of Canadian-United States of America Agreement, and could not, in our opinion, be invoked to justify taxation inconsistent with Newfoundland's undertaking under Article X and schedule 11 of former agreement. It will be necessary therefore to obtain concurrence of United States Government before proposal can be put into effect, but it is hoped that Canadian precedent will prove helpful in approaching them.

It is thought that approach to United States Government should be through His Majesty's Embassy, Washington and we agree that you should telegraph direct. The Board of Trade have asked that Embassy may be requested to keep Mr. D'arcy Cooper informed.

We agree also to proposed income tax increases proposed in your telegram of November 14th, No. 746.<sup>1</sup> We very much appreciate your desire to eliminate necessity for grant in aid and are glad to be assured of confidence felt by Commission of Government that proposed increased taxation will be willingly accepted in Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1274.

5665-40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 62

St. John's, November 21, 1940

IMPORTANT. Government of Newfoundland have in mind imposition, as special war measure, of war exchange taxes similar to that imposed by your Government in June last, and United States Government is now being approached through His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington with view to their concurrence being obtained in the same way as was done prior to imposition of taxes by the Canadian Government. Proposed taxes on non-Empire goods will be 10 per cent, and certain exemptions will be made covering not only articles exempted from Canadian taxes, but also tobacco and cigarettes and unmanufactured tobacco, sugar, cinematograph films, books and magazines, newspapers, gasoline and alcohol beverages. Privileged importations of certain manufacturing companies will also be exempted.

Effect of this tax in Newfoundland would undoubtedly be to divert trade mainly from the United States to Canada. As you are aware, trade balance with Canada is already very unfavourable to Newfoundland[.] [A]lthough prospective diversion would be welcomed from exchange point of view, we consider that further steps should be taken to give special advantages to sterling. Simple imposition of 10 per cent taxes on importations from non-Empire countries would not be sufficient from this latter point of view. Furthermore, revenue aspect of matter must be considered. Additional revenue is required here to give effect to this Government's undertakings not to call upon the United Kingdom Exchequer for financial assistance for the duration of the war. For these two reasons we have reached a decision that it would be right to propose similar taxes of 5 per cent on importations from Empire countries ou[tside] sterling area. While regretting necessity for step so far as Canada is concerned, we trust that your Government will recognise it is proposed under pressure of urgent war necessity. Effect of proposal as a whole will still, we believe, be to give further substantial advantages to Canadian exporters to this country. We are assuring the United States that the measure is temporary and of emergency character only, terminating at the end of the war, and a similar assurance would be given to your Government.

We should like to introduce taxes December 1st at the latest. While trade relations between Newfoundland and Canada are not at present on basis of formal treaty, we should much appreciate early expression of any comment your Government may care to make.

We should add that Price, Chairman of Newfoundland Board of Customs, who was recently in Ottawa, could be available in Ottawa November 25th to discuss details, if you should so desire. In that event should be glad if you would telegraph at once.

1275.

5665-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 65

Ottawa, November 26, 1940

IMPORTANT. Your telegram No. 62 of November 21st. Imposition of special taxes. I greatly appreciate your courtesy in bringing the matter to our attention. Various phases of proposals were discussed with Price when in Ottawa yesterday. We realize that tax on non-Empire goods would divert trade in certain fields to Canada and we realize also main purpose of the tax of 5% on imports from non-sterling Empire countries is to obtain additional revenue. At the same time we see difficulty in explaining to Canadian exporters the imposition of a tax on imports from Canada for exchange reasons in view of fact that no tax is being imposed on imports from other British countries and that Canada and Newfoundland are in the same currency area. If your Government concludes it is essential to impose the tax we would suggest for consideration that announcement might include reference to difficulty which United Kingdom experiences under present conditions in maintaining her exports to Newfoundland and desirability of helping maintain United Kingdom exports to Newfoundland at the same volume which would place Canadian dollars at the disposal of the United Kingdom to assist in financing purchases both from Newfoundland and from Canada. We are furnishing Price with copy of this telegram.

1276.

NPA S-7-6-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 66

[St. John's,] November 29, 1940

IMPORTANT. CONFIDENTIAL. Reference my Telegram No. 62, November 21st. Special War Revenue Tax. United States Government are not prepared agree proposal in form conveyed to you in Newfoundland Telegram No. 62, November 21st, relying upon difference in wording of War Clauses in United Kingdom and Canadian Trade Agreements respectively with United States. They have intimated, however, that in present circumstances they will concur in Special Tax being levied on importations into Newfoundland from United States provided that it applies equally to other countries, including



Empire countries other than those within sterling area. Our endeavours to move them from this attitude have not been successful, and short of abandoning proposal altogether, which would have serious effect upon our financial position and forego indisputable advantage of giving preference to importations from sterling areas, we reluctantly find it necessary to propose modification of previous arrangement to coincide with principle indicated by United States Government. We propose, however, that rate of Special Tax should not exceed  $7\frac{1}{2}$  percent. This would be applicable importations from all foreign countries and from Empire countries not in sterling area. As between Canada and the United States effect of tax will not be to alter present position. Whilst regretting this change we trust that in the circumstances you will agree that objection need not be raised. Wording suggested in latter part of your No. 65, of November 26th, will be adopted and if you would wish make any additional suggestions we would consider. Announcement will, however, be made tomorrow evening, November 30th and urgent reply is therefore requested.

Colonel Gibson is aware of the contents of this Telegram.

1277.

NPA S-7-6-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 770

[St. John's,] November 30, 1940

IMMEDIATE. CONFIDENTIAL. Your No. 957 Confidential, November 20th. United States Government replied November 29th that they considered tax in form proposed would be inconsistent with provisions of Trade Agreement and would object to establishment through arrangement proposed of entirely new preference in favour of Canada. They intimated, however, that if tax were imposed at same time on imports from Canada and United States then United States Government whilst reserving its legal rights would not be disposed to object at present time if Newfoundland felt action essential for war effort. We accordingly decided to modify proposal to one of seven and one half per cent tax on imports from countries other than Empire countries in the sterling area. United States Government raises no objection to proposal in this form. This whilst giving approximately same revenue yield, will still favour sterling area but not give any advantage to Canadian dollar. Canadian Government has agreed today not to raise objection to this modification.

We are making announcement tonight. It is regretted that in view of extreme importance of introducing tax by December 1st we are taking action in advance of your approval of proposal in its modified form.

## PARTIE 6/PART 6

## LE TRAVAIL

## LABOUR

1278.

Skelton Papers 395

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chargé d'affaires  
aux États-Unis*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chargé d'Affaires  
in United States*

TELEGRAM 27

Ottawa, February 4, 1941

Reference defence of Newfoundland. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence has been considering certain labour problems arising or likely to arise from the construction of defence works in Newfoundland. Please inform Mr. Hickerson that Canadian members of Board have been considering situation and have taken advice of interested Departments here. It is now proposed that, if the United States Government agrees, the following proposition be placed before the Newfoundland Government by the Secretary of State for External Affairs:

Suggest that to avoid competition for labour between contractors on various projects in Newfoundland; to determine propriety of importing labour and in what numbers and classifications; to establish regionally uniform wages and hours; to deal with labour disputes; to minimize absenteeism; and so to devise and administer labour policy that there will be a minimum of disturbance to the local economy, the Newfoundland Government should establish and administer a single labour agency charged with these functions for all projects. United States and Canada should maintain close liaison with the agency through representatives appointed for that purpose.

1279.

2515-40

*Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 823

Washington, April 2, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 346 of February 15,<sup>1</sup> and to previous correspondence concerning certain labour problems arising or likely to arise from the construction of defence works in Newfoundland, and to enclose a copy of a Memorandum from the Department of State dated

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

March 29 in answer to the Legation's memorandum of February 5,<sup>1</sup> which was left with Mr. Hickerson of the Department of State that day.

I have etc.

M. M. MAHONEY  
for the Minister

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire*  
*Memorandum*

Washington, March 29, 1941

Reference is made to the Canadian Legation's Memorandum of February 5, 1941<sup>1</sup> in regard to labor problems arising or likely to arise from the construction of defense works in Newfoundland.

The appropriate Departments of the Government of the United States have given careful consideration to the proposal set forth in the Legation's memorandum under reference which would be placed before the Newfoundland Government, if the United States Government agreed, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada. The appropriate authorities of the American Government agree that a proposal in the following terms might well be communicated to the Newfoundland Government by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada:

To avoid competition for native labor between contractors on various projects in Newfoundland; to determine regionally prevailing wages and hours; to deal with labor disputes; to minimize absenteeism; and so to devise and administer labor policy that there will be a minimum of disturbance to local economy, the Newfoundland Government should establish and administer a single labor agency charged with these functions for all projects. The United States and Canada should maintain liaison with this agency through their representatives responsibly in charge of the work.

1280.

50218-40

*CPCAD, compte rendu des débats et des décisions*

*PJBD, Journal of Discussions and Decisions*

TOP SECRET

Montreal, April 17, 1941

...

7. With reference to labour conditions in Newfoundland, Mr. Keenleyside stated that he had given to Mr. Emerson and Mr. Penson copies of the draft telegram on this subject which had been prepared after consultation between Ottawa and Washington. It was the general opinion of the Board

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and of the Newfoundland Commissioners that conditions in regard to the labour situation in the Island had changed for the better since this problem had been first brought to the Board's attention. The Commissioners agreed to take back to St. John's the copy of the draft telegram and to consider it in the light of the situation as revealed to them on their arrival. They undertook to inform the members of the Board of their views when the situation has been further examined.

. . .

1281.

NPA S-4-2-3

*L'administrateur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Administrator of Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

St. John's, October 24, 1941

Sir,

I have the honour to invite reference to your telegram No. 68 of the 21st August, 1941,<sup>1</sup> in which you request information relating to rates of pay and conditions of employment for civilians to be employed at certain stations operated in Newfoundland by your Department.

2. I attach herewith copies<sup>2</sup> of rates of wages paid to Newfoundlanders for various construction jobs now proceeding in this country together with two lists<sup>2</sup> (E and F) showing the rates paid to some of the employees of the Department of Public Works. The rates shown in "E" are used on construction jobs and on maintenance work which is done under the direct supervision of the Department and where employees are more or less assured of permanent employment. Those shown in "F" are rates paid where work is done on contract with outside firms.

3. You are no doubt aware of the fact that the unusual employment situation created by the construction programme of the United States and Canadian Governments in Newfoundland created a demand for higher wages than those normally paid. The attached sheets are the best available indication of the present level of wages in this country.

4. I take it that when you refer to the necessity for hiring civilians for the operation of stations you have in mind employment of a permanent nature. If so, then the attraction of permanent employment is likely to be great enough to lower somewhat the rates of pay shown and it was for this reason that the lists of wages paid by the Newfoundland Railway were included. These rates are likely to be a better guide when permanent employment is involved.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduites.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



5. There is no general law or regulation in this country which fixes either rates of wages or maximum hours. The usual day for labourers is generally taken to be 8 or 10 hours. In some cases overtime rates are paid beyond this limit and it is generally accepted that work on Sundays is at overtime rates. On construction jobs where men have to be away from their homes it is usual for employers to set up bunk houses and mess rooms and deductions, varying from 60¢ to \$1.00 per day, are made from the men's pay for meals.

6. If you desire further information I would be only too happy to reply to any inquiries that you may make.

I have etc.

[ ]

1282.

2515-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 310

St. John's, May 30, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of an official communiqué<sup>1</sup> announcing the appointment of a Labour Relations Officer who will deal with the labour problems under the direction of, for the present at least, the Commissioner for Public Utilities. Mr. Albert J. Walsh, K.C., who has been named to this post, was previously an Assistant-Secretary in the Department of Justice. He was a member of the Trade Dispute Board appointed to settle the question of wages and working conditions of the longshoremen at St. John's, on which I reported to you in my despatch No. 143 of March 12.<sup>2</sup>

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1283.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

SECRET

Ottawa, March 25, 1943

#### RECRUITING OF LABOUR IN NEWFOUNDLAND

28. THE SECRETARY reported that, following the meeting of March 5th, the Department of External Affairs and Labour and the Immigration Branch had worked out a scheme for the recruiting of labour in Newfoundland.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.  
<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.  
<sup>2</sup> Not printed

It had been agreed that labour would be admitted from Newfoundland on the same basis as regards military service as Canadians or other British subjects. Representatives of Canadian employers were to proceed to Newfoundland to offer definite contracts to labourers wishing to come to Canada. An official of National Selective Service, to advise on the type of work available, and a medical examiner, representing the Immigration Branch, to examine applicants, would also go to Newfoundland.

The Canadian High Commissioner had been directed to inform the Newfoundland Commission of Government of these proposals.

An explanatory note had been circulated.

(Secretary's note, Mar. 24, 1943<sup>1</sup>—C.W.C. document 455).

29. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, noted, with approval, the report submitted.

. . .

1284.

NPA S-5-6-1

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Services publics à la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities to Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 48-'43

[St. John's,] April 2, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The annexed draft which I submit for the approval of my colleagues will, I think, speak for itself.

2. On my making preliminary inquiries from the High Commissioner for Canada as to the possibilities of finding employment in Canada for any surplus labour that may become available in the course of this year owing to the completion of work on the Bases, I found that he had already had a communication from his Government on the subject. At about the same time the American Consul General informed me that he had received a telegram from his Government inquiring as to the possibility of obtaining from Newfoundland lumberjacks, miners, and agricultural workers. I then arranged for a conference between Mr. Burchell, Mr. Hopper, Sir John Puddeste, Mr. Emerson, Mr. Dunn and myself in order that there might be a preliminary exchange of views. The annexed draft letter is the result of this Conference.

W. W. WOODS

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE

*Projet de lettre du commissaire aux Services publics au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve et au consul général des États-Unis à Terre-Neuve*

*Draft Letter from Commissioner for Public Utilities to High Commissioner in Newfoundland and Consul General of United States in Newfoundland*

[St. John's,] April 2, 1943

Dear Sir,

At the Conference held at this office yesterday at which you were present there was a preliminary discussion of the prospects of surplus labour becoming available this year for employment in the United States and Canada on work connected with the war effort and we gave some consideration to the procedure which should be adopted in the event of such transfer of labour actually taking place.

2. The Commission of Government endorses the view expressed by the Commissioners present at the Conference that there is a probability that in the near future there will be a surplus of general labourers in Newfoundland, over and above the requirements of work available in Newfoundland, who under suitable conditions might be made available for transfer to the United States and Canada. These general labourers would consist of "pick and shovel" men, semi-skilled carpenters and men who have already had experience in Canada or the United States as steel riggers. The men recently employed by the Bell Telephone Company on the construction of telegraph and telephone communications across the Island would be representative of the class of men covered by the description of "general labourers." It is considered that the prospect of a substantial number of these men becoming available is sufficient to justify you in advising your Government to this effect. It is difficult at this stage to mention a figure but it seems probable that five or six thousand men at least will become available in the course of the year.

3. As regards woodsmen, the Commission of Government is of opinion that further inquiries are required before any indication can be given as to the probability of any appreciable number becoming available for work outside Newfoundland. As you are aware some 1450 Newfoundland woodsmen are already employed in the United Kingdom on woods operations there. It would assist this Government in deciding what number, if any, of the available woodsmen in Newfoundland could be spared for work in Canada and the United States if you could ascertain from your Government the terms on which and the conditions under which such employment would be offered. In the meantime we will consult the two Paper Companies in Newfoundland as to their requirements in the matter of woods labour during the next twelve months or so. I should add that this Government would wish to make at least a limited number of woodsmen available for work outside Newfoundland if their services were urgently required for some definite requirement of the war effort, such as the cutting of wood for the aeroplane industry, which could not be met in full without such assistance from Newfoundland.

4. We are of opinion that agricultural labour suitable for employment on farms in Canada or the United States is not likely to be available in Newfoundland in sufficient quantity to make it worth while embarking upon a scheme for this purpose. The type of agricultural experience and knowledge of men who have worked on the land in Newfoundland is not such as to justify encouraging them to take up agricultural work elsewhere.

5. We will send a further communication in regard to the possibility of recruiting labour for mines in Canada or the United States. So far as skilled drillers and blasters are concerned, it is doubtful whether any considerable number could be spared, but this will depend partly on the final decision as to the operations at Wabana during the next twelve months.

6. The Commission of Government is of opinion that any transfer of labour from Newfoundland to Canada or the United States should be on an organised basis and subject to the joint control of the Newfoundland Government and the other Government concerned. Any arrangement decided by the other Government to give effect to this would be facilitated by the Newfoundland Government. It would be a condition of the consent of this Government to the transfer of labour that where organised transfers on a substantial scale take place arrangements should be made whereby the persons included in such transfers would not become liable to compulsory military service in the country to which they were transferred and we hope it will be possible for your Government to make arrangements accordingly.

Yours truly,

[W. W. WOODS]

1285.

NPA S-5-6-1

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire aux Services publics*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner for Public Utilities*

No. 35

St. John's, May 10, 1943

Dear Sir Wilfrid [Woods],

I am leaving for Ottawa on Wednesday morning and arrangements have been made for me to have a conference with certain officials of the Canadian Government with regard to the possibility of relieving the threat of unemployment in Newfoundland by the transfer of certain labour to Canada.

From the despatches I have received it is clear that it will not be possible for the Canadian Government to agree to the suggestion contained in the final paragraph of your letter of April 5, 1943,<sup>1</sup> namely that the persons included in the transfer to Canada will not become liable to compulsory military service.

The view of the Canadian Government is that there is no reason why Newfoundlanders going to Canada should not be prepared to accept the

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 1284 (pièce jointe).

<sup>1</sup> See Document 1284 (Enclosure).



same obligation concerning military service as Canadians and other British subjects, including Newfoundlanders, now residing in Canada.

It is pointed out that the Canadian Government would be subject to immediate protest if Newfoundlanders of military age and fitness took positions which had previously belonged to Canadians called up for military service.

I am instructed that it will not be possible for Newfoundland labourers in Canada to obtain exemption from income taxation.

I should point out to you that by order issued on May 3, 1943, the Minister of Labour directed the registration of Canadian men engaged in non-essential industries and occupations with a view to their possible transfer to essential industry.

As I have already explained to you, the Canadian Government is desirous of assisting the Newfoundland Government if there is a real threat of unemployment and possible distress in Newfoundland, but I am instructed that if any arrangement is to be made the matter should be given immediate attention, as otherwise the Canadian Government will have to proceed in its re-allocation of labor in Canada for essential industries without taking into account the possibility of obtaining additional labor from Newfoundland and later in the year the situation may be so arranged that it will not be desirable or necessary to take any Newfoundlanders into Canada.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1286.

4995-40

*Decret du Conseil*  
*Order in Council*

P.C. 4446

May 31, 1943

WHEREAS the Minister of Labour reports that there is a shortage of men for employment in certain essential industries in Canada; that the Director of National Selective Service reports that he is reliably advised that men may be recruited for such employment in Newfoundland and recommends that necessary authority be given for such purpose, and advises that, in order to facilitate the recruiting of such men, it will be necessary to make provision for the payment of their necessary travelling expenses from Newfoundland to Canada;

NOW, THEREFORE, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Labour and under the authority of the War Measures Act, is pleased hereby to authorize the Director of National

Selective Service to undertake appropriate measures to recruit persons resident in Newfoundland for temporary employment in essential industries in Canada; to pay necessary travelling expenses from Newfoundland to the place of employment in Canada of persons recruited under the direction of the Director of National Selective Service for such temporary employment, and in special circumstances as the Director of National Selective Service deems advisable to pay necessary travelling expenses for the return of such persons from the place of employment to Newfoundland.

His Excellency in Council is further pleased to authorize payment of the amount of such travelling expenses in whole or in part to a transportation company in payment of transportation of any such person or to the employer of such person in reimbursement of amounts advanced by the employer for such person's travelling expenses, and to direct that the amounts so expended for recruiting and travelling expenses be chargeable to the funds allotted from the War Appropriation to the Department of Labour for General Labour Transference.

A. D. P. HEENEY  
Clerk of the Privy Council

1287.

NPA S-5-6-1

*Mémorandum du commissaire aux Services publics à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Public Utilities to Commission  
of Government of Newfoundland*

P.U. 48(c)-'43

St. John's, July 7, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

With reference to the recruitment of labour in Newfoundland for work in Canada I circulate for the information of my colleagues a memorandum written by the Labour Relations Officer which gives available information to date. I saw one of the representatives of the C.P.R. and C.N.R. before he returned to Canada and told him that there was a possibility that the labour situation here might change quite suddenly so that we might be anxious to obtain pick and shovel work for men without employment and I asked him to make this known to the two Companies. He assured me that their disappointment in being unable to recruit labour on this occasion would not deter them from coming back if they received advice that the situation had changed so that the prospects of obtaining a considerable number of men were improved. I should like to think that such an outlet exists for any surplus labour that we may find on our hands. Of course, it is too much to hope that employment will be available in Canada if Newfoundland should be struck by a post-war economic blizzard, but the blizzard may possibly start here even before the war ends.

W. W. WOODS

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Mémoire**Memorandum*

[St. John's,] July 6, 1943

Following the conversations between a Committee of Commissioners and the High Commissioner for Canada and the American Consul General held at the office of the Commissioner for Public Utilities on or about April 1st past, application has been made by several concerns in Canada for the transfer of unskilled labourers for work there.

It was agreed at that meeting that Par-Tex Foundation Company could recruit workers for transfer to Canada. It will be remembered that the Company installed the cross-country cable here last year and I understand that its officials intimated upon the completion of their work here that they would like to take to Canada some of the men who had worked with them. As the Company proceeded to recruit men without further consultation with us we have not been advised of the number who actually left this country for work. A few weeks ago the National Selective Service Branch of the Department of Labour at Ottawa forwarded to me a list of 21 males and 5 females who have been transferred to Toronto from this country by the Company. I understand that a larger number has, from time to time, been recruited here.

Representatives of the Aluminum Company of Canada recently recruited 298 men for work as potmen at its plant at Arvida, Que. These men were to receive 79¢ per hour for an eight hour day. It has been intimated that the Company will seek additional men later.

Saint John Dock and Shipbuilding Company has recruited 94 men for general work about its premises at Saint John, N.B. That Company wished to obtain 120 men but was unable to make suitable arrangements for transportation for the balance and the representative has returned to Canada. The men will receive 45¢ per hour for a 44 hour week and time and a half for additional hours worked during the week. After six months the basic rate will be 50¢ per hour. In addition they will receive \$1.85 per week Cost of Living bonus.

Messrs. Cape & Company obtained permission to take 30 men from Botwood and vicinity for work on a construction job at Saint John. These men were [passage illegible] from former employees and have now left the country. They receive \$8.20 per day.

In addition to the above Al Johnson Construction Company obtained permission to recruit 300 men for work on a United States defence project in Canadian Labrador. These men will receive \$250.00 per month with board free. The Company received quite a number of applications and no doubt all men required have been recruited by this time.

Representatives of C.P.R. and C.N.R. have been in this country for about three weeks endeavouring to recruit a number of men for maintenance work

on their railways at 45¢ per hour. They urgently require approximately 5,000 men and can make use of any number up to 12,000. They visited a number of settlements in Conception Bay, Trinity Bay, St. Mary's Bay and appointed agents there. Only 63 men were interested and as there was little prospect of obtaining substantial numbers in a short period the representatives have been recalled without taking any men.

In all the above cases, except the case of Par-Tex Foundation Company, permission to recruit men was given on the understanding that work in mining, logging and the fishery would not be interfered with. Most of the men have been recruited from the Avalon Peninsula. The representatives of the Canadian railways were given permission to recruit in this area pending a decision as to whether they might request applications from other parts of the country. It is not likely that at the present time any large number of men would be attracted by 45¢ per hour for "pick and shovel" work in Canada. A considerable number of men who worked on defence bases last year have returned to the fishery and there are few who are not now employed or who have not employment in sight.

Workmen proceeding to Canada under inter-governmental arrangement are exempt from military service for one year but are subject to the Canadian Income Tax laws.

In addition to the organized movements of men to Canada a number of families have, from time to time, been moving there. It is said that approximately 200 skilled workmen moved from Cornerbrook alone when the mill was on short time. A few other families or individuals have moved to Canada from other parts of the country to seek work there. We have no record of those numbers.

A. J. WALSH  
Labour Relations Officer

1288.

NPA S-5-6-1

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au commissaire  
aux Services publics*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

No. 84

St. John's, August 7, 1943

Dear Sir Wilfrid [Woods],

May I refer to your letter of the 28th of July<sup>1</sup> and previous letters with reference to Newfoundland labour recruited by the Aluminum Company of Canada for work at their plant at Arvida.

The Department of External Affairs requested the Department of Labour to examine this matter more closely and the Deputy Minister of Labour has reported as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



A further investigation has been made through independent sources, and it can be definitely stated that the men from Newfoundland were not taken to Arvida as strikebreakers. For some time past there has been considerable rivalry between two unions at Arvida. Both factions are endeavouring to obtain a majority of the workers presently employed by the Aluminum Company as members of their particular union. We are informed that the representatives of one union advised the men from Newfoundland on their arrival that they were being used as strikebreakers and that they should not accept work until the union dispute was settled. At the time there was no dispute, although this particular union has been asking for a vote to determine which union should represent the workers. We feel that the activity of the union in this case was an endeavour to create a rather serious situation, and to thus embarrass the Company. We have not considered that there has been any labour dispute at the Aluminum Company plant during recent months, and we have been, and still are, continually supplying workers for this very important project from all parts of the Province of Quebec.

I am asked to communicate this information to you but to state that it would not be wise to make this information public. The Aluminum Company of Canada has undertaken to cease recruiting workers in Newfoundland for their Quebec plants. Any men they employ will be only in their Ontario plants where, I understand, they are not having the same difficulty as in Quebec.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1289.

4995-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 730

St. John's, September 10, 1943

Sir,

May I refer to your despatch No. 268 of September 2, 1943<sup>1</sup> with which you enclosed a copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> from the Deputy Minister of Labour, stating that the Newfoundland authorities can be assured that all Newfoundlanders who have been recruited for work in Canada are exempt from military call-up under the Mobilization Regulations for one year from the date of their entry into Canada.

2. This statement does not fit in with the information contained in the last paragraph of your despatch No. 127 of May 6, 1943<sup>1</sup> in which you asked me to make it definitely clear to the Newfoundland Government that there will be no special exemptions from military service.

3. In accordance with the last mentioned despatch I sent a note to Sir Wilfrid Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities, under date of May 10, from which I quote as follows:

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The view of the Canadian Government is that there is no reason why Newfoundlanders going to Canada should not be prepared to accept the same obligation concerning military service as Canadians and other British subjects, including Newfoundlanders, now residing in Canada.

It is pointed out that the Canadian Government would be subject to immediate protest if Newfoundlanders of military age and fitness took positions which had previously belonged to Canadians called up for military service.

4. I now understand from your despatch No. 268 of September 2,<sup>1</sup> that the instructions sent to me in your despatch No. 127 of May 6<sup>1</sup> were not correct and that Newfoundlanders will be exempt from military call-up under the Mobilization Regulations for one year from the date of entry into Canada.

5. If this is the correct information, I should inform Sir Wilfrid Woods accordingly in correction of my previous letter to him.

6. I will await hearing further from you before I pass on to the Commission of Government the information contained in your despatch No. 268 of September 2.

I have etc.

C. J. BURCHELL

1290.

4995-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 281

Ottawa, September 14, 1943

Sir,

I refer to your despatch No. 730 of September 10 concerning exemption from military service for Newfoundlanders being recruited for employment in Canada.

2. You refer to despatch No. 127 of May 6,<sup>1</sup> which indicated that there would be no special exemption from military service for Newfoundlanders recruited for employment in Canada.

3. I think you may assume that my despatch No. 268 of September 2<sup>1</sup> is the interpretation of the regulations as presently followed. It may be said further that in the present shortage of labour no change in this interpretation is anticipated.

4. The general question of the exemption from military service of Newfoundlanders recruited for employment in Canada has been referred to the Departments of Labour and Immigration by our Legal Adviser, and it is hoped to have a report on the matter shortly.

I have etc.

N. A. ROBERTSON  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1291.

4995-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au sous-ministre du Travail*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Deputy Minister of Labour*

St. John's, October 5, 1943

Dear Mr. MacNamara,

Your letter of September 21st<sup>1</sup> was only received a day or two ago as it was sent by surface mail.

This morning I spent an hour with the Labour Relations Officer, Mr. A. J. Walsh. Mr. Walsh is a very able and very satisfactory man to deal with. He is a graduate in law and a gold medallist of Dalhousie University and was at one time speaker of the Newfoundland Parliament.

The information which I obtained from Mr. Walsh is as follows:

At the peak of employment in Newfoundland there were about 20,000 Newfoundlanders employed on the various construction contracts. This figure however includes some very old and also some very young men, such as boys attending school who worked during vacations. It also includes a number of men such as shop-keepers who would not ordinarily be engaged in construction work but who found it profitable to engage temporarily in this work.

Mr. Walsh has recently obtained figures from the Canadian and American authorities as to the number now employed in construction and maintenance work as of August, 1943, and as of December, 1943, and has furnished me with the following figures: (These figures only relate to Newfoundland men and do not include women.)

The American Armed Forces, including the Navy, had at the end of August, 6,441 men employed and estimate that at the end of December this will be reduced to about 4,700.

The number of Newfoundlanders employed by Canadian contractors at the end of August was approximately 2,900 men and this number will be increased to approximately 3,800 men by the end of December. (As you probably know, the Canadian Government will expend several millions of dollars in improving the harbour facilities in the Port of St. John's during the next few months.)

These figures mean that out of the 20,000 employed at the peak of construction by Canadian and American Forces, or contractors, 8,500 will be required for employment in December of the present year. Mr. Walsh has not the exact figures for the number of Newfoundlanders who have gone to Canada or Goose Bay to work during the past twelve months, but his estimate is 1,500. He gave me the following figures in that connection; namely:

300 men to Arvida of which about 100 have returned to Newfoundland;  
95 men for the drydock at St. John's;

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

- 60 men for the Brookfield Construction Company at Mahone Bay;  
 50 men to the Par-Tex Company for work on communications;  
 150 common labourers obtained by the MacNamara Construction Company to go to Goose Bay, plus a number of woodsmen also obtained by MacNamara for the same purpose, but he has not any information as to the number actually obtained. MacNamara's advertisement asked for 200.

- In addition, there was a substantial number of men who went to Canada during the past year in groups of two's and three's or individually, calculated to total 1,500 which he thinks is fairly accurate.  
 300 common labourers were also obtained by the Americans to work on the American base in Labrador (not Goose Bay). These were offered wages of \$250. a month and found, and were sent to Labrador two or three months ago.

Mr. Walsh's information is that 5,000 or 6,000 men who worked on contracts for Americans and Canadians went back to fishing during the present year, and he tells me they all did well and will probably stick to this work so long as the high price for fish continues. He feels they would not give up this work to obtain employment outside of Newfoundland except at very remunerative wages.

In addition to these men, a number are employed in civilian work by the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force, but I have no exact figures as to this. Mr. Walsh, however, informed me that the R.C.A.F. at Gander have about 250 civilian Newfoundlanders in their employ and the Royal Air Force Transport Department at Gander have also a number of civilians. He does not have the exact number but he thought it was about 100. I know also that the Canadian Naval Forces in St. John's have a number of Newfoundland civilians employed as transport drivers and for other purposes. Mr. Walsh's estimate is that the total number of civilians employed by all the Canadian Forces in Newfoundland and by the R.A.F. will run upwards of 750. He is, however, obtaining more accurate information as to this and will pass on the information when it is obtained.

A recapitulation of the foregoing figures is as follows:

Number of men to be employed by Americans in Dec. 1943 .....	4,700
Number of men to be employed by Canadian contractors in December 1943 .....	3,800
Number of men gone to Canada or Goose Bay .....	1,500
Number of men sent to American Base in Northern Labrador .....	300
Number of men returned to Fishing .....	6,000
Estimated number of civilians now employed by Canadian Navy, Army and Air Force at Gander, St. John's and other places .....	750
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>17,050</b>



In addition also to the men above referred to, some of the men who worked on construction work enlisted in the Army, and Navy and Air Force of Canada or in the Army of Newfoundland or the British Navy.

From the foregoing figures you will appreciate that of the 20,000 men employed at the peak of work here there are approximately over 17,000 who are now employed in Newfoundland or in Canada or Labrador and that consequently there is very little surplus labour in Newfoundland.

Mr. Walsh in the conference I had with him this morning informed me that this statement is confirmed by the inquiries which he has made from time to time and from the information he has received as above outlined.

His statement to me is that it may be possible to obtain approximately 1,000 carpenters, a few of them skilled, but mostly what they call unskilled carpenters in this country. The so-called unskilled carpenters, however, would be quite suitable for working on ordinary construction work, and most, if not all of them, would be quite suitable for working on the building of small ships or boats or barges, as this is the work to which they have been trained. These men, however, could not be obtained unless they were offered wages of 70¢ to 80¢ an hour with fairly steady work.

The Brookfield Construction Company had no difficulty in obtaining 60 carpenters in the City of St. John's and could probably have obtained many more in the City. They only accepted men with families who would not be so badly hit by the Canadian Income Tax and they did not go out to the outports at all and it is in the outports that most of these skilled and semi-skilled carpenters reside. The wages offered by the Brookfield Company were 70¢ an hour for a 10-hour day with payment at this rate for 11 hours and no broken time as the building of barges on which they were working was to be done under cover. They were also offered camp board and lodging at the rate of \$1.00 per day. Mr. Walsh's estimate is that at this rate of wages and board a total of 1,000 might be obtained for similar work.

With regard to common labour, his estimate is that perhaps 500 or 600 men might be obtained, but these would all be young men of from 18 to 25 years of age who are anxious to get out of Newfoundland in a spirit of adventure. They would all be men with very little experience and might or might not prove serviceable. He does not think that older men would be attracted by the wages for common labour which are offered in Canada as the wages are about the same as Newfoundland is paying to common labour, and in Canada the yearly wage would be substantially reduced by reason of the fact that the men would have to pay Canadian Income Tax which is very much higher than what they would have to pay in Newfoundland.

In my despatch No. 761 of September 21st,<sup>1</sup> I sent to the Department of External Affairs information as to the possibility of obtaining men from Newfoundland to work in the coal mines of Cape Breton and I assume copy

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

of this despatch has reached your desk, but in case it has not done so, I am enclosing copy herewith.

I discussed the matter of obtaining men for the Cape Breton Mines with Mr. Walsh today, but he did not hold out much prospect of getting men to go to Cape Breton to work in the mines. He stated that any Newfoundland[er] who is a Certified Miner is now past the working age for useful work as no Newfoundlanders have gone to Cape Breton to work in the mine for the last 15 or 20 years. He also stated that he doubted whether even young men of 20-25 years of age would be attracted to work in the mines as this work does not appeal to them. He tells me that the American Smelting and Refinery Company are operating a zinc mining company at Buchans and are having great difficulty in getting men to work in their mines although they are offering 50¢ to 55¢ per hour for common labour. Mr. Walsh also explained to me that there is a constant demand for woodsmen by the Bowater's Company and the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company and that men can make good wages working for these companies. I understand that both companies are very short in their stock piles because of the inability to obtain sufficient labour to work in the woods during the past two years.

He also mentioned the fact that there is considerable building going on at the present time in St. John's and that a substantial number of men are now employed at that work.

He told me that his recommendation to the Commission of Government would be that they should place a limit of 2,000 on the number of men which should now be released from Newfoundland to go to Canada and his own opinion is that unless very attractive wages were offered it would not be possible to obtain even that number of men and the majority of men who could easily be obtained would be unskilled and semi-skilled carpenters.

Yours faithfully,

C. J. BURCHELL

1292.

NPA S-5-6-1

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve au commissaire aux  
Services publics*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner  
for Public Utilities*

[St. John's,] February 2, 1944

Dear Sir Wilfrid [Woods],

I have been requested by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, to inform you that meetings have been held between representatives

of that Department and representatives of National Selective Service (Civilian), the Supervisor of Mobilization, National Registration and Immigration, with a view to regularizing procedure about the call-up for military service of workers recruited in Newfoundland under contract.

It has been agreed that since the recruitment of labour in Newfoundland may in some instances be prejudicial to the labour situation in essential Newfoundland industries, or to the labour situation there generally, the Department of External Affairs should be informed at the time an application is made to recruit Newfoundland labourers and the approval of the Newfoundland Government obtained before permission is granted.

Workers so recruited will be admitted on non-immigrant status to Canada. They will be required to register under the National Registration Act within six weeks of entry, but they will be exempt from call-up for military service during the period of the contract or formal extension thereof, provided that the period of exemption shall not extend beyond twelve months.

At the end of the period of contract of service, or formal extension thereof, and in any case not later than twelve months after arrival, they will be liable to call for medical examination under the provisions of the National Mobilization Act. It will, however, still be possible to make formal application for exemption from military service on the ground that they are engaged in essential work, as is the case with workers ordinarily resident in Canada.

If a worker leaves his employment before the expiration of the term of contract, or engages in other work than that for which he originally contracted, he will become subject to the provisions of the Immigration Act as in the case of a person applying for entry to Canada. If permitted to remain in Canada, he will be deemed to have become ordinarily resident therein, in which case he will be liable for military service on the same terms as British subjects ordinarily resident in Canada.

It will be observed that the above arrangement applies only to workers recruited in Newfoundland and entering under contracts of service. Newfoundlanders entering as visitors and becoming resident by reason of obtaining employment will be liable to military call-up on the same terms as British subjects ordinarily resident in Canada.

I believe that the decisions and understandings described above are in accordance with the desires of the Newfoundland Commission of Government and I shall be happy to receive your confirmation of this belief.

Yours sincerely,

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE

1293.

4995-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
par intérim à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High  
Commissioner in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 95

Ottawa, March 28, 1944

Sir,

May I refer to correspondence about the recruitment of labour in Newfoundland.

2. I am informed by the Deputy Minister of Labour that the Department of Labour has abandoned recruiting in Newfoundland and is withdrawing its representative from St. John's. This appears to be in accordance with a Cabinet decision.

3. This decision is evidently due to improvement in the labour situation in many centres in Canada. A number of war industries producing materials of which there is now an abundance of supply, and no prospect of shortages, are now laying off employees. These employees, insofar as they are not subject to military call-up, will be available for other industries where labour is needed. You will recall that in the case of the Saint John Drydock Company recently it was found there was an abundance of surplus labour in Montreal.

4. It is suggested that you inform the Commission of Government about the decision of the Department of Labour and explain to them that it is in no sense a reflection on Newfoundland labour but is due to the improved labour situation in Canada.

I have etc.

H. H. WRONG  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1294.

4995-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 356

St. John's, August 17, 1944

Sir.

With reference to my despatch of August 7th, 1944, No. 346<sup>1</sup> and previous despatches concerning recruitment of labour in Newfoundland for

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



work in Canada, I have the honour to inform you that the Labour Relations Officer reports that 3,000 men and women have left Newfoundland for work in Canada and the United States.

2. A total of 1,222 men, 82 women and 73 children were despatched to dairy farms in the North Eastern United States following country wide recruiting by representatives of the United States Department of Agriculture. Of this number only from 7% to 10% have returned or signified their intention of so doing. The mica mines in New England recruited a total of 114 men during the present year and copper mining interests in Vermont secured 50 workers.

3. The Labour Relations Officer further indicated that the Al Johnson Construction Company secured 300 labourers from Newfoundland for a project in Canadian Labrador, and that 300 men went to the Aluminum Company of Canada's plant at Arvida, Quebec. Ninety men were recruited in June, 1943, by the Saint John Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company, and the Brookfield Construction Company obtained a total of 112 men in 1943 and 1944. The MacNamara Construction Company recruited 60 men for work in Canada in October, 1943, and ten men proceeded in November, 1943, to the Halifax plant of Canadian Industries, Limited. The Par-Tex Foundation Company, Toronto, acquired 60 men in 1943, and Cape and Company took 30 base workers to Saint John, N.B. The Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation, Limited, in Sydney are recruiting 400 men for work at their steel plant, and the Dominion Rubber Company of Canada have now obtained 150 men and 150 women. T. C. Gorman, (Nova Scotia), Limited, were granted permission to recruit 25 labourers for work on their railway wharf at North Sydney.

4. You have previously been notified concerning most of the recruitment enumerated and are aware that additional requests have recently been transmitted on behalf of the Nova Scotia Sanitorium, Kentville for 20 men and 8 orderlies; the National Harbour Board at Halifax 30 men; the Kaufman Rubber Company of Kitchener 20 factory workers; the Dominion Woolens and Worsted Company of Hespeler 50 girls; the Goodrich Rubber Company 20 men; the Atlas Steel Corporation, Welland, Ontario, 400 men; the Mersey Paper Company 50 labourers; and Shurly-Deitrich Atkins Company, Limited, of Galt, 135 men. Furthermore the Newfoundland Government have approved the recruitment of 500 men for the fish processing industry in Massachusetts, Maine and Connecticut. The total number of men and women for which the Newfoundland Government have approved recruitment for work in Canada and the United States is approximately 4,500 during the period June, 1943 to August 1944.

5. With regard to future possibilities, the fishing season is rapidly drawing to a close and agriculture work will soon be completed. In addition

the number of workmen employed by the base contractors is steadily diminishing. It is anticipated, therefore, that a reasonable number of workmen, roughly 1,000, would be available from this country for work in essential industry during the next six or seven months if required. This estimate is over and above the labour for which permission to recruit has already been granted.

6. I am enclosing copy of a letter of August 12th, 1944,<sup>1</sup> received from the Labour Relations Officer which contains permission for recruitment by the Nova Scotia Sanatorium, Kentville, the National Harbour Board at Halifax and the Kaufman Rubber Company, Kitchener, Ontario, which you may wish to have for your records.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1295.

4995-40

*Le haut commissaire suppléant à Terre-Neuve au commissaire aux  
Services publics et aux Approvisionnements  
Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Commissioner for  
Public Utilities and Supply*

No. 32

St. John's, October 10, 1947

Dear Mr. Neill,

I wish to refer to your letter of October 8th,<sup>1</sup> (File No. L/R/4(g)) concerning the recruitment of labour in Newfoundland for employment in Canada.

In accordance with recent changes the Canadian Government is not as such concerned with recruitment in Newfoundland as there is no longer any prohibition of contract labour. Companies may arrange for immigration into Canada and if necessary make their own arrangements with the Newfoundland Government.

Yours sincerely,

J. C. BRITTON

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

PARTIE 7/PART 7  
L'IMMIGRATION  
IMMIGRATION

1296.

NPA S-5-6-1

*Mémoire du commissaire aux Finances à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Finance to Commission of  
Government of Newfoundland*

F. 17-'39

[St. John's,] January 24, 1939

## CANADIAN IMMIGRATION PRACTICE AS AFFECTING NEWFOUNDLAND

I undertook at the last meeting of the Commission to outline the points, so far as they were known to my Department in respect of which Canadian Immigration practice bore particularly heavily on Newfoundland citizens. They are as follows:

- (1) The prohibition against Newfoundlanders attending schools, colleges or universities in Canada from engaging in remunerative employment in that Country during vacations.
- (2) Lack of facilities for transfer to Canada of Newfoundland-born employees of Companies, etc., which have their Head Offices in Canada, from their branches in Newfoundland. Provision might, for instance, be made that Canada would permit a number of Newfoundlanders to enter that Country to join a specified Company, provided an equal number of Canadians were similarly employed in Newfoundland.
- (3) Newfoundland-born Bank officials, recruited here, should similarly be permitted to enter Canada, on the understanding that Bank officials from Canada can as at present enter Newfoundland without being subjected to the usual immigration laws.
- (4) The recent instructions regarding the non-employment of Newfoundlanders on vessels of Canadian register. This is a serious matter.

. . .

- (5) There is, further, the question of the requirements of the Canadian authorities in the way of proof that an immigrant will not become

a public charge. These appear to be quite uncertain in amount, which is itself a grievance, and in the case of many individuals excessive in amount. The Canadian authorities are not laying down any hard and fast rules as to the minimum amount of money which must be in possession of any person desiring to take up permanent residence in Canada. The local steamship companies inform me that they have now made a definite regulation that they will not issue a ticket to a person who is unable to show that he is proceeding to Canada for a temporary period, unless he is able to produce a statement showing the prior approval to his permanent settlement in Canada signed by the appropriate Immigration Authorities. It is understood that each case is decided on its merits, that is to say, the sum which must be in the possession of an intending settler has to bear some ratio to his social standing, family and other circumstances. We want (i) greater certainty as to the amounts required, (ii) more moderate limits, and (iii) greater elasticity in the interpretation of the limits and requirements as to proof.

- (6) We also want modification of the position taken regarding the deportation of persons born in Newfoundland who may become public charges, etc. in Canada. I believe cases have arisen in which persons of mature age have been deported to Newfoundland simply because they happened to be born here of parents of Canadian domicile; in some cases such persons accompanied their parents back to Canada when only two or three weeks old.
- (7) Finally, it is well to remember that we allow numerous Canadian technical experts to settle and earn their living in Newfoundland; it is improbable that we shall be able to do without a flow of such material for some years. In these circumstances a modification of the stringent rules which may properly be applied by Canada against the citizens of some countries would seem to be justified in the case of Newfoundland. I think we should seek reciprocity in this matter. Not only does the Government itself employ Canadian experts, but all the large firms bring in technicians, business executives and others. The paper firms and other manufacturing firms, wholesale suppliers of food products and other articles, all employ Canadians to a greater or less extent. Canadians are mostly to be found in valuable appointments, whilst Newfoundland seamen and miners are being excluded altogether from Canada, on the ground that they intend to engage in gainful occupation for which Canadians are available. It seems right that in these circumstances some modification of the Canadian restrictions could properly be made in favour of Newfoundlanders.



1297.

4995-40

*Le haut commissaire par intérim à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 158

St. John's, March 31, 1944

Sir,

With reference to my despatch of February 21st, 1944, No. 104,<sup>1</sup> and previous despatches relative to Canadian Immigration Regulations, I wish to advise that I have discussed the matter of the effect of the administration of Canadian Regulations with Mr. F. E. Pittman, General Passenger and Ticket Agent, Newfoundland Railway.

2. Mr. Pittman contends that in cases where the railways are [is] compelled, through the interpretation of the Canadian Immigration regulations, to refuse passage to intending immigrants, a certain number of those turned down immediately contact the office of the United States Consul-General in St. John's and procure visas for entry into the United States.

3. The fact that Mr. Pittman wishes to establish is that Canada is losing reputable immigrants because of the hampering delay in handing down decisions in individual cases. I am, however, inclined to the opinion that the number of Newfoundland immigrants who are diverted to the United States in this manner is negligible. It is my desire to make some investigations in the matter, and I should be obliged if you would procure the figures showing immigration from Newfoundland into Canada during 1943 and the first three months of 1944. It is my intention to endeavour to obtain similar data covering Newfoundland immigration into the United States for purposes of comparison.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE

1298.

4995-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au haut commissaire  
suppléant à Terre-Neuve*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Acting High Commissioner  
in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 117

Ottawa, April 20, 1944

Sir,

May I refer to despatch No. 158 of March 31, 1944 from Dr. Keenleyside referring to the result of the application of the Canadian Immigration Regulations to certain Newfoundlanders.

2. I think Mr. Pittman, General Passenger and Ticket Agent of the Newfoundland Railway, would be unable to establish that Canada is losing

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

many reputable immigrants to the United States because of the application of the Canadian Regulations, and I am quite certain that decisions are not delayed beyond the time required for investigation in cases referred here for decision.

3. In compliance with Dr. Keenleyside's request for statistics, I give below the number of immigrants admitted to Canada from Newfoundland for the Calendar Years 1942, 1943, and the first three months of 1944:

1942 .....	1,381 immigrants
1943 .....	2,645 immigrants
3 months ended March 31,	
1944 .....	419 immigrants

4. The following figures record Newfoundland immigrants admitted to the United States for the three-year period ended June 30 1942:

Year ended .....	272 immigrants
June 30, 1940	
Year ended .....	193 immigrants
June 30, 1941	
Year ended .....	149 immigrants
June 30, 1942	

5. I am sorry that we have not received the 1943 record, but the figures quoted certainly indicate that the loss to the United States is infinitesimal, if it exists at all.

I have etc.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE<sup>1</sup>  
for the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1299.

4995-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures au directeur  
du Service de recrutement national, ministère du Travail*<sup>2</sup>

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Director of  
National Selective Service, Department of Labour*<sup>2</sup>

Ottawa, October 30, 1944

I am enclosing a copy of despatch No. 485 of October 25th<sup>3</sup> from the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland concerning applications by individual Newfoundlanders for entry into Canada with the object of finding employment.

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside était de retour à Ottawa et répondait à sa propre dépêche.

<sup>1</sup> H. L. Keenleyside had returned to duty in Ottawa and was answering his own despatch.

<sup>2</sup> A. MacNamara.

<sup>3</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

According to my understanding, a Newfoundlander can enter Canada if he or she is in any one of three categories: (1) a visitor, (2) a prospective permanent resident capable of self support, (3) a labour recruit of a Canadian employer who hires workers with the approval of Canadian and Newfoundland Governments. In the circumstances it would seem that an individual Newfoundlander cannot enter Canada if he or she is seeking employment. Newfoundlanders holding visitors permits have, I understand, lately been finding employment in Canada, and no effort has been made to deport them.

If this is so and if there is a general labour shortage in the Maritime Provinces, would it not be possible and desirable to regularize the situation by establishing a category of temporary entry permits for individual Newfoundlanders? The granting of such permits would, of course, have to be strictly controlled. They could, I think, be granted when National Selective Service judges the labour shortage sufficiently acute to warrant the immigration of labour and subject to the condition that the applicant is deemed responsible and not likely to become a charge of [sic-on?] the state.

I would appreciate your comments, and any information which can be sent to the High Commissioner on the points raised in his despatch.

H. L. KEENLEYSIDE

#### PARTIE 8/PART 8

### LA COOPÉRATION TECHNIQUE TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

1300.

NPA S-5-6-1

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

St. John's, March 25, 1942

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the appointment of Judge J. L. Ryan, Judge of the County Court of Bathurst, N.B., as a Member of a Trade Dispute Board appointed under paragraph 3 of the Defence (Control and Conditions of Employment and Disputes Settlement) Regulations, 1941, for the purpose of settling matters in dispute between the longshoremen's protective Union of St. John's and the Employers' Association of St. John's. The Government of Canada were good enough to permit Judge Ryan's appointment to be arranged informally between the Canadian Ministry of

Labour and Sir J. C. Puddester, Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare of Newfoundland, during the visit of the latter to Ottawa in October last.

2. The Board completed its investigations and presented its report on the 7th March, 1942. [Judge Ryan] returned to Canada from St. John's on the [illegible].

3. Printed copies of the Board's Report will be sent to the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland in case the Report should be of interest to any of the Departments of the Government of Canada.

4. This Government desires to express its appreciation of the services rendered by Judge Ryan as a Member of the Board and its thanks to the Government of Canada for having consented to his services being made available to this Government.

I have etc.

[HUMPHREY WALWYN]

1301.

DND 4-75/10

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 71

St. John's, February 6, 1945

Sir,

Last night I was a guest at the annual meeting of the Newfoundland Board of Trade which had as guest speaker Mr. Henry G. Birks, President of the Montreal Board of Trade.

. . .

3. The Commissioner for Natural Resources, Mr. Dunn, also spoke, touching more specifically, on post-war problems in Newfoundland. He stressed the necessity of greater productivity, the need for training and specialization and for more progressive and efficient methods of merchandising.

4. In the course of his address, Mr. Dunn expressed the appreciation of the Commission for the assistance Newfoundland has received from the United States and Canada. "We have been fortunate", he said, "in receiving from these two Governments the fullest co-operation and assistance. The American Government has willingly lent us the services of experts on soil conservation, canning and bird life. The Canadian Government has sent us experts on water power, engineering and forest regeneration and have at all times



placed the resources of their much larger organizations at our disposal. We have received valuable assistance from the Armed Forces in dealing with forest fires, sea and other emergencies on land. The Navy, the Army and the Air Forces [sic] have all been equally generous with their help. It is not generally realized by the man in the street the extent of [to?] which such assistance has been given, and I gladly take this opportunity of acknowledging it".

. . .

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1302.

CWC

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion du Comité de guerre du Cabinet*  
*Minutes of a Meeting of Cabinet War Committee*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 7, 1945

. . .

PROVISION OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL TO NEWFOUNDLAND

21. THE SECRETARY reported that the Canadian Medical Procurement and Assignment Board had raised the question of a request from the Director of Medical Services of Newfoundland for assistance in providing doctors to meet an acute shortage in the island.

The War Committee, on February 10th, 1944, had given the Board authority to meet certain essential needs for medical care within civilian communities in Canada. The Newfoundland Director suggested that the requirements of Newfoundland might also be dealt with by the Canadian Board in the same fashion.

Decision was requested as to whether the terms of reference of the Board should be extended to comply with the request of the Newfoundland authorities

An explanatory note had been circulated.

(Secretary's memorandum, Feb. 1945<sup>1</sup>—C.W.C. document 933)

22. THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE pointed out that the shortage of medical doctors to meet Canadian needs, both Service and civilian, was still very acute and was not likely to become easier for some time.

23. THE WAR COMMITTEE, after discussion, agreed that, in the circumstances, it would not be possible to provide to Newfoundland the medical assistance requested.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1303.

2757-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État suppléant  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 521

St. John's, November 7, 1946

Sir,

With reference to Mr. Cannon's<sup>1</sup> despatch No. 489 of October 26th<sup>2</sup> respecting the desire of the new Commissioner of Finance, the Honourable R. L. M. James, to strengthen Newfoundland Statistical Services and the conversation Mr. MacKay and I had with the Dominion Statistician in the course of my recent visit to Ottawa, I wish to inform you that I called Mr. James and outlined to him the views expressed by the Dominion Statistician.

2. Mr. James was quite agreeable to the suggestion that, as a preliminary step, it might be advisable for a competent Statistical Officer to spend a few weeks in his Department looking over the situation before offering any views as to the approach that should be made to the problem or the selection of the official most competent to undertake it. If, therefore, the Dominion Statistician is prepared to send down a competent Statistician, in due course, to look over the field Mr. James would be happy to receive him and to give him any necessary facilities to carry out his work. It would be desirable, of course, that I be advised some time in advance so that Mr. James could make any necessary arrangements for office accommodation, etc.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1304.

6319-40

*Le ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social au secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of National Health and Welfare to Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

Calgary, November 7, 1947

My dear Colleague,

In 1944 a group of doctors from England, United States and Canada arranged a survey of health conditions in Newfoundland with a special

<sup>1</sup> A. E. L. Cannon, troisième secrétaire du haut commissariat à Terre-Neuve.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> A. E. L. Cannon, Third Secretary, High Commission in Newfoundland.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

regard to nutrition and the nutritional status of people in various areas. The survey was carried out on invitation of the Commissioner of Health, the late Sir John Puddester. A confidential report was made to the Newfoundland Administration and a scientific report was published in the Canadian Medical Journal. At that time certain recommendations were made and it was agreed that the same group of doctors would return in the course of three or four years to re-survey the situation, assess any improvements and give additional advice to the health authorities in that country.

The reason I am bringing this to your attention is the fact that one of the members of my department is a member of the group and assisted in organizing the survey. He now has a telegram from the Director of Health Services in St. John's, Newfoundland, stating that the Commissioner of Health has approved a survey for 1948. As many of the doctors in the group are very busy, it is necessary to have a preliminary meeting in New York the first week in December, and, due to the fact that at the present time negotiations are under way between the Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland, I thought that the matter could be brought to your attention to see if there would be any possible objection to Canadian doctors participating in this re-survey.

I wish to make it clear that this is not an official project of my department but that any of my officers taking part are doing so as private citizens, invited to join this group because of their special knowledge or interest in the subject.

I would appreciate an early reply, giving me your views on this matter.

Yours sincerely,

PAUL MARTIN

1305.

6319-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre de la Santé  
nationale et du Bien-être social*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of National  
Health and Welfare*

Ottawa, November 15, 1947

My dear Colleague,

I refer to your letter of November 7th regarding the proposed re-survey of nutritional conditions in Newfoundland.

Since the survey was originally done at the request of the Newfoundland Government and since the proposed re-survey appears to have been agreed upon at the time the report was made, I see no objection to an officer of your Department taking part in a private capacity, as is suggested.

I thank you for bringing the matter to my attention.

Yours sincerely,

LOUIS S. ST. LAURENT

PARTIE 9/PART 9  
LES TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1306.

NPA S-7-6-1

*Mémorandum du commissaire aux Finances à la commission  
pour Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum from Commissioner for Finance to Commission of  
Government of Newfoundland*

F.67-'45

[St. John's,] August 3, 1945

CANADIAN MARCONI INTERNATIONAL RADIO TELEPHONE SERVICE

Act No. 43 of 1938 confirmed an Agreement which gave the Canadian Marconi Company exclusive rights to furnish to the public telephone communication by wireless or like means between Newfoundland and the American or other Continents for a period of twenty-five years from the 1st day of August, 1938. The Act and the Agreement give to the Company the following relief from taxation:

- (a) For a period of five years from the date on which the Company's radio telephone service was opened for public use (10th January, 1939) exemption from the payment of the tax of \$4,000 a year, provided in Chap. 26 of the Consolidated Statutes (Third Series).
- (b) For the period during which the concession under (a) is effective, exemption from half the normal rates of Customs duties on material and accessories required for the repair, renewal and replacement of the Newfoundland terminal.

The Agreement further provides that at the end of the five year period the Government will examine the economic position of the radio telephone service in the light of the capital expenditure incurred by the Company up to that time, the annual operating charges, and the amount of annual revenue received from calls, in order to determine whether exemption from the statutory taxation referred to in (a) above shall be continued for a further period. Any such extension would apply automatically to (b) also.

By Minute of Commission 912, of November, 1943, the Commission agreed that the five year period which would otherwise have expired on the 9th January, 1944 should be extended to the 1st November, 1944 on account of the interruption of the service for a period of nearly ten months from August 1939 to June, 1940, by order of the Censorship Authorities.

The Company has now begun to pay its annual tax of \$4,000 a year and full Customs duties on materials and accessories. In a letter addressed to



the Secretary for Posts & Telegraphs dated the 3rd May, 1935<sup>1</sup> [1945] the Company pointed out that although it made considerable profits during the years 1941 to 1944 by reason of abnormal wartime traffic, it made losses during the time it operated in 1939 and 1940, and it fears that following the end of the war a very marked decline in traffic may occur which may result in further losses on operation. The period of five years during which it has been operating has been abnormal, and the Company therefore asks that the review of its economic position provided for in the Agreement should take place at a later date following the return to more normal conditions. The Company has suggested that such a review should occur annually.

Although I consider it unlikely that the traffic will fall off to such an extent as to convert the substantial profits made by the Company during the war years into an annual loss, I feel that it would be in accordance with the spirit of the original Agreement to offer to review the position at a fixed date—2 or 3 years after the cessation of hostilities in Europe, say in November, 1947. I would not, however, recommend that the right of annual review should be given, since the original Agreement contemplated one review only, at the completion of the five year initial period.

The Secretary for Posts & Telegraphs has informed the Company that it would be reasonable to review the position at the date I have mentioned, and I ask for the authority of the Commission to confirm this.

I. WILD

1307.

NPA S-7-6-1

*Procès-verbal d'une réunion de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*

*Minutes of a Meeting of Commission of Government of Newfoundland*

681-'45

[St. John's,] August 4, 1945

. . .

F. 67-'45. It was agreed to extend to November, 1947 the time at which a review of the International Radio Telephone Service operated by the Canadian Marconi Company should be undertaken in order to determine whether exemption from certain taxation should be continued for a further period. The decision taken in Minute No. 912-'43 is modified accordingly.

. . .

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

## PARTIE 10/PART 10

LE LABRADOR<sup>1</sup>LABRADOR<sup>1</sup>

1308.

King Papers C133990

*Le ministre des Mines et des Ressources au ministre des Pensions  
et de la Santé nationale*

*Minister of Mines and Resources to Minister of Pensions  
and National Health*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, May 10, 1938

My dear Colleague,

I have your personal letter of March 25th<sup>2</sup> with which you enclosed a copy of a letter<sup>1</sup> relative to the possibility of granting a contract to Mr. Henri Belanger, surveyor of Quebec, to delimit the boundary between Canada and Labrador.

From the Report of the Committee of the Privy Council as issued in March, 1927, the demarcation of the boundary between Canada and Labrador is a matter that concerns the Dominion and the Newfoundland Administration. I have no information as to whether or not the Newfoundland authorities have made any representations to Canada in regard to having a survey made of the boundary line.

This survey would be a very large undertaking and would involve a great many points in addition to the carrying on of the actual survey work. The consent of the Newfoundland Administration would first be necessary and the latter would no doubt have representations to make in regard to the survey and in regard to the methods to be followed. The standard of accuracy to be adopted would also be a matter that would no doubt be decided under agreement between Newfoundland and Canada.

I might also mention that insofar as the Dominion is concerned, a Boundary Commission exists for handling boundary matters as between Canada and adjacent areas and for undertaking any surveys that are necessary. This Commission, which is one of the Services of this Department, would appear to be the proper organization to undertake such boundary surveys as the Dominion might be responsible for between Canada and Labrador.

<sup>1</sup> Le Labrador fut accordé à Terre-Neuve en vertu d'un jugement du Comité juridique du Conseil Privé à Londres en 1927. Par la suite et jusqu'en 1933, alors que la situation financière de Terre-Neuve ne cessa de se détériorer, il y eut des propositions périodiques d'achat du Labrador par le Canada. Le prix de vente le plus fréquemment mentionné était de \$100 millions. Bien que le Québec voulût acquérir le Labrador, aucune de ces propositions ne porta fruit.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Labrador was awarded to Newfoundland by an opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London in 1927. Thereafter and until 1933, as Newfoundland's financial situation worsened there were periodic proposals that Newfoundland sell Labrador to Canada. The purchase price most frequently mentioned was \$100 million. Although Quebec wanted to acquire Labrador, none of these proposals bore fruit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Under the circumstances, it will be appreciated that there is little possibility of boundary survey work being undertaken in the near future, and it does not seem possible to give Mr. Bélanger any encouragement in regard to his request.

Yours very truly,

[T. A. CRERAR]

1309.

NPA GN1/3 31/40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*

*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 39

[St. John's,] January 23, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL. Woods obtained following information during his recent visit to Canada from McKay, Vice-President of the Labrador Mining & Exploration Company, Limited (see Act 41 of 1938)<sup>1</sup>. There is a possibility of extensive development in the Labrador beginning next season as a result of discoveries of high grade iron ore deposits made by the Company since 1937. A full report on these deposits made by PICKANDS MATHER AND COMPANY and sent by President of Barclays Bank Canada to Chairman Barclays Bank London who in turn handed it to Allen & Overy Solicitors. A synopsis of this report sent on 8th January last to Sir Charles Wright and Sir Andrew Duncan by Campbell, Director of Vickers and Baldwin, Canada. According to McKay PICKANDS MATHER satisfied as to existence of large tonnages high grade ore in Concession Area comparable Lake Superior iron ranges. Deposits vary from 60% to 70% iron ore content and high qualities practically pure hematite. In some of the deposits iron content is supplemented by manegese up to 20% with total iron and manganese content in excess of 60%. This ore is of much higher quality than Wabana ore and should be able to compete successfully with foreign ores for permanent share of British market. Development would start next summer if the interest concerned could be assured within next few months that there would be a market in the United Kingdom for 2,000,000 tons per annum over and above 1,000,000 tons per annum which Bethlehem Steel Company would take. The work involved would include over 300 miles of railway of which more than half would be in Newfoundland Labrador and construction of mining towns and hydro-electric development and would cost some \$40,000,000. Estimated that production would begin within 3 years of start of development work. We should be grateful if you would use your influence to stimulate interest of British steel trade in developing this new Empire source and would advise us as to their reactions to the idea of quantity named being absorbed by them and as to any action we could take to enlist their support. We understand financial participation by United Kingdom interest would be acceptable but is not in any way necessary.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1310.

NPA GN1/3 31/40

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve**Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

[London,] February 25, 1940

TELEGRAM 106

CONFIDENTIAL. Your telegram of January 23rd No. 39, Confidential. I am informed that while British iron and steel trade would naturally welcome any addition to Empire sources of supply of iron ore, it is not thought that, having regard to climatic conditions both at deposits and on sea-board and distance of these from tidewater, Labrador ore could be marketed in the United Kingdom at prices competitive with similar ores available from other sources more favourably situated. Trade cannot, therefore, give assurance that market for two million tons can be found in the United Kingdom. Iron and Steel Control add from their point of view that the fact that no output can be obtained for three years would seem to rule out these deposits.

1311.

PRO DO 35 1151 N601/3 X/J 9827

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Dominions au haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne**Under-Secretary of State for Dominions to High Commissioner of Great Britain*

London, March 18, 1943

Dear Malcolm [MacDonald],

We have recently seen a number of references in the Newfoundland Press to a request stated to have been addressed to Mr. Mackenzie King by Mr. Godbout, the Premier of Quebec, that negotiations should be opened for the transfer of Labrador to Canada.

We notice too that a somewhat similar suggestion, though falling short apparently of an actual transfer of territory, was made in the Canadian House of Commons by Mr. L. P. Picard during the recent debate on the Address (pp. 516-517 of the Official Report for February 17th).

No doubt we can safely assume that suggestions of this kind are unlikely to be taken seriously in Canadian Government circles, but it would be interesting to have any side-light you can give us on Mr. Godbout's initiative. We had thought at first that possibly the developments at Goose Bay plus the important iron-ore discoveries inland, in which Canadian mining and financial interests are interested, were responsible for whetting the appetite of Quebec, but I see that Mr. Picard's remarks were directed primarily to the "vast water powers on the Hamilton River", the potentialities of which have, of course, been canvassed for many years. It looks in any case as



if Mr. Godbout's intervention has been prompted in the main by a realisation of the post-war possibilities of Labrador, and his train of thought in suggesting the opening of negotiations for the cession of the territory appears to follow that of those United States circles which have urged the United States Government to seek various territorial acquisitions in return for Lend-Lease.

According to a news telegram recently received from Newfoundland, public opinion there is taking Mr. Godbout's suggestion quite calmly. One paper summed up by saying: "We cannot subscribe to the fear of those who think we may be robbed of Labrador by the machinations of Ottawa-Dominions Office", and this is said to be the general view. But Mr. Godbout's action appears to have stimulated thinking in Newfoundland about Labrador, on the lines that Newfoundland must pay greater attention to the territory if she is to justify her ownership of it, and this may be all to the good. At the same time the Newfoundland press have not been slow to point out that neither the Commission of Government nor the United Kingdom Government itself are in a position to enter into negotiations for the disposal of the territory, since both are trustees for the Newfoundland people by whom alone such a transfer could be authorized.

Yours sincerely,

ERIC MACHTIG

1312.

PRO DO 35 1151 N601/3 X/J 9827

*Le haut commissaire de Grande-Bretagne au sous-secrétaire  
d'État aux Dominions*

*High Commissioner of Great Britain to Under-Secretary  
of State for Dominions*

851/10

Ottawa, April 5, 1943

Dear Eric [Machtig],

Thank you for your letter of the 18th March regarding suggestions, emanating principally from Quebec, that negotiations would be opened for the transfer of Labrador to Canada. Since you wrote you will have received, under cover of my despatch 136 of the 10th March,<sup>1</sup> the text of an answer made by Mackenzie King to an enquiry by Roy, a French-Canadian member, about the possibility of the United Kingdom Government arranging for Labrador to be handed over to Canada in compensation for goods supplied to the United Kingdom by Canada.

I do not think that very much significance attaches to the recent references to Labrador in Quebec or Ottawa. The territory has been brought to the attention of the public by reason of the air-field development known to be going on there, and this has revived old stories of extensive deposits of iron or large reserves of water power.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

There is, I know, a certain amount of discussion going on in the Department of External Affairs about the post-war position of Newfoundland as a whole, and I understand that the original draft put up to the Prime Minister for a reply to Mr. Roy's question was much more detailed and hinted at the possibility of Canada considering the incorporation of Newfoundland in Confederation. I do not think, however, that any serious consideration is being given to the possibility that Canada might absorb Labrador alone, though there is no doubt that the Canadians are anxious to make the most of the concession which they have acquired at Goose Bay and the facilities which they have constructed there.

Yours sincerely,

MALCOLM MACDONALD

1313.

NPA GN1/3 31/40

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 65

[St. John's,] June 9, 1943

Negotiations as shown below have been carried on in recent months between the Commission of Government and Labrador Mining and Exploration Company Limited.

2. In January the Commissioner for Public Utilities, during a visit to Montreal, discussed with the President (Jules R. Timmins) and officials of the Company certain clauses of the Agreement and model lease at present in force under the Labrador Mining and Exploration Company Limited Act of 1938 which the experience gained by the Company in its work in Labrador had shown in their opinion to require clarification and modification. On 17th February the Company addressed a letter to the Commission of Government in which the following specific requests were made:

- (1) that the period of the Agreement be extended from 31st December, 1946 to 31st December, 1953. (Sec. 3 of Agreement)<sup>1</sup>
- (2) that the annual release of 15% of the area as required under Section 18 of the Agreement be postponed until the end of the proposed termination of the Agreement, i.e. 31st December, 1953, at which date the Company would release the whole of the concession area with the exception of the 2,000 square miles which it is allowed to hold under Section 19 of the Agreement.
- (3) that Clause 6 of the Lessees' Covenants in the Lease be re-worded in such a manner as to make it clear that the requirement "to work and get the demised ores . . . in a skilful and workmanlike manner according to the most approved practice" be interpreted as imposing

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

on the Company no obligation to work continuously the whole of a leased area.

- (4) that the system of royalties as outlined in Clause 2 of the Lessees' Covenants in the Lease be changed to conform to the basis of royalties imposed by Section 111 of the Crown Lands Act, 1930.
- (5) that provision be made in the lease for an additional renewal period of thirty years, thus bringing the total period for a mining lease to a maximum of ninety years instead of sixty.
- (6) that Clause 10 of the Lessees' Covenants in the Lease be amended to accord with Clause 42 of the Agreement which provides that the Company shall have the right to sell, assign, transfer in whole or in part its rights under the Agreement and to have its obligations thereunder assumed provided the Government is not prejudiced in its claims against the Company for any accrued obligation.
- (7) that a definition of the word "minerals" be inserted in the Agreement and lease to accord with the definition now given in Section 2 of the Crown Lands Act, 1930.
- (8) that provision be made in Clauses 5 and 6 of the mutual Agreement clauses in the lease to the effect that in the event of the Company's failing to pay rentals and royalties within the stated period of thirty days the rights of the Government to enter upon the leased premises and to terminate the lease would be effective provided the Government had given notice of default to the Company and the Company failed to cure the default within sixty days after the date of the notice.
- (9) that the Company should have the same right to apply to the Governor in Commission for permission to acquire private property if such should be required for the Company's operations under the same terms as are granted by Sections 162 and 170 of the Crown Lands Act, 1930 to the holder of a mining lease, grant or location or of a license to cut timber or the owner or lessee of a water power.

3. It is to be noted that during the period of the previous negotiations neither the Company nor the Government had much knowledge of the existing conditions and potentialities in the area. During the recent discussions with the Commissioner and in their letter to the Government the Company has shown from the experience gained during five years field work that the present Agreement needs modification if it is to offer sufficient prospects to the Company to ensure the maximum mineral development of the area. Accordingly we have agreed to grant the requests of the Company subject to a qualification in the case of the request under 2(4) above. We have agreed only to the principle of calculating royalties on a net profit basis and have informed the Company that experience has shown that the conditions as laid down in Section 111 of the Crown Lands Act, 1930 for the calculation of royalties are not sufficiently specific. We have reserved for further discussion

with the Company both the percentage of profit to be paid as royalty and the method of calculating the amount of profit on which the percentage is to be paid.

4. We have further advised the Company that our consent to modification of the terms of the Agreement in their favour will be (a) subject to your approval and (b) conditional upon their agreeing to a modification in our favour whereby the Company's obligation under Section 8 of the 1938 Agreement will be increased from \$50,000 to \$100,000 annually as from 1st January, 1944.

5. Telegraphic approval of the action so far taken would be appreciated in order that we may continue negotiations.

1314.

PRO DO 35 1152 602/2 X/J 9743

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*

*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 346

[London,] July 6, 1943

Your telegram No. 65. Saving. Following for Woods from Clutterbuck. Begins. Your letter of 15th June<sup>1</sup> about the Agreement with the Labrador Mining and Exploration Company. We are consulting Imperial Institute in regard to Company's requests, (with particular reference to the question of royalties) and [shall] endeavour to send reply as soon as possible.

As regards request (4) we note your view that assessment of royalties on percentage of net profit is likely in practice to be only equitable method. Of the remaining requests those most open to question seem to be (5) and (6). As regards (5) objection was felt previously to so long a term for a mining lease unless accompanied by some provision for periodical revision of royalties. It would seem inappropriate that Government should be committed to a given scale of royalties for 90 years ahead and I take it you would agree that we ought to avoid this. Would possible solution be to make granting of Company's request conditional on the Government having the right to revise the royalty terms applicable during the extended period. As regards (6) it is not wholly clear to us why existing condition should be regarded as likely to hamper financing, having regard particularly to proviso that consent of Government should not be unreasonably withheld. On the other hand existing condition has always been regarded here as affording us some safeguard against disposal of leases to speculators. Any debenture issue would presumably be secured on the whole of the Company's undertaking and debenture holders would not we presume be regarded as third parties in relation to any particular lease.

Grateful for your further comments on (5) and (6) in the light of the above while we are consulting Imperial Institute on requests generally. Ends.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



1315.

PRO DO 35 1152 602/14 X/J 9743

*Le gouverneur de Terre-Neuve au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary*

DESPATCH 215

St. John's, August 5, 1944

My Lord,

I have the honour to refer to your Despatch No. 267 of 8th September<sup>1</sup> and your Despatch No. 386 of 28th December, 1943<sup>1</sup> regarding the proposals for a revision of the Agreement with Labrador Mining and Exploration Company Limited. In our Despatch No. 63 of 4th March, 1944<sup>1</sup>, we advised you of the consideration given by the Commission to the suggestions in your Despatch relating to the calculations of royalty on iron ore and to the means by which the Government would propose to deal by means of Security Regulations with the question of the assignment or transfer of leases.

2. Following receipt of Telegram No. 255 of 4th May<sup>2</sup> containing an informal message on the matter of the sliding scale for royalty, this point was re-opened with the Company by the Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply during discussions held in Montreal on May 27th and 28th, 1944, and arrangements were then made for discussions between the Company and the sub-committee of the Commission of Government, appointed to discuss this matter, in St. John's during the early part of July. As the Government was anxious to make every possible effort to have the outstanding matters dealt with in the best way possible, it was decided to request the presence, at the discussions, of Dr. Charles A. Camsell, Deputy Minister of Mines, Ottawa, Canada. Dr. Camsell is a member of the Mining Law Technical Committee of the Imperial Institute and, as such, he had already submitted his views on the matter of royalty to the Imperial Institute, which views were subsequently forwarded to us, with a demi-official letter N.602/2 of 5th October, 1943.<sup>1</sup> Owing to illness Dr. Camsell was unable to attend the conference but he sent as his representative Mr. E. S. Martindale, Chief of the Division of Mineral Economics of the Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa, who had originally submitted to Mr. Camsell the memorandum forwarded with the demi-official letter noted above.

3. Conferences with officials of the Labrador Mining and Exploration Company Limited took place in St. John's on 4th and 5th July, 1944. The Company strongly objected to a sliding scale for royalty on the ground that such a scale, together with the possibility of a rise or rises in the rate of Income Tax, would make the financing of the whole Labrador development so unattractive to investors as to make it impossible to carry out the very substantial financing programme that would inevitably be necessary for the development of the Company's areas in Labrador. Mr. Martindale pointed out that royalty payment was, in effect, a payment to the Government of a

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.<sup>2</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

percentage of the net value of the ore in the ground, which value would necessarily change with changes in the costs of mining, market values, etc. and had no relation whatever to the capital structure of an operating company. While, therefore, an attempt has been made to induce the Company to agree to a sliding scale, it was found absolutely impossible to do so and it is our belief that negotiations would have broken down on this point. The Government is still of the opinion, however, that the flat rate of Royalty of 5% calculated on the terms laid down in Clauses 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Lessees' Covenants of the Model Lease, which is the Schedule to the attached Bill,<sup>1</sup> is an equitable one.

4. In view of the experience in large mines particularly in iron mines, that the life of a mine may quite possibly be more than sixty years it was decided by the Commission of Government that the Company should have the right of renewal of the mining lease for an additional period of thirty years, making ninety years in all.

5. The Company has requested from the Government exemption from all taxes during the first three years of operation, and that imports of material, plant machinery and equipment both for original installation and for replacements be exempted from customs duties and taxes. As regards the first request the Company has been informed that whilst no special concession could be granted to the Company, the Government has under consideration the matter of income tax on mining companies generally and that they would be further advised of such action as the Government might take on the matter. With regard to the exemption from customs duties it was decided that the Company should be given the right of duty free entry on machinery, plant and materials for original installation and that on replacements for the foregoing the rate of duty would not exceed 20%. This arrangement is to have effect for general construction purposes for twenty years from the date of enactment of the attached Bill and for active mining for a period of twenty years from the granting of a mining lease. These arrangements which are in accordance with current practice where capital expenditures on large projects are involved, are covered in Clause 9 of the attached Bill and in Clause 3 of the Lessor's Covenants in the Model Lease of the Bill.

6. In its negotiations with the Company the Commission of Government has endeavoured to obtain the Company's consent to the various requests and suggestions which we have received through your office, but we have had to bear in mind that, unless the Company is given terms which it considers reasonable from the point of view of interesting capital in the area it will not, indeed cannot, take really effective action to try out its possibilities. Furthermore, we are satisfied that the Company are sincere in their requests and while they, naturally, have made every effort to obtain as favourable terms as possible they have on the whole been justified in their uncompromising attitudes on points which in their opinion would jeopardize their efforts to raise the necessary capital.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

7. The attached Bill has been read a first and second time and has been published, with the statement of Objects and Reasons, for comment. The Royalty clauses in the model lease follow the general lines of the clauses communicated to you with our Despatch No. 63 of the 4th March,<sup>1</sup> 1944. Certain modifications in the details of the clauses were made as a result of the discussions with the Company.

8. We should be glad to receive as early as possible your covering approval of our action. The Bill will probably come up for its third reading about the middle of September.

I have etc.

HUMPHREY WALWYN

1316.

PRO DO 35 1151 N601/16 X/J 9827

*Le commissaire aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements  
au secrétaire adjoint aux Dominions*

*Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply  
to Assistant Secretary for Dominions*

GD 4/55

St. John's, January 11, 1946

Dear Tait,

I have received the following minute from the Government Geologist:

In the Privy Council Award of 1927 the boundary between Canada and the Newfoundland Labrador Peninsula was defined as follows:

The boundary between Canada and Newfoundland in the Labrador Peninsula is a line drawn due north from the eastern boundary of the bay or harbour of Anse Sablon as far as the fifty-second degree of North latitude, and from thence westward along that parallel until it reached the Romaine River, and then northward along the left or east bank of that river and its head waters to their source and from thence due north to the crest of the watershed or height of land there, and from thence westward and northward along the crest of the watershed of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic Ocean until it reaches Cape Chidley.

2. In Part III of the 1943 report of the Labrador Mining and Exploration Company, Limited, on pages 5 and 6, Dr. A. E. Moss states as follows:

The northeastern and western boundaries of the Attikamagen-Andre Lakes Area are located along the height of land, which is also the boundary between Quebec, Canada and Newfoundland. The position of this boundary has been determined by ground traverses, information taken from the sketches submitted by prospectors and sketches made by Retty and others from the Air. A study of the map sheets will indicate the relatively few points on the boundary, that have been tied in with ground traverses. Although the location of the boundary is known in a general way, the exact position of only a small portion is known accurately.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Changes in the position of the boundary will be made from time to time as more detailed mapping is completed. Furthermore, the position of the boundary is extremely difficult to locate at many points, as within a swamp where creeks draining opposite ends of the swamp drain into different watersheds. Many arbitrations between respective governments will be necessary before this international boundary can be fixed.

3. A large part of the exploration work of Labrador Mining and Exploration Company for the past two years has been done in the Ruth Lake-Burnt Lake-Denault Lake area. In this area more than a dozen iron ore deposits have been located. Though little or no trenching has been done on these deposits to delimit them some of them are known to have a possible length of three miles. With widths of from 100 to upwards of 200 feet it can be seen that the iron ore potentialities are enormous. Unfortunately the Labrador-Canada boundary meanders right through the middle of this area, and, as can be seen from Dr. Moss's report the establishment of a definite boundary line is going to present great difficulties, particularly at this present time when transportation in the area is so difficult and expensive. It may be assumed from Dr. Moss's statement that for certain parts of the boundary line a determination on the basis of the Award of the Privy Council will very likely be impossible as, where lakes and swamps may drain in both sections [directions?], it will be found impossible to determine the line marking the watershed. Furthermore the sinuosities of such a line will be infinite and straight lines will have to be used for the boundary delineation.

4. While I was at the C.I.M. Convention at Quebec recently I discussed the matter informally with Dr. T. L. Tanton of the Geological Survey of Canada. At this stage it was obviously impossible for either Dr. Tanton or me to have any definite ideas on the subject but we agreed that at the present time the only practical method of delineating the boundary appeared to be by means of a Commission having definite terms of reference and having power to establish a boundary line in such areas where topography renders it impossible of determination on the basis of a literal interpretation of the Privy Council Award.

5. If the delineation of the boundary is delayed until mining operations start in the area then I think we may safely assume the possibility of trouble and disputes between Newfoundland and Canada. It is my opinion that this problem should be brought to the immediate attention of the Commission of Government and I should recommend that the Commission of Government approach the Dominion Government at Ottawa on the matter, suggesting that a preliminary investigation of the problem be made as quickly as possible with a view to having that part of the boundary in the Northwest section of Labrador determined as soon as practicable on a basis to be mutually agreed between the two Governments.

2. I have submitted this minute to Commission with the observation that a boundary survey would be very expensive—just how expensive it is



impossible at this time to say. The length of the boundary is of the order of 1,000 miles running through an undeveloped and inaccessible area. I recommend—and Commission agreed—that we should approach you for guidance before initiating discussions with Canada.

3. The need for the consideration of the problem arises from the fact that Labrador Mining and Exploration Company has demonstrated the existence of large iron ore deposits and there is a probability that some of them are actually cut by the meandering and indefinite line which might be the boundary line in the particular area.

4. I was surprised to learn from Howse that no survey had followed the Privy Council Award. There must, of course, have been a reason. There is a possibility that, at this stage, there would be no necessity for the determination of the full boundary line—a survey of the comparatively short section in the vicinity of the known iron ore deposits might suffice for many years to come. Canada has an interest and we do not know what her attitude may be.

5. We would be grateful if you considered the matter and let us have your views as to the line of action you suggest we should take. The problem is difficult and its solution expensive.

6. Howse informs me that he is the only official of this Government who has visited the area and that it is *terra incognita* to Canadian officials.

Yours sincerely,

J. S. NEILL

1317.

PRO DO 35 1151 N601/16 X/J 9827

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Dominions au commissaire  
aux Services publics et aux Approvisionnements*

*Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions to Commissioner  
for Public Utilities and Supply*

CONFIDENTIAL

London, March 14, 1946

My Dear Neill,

We have read with great interest your letter to Tait of the 11th January about the difficulties which may arise at some time in the future owing to the lack of a clearly defined boundary line between Labrador and Quebec.

We quite understand the uneasiness that has been expressed on this account, and no doubt some arrangement will have to be come to with Canada sooner or later for the exact determination of the boundary by a joint Boundary Commission. But, as you say, this would be likely to be a difficult and expensive matter, even if the work of the Commission were to be confined to that part of the boundary which runs through the iron-ore area.

But what impresses us even more is the difficulty of taking up this awkward and obviously somewhat explosive subject just at a time when the machinery for the determination of the future form of Government is about to be set in train. I gather that there is as yet no pressure from Canada, and our view accordingly is that the commission would be well advised to find ways and means of stalling on this matter, as indeed they are fully entitled to do when the length of their own tenure of office must in present circumstances necessarily be uncertain.

Yours etc.

P. A. CLUTTERBUCK

1318.

9475-40

*Le secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in Newfoundland*

DESPATCH 105

Ottawa, May 14, 1946

Sir,

The granting of mining leases in adjoining areas of Labrador and Canada has raised the problem of the location of the boundary line. The Canadian authorities concerned feel it essential for purposes of clarifying jurisdiction that the boundary, at least in some areas, should be determined on the ground with some degree of definiteness in the near future. In particular they consider that surveying of the boundary in the area north of latitude 54 degrees and west of longitude 66 degrees, as shown approximately on the attached map,<sup>1</sup> entitled "Dyke Lake Sheet", should be begun this summer.

2. A survey of the boundary should include vertical photography and mapping of a strip adjacent to the height of land, ground control surveys, establishment, survey and monumenting of the boundary on the ground. The first two of the above operations, vertical photography and mapping of a strip, are essential preliminaries which could readily be undertaken at any time. The Canadian Government is prepared to carry out vertical photography this summer on the strip of country on both sides of the boundary in the above area if satisfactory arrangements can be made with the Commission of Government.

3. The normal practice in surveying boundaries between countries is a joint survey, either by a single party or by separate parties, the two countries sharing the cost. If the Newfoundland Government would not be prepared to participate in a joint survey the Canadian Government might be prepared to undertake the survey alone provided Newfoundland were prepared to assume its share of the cost.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

4. With respect to aerial photography and mapping of a strip on both sides of the height of land north of latitude 54 degrees and west of longitude 66 degrees, it is suggested that the Commission of Government might be prepared to pay the cost of the photography of that part of the area within Labrador and the plotting and printing of maps based on such photography. If desired, an estimate of the cost could be provided the Newfoundland Government shortly. It is felt, however, that the matter is of some urgency and a decision on principle by the Newfoundland Government at an early date would be appreciated.

5. It should perhaps be noted that the proposed survey has nothing to do with the survey for defence purposes proposed in the recent Defence Agreement between Newfoundland and Canada. The present survey is entirely for economic and jurisdictional purposes.

I have etc.

H. H. W[RONG]  
for Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

1319.

9475-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État suppléant  
aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Acting Secretary of State  
for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 184

St. John's, May 25, 1946

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my communication No. 181 of May 23<sup>1</sup> respecting the question of the location of part of the boundary line between Labrador and Canada and to report that I am now informed that the matter has been discussed by the Commission of Government.

2. It is pointed out that the survey programme for this year has already been settled and it is not possible to alter it now. The field season is very short and the staff is limited. For this reason alone it would not be possible to arrange for a proper joint survey of the boundary line between Canada and Labrador this year. Meanwhile, to enable full consideration to be given I have been requested to furnish an estimate of the cost of the various parts of the proposed survey on the assumption that Newfoundland could not participate directly in the aerial survey and could not, before the summer of 1947, supply more than two surveyors for the rest of the project.

3. The Commissioner for Natural Resources has also informed me that the information at present at the disposal of his Department indicates that the triangulation network in Labrador is unlikely, during the present or next few years, to reach the stage at which fixed ground points would be available for correlation with the aerial photographic survey.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

1320.

NPA GN1/3 261/46

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM 190

[London,] May 30, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL. Your telegram No. 182 of the 27th May.<sup>1</sup> Following for Flinn from Tait. Begins. In the circumstances no objection will be raised here to joint Canada-Newfoundland survey on the lines suggested if Commission are satisfied that grounds for urgency override considerations set out in last paragraph of Clutterbuck's letter of the 14th March. We should be glad to receive in due course estimate of Newfoundland's share in the cost. Ends.

1321.

NPA GN1/3 261/46

*Le vice-président de la commission pour Terre-Neuve*  
*au secrétaire aux Dominions*  
*Vice-Chairman, Commission of Government,*  
*to Dominions Secretary*

TELEGRAM 351

[St. John's,] October 19, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL. Your telegram No. 190. Following for Tait from Flinn. Begins. Commission is satisfied that necessity for urgency overrides considerations contained in Clutterbuck's letter referred to.

2. Newfoundland's share in estimated cost of proposed aerial survey of portion of Labrador-Canada boundary is \$6,338 based on 3,900 square miles at \$3.25 a square mile. It is proposed to inform Canadian Government forthwith that Newfoundland will accept this expenditure and the aerial photography as starting point for full survey of boundary.

3. Full survey, which should follow aerial survey, involves many problems and it is intended, subject to the agreement of the Canadian authorities, to appoint a technical and legal committee to discuss preliminary arrangements in Ottawa. Ends.

1322.

9475-40

*Le haut commissaire à Terre-Neuve au secrétaire d'État*  
*aux Affaires extérieures*  
*High Commissioner in Newfoundland to Secretary of State*  
*for External Affairs*

DESPATCH 27

St. John's, January 17, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

With reference to your confidential telegram No. 10 of January 13th<sup>1</sup> concerning the proposed discussions regarding the Canada-Labrador boundary, I have the honour to report that the Newfoundland Government agree

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



that January 27th is a convenient date for the beginning of these discussions and have decided that it is not necessary at this stage for the Newfoundland Department of Justice to be represented on the Committee.

2. Their representatives, who will communicate with the Department of External Affairs on their arrival in Ottawa, are the Government Geologist, C. K. Howse and the Chief Surveyor, Division of Surveys, J. H. Burrridge.

I have etc.

J. S. MACDONALD

1323.

9475-40

*Mémorandum des réunions d'un comité conjoint pour discuter d'un projet de démarcation de la frontière Canada-Terre-Neuve*

*Memorandum of Meetings of Joint Committee to Discuss Proposal for Surveying the Canada-Newfoundland Boundary*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa,] February 8, 1947

The meetings were held on January 27th and 28th, 1947, in Ottawa. The following were present:

L. C. Audette (Chairman)	Department of External Affairs
N. J. Ogilvie	Canadian International Boundary Commissioner
J. A. Pounder	General Executive Assistant, Surveys and Engineering Branch, Department of Mines and Resources
P. A. Bridle	Department of External Affairs
C. K. Howse	Newfoundland Government Geologist
J. H. Burrridge	Chief Surveyor, Division of Surveys, Newfoundland Government

2. It was agreed that the most immediate reason for considering ways and means of surveying the Canada-Newfoundland boundary is the mining development which is taking place in the neighbourhood of the boundary and on both sides of it. Canadian and Newfoundland authorities are desirous, in view of the possibility of applications being made for mining leases, that the boundary between the two countries in this area should be accurately located. Account must also be taken of problems of civil administration which will accompany development of the area.

3. The Committee then proceeded to conduct informal and unofficial conversations on a technical level with a view to making recommendations to the Canadian and Newfoundland Governments concerning the appropriate method of arranging for the survey of such portions of the Canada-Newfoundland Boundary as may be designated by the two Governments.

4. It was agreed that the Committee should recommend the establishment of an International Boundary Commission to consist of a Boundary Commissioner appointed by each of the two Governments. Since Newfoundland would be unable to provide the personnel necessary for participation in a

joint survey, it was agreed that the actual survey work should be carried out by the Canadian Government and that the Newfoundland Government should provide attachés to accompany Canadian survey parties.

5. It was agreed to recommend a survey at the earliest possible date of the portion of the boundary lying between the intersection of the height of land with latitude 55 degrees and its northerly intersection with longitude 66 degrees. The Governments concerned should reach an agreement in principle regarding the remainder of the boundary and should give prior consideration to the portion of the boundary north of latitude 54 degrees and west of longitude 66 degrees. Consideration should also be given to early demarcation of the boundary in the Anse Sablon area.

6. It was agreed that the Committee should recommend that survey of the boundary on the ground should, if possible, commence next summer. Concurrently geodetic control should be established on the Newfoundland side of the area to be surveyed and a secondary triangulation net should be extended to the height of land. Aerial photography should be continued at the same time and standard air maps should be prepared. Preparation and printing of special boundary maps should be deferred until the Moisie River triangulation net of the Geodetic Service of Canada shall have been extended northward and the survey checked accordingly.

7. With respect to survey of such portions of the boundary as follow the height of land, it was agreed that the Committee should recommend that instructions to the International Boundary Commission should be to the effect that it should find and mark, as accurately as may be practicable, the height of land boundary in such areas as may be designated, using a series of monuments, the minimum distance between monuments to be one thousand feet except where, in the opinion of the Commissioners, a more satisfactory boundary would be obtained by reducing this distance.

8. It was agreed that the Committee should recommend that the cost of the survey should be borne on the following basis:

- (a) Each Government to pay the salaries of its Boundary Commissioner;
- (b) The Canadian Government to pay the cost of the main triangulation net;
- (c) Other costs in connection with the survey to be borne equally by the two Governments. This would include aerial photography; secondary triangulation between the main triangulation net and the boundary; location, survey and marking of the boundary on the ground; and preparation and printing of special boundary maps and reports.

9. It was agreed that the Committee should recommend that appropriate arrangements be made by the Governments concerned for the reservation from lease, sale or grant of any kind of a strip of land sixty feet wide adjacent to the boundary and on each side of it, such arrangement to be without prejudice to any existing agreement into which the Governments concerned may have entered.

10. It was agreed that since it was the Canadian Government which approached the Newfoundland Government regarding the proposal for a joint survey, it should be recommended that the Canadian Government should approach the Newfoundland Government regarding the establishment of an International Boundary Commission. It was pointed out that, before making any such approach to the Newfoundland Government, the Canadian Government would probably wish to consult the Government of the Province of Quebec.

L. C. AUDETTE

[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Résumé des recommandations*

*Summary of Recommendations*

[Ottawa, February 8, 1947]

- a) that a Canada-Newfoundland Boundary Commission be established, composed of two Commissioners, one being appointed by each of the two Governments;
- b) that a survey be undertaken at the earliest possible date, of the portion of the boundary lying between the intersection of the height of land with latitude 55 degrees and its northerly intersection with longitude 66 degrees a distance of approximately 160 miles (B to C on the accompanying photostat);<sup>1</sup>
- c) that agreement in principle should be reached with the Newfoundland Government regarding a future survey of the remainder of the boundary, and that, should such an agreement be reached, prior consideration should be given to surveying that portion of the boundary north of latitude 54 degrees and west of longitude 66 degrees (A to B on the accompanying photostat);
- d) that, since Newfoundland would be unable to provide the necessary personnel, the actual survey work be undertaken by the Canadian Government and the Newfoundland Government be invited to send observers to accompany Canadian survey parties;
- e) that the cost of the survey referred to in paragraph (b), which it is conditionally estimated will run to \$240,000, be borne equally by the two Governments;
- f) that each Government pay the salary of its Boundary Commissioner;
- g) that the Government of Quebec be informed of the proposed survey and, in conformity with recent practice, requested to reserve from lease, sale or grant of any kind, a strip of land sixty feet wide adjacent to the boundary, such arrangement to be without prejudice to any existing agreement into which the Government of Quebec may have entered;
- h) that an approach in this matter should then be made to the Newfoundland Government.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

1324.

9475-40

*Le premier ministre du Québec au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Prime Minister of Quebec to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Québec, le 22 mars 1947

Cher monsieur St. Laurent,

En 1912, l'Ungava fut annexé à la province de Québec. En vertu d'un jugement du Conseil Privé, que je n'ai pas à apprécier, une grande étendue de territoire fut attribuée à la colonie de Terre-Neuve.

La ligne de séparation entre la colonie de Terre-Neuve et la province de Québec ne fut jamais officiellement et définitivement délimitée. Je suis convaincu que, tous deux nous réalisons pleinement l'intérêt primordial que possède la province de Québec dans l'établissement de cette ligne de démarcation.

Des renseignements que je viens d'obtenir et que j'ai raison de croire bien fondés, sont à l'effet que, depuis quelque temps déjà, les autorités fédérales seraient entrées en pourparlers avec les autorités de Terre-Neuve dans le but d'établir définitivement cette ligne de démarcation, à l'établissement de laquelle la province de Québec possède des droits incontestables et intangibles.

Vous conviendrez, je crois, qu'il n'est pas convenable et qu'il ne saurait être convenable d'essayer d'établir cette ligne de démarcation sans avoir, au préalable, obtenu la participation et le consentement indispensable de la province de Québec.

Je suis très surpris que le gouvernement de la province de Québec n'ait pas été avisé de ces pourparlers et de ces démarches. J'aime à croire que le gouvernement fédéral n'a pas voulu se soustraire à l'obligation qui lui incombe de consulter la province de Québec et d'obtenir son consentement à ce sujet, mais qu'il s'agit plutôt d'un zèle intempestif et regrettable de la part de fonctionnaires fédéraux.

Comme vous êtes le ministre sénior représentant la province de Québec dans le cabinet fédéral, j'ai cru qu'il était de mon devoir de vous mettre au courant de ces faits et de vous demander d'avoir l'obligeance d'obtenir et de nous communiquer les renseignements officiels que possède le gouvernement fédéral à ce sujet qui intéresse vivement et avec raison la province de Québec et son gouvernement.

Il va sans dire que nous serons toujours heureux de collaborer à la fixation et à l'établissement d'une ligne de démarcation, d'une frontière, conforme à nos droits.

Vous voudrez bien agréer, cher monsieur St-Laurent, mes meilleurs vœux de santé.

M. L. DUPLESSIS.



1325.

9475-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre du Québec*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Québec*

PERSONNELLE

Ottawa, le 25 mars 1947

Cher Monsieur Duplessis,

J'ai bien reçu votre lettre du 22 mars concernant la délimitation de la frontière entre Terre-Neuve et le Canada, dans l'Ungava.

Je suis informé qu'on projette, en effet, de faire cette démarcation et il faut évidemment qu'elle soit faite comme bornage intéressant officiellement le gouvernement de Terre-Neuve et celui du Canada.

Il n'y a pas de doute qu'en fait le gouvernement de la province de Québec y est intéressé comme il l'était du reste lorsque la cause a été soumise aux tribunaux et vous pouvez être assuré que nous ne manquerons pas de tenir compte de votre désir naturel d'y collaborer. Je suis sûr qu'il n'y a pas eu jusqu'à présent autre chose que des pourparlers préliminaires mais je vais m'enquérir pour savoir où ils en sont rendus et aussi pour savoir exactement de quelle façon le gouvernement de Québec a été associé aux procédures qui avaient été soumises au Conseil Privé.

Je vous remercie de vœux que vous m'exprimez et, de mon côté, je vous offre très cordialement les miens.

LOUIS S. ST. LAURENT

1326.

9475-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au premier ministre du Québec*  
*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Prime Minister of Québec*

Ottawa, le 12 avril 1947

Cher monsieur Duplessis,

Je me réfère à la lettre que je vous adressais le 25 mars concernant la délimitation de la frontière entre Terre-Neuve et le Canada, dans l'Ungava.

Les Ministères intéressés du Gouvernement fédéral se rendent compte de la nécessité de délimiter cette partie de la frontière entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve qui divise la province de Québec du Labrador.

Il ne s'agit pas de décider quelle doit être la frontière mais plutôt d'en faire l'arpentage pour bien le marquer selon la décision du Conseil Privé de 1927.

Il a été d'usage en faisant l'arpentage des frontières internationales entre le Canada et les pays limotrophes de faire un arpentage conjoint sous la direction des deux gouvernements intéressés. En janvier dernier il y eut des entretiens entre le Géologue et l'Arpenteur en chef du Gouvernement de Terre-Neuve d'une part et les officiers correspondants du Gouvernement

canadien et deux représentants de ce Ministère de l'autre part. Le but de ces entretiens officiels était de préciser la méthode à suivre et de la répartition des frais d'arpentage.

Lors de ces entretiens il fut convenu de faire aux gouvernements intéressés certaines recommandations au sujet de l'arpentage projeté et que le Gouvernement canadien, après avoir considéré ces recommandations, adresserait une note au Gouvernement de Terre-Neuve afin de fixer les dispositions requises. Les fonctionnaires canadiens qui assistaient à ces entretiens ont signalé aux fonctionnaires terre-neuviens que le Gouvernement canadien jugerait peut-être à propos de communiquer toute décision au Gouvernement de la province de Québec. Aucune recommandation n'a été soumise encore au Gouvernement canadien.

Les ministres concernés tiennent bien compte de l'intérêt de la province de Québec dans l'arpentage de la frontière internationale qui est en même temps frontière de la province.

Je vous signale que les entretiens qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à date sont complètement officiels et je ne manquerai pas de vous faire part de toute décision touchant cette question de frontière.

Veuillez agréer,  
[LOUIS S. ST. LAURENT]

1327.

NPA GN1/3 261/46

*Le secrétaire aux Dominions au gouverneur de Terre-Neuve*  
*Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland*

TELEGRAM

[London,] April 22, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL Your telegram No. 110.<sup>1</sup> Labrador Boundary Commission. Proposals are approved in principle. Assume that estimates of cost will be transmitted as soon as they are available.

1328.

9475-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au ministre des Mines et des Ressources*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Minister of Mines and Resources*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, December 8, 1947

My dear Colleague,

You will recall that early this year officials of your Department and of the Department of External Affairs met with officials of the Newfoundland

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Government to discuss on a technical level the question of a possible survey of the Labrador boundary. These officials agreed on certain recommendations but they have not yet been submitted to Cabinet.

It is my view that it would be best to postpone the survey of any portion of the Labrador boundary until it is clear whether or not Newfoundland intends to enter into confederation with Canada. I feel that to raise any question about a survey at the present time would be apt to create political difficulties which would be much more serious than any administrative difficulties which might result from uncertainty about the exact location of the boundary.

I should like to inform the Newfoundland Government of our position in this matter. Before doing so, I would be glad to know if you concur in my views.<sup>1</sup>

Yours sincerely,

LOUIS S. ST. LAURENT

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<sup>1</sup> Il fut impossible de trouver une réponse à cette lettre. De fait, le projet de démarcation n'eut pas de suite.

<sup>1</sup> No reply to this letter has been found but the proposed survey did not in fact take place.





## APPENDICES

### APPENDICE A/ APPENDIX A

50218-40

*Recommandations de la CPCAD concernant Terre-Neuve*  
*Recommendations of the PJBD Concerning Newfoundland*

TOP SECRET

SECOND RECOMMENDATION<sup>1</sup>

FIFTH RECOMMENDATION

Ottawa, August 27, 1940

*Improving Communications in the Northeast*

That the subject of communications between Newfoundland, the Maritime Provinces, Eastern Canada and the United States, is of high importance, the following subjects requiring to be examined:

- (a) Railway facilities.
- (b) Water transport.
- (c) Roads.
- (d) Air transport and communications.

That the establishment of additional commercial airways, complete with landing facilities and aids to air navigation, between these important areas, would be essential to the defence plan.

SEVENTH RECOMMENDATION

Ottawa, August 27, 1940

*Joint Defence Plan*

That the Service Members of the Board should proceed at once with the preparation of a detailed permanent plan for the joint defence of Canada and the United States and keep the Board informed of the progress of the work.

EIGHTH RECOMMENDATION

Washington, September 11, 1940

*Defence of Newfoundland*

That the United States initiate as expeditiously as practicable such portions of the increased defence of Newfoundland, covered by the Second Recommendation of the Board approved in Ottawa on August 26 and 27, as may be found to fall within the limits of bases now being acquired by the United States.

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 210.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 210.

## NINTH RECOMMENDATION

The Board learned from Messrs. Emerson and Penson that the Government of the United Kingdom is now arranging to send approximately one thousand captured German airmen to Newfoundland for imprisonment there and that the Newfoundland Government is now beginning the construction of barracks for this purpose about five miles inland from the shore of Conception Bay.

The Board feels strongly that the incarceration of German prisoners in Newfoundland would present a serious military hazard which might jeopardize the Defence Scheme for Newfoundland which the Board is now preparing and thus menace the safety of Canada and the United States.

In these circumstances, the Board earnestly recommends to the Canadian Government that discussions be initiated with the Governments of Newfoundland and the United Kingdom with a view to bringing about an alteration in this plan by the diversion of these German prisoners to some less dangerous destination.

## FOURTEENTH RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, January 21, 1941

*United States Air Units for Newfoundland*

That most urgent priority should be given to the provision of facilities for at least one United States squadron of patrol planes at Halifax and one United States squadron in the Botwood area.

## FIFTEENTH RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, April 16, 1941

*Newfoundland Fuel Storage*

The Board reviewed the problem of fuel supply required for aerial operations from the Newfoundland airport and in the Lewisporte-Botwood area. Previous estimates contemplated storage for 1,600,000 gallons (of which 600,000 gallons, one month's supply, would be located at Newfoundland Airport) premised on continuous supply by rail from St. John's. It has now been determined that reliance on continuous rail supply during the winter is unsound. Facts were adduced to show that a minimum storage capacity of 2,600,000 gallons will be essential before the close of navigation in the Botwood area next winter. Discussion clearly exposed the urgency of providing the increase in capacity.

It was also pointed out that not only is the increase essential for defence operations but is equally necessary for overseas ferrying of aircraft.

The Board agreed as its fifteenth recommendation that Canada provide the increased aviation fuel storage capacity required by prospective needs in the Newfoundland Airport and Lewisporte-Botwood area in accordance with the responsibilities accepted by the Canadian Government; and that the United States Government assist in the procurement of the necessary priorities to permit this recommendation to be carried out within the time specified.

## SIXTEENTH RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, April 17, 1941

*Rehabilitation of the Newfoundland Railroad*

After prolonged consideration with the Newfoundland Commissioners; after determination that the present condition and rolling stock (on hand and on order) of the Newfoundland railroad are barely adequate for civilian requirements; and after full consideration of the great urgency of adequate supply prior to the winter of 1941 of United States bases and United States forces stationed outside base areas in Newfoundland, the Board agreed as its sixteenth recommendation.

That the United States procure and retain title to such railroad rolling stock as is necessary for its military requirements in Newfoundland including possible operations from the Newfoundland Airport;

That the Newfoundland Government continue to operate the Newfoundland railroad and undertake at once the construction of additional facilities and necessary rehabilitation of the railroad outside of areas leased to the United States;

That necessary arrangements for essential financial assistance be immediately worked out between the United States and Newfoundland Governments;

That both Canada and the United States assist in the procurement of the necessary priorities required to permit this recommendation to be carried out in the time specified.

## SEVENTEENTH RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, July 29, 1941

*Northwest River Landing Field*

In order to facilitate the ferrying of long and medium range aircraft across the Atlantic, to enhance the effectiveness of plans for hemisphere defence, to prevent congestion at the Newfoundland Airport and to provide greater security for crews and equipment, the Board recommends:

That the Canadian Government should undertake the construction of an air base in the vicinity of Northwest River, Labrador, and provide the following facilities as quickly as possible.

- (a) At least two runways, minimum  $150 \times 5000$  feet, to enable take off and landing into prevailing winds.
- (b) Storage facilities for 450,000 gallons aviation gasoline, for 11,250 gallons aviation oil, and for other supplies.
- (c) Seven 100 gallon per minute gasoline pumping units for servicing aircraft.
- (d) Technical housing and equipment as follows:
  1. A direction finder station.
  2. An aircraft radio range station.
  3. Instrument landing equipment.

4. An airways radio station capable of communication with stations in the U.S., Canada, Newfoundland, and Greenland and with aircraft in flight, for purposes of aircraft control, forwarding and receiving weather data and airplane movement communications.
5. A meteorological station.
6. A maintenance hangar (heated), minimum dimensions 150 × 200 feet.

(e) Housing for personnel.

That if the Canadian Government should decide for any reason that it will not undertake the desired construction immediately, this decision should be made known at once to the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Newfoundland and that the Government of the United States be invited to provide the necessary facilities in the area under reference;

That Governments of Canada and the United States should cooperate to make provision for the necessary priorities to permit the earliest possible completion and that the Government undertaking the project should also immediately initiate the necessary measures to ensure provision of an installation suitable for safe operations from the ice in the Northwest River area during the winter of 1941-42.

EIGHTEENTH RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, July 29, 1941

*Underwater Defences for Argentina*

That the United States proceed with the installation of underwater defences in the Argentina-Ship Harbour area.

TWENTIETH RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, July 30, 1941

*Newfoundland Roads*

- (a) That improvement and maintenance of road communications is recognized as essential for effective military operations in the defence of Newfoundland.
- (b) That the Newfoundland Government should, without cost to the United States or the Canadian Governments, make available the rights of way necessary for such roads as the United States or the Canadian Governments [sic] consider must be constructed for military purposes.
- (c) That the United States and Canada should be given the right to construct and maintain such roads as each individually requires in Newfoundland for military purposes without obligation either to construct or maintain any roads.
- (d) That Newfoundland, Canadian and United States vehicles would have use without tolls of any roads constructed by the United States or Canada in Newfoundland outside of base areas.



- (e) That all necessary road maintenance in Newfoundland other than as provided for above should be a responsibility of the appropriate Newfoundland authorities.

## TWENTY-FIRST RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, November 10, 1941

### *Maintenance of Facilities*

Attention was directed to the question of the maintenance of the structures, etc., provided by Canada at Gander Lake for occupation by United States Forces and it was recognized that the course of events may make it convenient to permit the use by United States Forces of like facilities in both Newfoundland and Canada and also permit the use of facilities in the United States by Canadian forces. Consideration was accordingly given to the general principles which should govern the responsibilities of each country in respect of the maintenance of structures, etc., built by the Government of either which are occupied by the Forces of the other, and the Board agreed upon the following as its twenty-first recommendation.

When facilities are provided by the Government of either country for the occupation of Forces of the other the following principles should apply to the maintenance, upkeep and servicing of such facilities, subject to such local definition and if necessary modification as the circumstances require:

- (a) Any building constructed by the Government of one country and wholly occupied by Forces of the other should be maintained by the occupying Forces and at the termination of the occupation turned over to the Government of the country by which it was provided in the same condition as when the occupation commenced, ordinary wear and tear, act of God, enemy action, riot, insurrection or fire excepted.
- (b) The same rule should apply to structures appurtenant to buildings when these are included in an area capable of delimitation and occupied by the Forces concerned which should in these circumstances undertake the policing of the area.
- (c) The occupying Forces should also be responsible for the heating, lighting and other services relating to any building or area occupied by them in all cases in which the service is derived from a source adapted exclusively to take care of the building or area in question but in other cases the services should be provided on an equitable basis by the Government of the country by which the occupation is permitted.
- (d) No occupying Forces should make any structural change in existing facilities without the approval of the Service by which the area is set aside for occupation or the occupied buildings are provided.

## TWENTY-SECOND RECOMMENDATION

New York, December 20, 1941

*Decentralization of Functions to Local Commanders*

That the United States and Canadian Governments now authorize the Commanders named in paragraph 12 of ABC-22, or their duly authorized representatives, to effect by mutual agreement any arrangements they deem necessary for the perfection of preparations for the common defence including but not limited to, the installations of accessory equipment in the territory of either, the transit of armed forces, equipment or defence materials into or through the territory of either, and the utilization by either nation of the base and military facilities of the other.

## TWENTY-SIXTH RECOMMENDATION

Montreal, June 9, 1942

*Northeast Short-Range Ferry Routes to United Kingdom*

- (a) That the airfields in Canadian territory on the ferry routes outlined in the Army Air Forces appreciation dated June 6th be constructed with such variations as the detailed survey, now under way, may determine to be advisable.
- (b) That the Canadian Government construct or authorize the United States Government to construct these fields and inform the United States Government as promptly as possible what fields, if any, Canada will construct.
- (c) That the existing ferry airdrome facilities in Canada and Newfoundland, including Labrador, form a part of the proposed ferrying project and be increased, wherever necessary, to appropriate capacity.
- (d) That such additional radio weather-reporting facilities for these routes be provided and maintained as may be agreed upon by the United States and the Canadian Governments.
- (e) That all costs of constructing air fields and other installations in connection with this project be borne by the Government which agrees to undertake that part of the project.
- (f) That suitable arrangements be made in Washington and Ottawa to insure the proper centralization of responsibility for and control over the work of construction, and to provide the maximum facilities for instant and effective contact and cooperation between the appropriate authorities of the two countries.
- (g) That the proposals relating to defence, to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and the post war disposition of the new installations as outlined in the memoranda under reference be accepted by the two Governments.
- (h) That these airfields and facilities be made available for the use of the Royal Air Force Ferry Command.

APPENDICE B/APPENDIX B

CTS 1941 No. 2

*Accord entre les gouvernements du Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis  
d'Amérique concernant les bases cédées à bail  
aux États-Unis d'Amérique*

*Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and  
the United States of America relating to the Bases Leased  
to the United States of America*

London, March 27, 1941

Whereas the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Government of Newfoundland, are desirous at this time of further effectuating the declarations made on their behalf by His Excellency the Most Honourable the Marquess of Lothian, C. H., His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, in his communication of the 2nd September, 1940,<sup>1</sup> to the Secretary of State of the United States of America, a copy of which is set out in Annex I hereto and made a part hereof;

And whereas it is agreed that leases in respect of the naval and air bases to be leased to the United States of America in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad and British Guiana, respectively, shall forthwith be executed substantially in the forms of the leases set out in Annex II hereto, which are hereby approved, and that a similar lease in respect of a base in the Bahamas shall be executed as soon as possible;

And whereas it is desired to determine by common agreement certain matters relating to the lease of the said bases, as provided in the communication of the 2nd September, 1940, and the reply thereto of the same date<sup>2</sup> from the Honourable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State of the United States, set out in Annex I and made a part hereof;

And whereas it is desired that this Agreement shall be fulfilled in a spirit of good neighbourliness between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America, and that details of its practical application shall be arranged by friendly co-operation;

The Undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

*General Description of Rights*

(1) The United States shall have all the rights, power and authority within the Leased Areas which are necessary for the establishment, use,

<sup>1</sup> Voir le document 248.

<sup>2</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> See Document 248.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

operation and defence thereof, or appropriate for their control, and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of territorial waters and air spaces adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Leased Areas, which are necessary to provide access to and defence of the Leased Areas, or appropriate for control thereof.

(2) The said rights, power and authority shall include, *inter alia*, the right, power and authority:

- (a) to construct (including dredging and filling), maintain, operate, use, occupy and control the said Bases;
- (b) to improve and deepen the harbours, channels, entrances and anchorages, and generally to fit the premises for use as naval and air bases;
- (c) to control, so far as may be required for the efficient operation of the Bases, and within the limits of military necessity, anchorages, moorings and movements of ships and water-borne craft and the anchorages, moorings, landings, take-offs, movements and operations of aircraft;
- (d) to regulate and control within the Leased Areas all communication within, to and from the areas leased;
- (e) to install, maintain, use and operate under-sea and other defences, defence devices and controls, including detecting and other similar facilities.

(3) In the exercise of the above-mentioned rights, the United States agrees that the powers granted to it outside the Leased Areas will not be used unreasonably or, unless required by military necessity, so as to interfere with the necessary rights of navigation, aviation or communication to or from or within the Territories, but that they shall be used in the spirit of the fourth clause of the Preamble.

(4) In the practical application outside the Leased Areas of the foregoing paragraphs there shall be, as occasion requires, consultation between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom.

## ARTICLE II.

### *Special Emergency Powers.*

When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergency, the Government of the United Kingdom agree that the United States may exercise in the Territories and surrounding waters or air spaces all such rights, power and authority as may be necessary for conducting any military operations deemed desirable by the United States, but these rights will be exercised with all possible regard to the spirit of the fourth clause of the Preamble.



## ARTICLE III.

*Non-user.*

The United States shall be under no obligation to improve the Leased Areas or any part thereof for use as naval or air bases, or to exercise any right, power or authority granted in respect of the Leased Areas, or to maintain forces therein, or to provide for the defence thereof; but if and so long as any Leased Area, or any part thereof, is not used by the United States for the purposes in this Agreement set forth, the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of the Territory may take such steps therein as shall be agreed with the United States to be desirable for the maintenance of public health, safety, law and order, and, if necessary, for defence.

## ARTICLE IV.

*Jurisdiction.*

## (1) In any case in which

- (a) a member of the United States forces, a national of the United States or a person who is not a British subject shall be charged with having committed, either within or without the Leased Areas, an offence of a military nature, punishable under the law of the United States, including, but not restricted to, treason, an offence relating to sabotage or espionage, or any other offence relating to the security and protection of United States naval and air Bases, establishments, equipment or other property or to operations of the Government of the United States in the Territory; or
- (b) a British subject shall be charged with having committed any such offence within a Leased Area and shall be apprehended therein; or
- (c) a person other than a British subject shall be charged with having committed an offence of any other nature within a Leased Area,

the United States shall have the absolute right in the first instance to assume and exercise jurisdiction with respect to such offence.

(2) If the United States shall elect not to assume and exercise such jurisdiction the United States Authorities shall, where such offence is punishable in virtue of legislation enacted pursuant to Article V or otherwise under the law of the Territory, so inform the Government of the Territory and shall, if it shall be agreed between the Government of the Territory and the United States authorities that the alleged offender should be brought to trial, surrender him to the appropriate authority in the Territory for that purpose.

(3) If a British subject shall be charged with having committed within a Leased Area an offence of the nature described in paragraph (1) (a) of this Article, and shall not be apprehended therein, he shall, if in the Territory outside the Leased Areas, be brought to trial before the courts of the Territory; or, if the offence is not punishable under the law of the Territory,

he shall, on the request of the United States Authorities, be apprehended and surrendered to the United States Authorities, and the United States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the alleged offence.

(4) When the United States exercises jurisdiction under this Article and the person charged is a British subject, he shall be tried by a United States court sitting in a Leased Area in the Territory.

(5) Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect, prejudice or restrict the full exercise at all times of jurisdiction and control by the United States in matters of discipline and internal administration over members of the United States forces, as conferred by the law of the United States and any regulations made thereunder.

## ARTICLE V

### *Security Legislation*

The Government of the Territory will take such steps as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary with a view to the enactment of legislation to ensure the adequate security and protection of the United States naval and air Bases, establishments, equipment and other property, and the operations of the United States under the Leases and this Agreement and the punishment of persons who may contravene any laws or regulations made for that purpose. The Government of the Territory will also from time to time consult with the United States Authorities in order that the laws and regulations of the United States and the Territory in relation to such matters may, so far as circumstances permit, be similar in character.

## ARTICLE VI

### *Arrest and Service of Process*

(1) No arrest shall be made and no process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any Leased Area except with the permission of the Commanding Officer in charge of the United States forces in such Leased Area; but should the Commanding Officer refuse to grant such permission he shall (except in cases where the United States Authorities elect to assume and exercise jurisdiction in accordance with Article IV (1)) forthwith take the necessary steps to arrest the person charged and surrender him to the appropriate authority of the Territory or to serve such process, as the case may be, and to provide for the attendance of the server of such process before the appropriate court of the Territory or procure such server to make the necessary affidavit or declaration to prove such service.

(2) In cases where the courts of the United States have jurisdiction under Article IV, the Government of the Territory will on request give reciprocal facilities as regards the service of process and the arrest and surrender of alleged offenders.

(3) In this Article the expression "process" includes any process by way of summons, subpoena, warrant, writ or other judicial document for securing the attendance of a witness, or for the production of any documents or exhibits, required in any proceedings civil or criminal.

## ARTICLE VII

*Right of Audience for United States Counsel*

In cases in which a member of the United States forces shall be a party to civil or criminal proceedings in any court of the Territory by reason of some alleged act or omission arising out of or in the course of his official duty, United States counsel (authorized to practise before the courts of the United States) shall have the right of audience, provided that such counsel is in the service of the Government of the United States and appointed for that purpose either generally or specially by the appropriate authority.

## ARTICLE VIII

*Surrender of Offenders*

Where a person charged with an offence which falls to be dealt with by the courts of the Territory is in a Leased Area, or a person charged with an offence which falls under Article IV to be dealt with by courts of the United States is in the Territory but outside the Leased Areas, such person shall be surrendered to the Government of the Territory or to the United States Authorities, as the case may be, in accordance with special arrangements made between that Government and those Authorities.

## ARTICLE IX.

*Public Services.*

The United States shall have the right to employ and use all utilities, services and facilities, roads, highways, bridges, viaducts, canals and similar channels of transportation belonging to, or controlled or regulated by, the Government of the Territory or the Government of the United Kingdom, under conditions comparable to and no less favourable than those applicable from time to time to the Government of the United Kingdom.

## ARTICLE X.

*Surveys.*

(1) The United States shall have the right, after appropriate notification has been given to the Government of the Territory, to make topographic and hydrographic surveys outside the Leased Areas in any part of the Territory and waters adjacent thereto. Copies, with title and triangulation data, of any surveys so made will be furnished to the Government of the Territory.

(2) Notification and copies will be given to the United States Authorities of any such surveys carried out by the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of the Territory.

## ARTICLE XI.

*Shipping and Aviation.*

(1) Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or established in the Leased Areas and the territorial waters adjacent thereto or in the vicinity thereof shall conform to the system in use in the Territory. The position, characteristics and any alterations thereof shall be notified in advance to the appropriate authority in the Territory.

(2) United States public vessels operated by the War or Navy Departments, by the Coastguard or by the Coast and Geodetic Survey, bound to or departing from a Leased Area shall not on entering or leaving the Leased Area or the territorial waters in the vicinity thereof be subject to compulsory pilotage or to light or harbour dues in the Territory. If a pilot is taken pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates.

(3) British commercial vessels may use the Leased Areas on the same terms and conditions as United States commercial vessels.

(4) It is understood that a Leased Area is not a part of the territory of the United States for the purpose of coastwise shipping laws so as to exclude British vessels from trade between the United States and the Leased Areas.

(5) Commercial aircraft will not be authorized to operate from any of the Bases (save in case of emergency or for strictly military purposes under supervision of the War or Navy Departments) except by agreement between the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom; provided that in the case of Newfoundland such agreement shall be between the United States and the Government of Newfoundland.

## ARTICLE XII.

*Motor Traffic.*

(1) Standard and test types of motor vehicles as determined by the United States shall not be prevented from using roads in a Territory by reason of non-compliance with any law relating to construction of motor vehicles.

(2) No tax or fee shall be payable in respect of registration or licensing for use in a Territory of motor vehicles belonging to the Government of the United States.

## ARTICLE XIII.

*Immigration.*

(1) The immigration laws of the Territory shall not operate or apply so as to prevent admission into the Territory, for the purposes of this Agreement, of any member of the United States Forces posted to a Leased Area or any person (not being a national of a Power at war with His Majesty the King) employed by, or under a contract with, the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases in the Territory; but suitable arrangements will be



made by the United States to enable such persons to be readily identified and their status to be established.

(2) If the status of any person within the Territory and admitted thereto under the foregoing paragraph shall be altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the United States Authorities shall notify the Government of the Territory and shall, if such person be required to leave the Territory by that Government, be responsible for providing him with a passage from the Territory within a reasonable time, and shall in the meantime prevent his becoming a public responsibility of the Territory.

#### ARTICLE XIV.

##### *Customs and other Duties.*

(1) No import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or impost shall be charged on

- (a) material, equipment, supplies or goods for use in the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, consigned to, or destined for, the United States Authorities or a contractor;
- (b) goods for use or consumption aboard United States public vessels of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard or Coast and Geodetic Surveys;
- (c) goods consigned to the United States Authorities for the use of institutions under Government control known as Post Exchanges, Ships' Service Stores, Commissary Stores or Service Clubs, or for sale thereat to members of the United States forces, or civilian employees of the United States being nationals of the United States and employed in connection with the Bases, or members of their families resident with them and not engaged in any business or occupation in the Territory;
- (d) the personal belongings or household effects of persons referred to in sub-paragraph (c), and of contractors and their employees being nationals of the United States employed in the construction, maintenance or operation of the Bases and present in the Territory by reason only of such employment.

(2) No export tax shall be charged on the material, equipment, supplies or goods mentioned in paragraph (1) in the event of reshipment from the Territory.

(3) This Article shall apply notwithstanding that the material, equipment, supplies or goods pass through other parts of the Territory *en route* to or from a Leased Area.

(4) Administrative measures shall be taken by the United States Authorities to prevent the resale of goods which are sold under paragraph (1) (c), or imported under paragraph (1) (d), of this Article, to persons not entitled to buy goods at such Post Exchanges, Ships' Service Stores, Commissary Stores or Service Clubs, or not entitled to free importation under paragraph (1) (d); and generally to prevent abuse of the customs privileges granted under this Article. There shall be co-operation between such Authorities and the Government of the Territory to this end.

## ARTICLE XV.

*Wireless and Cables.*

(1) Except with the consent of the Government of the Territory, no wireless station shall be established or submarine cable landed in a Leased Area otherwise than for military purposes.

(2) All questions relating to frequencies, power and like matters, used by apparatus designed to emit electric radiation, shall be settled by mutual arrangement.

## ARTICLE XVI.

*Postal Facilities.*

The United States shall have the right to establish United States Post Offices in the Leased Areas for the exclusive use of the United States forces, and civilian personnel (including contractors and their employees) who are nationals of the United States and employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, and the families of such persons, for domestic use between United States Post Offices in Leased Areas and between such Post Offices and other United States Post Offices and Post Offices in the Panama Canal Zone and the Philippine Islands.

## ARTICLE XVII.

*Taxation.*

(1) No member of the United States forces or national of the United States, serving or employed in the Territory in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, and residing in the Territory by reason only of such employment, or his wife or minor children, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Territory except in respect of income derived from the Territory.

(2) No such person shall be liable to pay in the Territory any poll tax or similar tax on his person, or any tax on ownership or use of property which is inside a Leased Area, or situated outside the Territory.

(3) No person ordinarily resident in the United States shall be liable to pay income tax in the Territory in respect of any profits derived under a contract made in the United States with the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases, or any tax in the nature of a licence in respect of any service or work for the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defence of the Bases.

## ARTICLE XVIII.

*Business and Professions.*

Unless the consent of the Government of the Territory shall have been obtained

- (1) no business shall be established in a Leased Area; but the institutions referred to in Article XIV (1) (c), offering goods, under a prohibition against re-sale, exclusively to the persons mentioned in the said Article XIV (1) (c), shall not be regarded as businesses for the purposes of this Article;
- (2) no person shall habitually render any professional services in a Leased Area, except to, or for, the Government of the United States or the persons mentioned in Article XIV (1) (c).

#### ARTICLE XIX

##### *Forces outside Leased Areas.*

(1) United States forces stationed or operating outside the Leased Areas under separate agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of the Territory shall be entitled to the same rights and enjoy the same status as United States forces stationed within the Leased Areas.

(2) The United States shall be under no obligation to maintain forces outside the Leased Areas by virtue of any such agreement.

#### ARTICLE XX

##### *Health Measures outside Leased Areas.*

The United States shall have the right, in collaboration with the Government of the Territory and, where necessary, with the Local Authority concerned, to exercise, without other consideration than just compensation to private owners, if any, such powers as such Government and Local Authority and the Government of the United Kingdom may possess of entering upon any property in the vicinity of the Leased Areas for the purpose of inspection, and of taking any necessary measures to improve sanitation and protect health.

#### ARTICLE XXI.

##### *Abandonment.*

The United States may at any time abandon any Leased Area or any part thereof, without thereby incurring any obligation, but shall give to the Government of the United Kingdom as long notice as possible and in any case not less than one year, of its intention so to do. At the expiration of such notice the area abandoned shall revert to the Lessor. Abandonment shall not be deemed to have occurred in the absence of such notice.

#### ARTICLE XXII.

##### *Removal of Improvements.*

The United States may at any time before the termination of a lease, or within a reasonable time thereafter, take away all or any removable improvements placed by or on behalf of the United States in the Leased Area or territorial waters.

## ARTICLE XXIII.

*Rights not to be Assigned.*

The United States will not assign or underlet or part with the possession of the whole or any part of any Leased Area, or of any right, power or authority granted by the Leases or this Agreement.

## ARTICLE XXIV.

*Possession.*

(1) On the signing of this Agreement, leases of the Leased Areas, substantially in the forms respectively set out in Annex II hereto,<sup>1</sup> shall be forthwith executed, and all rights, power, authority and control under such leases and under this Agreement (including transfer of possession where it shall not previously have been transferred) shall thereupon become effective immediately, and pending execution of such Leases they may be exercised *ad interim* and possession of the Leased Areas shall be immediately given so far as the location thereof is then ascertained. Where the precise location of a portion of any Leased Area is not ascertainable until more detailed descriptions are available, possession of such portion shall be given as rapidly as possible. This Article shall not require occupiers of buildings in a Leased Area to be removed from such buildings until reasonable notice to vacate has been given and expired, due regard being had to the necessity of obtaining alternative accommodation.

(2) The foregoing paragraph shall not apply in relation to the Bahamas, but a lease of the Leased Area therein, in terms similar to those of the leases set out in Annex II<sup>1</sup> hereto, and subject to such special provisions as may be agreed to be required, will be granted to the United States of America as soon as the location of that area shall have been agreed, whereupon this Agreement shall apply thereto.

## ARTICLE XXV

*Reservations.*

(1) All minerals (including oil) and antiquities and all rights relating thereto and to treasure trove, under, upon or connected with the land and water comprised in the Leased Areas or otherwise used or occupied by the United States by virtue of this Agreement, are reserved to the Government and inhabitants of the Territory; but no rights so reserved shall be transferred to third parties, or exercised within the Leased Areas without the consent of the United States.

(2) The United States will permit the exercise of fishing privileges within the Leased Areas in so far as may be found compatible with military requirements, and in the exercise of its rights will use its best endeavours to avoid damage to fisheries in the Territory.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduit.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



## ARTICLE XXVI

*Special Provisions for Individual Territories.*

The provisions contained in Annex III<sup>1</sup> hereto shall have effect in relation to the Territories to which they respectively appertain.

## ARTICLE XXVII

*Supplementary Leases.*

The United States may, by common agreement, acquire by supplementary lease for the unexpired period of the Lease granted in a Territory, such additional areas, sites and locations as may be found necessary for the use and protection of the Bases upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed, which shall, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, be on the basis of those contained in this Agreement.

## ARTICLE XXVIII

*Modification of this Agreement.*

The Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom agree to give sympathetic consideration to any representations which either may make after this Agreement has been in force a reasonable time, proposing a review of any of the provisions of this Agreement to determine whether modifications in the light of experience are necessary or desirable. Any such modifications shall be by mutual consent.

## ARTICLE XXIX

The United States and the Government of the Territory respectively will do all in their power to assist each other in giving full effect to the provisions of this Agreement according to its tenor and will take all appropriate steps to that end.

During the continuance of any lease, no laws of the Territory which would derogate from or prejudice any of the rights conferred on the United States by the Lease or by this Agreement shall be applicable within the Leased Area, save with the concurrence of the United States.

## ARTICLE XXX

*Interpretation.*

In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them:

“Lease” means a lease entered into in pursuance of the communications set out in Annex I hereto, and in relation to any Territory means a lease entered into in respect of an area therein.

“Leased Area” means an area in respect of which a lease is or will be entered into.

<sup>1</sup> Non reproduite.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

"Base" means a base established in pursuance of the said communications.

"Territory" means a part of His Majesty's dominions in which a lease is entered into in pursuance of the communications set out in Annex I hereto; and "the Territory" means the Territory concerned.

"The United States Authorities" means the authority or authorities from time to time authorised or designated, by the Government of the United States of America, for the purpose of exercising the powers in relation to which the expression is used.

"United States forces" means the naval and military forces of the United States of America.

"British subject" includes a British protected person.

Signed in London in duplicate this twenty-seventh day of March, 1941.

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
CRANBORNE  
MOYNE

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America:

JOHN G. WINANT  
CHARLES FAHY  
HARRY J. MALONY  
HAROLD BIESEMEIER

*Protocole concernant la défense de Terre-Neuve entre le Canada,  
le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis d'Amérique*

*Protocol Concerning the Defence of Newfoundland between Canada,  
the United Kingdom and the United States of America*

London, March 27, 1941

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of the Government of Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America having been authorized by their respective Governments to clarify certain matters concerning the defence of Newfoundland arising out of the Agreement signed this day concerning the Bases leased to the United States, have drawn up and signed the following Protocol:

1. It is recognised that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence, and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government, which has already assumed certain responsibilities for this defence.

2. It is agreed therefore that, in all powers which may be exercised and in such actions as may be taken under the Agreement for the use and operation of United States bases dated the 27th March, 1941, in respect of Newfoundland, Canadian interests in regard to defence will be fully respected.

3. Nothing in the Agreement shall affect arrangements relative to the defence of Newfoundland already made by the Governments of the United States and Canada in pursuance of recommendations submitted to those Governments by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence—United States and Canada.

4. It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Articles I (4), II and XI (5) of the Agreement, or of any other Articles involving considerations of defence, the Canadian Government as well as the Government of Newfoundland will have the right to participate.

Done in triplicate, in London, the 27th day of March, 1941.

On behalf of the Government of Canada:

VINCENT MASSEY  
L. W. MURRAY  
L. B. PEARSON

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  
CRANBORNE  
MOYNE

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America:

JOHN G. WINANT  
CHARLES FAHY  
HARRY J. MALONY  
HAROLD BIESEMEIER

*Décret du Conseil*  
*Order in Council*

P.C. 4077

August 21, 1940

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated August 20th, 1940, from the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, representing:

That on August 17th, 1940, at the invitation of the President of the United States, he proceeded to the United States to Ogdensburg in the State of New York, to meet Mr. Roosevelt for the purpose of discussing mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States;

That conversations on this subject between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States, accompanied by the Secretary of State for War of the United States (Mr. Stimson), took place on August 17th, and the following joint statement with respect to agreement which had been reached was, on August 18th, released for publication by the Prime Minister and the President:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defense in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defense shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material.

It will consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.

That the actions of the Prime Minister in conducting the said conversations and in agreeing, on the part of Canada, to the establishment of a Permanent Joint Board on Defense for the consideration of the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere, are in accord with the policy of the Government as approved on many occasions by the War Committee of the Cabinet and the Cabinet itself.

The Prime Minister, therefore, recommends that his actions in conducting the said conversations and in agreeing to the establishment of the said Permanent Joint Board on Defense be ratified and confirmed.

The Committee concur in the foregoing recommendation and submit the same for approval.

A. D. P. HEENEY  
Clerk of the Privy Council



## APPENDICE D/APPENDIX D

*Avions reçues et livrées par le Service transocéanique de la RAF  
et par le Service des transports de la RAF  
de septembre 1940 au 30 avril 1945*

*Aircraft Receipts and Deliveries by RAF Ferry Command  
and RAF Transport Command  
from September 1940, to April 30, 1945*

[London,], May, 1945

Type		1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	TOTAL	
Catalina	Rec.	3	95	185	131		179	7	600
	Del.	1	89	150	119		190	1	550
Mariner	Rec.				30				30
	Del.				27				27
Coronado	Rec.				4		9		13
	Del.				3		2		5
Liberator	Rec.		84	106	175		188	88	641
	Del.		78	93	170		187	86	614
Hudson	Rec.	38	451	494	113		2		1,098
	Del.	25	404	284	96		0		809
Fortress	Rec.		20	59	5		88	10	182
	Del.		20	54	10		85	10	179
Ventura	Rec.			275	45		24		344
	Del.			139	34		26		199
Mitchell	Rec.			126	240		335	30	731
	Del.			93	197		322	42	654
Marauder	Rec.			5	2		2		9
	Del.			4	2		2		8
Lodestar	Rec.		2	2	7		1		12
	Del.		2	2	4		4		12
Boston	Rec.			111	87		134		332
	Del.			48	133		132		318
Glider	Rec.				2				2
	Del.				1				1
Dakota	Rec.				91		528	186	805
	Del.				74		502	193	769
Mosquito	Rec.				7		281	196	484
	Del.				5		224	208	437
Baltimore	Rec.				1				1
	Del.				1				1
Lancaster	Rec.				12		175	141	328
	Del.				6		165	143	314

Type		1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	TOTAL
Electra	Rec.				1			1
	Del.				1			1
Skymaster	Rec.					1	4	5
	Del.					1	2	3
Lib. C-VII	Rec.					24		24
	Del.					22		22
Goose	Rec.					1		1
	Del.					0		0
Lib. C-IX	Rec.					4	2	6
	Del.					0	1	1
York	Rec.						1	1
	Del.						0	0
Total	Rec.	41	652	1,363	952	1,976	665	5,650
	Del.	26	593	867	883	1,864	686	4,919

APPENDICE E/APPENDIX E

CTS 1941 Supplement No. 15

*Mémoire d'un accord entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve  
visant la concession de bases aériennes*

*Memorandum of Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland  
Respecting the Transfer of Air Bases*

St. John's, April 17, 1941

In order to arrange for effect to be given to the Agreement for the transfer of control of the air bases of the Government of Newfoundland at Newfoundland Airport, Gleneagles and Botwood to the Government of Canada, which had been reached in principle by telegraphic and other correspondence terminating on the 3rd day of April, 1941, meetings were held at the Newfoundland Airport on Monday the 7th, Tuesday the 8th and Wednesday the 9th days of April, 1941, and the following terms were agreed upon and have been submitted to and approved by the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland.

1. (1) Subject to the fundamental points set out in the succeeding paragraph and subject to such agreed arrangements with regard to specific activities as are hereinafter set forth and for purposes of defence, the Government of Newfoundland will transfer to the Government of Canada for the duration of the war the control of the Newfoundland Airport (as set out in the annexed plan) and of the seaplane bases situated at Botwood and Gleneagles, hereinafter referred to as the air bases; and the Government of Canada shall undertake in the place of the Government of Newfoundland the responsibility for the operation of the air bases.

(2) The responsibility for operation of the air bases to be assumed by the Canadian Government shall include normal air base facilities for trans-Atlantic movement of aircraft in accordance with established Air Ministry practice.

2. The Government of Canada agrees that:

(1) No part of the air bases shall be handed over to control of a third party without prior consent of the Newfoundland Government.

(2) No alterations shall be made in the existing layout of the air bases without prior consent of the Newfoundland Government.

(3) Any damage to the air bases other than extensive damage caused by enemy action, while such bases are controlled by the Government of Canada shall be repaired by the Government of Canada; provided that this obligation on the part of the Canadian Government shall not apply to works and buildings constructed at the cost of the Canadian Government.

(4) Control of the air bases shall be handed back to the Newfoundland Government on the termination of hostilities.

(5) Control of the Newfoundland Airport Area vested in the Commissioner for Public Utilities by Act No. 19 of 1938 shall not be affected.

(6) So far as practicable (a) Newfoundland personnel will be employed and (b) the present staffs at the air bases will be continued in employment.

(7) Materials manufactured or produced in Newfoundland and sold at competitive prices will be given preference.

(8) The facilities at the air bases, including the civil hangar at the Newfoundland Airport will continue to be made available as required for British civil aircraft operating across the North Atlantic or undertaking local flights and plans for delivery by air of military aircraft across the Atlantic will be facilitated. The Canadian Government will co-operate with the Newfoundland Government in the provision of suitable ground space as required for the erection at the expense of the United Kingdom Government, of accommodation for aircraft and personnel.

3. It is agreed that as from the date of transfer of control of the air bases the present Aerodrome Control Officer will cease to have general charge of administration of the air bases, but that he or some other person will be employed by the Newfoundland Government as liaison officer at the air bases between the Newfoundland Government, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Air Ministry; and it is understood that the liaison officer will continue to direct the Air Ministry wireless organization in Newfoundland.

4. It is understood and agreed that the Air Ministry wireless organization and equipment will be available for all purposes connected with aviation, but that the control thereof will be retained for the duration of the war by the Air Ministry which will have first call on its use at all times.

The Canadian Government will provide the power, heat and transport required by the wireless organization, will repair ordinary wear and tear of the buildings occupied by the organization, will keep open the roads thereto and will provide, at reasonable rates, messing facilities and quarters for members of the staff. Provided the United Kingdom Government will reimburse the Canadian Government for so much of the cost thereby incurred by that Government as shall not exceed in any year the sum of \$25,000; and provided further that the said sum shall be subject to adjustment in the event of a substantial expansion of the Air Ministry wireless organization or equipment.

5. The Atlantic Ferry Organization of the Ministry of Aircraft Production and its agents shall continue to have at the air bases the status of an operating company and shall be allowed to provide itself at these bases (at its own expense as to construction and maintenance) with such buildings and other facilities as the Newfoundland and Canadian Governments may agree to be reasonably required and suitable as to the sanitary and other requirements of the bases.



6. The Government of Canada shall assume and discharge any obligations, other than financial obligations, of the Government of Newfoundland to another Government in respect of the air bases, including the provision of ground facilities for trans-Atlantic flights, if such obligations arise out of the Ottawa negotiations of 1935.

7. The Newfoundland Government agrees to lease to the Canadian Government the lands at the Newfoundland Airport occupied by the hangars, works and buildings which have been constructed at the cost of the Canadian Government for the R.C.A.F. or which shall be so constructed with the consent of the Newfoundland Government for the R.C.A.F. at any of the air bases, for a period of 5 years, provided that on or after the cessation of hostilities the Newfoundland Government shall have the right, notwithstanding any such lease, to resume possession of all of the area of land situated on the north side of No. 1 runway of the Newfoundland Airport and between the said runway and the main line of the Newfoundland Railway, but on the exercise of such right the Newfoundland Government shall pay to the Canadian Government such reasonable compensation for buildings and erections thereon the property of the Canadian Government as shall be agreed.

8. The Canadian Government agrees to maintain and repair the buildings now owned by the Newfoundland Government, possession of which is being transferred to the Canadian Government, and to return possession to the Newfoundland Government at the cessation of hostilities.

9. The Newfoundland Government understands that practice bombing ranges and air-firing ranges will be required by the Royal Canadian Air Force in the vicinity of the air bases and agrees to facilitate the establishment of such ranges.

9A. The Newfoundland Government agrees to permit the construction of bomb storage facilities in the V between the south side of No. 3 runway and the west side of No. 4 runway and in an area southeast of the southern end of No. 2 runway together with necessary roads and spur trackage. Final plans therefor to be made in consultation with the Newfoundland Government. (Not to be published).

10. The Newfoundland Government agrees to transfer to the Canadian Government for the duration of the war its equipment at the air bases including surplus equipment (but not including the small power boat at Botwood or the power boat at Glencables) for use or safe custody at any of the air bases. The Canadian Government agrees that no movable property is to be disposed of or removed from the air bases without the consent of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland Governments and that the proceeds of any agreed sales will be the property of those two Governments.

11. It is agreed that the Canadian Government shall not be responsible for providing marine facilities at the base on Gander Lake to be operated by the Atlantic Ferry Organization.

12. It is agreed that as from the date of transfer the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Newfoundland shall each pay to the Government of Canada, while it is in control of the air bases, an annual contribution of \$25,000 towards the cost of the maintenance and operation of the facilities at the air bases, and that the Government of Canada shall be responsible for the balance of such cost, exclusive of the cost of maintaining and operating the Air Ministry wireless organization.

The Canadian Government will be entitled to receive all rentals and other items of revenue accruing during such period.

13. It is agreed that the Government of Canada will take over as from the date of transfer of the bases the rights and obligations under the three subsisting contracts between the Commissioner for Public Utilities and the Goodyear Humber Stores, Limited, hereinafter described, viz.,

(1) Contract for the supply of meals at the Administration Building of the Newfoundland Airport; terminable on one month's notice;

(2) Contract for operation of the Airport Store; terminable on three months' notice;

(3) Contract for operation of a bakery; terminable on three months' notice.

14. The Newfoundland Government agrees to the establishment by the Canadian Government of refuelling bases in Newfoundland and Labrador, the sites of which shall be settled in consultation with the Newfoundland Government.

15. The Government of Canada agrees that, save with the consent of the Newfoundland Government, only such foreign undertakings as are at present authorized shall be permitted to use the air bases and only to the extent permitted by existing authorizations.

16. The Newfoundland Government agrees in principle that the Canadian Government may establish:

(1) A radio range station at the Newfoundland Airport which will be approximately three miles from the main runway and along its projection;

(2) A sewage disposal plant at the Newfoundland Airport which it is proposed to place to the north of the railway and which will require an area of several acres;

(3) A water supply system including a pumping station at Gander Lake and reservoirs situated in the vicinity of the buildings at the Newfoundland Airport;

(4) Anti-aircraft defensive sites in the vicinity of the air bases including accommodation for personnel;

(5) Gasoline storage plants at the air bases with necessary spur trackage.

17. The Newfoundland Government agrees that during the continuance of hostilities,

(a) The present status of the area of and surrounding the Newfoundland Airport as a prohibited area under the Defence Regulations shall not be altered except by prior arrangement with the Canadian Government; and

(b) The Newfoundland Department of Customs will not issue permits to fly over any part of Newfoundland without the prior consent of the Commanding Officer, R.C.A.F., Newfoundland.

18. It is understood that it is the intention of the Newfoundland Government when it resumes control of the air bases upon cessation of hostilities that the bases shall be operated primarily as civil airports and in accord with their original purpose for the development of trans-Atlantic aviation. The extent of the continued use of the bases by the Canadian Forces after such resumption of control shall therefore be the subject of consultation between the two Governments and regard shall be had to the respective interests of the United Kingdom and Newfoundland and Canadian Governments in Western Hemisphere defence and their financial investment in the bases.

19. The date of transfer of control of the air bases shall be agreed upon between the Aerodrome Control Officer and the Officer of the R.C.A.F. taking over.

Signed on behalf of the  
Government of Canada:

COLIN GIBSON

Signed on behalf of  
the Government of  
Newfoundland subject  
to the concurrence  
of the Government  
of the United Kingdom:

W. WOODS

*Mémoire d'un accord entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve  
visant l'établissement d'une base aérienne  
à Goose Bay, au Labrador*

*Memorandum of Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland  
relating to the Establishment of an Air Base  
at Goose Bay, Labrador*

St. John's, October 10, 1944

Made this tenth day of October, Anno Domini one thousand nine hundred and forty-four BETWEEN The Government of Canada represented herein by the High Commissioner for Canada in Newfoundland of the first part AND The Government of Newfoundland represented herein by the Commissioner for Public Utilities and Supply of the second part.

WHEREAS the development of a strategic air base for the defence of Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador, within the general scheme of hemisphere defence and as a basis of operations in the Atlantic area, is considered by the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland to be of the utmost importance:

Therefore the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have agreed as follows:

1. (1) The Government of Newfoundland will lease to His Majesty the King in right of Canada ALL THAT certain piece or parcel of land situated at Goose Bay in Labrador described as follows: Beginning at a concrete post marked "A" at the most northerly point of Terrington Basin at ordinary high watermark, the said point being North Latitude 53 degrees 22 minutes 24.6 seconds and West Longitude 60 degrees 23 minutes 21.5 seconds; thence North astronomically 305 chains; thence West astronomically 640 chains; thence South astronomically 920 chains more or less to the northern shore of the Hamilton River at ordinary high water mark; thence easterly along the northern shore of the Hamilton River at ordinary high water mark to Goose Bay; thence northerly and westerly along the shore of Goose Bay at ordinary high water mark to Terrington Basin; thence westerly and northerly along the shore of Terrington Basin at ordinary high water mark to the point of beginning; containing 120 square miles more or less; hereinafter referred to as the Air Base; reserving nevertheless from the Air Base all mines and minerals; TO HOLD the same unto His Majesty the King in right of Canada for a period of ninety-nine years from the first day of September Anno Domini one thousand nine hundred and forty-one for the purpose of the construction, operation and maintenance of an air base thereon for operations by land or water for the purposes set forth in the recital hereto.

(2) Such lease shall be authorized or ratified in such manner as may be agreed upon by the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland.



2. During the period of the lease the Government of Canada shall have the right to construct, maintain, operate, manage and control an air base at the Air Base and without restricting the generality of the foregoing shall have as incidental thereto the following rights, namely:

- (a) to build and maintain a roadway approximately 22 miles in length from the Air Base to Northwest River and such other roads outside the Air Base as may be agreed with the Government of Newfoundland from time to time. All roads built hereunder outside the Air Base shall become public highways. Where the Air Base separates two roads or two parts of the same road, passage through the Air Base will be permitted, subject to such reasonable limitations as are necessary for the protection of the Air Base and its operations;
- (b) to take from the neighbouring streams and rivers such water as may be necessary for the purposes of the Air Base;
- (c) to develop, construct and operate power plants for use of the Air Base and for such purposes to use such water storage and power sites as may be agreed and upon such conditions as may be imposed by the Government of Newfoundland;
- (d) to construct radio stations and transmission lines and operate communications by radio, telephone and telegraph for the purposes of the Air Base, subject to agreement with the Secretary for Posts and Telegraphs of the Government of Newfoundland as to frequencies and power output in the case of radio communications;
- (e) to construct docks, wharves, slipways, piers and anchorages for ships and aircraft at such places as may from time to time be agreed with the Government of Newfoundland.

3. For the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as the Governments agree to be necessary or advisable in the interests of common defence:

- (a) the management and control of the Air Base shall be under the direction of the Royal Canadian Air Force, wireless and meteorological services being supplied by the Department of Transport of the Government of Canada;
- (b) use of the Air Base will be made available to United Kingdom military aircraft and to aircraft of the United States Navy and Army Air Forces. The Government of Canada may permit the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States to erect buildings at the Air Base for the accommodation of aircraft and military personnel, and may permit such Governments to station Naval and Air Force military personnel at the Air Base;
- (c) the use of the Air Base by civil aircraft shall be permitted insofar as such use is a necessary part of the war effort, and the Air Base shall be available for such other civilian use as may be mutually agreed upon;
- (d) in addition to any arrangements for the co-ordination of the wireless and meteorological services with other operating air bases and

stations, such services at the Air Base may be co-ordinated with those operated by the Government of the United States in Canadian territory adjacent to Labrador and by the Royal Air Force.

4. The Government of Canada may from time to time erect within the Air Base such works, buildings and fortifications as it may deem to be necessary for the maintenance of the Air Base as an operational air base and for its defence, and may station at the Air Base such military personnel as may be required for the defence thereof.

5. Civil and military aircraft owned by the Government of Newfoundland shall have the right to use the Air Base on terms not less favourable than those of the Government of Canada.

6. The right of the United Kingdom to use the Air Base for military aircraft shall be the subject of consultation and agreement between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland after the war, and, in the meantime, the rights of the United Kingdom under Article 3 of this Agreement shall continue unimpaired.

7. The Government of Canada will employ Newfoundland labour as far as practicable at the Air Base.

8. Duly authorized officers of the Government of Newfoundland shall have access at all reasonable times to the Air Base in the course of the carrying out of their duties.

9. The Government of Canada shall transfer free of cost to the Government of Newfoundland any land within the Air Base reasonably required by the Government of Newfoundland for the erection of buildings for the accommodation of its officials or for any other Government purposes.

10. In order to avoid doubt it is hereby declared that the laws of Newfoundland shall be applicable throughout the Air Base and to all persons therein or thereon.

11. The development of the Air Base being primarily for defence, the Air base and its facilities shall not during the war be used for civil or for commercial operations, except as provided in clause (c) Article 3 hereof. The question of its or their use for civil and commercial operations after the war, and all matters incidental thereto, will form the subject of discussion between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland, and this discussion will take place not later than twelve months after the war.

12. The Government of Canada agrees that it will not, without the consent of the Government of Newfoundland, transfer to any third party in whole or in part the rights, powers and authority herein granted to the Government of Canada.

Signed at St. John's, Newfoundland, in duplicate, this tenth day of October, A.D. 1944.

On behalf of the Government of Canada:  
J. S. MACDONALD

On behalf of the Government of Newfoundland:  
W. W. WOODS

# APPENDICE G/ APPENDIX G

72-NL-40

*Pièce jointe d'un memorandum du ministère des Affaires extérieures  
au Comité du Cabinet sur la reconstruction*

*Enclosure to Memorandum from Department of External Affairs  
to Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction*

Ottawa, September 5, 1945

## EXPENDITURES FOR CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AIRFIELDS AND FACILITIES IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR TO MARCH 31, 1945.

	D.O.T. Appropri- ations.	D.O.T. Expend- iture from DND. Air Funds.	Other DND.—Air Expend's (As supp- lied by R.C.A.F.)	D.O.T. Expend- iture from DND.—Army Funds.	TOTAL
NEWFOUNDLAND					
Botwood Seaplane Base and Facilities	3,609	10,232	2,794,304		2,808,145
Buchans Aerodrome and Facilities	1,046,733				1,046,733
Cape Bauld Radio Detachment			84,752		84,752
Donovans Fuel Depot		3,000	79,410		82,410
Gander Aerodrome, Sea- plane Base and Facilities	37,456	1,707,455	18,528,949		20,273,860
Gander Radio Detach- ment			8,095		8,095
Gander Lake—Lewis- porte—Bishops Falls H'way			1,423,200		1,423,200
Holyrood Fuel Depot		2,771	118,934		121,705
Lewisporte Fuel Depot			5,376		5,376
Port-aux-Basques Radio Detachment			66,192		66,192
St. John's Headquarters		84,307	1,746,849		1,831,156
St. Andrews Radio Range	200,389				200,389
Torbay Aerodrome and Facilities	261,496	1,146,428	7,301,507		11,709,431
Torbay—St. John Road	64,997				64,997
Refuelling Bases			9,370		9,370
LABRADOR					
Brig Harbour Radio Detachment			16,239		16,239
Goose Airport and Facilities	674,317	21,446,786	99,845	3,161,578	25,382,526
Sandgirt Lake Radio Weather Station	44,107				44,107
Spotted Island Radio Detachment			12,518		12,518
Wilson Radio Range Investigation		1,267			1,267
TOTAL	\$2,333,104	27,402,246	32,295,540	3,161,578	65,192,468

## APPENDICE H/APPENDIX H

CTS 1946 No. 15

### *Accord entre le Canada, Terre-Neuve et le Royaume-Uni relatif aux installations de défense à Terre-Neuve*

### *Agreement between Canada, Newfoundland and the United Kingdom Respecting Defence Installations in Newfoundland*

St. John's, April 8 and London, May 3, 1946

The Governments of Canada, Newfoundland and the United Kingdom, having examined the various problems relating to defence installations constructed in Newfoundland under various agreements and understandings made during the recent war, and having considered their respective interests in Western Hemisphere defence, have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE 1

In this Agreement the expression "Newfoundland" shall mean Newfoundland and its Dependencies and the territorial waters thereof.

#### ARTICLE 2

(a) The Government of Canada shall re-transfer control and operation of the Newfoundland Airport at Gander and the seaplane bases at Gleneagles and Botwood to the Government of Newfoundland as of March 31, 1946, and the obligations of the Government of Canada under the Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941, between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland shall thereupon cease and shall be deemed to have been discharged.

(b) In order to assist the Government of Newfoundland in maintaining the continuous operation of the Newfoundland Airport, a progressive withdrawal of Canadian personnel from March 31, 1946 to May 31, 1946 may be arranged between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Newfoundland Director of Civil Aviation.

(c) With a view to facilitating the development of the Newfoundland Airport as a civil airport, the Government of Canada forgoes its rights with respect to a lease at the Newfoundland Airport under Article VII of the said Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941.

(d) The Government of Canada shall transfer to the Government of Newfoundland all the buildings, hangars and works constructed by the Government of Canada at the Newfoundland Airport, and all the equipment and supplies of the Government of Canada at the Airport, excluding stocks of solid and liquid fuels, oils and lubricants and the equipment and supplies of the Department of Transport of the Government of Canada, and the Government of Newfoundland shall pay therefor the sum of one million dollars in such instalments and at such times as may be agreed upon.

(e) The Government of Newfoundland shall provide at the Newfoundland Airport such accommodation as may be required by the Canadian Armed



Forces during the period of progressive withdrawal from the Airport and for the storage of such supplies as remain after March 31, 1946.

(f) During the provision by the Government of Canada of the Meteorological Service and Radio Range Service at the Newfoundland Airport the Government of Newfoundland shall maintain suitable office and living accommodation for the necessary staffs of these Services, the location, type and standard of this accommodation to be agreed between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland.

(g) The responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the Radio Range at the Newfoundland Airport shall be the subject of separate negotiations between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland.

(h) In the event of an outbreak of hostilities involving Canada and Newfoundland the Government of Newfoundland, at the request of the Government of Canada, shall transfer control and operation of the Newfoundland Airport to the Government of Canada for the duration of hostilities. Provided that during the control and operation of the Airport by the Government of Canada no part of the Airport shall be handed over to the control of a third party without the prior consent of the Government of Newfoundland, and that the Government of Canada shall maintain in repair, except in respect of damage occasioned by enemy action, the buildings owned by the Government of Newfoundland at the date of transfer and shall return possession thereof to the Government of Newfoundland on the cessation of hostilities.

### ARTICLE 3

The Government of Canada forgoes its rights with respect to leases at the seaplane bases at Botwood and Gleneagles under the provisions of Article VII of the said Air Bases Agreement of April 17, 1941.

### ARTICLE 4

(a) Title in fee simple to the lands of Torbay Airport and its subsidiary installations shall be vested in the Government of Canada in accordance with the understanding between the Governments of Canada and Newfoundland at the time of the construction of the Airport.

(b) Torbay Airport may be operated as a commercial airport by the Government of Canada for the air service between Newfoundland and Canada, in accordance with such laws and regulations in force from time to time in Newfoundland as may be applicable to civil aviation.

(c) Torbay Airport shall be available to Newfoundland civil and military aircraft on terms not less favourable than those applicable to Canadian civil and military aircraft.

(d) Torbay Airport shall be available for emergency landing by any civil or military aircraft.

(e) Any landing fees imposed on civil aircraft using Torbay Airport shall enure to the Government of Canada, provided that any revenue from landing

fees or other charges in excess of the costs of operating the Airport for civil purposes shall be paid to the Government of Newfoundland.

(f) The Government of Canada may construct and maintain at Torbay Airport such installations for defence purposes and may maintain there such military equipment and supplies as it deems advisable.

(g) The Government of Canada may use Torbay Airport for military training and requirements including the stationing there of military aircraft and personnel for such purposes.

(h) In order to avoid doubt it is hereby declared that the laws of Newfoundland shall be applicable throughout Torbay Airport and to all persons therein, and duly authorized officials of the Government of Newfoundland shall have access at all reasonable times to the Airport in the course of the carrying out of their duties.

(i) The Government of Canada shall provide suitable accommodation for the Customs, Immigration and Posts and Telegraphs services of the Government of Newfoundland at Torbay Airport.

(j) The Government of Canada shall as far as practicable employ Newfoundland labour at Torbay Airport.

(k) The Government of Newfoundland shall enact Aerodrome Zoning Regulations to ensure the safety of aircraft using Torbay Airport.

## ARTICLE 5

(a) The Governments of Canada and Newfoundland, and as necessary the Government of the United Kingdom, will consult with one another from time to time as occasion may require with a view to co-ordinating defence requirements in Newfoundland. The Government of Canada may establish and operate in Newfoundland such facilities and installations as, at any such consultation, may be agreed to be necessary.

(b) Canadian and United Kingdom military aircraft may fly over Newfoundland and use airports therein under Newfoundland or Canadian control, as required, without payment of landing fees but subject to the payment of current charges for fuel, repairs, accommodation and other services. Notification shall, however, be given in advance to the appropriate air traffic control and airport authorities.

(c) The Government of Canada may in consultation with the Government of Newfoundland carry out air photography and make topographic and hydrographic surveys in Newfoundland. Copies of maps, charts and other data resulting therefrom shall be available to the Government of Newfoundland.

## ARTICLE 6

This Agreement shall enter into force as from the 31st day of March, 1946, and shall remain in force for a period of three years, and thereafter

shall continue in force subject to revision by mutual agreement or to termination after twelve months' notice by any one of the contracting Governments.

In Witness Whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Signed on behalf of the  
Government of Canada:  
J. S. MACDONALD

Signed on behalf of the  
Government of Newfoundland:  
J. S. NEILL

Signed on behalf of the  
Government of the United Kingdom:  
ADDISON

APPENDICE I/APPENDIX I

CTS 1946 No. 34

*Accord entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve relatif aux transports aériens  
entre le Canada et Terre-Neuve*

*Agreement between Canada and Newfoundland on Air Transport  
between Canada and Newfoundland*

St. John's, July 29, 1946

The Governments of Canada and Newfoundland agree:

*Article I*

That an airline designated by the Government of Canada shall have the right to pick up and set down in Newfoundland, traffic carried between Canada and Newfoundland, and any other traffic which the Government of Newfoundland may from time to time indicate.

*Article II*

That the Government of Newfoundland shall grant permits for the duration of this Agreement, to the designated Canadian airline for the operation of a regional service between Canada and Newfoundland and for the operation over Newfoundland territory of a trans-Atlantic service.

*Article III*

For the purpose of this Agreement Trans-Canada Air Lines shall be deemed the airline designated by the Government of Canada.

*Article IV*

That the two Governments shall consult in respect of any further arrangements or agreements affecting the carriage of traffic by air on regional services between Newfoundland and North America.

*Article V*

The service provided by the designated Canadian airline on the regional operation between Newfoundland and Canada and the rates and regulations for the carriage of traffic thereon shall be comparable to those offered by Trans-Canada Air Lines in Canada; any fees which the Government of Newfoundland charges the designated Canadian airline for the use of bases and facilities in connection with the operation of this service shall be comparable to those charged Trans-Canada Air Lines in Canada.

*Article VI*

The conditions covering the carriage of mail by air to and from Newfoundland by the designated Canadian airline shall be agreed by the postal authorities of Canada and Newfoundland from time to time.



*Article VII*

The operation of the designated Canadian airline shall be conducted in accordance with the air customs and immigration regulations prevailing from time to time in Newfoundland and Canada.

*Article VIII*

The Government of Newfoundland shall exempt from customs duties and taxes all aircraft, engines, parts and accessories, radio, motor tank trucks, material for original construction and equipment of hangars and buildings at the aerodromes, and all other equipment necessary for the operation of its services which may be imported by the designated Canadian airline or by the Government of Canada, provided that this exemption from duties shall not apply to vehicles or equipment of any class used on public highroads other than motor tank trucks, nor to other articles or materials not specified above, e.g. office supplies and equipment, consumable stores, wearing apparel of all kinds, foodstuffs imported by or for the Company or to be used in any hostel or by its employees or passengers.

*Article IX*

The Government of Newfoundland shall permit the entry, free of duty and taxes, of special aviation fuel and petroleum products necessary for the operation of the aircraft on the services.

*Article X*

The Canadian Government shall have the right to operate an airfield in Newfoundland at Goose Bay and the airline services referred to in *Article II* may use this airfield and the airfield at Gander as regular or alternate points of call, it being understood that the terminal of the local service to Newfoundland shall be Torbay, unless otherwise agreed.

*Article XI*

At the airfield at Goose Bay the Government of Canada may construct buildings required for the administration of the airfield and the accommodation of personnel and traffic and may grant concessions for the operation of these buildings. In the granting of concessions and in the employment of labour at the field the Government of Canada shall, wherever possible, give priority to citizens of Newfoundland.

*Article XII*

In the event that the Government of Canada desires to use the airfield at Buchans for regional services, the Government of Canada may take the necessary steps to provide the accommodation and facilities necessary for the administration of the airfield, for personnel and traffic, and for the operation of such buildings as may be required. In the granting of concessions and in the employment of labour at the field the Government of Canada shall, wherever possible, give priority to citizens of Newfoundland.

*Article XIII*

Civil aircraft of Newfoundland shall have the right to use the airfield at Buchans on terms no less favourable than those applying to Canadian civil aircraft.

*Article XIV*

Any landing fees collected at Goose Bay and Buchans shall inure to the Government of Canada. Any profits arising out of the operation of these airfields shall be paid to the Government of Newfoundland.

*Article XV*

At any other air bases in Newfoundland which may be made available for commercial traffic, the Government of Canada shall be granted most favoured nation treatment.

*Article XVI*

The airfields at Goose Bay, Torbay and Buchans shall be made available as alternate bad weather airports for the air services of other nations on trans-Atlantic operations. The airfield at Torbay may also be designated by the Government of Newfoundland as a terminal for regional air services originating in North America. Additional commercial use over and above these designations may be determined by the two Governments from time to time.

*Article XVII*

This Agreement and all contracts connected therewith shall be registered with the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization set up under the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation done at Chicago on December 7, 1944.

*Article XVIII*

If either Government considers it desirable to modify any provision or provisions of this Agreement, such modification may be made by direct agreement between the competent air authorities of the contracting parties, confirmed by exchange of notes.

*Article XIX*

Any dispute between the two Governments relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be referred for decision to the Interim Council in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Section 6 (8), of the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation done at Chicago on December 7, 1944, unless the Governments agree to settle the dispute by referring to an arbitral tribunal appointed by agreement between them, or to some other person or body. The Governments undertake to comply with the decision given.

*Article XX*

When the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944, comes into operation in respect of both the two Governments, references in this Agreement to the Interim Agreement and the

Interim Council shall be interpreted as references to the Convention and the Council. In the event of the conclusion of any other multilateral convention concerning air transport to which both Governments adhere, this Agreement shall be modified to conform with the provisions of such convention.

*Article XXI*

This Agreement shall continue in force subject to amendment from time to time as may be agreed by the two Governments, and subject to cancellation on twelve months' notice by either party.

*Article XXII*

This Agreement shall come into force on the date of signature.

Done in St. John's, Newfoundland, in duplicate this 29th day of July, 1946.

For the Government of Canada:

J. S. MACDONALD

For the Government of Newfoundland:

J. S. NEILL





## LISTE DES ABRÉVIATIONS\*

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS\*

A/A .....	Antiaérien .....	Anti-aircraft .....
AA and QMG ..	Adjudant et quartier-maître général adjoint .....	Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General .....
A/AOC .....	Sous-commandant de l'aviation ....	Assistant Air Officer Commanding .....
A/C .....	Commodore de l'air .....	Air commodore .....
ACFC .....	Corps d'aviation du service transocéanique de l'armée américaine ....	Air Corps Ferrying Command of the United States Army .....
A/DNI .....	Directeur adjoint du service de renseignements navals .....	Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence .....
AM .....	Ministère de l'Air (Grande-Bretagne) .....	Air Ministry (Great Britain) .....
AMAS .....	Directeur du personnel militaire au Conseil de l'Air .....	Air Member for Air Staff ....
AOC .....	Commandant de l'aviation .....	Air Officer Commanding ....
AOC in C .....	Commandant en chef de l'aviation ..	Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief .....
A/S .....	Anti-sous-marin(e) .....	Anti-submarine .....
ASO .....	Directeur des services de l'état-major de l'Air .....	Air Staff Officer .....
ASW .....	Guerre anti-sous-marine .....	Anti-Submarine Warfare ....
A/T .....	Anti-torpille .....	Anti-Torpedo .....
ATC .....	Voir ACFC .....	See ACFC .....
ATFERO .....	Organisation transocéanique (Grande Bretagne) .....	Atlantic Ferry Organization (Great Britain) .....
AVM .....	Vice-maréchal de l'air .....	Air Vice-Marshal .....
BCATP .....	Plan d'entraînement aérien du Commonwealth britannique .....	British Commonwealth Air Training Plan .....
CA .....	Artillerie côtière .....	Coast Artillery .....
CAC .....	Corps blindé canadien .....	Canadian Armoured Corps ..
CARC .....	Corps d'aviation royal canadien ....	Royal Canadian Air Force ..
CAS .....	Chef de l'état-major de l'Air .....	Chief of Air Staff .....
CASL .....	Projecteurs de la défense côtière ....	Coastal Artillery Search-lights .....

\*Cette liste inclut seulement les abréviations les plus fréquemment utilisées dans ce volume.

\*This list includes only the abbreviations which occur most frequently in this volume.

CB .....	Contre-batterie .....	Counter Battery .....
CD .....	Défense côtière .....	Coast Defence .....
CGS .....	Chef d'état-major général .....	Chief of the General Staff ..
C in C .....	Commandant en chef .....	Commander-in-Chief .....
CLB .....	.....	Church Lads' Brigade .....
CNS .....	Chef de l'état-major naval .....	Chief of the Naval Staff .....
CO .....	Commandant .....	Commanding Officer .....
COS .....	Chefs d'état-major .....	Chiefs of Staff .....
COSC .....	Comité des chefs d'état-major .....	Chiefs of Staff Committee ..
CPCAD .....	Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense .....	Permanent Joint Board on Defence .....
CWAC .....	Corps féminin de l'armée canadienne .....	Canadian Women's Army Corps .....
CWC .....	Comité de guerre du Cabinet .....	Cabinet War Committee .....
DBS .....	Bureau fédéral de la Statistique .....	Dominion Bureau of Statistics .....
DCA .....	Défense aérienne du territoire .....	Territorial Antiaircraft Defence .....
D/CAS .....	Chef adjoint de l'état-major de l'air .....	Deputy Chief of Air Staff ..
DCGS .....	Chef adjoint d'état-major général ..	Deputy Chief of the General Staff .....
D/F .....	Radiogoniométrie .....	Direction Finding .....
DMO and I .....	Directeur des opérations militaires et des renseignements .....	Director of Military Operations and Intelligence .....
DNI and P .....	Directeur du service de renseignements navals et des plans .....	Director of Naval Intelligence and Plans .....
DO .....	Bureau des Dominions .....	Dominions Office .....
DOC .....	Commandant de district .....	District Officer Commanding .....
EAC .....	Région aérienne de l'Est .....	Eastern Air Command .....
FONF .....	Officier supérieur, détachement de la MRC à Terre-Neuve .....	Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force .....
GOC .....	Officier général commandant .....	General Officer Commanding .....
GOC in C .....	Officier général commandant en chef .....	General Officer Commanding-in-Chief .....
GSO .....	Officier d'état-major général .....	General Staff Officer .....
HAA .....	DCA lourde .....	Heavy Anti-aircraft .....
HD .....	Service territorial .....	Home Defence .....
HQ .....	Quartier général .....	Headquarters .....
ICAO .....	Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale .....	International Civil Aviation Organization .....
JATP .....	Voir BCATP .....	See BCATP .....
JPC .....	Comité mixte de planification .....	Joint Planning Committee ..

JSC	Comité mixte	Joint Service Committee
JSCS-C	Sous-comité mixte	Joint Service Sub-Committee
LAA	DCA légère	Light Anti-aircraft
L/T	Ligne télégraphique	Line telegraphy
MAP	Ministère de la Production d'avions (Grande-Bretagne)	Ministry of Aircraft Production (Great Britain)
MG	Mitrailleuse	Machine Gun
MGO	Maître général de l'artillerie	Master General of the Ordnance
MO	Médecin militaire	Medical Officer
MR	Marine royale (Grande-Bretagne)	Royal Navy (Great Britain)
MRC	Marine royale canadienne	Royal Canadian Navy
M/S	Dragueur de mines	Mine Sweeper
NCO	Sous-officier	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDHQ	Quartier général de la Défense nationale	National Defence Headquarters
NOIC	Premier officier de marine	Naval Officer-in-Charge
NSHQ	Quartier général de la Marine	Naval Services Headquarters
OC	Commandant	Officer Commanding
OR	Gradés et hommes de troupes	Other Rank(s)
OPA	Bureau de contrôle des prix (États-Unis)	Office of Price Administration (United States)
PC	Décret du Conseil	Order in Council
PICAO	Organisation provisoire de l'aviation civile internationale	Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization
PJBD	Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
POL	Essence, huile et lubrifiants	Petrol, oil and lubricants
PWSS	Station de transmission de port de guerre	Port War Signal Station
RAF		Royal Air Force
RCAF	Corps d'aviation royal canadien	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCN	Marine royale canadienne	Royal Canadian Navy
RCNR	Réserve de la Marine royale canadienne	Royal Canadian Navy Reserve
RCNVR	Réserve volontaire de la Marine royale canadienne	Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve
RDF	Radiogoniométrie	Radio Direction Finding
RN	Marine royale	Royal Navy
RNVR	Réserve volontaire de la Marine royale (Grande-Bretagne)	Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (Great Britain)
R/T	Radiotéléphonie	Radio Telephony
SAO	Officier supérieur d'aviation	Senior Air Officer

SL .....	Projecteur .....	Searchlight .....
S/L .....	Chef d'escadrille .....	Squadron-Leader .....
SNO .....	Premier officier de marine .....	Senior Naval Officer .....
SOO .....	Officier supérieur des magasins militaires .....	Senior Ordnance Officer ....
TCA .....		Trans-Canada Air Lines ....
T/T .....	Téléphone et télégraphe .....	Telephone and Telegraph ....
UNRRA .....	Office des Nations Unies pour le secours et la reconstruction .....	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency .....
V/CAS .....	Sous-chef de l'état-major de l'Air ..	Vice-Chief of Air Staff .....
V/CGS .....	Sous-chef d'état-major général .....	Vice-Chief of the General Staff .....
V/CNS .....	Sous-chef de l'état-major naval .....	Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff .....
WD .....	Voir CWAC .....	See CWAC .....
W/T .....	Télégraphie sans fil .....	Wireless Telegraphy .....



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